Strengthening African Peace Support Operations: Nine Lessons for the Future of the African Standby Force Walter Lotze

Over the last decade, African countries, with the support of international partners, have engaged in a collective effort to develop regional capacities for peace support operations. Under the umbrella of the African Peace and Secu- rity Architecture (APSA), the (AU), three Regional Economic ( ) ( ) Communities RECs and two Regional Mechanisms RMs have worked to 1 develop the African Standby Force (ASF). Although the AU and the RECs/RMs are progressively displaying their willingness and enhanced capacity to deploy peace support operations, the appropriateness of the ASF concept is under Policy Briefing | December 2013 scrutiny. In light of nine principal lessons learned over the last ten years, it would seem appropriate to adjust the ASF concept somewhat, and to make investments in the respective key areas.

The ASF, established in 2003, envisions the Union Mission in (AMISOM) was expand- development of five regional standby capabilities ed, a joint AU-ECOWAS mission was launched for peace support operations, for which the RECs/ in (AFISMA), operations against the Lord’s RMs have primary responsibility1. These can then Resistance Army under the AU-authorised be made available to the AU when a deployment ­Regional Task Force (LRA RTF) continued, and need arises, or can be deployed at regional level. the existing MICOPAX mission of the Economic As a result of these efforts, as well as of bilateral Com­munity of Central African States (ECCAS) support to member states, there has been a steady in the was re-hatted into improvement in African capacities to respond to a joint AU-ECCAS operation (AFISM-CAR2). crisis situations through the deployment of increasingly larger and complex peace support In total, 40,641 uniformed and civilian personnel operations. were mandated to serve in AU peace support opera­ tions and an additional 30,424 in the joint AU-UN In 2013 African peace support operations capa- mission in Darfur (UNAMID). This is a record high bilities were tested more than ever: the African since the establishment of the AU and the ASF.

