Does PR Promote Political Extremism? Evidence from the West European Parties of the Extreme Right

Representation

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Does PR promote political extremism? Evidence from the West European parties of the extreme right

Elisabeth Carter

To cite this article: Elisabeth Carter (2004) Does PR promote political extremism? Evidence from the West European parties of the extreme right , Representation, 40:2, 82-100, DOI: 10.1080/00344890408523252 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00344890408523252

Published online: 06 Jul 2007.

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rrep20 Representation, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2004, pp. 82-100 Does PR Promote Political Extremism? Evidence from the West European Parties of the Extreme Right1 Elisabeth Carter

Abstract: Focusing on the West European parties of the extreme right, this article considers the validity of the claim that proportional electoral systems promote political extremism. After a systematic, empirical examination of the relationship between electoral systems and the electoral scores of right-wing extremist political parties it concludes that there is little evidence to support the assumption that PR fosters extremist party success. Instead, the share of the vote going to these parties appears unrelated to the type of electoral system employed.

Politicians, observers and academics alike have long suggested that extremist political parties have frequently encountered success at the polls because of the existence of advantageous electoral systems. More than sixty years ago Ferdinand A. Hermens (1941) - one of the most well known early critics of proportional representation (PR) - claimed that the breakdown of democracy in Germany in the 1930s and the subsequent rise of dictatorship were directly attributable to PR. More recently, the cross-bencher Lord Marsh argued that the rise of the Austrian Freedom Party (and its inclusion in government) should also be 'wholly and solely' put down to PR (Lords Hansard, 2000). In addition to these explicit allegations, a number of analyses of individual extremist parties have tended to bolster the assumption that proportional electoral systems have helped extremist parties prosper at the polls while majoritarian systems have hindered their success (e.g., Hain, 1986; DeClair, 1999). At one level these allegations make perfect sense. The effects of electoral rules on political parties have been extensively documented (see for example Duverger, 1954; Rae, 1967; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Lijphart, 1994; Katz, 1997) and it is widely acknowledged that proportional electoral systems do indeed afford smaller parties greater opportunities for success - and in the main, extremist parties continue to be small competitors (for a discussion of what constitutes a small party, see Mair, 1991; Smith, 1991). Yet, in spite of its widespread prevalence and strength, it should be remembered that the assumption that extremist electoral success may be explained by the presence of PR continues to be just that - an assumption. It is still the case that, with the notable exceptions of Kitschelt's comparative analysis (1995) and Harrison's study on Germany (1997, 2000), little empirical work exists on the link between electoral systems and extremist party success. The claim that PR encourages political extremism therefore remains based on little or no evidence.

In light of this situation, this article proposes to explore the link between electoral systems and extremist party success in a direct, systematic and empirical fashion. In doing so, it builds on and updates a previous article (Carter, 2002), which was one of the first to examine the relationship between electoral systems and the fortunes of extremist parties.2 It begins by briefly examining the logic behind the assumption that PR fosters extremist party success. Then, focusing specifically on the impact of electoral systems on the parties of the extreme right in the period 1979-2002 (the 'third wave' of right-wing extremism as von Beyme (1988) has called this period), the article turns its attention to the two main dimensions of electoral systems - the district magnitude (number of seats per district) and the electoral formula. Taking each in turn, it investigates the extent to which these two dimensions influence the scores of the right-wing extremist parties. Finally, the article considers the overall impact of the disproportionality of the electoral system on the right-wing extremist party vote. Throughout its analysis, this article adopts an inclusive approach as to which parties are considered as belonging to the extreme right (see Appendix 1).3 Before going any further, however, it is perhaps necessary to restate the clarification that was made in the earlier study upon which the present article is based, namely that the analysis that follows does not seek to account for right-wing extremist party success as such. Instead, it simply endeavours to isolate the effects of electoral systems on the West European parties of the extreme right, and hence, enable a reassessment of the claim that PR promotes political extremism. It thus remains ever conscious of the fact that electoral systems are only one of the very many factors that may influence the electoral success of parties of the extreme right.

The assumption that proportional electoral systems foster extremist party success It has been long recognised that electoral systems not only affect the size of parties' representation in parliament, but also influence their vote share. Indeed, ever since Maurice Duverger's seminal book Political Parties (1954), it has been acknowledged that the way in which votes are translated into seats induces a psychological effect on both voters and party elites. Voters realise that small parties may be underrepresented due to the mechanical workings of the electoral system, and that a vote for a small party may become a wasted one. Thus, they may decide to choose the least unacceptable of the larger parties rather than support the smaller competitor. For their part, party leaders may react to the mechanical workings of the electoral system by opting not to partake in elections where representation cannot be guaranteed (Blais and Carty, 1991: 80-1). The stronger the mechanical effect of an electoral system, the stronger its psychological effect on voters and party elites may be assumed to be, since the more an electoral system favours large parties and discriminates against smaller ones, the more likely it will be that voters will decide to support a larger party rather than see their vote 'wasted' on a smaller contender. And, since the majority of extremist

83 Representation, 40 (2) political parties are small parties, a strong mechanical effect can be expected to lead to extremist parties performing poorly at the polls, whereas a more proportional system should result in higher vote scores for the extremists. Theoretically, therefore, the assumption that PR bolsters political extremism makes perfect sense. The crucial question is whether this assumption withstands empirical testing. To examine this, it is necessary to investigate the influence of the different determinants of electoral systems. The most important of these are (i) the district magnitude and (ii) the electoral formula. Each of these two dimensions has important consequences for the overall proportionality of the electoral outcome.

