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frequently experience clashes The , along their shared , espe- cially on the de facto of Pa- India, and kistan-administered and India-ad- 3 Triangle ministered .3 Pakistan’s Place in The triangular relationship be- the Sino-Indian tween India, China, and Pakistan is of critical importance to regional Border Dispute and global stability.4 Managing the Dr. Maira Qaddos relationship is an urgent task. Yet, the place of Pakistan in the trian- gular relationship has sometimes gone overlooked. When India and China were embroiled in the recent military standoff at the Line of Ac- tual Control (LAC), Pakistan was mentioned only because of an ex- pectation (or fear) that would exploit the situation to press its interests in Kashmir. At that time, the Indian-administered por- tion of Kashmir had been experi- t is quite evident from the history encing lockdowns and curfews for of Pakistan’s relationship with months, raising expectations that I China that Pakistan views Sino- Pakistan might raise the tempera- Indian border disputes through a ture. But although this insight Chinese lens. This is not just be- (that the Sino-Indian clashes cause of Pakistani-Chinese friend- would affect Pakistan’s strategic , of , but also because of interests) was correct, it was in- the rivalry and territorial disputes complete. The focus should not that have marred India-Pakistan have been on Pakistani opportun- relations since their independ- ism, which did not materialize, but ence.1 Just as China and India on the fundamental interconnect- have longstanding disputes that edness that characterizes the led to wars in the past (including, South Asian security situation—of recently, the violent clashes in the which Sino-Indian border disputes Galwan in May- are just one part. 2020),2 so too do Pakistan and Indo-Pacific Perspectives │ 10

The Pakistan, India, and China Triangle

Strategic Triangle in Contem- in various sectors of porary Times the Pakistan economy. For exam- ple, the China-Pakistan Economic The India-China-Pakistan relation- Corridor (CPEC) is expected to cre- ship is a strategic triangle of three ate jobs and infrastructure for the nuclear powers. Given the geo- people of Pakistan. Moreover, graphic and strategic factors at China is the largest defense and play, it is impossible for these military-equipment supplier for three powers to co-exist in com- Pakistan, with a full 70 percent of plete isolation from one another; Pakistan’s imported weapons com- they interact with one another as a ing from China between 2015 and matter of ongoing political reality. 2019. The only option, then, is for all three governments to understand From the Indian perspective, a the implications of their behavior two-front war with both China and on the other states in the triangle. Pakistan cannot be ruled out This means working toward a whenever there are tensions along 7 friendly, peaceful, and amicable the Sino-Indian border. India’s neighborhood. The worst outcome , for all parties would be if any two Chief of the Army Staff, expressed powers joined forces against the his concerns about a two-front war third, which would run the risk of in May 2020. He cautioned that it upsetting the balance of power in is not just the military that fights South and creating insecurity wars, but also other pillars of na- tions like the bureaucracy and for the entire region.5 elected officials.8 Dealing with two When it comes to the Sino-Indian adversaries at the time—especially border disputes, some Interna- at a moment when India, China, tional Relations experts have pre- and Pakistan were all consumed dicted that Pakistan will be the big with the Covid-19 — winner of a worsening Sino-Indian would pose a grave security and relationship.6 While overstated, foreign policy challenge for India.9 this observation rests on the obser- vation that Pakistan and India are In Pakistan, meanwhile, the fear is engaged in a strategic rivalry while that India might one day provoke a Pakistan and China have main- border clash with Pakistan if In- tained a strategic for sev- dian forces were to suffer humilia- decades. Recently, China has tion or defeat along the Sino-In- expanded its investments and dian border. Last , for Indo-Pacific Perspectives │11

Qaddos

example, Islamabad was concerned control.11 In the end, Pakistan is that Prime Minister Modi would interested in preserving a stable plan a face-saving mission against balance of power in —a Pakistan in response to the embar- goal not served by a weakened and rassment of a setback in .10 humiliated Indian neighbor. The distrust runs both ways. Dur- Pakistan is exposed to the Sino-In- ing the Galwan Valley clashes, In- dian border disputes in compli- dian media outlets claimed that cated and cross-cutting ways. In Pakistan and China had coordi- some respects, the Sino-Indian bor- nated a grand conspiracy against der conflict of 2020 was detri- India, with Pakistan allegedly de- mental to Pakistani interests. For ploying around 20,000 troops in example, the conflict diverted the Gilgit-Baltistan at the behest of attention of the global community Chinese generals. According to Pa- from India’s controversial actions kistani officials, however, Paki- in and Kashmir, which stan’s troop movements were not were regarded as atrocities in Pa- extraordinary, but rather a reason- kistan and elsewhere.12 India’s ab- able response to a regional security rogation of Article 370 of the In- crisis; a prudent move to deal with dian Constitution, a move that any unexpected contingencies. eliminated special status for the Indian-administered states of The Need for Regional Peace Jammu and Kashmir, is a topic and Stability that Pakistan would like the inter- national community to focus upon. The reality is that Pakistan had no However, the issue garners less at- interest in pursuing an aggressive tention than would otherwise be or opportunistic policy during the the case whenever violence erupts clashes along the LAC. To do so on the Sino-Indian border. On the would have been to undermine Pa- other hand, Pakistan has benefit- kistan’s own territorial security. To ted indirectly from the Sino-Indian be sure, there was a general feeling conflict insofar as it has spurred of excitement in Pakistan at the Sino-Pakistani cooperation. In sight of its rival’s military struggle 2020, China and Pakistan signed a to contain China. But Pakistan’s hydropower agreement worth $2.4 approach was to let China fight its billion, with the project to war with India on its own, while launched in Pakistan-administered taking steps to lower the tempera- Kashmir. Part of the CPEC, this ture along the Kashmiri line of project is expected to deliver Indo-Pacific Perspective │12

