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Northern Sea Route Cargo Flows and Infrastructure- Present State And
Northern Sea Route Cargo Flows and Infrastructure – Present State and Future Potential By Claes Lykke Ragner FNI Report 13/2000 FRIDTJOF NANSENS INSTITUTT THE FRIDTJOF NANSEN INSTITUTE Tittel/Title Sider/Pages Northern Sea Route Cargo Flows and Infrastructure – Present 124 State and Future Potential Publikasjonstype/Publication Type Nummer/Number FNI Report 13/2000 Forfatter(e)/Author(s) ISBN Claes Lykke Ragner 82-7613-400-9 Program/Programme ISSN 0801-2431 Prosjekt/Project Sammendrag/Abstract The report assesses the Northern Sea Route’s commercial potential and economic importance, both as a transit route between Europe and Asia, and as an export route for oil, gas and other natural resources in the Russian Arctic. First, it conducts a survey of past and present Northern Sea Route (NSR) cargo flows. Then follow discussions of the route’s commercial potential as a transit route, as well as of its economic importance and relevance for each of the Russian Arctic regions. These discussions are summarized by estimates of what types and volumes of NSR cargoes that can realistically be expected in the period 2000-2015. This is then followed by a survey of the status quo of the NSR infrastructure (above all the ice-breakers, ice-class cargo vessels and ports), with estimates of its future capacity. Based on the estimated future NSR cargo potential, future NSR infrastructure requirements are calculated and compared with the estimated capacity in order to identify the main, future infrastructure bottlenecks for NSR operations. The information presented in the report is mainly compiled from data and research results that were published through the International Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP) 1993-99, but considerable updates have been made using recent information, statistics and analyses from various sources. -
Russian Museums Visit More Than 80 Million Visitors, 1/3 of Who Are Visitors Under 18
Moscow 4 There are more than 3000 museums (and about 72 000 museum workers) in Russian Moscow region 92 Federation, not including school and company museums. Every year Russian museums visit more than 80 million visitors, 1/3 of who are visitors under 18 There are about 650 individual and institutional members in ICOM Russia. During two last St. Petersburg 117 years ICOM Russia membership was rapidly increasing more than 20% (or about 100 new members) a year Northwestern region 160 You will find the information aboutICOM Russia members in this book. All members (individual and institutional) are divided in two big groups – Museums which are institutional members of ICOM or are represented by individual members and Organizations. All the museums in this book are distributed by regional principle. Organizations are structured in profile groups Central region 192 Volga river region 224 Many thanks to all the museums who offered their help and assistance in the making of this collection South of Russia 258 Special thanks to Urals 270 Museum creation and consulting Culture heritage security in Russia with 3M(tm)Novec(tm)1230 Siberia and Far East 284 © ICOM Russia, 2012 Organizations 322 © K. Novokhatko, A. Gnedovsky, N. Kazantseva, O. Guzewska – compiling, translation, editing, 2012 [email protected] www.icom.org.ru © Leo Tolstoy museum-estate “Yasnaya Polyana”, design, 2012 Moscow MOSCOW A. N. SCRiAbiN MEMORiAl Capital of Russia. Major political, economic, cultural, scientific, religious, financial, educational, and transportation center of Russia and the continent MUSEUM Highlights: First reference to Moscow dates from 1147 when Moscow was already a pretty big town. -
Updated to the Most Recent the Beginning of Satellite Observations and the Onset Past Month