Determinants of electoral systems: district magnitude and legal thresholds The district magnitude of an electoral system (the number of representatives elected in a district) has long been deemed crucial in determining the proportionality of the electoral result. In fact, when majoritarian and proportional electoral systems are considered separately, the district magnitude has been shown to be the most important determinant of proportionality. If all electoral systems are taken together, however, the electoral formula becomes more important than the district magnitude in determining the proportionality of the electoral outcome (Rae, 1967; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 112; Lijphart, 1994: 98-100; Katz, 1997: 137-8). Determining the district magnitude of an electoral system is relatively straightforward in democracies that use a single-tier districting system (e.g., the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland). The country is divided into a number of districts and each elects a number of representatives to the legislature. Elsewhere, however, multi-tiered districting systems are used, in which a certain number of seats are allocated at a higher tier (e.g., the region or the country as a whole), and all votes not needed for seat allocation at the lower tier are pooled and used to determine the seats allocated at the higher tier. Determining the district magnitude in these countries is not as straightforward as it is in single-tiered systems because different tiers may have different district magnitudes and may employ different electoral formulae. In these situations it becomes important to determine which tier is the decisive one for the proportionality of the electoral outcome, which in turn depends on how seats are allocated. In so-called remainder-transfer systems the decisive tier for the proportionality of the electoral outcome is the lower tier, whereas in adjustment-seat systems it is the higher tier that is the crucial one (see Lijphart, 1994:32-6). Table 1 provides details of which electoral systems have single-tier districting and which have multi-tiered districting. The decisive tier of the electoral systems is shown in italics. Given that it has been widely documented that, in proportional systems, the proportionality of the electoral outcome improves as the district magnitude increases (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 112; Lijphart, 1994: 20; Katz, 1997: 134), extremist parties may be expected to encounter greater electoral success in systems where the district magnitude (at the decisive level) is high rather than where it is low. In such instances of high district magnitude, a legislative seat may be won with a much

84 Does PR Promote Political Extremism? smaller share of the vote than in situations where the district magnitude is low, and voters are assumed to react to this fact by recognising that their vote may not be 'wasted' even though they are choosing to support a smaller party. This said, it is important to observe that, in some systems, the effect of district magnitude is overridden by the imposition of legal thresholds. These thresholds are introduced in instances where the district magnitude is so large that, left unchecked, parties would be able to win a legislative seat with only a very small share of the vote - a situation considered undesirable for party system and governmental stability. To take account of the fact that in such instances the district magnitude no longer determines the share of the vote a party must win in order to gain parliamentary representation, and to enable the comparison of electoral systems across countries with and without legal thresholds, Lijphart estimates an 'effective threshold', expressed as a percentage of the vote a party must win if it is to secure parliamentary representation (1994: 26, 182). The effective threshold of an electoral system may either be determined by the legal threshold (if such a threshold exists), or it may be inferred from the district magnitude.4 The right-hand column in Table 1 reports the effective thresholds of the electoral systems under investigation in this article. Given that effective thresholds are expressed as a percentage of the vote necessary for a party to win a seat in parliament, it is expected that right-wing extremist parties will perform better in systems with low effective thresholds, than in systems where the effective threshold is high. In other words, the correlation between the right-wing extremist party vote (as reported in Appendix 1) and the effective threshold should be a negative one. The correlation is indeed negative.5 When all electoral systems are taken together the Pearson correlation coefficient is -.098, and when proportional systems are considered on their own the correlation coefficient is -.184.6 The first of these correlation coefficients is not statistically significant, however.7 Therefore, when all electoral systems are taken together, the conclusion must be drawn that high right- wing extremist party scores may not be explained by the presence of low effective thresholds, and low right-wing extremist party scores may not be accounted for by the existence of high effective thresholds. When proportional electoral systems are considered on their own, however, the story is slightly different. The second correlation coefficient (-.184) is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, thereby implying that when proportional electoral systems are taken on their own, high effective thresholds do appear to be associated with low right-wing extremist party scores and low effective thresholds do seem linked to high right-wing extremist party scores.8 The finding that high district magnitudes and low legal thresholds are linked with high right-wing extremist electoral scores when proportional systems are considered on their own, but not when all electoral systems are taken together makes sense given that, as was observed above, the district magnitude is the most important determinant of proportionality when majoritarian and proportional electoral systems are considered separately. It ceases to be the case when all systems are examined together.

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Table 1: Dimensions of electoral systems in Western Europe (1979-2002) Country Date Tier Formula1 Average Number of Assembly Size legal Effective District Districts Threshold3 Threshold4 Magnitude2 (%) Austria 1979-1990 H d'Hondt 91.50 2 183 1 const seat 2.6a L LR-Hare 20.33 9 1994-2002 N d'Hondt 183 1 183 1 const seat or 4 H d'Hondt 20.33 9 4% (N) L LR-Hare 4.26 43

Belgium 1981-1991 H H-B 23.56 9 212 0.66 of a Hare 4.8a L LR-Hare 7.07 30 quota

1995-1999 H H-B 15.00 10 150 0.33 of a Hare 2.8 L LR-Hare 7.50 20 quota

Denmark 1979-2001 H LR-Hare 179 1 179 SRC 2 L MSL 7.32b 19 France11 1981 Maj-Plur 1 474 474 - 37.5* 1986 d'Hondt 5.78 96 556 5%(D) 11.1 1988-2002 Maj-Plur 1 555 555 - 37.5* Germany 1980-1983 H d'Hondt 496 1 496e 5% (N) or 3 5 L Plurality 1 248 const seats