1 RECs: Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). RMs: Eastern African Standby Force Coordinating Mechanism (EASFCOM) and North African Regional Capability (NARC). 2 AFISM-CAR is synonymous with MISCA (Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique), the acronym used in the relevant UN resolutions. AU-Mandated Deployments in 2013 2. Multilateral (including AU, REC/RM, UN and EU) planning and decision-making processes for ( ) Somalia AMISOM 22,126 uniformed/70 civilian multi-dimensional peace support operations have Mali (AFISMA) 9,620 uniformed/173 civilian increasingly become the norm. On the basis of Central African Republic 3,500 uniformed/152 civilian past experience, future deployments on the (AFISM-CAR) continent will likely take place in the context of LRA Regional Task Force 5,000 uniformed joint planning and decision-making processes, whatever their weaknesses, at the sub-regional AU-UN hybrid mission 25,987 uniformed/4,437 civilian Darfur (UNAMID) and regional levels, in which organisations such as the EU and the UN are also involved. TOTAL AU/RECs/RMs 40,246 uniformed/395 civilians incl. UNAMID 66,233 uniformed/4,832 civilians 3. Despite numerous political hurdles, and although there remains much room for improve- A decade into the development of the ASF, AU ment, the AU and the RECs/RMs are slowly member states in January 2013 called for a com­ learning to work together in the formulation of pre­hensive progress review. And in recognition joint responses to crisis situations, and to jointly of some of the deployment challenges faced plan and manage peace support operations. (especially financial and logistical), AU member states in May 2013 called for the development of Contributors to AU-Mandated Operations an African Capacity for Immediate Response to , , , , Crises (ACIRC), as a temporary mecha­nism until AMISOM . was a major Police Contributing Country. the ASF becomes fully operational. , , , Côte d’Ivoire, AFISMA , , Guinea Bissau, , Ni- 2 This call for the ACIRC may be representative ger, Nigeria, , Sierra Leone, of the frustrations that have accompanied the AFISM-CAR To be determined development of the ASF to date, and of the desire Central African Republic, Democratic Re- LRA RTF of African states to play a greater role in crisis public of the Congo, South , Uganda Policy Briefing | December 2013 management on the continent. However, the Burkina Faso, Burundi, Djibouti, , deve­lopment of a temporary, mostly military, , Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, , UNAMID intervention mechanism would not in and of Nigeria, , Senegal, Sierra Leone, South , , Togo, itself address the underlying challenges encoun- tered to date. Rather, focus should be placed on adjusting the ASF concept and on investing in 4. More and more African countries are willing key areas based on the successes achieved and and capable to deploy their personnel to both challenges encountered so far. African-led peace support operations and UN peacekeeping operations. In 2010, the AU was The Evolving African Role struggling to find Troop and Police Contributing Countries to join Burundi and Uganda in Although the development of the ASF has often AMISOM. Just three years later, the Lord’s Resis- been criticised as being slow, four major achieve- tance Army Regional Task Force (LRA RTF) had ments should be noted: four, AMISOM five and AFISMA 13 troop contrib- uting countries, and contributors were being lined 1. African states have demonstrated that they up for the new mission in the CAR. In addition, are willing to mandate the deployment of peace African contributions to UN peacekeeping opera- support operations into extremely complex tions have steadily increased from little over and volatile conflict situations. In 2013 two new 10,000 per annum in 2003 to approximately operations were mandated (to Mali and the 35,000 per annum by 2013. Combined, this has CAR), and an existing operation was reinforced led to the highest number of African contribu- (Somalia) as part of international efforts in tions to operations in Africa to date in little over these countries. a decade since the inception of the ASF. Nine Lessons Learned Lesson 3 Strengthening AU-REC/RM relations The relationship between the AU and the RECs/ Nine major lessons of the past decade can inform RMs needs to be strengthened. It is likely that the the future development of the ASF: future deployment of peace support operations will see the AU and the regions having to work Lesson 1 Recognizing deployment politics more closely together, both when developing The ASF concept has contributed to the develop- political and operational responses to crisis ment of African capabilities for peace support situations. Under the ASF concept, peace support operations, but it has been less useful in terms of operation capabili­ties reside with the RECs/RMS, deploying these capabilities. The strength of the and are made avail­­able to the AU when a deploy- ASF concept lies in setting common standards for ment need arises. The reality is that capa­bilities the identification, training and retention of capa- firmly reside with member states, and RECs/RMs bilities at the national level which can be deployed and the AU will have to find better ways of work- when required. The ASF concept has also led to ing together to access them when required. the development of multidimensional planning capabilities at the level of the AU Commission and Lesson 4 Institutionalizing flexibility the REC/RM planning elements. However, actual A more structured concept of burden-sharing deployments have relied on lead states and coali- needs to be elaborated between African states, the tions of the willing. The mission in Burundi regions, the AU, and partners such as the EU and (2003 – 2004) was mostly undertaken by a single the UN. While the response to a particular conflict lead state, all subsequent missions by coalitions will always be shaped by the political realities, of willing member states, often also involving lead more attention can be given to establishing frame- states at critical times. As in other multilateral works that provide a sense of predictability to all deployment contexts, the willingness of member actors involved. The AU and the RECs/RMs often 3 states to contribute to a particular operation will have political legitimacy, the advantages of prox- always be based on considerations of national imity and access to African capabilities. Partners interest and the prevailing political climate. The bring funding, experience and logistical capabili- AU and the RECs/RMs will therefore have to ties, as well as political leverage in specific cases. Policy Briefing | December 2013 deploy missions using what resources are avail- All of these comparative advantages have come to able at the time, and probably not on the basis of play in various forms in support for African peace a readily-deployable force from a particular region support operations to date, but largely on an ad that can be deployed as a coherent entity. hoc basis. Greater attention should be given to understanding how effective collaboration could Lesson 2 Adjusting the planning scenarios be attained, and to developing mechanisms of The deployment scenarios for the ASF need to be coordination that can be activated if need be. re-examined. In 2003, six scenarios were envis- aged, based on the conflict dynamics on the Lesson 5 Strengthening multi-dimensionality continent in the 1990s. These ranged from ob- Multi-dimensionality is key to success. Early server missions through to the rapid deployment missions tended to be comprised mostly of mili- of an intervention force in response to grave tary personnel while political processes were circumstances. However, at present the continent largely managed by separate special envoys or finds itself grappling with international terror representatives. In recent times, the AU has networks, organised criminal networks that appointed Special Representatives of the Chair- subvert state authority, piracy, coups, state re- person of the Commission (SRCCs) to head multi- pression, or humanitarian disasters. Finding the dimensional operations comprising civilian, police appropriate operational responses to complex and military personnel, tasked simultaneously situations, such as in Somalia or Mali, proved with leading the political engagement in-country. extremely challenging. More attention will need This alignment of political and security processes to be paid to the types of capabilities needed in has yielded greater results and is now being relation to the threat agendas being faced. imitated at the regional levels. Design: finedesign, Berlin finedesign, Design: - . ) ZIF ( The views expressed in this expressed paper are The views of thethe author neces- views and do not sarilyfor of reflect the Center views the Operations International Peace Securing predictable funding predictable Securing appears to be increasingly untenable in the untenable be increasingly appears to ) Lesson 9 EDF was a guest researcher at ZIF in 2013. researcher a guest was Lotze Walter Dr. he served that, Liaison Officer as a Planning and ­Before Commission. AU for the Conclusion During and the the decade the RECs/RMs last AU as important in the emerged actors deploy have ment of peace support operations on the- conti use of the capacity which better make nent. To strengthen continue to and to has been developed, the adjust this be appropriate to role, it would along the investments make and to ASF concept, lines of the above. nine lessons highlighted Funding constraints have impacted on every on every impacted have Funding constraints significant African The most date. operation to Africa remain the Peace funding mechanisms AU mobilise contributions designed to from Facility, and the member states, Africa EU Peace AU a billion Euro over has channelled which Facility, in support of African peace support operations to been vital, it is broadly While thesedate. have agreed that been less than the satis- resultshave of the kind of APF remains devoid The AU factory. funding required peace missions, and member for fund the to operations remain unwilling states The EU APF has performed they mandate. well, be had to consistently funding volumes however, increased, security and funding peace and initia- through Fund tives the European Development ( European context. New modes of cooperation, and New European context. financial mechanisms that provide the required to be will need of financial predictability, levels established. Egypt and South and Egypt Africa) this been tapped not has a support to be given also needs to Attention into. model that relies on the outsourcing of service as the UN has done. These issues will delivery, be addressed if African to peace support have independent of the be deployed operations are to goodwill of others.

