Progress with the African Standby Force Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan

ISS Paper 98 • May 2005 Price: R10.00

INTRODUCTION1 Republic (CAR), the , the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and ), Having failed to reach agreement on the structure as well as the - border dispute and of an inter-African force for the military aspects of conflict.2 In the field of peacekeeping, the mechanism conflict management, the Organisation for African endowed the OAU with the capacity, though limited, Unity (OAU) occasionally undertook or endorsed to mount observer missions and small operations in less complex ceasefire monitoring missions such as five countries, namely Rwanda (NMOG l and NMOG the Bamako Ceasefire Commission (1963). The Pan- ll); (OMIB); the Comoros (OMIC l, ll and African peacekeeping force that operated in Shaba lll); DRC (JMC); and Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE). The Province of Congo (Kinshasa) in 1978–79 was the budgets for these very limited operations ranged from first OAU peace support undertaking; followed by US$105,000 to around US$3 million. the Chadian operation (1979–82), which was also the only OAU peacekeeping venture of a The rather unsatisfactory record of the complex nature during this period. ad hoc mechanisms for intervention called for a reappraisal in subsequent In the immediate aftermath of the fall of It took several years. On the one hand, the UN Security the Berlin Wall, the OAU re-examined its Council’s early commitment to ran security and peace agenda. It recognised years and a new into problems in Somalia in 1993; and the prevalence of destabilising conflicts Secretary General this factor contributed to its disgraceful that would seriously impede collective before the UN inaction during the genocide in Rwanda and individual efforts to realise the in 1994. After Somalia and Rwanda, the continent’s political and socioeconomic returned to UN showed less interest, responsibility objectives. The outcome of the peacekeeping in and commitment to resolving conflicts 1990 summit was the “Declaration in Africa than Asia, the Americas and of the Assembly of Heads of State Africa. Europe. It took several years and a and Government of the Organisation new Secretary General before the UN of African Unity on the Political and returned to peacekeeping in Africa. On Socio-Economic Situation in Africa the other hand, regional organisations and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the in west and southern Africa, led by countries such as World”, according to which leaders agreed to work , and , began to show together towards the peaceful and rapid resolution much greater willingness and capacity to launch of all conflicts on the continent. To this end, African peace operations when no action was forthcoming Heads of State adopted the Cairo Declaration of from the UN or the OAU. 1993 establishing the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which The OAU was formally transformed into the African marked the beginning of the organisation’s second- Union (AU) in Durban in 2002. Pursuant to Article generation peace and security agenda. 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the , the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council The OAU Mechanism was instrumental in enabling (PSC) was established as a collective security and the organisation, through the Central Organ, the early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and Secretary General and the Conflict Management efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Centre (CMC), to react more promptly and effectively Africa, replacing the OAU Mechanism.3 Within the to the numerous existing and new conflicts. It thus framework of Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, the facilitated the intervention of the OAU in a number AU Commission is mandated to establish an African of conflicts (, Burundi, the Central African Standby Force (ASF).4

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IISSSS - PPaperaper 998.indd8.indd 1 22005/06/01005/06/01 08:52:1408:52:14 The PSC Protocol provides for the conversion of the also requested that the chairperson of the Commission • a brigade (mission level) headquarter and support those involving low-level spoilers. ASF completed existing situation room at the Commission into a fully conclude memoranda of understanding between the AU unit of up to 65 personnel and 16 vehicles; deployment required within 90 days of an AU fledged Continental Early Warning System to “facilitate and the regions to guide relations between the various • a headquarter company and support unit of up to mandate resolution, with the military component the anticipation and prevention of conflicts”.5 It also bodies on peace and security. 120 personnel; being able to deploy in 30 days; provides for the creation of a , made • four light infantry battalions, each composed of up to • Scenario 6. AU intervention, for example in genocide up of African elder statesmen and women, to advise the Whereas the original concept had called for substantive 750 personnel and 70 vehicles; situations where the international community does council and the chairperson of the Commission and to progress by mid-2004, delays in the approval of the • an engineer unit of up to 505 personnel; not act promptly. Here it is envisaged that the AU undertake preventive action. Should prevention fail, or policy framework, which had first been submitted to • a light signals unit of up to 135 personnel; would have the capability to deploy a robust military an emergency develop, the protocol makes provision Heads of State in 2003, the absence of substantive follow- • a reconnaissance company (wheeled) of up to force in 14 days. for an African Standby Force that would be ready to up consultations and exchange of information between 150 personnel; undertake peacekeeping or intervention missions, while the AU and the regions/regional economic communities • a helicopter unit of up to 80 personnel, ten vehicles According to initial planning, the ASF would be a Military Staff Committee would advise and assist the (RECs), as well as the process of transformation within and four helicopters; established in two phases: council in this and other matters. The Peace Fund, the Commission of the African Union, impeded progress • a military police unit of up to 48 personnel and inherited from the OAU, is to be increased in size and at continental level. Regions such as ECOWAS and IGAD 17 vehicles; • Phase 1 (up to 30 June 2005): The AU’s objective used to “provide the necessary financial resources for proceeded with their own arrangements, some of which • a light multi-role logistical unit of up to 190 personnel would be to establish a PLANELM for the management peace support missions and other operational activities are not in accordance with the guidelines approved at and 40 vehicles; of Scenario 1–2 missions, while the five regions related to peace and security”.6 the continental level. Regions also developed other • a level II medical unit of up to 35 personnel and would establish regional standby forces up to brigade arrangements in the absence of substantive guidance. ten vehicles; size to achieve capabilities up to Scenario 4. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview • a military observer group of up to 120 officers; • Phase 2 (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010): It is envisaged of the progress that has been made towards the Key planning assumptions • a civilian support group consisting of logistical, that by 2010 the AU will have developed the capacity establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) at administrative and budget components. to manage complex peacekeeping operations, continental and regional levels.7 The text necessarily Whereas the concept presented to the OAU in 2003 while the five regions will continue to develop draws heavily on a number of official documents that proposed a single standby high readiness brigade The policy framework sets the following additional the capacity to deploy a mission headquarters have been produced in the wake of a (SHIRBRIG) type of arrangement at military, police and civilian standby list for Scenario 4, involving AU/regional series of recent planning meetings at continental level and the subsequent targets to be maintained centrally by peacekeeping forces. various levels across the continent. The final concept development of standby brigades at sub- the AU: The core functions regional level, the final concept adopted These dates have proven ambitious, and The first section provides a review of the adopted ... by Heads of State provided for five • 300–500 military observers (MilObs); of the PLANELMs while substantive progress has been made continental framework as it has evolved provided for five standby brigades, one in each of Africa’s • 240 civilian police (CivPol); and are planning, in three of the five regions will not to date and been adopted by the AU. five regions, supported by civilian police • an unspecified roster of civilian experts be met. Subsequent sections deal with progress standby brigades, (CivPol) and other capacities. In doing so, to fill the human rights, humanitarian, preparation and in three regions in Africa, namely the one in each of the concept for peacekeeping in Africa governance, demobilisation, disarma- training, including Planning elements and brigade Economic Community of West African Africa’s five regions, reverted to that agreed to by two earlier ment, repatriation and reconstruction the verification headquarters States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental meetings of African Chiefs of Defence structure. Authority on Development (IGAD) and supported by Staff in July 1996 and October 1997. of brigade To provide for multidimensional the Southern African Development civilian police and The AU has decided that the civilian headquarters and strategic-level management capability, Community (SADC). The conclusion When fully established, the ASF will roster of experts is not a Phase 1 priority the ASF policy framework requires the highlights the most salient challenges to other capacities. consist of standby multidisciplinary because UN humanitarian, development standby elements. establishment of a 15-person PLANELM be overcome if the ASF is to become contingents, with civilian and military and human rights elements, which do not at the level of the Commission of the a meaningful and effective conflict components located in their countries require a UN Security Council mandate, African Union and an initial nucleus management tool in the hands of the PSC. of origin and ready for rapid deployment anywhere could deploy in tandem with an ASF mission. of five officers within the PLANELM at each of the in Africa (or beyond) at appropriate notice. Effective regional headquarters to be responsible for pre- The Continental Policy Framework for the command and control of the ASF will therefore require The ASF structure is informed by the following six deployment management of the ASF and its regional African Standby Force (ASF)8 the installation of an appropriate Africa-wide, integrated missions and scenarios: standby brigades during Phase 1.12 and interoperable command, control, communication Following two meetings of African Chiefs of Defence and information system (C3IS) infrastructure, linking • Scenario 1. AU/regional military advice to a political The core functions of the PLANELMs are planning, Staff in (in May 2003 and January 2004), deployed units with mission headquarters, as well as mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an preparation and training, including the verification of as well as a meeting of African Ministers of Defence on the AU, planning elements (PLANELMs) and regions. To AU mandate resolution; brigade headquarters and standby elements. This is 20 January 2004, the policy framework of the ASF and elaborate on its strategic and operational requirements, • Scenario 2. AU/regional observer mission co- considered a full-time requirement, implying that the the military staff committee was approved by African the AU will host a technical workshop on C3IS in the latter deployed with a UN Mission. Deployment required PLANELMS should be staffed on a permanent basis, Heads of State in Addis Ababa in July 2004.9 The force is half of 2005. Similarly, the ASF will require an integrated within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution; while the brigade headquarters could be staffed on to consist of standby brigades in each of the five regions, logistics system that will enable interoperability, a • Scenario 3. Stand-alone AU/regional observer a part-time basis – although the planners recognised and to incorporate a police and civilian expert capacity common doctrine, uniform training standards, a single mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an that readiness levels of 30 days and less will require as well.10 integrated standby system and the like. All of these AU mandate resolution; full-time brigade headquarters. Where possible, the are to be ironed out in a series of high-level expert • Scenario 4. AU/regional peacekeeping force for regional PLANELMs should be co-located with the Heads of State also approved a proposal by the Ministers workshops during the remainder of 2005. Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and regional brigade headquarters for ease of command, of Defence and Security to establish a specialised peace-building). Deployment required within 30 control and communications. This is not the case technical committee comprising Ministers responsible for As stipulated in the policy framework, the standby days of an AU mandate resolution; everywhere, as we will note with the Eastern African Defence and Security of the AU to work with the PSC to brigades in each of the five regions will, as a guideline, • Scenario 5. AU peacekeeping force for complex Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), and inevitably depends follow up on the establishment of the ASF.11 The summit be composed of: multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including on the nature of the standby brigade headquarters.