1987 H LR-Hare 496 1 496e 5% (N) or 3 5 L Plurality 1 248 const seats 1990-1998 H LR-Hare 656 1 656e 5% (N) or 3 5 L Plurality 1 328 const seats 2002 H LR-Hare 598 1 299C 5% (N) or 3 5 L Plurality 1 299 const seats Greecef 1981 S LR-Hare 12 1 12 17 (N) 17 H d'Hondt* 18 1 18 17 (N) 17 M d'Hondt* 4.22 9 38 17 (N) 17 L d'Hondt* 4.14 56 232 14.6 weighted mean d'Hondt* 5.30 184.77 16.1

1985 S d'Hondt 12 1 12 5.8 H d'Hondt* 18 1 18 3.9 M d'Hondt* 4.22 9 38 14.4 L d'Hondt* 4.14 56 232 14.6 weighted mean d'Hondt* 5.30 184.77 14.7 1989-1990 S d'Hondt 12 1 12 3.3 H LR-Hare 22.15 13 }288 L LR-Droop 5.14 56

1993-2000 S d'Hondt 12 1 12 3 H d'Hondt* 1 3 M LR-Hare 13 }288 3 L d'Hondt* 56 3

86 Does PR Promote Political Extremism?

Country Date Tier Formula1 Average Number of Assembly Size Legal Effective District Districts Threshold3 Threshold4 Magnitude2 (%)

Italy 1979-1992 H LR-Hare 630 1 630 1 const seat 2.0s L LR-lmp 19.69 32 and 300,000 votes

1994-2001 H LR-Hare 155 1 630 4% (N) for 4 L Plurality 1 475 higher tier 37.5* alloc only

Neths. 1981-2002 d'Hondt 150 1 150 0.67% (N) 0.67

Norway 1981 MSL 7.75 20 155 8.6

1985 MSL 7.85 20 157 8.5

1989-2001 H MSL 165 1 165 496 (N) 4 L MSL 8.26h 19

Portugal 1979-1987 d'Hondt 12.50 20 250 5.6

1991-2002 d'Hondt 11.50 20 230 6.0

Spain 1979-2000 d'Hondt 6.73 52 350 5% (D) 9.7

Sweden 1979-2002 H MSL 349 1 349 4% (N)< L MSL 11.07' 28 4% (N) or 12% in one const

Switz. 1979-1999 H-B 7.69 26 200 - 8.6

UK 1979-1987 Plurality 1 650 650 37.5*

1992 Plurality 1 651 651 37.5*

1997 Plurality 1 659 659 - 37.5*

2001 Plurality 1 659 659 37.5*

Notes: 1 In the case of multi-tiered electoral systems, the table shows which tier is decisive by the use of italics. In remainder- transfer systems this is the formula at the lower tier, while in adjustment-seat systems this is the formula used at the higher tier. 2 The average district magnitude is calculated by dividing the number of seats in the legislature by the number of districts. 3 N denotes a legal threshold imposed at the national level; D refers to a legal threshold applied at the district level. 4 The effective threshold is either determined by the legal threshold of the electoral system, or is inferred from the district magnitude, whichever value is higher. If inferred from the district magnitude, the effective threshold is calculated by taking the mean of the upper threshold and the lower threshold: 75 / (M+l). LR-Hare: largest remainder Hare formula H-B: Hagenbach-Bischoff formula MSL: modified Sainte-Lague formula Maj-Plur: Majority-Plurality 2-ballot formula LR-Droop: largest remainder Droop formula LR-lmp: largest remainder Imperiali formula a see Lijphart, 1994: 38-39. b In Denmark only 139 seats are distributed among the constituencies. c Special rules: to receive seats at the higher level Danish parties must either i) have won at least one constituency seat,

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ii) have obtained at least as many votes as on average were cast per constituency in at least two of the three regions, or iii) have obtained at least 2% of all valid votes in the country as a whole. * approximation d Metropolitan France only. e not including Uberhangmandate. f The Greek electoral system is extremely complex. From 1981 to 1985 and again from 1993 to 2000 it has had four separate tiers (lower (L), medium (M), higher (H) and state (S)) and, rather than have a decisive tier, it has taken the form of four separate and parallel elections to four mini-assemblies. Although the electoral formula used in these two periods has been thhe LR-Hare formula, it actually operates like the d'Hondt formula. By contrast, the electoral system employed in the period 1989-1990 was a remainder-transfer system with three separate tiers (lower (L), higher (H) and state (S)). For further details on the Greek electoral systems see Lijphart, 1994: 33-45. 8 see Lijphart, 1994: 38. h In Norway only 157 seats are distributed among the constituencies. ' In Sweden only 310 seats are distributed among the constituencies. ' Swedish parties that have obtained seats at the lower level through the 12% rule only are excluded from representation at the higher tier. Sources: Lijphart, 1994; Gallagher et al., 1995; LeDuc et al., 1996; Lijphart Election Archive; Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline Database.

It remains premature to draw any conclusions about the influence of electoral systems on the right-wing extremist party vote at this stage of the discussion, however, because the district magnitude, it should be remembered, is not the only determinant of proportionality of the electoral outcome. The electoral formula also affects the proportionality with which votes are translated into seats.

