september 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 9

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Reevaluating Al-Qa`ida’s

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Reevaluating Al-Qa`ida’s Weapons Weapons of Mass Destruction of Mass Destruction Capabilities By Peter Bergen Capabilities Reports By Peter Bergen 5 The Evolving Terrorist Threat in Yemen By Christopher Boucek 8 The U.S.- Relationship and Finding an End State in By Moeed W. Yusuf 11 Piracy in the Horn of Africa: A Growing Maritime Security Threat By Peter Chalk 15 Al-Qa`ida’s Key Operative: A Profile of Mohammed By Seth Nye 19 The Role and Significance of Signature Attacks in the Iraqi Insurgency By Michael Knights

22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

wo months after the 9/11 coyly, “Go to the next question.”3 After attacks, Usama bin Ladin the interview was finished, Mir followed claimed to possess a nuclear up this exchange over tea with Bin capability.1 On the morning of Ladin’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. “I TNovember 8, 2001, the Saudi militant was asked this question to Dr. al-Zawahiri: eating a hearty meal of meat and olives that it is difficult to believe that you have as Hamid Mir, a Pakistani , nuclear weapons,” Mir explained. “So he interviewed him in a house in Kabul. Mir said, ‘Mr. Hamid Mir, it is not difficult. asked Bin Ladin to comment on reports If you have 30 million dollars, you can About the CTC Sentinel that he had tried to acquire nuclear go to the black market in Central Asia, The Combating Terrorism Center is an and chemical weapons, to which the al- make contact with a disgruntled Russian independent educational and research Qa`ida leader replied: “I wish to declare scientist and get from him suitcase institution based in the Department of Social that if America used chemical or nuclear nuclear weapons.’”4 Sciences at the United States Military Academy, weapons against us, then we may retort West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses with chemical and nuclear weapons. Al-Qa`ida’s nuclear weapons claims the Center’s global network of scholars and We have the weapons as deterrent.”2 came after a long quest by the terrorist practitioners to understand and confront Mir asked, “Where did you get these organization to research nuclear contemporary threats posed by terrorism and weapons from?” Bin Ladin responded technology and acquire nuclear materials. other forms of political violence. Sensing the inadequacy of his own knowledge about nuclear weapons, Abu 1 This marked Usama bin Ladin’s first public statement The views expressed in this report are those of claiming to have a nuclear capability. the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 2 Hamid Mir, “Osama Claims he has Nukes: If US Uses 3 Ibid. the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. N-Arms it Will Get Same Response,” , November 10, 4 Personal interview, Hamid Mir, , Pakistan, 2001. May 11, 2002.

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Khabab al-Masri, the terrorist group’s analysts reached the same conclusion in the United States and the United in-house weapons of mass destruction in 2002.9 There is evidence, however, Kingdom were awash in stories about researcher, asked his al-Qa`ida bosses that al-Qa`ida experimented with crude a group of men arrested in who in a pre-9/11 memo whether it was chemical weapons, explored the use of possessed highly toxic ricin to be used possible to get more information about biological weapons such as botulinum, in future terrorist attacks. Two years nuclear weaponry “from our Pakistani salmonella and anthrax, and also made later, however, at the trial of the men friends who have great experience in multiple attempts to acquire radioactive accused of the ricin plot, a government this sphere.”5 For that information, al- materials suitable for a .10 scientist testified that the men never Qa`ida’s leaders turned to Dr. Sultan had ricin in their possession, a charge Bashiruddin Mahmood, a recently After the group moved from Sudan to that had been first triggered by a false retired senior Pakistani nuclear Afghanistan in 1996, al-Qa`ida members positive on a test. The men were cleared scientist sympathetic to the .6 escalated their chemical and biological of the poison conspiracy except for an Mahmood failed polygraph tests about weapons program, innocuously code- Algerian named Kamal Bourgass, who his meetings with al-Qa`ida’s leaders naming it the “Yogurt Project,” but only was convicted of conspiring to commit once those encounters became known earmarking a meager $2,000-4,000 a public nuisance by using poisons or to U.S. and Pakistani investigators. explosives.13 It is still not clear whether Mahmood met with Bin Ladin over al-Qa`ida had any connection to the the course of two meetings just weeks “There is no evidence plot.14 before the 9/11 attacks, during which he that al-Qa`ida’s quest for provided information to the al-Qa`ida In fact, the only post-9/11 cases where leader about the infrastructure needed nuclear weapons ever went al-Qa`ida or any of its affiliates actually for a nuclear weapons program.7 beyond the talking stage.” used a type of WMD was in Iraq, where al-Qa`ida’s Iraqi affiliate, al-Qa`ida in Bin Ladin’s and al-Zawahiri’s portrayal Iraq (AQI), laced more than a dozen of of al-Qa`ida’s nuclear and chemical its bombs with the chemical chlorine in weapons capabilities in their post-9/11 for its budget.11 An al-Qa`ida videotape 2007. Those attacks sickened hundreds statements to Hamid Mir was not based from this period, for example, shows a of Iraqis, but the victims who died in any reality, and it was instead meant small white dog tied up inside a glass in these assaults did so largely from to serve as psychological warfare against cage as a milky gas slowly filters in. An the blast of the bombs, not because of the West. There is no evidence that al- Arabic-speaking man with an Egyptian inhaling chlorine. AQI stopped using Qa`ida’s quest for nuclear weapons accent says: “Start counting the time.” chlorine in its bombs in Iraq in mid- ever went beyond the talking stage. Nervous, the dog barks and then moans. 2007, partly because the insurgents Moreover, al-Zawahiri’s comment about After struggling and flailing for a few never understood how to make the “missing” Russian nuclear suitcase minutes, it succumbs to the poisonous chlorine attacks especially deadly and bombs floating around for sale on the gas and stops moving. This experiment also because the Central Intelligence black market is a Hollywood construct almost certainly occurred at the Darunta Agency and U.S. military hunted that is greeted with great skepticism training camp near the eastern Afghan down the bomb makers responsible for by nuclear proliferation experts. This city of Jalalabad, conducted by the the campaign, while simultaneously article reviews al-Qa`ida’s WMD Egyptian Abu Khabab.12 clamping down on the availability of efforts, and then explains why it is chlorine.15 unlikely the group will ever acquire a Not only has al-Qa`ida’s research into nuclear weapon. WMD been strictly an amateur affair, Indeed, a survey of the 172 individuals but plots to use these types of weapons indicted or convicted in Islamist Al-Qa`ida’s WMD Efforts have been ineffective. One example terrorism cases in the United States In 2002, former UN weapons inspector is the 2003 “ricin” case in the United since 9/11 compiled by the Maxwell David Albright examined all the Kingdom. It was widely advertised as a School at Syracuse University and the available evidence about al-Qa`ida’s serious WMD plot, yet the subsequent New America Foundation found that nuclear weapons research program and investigation showed otherwise. The none of the cases involved the use concluded that it was virtually impossible case appeared in the months before the for al-Qa`ida to have acquired any type U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, when media 13 Stenersen, p. 48; Walter Pincus, “London Ricin Find- 8 of nuclear weapon. U.S. government ing Called a False Positive,” Washington Post, April 14, 58:1 (2002). 2005. For details on Bourgass, see Duncan Campbell, 5 Roland Jacquard, L’Archive Secretès d’al Qaida (: 9 Thom Shanker, “U.S. Analysts Find No Sign Bin “Yesterday’s Trial Collapse has Exposed the Deception Jean Picollec, 2002), p. 291. Laden Had Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, February Behind Attempts to Link al-Qaida to a ‘Poison Attack’ on 6 Graham Allison, : The Ultimate Pre- 26, 2002. London,” Guardian, April 14, 2005. ventable Catastrophe (New York: Henry Holt, 2004), pp. 10 Barton Gellman, “Al Qaeda Nears Biological, Chemi- 14 Vikram Dodd, “Doubts Grow Over al-Qaida Link in 20-22. cal Arms Production,” Washington Post, March 23, 2003. Ricin Plot,” Guardian, April 16, 2005. 7 Peter Baker, “Pakistani Scientist Who Met Bin Laden 11 Anne Stenersen, Al-Qaida’s Quest for Weapons of Mass 15 Stenersen, p. 42; “‘Chlorine Bomb’ Hits Iraq Village,” Failed Polygraphs, Renewing Suspicions,” Washington Destruction: The History Behind the Hype (Saarbrücken, BBC, May 16, 2007; Personal interview, Charles Faddis, Post, March 3, 2002. Germany: VDM Verlag, 2009), p. 35. Central Intelligence Agency officer involved in the effort 8 David Albright, Kathryn Buehler, and Holly Higgins, 12 Nic Robertson, “Tapes Shed New Light on Bin Laden’s against Iraq’s chlorine bomb makers in 2007, Washing- “Bin Laden and the Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Network,” CNN, August 19, 2002. ton, D.C., January 20, 2010.