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IISSSS - PPaperaper 998.indd8.indd 2-32-3 22005/06/01005/06/01 008:52:358:52:35 To establish the AU headquarters PLANELM, the AU • The nucleus of the brigade headquarters will verify • Readiness to deploy within 14 days will require • The AU will organise workshops to develop a set of Commission has requested the secondment of five and report on the operational readiness of the regular joint field exercises with all units, a standing standardised SOPs based on its draft generic SOPs, experienced officers from African member states brigade for Phase 1 requirements, in conjunction fully staffed brigade headquarters and support. It as well as those existing within the regions. for an initial period of one year from 1 July 2005 to with the regional PLANELMs, to the AU PLANELM will also require an established and fully stocked • The AU will facilitate doctrinal coherence and 30 June 2006 to be located in Addis Ababa and to before 30 June 2006. logistics system capable of sustaining the entire dissemination of lessons learnt. constitute the AU PLANELM for Phase 1. They will • The AU and regions will negotiate with donors for brigade. Such timelines could probably only be • The AU and regional PLANELMs will harmonise ASF work under the PLANELM chief of staff. support to cover the costs of the establishment of met by AU member states with relatively well- training cycles with UN and external initiatives, as brigade headquarters and regional PLANELMs. endowed military establishments. well as feed into these initiatives, to enhance and To achieve set targets for Phase 1 of the ASF, the • At 30 days readiness, collective training will at least synergise ASF capacities. AU PLANELM is expected to complete the following In the case of the military and police capabilities have to involve regular command post exercises. At • Regions are to adopt an appropriate training tasks before 30 June 2006: required for Phase 1, each category of ASF mission this level of readiness there is a clear requirement policy providing for cycles of national, component is to consist of observers, individuals and for at least a standing nucleus of a brigade regional and AU-wide training; this should • Convene a series of workshops with participation formed units, on standby in their countries of origin headquarters with its attendant support as well as be coordinated with major external by the regions and major donor partners, to ready to be deployed, using a system of on-call lists. an established and fully stocked logistics system initiatives. While ASF training is to be consistent with provide a costed continental logistic system, The AU PLANELMs will undertake the development of capable of sustaining the entire brigade. SHIRBRIG UN doctrine with a view to standardising doctrine, continental C3IS and continental training concept the ASF standby system. provides a good example of the structure. In its based on the standard generic training modules and the initiation of key recommendations in system, contingents deploy fully self-sustained (SGTM), ASF training beyond this level would this regard; It was thus also agreed that the following tasks would for 60 days. This might not be the case with be regionally coordinated and enhanced through • Develop standard tables of organisation and be completed before 31 October 2005: African contingents where the preference is for regional peacekeeping centres of excellence. equipment (TOE), in conjunction with regions; ASF-owned logistics bases in view of the lack of • Regions should streamline the establishment of • Develop and implement a continental standby • Member states should nominate the standby brigade national capacities. centres of excellence/use of existing national training system, and link it to the Standby headquarters staff, populate the standby database, • At 90 days readiness, there may be time to institutions within the various regions to optimise Arrangement System (UNSAS); and submit this data to the regions. conduct preparatory training to develop a level of their regional profile and use. • Initiate and coordinate the drafting • Member states should nominate coherence before deployment. There • Efforts of the PLANELMs should be of memoranda of understanding and standby units, including the is also time to form headquarters and deployed to develop all aspects of letters of exchange; completion of the standby database, logistics stocks. This does require a The policy the ASF training policy, including the • Draft standard operating procedures and forward this data to the regions. small full-time staff to manage the framework also development of ASF SOPs, tables of The deployment (SOPs) for the ASF; • Member states should nominate standby system, and to standardise proposed a system equipment and other manuals. • Elaborate/draft doctrine for the ASF; timelines outlined and populate the CivPol standby procedures and doctrine. • The AU should seek appropriate advice of AU military • Elaborate/develop standardised by the AU are database, and forward it to for the production of doctrine for robust training modules, as well as the regions. To be able to deploy within the timelines logistical depots, [humanitarian] intervention missions. command post exercises (CPX). ambitious by any • Member states should nominate for the various conflict scenarios, the • Where necessary, the UN consisting of the AU standard, and this and populate the MilObs standby ASF will need mission-ready units and Department of Peace Keeping The ASF concept requires the database, and forward it to headquarters, with equipment, including Military Logistical Operations (DPKO) would be has far-reaching establishment of a mission headquarter- the regions. vehicles and communications, ideally Depot in Addis requested to assist with training-the- level management capability in the form implications. • The regions will forward all databases held in centralised regional logistical trainer and pre-deployment training of a brigade headquarters within each collected from member states to bases or provided by donors under clear Ababa and regional for ASF brigades and units. region. During Phase 1 it was agreed the AU. terms of commitment. To launch the logistical bases. that a nucleus of three to five officers ASF elements into mission areas, these One of the vehicles through which African augmented by non-permanent brigade The routine selection, preparation pre-deployment arrangements would institutions can extend lessons learnt, and headquarters staff on standby should be formed in and training of the ASF components would be a have to be backed up by standing arrangements for share training experiences is the African Peace Support the regions. The AU noted that some regions may national responsibility. strategic sea- and airlift. Trainers’ Association (APSTA).13 The objectives of APSTA decide to combine their PLANELMs with this nucleus, read as follows (from its articles of association): while others may wish to base the standby brigade Logistics The policy framework also proposed a system of AU headquarters on an existing brigade headquarters in a military logistical depots (AMLD), consisting of the “The African Peace Support Trainer’s Association is member state. Other regions may decide in favour of The ASF policy framework provides that missions AU Military Logistical Depot in Addis Ababa and a voluntary association of individuals, centres, and a skeleton brigade headquarters based on an existing deployed for Scenarios 1–3 should be self-sustainable regional logistical bases, aiming at rapid deployment institutions working in Africa in peacekeeping capacity brigade in a member state. for up to 30 days, while Scenarios 4–6 missions and and mission sustainability. building, whose principal core activity or function operations should deploy with up to 90 days self- delivers practical training. Its objectives are: Against this background, it has been agreed that: sustainability. Thereafter the AU or UN must take Training and doctrine responsibility for the sustainment of the missions or, if • to facilitate the ability of peace support training • Each region would confirm the location, concept lacking that capacity, the readiness and ability of the A multifunctional peace operations capability for the ASF centres to dialogue with each other as a matter and staffing of the brigade headquarters and its AU to start reimbursing troop-contributing countries would require standardised doctrine and a clear concept of routine; relation to the regional PLANELMs by 1 July 2005, (TCCs) so that these countries can continue to sustain of operations that is consistent with UN missions. The • to facilitate meetings and the exchange of and communicate its decisions to the AU. their contingents. UN Multifunctional Peacekeeping Handbook provides information and best practices; • The regions will constitute a nucleus brigade valuable guidelines and may be complemented by • to facilitate efforts to harmonise the doctrine, headquarters capacity under a chief of staff of The deployment timelines outlined by the AU are documented African experiences and lessons. Agreement training, etc, of the various members; the rank of brigadier-general by 31 December ambitious by any standard, and this has far-reaching has been reached that the following actions must be • to serve as a depository that offers advisory 2005 and provide appropriate office space and implications. For example, in 2004 the Chiefs of taken in order to develop and implement an effective services to the AU (the Commission and the PSC) associated facilities. Defence Staff noted that: ASF training plan: on peace support operations issues;

