Volume 3 . Number 2 . June 2002 Transcendent Philosophy An
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Volume 3 . Number 2 . June 2002 Transcendent Philosophy An International Journal for Comparative Philosophy and Mysticism Articles Latimah‐Parvin Peerwani Reincarnation or Resurrection of the Soul? Sayyed Yahya Yasrabi The Epistemology of the Mystics (Part one) Arthur Saniotis Saut‐e‐Sarmad: A Study of Inayat Khan’s Theory of Music Reza Akbarian Transubstantial Motion and its Philosophical Consequences Yanis Eshots Preexistence of Souls to Bodies in Sadra’s Philosophy Book Reviews Books Received Recent Articles Reincarnation or Resurrection of the Soul? Mullâ Sadrâ’s Philosophical Solution to the Dilemma Latimah‐Parvin Peerwani, Al‐Hedayah Academy, USA Abstract One of the issues which confronted Mullâ Sadrâ in his philosophical psychology was concerning the post‐mortem status of the human soul. The existing competitive conceptions on this issue were four: (a) upon the death of the body the soul also dies together with the body; (b) reincarnation or transmigration of the soul attributed to Pythagoras and Plato and maintained by Ikhwân al‐Safâ’, some Ismâ‘îlî philosophers and Qutb al‐Dîn al‐Shîrâzî the commentator on Hikmat al‐Ishrâq of Suhrawardî; (c) the soul will remain in the physical tomb and will have the fore‐taste of bliss or chastisement according to its deeds, and on the Day of Resurrection the elemental physical body will be resurrected together with the soul and recompensed physically. In the Islamic religious language it is phrased as ma‘âd jismanî (bodily resurrection). This was the interpretation of the Islamic religious revealed texts maintained by Mutakallimûn (theologians) foremost among them was al‐Ghazzâlî; (d) the resurrection will only be the spiritual resurrection (ma‘âd rûhânî) and the recompense will be spiritual maintained by Avicenna and the Muslim Peripatetic philosophers. Mullâ Sadrâ demonstrated the inadequacy of all the above positions pertaining to the posthumous state of the psychic non‐physical being and its bodily resurrection on the basis of his philosophical premises which deal with his concept of matter and form, different levels of body, independence of the imaginative faculty of the soul, the imaginal world (‘âlam al‐mithâl) or barzakh (the intermediate world), substantial motion of the soul, and oneness and gradation of being. In this philosophy we find that he had reworked the writings of Ibn ‘Arabî and Suhrawardî on this issue. Besides the Qur’ân, Hadîth and the sayings of the Shi‘ite Imams, he drew on a number of contemporary domains of knowledge such as psychology, medicine, religious experience of death and his personal spiritual experience. So his metaphysics of resurrection goes far beyond the competing theological interpretations and could serve as a key to understand the religious texts dealing with this issue and the death and afterlife. In this paper, I will briefly discuss various positions indicated above pertaining to the post‐mortem state of the soul and body as discussed by Sadrâ and his invalidation of those theories on the philosophical grounds, then I will focus on his theory basing my research mostly on his Asfâr, his Ta‘liqah on Hikmat al‐ Ishrâq of Shihâb al‐Dîn al‐Suhrawardî and Mabda’ wa al‐ma‘âd. Reincarnation Belief in the reincarnation of the soul in one or more successive existences which may be human, animal or vegetable is characteristic of Asian religions especially Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism. From the account of Muslim philosophers such as the Nâsir‐I Khusraw (d. cir. 1094)1, Shams al‐Dîn al‐Shahrzûrî (d. after 1288) and Qutb al‐Dîn al‐Shirâzî (d.1311) we learn that this doctrine was also upheld by Greek sages such as Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, some Babylonian and Persian sages. Among the Islamic thinkers prior to Mullâ Sadrâ who were inclined towards the doctrine of reincarnation were: Ikhwân al‐Safâ (10th century A.C.), the Ismâ‘ilî thinker Abû Ya‘qûb al‐Sijistânî (d. cir. 1002), Shams al‐Dîn Shahrzûrî and Qutb al‐Dîn al‐Shîrâzî.2 Their thesis in favour of reincarnation are as follows: The first place of descent of the immaterial spiritual substance or the rational soul from the sacred world is the human body. As long as the soul is associated with the body whatever actions a person does gets rooted in his soul and will have their effects in the next life. If the immoral quality dominates on the rational substance, it would necessitate the transference (of the human soul) after the corruption of person’s body to the body corresponding to that dark quality either in different classes of human, or animals or even plants. If a person is are perfect in good morals he will ascend to the world of Light. Some have upheld the belief in the