2 september 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 9 of WMD of any kind. In the one case have already engaged in crude chemical In the end, Aum abandoned its where a radiological plot was initially and biological weapons attacks.19 Yet investigations of nuclear and biological alleged—that of the Hispanic-American the prospects of al-Qa`ida or indeed weapons after finding them too difficult al-Qa`ida recruit Jose Padilla—that any other group having access to a true to acquire and settled instead on a allegation was dropped when the case WMD—a nuclear device—is near zero chemical weapons operation, which went to trial.16 for the foreseeable future. climaxed in the group releasing sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995. It is Unlikely Al-Qa`ida Will Acquire a Nuclear If any organization should have Weapon developed a serious WMD capability “Terrorist groups simply Despite the difficulties associated with it was the bizarre Japanese terrorist terrorist groups acquiring or deploying cult Aum Shinrikyo, which not only do not have the resources WMD and al-Qa`ida’s poor record in recruited 300 scientists—including of states. Even with access the matter, there was a great deal of chemists and molecular biologists—but hysterical discussion about this issue also had hundreds of millions of dollars to nuclear technology, it after 9/11. Clouding the discussion was at its disposal.20 Aum embarked on a is next to impossible for the semantic problem of the ominous large-scale WMD research program in term “weapons of mass destruction,” the early 1990s because members of terrorist groups to acquire which is really a misnomer as it the cult believed that Armageddon was sufficient amounts of suggests that chemical, biological, and fast-approaching and that they would nuclear devices are all equally lethal. In need powerful weapons to survive. Aum highly enriched uranium to fact, there is only one realistic weapon acolytes experimented with anthrax and make a nuclear bomb.” of mass destruction that can kill tens botulinum toxin and even hoped to mine or hundreds of thousands of people in a uranium in Australia. Aum researchers single attack: a nuclear bomb.17 also hacked into classified networks to find information about nuclear facilities hard to imagine an environment better The congressionally authorized in , South Korea and Taiwan.21 suited to killing large numbers of Commission on the Prevention people than the Tokyo subway, yet only of Weapons of Mass Destruction Sensing an opportunity following the a dozen died in the attack.24 Although Proliferation and Terrorism issued collapse of the , Aum Aum’s WMD program was much further a report in 2008 that typified the recruited thousands of followers in advanced than anything al-Qa`ida muddled thinking about WMD when it Russia and sent multiple delegations to developed, even they could not acquire concluded: “It is more likely than not meet with leading Russian politicians a true WMD. that a weapon of mass destruction will and scientists in the early 1990s. The be used in a terrorist attack somewhere cult even tried to recruit staff from It is also worth recalling that Iran, in the world by the end of 2013.”18 The inside the Kurchatov Institute, a leading which has had an aggressive and well- report’s conclusion that WMD terrorism nuclear research center in Moscow. One funded nuclear program for almost was likely to happen somewhere in of Aum’s leaders, Hayakawa Kiyohide, two decades, is still some way from the world in the next five years was made eight trips to Russia in 1994, developing a functioning nuclear simultaneously true but also somewhat and in his diary he made a notation bomb. Terrorist groups simply do not trivial because terrorist groups and cults that Aum was willing to pay up to $15 have the resources of states. Even with million for a nuclear device.22 Despite access to nuclear technology, it is next 16 Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Ter- its open checkbook, Aum was never to impossible for terrorist groups to rorist Threat,” A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s able to acquire nuclear material or acquire sufficient amounts of highly National Security Preparedness Group, September 10, technology from Russia even in the enriched uranium (HEU) to make 2010. chaotic circumstances following the a nuclear bomb. The total of all the 23 17 Creating true WMD using chemical and biological implosion of the communist regime. known thefts of HEU around the world weapons is complex because “weaponizing” such devices tracked by the International Atomic is quite difficult. Consider that the anthrax attacks in the Energy Agency between 1993 and 2006 United States in the fall of 2001 which targeted a number was just less than eight kilograms, well of politicians and caused considerable panic short of the 25 kilograms needed for the 25 but only killed five people. The Federal Bureau of Inves- 19 In 1984, for instance, in The Dalles, Oregon, follow- simplest bomb; moreover, none of the tigation concluded that Bruce E. Ivins was the author of ers of the Indian guru Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh tried to HEU thieves during this period were that attack. Before he committed suicide, Ivins was one of swing a local election by infecting salad bars through- linked to al-Qa`ida. the leading biological weapons researchers in the United out the town with salmonella. Hundreds succumbed to States. Even this skilled scientist only weaponized an- severe food poisoning, but no one died in the biological thrax to the point that it killed a handful of people, al- attack. 24 David Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the beit it is not clear whether his intent was to infect a large 20 Sara Daly, John Parachini and William Rosenau, Aum End of the World: The Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday number of people or strictly target certain individuals. Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor (Santa Mon- Cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear Arsenals of 18 Bob Graham et al., World at Risk: The Report of the Com- ica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005). Russia (New York: Crown, 1996), pp. 33, 65, 157-167. mission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 21 Ibid. 25 “Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Other Proliferation and Terrorism (New York: Vintage Books, 22 Ibid. Radioactive Material,” IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 2008). 23 Ibid. 6, 2007, pp. 129-130.

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Therefore, even building, let alone weapons.28 The U.S. Department of the mirror image of the Cold War, where detonating, the simple, gun-type nuclear Defense has assessed that “Islamabad’s the Soviets had enough nuclear devices device of the kind that was dropped nuclear weapons are probably stored in to end civilization, yet their intentions on Hiroshima during World War II component form,”29 meaning that the about what they might do with those would be extraordinarily difficult for a weapons are stored unassembled with weapons were so opaque that the art terrorist group because of the problem the fissile core separated from the non- of Kremlinology was created to divine of accumulating sufficient quantities nuclear explosive.30 Such disassembling what their plans might be. The Soviets of HEU. Building a radiological device, is just one layer of protection against had the capability to destroy the United or “dirty bomb,” is far more plausible potential theft by jihadists.31 A further States but never really had the intention for a terrorist group because acquiring layer of protection is Permissive Action to do so, while al-Qa`ida’s leaders have radioactive materials suitable for such Links (PAL), essentially electronic said they intend to kill millions of a weapon is not as difficult, while the locks and keys designed to prevent Americans but their ability to do so has construction of such a device is orders of unauthorized access to nuclear been nonexistent. magnitude less complex than building a weapons; Pakistan asserts that it has nuclear bomb. Detonating a radiological the “functional equivalent” of these.32 Conclusion device, however, would likely result in As a result of these measures, Michael Nevertheless, governments must be a relatively small number of casualties Maples, the head of the U.S. Defense cognizant that scientists motivated and should not be considered a true Intelligence Agency at the time, told the either by greed or ideology might give WMD. Senate Armed Services Committee in WMD technology to terrorist groups. March 2009 that “Pakistan has taken Yet even a group armed with such There is also the concern that a state important steps to safeguard its nuclear scientific knowledge would still have to may covertly provide a nuclear device weapons.”33 overcome enormous technical challenges to a terrorist group. This was one of the to build a workable nuclear device or to underlying rationales to topple Saddam What has distinguished al-Qa`ida weaponize agents such as anthrax. As a Hussein’s government in Iraq in 2003. from other terrorist groups is that its result, groups such as al-Qa`ida will, for Yet governments are not willing to give leaders have made it clear publicly the foreseeable future, continue to use their “crown jewels” to organizations that they would deploy such weapons the tried-and-true tactics of hijackings, that they do not control, and giving a without hesitation, despite the fact that truck bombs, and suicide attacks, rather terrorist group a nuclear weapon would privately some al-Qa`ida leaders were than being able to successfully execute expose the state sponsor to large- aware that their WMD program was the quite complex and prohibitively scale retaliation.26 The United States strictly an amateur affair.34 This was expensive task of developing true destroyed Saddam’s regime on the mere WMD. This, of course, does not suspicion that he might have an active preclude al-Qa`ida or its affiliates from 28 Thom Shanker and David Sanger, “Pakistan is Rap- nuclear weapons program and that he deploying crude biological, chemical, or idly Adding Nuclear Arms, U.S. Says,” New York Times, might give some kind of WMD capacity radiological weapons during the coming May 17, 2009. to terrorists. Also, nuclear states are years, but these will not be “weapons of 29 “Proliferation: Threat and Response,” U.S. Depart- well-aware that their nuclear devices mass destruction.” Instead, they will ment of Defense, January 2001, p. 27. leave distinctive signatures after they be weapons of mass disruption, whose 30 “Nuclear Weapons Status 2005,” Carnegie Endow- are detonated, which means that even principal effect will be panic and a ment for International Peace, available at www.carn- in the unlikely event that a government limited number of casualties. egieendowment.org/images/npp/nuke.jpg. gave a nuclear weapon to terrorists, 31 Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear their role in the plot would likely be Peter Bergen is a fellow at the New America Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congres- discovered.27 Foundation and New York University’s sional Research Service, June 12, 2009. Center on Law and Security. 32 Ibid.; Peter Crail, “Pakistan Nuclear Stocks Safe, Of- Just as states will not give nuclear ficials Say,”Arms Control Today, June 2009. weapons to terrorists, they are unlikely 33 Michael Maples, “The Current and Future World- to sell them either. This leaves the wide Threats to the National Security of the United option of stealing one, but nuclear- States,” U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, March armed states, including Pakistan, 10, 2009. One caveat: Shaun Gregory of the University are quite careful about the security of Bradford in The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s Nuclear measures they place around the Weapons in the CTC Sentinel of July 2009 pointed out that most strategic components of their while these weapons are unassembled, “Pakistan’s usual arsenals. After 9/11, the United States separation of nuclear weapons components is compro- gave Pakistan approximately $100 mised to a degree by the need to assemble weapons at cer- million in aid to help secure its nuclear tain points in the manufacture and refurbishment cycle at civilian sites, and by the requirement for co-location of the separate components at military sites so that they can 26 Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? be mated quickly if necessary in crises.” (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), p. 143. 34 Abu Walid al-Masri, The History of the Arab Afghans 27 Daniel Chivers and Jonathan Snider, “International from the Time of their Arrival in Afghanistan until their De- Nuclear Forensics Regime,” Security for a New Century parture with the Taliban, serialized in al-Sharq al-Awsat, Study Group Report, February 2, 2007. December 8-14, 2004.