1 Contents: Page 3: November 2020 global surface air temperature overview Page 4: November 2020 global surface air temperature overview versus November last 10 years Page 5: November 2020 global surface air temperature compared to November 2019 Page 6: Temperature quality class 1: Lower troposphere temperature from satellites Page 7: Temperature quality class 2: HadCRUT global surface air temperature Page 8: Temperature quality class 3: GISS and NCDC global surface air temperature Page 11: Comparing global surface air temperature and satellite-based temperatures Page 12: Global air temperature linear trends Page 13: Global temperatures: All in one, Quality Class 1, 2 and 3 Page 15: Global sea surface temperature Page 18: Ocean temperature in uppermost 100 m Page 20: North Atlantic heat content uppermost 700 m Page 21: North Atlantic temperatures 0-800 m depth along 59N, 30-0W Page 22: Global ocean temperature 0-1900 m depth summary Page 23: Global ocean net temperature change since 2004 at different depths Page 24: La Niña and El Niño episodes Page 25: Troposphere and stratosphere temperatures from satellites 2 Page 26: Zonal lower troposphere temperatures from satellites Page 27: Arctic and Antarctic lower troposphere temperatures from satellites Page 28: Temperature over land versus over oceans Page 29: Arctic and Antarctic surface air temperatures Page 32: Arctic and Antarctic sea ice Page 36: Sea level in general Page 36: Global sea level from satellite altimetry Page 38: Global sea level from tide gauges Page 39: Snow cover; Northern Hemisphere weekly and seasonal Page 41: Atmospheric specific humidity Page 42: Atmospheric CO2 Page 43: Relation between annual change of atm. -
Russia's Akademik Lomonosov – the First Modern Floating Nuclear
Russia’s Akademik Lomonosov – The First Modern Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP) Peter Lobner, 15 May 2021 1. Introduction Designated Project 20870, construction of Akademik Lomonosov started on 15 April 2007, when the keel was laid at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk, which also is Russia’s premier submarine building shipyard. Originally, Akademik Lomonosov was expected to supply power to the Sevmash shipyard itself and the town of Severodvinsk, in Northwest Russia. Cutaway drawing showing the general arrangement of the Akademik Lomonosov. Source: Rosatom In August 2008, the hull of Akademik Lomonosov was transferred to the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg, where a second “keel laying” was held in May 2009. Plans for deploying the FNPP were reconsidered, leading to the final selection of Pevek, a remote Arctic coastal city in Russia’s Far East. The FNPP was launched on 30 June 2010 and outfitting continued with the vessel secured dockside at the Baltic Shipyard. Two un-fueled OKBM Afrikantov KLT-40S modular pressurized water reactors (PWRs) were installed in October 2013. 1 After work on the vessel and reactor systems was completed in April 2018, Akademik Lomonosov was towed 4,000 km (2,485 miles) around Norway to Murmansk, where the reactors were fuelled and tested at Rosatomflot facilities, which also support their nuclear- powered icebreaker fleet. In June 2019, the Russian nuclear regulatory agency Rostekhnadzor issued a 10-year license to Rosenergoatom to operate Akademik Lomonosov until 2029. After successfully completing testing, Akademik Lomonosov departed Murmansk on 23 August 2019 and was towed 4,770 km (2,964 miles) along the Northern Sea Route, arriving at its final destination on 9 September 2019 at a new protected pier at Pevek, which is about 980 km (609 miles) west of the Bering Strait. -
Interannual Variability in Transpolar Drift Ice Thickness and Potential Impact of Atlantification
https://doi.org/10.5194/tc-2020-305 Preprint. Discussion started: 22 October 2020 c Author(s) 2020. CC BY 4.0 License. Interannual variability in Transpolar Drift ice thickness and potential impact of Atlantification H. Jakob Belter1, Thomas Krumpen1, Luisa von Albedyll1, Tatiana A. Alekseeva2, Sergei V. Frolov2, Stefan Hendricks1, Andreas Herber1, Igor Polyakov3,4,5, Ian Raphael6, Robert Ricker1, Sergei S. Serovetnikov2, Melinda Webster7, and Christian Haas1 1Alfred Wegener Institute, Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research, Bremerhaven, Germany 2Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation 3International Arctic Research Center, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Fairbanks, US 4College of Natural Science and Mathematics, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Fairbanks, US 5Finnish Meteorological Institute, Helsinki, Finland 6Thayer School of Engineering at Dartmouth College, Hanover, US 7Geophysical Institute, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Fairbanks, US Correspondence: H. Jakob Belter ([email protected]) Abstract. Changes in Arctic sea ice thickness are the result of complex interactions of the dynamic and variable ice