Water allocation rules in Afghanistan for improved food security

Frank A. Ward, Saud A. Amer & Fahimullah Ziaee

Food Security The Science, Sociology and Economics of Food Production and Access to Food

ISSN 1876-4517

Food Sec. DOI 10.1007/s12571-012-0224-x

1 23 Author's personal copy

Food Sec. DOI 10.1007/s12571-012-0224-x

ORIGINAL PAPER

Water allocation rules in Afghanistan for improved food security

Frank A. Ward & Saud A. Amer & Fahimullah Ziaee

Received: 17 February 2012 /Accepted: 28 October 2012 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht and International Society for Plant Pathology 2012

Abstract In many arid countries, rules for the allocation of flexibility of irrigated agriculture in dealing with water irrigation water when shortages occur are poorly defined. shortages are analyzed for their impacts on farm profit- These weaknesses present a critical constraint to food secu- ability and food security. Findings show that a propor- rity and can be a major cause of poverty and hunger. The tional sharing of water shortages, in which each canal search for flexible rules for the allocation of irrigation water bears an equal proportion of overall shortages, is the is especially important in dry regions of the developing most flexible rule among those analyzed for limiting world where drought and climate change compound the threats to food security and farm income. This water challenges faced by farmers, extension advisers, water man- sharing arrangement is also seen as fair in many cultures agers and governments. Afghanistan is one country in which and is simple to administer. In the developing world, the inflexible arrangements for allocating irrigation water when design and practical implementation of flexible rules for drought occurs continue to undermine its food security. This adapting to periodic water supply changes are important paper develops and applies an empirical framework to eval- as water shortages become more pronounced in the face uate several arrangements for the allocation of irrigation of droughts and climate variability. The results provide a water when shortages occur. The intent of the analysis is framework for identifying, designing, and implementing to identify a water allocation system for sharing shortages water allocation rules for food security in the developing that minimizes the loss in economic benefits and food secu- world’s irrigated areas. rity by efficiently sharing water supplies when the inevitable drought occurs. An integrated decision framework for water Keywords Food security . Irrigation . Water rights . River resources is developed that unifies crop, water, and farm basins . Afghanistan data. Several water allocation rules that could increase the

Support by these organizations is gratefully acknowledged: • New Mexico Agricultural Experiment Station Introduction • US Geological Survey • UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education, the Netherlands Recent years have witnessed growing interest in the use of F. A. Ward (*) integrated water resources management (IWRM) as an ap- Department of Agricultural Economics and Agricultural Business, proach to guide policies that promote food security in the New Mexico State University, developing world’s dry areas (e.g., Gupta and van der Zaag Las Cruces, NM, USA e-mail: [email protected] 2008). Interest has been stimulated by growing evidence of climate change accompanied by increased variability in water S. A. Amer supply around the world. A related challenge is the need to US Geological Survey, ensure food security, meet water demands for multiple uses 12201 Sunrise Valley Dr., Reston, VA 20192, USA and sustain key ecological assets for growing populations. e-mail: [email protected] Despite the widely recognized potential offered by integrating hydrology, economics and institutions, only recently has re- F. Ziaee search started to address some of the challenges faced by Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock, Kabul, Afghanistan practical application of IWRM to guide the design of food e-mail: [email protected] policies. IWRM plays an important role in informing policy Author's personal copy

F.A. Ward et al. tradeoffs by keeping track of all sources and uses of water as The journal Food Security has published a series of water supplies move from the headwaters to downstream recent papers describing the kinds of irrigation management areas where the water is used for irrigation. IWRM is recog- improvements needed to support growing food security nized as the best practice method to account for the interde- needs in several parts of the world. Mu and Khan (2009) pendence of water use and food production in large systems of developed a decision support tool to conduct stochastic irrigated regions in a watershed (Batchelor 1999). analysis on future water availability and water demand to Several studies have examined IWRM approaches for better address food security challenges in China. Waddington addressing flexibility in water management. Jewitt (2002) et al. (2010) identified poor management of irrigation water described how IWRM principles could be applied to im- as an important production constraint for six major food prove ecosystem functions in South Africa and Scott et al. crops in 13 farming systems where there are high pov- (2003) showed how use of the IWRM framework could erty rates in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and East better sustain aquifer dependent lives in Jordan. Several Asia.Lietal(2011) identified the importance of drought and challenges were described by Biswas (2004) for implement- water-related shortages compared with other constraints that ing IWRM to inform the development of more flexible rules limit production of wheat, rice, sorghum, and chickpea in five for water allocation for a number of developing countries. South Asian farming systems. The impact of climate change Mulwafu and Msosa (2005) documented uses of IWRM to on rice production in the lower Mekong Basin was examined comprehensively tackle poverty in Malawi by rehabilitating by Mainuddin et al (2011), who evaluated some widely used water facilities, improving water supply capacity and pro- adaptation options, including better irrigation management, moting community-based management. Van der Zaag and analyzed their implications for overall food security by (2005) showed how the IWRM framework could help water 2050. Better management of irrigation water was shown to be managers in South Africa. Another application of IWRM an important target area for adapting to shortages in the future was described by Yates et al. (2005) who demonstrated its water supply. use through optimization modeling to support the design of Huangetal(2009, 2010) examined the potential for programs for dealing with climate change. Castelletti and water institutional reform in China through better under- Soncini-Sessa (2006) described the use of IWRM to address standing of emerging water institutions. Using survey data management and institutional challenges for a water system from northern China, they found that water managers need- shared by Italy and Switzerland, and Lamberts (2006) pre- ed increased incentives to manage their villages efficiently sented an IWRM framework for improving the performance in order to raise the productivity of regional irrigated agri- of key ecological assets in the Mekong River Basin. Gov- culture. The question of how to match water programs and ernance structures for watersheds in California and France policies to the needs of the world’s poor irrigation farmers could be improved by IWRM, according to Davis (2007) was identified by Namara et al (2010) as a difficult chal- and Fang et al. (2007) who showed how IWRM could lenge and one that required policy reforms. Their research enhance water management in northwest China by the dis- examined an array of promising pathways through which covery of cost effective ways to conserve water and promote management of agricultural water and policies could sustain sustainable development. Murad et al. (2007)usedthe reductions in poverty. Turral et al. (2010) examined the IWRM framework in the United Arab Emirates to address implications of climate change on irrigation through impacts problems of salinity, evaporation and groundwater overdraft on hydrology and water supply. The authors concluded that to promote the economic development of a country heavily emerging programs will require constant adaptation to cul- constrained by scarcity of freshwater supplies. Harou et al. ture, climate, and economic forces. Despite the significant (2009) presented a state-of-the art review of the development achievements described above, many of these articles rec- and use of hydroeconomic models to support implementation ognized the need to develop more flexible rules for the of IWRM through better use of existing water supplies. allocation of irrigation water. Allocation rules that allow for Batchelor (1999) discussed the extent to which IWRM flexibility in times of drought will be needed to allow for principlescouldbeusedtofindirrigationprogramsfor adaption to climate variability and to sustain food security raising water productivity at both farm and catchment and rural livelihoods in the developing world’s dry regions. scales. Yang et al. (2003) found that clearly defined and legally enforceable water rights and responsibilities for wa- Irrigation in Afghanistan ter managers and farmers can contribute to a more produc- tive irrigated agriculture. In an analysis of the Ruaha River Since the late 1970s, few countries have had a greater need for in Tanzania, Lankford et al. (2004) discovered that imple- increased flexibility in rules for the allocation of irrigation mentation of IWRM required better informed policy advice water than Afghanistan. Afghanistan is home to 25 million in order to draw policy-makers into scientifically informed people (Pauli 2008;UN2009) three quarters of whom live in decision-making. rural areas (CSO 2008). Here, the high spatial and temporal Author's personal copy