Electoral formulae The formula of an electoral system refers to the method used to translate votes into seats. The two main types of electoral formula are (i) majoritarian formulae and (ii) proportional formulae (and within each of these categories, there are a number of subgroups). Majoritarian electoral formulae allocate seats in a 'winner takes all' fashion, reflecting a concern for the stability of the political system and aiming to discourage multipartism and promote the construction of parliamentary majorities (Duverger, 1954; Rae, 1967). Proportional formulae on the other hand distribute seats in some proportion to the votes cast for individual parties and/or candidates. Table 1 gives details of the different formulae used in the countries under investigation in this study. Of these, only France (with the important exception of 1986) and Britain employ majoritarian formulae.9 All other countries under observation make use of proportional formulae. Just as district magnitude has long been recognised as affecting the proportionality of the electoral outcome, so too has the electoral formula. As was mentioned above, when majoritarian and proportional electoral systems are considered together, the formula is judged to be the most important determinant of proportionality. Majoritarian formulae result in much higher levels of disproportionality than proportional formulae because they tend to systematically favour larger parties.

88 Does PR Promote Political Extremism?

Small parties have a hard time gaining representation - unless their support is geographically concentrated - because they have little chance of winning the plurality or majority of the votes in an electoral district necessary to win a seat. Given this, it may be reasonably assumed that right-wing extremist parties will record lower electoral scores in contests that take place under majoritarian formulae than they will in elections that make use of proportional formulae.

Figure 1: Electoral formula and mean votes for extreme right parties in the period 1979-2002

16 -i

• Electoral systems with PR 14 electoral formulae

• Electoral systems with 12 majoritarian electoral formulae

10 •

4 •

JL n ^* *fe

Notes: The mean vote is calculated as follows: the vote share obtained by all right-wing extremist parties in a given country for each election is summed. This total is then divided by the number of elections in which the extreme right competed. In the case of multi-tiered electoral systems the graph reports the formula used at the decisive tier. Flanders and Wallonia are treated as two separate political systems - see note 2.

Sources: electoral returns (as Appendix 1).

As Figure 1 illustrates, this has not been the case, however. When all types of electoral formula are examined together, there is no clear relationship between the type of formula used and the level of electoral success of the parties of the extreme right. Instead, while these parties have sometimes recorded low scores under majoritarian formulae (like in Britain) as was expected, they have also experienced poor results in countries that employ proportional formulae (as in Germany, Portugal

89 Representation, 40 (2) and Spain). At the same time, although they have encountered success under proportional formulae (in Austria and Norway for instance), they have also polled reasonably high electoral scores under majoritarian formulae (as in France). The lack of a clear relationship between the type of electoral formula and the right-wing extremist party vote is further illustrated if proportional formulae are considered on their own. Although the differences are fairly small, the various proportional formulae that are used in the countries under investigation can be ranked according to their proportionality. Indeed, the literature on electoral systems concurs that the d'Hondt, the Imperials and the Hagenbach-Bischoff formulae are the least proportional of the proportional formulae, that the modified Sainte-Lague and the Droop formulae form an intermediate category, and that the Hare formula is the most proportional of the proportional formulae (Rae, 1967; Loosemore and Hanby, 1971; Lijphart, 1994: 24, 192; Katz, 1997: 123; Farrell, 2001: 155). Given these rankings, it is therefore reasonable to expect the parties of the extreme right to record the highest electoral scores in countries which make use of the Hare formula, slightly lower scores in countries that employ the modified Sainte-Lague formula or the Droop formula, and the lowest scores of all in countries that use the d'Hondt, the Imperiali, or the Hagenbach-Bischoff formula. Yet, as Table 2 shows, no such pattern emerges. Even though the parties of the extreme right have recorded high electoral scores in Italy where, in the period since 1994, the Hare formula has been used at the decisive tier, they have also encountered success under the less proportional d'Hondt formula, as in France in 1986. At the same time, certain parties of the extreme right have performed poorly at the polls even though they have competed under one of the most proportional types of proportional formula. In Germany, for example, the parties of the extreme right have not experienced electoral success despite the fact that the Hare formula has been in operation since 1987. The absence of a clear relationship between the electoral formula used and the right-wing extremist party vote is rather surprising. Especially remarkable is the fact that no difference emerges in the right-wing extremist party vote between countries with majoritarian formulae and those with proportional ones even though the formula is considered the most important determinant of proportionality when all electoral systems are examined together. This in turn raises questions about the workings of the psychological effects of electoral systems as there is little evidence to suggest that majoritarian electoral systems have consistently discouraged voters from favouring smaller parties such as those of the extreme right. At the aggregate level at least, voters do not appear to be aware of the impact of different electoral formulae on the disproportionality of the electoral outcome, or if they are, it seems that their awareness of the consequences of different electoral formulae is overshadowed by other concerns. All this raises serious doubts over the validity of the general assumption made by proponents of majoritarian electoral systems that proportional electoral systems encourage political extremism.