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The Evolving Terrorist Gauging the Threat security situation in the country (and According to media reports, the U.S. the occasional exaggerated reporting of Threat in Yemen intelligence community recently the situation), fewer foreign students estimated that there are approximately are studying Arabic in Yemen.7 By Christopher Boucek 100 al-Qa`ida fighters in Afghanistan and roughly 300 in Pakistan.2 While it Compared to al-Qa`ida’s senior on december 25, 2009, a terrorist is admittedly difficult to obtain accurate leadership in South Asia, AQAP is under dispatched by al-Qa`ida in the Arabian numbers regarding the current size significantly less pressure. The large Peninsula (AQAP) attempted to blow of AQAP, commonly cited estimates U.S. military presence in Afghanistan up Northwest Airlines Flight 235 over suggest that there are several hundred and a more aggressive drone campaign Detroit, Michigan. Since the attack, fighters in Yemen.3 These consist of in Pakistan have degraded the capacity instability in Yemen has emerged as a Yemenis, Saudis and various Arab of al-Qa`ida central. By comparison, in U.S. national security priority. Although nationals, as well as other foreigners Yemen there is no public U.S. military the initial concern in the aftermath of the including Westerners. Since January presence aside from training missions,8 attack has waned, in recent weeks there 2009, at least 12 non-Yemeni Arabs and after several U.S.-facilitated has been increased suggestion that the have been killed or captured, while 50 airstrikes in 2009 and 2010, these have Yemen-based AQAP has eclipsed “al- foreigners have been arrested by Yemeni reportedly all but stopped following Qa`ida central” as the primary threat to authorities on suspicion of involvement a May 25 airstrike that inadvertently U.S. national security.1 This assessment with AQAP; these foreigners have killed the deputy governor of Marib comes as conditions in Yemen continue been identified as British, French Province, Jabir al-Shabwani.9 Although to deteriorate, and U.S. policy options and Malaysian nationals, among the Yemeni government has recently for addressing Yemen’s confluence of others.4 Reportedly, 12 Americans are launched large-scale offensives against crises are narrowing. among the 50 detained foreigners in suspected AQAP operatives in the Yemen, although there has been little southern cities of Lawder and Huta, it AQAP has evolved into an increasingly information forthcoming about their has not been clear who the government lethal and agile organization, with status, or why they were detained.5 has actually been fighting—whether a proven track record of mounting it is AQAP, southern separatists, or operations within Yemen, regionally, The lure of Yemen has received disaffected tribes.10 and internationally. AQAP has been significant coverage, and there is clear in stating its planned objectives, considerable concern about Westerners According to some recent press and it has repeatedly delivered on its who travel to the country. In January reports, the debate around which al- threats. These concerns have been 2010, a report by the U.S. Senate Qa`ida faction is the greatest danger heightened by the presence of Yemeni- Committee on Foreign Relations to U.S. national security centers on the American cleric Anwar al-`Awlaqi in suggested that as many as 36 American magnitude and immediacy of the threat Yemen and his alleged role in inciting ex-convicts who converted to Islam posed by each group. Al-Qa`ida central English-speaking foreigners to engage while in prison traveled to Yemen in is still believed to represent the greater in violence and militancy. There are 2009 to study Arabic. According to the threat because of an assumption that also increasing worries about the committee’s report, some of these former it could mount a large-scale “complex” involvement of Western, and especially convicts have since disappeared and are operation such as the 9/11 attacks. American, nationals in alleged domestic suspected of having joined AQAP.6 The Yemen-based AQAP, however, is terrorist plots related to or connected reportedly a more “imminent” threat with Yemen, AQAP, and Anwar al- The Yemeni government has taken and is more likely to attack the United `Awlaqi. Moreover, Yemen itself is measures to address these issues. Visa States, although by less “sophisticated” being transformed from a rest and waiting periods are now longer, and training arena into an actual theater of according to the Yemeni government 7 Previous Arabic language students in Yemen have jihad. visas are no longer available upon included John Walker Lindh and Umar Farouk Abdul- arrival at Sana`a International Airport. muttalab. This article examines the evolving threat Additionally, due to the deteriorating 8 Numbers differ from 25-50 (Lolita Baldor, “US Terror from AQAP, including the possibility Training in Yemen Reflects Wider Program,” Associ- that the group has recruited a number of 2 “Inside al-Qaeda,” Newsweek, September 4, 2010. ated Press, September 8, 2010) to nearly 75 (Schmitt and Americans. It also reviews how AQAP 3 Some reports suggest there may be up to 600 AQAP Shane). has turned Yemen into a theater of fighters in Yemen. For details, see Eric Schmitt and Scott 9 Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti and Robert F. Worth, “A jihad, pursuing a strategy to destabilize Shane, “Aid to Fight Qaida Divides US Officials,” New Secret Assault on Terror Widens on Two Continents,” the state and its security forces. York Times, September 15, 2010. New York Times, August 15, 2010. 4 “Yemen Arrests 50 Foreigners, Clashes Hit South,” 10 In addition to fighting a resurgent al-Qa`ida organiza- Reuters, June 7, 2010. tion, the Yemeni government is also involved in two oth- 5 Ibid. er conflicts. In Sa`da in the north of the country, the gov- 6 “Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time ernment has been fighting Shi`a Zaydi rebels known as Bomb,” report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Huthis. In the former South Yemen, the government U.S. Senate, January 21, 2010. While some have disputed is facing an increasingly violent, albeit divided, southern 1 Cameron Barr, “Obama’s Depiction of al-Qaeda Differs the report’s accuracy, it does adequately represent the secessionist movement. On top of these conflicts, the gov- from Aides,” Washington Post, September 1, 2010. level of concern regarding Yemen. ernment has also been at odds with various tribes.

5 september 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 9 methods.11 Moreover, there is concern warning with regard to the failure of killed in an earlier suicide bombing in that AQAP has had success in recruiting the Christmas Day attack to destroy Shibam that killed four South Korean Westerners, including converts, who do Northwest Airlines Flight 253. nationals.18 In both incidents, the not fit traditional terrorist profiles; it attackers knew their targets’ vehicles, will be more difficult for U.S. security Throughout much of 2010, there have routes and schedules, suggesting a services to identify and disrupt plots been back and forth AQAP attacks level of prior knowledge. These attacks led by these individuals. and counterattacks by the Yemeni were especially concerning due to the government (facilitated by the close heightened sense of vulnerability and AQAP’s Violence Spreads in Yemen support of the United States). Yemeni exposure that comes with sitting in In Yemen, AQAP has been able to government claims of having dealt traffic in Sana`a. take advantage of the absence of the serious blows to the organization central government’s authority and In mid-June, AQAP attacked the Aden presence in large swaths of the country headquarters of the Political Security to plot, plan, prepare, and mount “There is concern that Organization (PSO) and broke out operations domestically, regionally, and AQAP has had success in several imprisoned comrades. The internationally. Since AQAP announced attackers were reportedly dressed its formation in January 2009, the pace recruiting Westerners, in military uniforms, and at least of attacks has increased. One recent including converts, who do 10 security personnel were killed.19 assessment identified more than 30 Violence in Aden continued throughout AQAP incidents in Yemen so far this not fit traditional terrorist the summer, including an explosion year.12 profiles.” outside a PSO building.20