Water allocation rules in Afghanistan for improved food security variability in water supply, limited capacity of reservoir stor- or stolen hydrometric data networks, damaged irrigation age and poorly developed rules for the allocation of water infrastructure, periodic drought and ongoing military con- continue to cause numerous hardships. flict. The lack of a unified analytical framework for discov- A 2010 FAO report (FAO 2010) estimated several indi- ering water allocation rules for adapting to water supply cators of weak food security in Afghanistan. The data shortages that are more flexible has left the region at con- showed 32.8 % and 25.7 % of children under the age of siderable risk of food insecurity. It also has contributed to 5 who were underweight or who had died, respectively and, the weak capacity of irrigated agriculture to provide a living of all children, 59 % were under normal height for their age wage to the high percentage of Afghans who make their and 8.9 % were under normal weight for their age. There- living in production agriculture. fore, even if these percentages are static or improving, in the In light of the unmet needs and gaps described above, the context of rapidly rising population levels, absolute numbers contribution of this analysis is to create, describe and apply may be rising, indicating increased real suffering in the a framework that enables water managers and water stake- country over time. These hardships undermine rural live- holders to improve food security and raise farm net incomes lihoods, food security, and net incomes. The main reason for when irrigated agriculture is faced with large, unexpected, taking land out of production is unreliable and/or inadequate and periodic changes in water supplies. Its goal is to conduct water supplies (Pauli 2008). Since 2000, several droughts an analysis of water allocation rules which are economically have occurred that have caused considerable damage to efficient and that support food security and farm livelihoods irrigated agriculture, undermined already weak food securi- in an environment where water supplies are scarce and ty and contributed to out-migration. Recent data estimate fluctuate. It addresses the important and relevant issue of about 36 % of irrigated systems developed in Afghanistan how water governance and allocation rules can be made no longer function (FAO 2010). more flexible in adapting to water shortages. Moreover, Agriculture employs four-fifths of the Afghan population Central Asia is a region for which little peer reviewed and contributes to more than half of its gross domestic published research currently exists to address the need for product. Improving the performance of Afghanistan’s irri- better food security at the basin scale. In order to achieve its gated agriculture is essential to food security, rural live- goal, this paper has four objectives relating to analysis of lihoods and to a future stable and peaceful society (Lautze water allocation rules for irrigated agriculture in the Balkh et al. 2002; Asian Development Bank 2004; Ahmad and Basin, Afghanistan. Wasiq 2004). The Afghan agricultural community faces a & Assemble a historical database on water supply and number of challenges related to irrigation for which the water demand that characterizes the hydrology, agrono- practical application of IWRM has the potential to improve my, economics, and institutions governing irrigated lives and livelihoods by addressing weak food security and agriculture. low farm net incomes (Mahmoodi 2008). & Integrate these data into a framework that describes irrigated land and water use behavior at the basin scale Food security in Afghanistan so that water managers, water administrators, and farm- ers can understand what influences profitability and Wheat is the main cereal crop for food consumption and food-security in irrigated agriculture. security in Afghanistan (USAID 2007). In 2002, wheat was & Evaluate impacts on farm profitability and food security planted on 2.4 million ha, about two-thirds of the nation’s associated with selected water sharing rules for adapting total cultivated area. Malnutrition threats to Afghanistan’s to water shortages. rural population point to the importance of finding and & Identify those water allocation rules that could improve implementing more flexible rules for the allocation of irri- the flexibility by which irrigated agriculture could better gation water. Large fluctuations in annual and seasonal adapt to periodic water shortages. stream flows (Shobair 2001; Shobair and Alim 2004) along with poorly developed rules for assigning and enforcing property rights in water have created economic and food security risks for many Afghan farmers (Maletta 2004, Materials and methods 2006, 2007), especially those who live in downstream areas. A major challenge facing Afghan water managers is the Balkh Province is located in the northern part of Afghani- need for good hydrologic, economic, agronomic and insti- stan. Nearly half the province is mountainous. With a total tutional data that describe the country’s irrigated agriculture. population of about 1.12 million, it has 15 districts, with its In addition, the capacity to assemble relevant data into a capital at Mazar-Sharif, a commercial and financial center of framework that connects economics, crop production and about 375,000 (Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and De- food security has been hampered by years of lost, damaged velopment 2007). The Balkh River Basin (referred to Author's personal copy

F.A. Ward et al. hereafter as the Basin) is located in northwest Afghanistan. government, to allocate water among canals that compete The Balkh River (referred to as the River) and the canals fed for the River’s supplies. In Afghanistan, the mirab is part of by its supplies lie in the Jowzjan, Balkh, Samangan and an ancient water management system revolving around Bamian provinces (Fig. 1). The River supplies irrigation farmer-elected water masters (mirabs) who live and work water to 14 canals (Fig. 2). Each canal supplies water to a in the community. The mirab system, which generally large number of individual farmers within the Basin. The extends beyond ethnic, religious and political boundaries, community served by each canal has a long history of has lasted for millenia. While much social stress has oc- customary property rights in water, based on the paikal curred as a result of military conflict since the 1970s, the measurement system. The paikal is an Afghan land-water mirab system has survived and has often been the only unit equal to an average of about 80 ha of irrigated land and remaining institution to support management of in-canal sufficient water needed to support its irrigation. A quantity and on-farm water distribution (Lee 2006). of land equal to 80 ha irrigated per paikal of water is an The mirab typically spends a large part of his time walk- estimated average under full water supply conditions (Beck ing his canal system and checking its control structures in 2010a, b, p. 11). However, in Afghanistan, the paikal has order to monitor technical or institutional problems and to considerable variability. That variability occurs over loca- make sure the system functions continuously. Afghan canals tions, water years and months within the irrigation season. are rarely lined, so upkeep and maintenance is labor- Throughout most of Afghanistan, the mirab is responsi- intensive and requires vigilance. When system maintenance ble for allocating water within each canal’s service area to is needed, the mirab finds and assigns labor from the com- individual farmers. The mirab system functions, but has munity of canal water users. Provision of unpaid labor for neither the support nor the authority of higher level institu- repairs and maintenance is supplied in exchange for access tions, such as village and provincial councils or national to the canal’s water. Labor is traded for water. Users

Fig. 1 Afghanistan Map Showing the Balkh River Basin. Adapted from Asian Development Bank (2004) Author's personal copy

Water allocation rules in Afghanistan for improved food security

Fig. 2 Schematic of the Balkh Basin Canal System, Afghanistan. Adapted from Asian Development Bank (2004)

who dodge contributing their share of labor are denied budgets originally prepared by Chemonics International. The canal service rights. So incentives are well-placed to budgets were revised by the AWATT team in Afghanistan in contribute to upkeep. Under the system each water user 2009 to reflect more recent and local conditions (Eberle et al. contributes to the system’s maintenance in proportion to 2009). Data for cropland and their productive capacity was that user’s land area, and the land’slocationonthe based on Kugbei and Shahab (2007). canal. A similar distribution of maintenance responsibil- ity occurs among different canals in a single watershed. Integrated management framework Farmers in the upper parts of watersheds are expected to contribute more labor to system maintenance than The basin-level approach is widely regarded as a best prac- those at lower levels because of reduced reliability of tice in water management. Nevertheless much recent aca- water supplies in the lower reaches. demic literature has drawn attention to numerous special challenges posed by integrated water resources management Data (IWRM) as well as river basin management (RBM) applied to the developing world (Lankford and Hepworth 2010; One objective of this study was to collect and assemble the Pigram 2001; Svendsen et al. 2005). One of the motivations data required to build an integrated framework to inform the behind the current paper is to deal with the special chal- design of more flexible water allocation rules. Data were lenges in applying IWRM to the developing world under assembled for headwater inflows (water supplies), crop conditions of Civil War and foreign invasion. costs and returns, land available for agricultural production An IWRM decision support framework was developed to and wheat production that are required to sustain food meet the need for a unified approach to inform debates on security. The data used to characterize food security sustained the economic and food security performance of various by wheat production come from Maletta and Favre (2003). possible rules proposed for water sharing that affect the Farm enterprise budgets were updated in 2009, based on use of the River’s water supply for irrigation. Since 2002, Author's personal copy