90 Does PR Promote Political Extremism?

Table 2: Electoral formulae and the mean right-wing extremist party vote (1979-2002)

Country Period Number of Formula21 Mean right-wing Elections extremist vote

Italy 1994-2001 3 LR-Hare 21.6 Austria 1979-2002 8 LR-Hare 14.8 Denmark 1979-2001 9 LR-Hare 8.1 Germany 1987-2002 5 LR-Hare 1.9

Norway 1981-2001 6 MSL 9.7 Sweden 1979-2002 8 MSL 1.3

France 1986 1 d'Hondt 9.8 Italy 1979-1992 4 LR-Imperiali 8.2 Flanders 1981-1999 6 H-B 7.0 Switzerland 1979-1999 6 H-B 5.4 Wallonia 1981-1999 6 H-B 2.6 Spain 1979-2000 7 d'Hondt 0.5 Netherlands 1981-2002 7 d'Hondt 0.8 Portugal 1979-2001 9 d'Hondt 0.4 Germany 1980-1983 2 d'Hondt 0.2

France 1981 and 1988-2002 5 Majority-Plurality 10.0 Britain 1979-2001 6 Plurality 0.2

Notes: The cases are ranked from most to least proportional electoral formula. The mean vote is calculated as follows: the vote share obtained by all right-wing extremist parties in a given country for each election is summed. This total is then divided by the number of elections. Flanders and Wallonia are treated as two separate political systems - see note 2. a In the case of multi-tiered electoral systems the table reports the formula used at the decisive tier. LR-Hare: largest remainder Hare formula LR-Imperia!i: largest remainder Imperiali formula MSL: modified Sainte-Lague formula H-B: Hagenbach-Bischoff formula Greece is not included in the table because of the sheer complexity of the Greek electoral system. Not only do elections take the form of four separate and parallel elections to four mini-assemblies, but the formula employed (LR-Hare) in practice operates like the d'Hondt formula. For these reasons it is extremely difficult to rank the Greek system in terms of its proportionality. Sources: as Table 1 and Appendix 1.

This said, however, before any final conclusions are drawn about the influence of electoral systems on the right-wing extremist party vote, it is essential to examine the overall mechanical effect of the different electoral systems under observation in this study. Although the impact of the two main determinants of proportionality has

91 Representation, 40 (2)

already been investigated, the two dimensions have been considered separately rather than together. Establishing the overall mechanical effect of each system and exploring its impact on the right-wing extremist party vote allows for the joint influence of district magnitude and electoral formula (as well as the effect of other more minor determinants of proportionality such as assembly size) to be examined. From this more complete conclusions may be reached.

The overall mechanical effect of electoral systems: measuring disproportionality The strength of the mechanical effect of an electoral system can be measured quite easily by calculating the deviation of the seat shares of the parties from their vote shares. The most favoured measure of this deviation - otherwise known as the disproportionality of the electoral system - is the Gallagher index (1991). High values on this index point to strong mechanical effects, with larger parties winning a greater percentage of the seats than they did of the vote, and with smaller parties gaining a smaller proportion of the seats compared to their proportion of votes. Low values indicate little deviation between the seat shares of the parties and their vote shares. The disproportionality scores of every national election in Western Europe in the period 1979-2002 are reported in Appendix 2. Since strong mechanical effects are believed to induce strong psychological effects on voters, which, in turn, are deemed to lead to lower scores for smaller parties since these parties have little chance of securing parliamentary representation, it is reasonable to anticipate a negative relationship between the disproportionality measure of an electoral system and the right-wing extremist party vote. That is, the more disproportional an electoral system, the lower the electoral scores of the parties of the extreme right are expected to be. When the two variables are correlated, the correlation is indeed negative: if all electoral systems are considered together, the Pearson correlation coefficient is -.048, and if proportional systems are taken on their own, the correlation coefficient is -.061. Neither correlation is statistically significant, however, thus implying that strong mechanical effects (as reflected by high levels of disproportionality) do not seem to translate into low electoral scores for parties of the extreme right. Similarly, weak mechanical effects do not appear to be linked with high right-wing extremist party vote scores. In light of the earlier investigations, this finding is not wholly surprising. After all, no significant relationship was found to exist between the right-wing extremist party vote and the district magnitude when all systems were examined together, and no significant relationship existed between the right-wing extremist party vote and the electoral formula. Since these two dimensions of electoral systems make up the main determinants of proportionality, it is therefore not unexpected that the relationship between the disproportionality of the electoral system and the right-wing extremist party vote is not significant.

92 Does PR Promote Political Extremism?

At the same time, however, this result continues to contradict the widespread agreement that exists in the literature that 'the disproportionality characteristic of all electoral systems tends to favour the larger parties and to discriminate against the smaller ones' (Lijphart, 1988: 165). The finding also challenges the conclusions of one of the very few existing comparative studies on small parties that uncovered a much stronger (negative) relationship between the disproportionality of electoral systems and the small party vote (Mair, 1991: 54-5).

Conclusion This article has sought to test the 'conventional wisdom', often put forward in Anglo- American circles by critics of PR, that proportional electoral systems promote political extremism. In doing so, it has shown that, contrary to prevalent assumptions, the share of the vote won by the West European parties of the extreme right in the period 1979-2002 appears unrelated to the type of electoral system in operation in the various countries. This finding is both intriguing and important. It is intriguing because it implies that the different effects of electoral systems are not being reflected in the behaviour of right-wing extremist party supporters. As was suggested above, it could be that these voters are simply not aware of the consequences of electoral systems, or it could be that if they are, their awareness is being overshadowed by other, more pressing, concerns. Alternatively, it may be the case that the psychological effects of electoral systems have a different, and possibly weaker impact on right-wing extremist party supporters than on other sections of the electorate. Further research is clearly needed if these questions are to be investigated and if the nature of the relationship between electoral systems and extremist party success is to be more fully documented and explained. In particular, future work that takes into account other factors that potentially influence the vote share of these parties would be useful because it could well be that, once other variables are taken into account, the effects of electoral systems on the extremist party vote may be somewhat different. As well as constructing such multivariate models using pooled analysis, future work may usefully also engage in a series of (cross-sectional or cross- temporal) comparisons of cases where similar levels of extremist party support may be expected for historical, cultural or social reasons, but where different electoral systems are in operation. With such comparisons a more confident assessment of the power of electoral systems in explaining the variation in the extremist party vote would be possible. For the time being, however, the simple finding that the relationship between electoral systems and extremist party success is not as was expected or as was alleged provides sufficient food for thought. Not only does it discredit a very pervasive assumption but it also raises important issues that proponents of electoral reform would be unwise to overlook. Indeed, the conclusions reached above emphasise the need to exert great caution in any endeavour to alter a country's

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existing electoral system and, more specifically, they suggest that reforming a country's electoral system in response to an extremist electoral challenge - a subject recently debated in France, for example - may not necessarily result in the desired consequences.

