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Constitution Making and Democratization © Copyright by The 15 Constitution Making and Democratization The Spanish Paradigm1 Andrea Bonime-Blanc s a type of political change, a tran- pluralism; with a variety of political ideologies sition from authoritarianism to and mentalities; with some political mobilization democracy is on par, in its conse- and participation possible through political par- ties; and in which a leader exercises power within quences, with a revolution, civil war, or coup formally well-defined limits (constitutional ones) A 3 d’etat. To understand transitions, one must that are normally quite predictable. first understand the nature of the regimes that the transition is evolving away from While an authoritarian leader may be char- and toward. Spain in the 1970s was evolving acterized as aconstitutional or abusive of © Copyrightaway from an authoritarian by regime, the which Endowmentconstitutional limits (if there are of any), a Juan Linz defines as follows: democratic leader usually has well-defined powers limited not only by constitutionally theAuthoritarian United regimes are politicalStates systems with Institute of Peace limited, not responsible, political pluralism; sanctioned powers—the judiciary and the without elaborate and guiding ideology (but legislature—but also by constitutionally pre- with distinctive mentalities); without intensive dictable limits. or extensive political mobilization . and in If an authoritarian regime is the starting which a leader (or occasionally a small group) point and a democratic regime the end point exercises power within ill-defined limits but ac- tually quite predictable ones.2 of a transition, the transition itself may be defined as an evolutionary period of reform By utilizing contrasting concepts, one can coupled with regime change. Such a period turn Linz’s definition of authoritarian re- of reform and regime change may contain gimes into a useful definition of democratic two or more of the following developments: regimes: the pluralization and mobilization of society Democratic regimes are political systems with from below; the liberalization of socioeco- mostly unrestricted and responsible political nomic policies; the constitutionalization of 417 418 Andrea Bonime-Blanc political activity; and the liberalization and icy, began to feel increasing social pressure possible democratization of the bureaucracy. and demands. Its responses throughout the This chapter focuses on one aspect of one 1960s were a mix of piecemeal policy reform transition to democracy: the constitution- and overall repression. making period during Spain’s transition to In the mid-1960s, however, new politi- democracy in the late 1970s. The constitu- cal factors began to emerge within Spain’s tionalization of political activity consists of authoritarian regime. A limited number of the democratic reordering and restructuring governmental elites became interested in re- of political rules and institutions. Such dem- forming the political system. The extent of ocratic mainstays as regular elections, free- this interest neither became clear nor did it dom of association, the separation of govern- translate into regularized effective action. But mental powers, and guarantees of individual politicians did emerge from the ranks of the liberties are integrated or reintegrated into pro-reform Francoists who would compete the mainstream of the polity. Such reorga- in post-Franco democratic politics. Among nization of political rules and institutions those who would span both authoritarian requires both an elite decision-making phase and democratic politics were Manuel Fraga and an implementation phase. The decision- Iribarne, a minister under Franco and the making phase is the constitution-making leader of the Popular Alliance, a right-wing process itself, during which the constitution party founded in 1976, and Adolfo Suarez, a makers hammer out the shape of the docu- Franco bureaucrat and the first democrati- ment. The implementation phase follows the cally elected prime minister of post-Franco approval and adoption of the new constitu- Spain. tion and consists of the practical translation As Franco grew older, even he realized of constitutional theory into political action. the need for some reform. His ideas of re- form, however, were intended to perpetu- ate the system he created, not change it. In Preconditions to Constitution Making Linz’s terminology, an authoritarian regime 4 is one that has ill-defined limits. Franco’s ill- A Brief Review of Franco’s Record on Reform defined limits were embodied in his Leyes ©Francisco Copyright Franco y Bahamonde and by his min the- Fundamentales, Endowment or Fundamental Laws. of Six isters first recognized the need to institute of these laws were promulgated over a pe- economic