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IISSSS - PPaperaper 998.indd8.indd 4-54-5 22005/06/01005/06/01 008:52:368:52:36 • to act as a sounding board for the AU Commission training, planning and conduct of command post 1999, provides the foundation and legal basis for • The ECOWAS Main Brigade will comprise 5,000 on peace support operations concerning donor exercises as well as allocation of vacancies to ASF this capability. soldiers within pre-determined units and upon relations.” staff for external training; order be prepared to deploy within 90 days and • endowment of the Peace Fund/accessible financial Implementation of the ECOWAS Mechanism has be fully self-sustaining for 90 days. The Peace Support Training Centre was the support to support short-term ASF deployments been delayed by the need for emergency responses to original chair of the Association, a role that has now and sustainment contingencies, as and when ongoing armed conflicts in and Côte d’Ivoire The ESF is to consist of 6,500 troops,17 pledged by rotated to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping necessary, pending deployment of a UN force. and, more recently, to the political crisis in . The contributing nations, and coordinated through the Training Centre (KAIPTC). missions in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia have highlighted Mission Planning and Management Cell (MPMC). The The establishment of the PLANELMs by the AU and an emerging trend towards ‘hybrid operations’ in idea is for the Task Force to have the capacity to deploy Funding the regions is fundamental to the realisation of all the Africa. As in , Rwanda and Burundi, rapidly to meet initial contingency requirements. If remaining priorities and the execution of the key steps there was an initial regional emergency response, the military effort requires an expanded force, the Funding is important for the success of any mission. towards the operationalisation of the ASF. The AU, in followed by the deployment of a multi-functional UN main brigade will be deployed. It is agreed that before 31 October 2005 the AU/ collaboration with the regions, will carry out timely mission. ECOWAS now sees its role in peace support regions will: periodic review of the implementation of the ASF operations as an interim one, and expects to hand It is assumed that all forces committed to the ESF Roadmap – the base document upon which much of over the lead to the UN not more than six months will meet the criteria and standards18 set out in • assess the detailed cost of the structures of the the preceding sections have been based. after launching an operation. While this principle an ECOWAS memorandum of understanding. A ASF, including pre-deployment activities such as is espoused in the ASF Policy Framework, it has further planning assumption is that the ESF Task training, and the activities of the PLANELMs and ECOWAS in West Africa understandably influenced the ECOWAS approach to Force will have the capability to deploy for up to 90 regional brigade groups; the development of standby forces. days; after which one of the following options will • assess the cost of the types of ASF mission, based The Economic Community of West African States be implemented: on the relevant levels of forces, including mandate, (ECOWAS) has been more frequently involved in The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) with an average mission timeframe of between peace operations than any other regional organisation • The Task Force elements will return to the troop- one and two years, a period which is long enough in Africa, having authorised six missions since 1990. When working outside the UN framework, the contributing nations. for the follow-on deployment of The members of ECOWAS have also ECOWAS approach to peacekeeping • The Task Force will remain deployed a UN mission or operation, and been very active UN peacekeepers operations has been essentially as an element of the ESF Main more limited operations in support (, Nigeria and have each military, and few civilians have been Brigade. of peace processes of between six The ASF will participated in at least 25 UN missions). involved in mission planning and When working • The Task Force will become an months and one year only; require that the On the other hand, the UN has become implementation. In Article 28 of the outside the UN element of an AU or UN mission. • encourage AU member states to increasingly supportive of ECOWAS, Protocol on the Mechanism, ECOWAS • The Task Force will hand over to a contribute to the endowment of the AU’s traditional while there has been a sharp increase in member states have agreed to make framework, the UN or AU force. AU Peace Fund; collaboration with the demand for both UN and regional available to ECOWAS all military, ECOWAS approach • sustain negotiations with external peacekeepers in Africa. As of February police and civilian resources for the An operational framework for the ESF was partners (donors) for assistance. its bilateral and 2005, seven UN missions were deployed accomplishment of multifunctional to peacekeeping developed by the ECOWAS Secretariat multilateral partners in Africa, with a total authorised peace missions. The protocol operations has (specifically the Mission Planning Additionally, external partnerships be maintained and strength of 51,163,14 representing 76% also clearly defines the role of the been essentially and Management Cell, or MPMC19), will be developed further to provide of the global authorised total of UN Special Representative of the in conjunction with military advisors assistance towards the establishment, deepened. peacekeepers. A total of 7,136 West Executive Secretary (SRES) as head military. from donor nations, in late January/ stocking, maintenance, and strategic African police, military observers and of all ECOWAS missions. Despite this early February 2005. The operational airlift of equipment and vehicles for ASF military personnel were committed to acknowledgement of the primacy framework aims to specify all the pre-deployment training and missions. the three UN missions in West Africa, of civilian political leadership, the activity strands and benchmarks for the a further 1,192 were committed to DRC, and 1,156 post-protocol missions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire establishment of the ESF. The purpose of the document Collaboration and cooperation more to other UN missions. While West Africa were essentially military operations.15 is to assist ECOWAS in the sequencing and coordination provides nearly 15% of the world's peacekeepers, of activities, while providing a coordination tool for The ASF will require that the AU’s traditional the three West African missions require 40% of the By April 2004, both ECOMIL and ECOMICI had donors to identify and target assistance to support collaboration with its bilateral and multilateral global total of UN peacekeepers. transitioned to UN operations and ECOWAS military the early and efficient establishment of the ESF. partners be maintained and deepened. For the AU, planners were able to concentrate on developing The operational framework document focuses almost the collaboration with the international community Extant West African capacities to mount and sustain a standby capability for peacekeeping operations. exclusively on the military component of the ESF but, will aim at the following broad priority areas: peace operations pale in comparison to this scale Guidance was provided by the Defence Staff according to the drafters, this “should not detract from of deployment, and the capacities of ECOWAS Commission in the form of an ECOWAS military the multi-functional nature of any PSO”. Moreover, • establishment of the pre-deployment structures of member states to provide more troops and police strategy,16 which states that: the document “is designed to evolve and be updated, the ASF, namely PLANELMs and regional brigade are severely stretched. Ghana alone (with armed so that its usefulness is sustained”. 20 headquarters, including the relevant activities and forces totalling under 10,000) needs to rotate around • The ECOWAS military component (ESF) will running costs of these structures; 7,000 troops annually for its existing commitments to comprise pre-determined regional standby In terms of force generation, it is envisaged that • establishment of African military logistics UN operations. formations that are highly trained, equipped and ECOWAS will define and certify the entry level depots, including the AU and regional military prepared to deploy as directed in response to a of capability for nations who pledge forces. The logistics depots and, in default, mechanisms for Nevertheless, ECOWAS has a firm desire to design, crisis or threat to peace and security. training, equipping and provision of logistic support the committal of donor-held equipment to ASF build, and maintain its own peace support operations • The ECOWAS Task Force will comprise 1,500 up to the entry level of baseline capability will be a missions, including strategic air- and sealifts; capability. The ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the soldiers within pre-determined units and upon national responsibility. Designated forces will receive • ASF training of regional brigade groups, including Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, order be prepared to deploy within 30 days and an additional level of training, equipment and logistic support to regional centres of excellence for Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, adopted in be self-sustaining for 90 days. support to enter a higher readiness pool. This pool will

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IISSSS - PPaperaper 998.indd8.indd 6-76-7 22005/06/01005/06/01 008:52:368:52:36 Figure 1: ESF Readiness Model assistance. It is unlikely to be met for more The Task Force working group, once established, demanding missions.25 needs to pursue this requirement and report to Operational readiness the Defence Staff Commission on other key issues The current version of the ESF operational framework such as core Task Force headquarter location and Tier 3 TF 2-90 days dependant on Operational Specific / ECOWAS focuses on the deployable elements of the ESF, infrastructure, training and logistic requirements. Operational Specific tasks and readiness state Pre-deployment Traning responsibility Capability particularly the Task Force. Further iterations of the • Force generation: Further to the pledges made at the operational framework document will examine in 10th Defence Staff Commission in 2004, ECOWAS Formal decision more detail the requirements for the main brigade.26 needs to assess both the operational capability and ECOWAS Tier 2 Pool A great deal of work must be done on defining and the shortfall in the agreed ESF force structure of National 3000 Troops responsibility meeting the training and logistic requirements of 6,500. The secretariat should conduct early force the ESF. The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping generation visits to all the ‘pledging’ nations to identify Entry Level ECOWAS certify Tier 1 Pool Training Centre (KAIPTC) is conducting a training specific pledged units, assess their operational (UN Standards) (Baseline Capability) needs analysis for the ESF. The process involves the capability, and allocate Task Force and main Complete ECOWAS Forces National development of an operational task statement, the brigade roles as appropriate. The secretariat should Mil Troops and CivPol responsibility specification of training objectives for each task, and conduct further discussions with pledging nations Note: The Entry Level is the lowest requirement for pledged troops. Some member nations are likely to exceed this with their ultimately a training policy that addresses individual, to fill any shortfall in the proposed ESF structure. Tier 1 forces. Tier 2 levels should be subject to amendment due to the resource, training and budget implications. collective and multinational annual training needs for • Concept development: An ESF concept of all the elements of the ESF. It is currently envisaged that operations, peacekeeping operations doctrine, need to be broad enough to have flexibility in terms courses have done much to improve the overall the initial two phases of the project will be completed and standing operating procedures (SOPs) will of nation, language and capability. The resources for readiness level of the wider pool. For member in 2005 with the subsequent design and conduct of need to be produced for the ESF. The secretariat training, equipping and sustaining Tier 2 forces will be nation pledges from this pool to be acceptable to training and evaluation taking place in 2006/7.27 should approach donors for assistance with this provided by a mix of member nation and ECOWAS ECOWAS, they must be capable of achieving a requirement. Britain has already offered to support support, the nature of which will depend on the level baseline or an entry level of operational readiness. Next steps in West Africa the necessary doctrinal development. of donor contributions. The MPMC will produce a detailed breakdown • Training needs analysis : As mentioned of capabilities and specify the required levels of The Defence and Security Commission above, the secretariat has tasked Member states have so far pledged 6,200 troops readiness. Rotation to Tier 2 will be coordinated by (DSC) has been requested to consider the KAIPTC to conduct a Training for the ESF.21 These will be organised by ECOWAS the MPMC in consultation with member states. approving the next series of activities Needs Analysis with the assistance planners to form a battle group or battalion group • Tier 2 will consist of a pool of 3,000 ESF to be undertaken by the ECOWAS A great deal of of key donors. and a logistics battalion22 for the Task Force. While soldiers, from which the Task Force of 1,500 Secretariat and supported by donors, work must be • Logistics : The secretariat needs to member states have pledged certain capabilities will be constituted and trained on an ‘in-case’ so that momentum is maintained. In approach key donors to request (such as an infantry company and/or an engineering basis, after strategic direction has been given. particular, Defence Staff Commission done on defining a joint review of the logistics squadron), specific units have not been named, so This approach provides the flexibility required to endorsement is sought for the following and meeting the requirement to support both the Task the pool of potential units that may one day deploy produce a mission-specific Task Force within the key actions: training and logistic Force and the whole ESF. ECOWAS as part of the ESF is large. To focus limited resources likely constraints of national will. The option of a has already indicated its intention of for training, equipping and sustaining the ESF, the readiness cycle based on a predefined Task Force • Appointment of a Task Force chief requirements of basing logistics support at two depot next step is for nations and the secretariat to identify was analysed, but was rejected because of practical of staff: The immediate appointment the ESF. locations, one on the coast and one and name specific units to be placed ‘in role’ and and political considerations.24 However, units that of a chief of staff with the rank of in the central interior of the region. raised to high readiness. The secretariat will need to join the Tier 2 pool should be named units that brigadier-general or colonel, and the • Communications and information visit nations to identify these units, and the respective are formed at company level or above, and kept establishment of a small but effective technology (J6): The secretariat chiefs of defence staff will need to have an assessment ‘in role’. This is to ensure that the Task Force is working group of three to four senior needs to initiate J6 staffing for the made of their pledged units’ operational readiness, interoperable and sustainable at least at company staff officers is considered essential for the early ESF communications and information technology their training and resource requirements. These units level. As a guideline, rotation of units from Tier 1 establishment of a core Task Force headquarter. requirements. Donor assistance should be sought will then be allocated roles and must be able to meet to Tier 2 should be for a minimum period of two The secretariat needs to approach the Chiefs of for expert advice and resourcing as required by the operational tasks within their given notice to move years to bring units up to standard. Funding by Defence Staff for a short list of suitable candidates the secretariat. (NTM). The force generation process is based on a donors will be a major limitation to the level that can be presented to the executive secretary • Analysis of policing functions: The secretariat tiered system as depicted in figure 1.23 of capability and readiness that the Task Force for decision. Donors have already indicated their should approach donors to request assistance with can attain. Tier 2 units will be under the direct willingness to support this appointment and the the initial analysis of the ESF policing requirements, Within the Tier 2 pool 3,000 troops will be ready on liaison authority of the ESF, but will remain under proposed working group. which will identify further detailed work needed 30 days NTM. The remaining 3,500 troops will be operational command of member nations as they • Establishment of core Task Force headquarter: to establish this component of ESF capability. A within the Tier 1 pool on 90 days NTM, once they will inevitably be engaged with national tasks Another urgent priority is the creation of a civilian police focal point within the secretariat have achieved the entry level of certification. Within while held in readiness for ESF deployment. permanently established core Task Force will be needed and consideration should be given the ESF there will be a spectrum of capability and • Tier 3: The protocol states that the Task Force must headquarter, which can conduct contingency to appointing a principal project officer in the operational readiness, which may be summarised be able to commence its mission within 30 days. planning, focus on force generation, and assist near future. as follows: Hence a permanent core Task Force headquarter the MPMC with the mission planning process. It will be established within Tier 3. Operational is envisaged that this core Task Force headquarter The operational framework document was presented • Tier 1 represents the baseline capability of capability will be achieved after the Task Force will comprise about 11 military officers, one at the 12th DSC meeting in Niamey on 21 April member states within ECOWAS and incorporates has assembled for a specific mission, and it senior police officer and ten other ranks (possibly 2005, and approved by the Chiefs of Defence Staff. the military forces of member nations and other will be based on the operational requirements from the host nation). It would be quickly However, major factors regarding the availability of elements such as CivPol. Regional training exercises of that mission. The 30-day timeline is perhaps expanded to produce a full-sized Task Force appropriately trained and equipped personnel for such as RECAMP and other training initiatives and achievable for missions such as humanitarian headquarter ready to deploy within 30 days. the ESF will be national capacity and political will.