transmigration (of the soul) in the ascending direction. They claim that the (body) which accepts the fresh effusion from the sacred world is that of the plant. Each soul effused on the plant transfers (after the death of that plant) to its species of different levels from the most imperfect to the most perfect plants until it reaches the level which is adjacent to the lowest level of the animal such as the palm. Then it transfers to the lowest animal level such as worm, and gradually rises up to the higher and higher level until it ascends to the human level. Thus the human soul in the human body has transcended all the levels of plant and animal souls. Sadrâ invalidates the doctrine of transmigration upheld by its adherents. He argues: The issue of transference (of human soul to another body after death) is very problematic (to comprehend) and (requires) a subtle way (to perceive). (Due to the lack of that) it has become popular among people that the ancient philosophers, despite their great level in philosophy still maintained (the doctrine of) transmigration. But relating such a doctrine to them is a sheer folly according to us whose basis is not knowing the difference between the ‘resurrection’ of human souls (after death), and the ‘transmigration’ of human souls (after death).3 This is an issue which some philosophers have discussed but were not able to solve it. But God gave us inspiration (about its solution) and threw (its light) in my mind which is as follows: The soul qua soul or Form is temporally created, and its creation from the Principle which is continuously effusive only depends on the preparedness of the receptacle which is the particular body suited for that particular soul. So when the body attains the sound constitution for its reception, then necessarily there effuses from the Donor [of Forms] a governing soul without any delay and hesitation at all. It is like the effusion of light from the sun on the receptacle before it. If we assume that a soul connects to it in the way of transmigration, then this would entail two souls for one body, and that is impossible. The soul has an essential connection with the body, and the composition between the two is a natural, unified composition; and simultaneously in each one there is a substantial, essential motion. The soul at the beginning of its (temporal) creation is something potential in all that it has from the states, and so is the case with (its) body and both of them emerge simultaneously from potentiality to actuality. The levels of potentiality and actuality in every soul are determined according to the acts and deeds, good or evil it has done which have become actualised in the soul be that fortunate or unfortunate. But once the soul becomes one of the species in actuality, its descending to the level of a pure potentiality is impossible, just as it is impossible for a human body to become sperm and clot after it has reached the completion of [its] physical creation. That is because this is the [ascending] motion [of growth] in its essence and substance, so it is not possible for it to reverse neither by compulsion, nor by nature, nor by will, nor by accident. If a disembodied soul connects to another physical body at its (level of) being foetus or something similar to it, it would entail that the being of one is potential [which is the physical body] and the other is actual [which is the soul], or the thing which is actual has become potential [in order to connect with the potential], and that is impossible. Because the composition between the body and the soul is a natural and unifying composition, so the natural composition between the two things one actual and the other potential is impossible."4 Sadrâ’s argument for the disapproval of transmigration or reincarnation is based on his concept of intra‐ substantive movement. According to this doctrine as long the soul is associated with the physical body elemental body it increases in its substance and actuality. So gradually it becomes more powerful in existence and stronger in the acquisition of qualities be they (good or evil). Further, soul and body are both potential to start with and both gradually actualise their potentialities and both move in the vertical ascension. This perfecting movement of being is not prevented, neither by the compulsion of the subject who compels, nor by any force, or any event so long there is the existence of the subject. Since this movement of being is irreversible, it is absurd to suppose that a developed soul after leaving its own body can enter a new undeveloped body and then start developing once again from scratch.5 Denial of reincarnation, however, entails certain serious problems, some of which arise from the Qur’ân, and others from the philosophic views concerning the destiny of the undeveloped humans.