The group’s targets have been strikingly In late summer, the Yemeni government consistent. They include foreigners and engaged in two large-scale operations expatriates, energy infrastructure, and frequently proved overstated. After against towns where suspected AQAP government security forces. Since the a period of relative calm for much operatives were said to be hiding. In merger that created AQAP, the group of 2009, violence again returned August, intense fighting took place in has also increasingly targeted Saudi to the capital in 2010. On April 26, the southern city of Lawder in Abyan Arabia, including trying to mount 2010, British Ambassador Tim Torlot Province. According to press reports, a suicide bombing campaign in the survived an attempt on his life when a more than 30 people were killed, kingdom and attempting to assassinate suicide bomber targeted his convoy.16 including 19 suspected militants.21 In the Saudi counterterrorism chief, As Torlot’s convoy drove through September, Yemeni forces mounted a Prince Muhammad bin Nayif. In many Sana`a, the attacker stepped into similar operation in the town of Huta respects, AQAP has learned the lessons traffic and detonated his explosives. in Shabwa Province. In both cases, the of the failed al-Qa`ida campaign in Saudi The ambassador was unhurt, but Yemeni military laid siege to the towns Arabia. AQAP avoids targeting Yemeni several bystanders were wounded after instructing the civilian populations civilians, has a highly sophisticated in the attack. AQAP subsequently to flee. In Huta, thousands of civilians media apparatus, and is cautious not claimed responsibility for the attempted have reportedly been displaced by the to repeat the same mistakes made in assassination, and in September four fighting. Reports in the Yemeni press Saudi Arabia.13 Of greater concern, individuals were charged by Yemeni claimed that Saudis and Somalis were when initial operations have been authorities for their roles in the plot.17 among the AQAP operatives fighting unsuccessful, AQAP has re-attacked the against the government in Huta.22 After same target, such as the U.S. Embassy The Torlot incident was strikingly retaking Huta, the Yemeni government in Sana`a14 and Prince Muhammad in similar to another attack that took said that it killed five AQAP fighters, Saudi Arabia.15 This serves as a stark place in March 2009. In that attack, a and arrested an additional 32.23 suicide bomber stepped into traffic and Despite these large operations, early 11 Baldor. detonated his explosives just as a convoy indications suggest that many of the 12 Cody Curran and Patrick Knapp, “AQAP and Suspect- from the South Korean Embassy was ed AQAP Attacks in Yemen Tracker 2010,” AEI Critical passing. The convoy was en route to the 18 There have been several attacks in Hadramawt, in- Threats, September 23, 2010. Despite these figures, more airport and was carrying investigators cluding a shooting that killed two Belgian tourists in than 80% of violence in Yemen is the result of disputes and the family members of the victims January 2008. over access to water. 19 “Yemen Gunmen in Deadly Raid on Aden Security 13 For more on these points, see “Da’wa, Jihad, and from Yemen. For details, see Abdullah al-Oraifij, “Fourth Service HQ,” BBC News, June 19, 2010. Salafism in Saudi Arabia and Yemen,” Carnegie Endow- Assassination Attempt Against Prince Foiled,” Saudi Ga- 20 Al-Masdar.com, August 26, 2010. ment for International Peace, November 24, 2008; “Al- zette, August 16, 2010. Yusuf al-Shihri, brother-in-law of 21 “Yemen Troops Kill Two at Checkpoint in Troubled Qaeda in Yemen,” Carnegie Endowment for Internation- AQAP deputy commander Said al-Shihri and a former Town,” Agence France-Presse, September 19, 2010. al Peace, July 7, 2009. detainee at Guantanamo Bay, was killed in this incident. 22 Nasser Arrabyee, “Four al-Qaeda Fighters Killed as 14 The U.S. Embassy in Sana`a was attacked twice in 16 “UK Envoy in Yemen Escapes ‘Suicide Bomb,’” BBC Army Starts All Out Attack in al-Huta,” Yemen Observer, 2008, in March and September. News, April 26, 2010. September 25, 2010. 15 The Saudi press recently identified three other- at 17 “Four Qaeda Suspects Charged with Targeting For- 23 “Yemen Forces Disable Bomb in Town Retaken from tempts made to assassinate Prince Muhammad, includ- eigners in Yemen,” Agence France-Presse, September Qaeda: Govt,” Agence France-Presse, September 26, ing the October 2009 attempt to smuggle in suicide belts 20, 2010. 2010.

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AQAP operatives believed to have been list identified by name 31 PSO officers, Pakistan, while highlighting Yemen as in the towns managed to recede into the 15 criminal investigation officers, and a “key battleground.”35 He cited AQAP’s countryside.24 nine military intelligence officers.30 The method in the Christmas Day attack campaign of violence continued into as making it much more difficult to Assassination Campaign September when militants launched successfully deter and disrupt.36 During the course of the summer of 2010, rocket-propelled grenades at the AQAP waged a coordinated campaign convoy of the deputy governor of Abyan The evolving threat from Yemen is in Yemen’s southern provinces to Province, Ahmed Ghalib al-Rahawi.31 clear. AQAP has effectively “recast” assassinate senior government security Al-Rahawi, who escaped an earlier the country as a legitimate venue and intelligence officers. In many of assassination attempt in August 2009, to participate in jihad against an the attacks, the victims were shot by survived the attack.32 illegitimate ruler and a place to resist motorcycle-riding assailants. One U.S. aggression. If increased U.S. Yemeni media outlet reported that by The assassination campaign serves counterterrorism assistance to Yemen September some 50 officers had been to weaken government stability in only focuses on military and security killed in the campaign;25 according to Yemen while avoiding large numbers of cooperation, it will likely increase the a Yemeni official, however, that figure civilian casualties, the latter of which grievances that fuel al-Qa`ida militancy could turn the population against and other opposition. There are fewer “AQAP avoids targeting AQAP. The intensity and pace of the attractive policy options with regards attacks demonstrate AQAP’s increasing to Yemen, and none of them offer any Yemeni civilians, has a ability to strike at will at those serving promise of solving the challenges posed highly sophisticated media the “illegitimate regime.” It has also by the deteriorating conditions in provided a clear reminder to those who the country. An important first step, apparatus, and is cautious continue to serve in the military and however, is to recognize that inattention not to repeat the same state security apparatus of what awaits is not an option. The United States and them should they not disassociate the international community must be mistakes made in Saudi themselves from government service. fully engaged in Yemen. The country’s Arabia.” Ultimately, the campaign has been a problems are no longer contained within clear example of the steady erosion of its borders. state power in southern Yemen. Dr. Christopher Boucek is an associate in was actually more than 60.26 The Conclusion the Middle East Program at the Carnegie campaign caused Yemeni authorities In early September 2010, Jonathan Endowment for International Peace and in September to announce a ban on Evans, director-general of Britain’s editor of the forthcoming book, Yemen on motorcycles in urban areas of Abyan Security Service, noted that the the Brink, September 2010. Province.27 threats to the United Kingdom are increasingly originating from Yemen During Ramadan 2010 (corresponding and Somalia.33 According to Evans, roughly to the first week of August there has been a “surge” in Yemen- through the first week of September), related casework this year at MI5.34 AQAP mounted nearly 12 attacks on Similarly, in recent congressional government security targets.28 At the testimony, National Counterterrorism beginning of Eid al-Fitr, marking the Center Director Michael Leiter noted end of Ramadan, AQAP escalated the the relative weakness of al-Qa`ida in campaign when it released a “hit list” of 55 security officers in Abyan.29 The also Ghamdan al-Yusufi, “Report on Al-Qaida Threat to Assassinate 54 Yemeni Security Officials in Abyan,” 24 Ellen Knickmeyer, “Al Qaeda 2.0,” Global Post, Sep- Elaph.com, September 20, 2010. Elaph.com lists only 54 tember 27, 2010. Knickmeyer highlights the timing of officers, not 55. these operations: the siege of Lawder coincided with 30 Ibid. the arrival in Sana`a of National Security Adviser John 31 “Yemen’s Abyan Deputy Governor Survives Qaida Brennan, while the Huta operation coincided with the Assassination Attempt,” Xinhua, September 18, 2010. Friends of Yemen meeting in New York City. Other reports have cited a roadside bomb rather than a 25 “Al Qaeda Claims Six Attacks in Yemen,” News Ye- rocket-propelled grenade in the attack. See “Yemen Of- men, September 8, 2010. ficial Escapes Death in Ambush, Five People Wounded,” 26 Personal interview, Yemeni official, August 2010. Jordan Times, September 19, 2010. 27 Benjamin Joffe-Walt, “Yemen Outlaws Motorcycles 32 “Security Official Escapes Assassination in Southern in Governorate Under Siege,” Jerusalem Post, September Yemen,” News Yemen, September 18, 2010. 19, 2010. 33 Selah Hennessy, “MI5: Somalia, Yemen Pose Increas- 35 Michael Leiter, “Nine Years After 9/11: Confront- 28 “Al Qaeda Attacks Yemeni Military Installations,” ing Threat to Security,” Voice of America, September 17, ing the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland,” U.S. Senate BBC Arabic, September 9, 2010. 2010. Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, 29 “Qaeda Threatens 55 Yemeni Security Officers by 34 Gordon Corera, “MI5 Head Warns of Serious Risk of September 22, 2010. Name,” Agence France-Presse, September 10, 2010. See UK Terrorist Attack,” BBC News, September 16, 2010. 36 Ibid.