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IISSSS - PPaperaper 998.indd8.indd 8-98-9 22005/06/01005/06/01 008:52:378:52:37 Improving the numbers and quality of resources for EASBRIG and IGAD in East Africa Figure 2 Schematic representation of EASBRIG command and control structure peacekeeping operations is most effectively achieved by supporting national capacity-building programmes. East Africa contributes to UN peacekeeping on a much PSC of the Assembly of HoS for EASBRIG Of course, these need to be tied to a regional approach smaller scale than West Africa, but the region currently African Union at operational level to prepare capacities to command, hosts two ongoing and expanding missions: the UN control and direct those national contributions to a Mission in [South] (with a mandated strength of mission, but this is possibly a lesser task. up to 10,000); and the AU Mission in Sudan [Darfur] Council of Ministers of Defence and Security (with a mandated strength of up to 6,171 staff and a Commission of the Financing remains a challenge for all regions, and request to increase this to 12,300 by the first half of African Union ECOWAS is no exception. According to Article 36 of 2006). At the time of writing the AU had approved the Protocol on the Mechanism, the Secretariat shall a mission in Somalia, to which and Sudan AU make provision in its annual budget for funds to finance will contribute troops. It is thus not inconceivable that PLANELM Committee of Chiefs of the activities of the mechanism (including PSO). A contributions to peacekeeping from this part of Africa Defence Staff percentage of the proposed community levy (0.5% are set to increase substantially in the foreseeable of each member state’s GDP) is to be earmarked for future. Currently Ethiopia is the largest contributor to such activities. Other potential sources of funding have UN peacekeeping with some 3,421 military and police been noted as the UN and other international agencies, staff deployed, followed by Kenya with 1,483. The only IGAD Secretariat Brigade HQ in Addis Ababa the AU, and voluntary contributions and grants from other contributors are and Uganda with 24 in Djibouti bilateral and multilateral sources. and 22 military/police staff respectively.30 Logistics base PLANELM in By comparative standards the ECOWAS Peace Fund is In contrast with West Africa, East Africa has a plethora in Addis Ababa quite healthy at the moment, thanks to a US$5 million of overlapping regional organisations including the special allocation for Liberia, which has not been used, Common Marke t for Ea st and S out hern Africa ( COME SA) because the UN took over the mission. and the East African Community. Although PLANELM in Nairobi. The decision to locate the provides for sealift capabilities and additional fire- However, no automatic percentage the AU defines East Africa as a region logistic base in Ethiopia has the benefit of potentially support capacity in Scenarios 5 and 6. has been levied on member states for composed of some 13 countries, it does co-locating with the AU logistic depot, but is possibly contribution to the fund, and assessments EASBRIG will not have an overarching and integrated not an optimal choice in terms of the regional The functions of the Committee of East African Chiefs are only made annually. To date, external be composed of conflict prevention, management and transport infrastructure or of benefiting from the of Defence Staff are to serve as an advisory military donors have not been forthcoming with mitigation framework similar to West region’s extended coastline. committee for the Council of Ministers of Defence and contributions to the Peace Fund. contributions from or Southern Africa. As a result, the Security and the assembly; and to oversee, direct and Djibouti, Ethiopia, AU mandated the Inter-Governmental The assembly serves as the ‘supreme authority’ for manage the PLANELM, EASBRIG headquarters and Greater financial visibility is needed. Authority on Development (IGAD), EASBRIG and authorises deployment for missions the logistics base. 38 ECOWAS has agreed that future missions Kenya, , on an interim basis, to coordinate mandated by the PSC.33 Unlike the ECOWAS should have one finance cell, which Rwanda, Uganda, the efforts of the region towards the military component (ESF), EASBRIG, in terms of its The head of the PLANELM also serves as the chief would include finance officers from Sudan, Eritrea and establishment of an East African Standby memorandum of understanding, can only deploy with of staff of EASBRIG and is located in Kenya.39 The ECOWAS as well as donor countries, to Brigade (EASBRIG).31 Whereas IGAD a mandate from the AU. On deployment, the brigade PLANELM will be composed of a regional military plan, coordinate, and manage financial . itself is composed of seven countries, will come under the operational control of the AU or and civilian staff on secondment from all EASBRIG matters associated with peace support the discussions on EASBRIG initially the UN, as applicable.34 member states, and is being equipped at its location operations.28 During pre- and post- included all 13 countries in the AU at Karen, outside Nairobi, close to the existing Peace peacekeeping periods this cell can, definition of the region, until the recent The Council of Ministers of Defence and Security Support Training Centre (KPSTC), with funding from among other duties, maintain a prioritised list of peace decision by and to contribute to the is to manage all aspects relating to EASBRIG, and Britain. The function of the PLANELM is to serve support operations-related personnel and materiel ASF as part of SADC. Since Somalia cannot currently only “appoint the commander of EASBRIG upon as multinational full-time planning headquarters for requirements for which funding is still being sought (an contribute, EASBRIG will be composed of contributions recommendation of the Committee of East African EASBRIG and it is empowered to enter into agreements unfinanced requirements list). This will be of great help from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS) for stand-alone with national and other training institutions. to partners seeking to assist ECOWAS. Additionally, the Uganda, Sudan, Eritrea and Seychelles – although the missions within the East Africa region”.35 Where the finance cell can be responsible for tracking the materiel latter two countries did not attend any of the associated AU mandates a deployment, the PSC will appoint the The function of the logistics base, which is located in and resources donated by partners to the ESF. Having preparatory meetings.32 brigade commander.36 Ethiopia (with proposed outposts in member states as a capable financial management team will significantly and when required), is to serve as the central regional expedite partner support. In the absence of a legal framework for conflict The EASBRIG Headquarters in Addis Ababa will serve base for maintenance, storage and management of the management, EASBRIG is to operate on the basis as a command headquarters for force preparation and logistical infrastructure of EASBRIG. It also coordinates It has also been recommended that member states of a memorandum of understanding that provides operational command. It is also responsible for the all activities involving logistics, “including but not should contribute to the ECOWAS Peace Fund without for an Assembly of Heads of State and Government provision of secretarial services to the Committee of limited to performing functions mandated by the further delay. All member countries, including Nigeria, for EASBRIG, a Council of Ministers of Defence and EACDS and is to be composed of seconded officers African Union and/or the United Nations managing are donor-dependent. In short, they are in no position Security, a Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff, a from all EASBRIG member states.37 external assistance”.40 to convene a donor conference on their own, or to standby brigade headquarters, a planning element and contribute substantially to a country-specific post- logistic base. In terms of capabilities, EASBRIG aims to optimise Through the EASBRIG fund, IGAD is able to collect conflict fund or the ECOWAS Peace Fund. However, its structure towards participation in traditional contributions from all member states assessed in the prospects of ECOWAS eliciting donor contributions EASBRIG has decided to separate the locations of peacekeeping tasks (that is, in accordance with accordance with the AU mode of contributions, and to the Peace Fund will increase dramatically once the PLANELM and the brigade headquarters, with Scenario 4 of the AU documents and Chapter VI of grants, donations and contributions from member member states are seen to be paying their dues. 29 the brigade headquarters in Addis Ababa and the the UN Charter), although the planning framework states and other sources. Funds may also be used for