reforms in the early 1950s, when riod of twenty years. Franco tried to impose the consequences United of Franco’s post–civilStates war a quasi-constitutionalInstitute structure of onPeace these un- policies of economic autarky and isolation- related laws in 1967 by passing the Seventh ism proved too costly. While such policies Fundamental Law. He also sought to cloak recognized the need to improve Spain’s then- his system with democratic legitimacy by desperate economic conditions, they were designating his system one of “organic de- initiated solely at the governmental level and mocracy.” The result, as one author has aptly were not prompted by widespread or well- put it, was one of “façade democracy.”5 organized sociopolitical pressures. Important developments with a profound Over the next decade, from the mid- impact on the demise of the authoritar- 1950s to the mid-1960s, some pluralization ian system followed Franco’s 1967 reforms. evolved through the formation of illegal la- When Franco designated Prince Juan Carlos bor movements and political, student, and de Borbon y Borbon his successor as head of liberal Catholic groups. The authoritarian state and Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco his regime, especially in the area of labor pol- first head of government in 1973—until then Framing the State in Times of Transition 419 Franco had held both titles—he did not sus- legal opposition,” which includes groups that pect that he had planted the crucial seeds for the authoritarian regime officially bans or a legal transition to democracy. Franco had persecutes and which, in authoritarian Spain, personally supervised the education and rear- included the communist and socialist parties ing of the prince and trusted him implicitly and their respective labor unions, the Comi- as an ideal successor. The future king, how- siones Obreras (Workers Commissions, or ever, turned out to be the opposite of Franco’s CCOO) and the Union General del Trabajo dreams: a man profoundly dedicated to de- (General Workers Union, or UGT).7 mocracy. Terrorism thwarted Franco’s plans How does an authoritarian regime react for Carrero Blanco, who was assassinated by to such social and political pluralization? the Basque terrorist organization Euzkadi ta Can it stem the tide of social demand for Azkatasuna (ETA) in 1973, six months after reform? Or does it try to satisfy some of becoming prime minister. Carrero Blanco’s these demands? The regime has several op- death was a severe blow to Franco’s plans; tions. It can refuse to recognize pluralization he had been one of Franco’s most loyal and and choose to suppress it actively. It can also hard-line supporters, a man who would have ignore the demands by neither suppressing stopped at very little to maintain authoritari- nor responding to them. The regime may re- anism in Spain. His death left the doors for act, however, by liberalizing specific policies leadership succession for the post of head of without implementing general reform or of- government wide open. ficially recognizing social or political groups. Finally, the authoritarian regime may do the 6 unexpected and implement an overall policy Sociopolitical Preconditions for Democratization of reform and democratization. In the latter In Spain, a phenomenon best described as years of his rule, Franco made a somewhat the pluralization of society had begun under feeble attempt at the third option of piece- Franco’s regime some years before his death. meal reform. Carlos Arias Navarro, the first Using Juan Linz’s typology of oppositions to prime minister of the post-Franco era, tried and under an authoritarian regime, one can to maintain this course. King Juan Carlos, distinguish between opponents within and however, took the first decisive step toward © Copyrightoutside of the system. In doing by so, one the comes Endowmentgeneralized reform and democratization of up with a “semiopposition”: “groups that are when he dismissed Arias Navarro and ap- not dominant or represented in the govern- pointed Adolfo Suarez as prime minister. theing groupUnited but are willing States to participate in Institute of Peace power without fundamentally challenging Post-Franco Reform Attempts, Failures, the regime.” The monarchist Carlists and the 8 far-right political quasi-party Fuerza Nueva and Successes (New Force) were among these groups in Franco died in November 1975; Arias an- Spain. Linz also distinguishes an “a legal op- nounced a program of political reform on position which aims at basic change in the January 28, 1976. The reform package in- regime and its political institutions and to a cluded small concessions to allow most po- large extent basic change in the social and litical groups, except the communists, to hold economic structure.” Many such groups ex- private
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