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Download (1 MB, PDF) UNIVERSITE DE PARIS - SORBONNE (PA R I S I V ) ENA Ecole des hautes études en sciences de l'information et de la communication Ecole nationale d’administration Master Professionnel 2e année Option : COMMUNICATION DES INSTITUTIONS PUBLIQUES « Yanis Varoufakis, le vol d’un Icare médiatique » Sous la direction de Madame Françoise Boursin, Professeur des Universités au CELSA Paris-Sorbonne et Monsieur Jean-Emmanuel Paillon, Délégué général à l’administration des ressources et des services, INRIA Nom et Prénom(s) : MAKRYTHANASIS Nasos Promotion : Winston Churchill Option : Communication des Institutions Publiques Soutenu le : Mention : Note du mémoire : REMERCIEMENTS Je remercie Madame Françoise Boursin, Professeur des Universités au CELSA Paris – Sorbonne, pour le temps précieux qu’elle m’a consacré et de son disponibilité. Je remercie Monsieur Jean-Emmanuel Paillon, Délégué Général de l’INRIA, qui m’a pleinement fait profiter de son dynamisme et de ses qualités professionnelles. Je remercie Monsieur Hervé Merlin, collègue français de la promotion Winston Churchill de l’ENA, pour la relecture de ce mémoire. SOMMAIRE REMERCIEMENTS .............................................................................................................................. 1 SOMMAIRE ........................................................................................................................................ 2 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 4 PREMIERE PARTIE : LE PHENOMENE YANIS VAROUFAKIS ................................................................... 9 Introduction partielle ........................................................................................................................ 9 I. APPRÉHENDER LA NOMINATION DE YANIS VAROUFAKIS ............................................................ 9 A. Le contexte des élections du 25 janvier 2015 ....................................................................... 10 1. La crise économique grecque ....................................................................................... 10 2. Le parti politique SYRIZA............................................................................................... 11 3. Un parti non homogène dans un gouvernement de coalition........................................ 13 B. L’homme politique Yanis Varoufakis .................................................................................... 14 1. Yanis Varoufakis avant les élections du janvier 2015 ..................................................... 15 2. Ministre de finances du gouvernement d’Alexis Tsipras ................................................ 16 II. LA COMMUNICATION DE YANIS VAROUFAKIS .......................................................................... 18 A. Les canaux de communication utilisés personnellement par Yanis Varoufakis ...................... 18 1. Un Twittos hyperactif ................................................................................................... 19 2. Un blogueur ................................................................................................................. 21 3. Les phrases choc .......................................................................................................... 23 4. Les conférences de presse ............................................................................................ 25 B. Les thématiques incontournables : ...................................................................................... 26 1. Le discours anti-austérité ............................................................................................. 26 2. Une autre solution pour la Grèce .................................................................................. 28 CONCLUSION PARTIELLE .................................................................................................................. 31 DEUXIEME PARTIE : YANIS VAROUFAKIS DANS LA PRESSE FRANÇAISE ............................................. 33 Introduction partielle ...................................................................................................................... 33 I. LA PERSONA YANIS VAROUFAKIS .............................................................................................. 33 A. Un ministre des finances « rock star » .................................................................................. 34 1. Un style excentrique..................................................................................................... 34 2. Un amateur du lifestyle ................................................................................................ 38 3. L’affaire du doigt d’honneur ......................................................................................... 40 B. Un économiste brillant......................................................................................................... 42 1. Un universitaire dans un milieu de technocrates .......................................................... 42 2 2. Un expert de la théorie des jeux ................................................................................... 44 II. YANIS VAROUFAKIS DANS LE CADRE DE SES FONCTIONS .......................................................... 45 A. Yanis Varoufakis en négociations ......................................................................................... 46 1. Un corps étranger dans l’Eurogroupe ........................................................................... 46 2. « Une attitude déplaisante » ........................................................................................ 48 B. Yanis Varoufakis, le provocateur .......................................................................................... 51 1. Le clash avec ses homologues....................................................................................... 51 2. L’explosion à l’Eurogroupe de février............................................................................ 53 3. La fin à Riga .................................................................................................................. 54 III. RECOMMANDATIONS ............................................................................................................. 56 1. L’habit ne fait pas le moine, pourtant… ........................................................................ 57 2. Athènes doit être plus pédagogue sans être didactique ................................................ 59 CONCLUSION PARTIELLE .................................................................................................................. 61 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................... 63 BIBLIOGRAPHIE ............................................................................................................................... 67 ANNEXES ......................................................................................................................................... 73 RESUME .......................................................................................................................................... 77 MOTS-CLES ...................................................................................................................................... 78 3 INTRODUCTION Après que les élections anticipées du 25 janvier 2015 ont porté le jeune Alexis Tsipras, président du parti radical Syriza, à la tête de l’exécutif, il a fallu doter la Grèce d’un nouveau gouvernement. Une tâche difficile pour le nouveau premier ministre de 41 ans, puisque cette victoire historique pour la gauche grecque n’était pas suffisamment large pour lui assurer une majorité absolue au parlement. C’est l’opposition à la « Troïka » qui va constituer le dénominateur commun du gouvernement de coalition formé par Alexis Tsipras avec le parti nationaliste des Grecs indépendants. Si cette coalition paraît fort surprenante, elle trouve son explication dans la réalité politique grecque actuelle. Pour les Grecs indépendants comme pour Syriza, le rejet de la « Troïka » était le cœur de la rhétorique électorale. Sont ainsi visés le Fonds Monétaire International (FMI), la Banque Centrale Européenne (BCE) et la Commission Européenne (CE) qui constituent le mécanisme instauré depuis 2009 dans le cadre duquel deux plans de sauvetage de l’économie grecque ont été mis en œuvre. Avant même qu’Alexis Tsipras annonce officiellement la composition de son gouvernement de coalition, on sait que Yanis Varoufakis en sera le ministre des Finances. En effet, celui-ci faisait figure de favori puisque, économiste réputé, il avait également été élu député avec le meilleur score dans la plus grande circonscription du pays, celle d’Athènes. Surtout Yanis Varoufakis a pris l’initiative d’annoncer sa nomination par le biais d’un « tweet » sur son compte Twitter personnel, avant même d’attendre le communiqué officiel. Un premier signe de la volonté de ce ministre d’être à la pointe du jeu médiatique. Trois mois plus tard, Yanis Varoufakis, qui est devenu le ministre le plus médiatisé de l’Eurogroupe, se voit retirer la responsabilité de conduire les négociations pour la Grèce au sein de l’Union européenne, sans toutefois perdre son portefeuille ministériel. En effet, le 27 avril 2015, après une réunion de l’Eurogroupe très tendue à Riga, le Premier ministre grec décide
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