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IISSSS - PPaperaper 998.indd8.indd 10-1110-11 22005/06/01005/06/01 008:52:378:52:37 general conflict prevention and conflict management a US$2,564 million budget to be contributed by Figure 3: SADC Strategic Management Structure for SADCBRIG apart from their use for peacekeeping.41 member states as funding for EASBRIG, as follows:

Hosting agreements for the brigade headquarters, • Brigade headquarters US$873,813 SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government PLANELM and logistics base have been drawn up for • Logistics base US$391,775 Summit Troika Organ Troika submission to the chiefs of defence staff of EASBRIG- • PLANELM US$860,684 contributing countries and until further notice IGAD will • Programme and coordination activities US$400,000 play its interim coordinating role, including the convening • Contingency US$37,894 42 of meetings of the council and the assembly. AU PLANELM The SADC Standby Force Brigade (SADCBRIG) Council of Ministers Plenary Ministerial Committee In February 2004 member states offered the following troop and equipment contributions to EASBRIG:43 Southern Africa (defined in terms of SADC membership) currently hosts the UN Mission in the Integrated Committee Inter-State Politics and Inter-State Defence and Diplomacy Committee Security Committee • Rwanda: two light infantry battalions with organic DRC (MONUC)46 with an approved annual budget of Ministers transport; one mechanised battalion (with ten to 30 June 2005 of US$746 million. South Africa is armoured personnel carriers, and four infantry the largest UN troop contributor from this region with State Security Defence Public Security Committee of Chiefs combat vehicles); one signal platoon; one provost 2,316 military and police staff deployed, followed by Standing Committee of Senior Officials Committee Committee Committee of Defence staff company; one engineer squadron/company; one (880), (193), (132), medical company; one special forces company; Zimbabwe (86), (55) and Madagascar (1). and public information and legal officers. Various Sub-committees • Sudan: one light infantry battalion, including South Africa, the current chair of the SADC Organ Standby PLANELM organic transport. on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, has Bde HQ • Kenya: one light infantry battalion, including organic prioritised the establishment of a regional early warning transport; one medical company; system, the SADC Standby Force Brigade and one squadron of engineers. (SADCBRIG) and support to the peace Chiefs of Defence Staff that was held in Mandela as president of South Africa and the launch of • Djibouti: one light infantry battalion process in the DRC for 2004/5. in October 1997. That meeting built on a similar his African renaissance project, premised on solidarity (consisting of three sub-units) with Preparations for meeting in Addis Ababa the previous year, and among African countries, set the region on a new organic transport composed of the establishment Following the various decisions by the in 2004 the Third Meeting of African Chiefs of course or regional collaboration and integration. 330–350 personnel consisting of a AU on the establishment of the ASF, Defence and Security took place, which kick-started support command company; two of a peacekeeping the SADC Inter-State Defence and current developments around the ASF. The Harare Like ECOWAS, SADC has an integrated economic infantry companies; and one de- brigade in SADC Security Committee (ISDSC) met in meeting made a host of substantive recommendations and security structure. The consolidation of these mining team Maseru, , in 2004 to consider towards the establishment of an African peacekeeping developments, however, is quite recent. Although • Uganda: one light infantry battalion, pre-date the the establishment of SADCBRIG. capacity. Shortly afterwards, in May 1998, a SADC SADC Heads of State agreed to the establishment of including organic support. current initiative Consequently, a Ministerial Defence military delegation visited Denmark (the Danish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co- towards the ASF by Sub-Committee was mandated by the Military and SHIRBRIG Headquarters) and Bosnia. operation on 28 June 1996 in , , In July 2004 the following additional IDSC to set up a technical team to Eventually, on 15 March 1999 the SADC Interstate the protocol was several years in the making before pledges were made:44 several years. plan the establishment. Recent meetings Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), consisting being signed by SADC leaders on 14 August 2001 of the technical team, composed of of Ministers of Defence and Security, approved a in Blantyre, Malawi. Beyond sometimes bruising • Ethiopia: one light infantry battalion military planners, took place in April and proposal on the way ahead for the establishment of regional divisions, the finalisation of the Organ and with organic transport; one company May 2005, including the establishment a multinational SADC standby peacekeeping brigade. its associated structures was delayed by the decision, of engineers; one de-mining company; one signals of an interim PLANELM at the SADC Secretariat Oriented towards Chapter VI missions, the then- in August 1999, to restructure all SADC institutions platoon; and one level ll medical unit. in Gaborone. Although the outcomes of these and SADC brigade was conceived as consisting of a (since SADC had previously been restricted to a • Madagascar: one light infantry battalion with a subsequent meetings are being treated with a high mobile headquarters, three infantry battalions, one developmental mandate) including the Organ. This medical component as from 2006. degree of confidentiality, the region is known to be reconnaissance company, an engineer squadron, process was completed in 2001.47 finalising the memorandum of understanding between a logistical support company, a military police East Africa is also committed to the use of centres of member states that will regulate the establishment company, a civilian police component, and an air The Protocol on the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence excellence for peacekeeping training, replicating the and maintenance of SADCBRIG. Member state troop and naval component. The brigade was to have been and Security Cooperation includes the following approach adopted in West Africa, with the capacity contributions have been pledged, and a proposed established over a period of five years. Unlike current specific objectives: to train the three levels of peace support operations: management and PLANELM structure completed, as thinking, which envisages a multinational standby tactical, operational and strategic. Thus Kenya and well as a structure for SADCBRIG. The planners aim brigade headquarters, the earlier concept called • To consider enforcement action in accordance Rwanda have offered the Peace Support Training to gain approval of their planning at the SADC Summit for a standing (ie full-time) multinational brigade with international law and as a matter of last resort Centre (KPSTC) at Karen and the Military Academy in August 2005. headquarters that could be established on a non- where peaceful means have failed; at Nyakinama as regional centres of excellence for all rotational or rotational basis. • To develop the peacekeeping capacity of national three levels. Uganda has offered its Senior Command Preparations for the establishment of a peacekeeping defence forces and co-ordinate the participation and Staff College at Jinja for the operational level brigade in SADC pre-date the current initiative towards Subsequent years saw two regional military operations of state parties in international and regional of training.45 the ASF by several years, as does the development of a into Lesotho (including troops from South Africa peacekeeping operations. regional peacekeeping training centre of excellence. and Botswana) and the DRC (including troops Different to West Africa, countries in the Horn appear from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) that initially At an extraordinary meeting in Blantyre, Malawi, to be making greater efforts at financial ownership. The original momentum for a regional peacekeeping appeared to accentuate rather than reduce regional in January 2001, the summit mandated the SADC Hence the EASBRIG Summit of April 2005 approved brigade came after the Second Meeting of African differences. In 1999 Thabo Mbeki succeeded Nelson Organ to prepare a strategic indicative plan for the