F.A. Ward et al. numerous consultants and development organizations have equivalent to the minimum number of calories required for proposed a wide range of institutional water reforms that are the regional population’s dietary consumption. Wheat pro- significant for Afghanistan. The Ministry of Energy and duction is valued above the production of other crops. Our Water (MEW) is the most important organization assigned approach emphasizes the importance that producers assign to the management of water resources. The principle of to wheat production in their planting decisions. It deals with IWRM has been promoted and a River Basin Management the long-recognized problem of putting a value on wheat approach has been adopted, as described in Article 4 of the production when wheat is a well-recognized poor contribu- 2009 Draft Water Law (Thomas and Ahmad 2009). tor to commercial farm income (Eberle et al. 2009). These The framework was designed to improve the capacity of data are based on WHO estimates of minimum calories the Basin’s farmers, mirabs and other stakeholders to assess required for good health. However in practice, some crop the impacts of alternative water sharing rules on the level will be lost along the way through accidents such as wan- and distribution of farm net income and food security. It was dering livestock, spillage and the like. Moreover, the mini- also designed to find a way to limit losses in food security mum number of calories needed to work these lands might and farm net income associated with future periodic be higher because of the nature of work and factors such as droughts that would reduce the basin’s water supplies. The climate. Ensuring sufficient wheat for minimum calorie framework unifies crop, water and farm data along with requirements may still leave people highly vulnerable to rules for sharing shortages when they occur. Our approach acute or unexpected shocks. Thus, 10 % more should be to developing more flexible rules for water management is added to provide a cushion to deal with contingencies consistent with the well-known Nine Principles of Develop- (Table 1). ment: ownership, capacity building, sustainability, selectiv- After food security is assured, if any water is left for a ity, assessment, results, partnership, flexibility and given canal service area, it is allocated among the other accountability (Natsios 2005). (non-wheat) crops in order to maximize farm profitability. Our model addresses three important aspects of IWRM: The highest valued crop is planted first. Farmers plant as much land to this crop as they can, until the entire area & Flexibility: this permits the policy analyst to experiment suitable for that crop is planted or until the water supply is with various rules for allocation of available water exhausted, whichever occurs first. If water remains after the among canals when possible water shortages occur. maximum number of hectares of the highest valued crop is & Basin scale: this accounts for the fact that more river planted, the next highest valued crop is planted. This pro- water allocated to a canal in one part of the basin reduces cess continues sequentially until the water from that canal is the availability of river water for a downstream or up- exhausted or until no positive net income can be earned by stream canal. irrigating the crops, or there is no land area left suitable for & Sustainability: this is based exclusively on surface water, planting. That profit maximizing allocation of remaining so it addresses renewable supplies. Work is ongoing to water is calculated for each water shortage sharing arrange- address other dimensions of sustainability, such as the ment selected by the model user. The model accounts in a quantity, timing and duration of flows to support key consistent way for both farm net income and food security by ecological assets. measuring the additional value gained by planting wheat in Figure 2 shows the 14 irrigation canals in the Basin in the same manner as commercially-valued crops. The model, which each canal area has a customary amount of water in GAMS, is posted at the website at http://agecon.nmsu.edu/ allocated to it during periods of full supply. A full water fward/water/, toward the end of the category “Integrated Wa- supply in the Basin is 1,540 million cubic meters per year, ter Management (IWRM) Basin Models with Multiple Water based on the annual average of the 1964–1978 US Geolog- Uses.” If a drought is severe enough so that too little water is ical Survey data from the Rabat-I-Bala Gauge on the Balkh available for a given canal to support a food-secure level of River. However, when supplies are progressively reduced in wheat production, the canal service area specializes in wheat. the face of a drought of growing severity, passionate debates typically center on which canals should shoulder what part Formulating water allocation rules of the overall shortage burden. It was with the intention of informing debates on basin-wide economic and food secu- Patterns of water used in production, food security, and farm rity impacts resulting from a number of potential rules for net income are highly dependent on the water allocation sharing shortages that we built the IWRM model (Fisher et rules that govern the distribution, timing, and level of water al. 2005). allocations. This is especially true in the Basin, where no Food security is the top priority for Afghan irrigators in formally defined and consistently enforced rules exist for the Basin. That security is enforced in our analysis by allocating water shortages. Weak water allocation rules assigning the top priority to a level of wheat production leave to chance the capacity of individual canals to produce Author's personal copy

Water allocation rules in Afghanistan for improved food security

Table 1 Wheat requirements for food security used in analysis Canal Full supply canal Land capacity Total wheat Additional 10 % by canal, Balk Basin, water allocation (Ha) production required required for contingencies Afghanistan (Paikals) for food security such as spillage and other (Metric tons) accidents or losses

Aman Sahib 200 16,000 17,557 19,313 Nahr Shahi 560 44,800 49,158 54,074 Siagard 150 12,000 13,167 14,484 Balkh 70 5,600 6,145 6,760 Chemtal 164 13,120 14,396 15,836 Mushtaq 209 16,720 18,347 20,182 Abdulah 700 56,000 61,448 67,593 Dawlatabad 750 60,000 65,837 72,421 Charbulak 750 60,000 65,837 72,421 Faizabad 600 48,000 52,670 57,937 Murdian 332 26,560 29,144 32,058 Khanaqah 328 26,240 28,793 31,672 Aqcha 201 16,080 17,644 19,408 Mingajik 239 19,120 20,980 23,078 Total 5,253 420,240 461,123 507,235

a food-secure level of wheat and achieve an acceptable level method is the default rule when no existing legally binding of farm net income. Individual canals take water when it’s framework for water allocation is in place. According to Rout available, often more than the crop needs. Weakly defined (2008) what we describe as upstream priority approximates to and poorly enforced water allocation rules along with limit- the current method of water allocation in the Basin during ed storage mean than each farmer on each canal faces the periods of shortfall. Afghan farmers are typically ignorant of incentive to appropriate as much as they can when the river actual crop water requirements. Irrigation scheduling practices and canal flow. They may see nothing more for several are still largely based on the maximum amount of water a weeks or months. farmer can capture. Present irrigation practices of Afghan This section describes the process and outcome of farmers include a tendency to over irrigate, which undermines several allocation rules analyzed for sharing shortages. the food and water security of downstream farmers (Qureshi Each has unique effects on the level and distribution of 2002). Found a similar default rule for sharing irrigation water farm net income and food security. Historically, in this in Nepal, where irrigators at the upper end of a river Basin, there has been only limited debate over water system took all the water they needed, leaving much allocation rules when a full supply occurs, for in that reduced quantities for those lower in the system. Tail- case all canal service areas receive their full allocation. enders typically receive considerably reduced quantities However, when a shortage occurs, rules for sharing the of water and therefore bear the greatest burden of major shortage take on considerable importance. The need to shortages in drought periods. evaluate economic and food security impacts for any proposed shortage sharing arrangements grows with Downstream user priority greater water scarcity. Several potential rules for sharing shortages are described below. Our definition of downstream priority is the opposite of upstream priority. Under downstream priority, the most Upstream user priority downstream (bottom) canal takes its full supply while the next upper canal receives whatever flows are left in the river Allocating water with a priority assigned to upstream users after the bottom canal is assigned its flows. For example, means that the farthest upstream (top) canal takes its cus- suppose that total river flows per year are limited to 3,000 tomary (full) allocation while the next downstream canal paikals (about 880 million cubic meters). The bottom canal takes its full allocation if any water is left over after the top (Mingajik Canal) then has a customary right to its full 160.8 canal appropriates water. This process continues sequentially paikals, so under this arrangement that canal has the most downstream until the river is dry. This water allocation senior right, which means it’s entitled to its entire customary Author's personal copy

