Religion and Conflict Case Study Series Sri Lanka: Civil War along Ethnoreligious Lines August 2013 © Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/classroom 4 Abstract 5 This case study addresses the underlying ethnic and religious tensions behind the Sri Lankan Civil War (1983-2009), a conflict led by the Liberation Ti- 6 gers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) on behalf of the Hindu Tamil minority against the Sri Lankan government and the Buddhist Sinhalese majority. The core 7 text of the case study investigates four main questions: What are the histori- cal origins of the conflict in Sri Lanka? How were domestic religious forces and identities involved? How important were international religious and political forces? What role did socioeconomic factors play? In addition to the core text, the case study also includes a timeline of key events, a guide to relevant religious organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and govern- 10 ment organizations, and a list of recommended further readings. 12 About this Case Study 14 This case study was crafted under the editorial direction of Eric Patterson, visiting assistant professor in the Department of Government and associate di- rector of the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at George- town University. This case study was made possible through the support of the Henry Luce Foundation and the Luce/SFS Program on Religion and International Affairs. 2 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — SRI LANKA Contents Introduction 4 Historical Background 5 Domestic Factors 6 International Factors 7 Religion and Socioeconomic Factors 8 Resources Key Events 10 Religious Organizations 12 Nongovernmental Organizations 14 Further Reading 15 Discussion Questions 16 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — SRI LANKA 3 Introduction During Sri Lanka’s long civil war (1983-2009), religion was Sinhala, rather than ethnic-neutral English, the national lan- an important part of the collective identity and social narra- guage in 1956, and promoted policies that further disenfran- tive of many participants. Though the war was not strictly a chised the Tamil minority. Over time, some militant Bud- religious conflict, the identity cleavage, Tamil (Hindu) versus dhist monks were in the vanguard of Sinhalese nationalism, Sinhalese (Buddhist), was central to understanding the war. including winning seats in parliament. In short, the promo- The close link between religion and ethnic identity made re- tion of Sinhalese identity—religion, culture, and language— ligious targets particularly appealing for symbolic violence, was a driving force for Tamil grievances, and the nationalist not against faith per se, but against symbols representing the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) responded with opposing side: worshippers, clerics, and houses of worship. terrorism and insurgency. After a quarter century of violence, Seeds of the conflict were sown following independence Colombo decisively beat the LTTE on the battlefield in May from the United Kingdom in 1948, soon after which the 2009, killing its senior leaders. However, at this writing it new government of the Sinhalese-dominated United Na- remains unclear whether the Sri Lankan government is on tional Party disenfranchised Tamil plantation workers; the a course that will ameliorate, rather than exacerbate, long- Sinhalese majority stoked more antagonism when it made standing tensions. Temple of the Tooth, Kandy 4 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — SRI LANKA Historical Background The conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the religious affiliations—fled their homes in the ensuing- de LTTE began in the late 1970s and flowed from disinte- cades. Furthermore, thousands of Tamils were killed by grating communal relations following independence from Sinhalese riots and paramilitary organizations, including British rule. In addition to disenfranchising a large number anti-LTTE Tamil paramilitaries supported by the Sri Lank- of Tamils upon independence in 1948 and making Sinhala an army. Hindu priests were targets of both the LTTE and the island’s official language in 1956, the government ad- the Sri Lankan army. Some Buddhist monks were among opted a new constitution in 1972 that gave priority to Bud- the most vocal opponents of compromise within the Tamil dhism (without making it an official state religion), changed community. For example, monks took to the streets to pro- the island’s name from Ceylon to Sri Lanka (the Sinhalese test Norway’s mediation of the conflict leading to a 2002 name for the country), and gave constitutional protec- ceasefire between the LTTE and the