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The U.S.-Pakistan it had supported the Taliban regime the United States the pretext to launch Relationship and in Afghanistan and Islamist militants attacks and destabilize the state.4 in Indian Kashmir for years; it feared Finding an End State in that an abrupt reversal in policy would Pakistan’s Response Afghanistan cause an internal backlash. Moreover, The key point of divergence between its strategic calculus had always been Pakistan and the United States has been By Moeed W. Yusuf India-centric, and a fear of a “two- the treatment of the Afghan insurgent front” scenario—whereby animosity groups and al-Qa`ida cadres who the u.s.-pakistan partnership in the with India was compounded by an sought refuge in Pakistan’s tribal areas war in Afghanistan has been both unfriendly or irredentist Afghanistan— to escape U.S. military operations in challenging and complex. While had preoccupied the county’s military Afghanistan.5 Pakistan was wary that Pakistan’s military has cooperated with minds for decades.2 Therefore, while an all out effort against these groups— its U.S. counterpart and has incurred Pakistan agreed to support the U.S. the major Afghan groups include tremendous losses itself, it has resisted effort in Afghanistan, at no cost did Mullah Omar’s Afghan Taliban, the American pressure to act against it want its intervention to upend its Haqqani network, and Hizb-i-Islami— prominent anti-U.S. groups operating balance vis-à-vis India or to create an would unnecessarily cause them to in Afghanistan from Pakistani soil. unfriendly scenario in Afghanistan. turn against the Pakistani state.6 From the Western perspective, Pakistan Pakistan’s concerns about a backlash has deliberately played a “double game” To ensure full Pakistani support, were accentuated when the state faced in South Asia by picking and choosing the United States needed to institute extreme opposition to President Pervez which militant outfits to target, while an incentive structure to convince Musharraf’s 2002 decision to send leaving out those that have been directly Islamabad to alter its strategic calculus. the army into the tribal region.7 The responsible for the deaths of Western To date, however, the United States Pakistani tribal areas are peculiar in forces in Afghanistan. Bewildered by has failed in this endeavor. In fact, that citizens from the region are fiercely this, Western analysts have often asked U.S. strategy in Afghanistan became opposed to intrusion of any sort from why Pakistan has not fallen in line with the reason for Pakistan’s growing, not the central government in Islamabad; the U.S. position. lessening, reluctance to support U.S. there had always been an in-principle policy. In the view of Pakistan’s military, understanding that the Pakistan Army This article attempts to explain U.S. involvement in Afghanistan further would not be sent into the tribal areas Pakistan’s strategy from the point of aggravated the regional imbalance without permission from the tribes. view of its security establishment. It regarding India and brought to power Moreover, cultural considerations highlights why Pakistan has defied the an antagonistic government in Kabul.3 reign supreme in the region; therefore, United States and why it is unlikely to Furthermore, Pakistan has been although the Afghan militants and al- depart from its position substantially. gradually challenged from within as Qa`ida operatives had not been invited Comprehending Pakistan’s strategy Pakistani Islamist militants continue to by Pakistani tribesmen, once they sought requires analyzing the conflict from make their country’s partnership with refuge the tribal customs did not allow within Islamabad’s own strategic the tribes to refuse them outright.8 The calculus and perceived objectives. “Bush Announces Opening of Attacks,” CNN, October 7, Using this lens, Pakistan’s otherwise 2001. 4 From 2003 onward, sporadic terrorist incidents began bewildering position appears rational 2 Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, “Pakistan’s Security Percep- to take place in Pakistan. Between 2003-2006, Karachi, even though it is counterproductive tions,” in Imtiaz Alam ed., Security and Nuclear Stabili- Rawalpindi, Multan, Quetta, and Dargai were attacked. to U.S. interests. Understanding the zation in South Asia (: Free Media Foundation, It is largely believed that much of this anti-state activity Pakistan security establishment’s 2006), pp. 201-216; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: was a direct reaction to Pakistani military operations in outlook is critical so that the United The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in the tribal areas. States and Pakistan can find converging Pakistan, Afghanistan­ and Central Asia (New York: Viking 5 These fighters also sought refuge in parts of Baluchistan interests on which they can achieve an Press, 2008). Province. end state in Afghanistan. 3 President Karzai was viewed as favoring elements of 6 For background information on these groups, see Greg the erstwhile Northern Alliance, perceived by Islam- Bruno and Eben Kaplan, “The Taliban in Pakistan,” Mismatched Goals abad to be anti-Pakistan, to take major power-wielding Council on Foreign Relations, August 3, 2009; Imtiaz The potential for divergent strategic positions in the post-Taliban Afghan set-up. Moreover, Ali, “The Haqqani Network and Cross-Border Terrorism objectives between Pakistan and the he remained strictly opposed to allowing Pakistan any in Afghanistan,” Terrorism Monitor 6:6 (2008); “Hizb-i- United States was inherent in the major role in developments in Afghanistan and instead Islami (Islamic Party),” GlobalSecurity.org, undated. circumstances that led the two to made positive overtures toward India. India’s major role 7 The Pakistan Army was first ordered to deploy to the partner in the “war on terrorism.” The in reconstruction in Afghanistan’s north was sufficient Tirah Valley in Khyber Agency to check possible infiltra- United States was seeking to eliminate to irk Islamabad tremendously. Relations reached their tion and movement of militants from across the Durand al-Qa`ida and the Taliban from nadir in 2007 when Presidents Karzai and Musharraf Line. The first major offensive, however, came in Febru- Afghanistan and wanted full Pakistani were regularly involved in a war of words as they sought ary 2003 when the army, under U.S. pressure, launched 1 support. Pakistan’s dilemma was that to pin the blame for the failing military campaign in Af- an operation against al-Qa`ida and Afghan Taliban op- ghanistan on each other. For details, see Moeed Yusuf, eratives in South Waziristan Agency. Opposition to the 1 U.S. President George W. Bush defined his initial goals “Rational Institutional Design, Perverse Incentives, and military intrusion escalated thereafter. in a speech announcing the launch of U.S. military opera- the US-Pakistan Relationship Post-9/11,” Defense Against 8 For a brief discussion of the local tribal norms and the tions in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. For details, see Terrorism Review 2:1 (2009): pp. 25-26. challenge they have posed in eliminating terrorist sanc-

8 september 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 9 locals thus saw the Pakistan military’s the old anti-India guard and situated a result, Pakistan’s military focused propensity to target these “guests” as a in the heartland of Pakistani Punjab, almost exclusively on the TTP and its breach of trust. also saw an opportunity and began to associated groups from 2007 onward.15 support the TTP—these individuals As for the Afghan Taliban insurgents As local resentment grew and as have been somewhat casually labeled present in Pakistan’s tribal belt, the the military’s initial forays proved the “Punjabi Taliban.”12 state used its leverage to prevent them ineffective, Pakistan’s establishment from supporting the anti-Pakistan concluded that defying U.S. pressure Pakistan’s reaction to the growing groups; this was the quid pro quo received was preferable to launching an all out instability within its borders was for not attacking them directly. war against Afghan insurgent groups precisely the opposite of what on Pakistani territory. A full blown Washington had hoped. Rather than There is an external dimension that military operation was seen as a catalyst heeding to Western warnings that played into Pakistan’s strategy as that would unite these groups and large Islamist militants ultimately share well. In Afghanistan, Pakistan lost a segments of Pakistani tribesmen against the same ideology, retain organic friendly government with the Taliban’s the state. Instead, Pakistan chose to links and should therefore be seen departure. The new Afghan government, pursue a selective approach whereby led by President , was until it targeted non-Afghan al-Qa`ida “Prominent voices within recently decisively firm against Pakistan cadres—this was preceded by difficult and open to allowing Indian ingress into negotiations and peace agreements with Pakistan’s strategic enclave Afghan territory.16 This shattered the the tribes—while taking a much softer contend that it should two fundamental pillars of Pakistan’s approach toward the Afghan militant security calculus: preventing India groups.9 be satisfied with any from encircling Pakistan and retaining Afghan government that a friendly government in Afghanistan. Even this selective approach did The Bush administration’s reluctance to not prevent a substantial number of is friendly, addresses its address these concerns—evident from ideologically-motivated , concerns vis-à-vis India, its supportive attitude toward President mainly hailing from the tribal belt, Karzai’s firm policy vis-à-vis Islamabad, to use Pakistan Army operations as a and prevents militants as well as Washington’s proactive efforts pretext to launch a domestic insurgency. from using Afghan to reach out to India while ignoring Starting with inconsequential sporadic Pakistan’s demands—irked Islamabad operations in the bordering tribal region territory to operate against even more. In 2003-2004, the Taliban in 2004, these loosely knit operators Pakistan.” insurgency in Afghanistan also seemed eventually came together under the to be nearing defeat.17 From Pakistan’s banner of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan perspective, its neighbor was slipping (TTP).10 By 2008-2009, the TTP had out of its control and the prospect of an successfully undermined the writ of the as a singular threat, the Pakistani antagonistic Afghanistan had become state in large pockets in the country’s security enclave chose to bank even real. Pakistan had been sidelined in northwest.11 A number of new splinter more heavily on its selective approach. what seemed to be the end game at the groups, some of them associated with Capacity limitations were also a major time. concern; as the internal threat grew, tuaries, see Vikram Jagdish, “Reconsidering American the security establishment became January 29, 2009; “Kayani Asks US to Give Pakistan Co- Strategy in South Asia: Destroying Terrorist Sanctuaries more certain that it could not afford bra Helicopters,” Daily Times, February 28, 2009. in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” Small Wars and Insurgencies to open new military fronts. This view 15 Pakistan has staunchly resisted U.S. demands to 20:1 (2009). was justified considering that Pakistan launch operations against Afghan insurgent groups op- 9 In the initial stages, the Afghan Taliban are believed had already deployed more troops to erating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, to have found a relatively safe existence in their hideouts fight militants in its northwest than the citing its need to focus on the TTP as a priority. The au- in Pakistan. For this view, see Ashley J. Tellis, Pakistan combined presence of the International thor’s conversations with Pakistani strategic experts and and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Per- Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and military officers confirm that the security establishment 13 formance (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Moreover, is acutely concerned about the military’s capacity limita- International Peace, 2008), p. 7. Pakistan’s military was (and remains) tions and is wary of opening any new operational fronts 10 For a profile of the TTP, see Hassan Abbas, “A Profile acutely short on equipment required for fear of spreading itself too thin. 14 of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel 1:2 (2008). for counterinsurgency operations. As 16 After indifferent relations in the initial period of 11 By April 2009, the Taliban had not only established President Karzai’s rule, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations their complete control in South Waziristan and partial 12 Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban- Net reached their nadir in 2006-2007 when Presidents control in a number of other tribal agencies, but they work,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009). Karzai and Musharraf continuously blamed each other had also effectively captured the settled area of Swat in 13 The Pakistani military claims that its deployments for the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. See “Bush Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (formerly known as the have been upward of 100,000, while ISAF and U.S. Urges Karzai, Musharraf to Unite Against Terrorism,” North-West Frontier Province) and were threatening to forces combined only crossed that mark in 2009. Radio Free /Radio Liberty, September 28, 2006. continue their advance further south. When Pakistan’s 14 Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership have con- 17 The confidence about having defeated the insurgency military finally launched a decisive operation against stantly emphasized the need for additional hardware to was high enough for U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald them in late April 2009, the Taliban had infiltrated Bun- bolster their counterinsurgency capabilities. See “Zardari Rumsfeld to declare in May 2003 that “major combat ac- er District, merely 60 miles from Islamabad. Asks US for Aid to Combat Terror,” Rediff India Abroad, tivity” in Afghanistan had ended.