F.A. Ward et al. right. In this case the next to bottom canal (Aqcha Canal) associated with natural supply variability. This rule allows has the right to its entire 191.2 paikal customary right, as the for a predictable amount of water to be allocated to the lower River’s total flows per year, at 3,000 paikals, exceed 352 canals even when overall supplies are highly variable within a paikals per year (160.8 million+191.2 million). This process year or across years. An important question asks why an of allocating the 3,000 total paikals continues from the bottom upstream and a downstream region would agree to such an to the top of the watershed until the river’s entire flow is allocation rule arrangement that obviously benefits down- exhausted. After all those claims are met, no canals farther stream users. History shows that they would agree when upstream receive any water at all. This simple but revealing upstream users have large amounts of capacity for storing example illustrates the allocation of the River’s available flood flows and downstream regions have little or none. In flows by a downstream priority arrangement. While it is that case, this rule arrangement can be attractive to both simple arithmetically, its implementation requires consider- regions, especially if the downstream user trades a high mean able institutional machinery and scientific capacity, as it’sa flow in exchange for shouldering the burden of a high variance hydrologically and institutionally complicated way to allocate of flows. Under those conditions, a Pareto Improving outcome water. It requires considerable analytic capacity as numerous can result because each region specializes in its comparative calculations are required to implement shares of river water advantage: upstream users have storage to trap flood flows, progressing from the bottom to the top of the watershed. while lower users have supply security in dry years. Despite its complexity, downstream priority as described here has the potential to increase both the Basin’s total farm Downstream user bears shortage risk net income and to raise its food security in those special conditions where the canals farther downstream have higher We next defined a rule for handling shortages that are opposite economic productivity. This higher potential productivity is to the rule in which the upstream group bears the shortage risk. a common occurrence in the world’s irrigated areas where When a downstream group of users bears a shortage risk, downstream areas possess longer growing seasons, higher shortages are allocated so that a co-equal group of down- temperature and more fertile soils, all of which allow a stream canals bears the higher shortage risk. Consider the wider diversity of staple or commercial crops to be planted. example in which seven upper canals receive their entire water allocation as a group before the seven lower canals are Upstream user bears shortage risk allowed to take any water whatsoever. If there is enough water in a dry period to assure deliveries to all seven top canals, then We defined this rule to reflect conditions in which a group of the lower group of seven shares whatever is left in proportion canals share a common priority (seniority) level. The group to its customary full right. We illustrate only for the case of sharing the common priority need not be contiguous. Sev- two groups who share a common priority. Our approach has eral canals scattered at great distances and even separated by enough flexibility for three or more groups to share a common other canals could have an identical seniority level. Each priority. When downstream canals bear the shortage risk, there canal within the group shares shortages with other canals of is greater predictability in flows to the upstream canals during the group, and all canals within the group are assigned an dry periods. However, downstream canal farmers as a group equal priority. For the case when upstream users bear the might be willing to bear a shortage in a basin with high shortage risk, those users have a more junior status than the variability of streamflows in exchange for higher mean flows, downstream users when drought occurs. especially if they had access to a reservoir as a place to store For example, suppose that a shortage sharing rule is water in wet years for use in dry years. defined by which the seven upper canals receive no water until the seven lower canals receive their entire allotment. If Proportional sharing of shortages there is enough total water in the River to secure deliveries to all seven lower canals, then the upper seven share remain- Droughts reduce precipitation, which is typically seen as ing water supplies in proportion to their customary full reduced streamflows at the headwaters. In these conditions, water right. Of course, there is nothing special about the water shortages in the river can be shared proportionally. number seven in either the junior or the senior group. Any Under this rule, canals share the risk of shortages propor- number of users can be assigned to either group. The model tionally (McCormick 1994). When shortages are shared we developed is quite flexible in allowing the policy analyst under this rule, a 25 % overall shortage produces a 25 % to experiment with a wide range of water allocation rules for reduction of each canal’s customary full allotment. This sharing shortages. An arrangement in which the upstream method provides a proportionate sharing of water supply users bear the shortage risk is identical in principle to the risk among all canals and prevents any single canal or group U.S. Colorado River Compact (McCormick 1994). That of canals from bearing a disproportionate burden of shortage river sharing rule places the risk on the upstream region risks (some for all rather than all for some). Author's personal copy

Water allocation rules in Afghanistan for improved food security

Priority by scale of historical use rules for sharing shortages among the canals shown in Table 1. When droughts reduce streamflows at the headwaters, an- The policy analyst or water manager selects one of the other way to share shortages is to assign priority to a canal’s water sharing rules by assigning a comparative numerical importance, in which importance is defined based on the priority to each canal. None of the water sharing rules total amount of land served by the canal under full produces an overall constrained optimization of the basin’s supply conditions. For example, Table 1 shows that economic returns from water used in crop irrigation. Never- three canals, Abdulah, Dawlatabad and Charbulak have theless, each of the water allocation rules can be compared larger land capacity and a larger food requirement be- with the others in terms of their performance for limiting cause of a larger population living there. But none of losses to farm net income under drought. A well-known these three districts is close to either the headwaters or disadvantage of analyzing a discrete set of water sharing the tail of the river system. For this reason, we consider rules is that none may be as efficient in minimizing eco- a water sharing rule with priority set by the importance nomic losses as a non-analyzed rule lurking in the back- of the canal. Under this proposed arrangement for short- ground. Moreover, even if several hundred water sharing age sharing, the top priority is assigned to the canal rules were analyzed, there could still be a more efficient way serving the largest land area under full supply condi- of allocating water shortages. Therefore the notion of a tions, with the second priority going to the second “most economically efficient” (optimal) water shortage largest command area, and the like, until the river’s sharing rule presents itself as a question of considerable water supply is exhausted. importance for the formulation and administration of water sharing rules (water right systems), as discussed below. Evaluating water allocations An optimal water allocation Water allocation rules While each of the above rules assigns a unique sharing ar- Each of the rules for sharing river water among irrigation rangement for allocating water supply shortages, none pre- canals, described above, prescribes a different set of princi- tends to allocate the river’s scarce water efficiently among the ples for sharing when shortages occur. Like most regions of 14 canals that compete for the total supply. Because none of the world where crop irrigation is important, streamflows in the water sharing rules described above could be guaranteed to the Basin are highly variable from year to year. The basin produce an economically efficient sharing of water shortages, has been subjected to many droughts even in its very recent a separate optimization exercise was conducted. Under that history. Data from the Afghan National Disaster Mitigation exercise we performed an overall constrained optimization to Policy database show that the country has been hit by severe find the most economically efficient way to share the basin’s droughts in 1971–1973, and 2000–2002 with significant water shortages when they occur. The most economically economic damage resulting. The period 2003 to 2008 is efficient water sharing rule distributes whatever river water the most recent, when despite efforts by the Government is available for the basin among its canals to minimize the total of Afghanistan and numerous donor organizations, drought loss of farm net income produced by drought. impacts were felt in shortages of drinking water and wheat The economically efficient water allocation is indepen- supplies. There were also high losses of livestock in the dent of concerns for equity, culture, or historical water northern part of the country (Ziaee 2011). The analysis of sharing rules. But in practice expectations and assessments water allocation rules described in this paper permits the of equity against cultural norms, historical practices, loyal- conduct of numerous policy experiments. Those policy ties and the like, often take precedence over economic experiments can be analyzed by comparing various rules efficiency outside much of the western world. So the dis- for the allocation of water shortages, including rules that are covery and design of economically efficient water sharing currently practised as well as those that have never been rules must account for the context of how people live and practised. The capacity to experiment with rules that are not think and must also be presented to stakeholders in ways now practised or with those that have never been practiced that are compatible with such realities in order to be em- was another motivation for the development of an integrated braced and carried out in action. Under a shortage sharing river basin model. The development of a model allows a rule that is economically efficient, water gravitates to the range of water sharing experiments to be conducted without combination of canals and crops that minimizes the Basin’s having the worst mistakes lead to ruin. It also allows policy total loss in farm net income compared to net income analysts to experiment with water sharing proposals far produced by a full water supply. outside the range of actual practice and permits a compari- Results of this basinwide analysis of economic efficiency son of hydrologic and economic outcomes under a range of can be interpreted as the outcome of a water sharing Author's personal copy