cover with atmosphere and ocean. Most of the sea ice exits the Arctic Ocean through Fram Strait, which is why long-term measurements of ice thickness at the end of the Transpolar Drift provide insight into the integrated signals of thermodynamic and dynamic influences along the pathways of Arctic sea ice. We present an updated time series of extensive ice thickness surveys carried 5 out at the end of the Transpolar Drift between 2001 and 2020. Overall, we see a more than 20% thinning of modal ice thickness since 2001. A comparison with first preliminary results from the international Multidisciplinary drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate (MOSAiC) shows that the modal summer thickness of the MOSAiC floe and its wider vicinity are consistent with measurements from previous years. -
Western Sanctions Will Affect Russian Shipbuilding
WESTERN SANCTIONS WILL AFFECT RUSSIAN SHIPBUILDING Western sanctions will not hamper construction of nuclear icebreakers, but can have negative consequences for other Russian civilian shipbuilding. Western sanctions could curb Russian Arctic oil Statoil, Rosneft delay Siberian drilling, while CEO Sechin added to international sanction list This week the U.S. and EU hardened its sanctions against Russia designed to punish its continuing backing of separatists in Eastern Ukraine. The sanctions include the EU banning any trade in arms and the US prohibiting transactions with Russia’s United Shipbuilding Corporation, which it classified as a defense company. According to the United Shipbuilding Corporation the sanctions will probably have no impact on state orders that already are under construction, but can seriously hamper future orders. The Baltic Shipyard outside St. Petersburg has orders to construct Russia’s three next, much-needed nuclear-powered icebreakers. The prototype was laid down in November 2013 and is planned to be ready for service in December 2017. The two next icebreakers should be ready for delivery in 2019 and 2020. “We don’t see any problems in the construction of the nuclear icebreakers, since no part of the equipment - down to the last bolt and screw – has anything to do with the U.S.” a spokesperson from United Shipbuilding Corporation says to Arctic Info. Others are not so optimistic about the future of civilian Russian shipbuilding after the last sanctions were imposed. Head of St. Petersburg’s Committee for Industrial Policy and Innovation Maksim Meyksin says to website Baltpp that the sanctions can have serious impacts on the large shipyards in the region. -
Template for Submission of Scientific Information to Describe Areas Meeting Scientific Criteria for Ecologically Or Biologically Significant Marine Areas
Template for Submission of Scientific Information to Describe Areas Meeting Scientific Criteria for Ecologically or Biologically Significant Marine Areas Title/Name of the area: Great Siberian Polynya and the the water of New Siberian Islands. Presented by Vassily A. Spiridonov (P.P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow), Maria V. Gavrilo (National Park “Russian Arctic”, Arkhangel). Abstract (in less than 150 words) The system of polynyas in the Laptev Sea and specific conditions of the waters of New Siberian Islands form ecologically and biologically significant area with medium level of uniqueness, high level of importance for life history stages of key or iconic species, medium level of importance for endangered or threatened species, medium (at the scale of the Arctic) levels of biological productivity and diversity and high vulnerability. Introduction (To include: feature type(s) presented, geographic description, depth range, oceanography, general information data reported, availability of models) Polynyas in the Russian Arctic have been recognized as extremely important for ecosystem processes and maintaining biodiversity (Spiridonov et al, 2011). The IUCN/NRDC Workshop to Identify Areas of Ecological and Biological Significance or Vulnerability in the Arctic Marine Environment (Speer and Laughlin, 2011) identified Super-EBSA 13 “Great Siberian Polynya” that can be divided into two “elementary” EBSA 33 (Great Siberian Polynya proper) and 35 (Waters of New Siberian Islands) (Speers and Laughlin, 2011). The report on identifying Arctic marine areas of heightened ecological significance (AMSA) also revealed these areas (Skjoldal et al., 2012: fig. 7). Location (Indicate the geographic location of the area/feature. This should include a location map. -