About the Author Elisabeth Carter is a postdoctoral researcher at Keele University where she is involved in a major cross-national project on the Europeanisation of national political parties. Her main research interests include European political parties (in particular those of the extreme right), party systems, and electoral systems.

Notes 1 The author would like to thank Paul Webb and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 2 More specifically, this present study is based on data that cover a longer time period than those in the previous article. The data for some countries have also been improved. In particular, Belgium is no longer treated as one political system. Instead, Flanders and Wallonia are considered separately and the electoral scores of the Flemish and Wallonian parties of the extreme right now reflect their vote shares in Flanders and Wallonia respectively. This makes for a much more accurate reading of their level of electoral support (see Swyngedouw, 1998: 68-9). 3 This inclusive approach is favoured in view of the acute lack of consensus in the academic literature over the Ignaz:, 1992, 2003; precise definition of right-wing extremism and the absence of agreement over which parties should be included in a right-wing extremist party family. For a discussion of the different definitions of right-wing extremism see Mudde, 1996; for discussions of the extreme right party family see Ignazi, 1992, 2003; Betz, 1993; Kitschelt, 1995; Taggart, 1995. 4 When the effective threshold is inferred from the district magnitude the average district magnitude is used and the effective threshold is calculated by taking the mean of the upper threshold (the vote share with which a party is guaranteed to win a seat) and the lower threshold (the minimum percentage with which it is possible for a party to gain representation). The effective magnitude of an electoral system, when inferred from the average district magnitude has been agreed to be 75 / (M+1), where M is the average district magnitude. The average district magnitude is used because in systems with multi-member districts the district magnitude tends to vary from district to district. The average district magnitude is calculated by simply dividing the total number of seats in the legislature by the number of districts. For details on the discussion surrounding the calculation of effective thresholds see Lijphart, 1994: 26-30, 1997; Penades, 1997; Taagepera, 1998. Strictly speaking, when inferred from the average district magnitude, the effective threshold of an electoral system is not a specific percentage of the vote but is a range of possibilities between the upper threshold and the lower threshold. This range is particularly apparent in majoritarian electoral systems where the upper threshold is 50% (plus one vote) but the lower threshold may be as low as 20% if votes are split relatively evenly between competitors. The effective threshold may thus be estimated to be approximately 37.5%, see Taagepera, 1998. 5 Each party's result at each national election in the period 1979-2002 constitutes one unit of analysis. The Pearson correlation coefficient was chosen because the data in question are ratio scale data. A one-tailed test was carried out because the direction of the relationship between the two variables was already hypothesised. 6 In this study, the post-1993 Italian electoral system is included in the proportional category. It is a multi-tiered system that uses the plurality formula at the lower tier and employs the Hare formula at the upper tier. In the literature on electoral systems it is referred to as a 'mixed' system since it contains both majoritarian and proportional elements. However, the decision has been made to classify it in the proportional category because it is the proportional formula that operates at the decisive tier. For further details on mixed electoral systems, see Massicotte and Blais, 1999; Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001.

94 Does PR Promote Political Extremism?

7 Although this article has adopted an inclusive approach in terms of which parties it has examined, the parties included in the analysis continue to form a sample rather than a population, mainly as a result of the limited time period under consideration. In light of this, a significance test is appropriate. 8 This statistically significant finding contrasts to the results of the study on which this present article is based (Carter, 2002). In the earlier work no significant relationship was found to exist between effective thresholds and the right-wing extremist party vote when all electoral systems were considered together and when proportional systems were examined on their own. As explained in footnote 1, the major difference between this earlier work and the present analysis is that, in the earlier study, Belgium was treated as one political system rather than two as it is in this article. Furthermore, the time period under consideration in this present article is longer than that covered in the earlier work. 9 In Britain the plurality formula is used and candidates must simply win the largest share of the vote in order to gain parliamentary representation. By contrast, in France the double-ballot majority-plurality formula is employed. Candidates may be elected after a first round of voting if they have gained an absolute majority of the votes cast. Most of the time, however, no candidate secures such a majority in the first round and a second round of voting takes place in which all candidates with a share of the vote equivalent to 12.5% of the electorate on the first ballot compete. In the second round a candidate may win representation with a simple plurality of the vote.