F.A. Ward et al. arrangement that would allow unrestricted trading of water community in Afghanistan remains an open challenge. In for cash. Under this idealistic trading economy, water buyers addition to this, the important question remains that of who pay cash, receive water and allocate purchased water to has the legal right to sell water. Those who have the legal crops with a higher value than the cash spent to purchase right to sell water can only be identified if a well-defined the water. However, there are many practical constraints that and consistently administered system of water rights is block the achievement of water trading. For example, infor- established. Without defined and enforced water rights, each mation and knowledge asymmetries disadvantage some farmer and any mirab can mount an argument claiming they farmers leading them to make poor decisions. More wide- have the right to sell water, even in the face of reduced spread and openly posted bid prices to buy or sell water can overall supplies (FAO 2006). spread the benefits of a water trading economy more widely and fairly. Such a posting of water trading information could help more farmers overcome a lack of knowledge, power Results and confidence. Despite all these advantages of water trad- ing, it can be argued that water trading raises risks of Base conditions eroding ideas and world views of water as a communal resource and a basis for cooperation and community cohe- We used the best data we could secure to reflect the Basin’s sion. Another well-known disadvantage of trading water for recent hydrologic, institutional, agronomic, and economic cash is the negative economic and cultural impacts to the realities, although these were still not good. Weak or non- water exporting area associated with reduced production existent data are a widespread phenomenon in Afghanistan that would occur. In fact, trading of water for cash is rarely and in most developing countries. Yet, the wait for research seen in Afghanistan. This absence occurs for many reasons, grade data to become available will postpone data-informed including the fact that when money is paid for water, there is decisions for a long time. So we used the data we could find little legal enforcement requiring the water seller to make and built a decision making framework that illustrated the the sold water available to the buyer. The water seller may use and importance of the data. We chose this approach with keep both the money and the water, with little legal recourse the hope that our results might engage enough debate to available to the buyer. motivate investments in better data. Where data are poor, it’s The basinwide efficiency analysis was implemented as a an important exercise to see how sensitive the results are to single constrained optimization, in which water was allocated the data used. Those data for which small changes bring among canals and crops to maximize total basin-wide farm about large adjustments in recommended policy emphasize net income, subject only to constraints on the total water the importance of investing in better data. Results from a supply available, an estimated crop water production re- sensitivity analysis performed on variability of price and lation,anddataoncropprices,yields,andcosts.The yield data are available from the authors on request. implementation of this special optimization model was based Data were secured on headwater inflows, crop costs and on the use of positive mathematical programming combined returns (based on Eberle et al. 2009) and land available for with basin scale water allocation optimization (e.g., Dagnino agricultural production and wheat production required to and Ward 2012). sustain food security. Table 1 shows the land area served There is no guarantee that this idealized efficient water by each of the 14 canals (varying from 5,600 to 60,000 ha) allocation outcome would or even could occur in the Basin and the amount of wheat required for food security (Zaheer no matter how many cultural constraints to water allocation 2009). Table 2 shows the data used for crop price, while are dissolved. For this reason, results of the basin optimiza- Table 3 presents net revenue per ha of land. tion are best interpreted as a reference point for comparing the water shortage sharing rules described above. Still, a Food security requirements principled argument can be made that something close to this outcome could be achieved if a community-enforced Between 1998 and 2002, large amounts of food aid helped system of rules for water sharing (water rights system) were offset wheat production shortfalls, but food security chal- established, combined with rules that permitted, encour- lenges remain (Chabot and Dorosh 2007). Table 1 shows the aged, or rewarded water trading. Irrigators who had the detailed assumptions used to characterize wheat production greatest economic need for water after the onset of a drought and food security requirements for the Basin’s rural farm would rent, buy, or lease water or water rights from those households. The wheat production required for dietary food who had a legal right to use water. The community-enforced security was measured as the product of cereal food require- system of water rights described here needs a mechanism ments per capita, the number family members per house- that rewards competence, honesty, and immunity to corrup- hold, the number of wheat-consuming farm households, and tion and patronage. Finding or even designing such a the percentage of current wheat production used for current Author's personal copy

Water allocation rules in Afghanistan for improved food security

Table 2 Base crop price by crop and canal from enterprise budg- Crop Wheat Cotton Pulses Rice Potato Melons Tomatoes ets, Balkh Basin, Afghanistan ($ US per metric ton) Canal Aman Sahib 708 2,472 1,022 475 132 66 101 Nahr Shahi 708 2,472 1,022 475 132 66 101 Siagard 708 2,472 1,022 475 132 66 101 Balkh 708 2,472 1,022 475 132 66 101 Chemtal 505 2,311 1,022 475 69 93 106 Mushtaq 505 2,311 1,022 475 69 93 106 Abdulah 505 2,311 1,022 475 69 93 106 Dawlatabad 505 2,311 1,022 475 69 93 106 Charbulak 505 2,311 1,022 475 69 93 106 Faizabad 314 2,311 1,022 475 69 66 101 Murdian 329 2,311 1,022 403 69 66 101 Khanaqah 329 2,311 1,022 403 69 66 101 Aqcha 329 2,311 1,022 403 69 66 101 Mingajik 329 2,311 1,022 403 69 66 101 Basin wide average 499 2,357 1,022 454 87 76 103

food consumption (not invested for planting in the next season). Base cost and return farm budgets The amount of wheat required to promote food-secure con- sumption is taken to be 180 kg per capita per year in each canal Table 3 shows budgeted net income per hectare for the area, with an estimated 210,000 farms producing and consum- seven crops for which significant production occurs in the ing wheat (Maletta and Favre 2003). The proportion of wheat Basin. Farm net income per unit land is measured as price withheld for future planting is 10.9 %, based on Maletta and multiplied by yield minus production cost, described in Favre and Chabot and Dorosh (2007). In the absence of ac- Eberle, et al. (2009). Net income per hectare for wheat is ceptable research grade data, each crop’s irrigation water re- taken to be $US 1 above the net income for the highest net quirement is set to 1 m in depth for the irrigation season. income valued non-wheat crop. This approach was used to

Table 3 Base income per hectare by Crop (Income per Ha is defined as (Crop Price) * Yield - Cost) and canal from enterprise budgets, Balkh Basin, Afghanistan ($ US per Year)

Crop Wheata Cotton Pulses Rice Potato Melons Tomatoes

Canal Aman Sahib 1,587 293 236 1 1,585 482 410 Nahr Shahi 1,587 293 236 1 1,585 482 410 Siagard 1,587 293 236 1 1,585 482 410 Balkh 1,587 293 236 1 1,585 482 410 Chemtal 1,018 222 236 1 25 1,017 592 Mushtaq 1,018 222 236 1 25 1,017 592 Abdulah 1,018 222 236 1 25 1,017 592 Dawlatabad 1,018 222 236 1 25 1,017 592 Charbulak 1,018 222 236 1 25 1,017 592 Faizabad 483 222 236 1 25 482 410 Murdian 525 222 236 525 25 482 410 Khanaqah 525 222 236 525 25 482 410 Aqcha 525 222 236 525 25 482 410 Mingajik 525 222 236 525 25 482 410 Basin wide average 1,002 242 236 151 471 673 475 a Income per hectare for wheat is defined as $1 above the highest valued other crop to assign top priority to assure food security Author's personal copy