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With no other allies within the in Pakistan’s case, U.S. policy has been an Islamist government rule Kabul is Afghan political spectrum, the Afghan unable to incentivize the necessary also a deterrent. insurgent groups remained Pakistan’s switch in its security establishment’s obvious and only support base if it thinking. Therefore, just as they Third, Pakistan has an interest in having had any chance of regaining ground in have cooperated, both sides have also the Afghan insurgent groups currently Afghanistan. This reinforced Pakistan’s continued to work at odds with each present in its tribal belt relocated to reluctance to target these groups. other. Going forward, a convergence Afghanistan. Their presence provides In fact, Pakistan had an interest in of interests and not a normative blame the TTP and other anti-Pakistan groups turning a blind eye to their actions in game will bring about a final solution the ability to present their actions as an Afghanistan, and according to some in Afghanistan. There is an opportunity extension of the Afghan fight against accounts even actively supported their for the two sides to work together to the Americans.21 Their co-existence in efforts in a bid to raise Western costs.18 find a mutually agreeable end state. The tribal agencies such as North Waziristan In retrospect, Pakistan’s Western allies optimism stems from the fact that both also makes it difficult for Pakistan’s underestimated Islamabad’s potential sides are highly constrained in their military to launch decisive operations to influence events in Afghanistan. options and yet remain frustrated with against the TTP. The sheer proximity They also discounted Islamabad’s the status quo. of the two factions carries a lingering inevitable rejection of any outcome threat of growing organic, and perhaps that left India at an advantage. Indeed, Three Pakistani limitations should give even covert, links. just as Islamabad had hoped, multiple Washington hope. First, Pakistan’s Western failures in Afghanistan post- quest for internal stability should In practical terms, the above implies 2004, Washington’s divided attention make it favorable to some semblance of substantial convergence in U.S. and between Iraq and Afghanistan, reported stability in Afghanistan. A reversion to Pakistani views on the end game. To links between Afghan insurgent groups an anarchic Afghanistan with little or begin with, both sides see an interest and al-Qa`ida’s affiliate in Iraq, and no state authority would imply a fresh in stabilizing Afghanistan. This should the former’s ability to operate from refugee spillover and economic burden prevent Pakistan from supporting any Pakistani soil reversed Western on Pakistan. Pakistan is also wary of the move that raises Western costs to a point successes and forced Pakistan back into possibility of the TTP using a lawless that they consider a premature troop the equation. Today in 2010, Pakistan Afghanistan as a safe haven to launch withdrawal. In fact, Pakistan has been has won the round tactically; the world attacks within Pakistani territory once looking for assurances from Washington acknowledges that it has a central role the U.S. and international presence that President Barack Obama’s July to play in negotiating an end state in scales down. The anti-Pakistan groups 2011 troop deadline does not signify Afghanistan.19 appear intent on fighting Islamabad, a drastic scale down next year. Next, regardless of what happens in the averseness to the Afghanistan The Opportunity Afghanistan. of the 1990s means that Pakistan is The United States and Pakistan have open to a broad-based government in blamed each other for being insincere Second, Pakistan’s security establishment Kabul. Pakistan’s positive reception of partners. Yet the fact is that both is no longer interested in an all- President Karzai’s recent conciliatory Pakistan and the United States have powerful Afghan Taliban government overtures toward Islamabad should be sought to defend their self-defined across the Durand Line (or for either seen in this light.22 Although the view interests all along. Bilateral mistrust and of the other two mentioned Afghan frustration stemmed from the fact that insurgent groups to take power on the Western presence and the Afghan government has their goals have never really converged; their own). There is growing consensus risen tremendously. For a sense of the changing opinion, that a return to the 1990s would see “WPO Poll: Afghan Public Overwhelmingly Rejects 18 The recent “wikileaks” controversy has reinforced cause Pakistan’s isolation among the al-Qaeda, Taliban,” World Public Opinion, January 30, this belief by exposing U.S. intelligence documents that international community. There is a 2006; “Afghanistan Conflict Monitor,” Human Security allege that Pakistani intelligence was supporting the in- realization that the Afghan Taliban Report Project, available at www.afghanconflictmonitor. surgency in Afghanistan as recently as 2007. Pakistan may have already peaked militarily and org/polls/. has consistently denied the allegations. See Mark Maz- that a lengthy civil war would have to 21 Moeed Yusuf, “Taliban Have Been Fooling Us All zetti, Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt, and Andrew W. Lehren, ensue for Taliban militants to take over Along,” The Friday Times 21:12 (2009). Interestingly, not “Pakistan Aids Insurgency in Afghanistan, Reports As- Afghanistan; Pakistan is neither willing only has this been the message the TTP has presented sert,” New York Times, July 25, 2010. nor able to back a new civil war across publicly, but this is also the thrust of their motivational 19 A number of Pakistani moves throughout this period the border. Pakistan is also cognizant of message imparted to would-be suicide bombers and in have reiterated both the country’s desire and ability to the development benefits large pockets their multimedia productions targeted at potential re- manipulate the end game. One much-hyped recent move of Afghan society have extracted from cruits. was to arrest Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a senior the U.S. presence, making Afghans 22 The Afghan president has repositioned himself to ac- member of Mullah Omar’s Afghan Taliban, allegedly be- unwilling to return to the repressive era commodate Pakistan’s concerns, a move largely believed 20 cause he was reaching out to President Karzai for peace of the 1990s. U.S. opposition to having to be a result of his realization that Pakistan’s support talks without the acquiescence of the Pakistani establish- is necessary for a stable end state in Afghanistan (and ment. Despite initial indications to the contrary, Pakistan 20 Most representative polls conducted in Afghanistan his own political future). See Nick Shifirin, “Afghan has not extradited Baradar to Afghanistan. For details, since 9/11 suggest that the majority of Afghans oppose a President Karzai Steps Up Talks with Insurgents,” ABC see Dexter Filkins, “Pakistanis Tell of Motive in Taliban return of the Taliban. This remains true even as the in- News, June 29, 2010. Senior Pakistani military officials Leader’s Arrest,” New York Times, August 22, 2010. surgents have gained ground of late and opposition to have reciprocated the overtures and have reportedly vis-