References Betz, Hans-Georg (1993) 'The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe', The Review of Politics, 55 (4): 663-85. Betz, Hans-Georg and Stefan Immerfall (eds.) (1998) The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies. New York: St. Martin's Press. von Beyme, Klaus (1988) 'Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe', West European Politics, 11 (2): 1-18. Blais, André and R. Kenneth Carty (1991) 'The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1): 79-93. Carter, Elisabeth L. (2002) 'Proportional Representation and the Fortunes of Right-Wing Extremist Parties', West European Politics, 25 (3): 125-46. Cheles, Luciano, Ronnie Ferguson and Michalina Vaughan (eds.) (1995) The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe, 2nd edition. London: Longman. DeClair, Edward G. (1999) Politics on the Fringe: The Peoples, Policies, and Organization of the French Front National. London: Duke University Press. Duverger, Maurice (1954) Political Parties: Their Organization and their Activity in the Modern State. London: Methuen. Elections around the world: http://www.electionworld.org/ Farrell, David M. (2001) Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Gallagher, Michael (1991) 'Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems', Electoral Studies, 10 (1): 33- 51. Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver and Peter Mair (1995) Representative Government in Modern Europe, 2nd edition. New York: McGraw-Hill. Hain, Peter (1986) Proportional Misrepresentation: The Case against PR in Britain. Aldershot: Wildwood House. Hainsworth, Paul (ed.) (1992) The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA. London: Pinter. Hainsworth, Paul (ed.) (2000) The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream. London: Pinter. Harrison, Lisa (1997) 'Maximizing Small Party Potential: The Effects of Electoral System Rules on the Far Right in German Sub-National Elections', German Politics, 6 (3): 132-51. Harrison, Lisa (2000) 'The Impact of German Electoral Systems upon Extremist Party Representation: A Comparative Analysis', Representation, 37 (1): 29-38. Hermens, Ferdinand A. (1941) Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representation. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. Ignazi, Piero (1992) 'The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe', European Journal of Political Research, 22 (1): 3-34. Ignazi, Piero (2003) Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

95 Representation, 40 (2)

Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline (IPU) Database at: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp Katz, Richard S. (1997) Democracy and Elections. New York: Oxford University Press. Kitschelt, Herbert (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. LeDuc, Lawrence, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris (1996) 'Introduction: The Present and Future of Democratic Elections', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris (eds), Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 1-48. Lijphart, Arend (1988) Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Lijphart, Arend (1994) Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty Seven Democracies, 1945-1990. New York: Oxford University Press. Lijphart, Arend (1997) 'The Difficult Science of Electoral Systems: A Commentary on the Critique by Alberto Penades', Electoral Studies, 16 (1): 73-7. Lijphart Election Archive at: http://www.dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij/ Loosemore, John and Victor J. Hanby (1971) 'The Theoretical Limits of Maximum Distortion: Some Analytic Expressions for Electoral Systems', British Journal of Political Science, 1 (4): 467-77. Lords Hansard (2000) 15 February 2000, Debates, coll. 1064. Mackie, Thomas T. and Richard Rose (1991) The International Almanac of Electoral History, 3rd edition. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Mackie, Tom and Richard Rose (1997) A Decade of Election Results: Updating the International Almanac. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde. Mair, Peter (1991) 'The Electoral Universe of Small Parties in Postwar Western Europe', in Ferdinand Müller- Rommel and Geoffrey Pridham (eds). Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives. London: Sage, pp. 41-70. Massicotte, Louis and André Blais (1999) 'Mixed Electoral Systems: A Conceptual and Empirical Survey', Electoral Studies, 18 (3): 341-66. Mudde, Cas (1996) 'The War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party Family', West European Politics, 19 (2): 225-48. Parties and Elections in Europe at: www.parties-and-elections.de/indexe.html Penades, Alberto (1997) 'A Critique of Lijphart's Electoral Systems and Party Systems', Electoral Studies, 16 (1): 58-71. Rae, Douglas W. (1967) The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Shugart, Matthew Soberg and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds) (2001) Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, Gordon (1991), 'In Search of Small Parties: Problems of Definition, Classification and Significance', in Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Geoffrey Pridham (eds.). Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives. London: Sage, pp. 23-40. Swyngedouw, Marc (1998) 'The Extreme Right in Belgium: Of a Non-existent Front National and an Omnipresent Vlaams Blok', in Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall (eds), The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 59-75. Taagepera, Rein (1998) 'Effective Magnitude and Effective Threshold', Electoral Studies, 17 (4): 393-404. Taagepera, Rein and Matthew Soberg Shugart (1989) Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Taggart, Paul (1995) 'New Populist Parties in Western Europe', West European Politics, 18 (1): 34-51.

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97 to 00 Appendix 1: Electoral scores of right-wing extremist parties (1979-2002)

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 FPO Austria 6.1 5.0 9.7 16.6 22.5 21.9 26.9 10.0 VB Flanders" 1.6 2.0 2.7 9.5 11.9 14.2 FN(b) Wallonia' 0.1 0.3 2.4 6.9 3.4 FNB Wallonia* 0.8 Agir Wallonia" 0.4 0.8 PFN(b) Wallonia1 0.3 0.3 0.1 BNP Britain 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 NF Britain 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 FRPd Denmark 11.0 8.9 3.6 4.8 9.0 6.4 6.4 2.4 0.6 DF Denmark 7.4 12.0 FN France 0.2 9.8 9.8 12.7 14.9 11.3 MNR France 1.1 as Republikaner Germany - - 2.1 1.9 1.8 0.6 •8 DVU Germany - - 0.6>> 0.3 >> - 1.2 s NPD Germany 0.2 0.2 0.6^ 0.3>> 0.3 0.3 0.4 f KP/EPEN/EK Greece 1.7' 0.6> 0.5 - - - Falangistas' Spain 2.3h 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 ND Sweden 6.7 1.2 0.2 0.0 SDk Sweden 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.4 DNP Sweden - 0.5 NA/SD Switz. 1.3 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.1 1.8 APS/FPS Switz. 2.6 5.1 4.0 0.9 LdT Switz. 1.9 1.8 0.9 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Does PR Promote Political Extremism?