F.A. Ward et al. account for the significant contribution to food security made high level of flexibility sustained by proportional shar- by subsistence wheat production. Existing enterprise budgets ing of shortfalls far out-performs all other shortage developed using national averages showed that farm net in- sharing rules under both a 25 and 50 % reduction in come per hectare produced by cotton, pulses and rice all the basin’s water supplies. Its supremacy compared to produce negative returns. However, considerable amounts of the other five rules is sustained even under a severe these crops are produced in the Basin. To reflect the observed drought in which overall basin supplies fall to half their cropping patterns and returns seen in the Basin, net income normal level. This finding shows that regional food values for the Basin’s enterprise budgets by crop were adjust- security for securing dietary caloric intake can be sus- ed to more closely represent the land use patterns and crop tained under even a severe drought scenario, as long as yields recently seen on the ground (Kugbei and Shahab 2007). water shortages are shared proportionally among the 14 canal service areas. Crop land limits A top performing water allocation rule The Basin is home to a wide range of geographic conditions that affect the economic performance of pro- A proportional sharing of shortage is the supreme water ducing each crop shown in Tables 2 and 3. So, in each shortage sharing rule for protecting against food poverty as canal service area, the physical geography, soils and droughts intensify. Nevertheless, the reform of water allo- climate affect the amount of land by crop that is eco- cation rules (institutional reform) can require overcoming nomically practical to bring into production in those large amounts of inertia as well as possibly needing new fortunate cases when water is available. Base quantities projects, bureaucracies and legal frameworks. Institutional of land in production by crop are derived from the reform can command a high cost indeed. For example one analysis of Kugbei and Shahab (2007). recent article on institutional reform in rural Indian irrigation found that those reforms face many challenges. These can Impact of water allocation rules on food security become intractable due to long-established bureaucracies, power relationships, and special interests (Atwood 2005). Table 4 presents results for food security outcomes associated When the Basin’s water supplies are full (just over 5,250 with each of the six alternative water sharing rules described paikals), there is plenty of water for both wheat and com- earlier in the paper. Results shown in Table 4 emphasize the mercial crops throughout the Basin. With half of full water importance of flexibility for any water- sharing rule to sustain supplies, 77 % of the irrigated land is still planted to wheat, food security in the face of various levels of total water supply as wheat for household subsistence remains the top priority. available. Results are presented by canal for varying amounts In fact, enough wheat production to sustain adequate food of water shortage for each of the six water sharing rules. security requires only about 39 % of the full supply if Table 1 shows that the total quantity of wheat re- proportional shortage sharing is well-administered (not quired to sustain a food secure output of 461,123 metric shown in Table 4). Enforcing and providing resources to tons depends on water supply, rules for sharing water support the high level of honesty and discipline required by shortages, and wheat yields. For the base case there is water administrators is a difficult ideal to carry out in any no shortage in caloric intake from wheat production that culture, especially where water administrators are under- occurs in periods of full water supply, regardless of the paid. But it’s even harder to implement in a culture where rule for sharing water shortages. However, the food the allocation of water among competing canal service areas security and food poverty implications of various rules historically depended on political connections (who you for sharing shortages look very different as total Basin know) rather than on an impartially administered system shortages become more pronounced. of justice. The burdens imposed by an invading foreign Table 4 vividly reveals the important principle that military force make honest and even-handed water admin- rules for sharing water shortages have a direct and large istration even harder. impact on food security. Different water allocation rules produce dramatically different outcomes for the capacity Weaker performing water allocation rules to support a food-secure level of wheat production when water shortages occur. The two shortages analyzed are Remarkably Table 4 shows that one of the poorest dry (25 % supply reduction) and drought (50 % reduc- performing water sharing institution is the one most tion). Among the six rules examined for sharing water commonly practised in the Basin (Rout 2008), the rule shortages, a proportional sharing of shortfalls performed we described as “upstream priority.” For both a 25 and the best in minimizing losses to food security. The five 50 % shortfall, upstream priority is a poor performer. remaining rules performed much worse. This remarkably Upstream priority means that shortage sharing rules for ae loainrlsi fhnsa o mrvdfo security food improved for Afghanistan in rules allocation Water

Table 4 Regional food security defined as wheat production, by water sharing arrangement, water supply and canal; Balkh Basin, Afghanistan (Metric tons)

Irrigation water shortage Base Upstream Downstream Upstream bears Downstream bears Proportional Priority by scale sharing arrangement priority priority shortage risk shortage risk sharing of historical use

Water supply scenario Normal Dry Drought Dry Drought Dry Drought Dry Drought Dry Drought Dry Drought Shortage 0 25 % 50 % 25 % 50 % 25 % 50 % 25 % 50 % 25 % 50 % 25 % 50 % Author's

Canal Aman Sahib 17,557 17,557 17,557 0 0 16,143 0 17,557 17,557 17,557 17,557 0 0 Nahr Shahi 49,158 49,158 49,158 0 0 45,199 0 49,158 49,158 49,158 49,158 49,158 0

Siagard 13,167 13,167 13,167 0 0 12,107 0 13,167 13,167 13,167 13,167 0 0 personal Balkh 6,145 6,145 6,145 0 0 5,650 0 6,145 6,145 6,145 6,145 0 0 Chemtal 14,396 14,396 14,396 0 0 13,237 0 14,396 14,396 14,396 14,396 0 0 Mushtaq 18,347 18,347 18,347 8,904 0 16,869 0 18,347 18,347 18,347 18,347 0 0 Abdulah 61,448 61,448 61,448 61,448 0 56,499 0 61,448 61,448 61,448 61,448 61,448 61,448

Dawlatabad 65,837 65,837 65,837 65,837 39,536 65,837 65,837 65,837 30,109 65,837 65,837 65,837 65,837 copy Charbulak 65,837 65,837 0 65,837 65,837 65,837 65,837 65,837 30,109 65,837 65,837 65,837 65,837 Faizabad 52,670 52,670 0 52,670 52,670 52,670 52,670 52,670 24,087 52,670 52,670 52,670 52,670 Murdian 29,144 0 0 29,144 29,144 29,144 29,144 29,144 13,328 29,144 29,144 29,144 0 Khanaqah 28,793 0 0 28,793 28,793 28,793 28,793 28,793 13,168 28,793 28,793 28,793 0 Aqcha 17,644 0 0 17,644 17,644 17,644 17,644 17,644 8,069 17,644 17,644 0 0 Mingajik 20,980 0 0 20,980 20,980 20,980 20,980 20,980 9,595 20,980 20,980 0 0 Basin wide total 461,123 364,562 246,055 351,257 254,604 446,609 280,905 461,123 308,682 461,123 461,123 352,887 245,792 Author's personal copy