Marine Nuclear Power: 1939 – 2018
Marine Nuclear Power: 1939 – 2018 Part 3B: Russia - Surface Ships & Non-propulsion Marine Nuclear Applications Peter Lobner July 2018 1 Foreword In 2015, I compiled the first edition of this resource document to support a presentation I made in August 2015 to The Lyncean Group of San Diego (www.lynceans.org) commemorating the 60th anniversary of the world’s first “underway on nuclear power” by USS Nautilus on 17 January 1955. That presentation to the Lyncean Group, “60 years of Marine Nuclear Power: 1955 – 2015,” was my attempt to tell a complex story, starting from the early origins of the US Navy’s interest in marine nuclear propulsion in 1939, resetting the clock on 17 January 1955 with USS Nautilus’ historic first voyage, and then tracing the development and exploitation of marine nuclear power over the next 60 years in a remarkable variety of military and civilian vessels created by eight nations. In July 2018, I finished a complete update of the resource document and changed the title to, “Marine Nuclear Power: 1939 – 2018.” What you have here is Part 3B: Russia - Surface Ships & Non-propulsion Marine Nuclear Applications. The other parts are: Part 1: Introduction Part 2A: United States - Submarines Part 2B: United States - Surface Ships Part 3A: Russia - Submarines Part 4: Europe & Canada Part 5: China, India, Japan and Other Nations Part 6: Arctic Operations 2 Foreword This resource document was compiled from unclassified, open sources in the public domain. I acknowledge the great amount of work done by others who have published material in print or posted information on the internet pertaining to international marine nuclear propulsion programs, naval and civilian nuclear powered vessels, naval weapons systems, and other marine nuclear applications. -
Circumpolar Military Facilities of the Arctic Five
CIRCUMPOLAR MILITARY FACILITIES OF THE ARCTIC FIVE Ernie Regehr, O.C. Senior Fellow in Arctic Security and Defence The Simons Foundation and Michelle Jackett, M.A. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Circumpolar Military Facilities of the Arctic Five – last updated: September 2017 Ernie Regehr, O.C., and Michelle Jackett, M.A. Circumpolar Military Facilities of the Arctic Five Introduction This compilation of current military facilities in the circumpolar region1 continues to be offered as an aid to addressing a key question posed by the Canadian Senate more than five years ago: “Is the [Arctic] region again becoming militarized?”2 If anything, that question has become more interesting and relevant in the intervening years, with commentators divided on the meaning of the demonstrably accelerated military developments in the Arctic – some arguing that they are primarily a reflection of increasing military responsibilities in aiding civil authorities in surveillance and search and rescue, some noting that Russia’s increasing military presence is consistent with its need to respond to increased risks of things like illegal resource extraction, terrorism, and disasters along its frontier and the northern sea route, and others warning that the Arctic could indeed be headed once again for direct strategic confrontation.3 While a simple listing of military bases, facilities, and equipment, either -
45 Russia's Arctic Security Policy
SIPRI Policy Paper RUSSIA’S ARCTIC 45 SECURITY POLICY February 2016 Still Quiet in the High North? ekaterina klimenko STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. GOVERNING BOARD Ambassador Sven-Olof Petersson, Chairman (Sweden) Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia) Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia) Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria) Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany) Professor Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom) The Director DIRECTOR Dan Smith (United Kingdom) Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00 Fax: +46 8 655 97 33 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org Russia’s Arctic Security Policy Still quiet in the High North? SIPRI Policy Paper No. 45 EKATERINA KLIMENKO February 2016 © SIPRI 2016 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of SIPRI or as expressly permitted by law. ISBN 978–91–85114–89–4 Contents Preface iv Summary v Abbreviations vii 1. Introduction 1 2. Russia’s Arctic aspirations 3 Russia’s Arctic policymaking 3 Russia’s Arctic energy resources: no development without foreign 6 technology The Northern Sea Route 9 The extension of limits of the continental shelf 11 3. Russia’s security policy in the Arctic 13 Arctic threat assessment 13 Russia’s military and civil emergency capacity in the Arctic 17 Russia’s growing military capabilities in, but not for, the Arctic 26 4. -