Appendix 1 (cont.)

Notes: Abbreviations and party names: FPO: Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (Freedom Party of Austria); VB: Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc); FN(b): From National / Front voor die Natie (National Front); FNB: Front Nouveau de Belgique (New Belgian Front); Agir: ('To Act'); PFN(b): Parti des Forces Nouvelles Beige (Party of the New Forces); BNP: British National Party; NF: National Front; FRPd: Fremskridtspartiet (Progress Party); DF: Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People's Party); FN: Front National (National Front); MNR: Mouvement National Republicain (National Republican Movement); Republikaner: (The Republicans); DVU: Deutsche Volksunion (German People's Union); NPD: Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany); KP: Komma Proodeftikon (Progress Party); EPEN: Ethniki Politiki Enosis (National Political Union); EK: Ethniko Komma (National Party); MSI/AN: Movimento Sociale Italiano / Alleanza Nazionale (Italian Social Movement / National Alliance); LN: Lega Nord (Northern League); Ms-Ft: Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (Social Movement-Tricolour Flame); NVU: Nederlandse Volks-Unie (Dutch People's Union); CP/ NVP-CP86: Centrumpartij / Nationale Volkspartij-Centrumpartij'86 (Centre Party / National People's Party-Centre Party 86); CD: Centrumdemocraten (Centre Democrats); FRPn: Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party); FLP: Fedrelandspartiet (Fatherland Party); PDC: Partido de Democracia Crista (Party of Christian Democracy); FNs: Fuerza Nueva / Frente Nacional (New Force/National Front); Falangistas: Spanish Phalanxes; ND: Ny Demokrati (New Democracy); SDk: Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats); DNP: Det Nya Partiet (The New Party); NA/SD: Nationale Aktion fur Volk und Heimat / Schweizer Demokraten (National Action for People and Homeland / Swiss Democrats); APS/FPS: Autopartei der Schweiz / Freiheitspartei der Schweiz (Car Party of Switzerland / Freedom Party of Switzerland); LdT: Lega dei Ticinesi (Ticino League).

Grey areas indicate that the party did not exist at this time, party did not contest election. a Flanders and Wallonia are treated as two separate political systems as Belgian political parties compete in only one of the two regions. The vote scores of the parties reflect their share of the vote in either Flanders and Brussels, or in Wallonia and Brussels. b from 1987 to 1990 the DVU and the NPD joined forces and contested elections under the banner DVU-Liste D. c Progress Party (Komma Proodeftikon, KP). d National Political Union (Ethniki Politiki Enosis, EPEN). e election of 18 June 1989. f EPEN and the National Party (Ethniko Komma, EK). g Lega Lombarda. h Fuerza Nueva and the Falangistas formed a coalition under the banner of the National Union (Union Nacional). i The Falangistas include the Falange Espanola de las Junta de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (the Spanish Phalanx of Committees for Nationalist Syndicalist Attack), the Falange Espanola Independiente (the Independent Spanish Phalanx), the Falange Espanola Authenica (the Authentic Spanish Phalanx), and the Falange Espanola de las Junta de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista - sector Diego Marquez (the Spanish Phalanx of Committees for Nationalist Syndicalist Attack - sector Diego Marquez. All these groups have extremely similar ideologies and contest elections together. Collectively they are known as the Falangistas.

Sources: electoral returns, Mackie and Rose, 1991, 1997; Cheles et al., 1995; Hainsworth, 1992, 2000; Betz and Immerfall, 1998; Elections around the World; Parties and Elections in Europe.

99 S Appendix 2: Disproportionality of elections (1979-2002)

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Austria 0.96 2.48 0.91 2.08 1.18 1.07 3.34 1.36 Flanders 2.41 3.46 3.77 4.21 3.39 2.33 Wallonla 6.55 3.58 3.17 3.59 8.33 3.80 Britain 11.60 20.63 17.73 13.50 16.63 17.86 Denmark 1.53 1.53 1.40 2.13 2.35 2.61 1.52 0.32 1.54 France 15.96 7.20 11.80 25.55 18.64 21.86 Germany 1.42 0.53 0.66 4.71 2.20 3.11 11.64 Greece 8.35 7.12 J4.36 3.90 7.57 9.43 6.79 N3.92 =0 Italy 2.64 2.59 2.48 2.49 9.69 5.92 6.73 •8 Neths. 1.27 1.12 1.66 1.24 1.42 1.32 0.92 I Norway 4.92 4.74 3.65 3.95 3.71 3.31 S o Portugal 3.99 4.12 2.94 3.74 6.27 6.04 4.58 4.96 5.41 3 Spain 10.59 8.08 6.72 9.19 7.05 5.56 4.82 Sweden 1.28 2.43 1.34 2.41 2.87 1.56 0.94 1.69 Switz. 2.05 3.12 3.74 2.60 4.49 3.06

Notes: Disproportionality scores calculated using the Gallagher index. The vote-seat differences for each party are squared and then added. This total is then divided by two, and finally the square root of this value is taken as the disproportionality score. The votes and seats of parties described by electoral returns as 'others' (i.e., very small parties) are not included in the calculations (see Iijphart, 1994: 61). For Greece, 1989J denotes the election of 18 June 1989. 1989N refers to the election of 5 November 1989. Source: electoral returns (as Appendix 1).