10 september 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 9 is still far from unanimous, prominent will have to be closer to Islamabad’s Piracy in the Horn voices within Pakistan’s strategic position. An imperfect yet defendable enclave contend that it should be settlement is the best one can hope for of Africa: A Growing satisfied with any Afghan government at this point. Pakistan on its part must Maritime Security Threat that is friendly, addresses its concerns not get carried away by its success vis-à-vis India, and prevents militants in regaining a place at the table. Its By Peter Chalk from using Afghan territory to operate achievement is tactical at best, and against Pakistan.23 Finally, Pakistan’s any flirtation with unrealistic goals the waters around the Horn of Africa interest in seeing the Afghan insurgent in Afghanistan may cause this to be (HoA) currently constitute the most groups relocate across the border implies converted into a strategic loss. Be that pirate prone region of the world. Between a desire for a negotiated settlement as it may, Washington and Islamabad 2008 and June 2010, 420 actual and sooner rather than later. are best advised to focus exclusively attempted attacks were reported in this on the points of convergence identified strategic corridor—which encompasses Approaching the End State in this article. Within this framework, the Gulf of Aden, southern Red Sea and Despite some shared goals between they should seek a minimal end state territorial seas of Somalia—accounting the United States and Pakistan, there acceptable to both. Their current for roughly 70% of global incidents should not be unwarranted optimism. recognition of each other’s limitations during this period.1 As of August 2010, There are a number of differences that provides a window of opportunity that Somali pirates were holding 18 ships need to be addressed within this frame of must be exploited as such windows and 379 crew for ransom, with average convergence. To cite just one example, are temporary. Should this pass, both settlements now in the range of $3.5 both sides have different definitions of Pakistan and the United States may be to $4 million per vessel.2 Perpetrating a “broad-based” government. It is still eventual losers. groups have demonstrated an ability to not clear whether Washington would operate far from shore as well as seize accept the three Afghan insurgent Moeed W. Yusuf is the South Asia adviser at even the largest ocean-going freighters. groups playing a role in the new the U.S. Institute of Peace and is responsible This article examines how these groups government.24 Pakistan, on the other for managing the Institute’s Pakistan operate, while also questioning whether hand, is likely to insist that these program. Before joining USIP, he was a the use of private security contractors groups be accommodated, or they will fellow at the Frederick S. Pardee Center to safeguard vessels constitutes a viable continue their insurgent activities and for the Study of the Longer-Range Future response to the ongoing piracy threat in possibly join the anti-Pakistan groups at Boston University, and concurrently a the HoA. directly. Moreover, the United States research fellow at the Mossavar-Rahmani would likely seek as a prerequisite Center at Harvard Kennedy School. In 2007, Piracy in the HoA: Perpetrating Groups and a guarantee that Afghan soil would he co-founded Strategic and Economic Policy Attack Dynamics not be used against U.S. interests in Research, a private sector consultancy firm in Historically, the Hobyo-Haradhere the future. Pakistan will be unable to Pakistan. By training as a political scientist, cartel (sometimes referred to as the provide any such assurance. In addition, he has worked extensively on issues relating Somali “Marines”) and syndicates the Pakistani paranoia about India’s to South Asian politics, Pakistan’s foreign based in Puntland dominated much of ambitions to encircle Pakistan remains policy, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, the Somali piracy scene. The Hobyo- entrenched; the stubbornness on not nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation, Haradhere cartel was largely the allowing India a foothold in Afghanistan and human security and development in product of one man, Mohammed Abdi is categorical.25 Will the United States South Asia. Mr. Yusuf has published widely Hassan “Afweyne,” a former civil be willing to dispense with India on the in national and international journals, servant, and it mainly operated out of Afghanistan question? If so, will India professional publications, magazines and Ceel-Huur and Ceel-Gaan (roughly 250 find enough reason to oblige? newspapers. miles north of Mogadishu). By the end of August 2006, the cartel was thought The United States will have to be realistic to have between 75 and 100 armed as it moves forward. If repeated recent men and a flotilla of at least 100 small U.S. pronouncements that a favorable motorized skiffs.3 Farah Hirsi Kulan end state in Afghanistan is impossible to (also known as “Booyah” and considered achieve without Pakistan’s acquiescence are true, then any sustainable end state 1 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Rob- bery at Sea: Annual Report, 2009 (London: International ited Kabul frequently in the recent past. Chamber of Commerce, 2010); International Maritime 23 This information is based on the author’s various per- Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report sonal conversations with Pakistani strategic experts and for the Period 1 January – 30 June 2010 (London: Interna- military officials during the summer of 2010. tional Chamber of Commerce, 2010). 24 As stated earlier, these groups include Mullah Omar’s 2 Carolyn Bandel and Kevin Crowley, “Somali Pirate Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and Hizb-i-Isla- Attacks Sink Premiums as Insurers Leap Aboard,” mi. Bloomberg, August 2, 2010. 25 This information is based on the author’s various per- 3 Bruno Schiemsky, “Piracy’s Rising Tide: Somali Pi- sonal conversations with Pakistani strategic experts and racy Develops and Diversifies,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, military officials during the summer of 2010. January 20, 2009.

11 september 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 9 the “father of piracy in Puntland”) was ships are those that are easy to intercept being held in hamlets located along key to the Puntland piracy scene, acting and board, and which offer the greatest the northeastern Somali coast.13 Since as the principal recruiter, organizer potential for a large payoff. In most cases, attacks are short and the distance to and financier for missions of several this means vessels traveling at 15 knots be monitored so large, the probability hundred pirates operating out of the or less with low freeboards (the distance of intercepting a “live” hijacking while Eyl area.4 Today, these players now from the upper deck to the waterline) and it is underway is extremely low. This compete with a diffuse mosaic of groups medium-to-high tonnage.9 means that in most cases perpetrating based in a number of coastal hamlets gangs have little to fear from the along the 1,900-mile Somali seaboard. While most incidents currently occur various international navies currently The current main piracy hubs include close to Somali shores, gangs have patrolling off the HoA.14 Eyl, Garard and Ras Asir.5 exhibited an ability to act extremely far out at sea. Somali pirates have been The cost of an attack obviously varies by Membership in these gangs is fluid, reported as far west as the Maldives complexity, but most amount to no more although most personnel have a and as far south as the Mozambique than $300 to $500 assuming a gang has fishing background and are generally Channel, tending to “migrate” as its own boats. The more expensive part linked by common clan, blood or tribal weather conditions around the HoA of an operation is the maintenance of allegiances.6 They do not espouse any deteriorate during the northeastern the vessel during negotiations, which particular ideological agenda and have monsoon period.10 One particularly can add up to as much as $100 a day no association with al-Shabab Islamist publicized attack, the hijacking of depending on the size of the ship and insurgents currently fighting the notional the Saudi-registered supertanker MV the number of hostages being held.15 Somali government in Mogadishu.7 Sirius Star in 2008, occurred more than In the case of smaller hijackings, costs 500 nautical miles from shore.11 When are either “fronted” by the pirate leader Unlike the pirate-infested waters of attacks of this distance are mounted, (who also takes most of the ransom) Southeast Asia, the vast majority of pirates will operate from a “mothership” or collectively borne by the gang’s HoA attacks—more than 93%—occur and then launch skiffs as they approach members. For operations involving the during daylight and last between 30 their intended target. seizure of large ocean-going freighters, and 45 minutes.8 The most vulnerable however, outside investors usually Once on board, the pirates will provide the necessary funds. Since generally round up the crew and detain 4 Kerin Backhaus, “Piracy in the Puntland Region of So- payments are made in cash and then them below deck. Depending on the malia,” OilPrice.com, May 12, 2010. transferred through the unofficial hawala size of the hijacked vessel, they will 5 Bosasso is also home to pirate gangs, but does not act as remittance system, the money trail has either force the captain and his first an operational base per se. Kismayo used to be a promi- proven difficult to follow. Nevertheless, officer to pilot the ship back to Somali nent den, but syndicates have mostly been driven out law enforcement officials believe waters or sail it themselves. The ship since al-Shabab took over the city a couple of years ago. backing comes principally from mafia will then be docked at a port under the 6 Peter Chalk, “Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” Brown “bosses” based in Somalia, Lebanon, control of the pirates where it remains 16 Journal of World Affairs 16:2 (2010): pp. 91-92. See also Dubai and Europe. until negotiations for its release are Stig Hansen, Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Mis- finalized.12 Most vessels are currently conceptions and Remedies (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Somali pirates are well equipped with Urban and Regional Research, 2009). It should be noted access to a wide assortment of both that a number of Somali gangs have recruited across lin- gen, Denmark, March 2010. basic and more advanced weaponry, eage lines to ensure they have the best and most experi- 9 Personal interview, Royal Australian naval officer, including assault rifles, heavy and light enced personnel available. Canberra, Australia, July 2009. See also “Countering machine guns, anti-ship ordinance and 7 Indeed, al-Shabab is vehemently opposed to Somali Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Most pirates, viewing them as common bandits that act con- Plan,” U.S. National Security Council, December 2008. of these arms appear to be sourced from trary to Islamic principles. During the brief period of rule 10 Personal interviews, maritime specialists, Copenha- under the Islamic Courts Union, the incidence of piracy gen, Denmark, March 2010; International Maritime Bu- as an economic lifeline). in Somalia dropped markedly and al-Shabab has vowed reau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for 13 Some vessels are also being held in Hobo (on the coast should they ever regain full control over the country the Period 1 January – 30 June 2010 (London: International of Puntland) and Hobyo. they will immediately move to eradicate any gangs that Chamber of Commerce, 2010), pp. 20-21. 14 There are currently around 14 international navies continue to operate from Somalia’s shores. While there 11 Robert Worth, “Pirates Seize Saudi Tanker Off Kenya: with a collective contingent of around 30 ships patrolling have been some reports of certain pirate syndicates split- Ship Called the Largest Ever Hijacked,” New York Times, in or near the Gulf of Aden. These include both unilat- ting their ransom payments with Islamist insurgents to November 18, 2008; Sharon Otterman and Mark Mc- eral deployments and coalition forces operating under obtain more powerful weaponry, there is no concrete evi- Donald, “Hijacked Supertanker Anchors off Somalia,” the auspices of Combined Task Force 151, the European dence to support these assertions. Additionally, Somali New York Times, November 19, 2008. Union’s Atalanta flotilla and NATO’s Operation Ocean pirates already have access to arms sources, including 12 Personal interviews, Royal Australian naval officer Shield. Yemeni gunmen and illegal munitions dumps/bazaars and maritime specialists, Canberra, Australia, July 2009 15 Hansen, p. 38. in East Africa, particularly in Sudan and Ethiopia. For and Copenhagen, Denmark, March 2010. While the ship 16 Chalk, “Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” p. 91; Patrick further details on the supposed link between pirates and is at dock, supplies are rendered from “vendors” working Mayo, “Kenyan Firms Make Killing from Piracy,” Daily insurgents in Somalia, see Jeffrey Gettleman, “In Somali on shore. In many ways, piracy has served to stimulate a Nation, July 23, 2010; Jaindi Kisero, “Mystery of Sh164bn Civil War, Both Sides Embrace Pirates,” New York Times, cottage service industry in pirate dens such as Eyl and Smuggled into Kenya,” Daily Nation, June 9, 2010; Ray- September 1, 2010. Garard and most locals in these communities have little mond Gilpin, Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy (Wash- 8 Personal interviews, maritime specialists, Copenha- motivation to see the practice eradicated (as it is viewed ington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009), p. 2.