The Pakistan, India, and China Triangle

around 3.3 billion units of reusable region. energy upon its completion in The governments of India, China, 2026.13 Because the project is being pursued in Pakistan-administered and Pakistan ought to each realize that their actions and interactions Kashmir (claimed by India), this decision can be regarded as bol- affect one another in profound stering Pakistan’s position—a dip- ways. Right now, the faces a lomatic and strategic win. Paki- bigger challenge than border dis- stani officials deny that they have putes, in the form of the deadly wanted to exploit a worsened secu- Covid-19 pandemic. There is a pressing need to put collective ef- rity situation for economic bene- fort into fighting this scourge, in- fit.14 stead of waging violent conflicts. Conclusion Unfortunately, the future of the In- dia-China-Pakistan triangle seems To conclude, it may be argued that to be quite unstable. A lot of diplo- Pakistan has a strong interest in matic work will be required to un- managing periods of tension and derstand the importance of build- rivalry between China and India. ing a peaceful neighborhood, let To be sure, there are many factors alone implement such a vision. ■ that push Pakistan toward taking a pro-China position. This cannot be denied. Not only is Pakistan Dr. Maira Qaddos working with China on the CPEC Dr. Qaddos is Lecturer in the Department of megaproject, but it also has close Mass Communication at the National University of Modern , , Pakistan. Her re- defense ties with . Both search on the Sino-Indian border dispute has have a strategic partner- been published in Policy Perspectives, the - ship that spans various fields and ship journal of Institute of Policy Studies, - abad. has persisted for several decades. Even so, it is notable that Pakistan tried to maintain a comparatively neutral stance during the Galwan Valley conflict. It instead put great energy into de-escalating the con- flict. This is because the spillover effects of bloodshed and rivalry can only sabotage the economic activi- ties, developmental programs, and overall peace process of the whole

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Qaddos

Notes https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/indo-china- conflict-whats-in-it-for-pakistan/2084091/. 1 Muhammad Notazai, “What Does the China-India 8 “First China, now Pakistan: How India’s battling on two Standoff in Ladakh Mean for Pakistan?” The Diplomat, fronts,” , Last modified July 03, 2020, June 24, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/what- https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/de- does-the-china-india-standoff-in-ladakh-mean-for-paki- fence/first-china-now-pakistan-how--battling-on- stan/. two-fronts/articleshow/76761327.cms?from=mdrSoutik 2 The clashes in Ladakh resulted in the deaths of at least 9 Soutik Biswas, “India-China clash: 20 Indian Troops 20 Indian soldiers. See Alyssa Ayres, “The China-India Killed in Ladakh Fighting,” BBC, June 16, 2020, Border Dispute: What to Know?”, Council on Foreign Rela- https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53061476. tions, June 18, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/china- 10 Tom Hussain, “China-India Clash Marks a Huge Re- india-border-dispute-what-know. gional Shift and Pakistan is its epicenter,” TRT World, July 3 Notazai, “China-India Standoff.” 01, 2020, https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/china-in- 4 Monish Tourangbam, “The China-India-Pakistan Trian- dia-clash-marks-a-huge-regional-shift-and-pakistan-is- gle: Origins, Contemporary Perceptions, and Future”, its-epicentre-37775. Stimson, June 25, 2020, https://www.stim- 11 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Why Pakistan is keeping mum about son.org/2020/the-china-india-pakistan-triangle-origins- India-China LAC conflict?,”The Print, July 04, 2020, contemporary-perceptions-and-future/. The history of https://theprint.in/opinion/why-pakistan-is-keeping- these political conflicts is grounded in . Anik mum-about-india-china-lac-conflict/454034/. , “China Is Pushing India Closer to the ,” 12 S. Gillani, “India-China Border Dispute has Im- Foreign Policy, June 09, 2020, https://foreignpol- plications for Pakistan and Region,” Centre for Aerospace icy.com/2020/06/09/china-india-border-united-states-paki- & Security Studies, July 15, 2020, stan/. https://casstt.com/post/india-china-border-dispute-has- 5 Satyabrat , “The Strategic Triangle: India-China- Pakistan,” China Report, 40, no. 2 (2004): 221–25; Haans implications-for-pakistan-and-region/229. 13 J. Freddy, “China, India & Pakistan strategic triangle – the “Pakistan, China sign $1.5 billion Hydropower Project Pakistan factor in Sino-Indian relations,” Global Affairs, 6, Agreement,” The News International, July 06, 2020, no. 4-5 (2020): 559–75. https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/682889-pakistan- 6 china-sign-15-billion-power-project-agreement. Claude Rakisits, “Why India-China Border Conflict is 14 Music to Pakistan’s ears?,” The Quint, June 18, 2020, Adnan Aamir, “Pakistan Benefits from China-India https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-china- Clash with Hydropower Deal,” Nikkei Asia, July 06, 2020, border-conflict-kashmir-issue-benefits-to-pakistan-belt- https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Paki- and-road-cpec-projects. stan-benefits-from-China-India-clash-with-hydropower- deal. 7 Shalini Chawla, “Indo-China Conflict- What’s in it for Pakistan?,” Financial Express, 16, 2020,

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