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IISSSS - PPaperaper 998.indd8.indd 12-1312-13 22005/06/01005/06/01 008:52:388:52:38 Organ (SIPO) that would provide guidelines for the • The SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government Figure 4 Schematic Structure of the Organ Component of the SADC Secretariat implementation of the protocol for its first five years. – the mandating authority for SADCBRIG. All The SIPO was eventually approved in August 2003 contributions to AU peace operations will be Executive Secretary and provides further details on the establishment of a subject to the approval of the SADC Summit on peacekeeping standby force. For example, as part of the recommendation of the country that chairs the the objectives of the political sector the Organ will: SADC Organ;51 • The chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence • “Develop peacekeeping capacity of national and Security Cooperation. This is currently South Deputy Executive Secretary defence forces and co-ordinate the participation Africa with Namibia next in line; of state parties in international and regional • The Ministerial Committee of Ministers for Foreign peacekeeping operations strategies/activities; Affairs, Defence, Public Security and State Security Department of Strategic Planning. • Co-ordinate the region’s involvement in (plenary) from all SADC countries that have signed Gender & Policy Harmonization international peace-keeping missions; and and ratified the Organ protocol.52 This committee • Mobilise resources and enhance regional capacity will manage all aspects relating to SADCBRIG. for peace support operations.”48 • The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee Various Directorates Directorate for Politics, Defence & Security (ISDSC) consisting of all Ministers of Defence, According to the SIPO, a key challenge under the Public Security and State Security.53 defence sector is “developing policies and capacities • A newly established SADC Committee of Chiefs of 54 Politics & Defence & to ensure that the region maintains trained units ready Defence Staff. REWC RPTC to be deployed in peace support operations in the • The SADCBRIG PLANELM located at the SADC Diplomacy Security region or under the auspices of the African Union Secretariat in Gaborone. Unlike EASBRIG, the or the United Nations”. One of its objectives is a SADC PLANELM will not be incorporated into Situation PLANELM commitment “[t]o develop peacekeeping capacity SADCBRIG during actual missions and will be Room of national defence forces and co- composed of regional military and ordinate the participation of State civilian staff on secondment from Parties in International and Regional The precise member states for two years. It will until a recent decision was made to reconfigure the The SADC standby system is based on the concept of Peacekeeping Operations [through the relationship manage the SADC standby system and centre. It now reports to the SADC Secretariat and a pool arrangement whereby total troops earmarked following] Strategies/activities: between assume responsibility for monitoring will be funded by contributions from member states, in the various potential TCCs for peacekeeping force preparation in troop-contributing although discussions with donors are continuing. The will provide sufficient capacity to ensure the full • Develop a regional peace support SADCBRIG, its countries (TCCs) up to the point that intention is also to resuscitate the concept of a SADC availability of a brigade at any time. The SADCBRIG operational capability based upon PLANELM and mission preparations commence. clearinghouse for peace support training activities at commander will then compose his/her force during the individual member state’s the RPTC. mission planning from the standby pool. In this standby arrangements. standby brigade The precise relationship between manner a deployment will not be held hostage by the • Consolidate and develop the activities headquarters SADCBRIG, its PLANELM and standby Like IGAD, SADCBRIG will be a true multinational decision by one or more TCCs not to contribute to a of the regional peacekeeping training and the SADC brigade headquarters and the SADC standby force, with contingents assigned for up to particular mission or inability to do so.56 centre. Secretariat is not yet clear. Within the six months for any in-country assignment. Even the • Finance the regional peacekeeping Secretariat is not SADC Secretariat, the newly established standby brigade headquarters will have a multinational All SADC member states have pledged contributions training centre (RPTC) according to yet clear. Department for Politics, Defence and structure and the commander and deputy/chief of staff to the SADCBRIG standby pool, with Angola also the capacities of member states or Security, headed by a chief director may not necessarily be from the same country. The earmarking contributions to the Economic Community through possible foreign partners. reporting directly to the executive downside of such an arrangement is that the region of Central African States (ECCAS) standby brigade, • Design and establish a regional peace support secretary, will be composed of three sub-divisions: will not be able to base the brigade on a reserve or given its dual membership of SADC and ECCAS. operational structure with appropriate means. active brigade structure in countries such as South • Promote the interoperability of military equipment • a Directorate for Politics and Diplomacy that will Africa, Angola or Zimbabwe. Other Regions to be used in peace support operations. work towards the Organ; • Train regional forces for peace support • a Directorate for Defence and Security; and SADCBRIG guidelines stipulate that the force or The situation in the North African region and the operations. • a strategic analysis unit, also responsible for the member states should support/sustain the force for planning for the creation of a standby force remain • Conduct joint multinational exercises."49 early warning situation room.55 the first three to six months and that the force should unknown to most African security analysts, as well be able to negotiate and conclude host-nation support as officials within the AU itself. The AMU (Arab The region has also committed itself to developing The SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre agreements and contracts with civilian authorities and Maghreb Union) should arguably be taking the lead, the peacekeeping capacity of national police services (RPTC) in Harare, Zimbabwe, will also fall under commercial companies for its initial requirements. but the organisation overlaps with the Community and promoting the joint training of civil police for this the department. Set up in October 1996, the RPTC The region has apparently not yet concluded its of Sahelian-Saharan states. Three of these states purpose as well as establishing a regional database of is adjacent to the Zimbabwe Staff College. It gained discussions on the location and composition of a would see their primary responsibility as contributing trained personnel. substantive support from the government of Denmark military logistic depot. towards the ECOWAS Standby Force. between 1997 and 2002. For a number of years the SADC expects that SADCBRIG or its components will RPTC nominally fell under the ISDSC, but was managed Earmarked units will remain in their countries of origin While some progress has been made towards the typically be deployed under a UN or AU mandate. by the Zimbabwean Ministry of Defence. In 2001 its on an on-call system and the region has adopted the establishment of the Central Africa Regional Standby Planning and preparations, however, do cater for staff became multinational with personnel seconded response times defined by the AU – although smaller Brigade, this has understandably been much slower deployment under the mandating authority of SADC from six SADC countries, but shortly afterwards contingents of multinational rapid reaction/early entry than in West Africa, the Horn and Southern Africa. itself. In this case the applicable strategic management the institution lost its support from Denmark and forces should be available on a much higher 14 days From July 2003 to December 2004, ECCAS held six structures will consist of:50 other partners, and effectively became moribund state of readiness. meetings at the levels of experts, chiefs of defence

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IISSSS - PPaperaper 998.indd8.indd 14-1514-15 22005/06/01005/06/01 008:52:388:52:38 staff and Ministers of the Peace and Security Council More recently61 two additional financing proposals • Non-UN support from organisations such as slow, to protect civilians and halt ethnic cleansing in of ECCAS (COPAX). At these meetings, the following were approved: a three-year agreement for an amount the EU for the AU or regional organisations. An the Darfur region. were adopted: of €6 million for capacity building of the Peace and example of this type of support is the Peace Security Department of the AU;62 and €80 million for Facility discussed earlier in this section. Importantly, the Sudanese government has not objected • the structure of regional headquarters of ECCAS Darfur (for the expanded mission, AMIS ll)63. • Bilateral arrangements between specific countries to the presence of troops from African countries, but PLANELM; and regional organisations such as a contribution rejects deployment of non-African troops. AMIS • the structure and tables of equipment for ECCAS Under the current arrangement, the EU could agree from the USA to the AU for AMIS ll. is therefore an essential part of the solution to the standby brigade (including strength of the brigade to the use of the Peace Facility for a peacekeeping • Funding by member states from that regional humanitarian crisis and the broader Sudanese peace of 2,177); operation by the AU or a regional organisation organisation, for example the deployment, during process. The AU therefore richly deserves credit • an action plan for the establishment of the ECCAS based on an indication of UN support – not Operation Artemis, of an EU battle group to Ituri in for taking the lead in efforts to restore security to PLANELM and ECCAS standby brigade; and necessarily through a resolution of the UN Security 2003. However, this is not viable for peacekeeping Darfur in the face of UNSC paralysis and inaction, • the exercise paper for the multinational training Council. This could for example take the form of a by the AU or regions in Africa for any but the most but these laudable efforts will inevitably cause ASF exercise known as ‘Exercise Bahl El Ghazel 2005’. statement by the UN Secretary General. For peace modest operation. establishment timelines to slip as the Commission enforcement, however, the EU requires a UNSC • Burden-sharing by individual countries. and the troop-contributing nations grapple with the Conclusion resolution if funds from the Peace Facility are to be Such arrangements could range from the US demands for more rapid deployment and expanded made available.64 provision of airlift to deploy Nigerian troops mission management. The AU, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC have made to Darfur, as happened recently, to the deployment significant progress towards establishing a viable In conjunction with generous assistance from of a coherent separate force to backstop a mission. A further complicating issue is that the ASF architecture regional peace support capability. However, the gap individual countries such as the USA, the Peace Recent examples include Britain (in Sierra Leone), dictates that it will be entirely dependant on the regions between aspiration and implementation remains Facility provides an important tool for meeting France (in Côte d’Ivoire) and South Africa during for force generation and operational capability. The extremely wide. Protocols and framework documents the operational costs of African peace missions as AMIB in Burundi.67 member states of these regions are already committed are in place, and institutional structures are being well as limited start-up funds for the ASF concept. • Various combinations of these, such as funding to providing troops and police to AMIS, as well as built, but operational capacity remains limited in the The problem is that it does not guarantee ongoing only one component of the peace mission from ongoing UN operations, and may also be contributing face of rising demands and expectations. support – hence the importance of assessed scales and the rest through to their own regional operations when Ultimately, Africa and its friends have to moving to a system based on assessed voluntary bilateral or multilateral co called upon to mobilise for future ASF be realistic about what can be achieved contributions and the integration of ntributions. The exit strategy operations. Moreover (as discussed in the short term by relatively young Ultimately, Africa peacekeeping in Africa with the UN for the AU remains earlier in this paper) the regions are organisations that lack institutional and its friends system. Even the EU Peace Facility is Beyond the critical issue of funding, a a UN operation developing their standby capacities at expertise and capacity and comprise inadequate to meet current demands number of other significant challenges different rates and with different levels some of the world’s poorest and least have to be realistic and at the existing rate of commitment lie ahead. since only the of linkage to the continental framework developed countries. Building effective about what can will shortly be exhausted – although UN can provide and standards. peacekeeping operations capacity in there are plans in the EU to provide A major impediment throughout the Africa will take time, and it does not offer be achieved in subsequent assistance under the process of establishing the ASF has a response to the Universal standards therefore need to a quick exit strategy from engagement in the short term by Stability Instrument as from 2007. been the need for the AU to launch types of complex be developed as a matter of urgency, Africa for the international community. relatively young and manage major peace missions emergency that taking into account that the ASF is likely Against this background there are in Sudan and Burundi – something to operate as a bridging force for UN This having been said, the single biggest organisations. probably seven options for meeting that has placed enormous demands characterise deployments rather than a replacement. impediment to peacekeeping in Africa by regional peacekeeping operational on the organisation’s still very limited conflict in Africa. In other words, the exit strategy for the Africans is funding – and there has been costs.65 mission planning and management AU remains a UN operation since only remarkable innovation and progress in capabilities. While the kind of donor the UN can provide a response to the this regard in recent years. • Funding regional operations as part of the assessed assistance outlined above has made a massive types of complex emergency that characterise conflict scale of peacekeeping contributions as proposed by difference, it cannot make up for the deficit in in Africa. This was true of Burundi and of recent At its annual summit in Maputo, the AU requested the two recent UN reports.66 By implication, missions African planning and mission management capacity ECOWAS experiences.68 EU to establish a peace facility “to fund peace support funded in this way would have to be mandated at headquarters level. Nor can it readily address and peacekeeping operations conducted under the by the UN Security Council. This arrangement the force generation challenges that are linked to Closing the capability gaps will require a hard- authority of the AU”. The facility should be “based would probably require the regional organisation limited national capacity in the individual AU troop- headed approach to the challenge, one that disregards on the principle of solidarity among African countries to present and defend the budget for a particular contributing countries. outcomes that result from mere wishful thinking, and should be financed from resources allocated mission to the UNSC working with and through particularly regarding mission support and sustainment, to each African State under existing co-operation the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations AMIS was originally deployed to monitor the April where the first need is for realistic joint assessment agreements with the EU”.57 The EU/ACP Council of (DPKO), and to establish oversight and financial 2004 ceasefire between the government and two between the UN, the AU, African regions and donors Ministers subsequently decided on 11 December accountability structures to the satisfaction of key rebel groups. As AMIS has documented since its to reach consensus on a viable approach to the future 2003 to allow €250 million58 to be earmarked for the UN contributors such as the . deployment, this ceasefire has been routinely violated of the ASF in its various guises and regarding logistics AU Peace Facility.59 • Voluntary contributions from international by all parties to the conflict. On 28 April 2005, the in particular. This will not be easy. organisations and/or bilaterally to a special trust chairperson of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar The first operation to be funded through the Peace fund. IGAD and SADC are both considering Konare, issued a report calling for an increase in For example, the soundness of present plans to establish Facility was the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) when the establishment of a regional peace fund. The AU forces in Darfur to 12,300 military, police and continental and regional logistic support bases is open the EDF Management Committee Meeting agreed establishment of a trust fund for the African civilian personnel by spring 2006. At the time of to challenge. Storing vehicles and equipment in harsh to provide €12 million for operations in Darfur, as Mission in Burundi (AMIB) set a precedent for such writing, AMIS had 2,372 troops deployed across a climates requires heavy investment in infrastructure against a total budget for the operation amounting to an arrangement, and in West Africa the ECOWAS region the size of France. This force is too small, and and climate control if stores are to be operational €21 million.60 Peace Fund has already been established. the projected rate of deployment of more troops too when needed. All of the investment falls on the users,