F.A. Ward et al. dividing up the River’s waters among competing canals implemented with national water administration elec- are defined by a complete lack of effective administra- tions, the existing mirab system with all its limitations, tion. The top canal takes whatever water flows in the will continue play a major role in the allocation of river, and ones farther downstream take what’s left. This water. process continues until the river runs dry. Not surpris- With the exception of proportional sharing of short- ingly wheat supplies fall to 53 % of the amount re- ages, most of the water-sharing rules present a major quired for food security (246,055/461,123 metric tons) weakness. Just as some districts lose all water in some when water supplies fall to 50 % of full and when the droughts, some lose none even in the most severe basin lacks definition or effective administration of a drought for some irrigation water sharing rules. As water sharing rule. This finding presents a serious in- some of the districts suffer no shortage even in the dictment of the existing way that water shortages are worst drought (all for some), these same districts face shared in the Basin. little incentive to invest in measures to conserve water. Water use can be reduced by investing in water con- Impact of water institutions on farm income serving technologies, idling land, reducing water appli- cations per unit land on existing crops, or eliminating Table 5 shows farm net income levels that can be achieved lower valued crops. under each of six water shortage sharing rules analyzed in Incentives matter. The incentive package produced by this study. Among the six rules analyzed, a proportional water a sharing rule has an immense influence on out- sharing of shortfalls performs with the highest level of comes for both food security and farm net income. For flexibility in adapting to both modest and severe water example Table 5 shows that Aman Sahib and Nahr shortages. The results showcase the importance of propor- Shani Districts receive full water supplies under the tional sharing of shortfalls as a top performer in sustaining “Upstream Priority” rule. Instead of these districts con- farm net income. The reason rests on the principle that all serving water in a drought and making available water canals get some water under proportional sharing no matter for higher valued crops for downstream districts like how severe the drought. This principle is illustrated below Aqcha and Mingajik, they continue to produce low with several results: valued crops as well as irrigating more heavily than Table 5 shows that as the basin’s water supplies are required for maximum net income or even maximum reduced from their base levels of 1,540 million cubic meters yields. These results show that all water sharing rules per year by 25 % to 1,155 million, farm net income fall by other than ‘proportional sharing of shortages’ present only 10.0 % in the basin under a proportional loss sharing poor incentives for the Basin’s irrigators to seek out arrangement compared to base levels. Similarly, farm net and discover ways to minimize either physical or eco- income levels fall by a comparatively small 33 % from nomic losses from water shortages. Therefore, without a $292.1 million to $194.5 million annually when water proportional sharing of water shortages, low valued supplies fall by 50 % to 770 million cubic meters per year crops such as pulses are kept in production and high under that same water sharing rule. valued crops like wheat, so important for achieving Proportional sharing also scores high based on jus- farm family food security, drop out of production with tice. Its perception as a fair way to share shortages will all the tragic consequences that follow. appeal to the sense of justice embraced in most cultures. In addition, that water sharing rule is comparatively An economically efficient water sharing arrangement simple to implement to conditions on the ground, re- quiring few complex calculations, no detailed hydrolog- Table 6 shows the outcome of a water shortage sharing ic models, and little water-metering technology. For arrangement that minimizes the Basin’slossoffarmnet these reasons, we believe that our findings stand a income under two alternative water supply conditions: chance of being put to good use. Still, on-the-ground dry and drought. The table reveals important messages implementation of any water shortage-sharing rule for about efficient shortage sharing institutions: as drought distributing water among a system of canals that are conditions worsen, total water shortages are not allocat- separated by several hundred kilometers from top to ed proportionally among the canals. For minimizing bottom requires extensive community (e.g., basin-wide total farm net income losses, most canals receive slight- or national) administrative machinery. The administra- ly more than 75 % of their base water right when 75 % tion of such a rule needs to extend beyond the individ- of the basin’s supplies are available. However two canal ual, farm, turnout, village or canal. So, until a larger service areas, Charbuluk and Faizabad, bear a larger community, such as the Afghan national government, proportion of the water shortage because current average develops more national enforcement authority, possibly farm net income per unit water is lower in those two ae loainrlsi fhnsa o mrvdfo security food improved for Afghanistan in rules allocation Water

Table 5 Potential regional farm net income by water sharing arrangement, water supply, and canal; Balkh River Basin, Afghanistan ($US million/year)

Irrigation water shortage Base Upstream Downstream Upstream bears Downstream bears Proportional Priority by scale sharing arrangement priority priority shortage risk shortage risk sharing of historical use

Water supply scenario Normal Dry Drought Dry Drought Dry Drought Dry Drought Dry Drought Dry Drought Shortage 0 25 % 50 % 25 % 50 % 25 % 50 % 25 % 50 % 25 % 50 % 25 % 50 % Author's

Canal Aman Sahib 14.25 14.25 14.25 0.00 0.00 9.15 0.00 14.25 14.25 13.06 11.25 0.00 0.00 Nahr Shahi 39.12 39.12 39.12 0.00 0.00 25.61 0.00 39.12 39.12 35.84 30.84 39.12 0.00

Siagard 11.09 11.09 11.09 0.00 0.00 6.86 0.00 11.09 11.09 10.17 8.79 0.00 0.00 personal Balkh 5.25 5.25 5.25 0.00 0.00 3.20 0.00 5.25 5.25 4.81 4.16 0.00 0.00 Chemtal 10.50 10.50 10.50 0.00 0.00 4.81 0.00 10.50 10.50 9.73 6.68 0.00 0.00 Mushtaq 13.38 13.38 13.38 3.24 0.00 6.13 0.00 13.38 13.38 12.40 8.51 0.00 0.00 Abdulah 44.83 44.83 44.83 44.83 0.00 20.54 0.00 44.83 44.83 41.52 28.50 44.83 44.83

Dawlatabad 48.03 48.03 44.69 48.03 14.38 48.03 45.49 36.00 10.95 44.48 30.54 48.03 48.03 copy Charbulak 44.01 44.01 0.00 44.01 44.01 44.01 41.47 36.00 10.95 40.46 30.54 44.01 44.01 Faizabad 19.02 14.83 0.00 19.02 19.02 19.02 16.99 13.67 4.16 16.18 11.59 19.02 15.74 Murdian 11.69 0.00 0.00 11.69 11.69 11.69 10.56 8.16 2.50 10.12 6.97 11.69 0.00 Khanaqah 13.23 0.00 0.00 13.23 13.23 13.23 11.27 8.13 2.47 10.33 6.89 10.41 0.00 Aqcha 8.11 0.00 0.00 8.11 8.11 8.11 6.91 4.98 1.51 6.33 4.22 0.00 0.00 Mingajik 9.64 0.00 0.00 9.64 9.64 9.64 8.21 5.92 1.80 7.53 5.02 0.00 0.00 Basin wide total 292.14 245.29 183.11 201.79 120.06 230.03 140.90 251.29 172.76 262.95 194.51 217.10 152.61 Author's personal copy

F.A. Ward et al.

Table 6 Cost-minimizinga adaptation to drought and shadow price of water by water supply scenario and canal, Balkh Basin Afghanistan

Shortage Base 25 % 50 % Base 25 % 50 % Base 25 % 50 % Canal Water allocation by canal Income by canal Shadow price by canal

Proportion water use compared to full supply Proportion income compared to full water supply $US/Paikal

Aman Sahib 1.00 0.78 0.50 1.00 0.96 0.84 – 13,449 29,698 Nahr Shahi 1.00 0.79 0.50 1.00 0.96 0.83 – 13,449 29,838 Siagard 1.00 0.78 0.50 1.00 0.96 0.84 – 13,449 29,438 Balkh 1.00 0.78 0.50 1.00 0.96 0.84 – 13,449 29,697 Chemtal 1.00 0.77 0.57 1.00 0.95 0.87 – 13,449 27,289 Mushtaq 1.00 0.77 0.57 1.00 0.95 0.87 – 13,449 27,289 Abdulah 1.00 0.77 0.57 1.00 0.95 0.87 – 13,449 27,289 Dawlatabad 1.00 0.77 0.57 1.00 0.95 0.87 – 13,449 27,289 Charbulak 1.00 0.73 0.51 1.00 0.94 0.84 – 13,449 27,013 Faizabad 1.00 0.65 0.32 1.00 0.85 0.55 – 13,449 27,951 Murdian 1.00 0.70 0.39 1.00 0.89 0.63 – 13,449 28,472 Khanaqah 1.00 0.79 0.51 1.00 0.93 0.72 – 13,449 29,729 Aqcha 1.00 0.79 0.51 1.00 0.93 0.72 – 13,449 29,729 Mingajik 1.00 0.79 0.51 1.00 0.93 0.72 – 13,449 29,729 Basin wide 1.00 0.75 0.50 1.00 0.94 0.81 – 13,449 28,357 a Cost defined as reduction in farm net income compared to earnings with a full water supply