government. tion to Sinhala as the official language. Tensions erupted in armed conflict in 1983, with the Black July riots that Sri Lanka descended into the most brutal phase of the civil claimed the lives of thousands while the secular-nationalist war after Indian withdrawal in 1991. Government forces LTTE launched attacks claiming both military and civilian embargoed the Jaffna Peninsula and bombarded LTTE lives. By the mid-1980s, the LTTE gained control of the forces. The LTTE retaliated with strikes on military and northern, Hindu-majority portion of the island (the Jaffna civilian targets, including the massacre of hundreds of Peninsula), and eliminated rivals within the Tamil commu- Muslims at prayer. Sinhalese paramilitary forces retaliated nity. In 1987, India mediated a peace agreement on the against Tamils, killing thousands. Hopes rose for a negoti- island and agreed to deploy thousands of troops to keep ated settlement in 2000 when the LTTE and the govern- the peace. However, the LTTE never accepted the agree- ment entered talks with mediation from Norway. This ment, and large-scale fighting soon broke out between the culminated in a joint ceasefire in 2002, an exchange of LTTE and the Indian military. The Indian military suffered prisoners between both sides, and hope that the war was at heavy casualties and began to fall out of favor with both the an end. While the ceasefire technically held until 2008, the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. Indian forces withdrew situation deteriorated significantly over time. Several thou- in 1990, and in 1991 the LTTE assassinated former Indian sand civilians were killed during the ceasefire—predomi- Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the architect of the Indian nantly by LTTE operatives but also some by the Sri Lankan military presence in Sri Lanka. army—and the Sri Lankan government rededicated itself to a military solution to the conflict. The LTTE became One of the hallmarks of this war was its civilian cost. Of- internally divided and withdrew from further peace talks. ten, the LTTE and paramilitary groups directly targeted ci- Government forces won victories over the LTTE, particu- vilians; at times, religious sites were easy targets for attack. larly in the Eastern Province, and killed the senior LTTE For example, the LTTE massacred 146 Buddhists at prayer leadership in May 2009, claiming an end to the conflict in Anuradhapura in 1985, bombed the Buddhist Temple and the advent of peace. While precise casualty figures do of the Tooth in 1998, and expelled over 75,000 Muslims not exist, it is estimated that as many as 100,000 died dur- from their homes in 1990. Thousands more—of multiple ing the three-decade-long conflict. BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — SRI LANKA 5 Domestic Factors Historically, most Sri Lankans respected the religious tra- ditions of their neighbors; for many citizens that contin- ues today. However, religion’s role in the contemporary Sri Lankan conflict is rooted in Buddhist nationalism that be- gan in the nineteenth century when Sinhalese Buddhist re- vivalist Anagarika Dharmapala popularized the link between Buddhism and Sinhalese nationalism rooted in the ancient history of the island and reflected in the national chronicle Mahavamsa, written 1,500 years ago. Over time, the insti- tutionalized body of Buddhist monks—the sangha—became a crucial power center, but one with ambivalent attitudes toward political participation. On the one hand, Buddhism often preaches nonviolence and withdrawal from social life; many Buddhist monks attempt to transcend this world and Temple on the way to the summit of Adam’s Peak (Sri Pada) are apolitical. On the other hand, however, there has often been a close association between Buddhism and royal or cess government services (all in Sinhala). Ethnic riots erupted political power in Asia. In the case of Sri Lanka, Buddhist- in 1956 and 1958, a cycle that would continue until major Sinhalese nationalism was an anticolonial voice against Great conflict broke out in the early 1980s. Some voices from the Britain. sangha called for restraint and cooperation, while others took a more aggressive, triumphalist tone. The LTTE and its pre- This ambivalence about political participation was character- decessors returned much of this aggressive tone. istic of mid-twentieth century Sri Lanka. In the late 1940s, a younger generation of monks began to assert themselves in Consequently, Sinhalese and Tamil nationalisms differ: Bud- political debates, sometimes on behalf of leftist labor causes, dhism was crucial to the Sinhalese whereas language was con- but increasingly on the side of Sinhalese nationalism. As sidered paramount