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Lesson 8 Lesson 7 Lesson 6 Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze www.zif-berlin.org [email protected] Efficient logistics systems are essential to opera- are essential systems Efficient logistics lacking. are severely yet they tional effectiveness, This has made African reliant missions entirely on the support as the of other such North actors, Treaty Organisation Atlantic the for contracting of logistical States the United service or the providers, comprehensive UN for as in thesupport case of Somalia. While packages capability resides withinsignificant logistical African (e.g. , , member states Effective command and controlof operations Effective this is yet underpins both success and credibility, one of the improvement room for areas in which strengthen More done to the can be role exists. and control structures the in relation to conduct of ensure thatoperations, to operations are man- effectively. aged of the guid- headquarters strategic in providing ance and support, and the mission command Proper planning has been a key challenge. On On challenge. Proper a key planning has been numerous the occasions UN Security Council gaps a mission, due to deploy plans to AU rejected information.in planning and insufficient And indeed, the Africanplanning processes for peace often ad been undertaken support operations have on Yet fashion. hoc, at times in an uncoordinated those where occasions planning processes thebrought together various Departments and Divisions within the and the Commission, the AU been undertaken RECs/RMs, or where they have withjointly the some of the results have UN, best recent planning initia- been attained. The most the and the UN on Somalia or AU between tives and the AU ECOWAS the joint planning between this, to and serveon Mali bear testament as be results are the to models for future. If better the are planning capacities which achieved, and the at the RECs/RMs will have AU available and partners states and member be reinforced, to more in strengthening the role invest to will have of the headquarters and Ababa strategic in Addis the planning elements in the regions.

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