service areas than elsewhere. They produce a higher among the six shortage sharing rules analyzed, a pro- percentage of low valued crops. So under an economi- portional sharing of shortages is nearly as efficient as cally efficient water trading arrangement, regardless of the shortage sharing outcomes that would prevail under how much water these two canals receive as their cus- the ideal water trading arrangement. tomary water right, trading would occur. When water supplies fall to either dry or drought conditions, if water trading existed, both districts would rent or lease out a considerable amount of their assigned right to the other Discussion 12 service areas. Table 6 also shows that the marginal value of water The challenges of Afghan irrigation water management are (shadow price) increases dramatically in the face of a more huge to put it mildly, and a straightforward solution is unlikely severe drought, increasing from an average of $13,449 per to appear soon. Yet, to achieve the more limited aim of raising paikal for a 25 % shortage to more than $29,000 per paikal agricultural production, one good strategy is to increase the for a 50 % shortage. Notice that the efficient allocation of economic and food security effectiveness of water allocation supply shortages occurs so that the marginal value of water by finding rules that encourage a higher valued use of existing is nearly equal for all 14 canal service areas. Only when the water. Our analysis of Afghan irrigation water sharing rules shadow price of water is equal everywhere is there no found that flexibility in adapting to shortages in the river further opportunity for gains from additional trading of system’s overall water supply is an essential requirement to water for cash. sustain national food grain security. Water shortage sharing Table 6 shows results of the economically efficient rules that fail to spread shortages proportionally around the water shortage sharing arrangement. It shows that basin can contribute to food shortages that, without donor among the six water allocation rules analyzed, a pro- assistance, can escalate to famine. For our analysis, the best portional sharing of shortfalls is the closest to being performing water shortage sharing rule for meeting the needs economically efficient. So in conditions where market of food security and farm net income was found to be a trading is impractical or violates cultural sensitivities, a proportional sharing of shortfalls because it is the most flex- proportional sharing of shortfalls produces results that ible in adapting to unexpected changes in overall water sup- are close to the economically efficient shortage sharing ply. In addition this water allocation rule is perceived as fair in arrangement. This is an important finding: it shows that many cultures and is also simple to administer. Author's personal copy

Water allocation rules in Afghanistan for improved food security

An important qualification of our analysis is that is better water allocation system. The joint development of that food security is considered in terms of total pro- storage and enactment of a more efficient water alloca- duction and dietary caloric requirement for the whole tion system would make it easier to meter available basin. This aggregate view of food security does not supplies during drought periods, greatly simplifying ad- guarantee food security for all families in the Basin. ministration of the kind of water allocation system de- Although a large percentage of the population is en- scribed in this paper. Better data combined with the gaged in farming, not everybody has land or access to existing or improved analysis have considerable power to land and water for crop production. Others may need to perform an important function in a more sustained and in- rent land or buy food. This challenge opens an impor- formed water management system in the Balkh Basin. To the tant area for further research. Another important limit of extent that the approaches described in this paper are our work lies with the limitations of quantitative analy- transferable, we anticipate their application could sup- sis. We found that the proportional sharing was the port greater flexibility in water institutions in other parts most effective approach for sustaining farm income of the developing world’s irrigated areas. and food security in the face of drought. But quantita- tive economics may not be the most effective way to References communicate and persuade irrigation water users and mirabs to take action. While our evidence is strong, it will be a challenge to get the findings and their impli- Ahmad, M., & Wasiq, M. (2004). Water resource development in cations embraced and put into action. At a minimum, Northern Afghanistan and its implications for Amu Darya Basin. Washington, DC: The World Bank. implementing the path forward will require considerable Asian Development Bank. (2004). Proposed grant assistance for the communication with a wide range of water stakeholders. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for the Balkh river integrated Translating our results into a just water rights administra- resources management. Agriculture Environment and Natural tion system will be difficult in Afghanistan or other develop- Resources Division South Asia Department Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction. ing countries with weak administration, pervasive corruption Atwood, D. W. (2005). Big is ugly? How large-scale institutions and world views different from policy analysts schooled in prevent famines in Western India. World Development, 33(12), western analytical thinking. The required legal system often 2067–2083. does not exist in any meaningful way in rural areas. Even in Batchelor, C. (1999). Improving water use efficiency as part of inte- grated catchment management. Agricultural Water Management, regional capitals the legal system is not affordable, convenient 40(2–3), 249–263. or timely for most people. Therefore, huge challenges remain Beck, R. (2010). Bi-weekly report, Afghanistan water, agriculture, and in finding culturally compatible methods to enforce the water technology transfer (Awatt). Report on the Second Mirabs Con- sharing rules described here. If the courts are not available or ference - Central Afghanistan, January 7. Beck, R. (2010). Quarterly report Fy2010, Jan - March 2010, Afghanistan lack the authority to enact enforcement then any new water water, agriculture, and technology transfer. Mirab Conference, sharing rule, even if it provides much more reliable food January 8. security, is difficult to make legally binding. One possibility Biswas, A. K. (2004). Integrated water resources management: a is for enforcement to be conducted through other institutions reassessment - a water forum contribution. Water International, 29(2), 248–256. such as tribal councils or the clergy. Castelletti, A., & Soncini-Sessa, R. (2006). A procedural approach to Our approach leaves much to be carried out on the strengthening integration and participation in water resource plan- ground. The existing water sharing system in which the ning. Environmental Modelling & Software, 21(10), 1455–1470. – upstream users are the top priority users by default will Central Statistics Organisation. (2008). Statistical year book 2008 2009, http://www.cso.gov.af/. be difficult to change for many reasons. Centuries of Chabot, P., & Dorosh, P. A. (2007). Wheat markets, food aid and food planting and water use habit will not change overnight security. Food Policy, 32(3), 334–353. without open and vigorous public debate of the alter- Dagnino, M., & Ward, F. A. (2012). 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and research agenda for Southern Africa. Physics and Chemistry Jordan, Iran, Central Asia, and Turkey. He has published extensively on of the Earth, 30(11–16), 867–871. water resources, including more than 65 peer-reviewed journal articles in Waddington, S. R., Li, X. Y., Dixon, J., Hyman, G., & de Vicente, M. water resources systems analysis and policy, environmental management, C. (2010). Getting the focus right: production constraints for six and irrigation economics. He has authored 2 books on the economics of major food crops in Asian and African farming systems. Food natural resources and the environment. Security, 2(1), 27–48. Yang, H., Zhang, X. H., & Zehnder, A. J. B. (2003). Water scarcity, pricing mechanism and institutional reform in Northern China irrigated agriculture. Agricultural Water Management, 61(2), Saud Amer is International Wa- 143–161. ter Resources Program Manager Yates, D., Sieber, J., Purkey, D., & Huber-Lee, A. (2005). Weap21 - a of the Middle East and Africa. demand-, priority-, and preference-driven water planning model He works for the US Geological part 1: model characteristics. Water International, 30(4), 487– Survey in Reston, Virginia. Dr. 500. Amer is also an adjunct associate Zaheer, F. (2009). Layout of Balkh River Basin canal system. Personal professor in the Department of Communication, edited, Personal Contact. agricultural economics and agri- Ziaee, F. (2011). Drought vulnerability and adaptation in Balkh Province cultural business at New Mexico of Afghanistan MSc thesis, Delft, The Netherlands. State University (USA). He re- ceived a Ph.D. in remote sensing from the University of Arizona (USA) in 1990. Dr. Amer has ’ Frank A. Ward is Professor of 22 years experience in interna- Water Economics and Policy in the tional development, research, department of Agricultural Eco- and management of water resources. Much of his development planning nomics and Agricultural Business work in the past 5 years has focused on a range of water issues facing at New Mexico State University. Africa, Central, and South Asia. He is currently overseeing water devel- His recent work has examined opment projects dealing with increased food security in Saudi Arabia and conservation and economically ef- poverty eradication in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Ethiopia. ficient use of water resources in the face of drought and climate change for irrigated agriculture, urban, and environmental uses. It Fahimallah Ziaee is policy ad- also includes policy planning, viser to the Minister for Agricul- program formulation for water ture, Irrigation, and Livestock resources development, analysis for the Afghan Government, of water resource systems, institu- Kabul, Afghanistan. He has ex- tional strengthening, and climate change adaptation. He has made addi- tensive experience in agricultur- tional contributions in methods to conduct economic appraisals; al engineering in connection developing interdisciplinary approaches to analysis of water policy with water improvement projects issues; and principles and procedures for valuing environmental water in Afghanistan. Mr. Ziaee com- services. 8Dr. Ward has conducted integrated hydrologic-agronomic- pleted his M.Sc. Degree in May institutional-economic analyses to support sustainable river basin man- 2011 from the UNESCO in agement and climate change adaptation. His recent work on integrated Delft, the Netherlands. river basin analysis has been applied to the Rio Grande Basin of North America and to river basins in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Australia, Egypt,