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IISSSS - PPaperaper 998.indd8.indd 16-1716-17 22005/06/01005/06/01 008:52:398:52:39 and maintenance is a challenge to in-house staff. On military. The Special Representative of the Executive March 2005, EXP/AU-Recs/ASF/4(I). Much of that is 20 ECOWAS Secretariat, ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) the other hand, most developed nations and many Secretary (SRES) in ECOWAS or his/her equivalent based on a non-paper submitted to the AU by the ISS Operational Framework, Draft Document, 10 April UN missions have moved to a much greater degree of elsewhere will have a limited role, possibly addressing in March 2004. 2005, par. 12 f. Hereafter ESF Framework. reliance on the commercial sector to provide logistic the start of a DDR process, and it is unlikely to extend 9 EX.CL/Dec. 156 (V) Decision on the African Standby 21 At the 10th DSC meeting. Troops are to be drawn from solutions for peace operations. The US company into significant post-conflict reconstruction activities. Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) all arms of service in order to create a balanced force. Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) has provided Similarly, the police component is most likely to DOC. EX.CL/110 (V), 5th Ordinary Session of the 22 The ECOWAS structure defines this as a ‘logistical substantial support to past ECOWAS operations, be configured for an advisory or limited and short- Executive Council, 30 June-3 July 2004 Addis Ababa, unit’, although it includes combat support elements and commercial logistics contracting merits serious term executive role, rather than for implementing Ethiopia. Assembly/AU/Dec. 35(III) Decision on the such as engineers and signals. consideration. It places much of the investment and comprehensive reform of the law enforcement sector African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff 23 ESF Framework, op cit, par 16. management load on the commercial sector rather within the wider context of rule of law, justice sector Committee (MSC) Doc. EX.CL/110 (V). 24 The Task Force order of battle (ORBAT) will only be than on overstretched regional organisations, and and security sector reforms. For the foreseeable 10 The erstwhile OAU recognised five main regions in confirmed once the mission type is known. avoids the need for the recruitment and training future, only the UN has the capacity to implement Africa, and prioritised one corresponding regional 25 ESF Framework, op cit, par 17. of a large number of additional staff. Strategic lift multifunctional mission mandates in Africa. economic community (REC) to advance the peace 26 Ibid, par 8. requirements can be met in the same way. The cost and security in each: The Inter-Governmental 27 The complexities of creating a training policy for of investing in a dedicated pool of heavy lift transport The biggest danger with any approach that seeks to Developmental Authority (IGAD) in the east; the deployable forces and associated staff of the aircraft and shipping, accompanied by the challenges simply devolve peacekeeping to African organisations the Economic Community of West African States ESF should not be underestimated. The force will be of maintaining them, is clearly disproportionate. The is that this will strengthen the ‘Band-Aid’ solution. An (ECOWAS) in the west; the composed of a number of national contingents that UN itself relies entirely on contracts not only for airlift, end to widespread armed conflict is a prerequisite (AMU) in the north; the Southern African Development are trained according to different national doctrinal but also for all non-combat aviation support to its for development – but it is no more than that. Community (SADC) in the south; and the Economic and performance standards. missions in Africa. Without an effort that replaces a conflict cycle with Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the 28 The absence of this capability markedly slowed one that reinforces peace and development, African Central African region. financial support from partners for the ECOMIL The aspiration of Africans to have control of key peacekeeping probably has less chance of success 11 Within the framework of Article 14.2 of the Constitutive mission. It was rectified only when financial technical enablers is understandable, and a commercial than UN peacekeeping and has great potential to Act of the AU. advisors from UN and EU peace support operations solution will inevitably depend on developed world approximate offensive military operations in the 12 The regional PLANELMs would also expand to 15 were dispatched to assist ECOWAS. companies. Nigeria has already proposed that the absence of sufficient resources. over time. 29 See Mark Malan, Report of the ECOWAS Workshop AU develop a policy that would prioritise African 13 Current members include the Kofi Annan International on Lessons from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations: companies in the provision of support to the AU.69 On Notes Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), the Zambakro 1990-2004, Accra, February 2005. www.kaiptc.org. the other hand, Africa lacks experience of commercial Peacekeeping Training School, the Cairo School 30 All figures for March 2005 are available at logistics on the scale and in the areas that are essential 1 Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African of Peacekeeping, the SADC Regional Peacekeeping www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/. for effective peace support operations. This needs Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee Training Centre, the Kenya Peace Support Training 31 The process to approve the EASBRIG structures and to be developed, and it will be essential for regional (MSC), Volume ll: Annexes, Annex C. Centre, the South African National War College, the framework was as follows: a preparatory meeting of organisations to acquire and retain personnel who are 2 In West Africa the Economic Community of West African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of EASBRIG military experts and a subsequent meeting capable of managing and evaluating ongoing logistic African States (ECOWAS) similarly engaged in Liberia, Disputes and the Institute for Security Studies. The of Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS) in contracts, and of activating the provisions of dormant -Bissau and Sierra Leone. latter is also responsible for secretariat functions. Jinja, Uganda, from 13 to 17 February 2004. This was contracts when required. 3 Article 2(1) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment 14 MINURSO 237, MONUC 16,270, ONUB 5,445, followed by a meeting of the Council of Ministers of of the Peace and Security Council of the African UNAMSIL 3,622, UNMEE 3,335, UNMIL 16,017, Defence and Security of Eastern Africa on 16–17 July Peace operations capacity building is not cheap, Union as adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the UNOCI 6,237. As of 28 February 2005, latest 2004, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. A second meeting and none of the envisaged capabilities are really Assembly of the African Union, Durban, 9 July 2002. figures available at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ of regional experts took place from 16 to 20 August affordable for Africa. However, all UN operations Hereafter the PSC Protocol dpko/contributors/. The UN Mission in Sudan has 2004, in Jinja, Uganda, and next second meetings of in Africa already involve a huge transfer of money 4 Article 13(1) of the PSC Protocol reads as follows: “In subsequently been authorised with a strength of the Chiefs of Defence Staff and then of the Council of from developed to developing countries – a trend order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform around 10,000. The first troops are due in the mission Ministers of Defence and Security were held in Kigali, particularly resented by the single largest financial its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of area in June 2005. Rwanda, from 7 to 10 September 2004. The Summit contributor to UN peacekeeping, the United States. peace support missions and intervention pursuant 15 There was not a single political adviser to the SRES Meeting of the Heads of States of EASBRIG in Addis Moreover, there is an unambiguous need for both UN to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an in Liberia, while in Côte d’Ivoire, one military officer Ababa on 11 April 2005 concluded the approval and regional peacekeeping operations in Africa. Over African Standby Force shall be established. Such was appointed to the staff of the SRES. process. The latter meeting, in turn, affirmed the three quarters of all UN peacekeepers are serving Force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary 16 As approved by the 9th Defence and Security earlier AU decision regarding the role of IGAD as in Africa, and it is difficult to see this massive effort contingents, with civilian and military components Commission (DSC) in 2004. interim coordinator. being replaced by African organisations. Regional in their countries of origin and ready for rapid 17 This total comprises1,500 for the Task Force, a further 32 Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda capacities should be for emergency or early action; deployment at appropriate notice”. 3,500 to add to the Task Force to form a military brigade, and Kenya. and UN engagement for sustained multifunctional 5 Ibid, Article 12(1). and a further 1,500 to form the strategic reserve. 33 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Articles 3 support to the entire peace-building process. Support 6 Ibid, Article 21(1). 18 As defined by the ECOWAS Secretariat, but based on and 5. for UN peacekeeping is, in effect, support for 7 In this paper the term ‘continental’ is used to refer to UN standards wherever appropriate. 34 The policy framework does refer to ‘stand-alone peacekeeping in Africa. Strategies aimed at enhancing the level of the African Union and the term ‘regional’ 19 While the AU and the other regions talk of PLANELMs, missions’. The first commander of EASBRIG, an regional capacities for peacekeeping operations that to refer to regions within Africa such as East or ECOWAS has set up the MPMC with a staff of ten Ethiopian brigadier-general, was appointed recently. are potentially at the expense of UN peacekeeping Southern Africa. military officers (with Canadian support) to deal with 35 MoU, Article 7(5). capabilities should therefore be avoided. 8 This section is based on the Roadmap for the strategic and operational planning. The intention is for 36 EASBRIG Policy Framework, Par 8g. Operationalisation of the African Standby Force, the MPMC to operate on a permanent basis. Its task 37 Article 9. It is clear from the operational framework being Experts’ Meeting on the Relationship between the AU will be to plan for mission deployments, and after that, 38 Article 8(2). developed by all regions that the main element of the and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, to oversee their management from the perspective of 39 Headed by Kenyan Col R Kibochi. ASF, and hence future regional missions, will be the Management and Resolution, Addis Ababa, 22–23 the ECOWAS Secretariat. 40 Article 11.

