Responsibility of Command How UN and NATO Commanders Influenced Airpower Over Bosnia
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Air University Press May we Reader Survey publish your Help us to improve! Tell us how well we’re doing. comments on our 5 4 3 2 1 web page? Excellent Good Fair Poor Fail Book Title(s) _______________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________ Product Rating Service Rating Book Design Rating _______ Subject Matter _________ Courtesy _________ Cover _______ Readability _________ Promptness _________ Format _______ Condition _________ Accuracy _________ Illustrations Upon Receipt What would you like to see Air University Press publish? _______________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________ Other comments: __________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________ May we use your comments for our marketing/advertising program? Yes No How did you learn about Air University Press? Friend/Acquaintance _______________________________________________________________ Display/Exhibit _____________________________________________________________________ Professional Journal Ad ____________________________________________________________ Internet ____________________________________________________________________________ AU Press Home Page _______________________________________________________________ Other ______________________________________________________________________________ Name: _______________________________________________________ Date: ________________ Organization: _______________________________________________________________________ Rank/Title: _________________________________________________________________________ Please fold so our address is on front and tape loose sides before mailing. Thank You! FOLD HERE FOLD HERE POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE Responsibility of Command How UN and NATO Commanders Influenced Airpower over Bosnia MARK A. BUCKNAM Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama March 2003 Air University Library Cataloging Data Bucknam, Mark A. Responsibility of command : how UN and NATO commanders influenced airpower over Bosnia / Mark A. Bucknam. p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58566-115-5 1. Yugoslav War, 1991-1995 -- Aerial operations. 2. Command of troops. 3. Air power -- Political aspects. 4. Military planning. 5. Combined operations (Military science) I. Title. 949.7103dc21 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. Air University Press 131 West Shumacher Avenue Maxwell AFB AL 36112–6615 http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil ii To all who serve or have served in our armed forces, and especially to the spouses, children, and other supporting family members, whose unheralded sacrifices make possible the service of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coasties. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . iiiii DEDICATION . iiiii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . xxi PREFACE . xiii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . ixvii 1 INTRODUCTION . 11 Existing Literature . 13 Method. 16 Structure . 20 Notes . 21 2 MILITARY INFLUENCE ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER . 27 Influence and Autonomy: The US Military and the Use of Force . 28 Deciding to Use Force: Military Reluctance and Influence . 29 How To Use Force: Options, Influence, and Overwhelming Force . 30 Theoretical Bases of Demands for Operational Autonomy: Expertise and Responsibility . 33 Political Constraints on Airpower: Targeting and Rules of Engagement . 39 Targeting as Air Strategy: What to Attack, What Not to Attack . 40 Bombing Pauses: When to Bomb or Not Bomb. 42 Rules of Engagement: Circumstances for Force . 43 Soldiers and Airmen: Efficacy and Control of Airpower . 47 Summary . 50 Notes . 50 v Chapter Page 3 BACKGROUND ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA: 1992–APRIL 1993 . 957 Airpower and Policy Making in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom . 958 Early USAFE Planning . 959 NATO Involvement in Bosnia . 961 Enforcing the No-Fly Zone . 962 “Safe Areas” and “Lift and Strike” . 964 Conclusion . 966 Notes . 967 4 NATO AIR SUPPORT AND AIR STRIKES: MAY–DECEMBER 1993 . 973 UNSCR 836: “Safe Areas” and Airpower—Expanding the UNPROFOR Mandate and the Role of NATO: May–July 1993 . 