22 IAHR International Symposium on Ice Floating Ice Induced Ship Casualties
22nd IAHR International Symposium on Ice Singapore, August 11 to 15, 2014 Floating Ice Induced Ship Casualties Nataliya Marchenko The University Centre in Svalbard, Longyearbyen, Norway State Oceanographical Institute, Moscow, Russia Postbox 156. Longyearbyen N-9171, UNIS [email protected] It is very important to analyze sea-ice-induced ship casualties because transport activity at high latitudes is growing. A significant search is underway for an Arctic alternative to the southern (Suez) route from Europe to Asia. However, despite global warming and forecasts of an ice-free Arctic, ice conditions are still rather difficult. The Vilkitsky Strait was closed by ice for almost the entire navigation season 2013. Several accidents occurred, including the rupture of a tanker by an ice floe, nipping and overwintering last year. The frequency of ship casualties in the Polar regions is much smaller than in the world ocean. But due to a low self-purification capacity of Arctic and Antarctic nature and harsh weather conditions, we should try to avoid any type of failure and minimize the risks involved. An analysis of ship accidents caused by sea ice in the Russian Arctic over the previous century (Marchenko, 2012) shows that a majority of casualties were related to floating ice. In significant number of cases, the accidents could be avoided if captains took into consideration sea ice properties, distinguished between “strong ice” (multiyear ice, icebergs) and “soft” first year ice. In this article, several cases on serious casualties with floating ice are presented. These cases include incidents with holing of the icebreaker Admiral Lazarev (1965, East Siberian Sea), the cruise ship Maxim Gorkiy (1989, Greenland Sea) and the tanker Nordvik (2013, Kara Sea); sinking of the adventure vessel Explorer (2007, South Ocean) and freighter Nina Sagaydak (1983, Chukchi Sea), nipping and drift of several vessels in Okhotsk Sea (2010-2011, 2013-14,) and Akademik Shokalskiy (2013-14, South Ocean). -
Dr. Nataly Marchenko
Arctic Safety Issues Dr. Nataly Marchenko The University Centre in Svalbard, Longyearbyen, Norway Arctic Technology Department 03.03.2015 1 Outline l Introduction l Arctic Shipping. Who, why, when and how? l Arctic Challenges. Sea Ice l Ship accidents in the Arctic l Maritime preparedness N. Marchenko_Warming of the North 03.03.2015 2 The University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS) - The northernmost university • Gate to the Polar Ocean • Area with increased strategic significance • Well suited to observe climate change… • Use nature as laboratory • Investigation of Sea Ice properties. Full scale experiments UNIS 03.03.2015 N. Marchenko_Warming of the3 North PetroArctic project. 2008-2012 l Offshore and Coastal Technology for Petroleum Production and Transport from Arctic Waters – Norwegian Research Council l Task 8: Collection of ice pilot experiences from sealers/sailors Accidents with ice in the Russian Arctic since 1900 SEA Kara Laptev E. Chuk Total Siberian chi Forced 12 7 3 7 29 Reasons: drift Drift/ nipping Over 8 6 9 8 31 wintering Ice floe hit Shipwreck 6 2 4 7 19 Ice jet Damage 4 2 5 4 15 Total 30 17 21 26 94 03.03.2015 N. Marchenko_Warming of the North 4 CURRENT PROJECTS SAMCoT - Sustainable Arctic Marine and Coastal Technology (NTNU and 18 research and industrial partners) 2011-2016 Research Council of Norway and companies MARPART - MARITIME PREPAREDNESS AND INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP IN THE HIGH NORTH (University of NORDLAND and 8 partners), 2014-2016 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Nordland County Administration SMIDA - Safety of Maritime operation and sustainable industrial development in the Arctic (UNIS and 5 universities ) 2012-2015 Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Education 03.03.2015 N.