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IISSSS - PPaperaper 998.indd8.indd 18-1918-19 22005/06/01005/06/01 008:52:398:52:39 41 The salaries of officers, professional civilians and non- 56 SADC has been careful to emphasise that member a threat to international peace and security and to 68 The ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) and the commissioned officers (NCOs), who staff specific states have the final say in the participation of their stability in the region, and: “Acting under Chapter ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) met positions in the brigade headquarters, the PLANELM earmarked forces in any particular mission. VII of the Charter of the United Nations … endorses the critical requirement to deploy something quickly, and the logistic base, will be paid by member states. 57 See ‘Decision on the Establishment by the European the deployment of international monitors, including but sustainability issues inhibited their capability in EASBRIG will cover mission allowances. EASBRIG Union of a Peace Support Operation Facility for the the protection force envisaged by the African Union, the longer term. In both cases this problem was well itself will cover costs of civilian support staff employed African Union’. to the Darfur region of Sudan under the leadership known from the outset and a good deal of coordination at the various structures. 58 Somewhat optimistically, the financing proposal of the African Union …” Resolution 1564 goes a bit took place between the two missions and the UN. 42 The policy framework creates the impression that anticipates that it would be able to finance a minimum further, with Council again “Acting under Chapter VII ECOMIL’s deployment was always seen as the first EASBRIG is entirely to be coordinated by IGAD. of six operations from this amount. The Peace of the United Nations Charter”, and welcoming and step towards the longer-term deployment of a UN 43 At the meetings in Jinja, Uganda. Facility may not be used to fund ammunition, arms supporting … “the intention of the African Union mission. It received significant support from the UN 44 At the meetings in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. and specific military equipment, spare parts for arms to enhance and augment its monitoring mission in Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was able 45 Report of the First Meeting of Ministers of Defence and military equipment, salaries for soldiers and the Darfur region of Sudan, and [encouraging] the to assist with the deployment of the Nigerian battalion and Security of the Eastern Africa Region on the military training for soldiers. The expectation was undertaking of proactive monitoring” (UN Security that had been due to withdraw from UNAMSIL Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade, that funding would be focused on operational costs Council, Resolution 1556 (2004), S/RES/1556(2004), as part of that mission’s downsizing process. With Addis Ababa, 15-16 July 2004, par 5.14. such as per diems, rations, medical consumables, 30 July 2004, par 2. UN Security Council, Resolution ECOMICI, the situation was somewhat different in 46 Authorised maximum strength: military personnel: transport, fuel and troop allowances (AIDCO/12/04- 1564 (2004), S/RES/1564(2004), 18 September 2004, that the ECOWAS mission operated alongside a 16,700; civilian police personnel: 475. Civilian EN (Rev2) page 11). The total amount consists of par 2). smaller UN mission that deployed at much the same personnel include specialists in human rights, €200 million for support to peacekeeping, €34 million 65 See Jakkie Cilliers, UN reform and funding peacekeeping time and, while MINUCI was eventually expanded to humanitarian affairs, public information, child for technical assistance, €2 million for monitoring and in Africa, African Security Review 14(2), Institute for a full peacekeeping mission, this was not a foregone protection, political affairs, medical and administrative evaluation, €1 million for auditing and €12 million Security Studies, Pretoria, May 2005. conclusion at the time. Such trends suggest that the support. Current strength: 16,270 total uniformed for contingencies. 66 United Nations General Assembly, A more secure emerging peacekeeping capacity in Africa should personnel, including 15,532 troops, 563 military 59 Within the EU Commission the financial proposal was world: our shared responsibility: Report Of The High- develop along UN standards and that the AU and its observers, 175 civilian police supported by 734 subsequently considered at length at the European Level Panel On Threats, Challenges And Change various partners should cooperate with the UN as far international civilian personnel and 1,154 local civilian Development Fund (EDF) Management Committee (A/59/565, 02 December 2004) and In Larger as possible, especially in relation to mission planning staff. Method of financing: assessments in respect of a Meeting on 30 March 2004. After a long debate, the Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human and concepts to promote interoperability among the special account. final compromise language reads as follows: “Each Rights for All. (United Nations General Assembly. various components of the architecture. 47 The Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and operation to be financed from the Peace Facility will Fifty-ninth session, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005. 69 At the Summit of the AU, in January 2005. Government, in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 March have to be initiated by the African Union (AU) and/or www.un.org/largerfreedom/report-largerfreedom.pdf) Executive Council, Decision on the Development of an 2001 approved the Report on the Review of the the sub-regional organization. As a general rule, 67 And historically, Nigeria, in support of other ECOWAS African Policy on the Supply of Items to Peacekeeping Operations of the SADC institutions. when a sub-regional organization takes an initiative, troop contributors in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Operations in Africa, EX CL/Dec 189 (VI). 48 SIPO, political sector objective 6. this initiative shall have the political approval of the 49 This would continue the practice established with AU. Peace support operations will be implemented by earlier exercises, notably Blue Hungwe (1996), the AU and/or the relevant sub-regional organization” Blue Crane (1999), Tanzanite (2002) and Blue (Par 7.2.2 of the Financing Proposal AIDCO/12/04- Angel (2003). EN (Rev 2) page 13). Furthermore: “Peace Support 50 See Articles 3 to 8 of the Organ Protocol. operations to be funded by the Peace Facility should 51 Unlike the AU and ECOWAS, SADC does not have be consistent with UN principles and objectives. a Peace and Security Council or committee with In this respect, endorsement in the broadest sense reduced membership that acts on behalf of member should be sought from the UN system in accordance states. Instead, all countries are involved within with the UN Charter, in particular chapter 7 and 8 of its peace and security framework below heads of the Charter. … Peace enforcement operations will state level. require a UN mandate” (Ibid, Par 7.2.3). 52 This is roughly equivalent to the ECOWAS meetings of 60 On 9 June 2004. the Mediation and Security Council at ministerial level. 61 On 20/21 October 2004. Note that the SADC Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy 62 AIDCO/36192-EN, EDF Committee Brief on Peace Committee (ISPDC) consisting of all Ministers for Facility Operations, Brussels, 15 October 2004. The Foreign Affairs is not part of the SADCBRIG strategic largest part (80%) of the funds is for the recruitment of management structure. The first meeting of the 25 additional staff members for the AU Commission. Interstate Political and Diplomatic Committee opened 63 The total budget foreseen by the AU for AMIS ll at in Maputo on 17 May 2002, but the committee has that point was €177 million and the request to the not succeeded in meeting regularly. EU followed the decision by the Peace and Security 53 The ISDC previously had three sub-committees: on Council of the African Union on 20 October 2004 to defence; state security; and public security. The strengthen the mandate of AMIS.AIDCO/37171/04- SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff is a EN, EDF Committee Brief on Peace Facility Operation fourth committee. Darfur Sudan AMIS ll, Brussels, 21 October 2004. 54 It will serve as an advisory committee to the Ministerial 64 Although neither AMIS nor AMIS II can be conceived Committee of the Organ and, if necessary, the SADC as enforcement operations, there is strong UN Summit, oversee and manage the PLANELM, and be endorsement, and even a Chapter VII element responsible for readiness levels, etc. in Resolution 1556, with the Security Council 55 SIPO, par 8.3.1. determining that the situation in Sudan constitutes

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Progress with the African Standby Force • page 22 Paper 98 • May 2005

IISSSS - PPaperaper 998.indd8.indd 22-2322-23 22005/06/01005/06/01 008:52:408:52:40 The ISS mission

The vision of the Institute for Security Studies is one of a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by a respect for human rights, the rule of law, democracy and collaborative security. As an applied policy research institute with a mission to conceptualise, inform and enhance the security debate in Africa, the Institute supports this vision statement by undertaking independent applied research and analysis; facilitating and supporting policy formulation; raising the awareness of decision makers and the public; monitoring trends and policy implementation; collecting, interpreting and disseminating information; networking on national, regional and international levels; and capacity building.

About this paper

This paper provides an overview of the progress that has been made towards the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF), at continental and regional levels. The first section provides a review of the continental framework as it has evolved to date and been adopted by the African Union. Subsequent sections deal with progress in three regions in Africa, namely the Economic Community for West Africa (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The conclusion highlights the most salient challenges to be overcome if the ASF is to become a meaningful and effective conflict resolution tool in the hands of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

About the author

Jakkie Cilliers is the executive director of the Institute for Security Studies and has published widely on regional security issues. Mark Malan is head of the Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution Department at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

Funder

This paper and the research upon which it is based was made possible through the generous funding of the Royal Danish Government through their Embassy in South Africa.

© 2005, Institute for Security Studies • ISSN: 1026-0404 The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, its Trustees, members of the ISS Council or donors. Authors contribute to ISS publications in their personal capacity. Published by the Institute for Security Studies • P O Box 1787 • Brooklyn Square • 0075 • Pretoria • SOUTH AFRICA Tel: +27-12-346-9500/2 • Fax: +27-12-460-0998 Email: [email protected] • http://www.iss.org.za 67 Roeland Square • Drury Lane • Gardens • Cape Town • 8001 • SOUTH AFRICA Tel: +27-21-461-7211 • Fax: +27-21-461-7213 Email: [email protected]

Progress with the African Standby Force • page 24 Paper 98 • May 2005

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