974 UNSCR 844: Implementing an Ambiguous Policy . 977 New Leadership for UNPROFOR . 979 NATO Air-to-Ground Missions: June–August 1993 . 981 Airpower and Coercion at Mount Igman: August 1993. 987 Command without Control: September–December 1993 . 991 UNPROFOR Commanders Strive to Control NATO Close Air Support . 994 Absent Political Guidance . 997 Responsibility, Risks, and Accountability. 999 Conclusion . 103 Notes . 105 5 AIRPOWER THREATS, USES, AND DISAPPOINTMENTS: JANUARY–JUNE 1994 . 115 Commanders and Command Relationships . 116 General Rose, Peacekeeping, and Airpower. 117 Command Relationships, Air Strikes, and Close Air Support . 120 vi Chapter Page The Sarajevo Ultimatum: February 1994 . 122 Military Influence . 123 Airpower, Control, and Autonomy . 125 No-Fly Zone Enforcement and First CAS Approval: February–March 1994. 129 NATO Downs Serb Aircraft in the No-Fly Zone . 129 Close Air Support . 130 Turning Point: Gorazde, April 1994 . 133 North Atlantic Council Decisions and the Gorazde Ultimatum . 138 UN and NATO Missions in Bosnia: A Matter of Interpretation and Political Guidance . 140 Trust, Expertise, and Forces at Risk . 143 Conclusion . 147 Notes . 148 6 COMPETING MISSIONS AND DEMANDS FOR FORCE PROTECTION: AUGUST–DECEMBER 1994 . 159 NATO Air Strikes and the Clash over Warnings and Control: August–October 1994. 160 NATO’s First Air Strike, 5 August 1994 . 162 Warnings . 163 NATO’s Second Air Strike, 22 September 1994 . 165 Proportionality . 167 Attempts to Control Air Strikes . 170 Udbina: Mission Accomplishment Versus Force Protection . 173 Udbina: November 1994 . 175 Targeting Udbina . 176 Interpreting the Results . 178 “Retrospective SEAD” and the Growing UN-NATO Rift: November–December 1994 . 180 Udbina and Otoka: November 1994 . 182 vii Chapter Page NATO and UN Split over Airpower: December 1994 . 3184 Conclusion . 3190 Notes . 3191 7 PAVING THE WAY TO ENFORCEMENT: JANUARY–JUNE 1995 . 3203 Air Campaign Plans and UNPROFOR Changes: Winter 1994–1995 . 3204 Dead Eye. 3204 Deliberate Force . 3204 New UN Commanders and Redefining UNPROFOR . 3207 The Beginning of the End . 3210 Rupert Smith on the Use of Airpower in Bosnia . 3211 Pale Air Strikes and UNPROFOR Hostages: 25–26 May 1995 . 3213 F-16 Downing and Hostage Deals. 217 Kicking the Problem Back Upstairs . 3223 US Response to the F-16 Downing . 3223 NATO Response to the F-16 Downing. 3227 Conclusion . 3230 Notes . 3233 8 SREBRENICA AND THE DECISIONS TO USE AIRPOWER: JULY–AUGUST 1995 . 3245 Srebrenica: 6–11 July 1995 . 3246 The Fall of Srebrenica: July 1995. 3247 Expectations and Blame . 3249 The London Conference and the Decisions to Use Airpower . 3251 Decision to Use Airpower to Protect Gorazde. 3253 Decision to Use Airpower in Defense of Other “Safe Areas” . 3255 Changing Landscape and US Political Leadership . 3258 viii Chapter Page AFSOUTH and UNPF Subject to Close Coordination . 3261 Conclusion . 3263 Notes . 3264 9 DELIBERATE FORCE: AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 1995 . 3273 Defense of Sarajevo . 3274 The Trigger . 3275 The Targets . 3276 The Execution . 3279 Collateral Damage and Other Priorities . 3281 The Bombing Pause . 3285 Leveling the Playing Field and Coercing the Serbs . 3288 New Objectives . 3289 Battle Damage Assessment and Target Selection . 3291 1 SEAD, Option 2 ⁄2, and Coercion . 3293 Aftermath: More of the Same . 3298 Conclusion . 3301 Notes . 302 10 CONCLUSIONS: MILITARY INFLUENCE ON AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA . 3313 How UN Commanders Influenced Airpower . 3314 Why UN Commanders Influenced Airpower . 3316 How NATO Commanders Influenced Airpower . 3320 Why NATO Commanders Influenced Airpower . 3321 Objectives, Authority, and Responsibility . 3322 Notes . 326 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY . 3327 ix Page INDEX. 3399 Illustrations Figure 1 Outline of Events around the Time of the Udbina Air Strike . 3182 2 Six-Day Outline of Attack on Srebrenica . 3247 3 Zones of Action and Target Distribution for Operation Deliberate Force . 3256 4 Time Line of Operation Deliberate Force . 3289 Photo Lt Gen Bertrand de Lapresle, UN Secretary- General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose . 284 Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose and Lt Gen Joseph Ashy . 285 Lt Gen Rupert Smith . 287 Lt Gen Francis Briquemont . 4 11 Gen Jean Cot . 4 12 Lt Gen Bernard Janvier . ..