12 september 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 9 illegal bazaars and dumps in Somalia, the chief executive officer of Eos Risk Several parties have actively backed Ethiopia and Sudan or bought directly Management, business opportunities the growing PSC presence off the HoA. from Yemeni gun dealers. Although for these firms have more than tripled The United States has been especially outfitted with an array of guns and since 2008.22 favorably inclined, with Vice Admiral other battle-related materiel, syndicates William Gortney—the commander of are generally low-tech. Contrary to PSCs have aggressively engaged the the 5th Fleet—acknowledging that popular wisdom, the use of night vision shipping industry, arguing that they coalition maritime forces simply do not goggles, global positioning systems, constitute a vital force multiplier to have the resources to provide round- satellite phones and automated ship existing naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden the-clock surveillance for a region identification units is rare.17 by providing professional protection that measures more than two million that is uniquely tailored to the specific square miles in area and sees transits The basic objective of an attack is to extort requirements of their customers. The in excess of 20,000 vessels a year.25 money from shipowners by seizing their range of services currently on offer European shipowners have been vessels and cargo. As noted, average has spanned the spectrum from advice equally as supportive. In Germany, settlements now amount to around $4 and training to active defense (both for example, there has been a growing million, which is more than double the lethal and non-lethal), escort support trend toward flagging vessels in open figure a mere 22 months ago. Last year, and hostage-rescue. An implicit point registry countries so that mercenaries Somali gangs netted an estimated $50 can be taken on board to protect to $150 million in total ransoms, with “If pirates encounter personnel and cargoes (which is not one case involving the Greek-owned allowed under German law).26 Maran Centarus running to a staggering vessels with heavily armed $7 million.18 Since the essential aim is security details, there is a A number of maritime insurance to elicit as large a payment as possible, companies have also welcomed the violence is typically not a feature of high likelihood that they growing interest of PSCs in the Gulf attacks (unlike incidents off West Africa will move to elevate their of Aden. Certain firms have slashed and Indonesia). In most cases, hostages premiums by as much as 40% for ships are treated relatively well and reports own threshold of violence hiring their own security—bucking of abuse and forced starvation appear and storm vessels with an a trend that has otherwise seen rates unfounded.19 Indeed, between 2009 and escalate by as much as 400% since mid-2010, of the 1,381 seafarers taken active intent to use lethal 2008.27 In late 2008, the British-based hostage in acts of piracy off the HoA, force against anyone they Hart Group launched the first joint only five were killed.20 venture with an insurance company, confront.” whereby the latter offered discounted Countering Piracy off the HoA: rates for ships sailing past Somalia The Role of Private Security Companies using the former’s guards.28 Growing international concern with the piracy problem off the HoA has prompted in the PSC case is that their presence Despite these endorsements, there are a number of private security companies obviates the need for shipowners a number of arguments against using (PSCs) to make their services available to arm their own crews.23 This is PSCs for policing duties in the HoA. to protect commercial vessels transiting an important consideration as most First, many firms have yet to develop the region. Prominent examples include mariners are generally not well versed clear rules of engagement or seek legal Eos Risk Management, Hollowpoint in the controlled use of light weapons advice about the legal consequences Protection, Anti-Piracy Maritime and do not have combat experience; of opening fire against suspected Security Solutions, Secopex, Gulf of not only would this leave the ship in criminals. Accidental death or injury Aden Group Transits, the Hart Group, jeopardy, it would also place the crew as a result of an exchange could, as a the Olive Group, ISSG Holdings Ltd., in extreme danger by exposing them to result, expose shippers to potentially Muse Professional Group Inc and Xe a situation for which they have little (if 21 24 Services. According to David Johnson, any) training. 25 Jacquelyn Porth, “Piracy Off the Horn of Africa Threatens Relief Efforts, Trade,” America.gov, October 17 Personal interviews, maritime security specialists, 31, 2008. Copenhagen, Denmark, March 2010. mali Piracy,” The Strategist, September 10, 2009; Kath- 26 Patrick Hagen, “German Owners Swap Flags to Pro- 18 “Pirates Seize Singapore Cargo Ship in the Gulf of erine Houreld, “Companies Hire ‘Shipriders’ Against tect Against Pirates,” Lloyds List, June 14, 2010. Aden,” BBC, June 28, 2010; Tristan McConnell, “Battle Somali Pirates,” Associated Press, June 5, 2009; Sandra 27 “Private Security Firms Join Battle Against Somali Pi- Rages in Pirate Hub Over $7 Million Ransom,” Times, Jontz, “Hired Guns Secure Ships, Stir Controversy,” Stars rates,” Fox News, October 26, 2008; “Economic Impact January 19, 2010. and Stripes, February 15, 2010. of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden on Global Trade,” U.S. De- 19 Chalk, “Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” p. 93. See also 22 “Splashing and Clashing in Murky Waters,” Econo- partment of Trade, undated; “Piracy Could Add $400m Jeffrey Gettleman, “Somali Pirates Seize Up to Five More mist, August 20, 2009. to Owners’ Insurance Cover Costs,” Lloyds List, Novem- Ships,” New York Times, April 7, 2009. 23 See, for instance, “‘Ships Need Armed Guards,’ Says ber 21, 2008. 20 Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual, Re- Security Firm Chief,” FeralJundi.com, October 20, 28 “Private Security Firms Join Battle Against Somali Pi- port 2009, p. 13; Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: 2008. rates”; “Potential Hikes in Shipping Rates Involving Gulf Report for the Period 1 January – 30 June 2010, p. 11. 24 Personal interviews, maritime security and defense of Aden Transits,” Gerson Lehrman Group, September 21 “Private Security Companies Called in to Combat So- officials, London, May 2009. 29, 2008.

13 september 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 9 crippling liability claims or even while an on-board three-man security of the PSC in question, which is criminal charges.29 detail can cost as much as $21,000 a unlikely to provide the basis for an day.34 Although larger owner-operators objective assessment of the security Second, many states do not allow armed may be able to contemplate such outlays, to be provided.39 In addition, because vessels to enter their territorial waters they are well beyond the means of smaller owner-operators seek to minimize their as this runs counter to the established “mom and pop” shipping companies. overhead operating costs as much as right of “innocent passage.” Having Unfortunately, it is these entities that possible, the probable tendency will be armed guards on board a ship would be constitute the bulk of attacks in the HoA, to hire the cheapest PSC on offer. In the likely to significantly enhance the legal presently accounting for around two- absence of a formal vetting procedure, complexities and costs of any journey thirds of all hijackings in the region.35 there is no way to ascertain whether that entails multiple ports of call, this price is genuinely cost effective which is the case for most commercial Fifth, PSCs could trigger an inadvertent or merely reflective of a “fly by night container carriers.30 Egypt already arms race with pirates—thereby cowboy outfit.”40 requires all commercial vessels to forfeit potentially placing vessels in even any weapons that they might have greater risk of being caught in a Conclusion before entering the Suez Canal, which hostile exchange. As noted, most gangs Long considered a scourge of the past, is creating eight-to-ten hour backlogs. presently neither act to cause structural piracy continues to flourish off the Abu Dhabi also recently announced that harm to the vessels they hijack nor do HoA. Gangs have access to a wide array it plans to confiscate weapons on any they injure those they capture: the basic of weapons, are prepared to act far from ship traveling through its territorial objective is to lever these “assets” for shore and are clearly capable of seizing waters, which could potentially create ransom.36 If pirates encounter vessels even the largest ocean-going carriers. delays of up to six hours.31 with heavily armed security details, While the use of PSCs may offer some however, there is a high likelihood that deterrent value, the potential costs Third, traditional flag states generally they will move to elevate their own of hiring these firms would appear do not register ships that carry threshold of violence and storm vessels to outweigh the benefits. Moreover, weapons.32 The employment of armed with an active intent to use lethal force employing PSCs have no effect on the guards would therefore be likely to against anyone they confront. In the land-based “push-factors” in Somalia encourage a shift to “open registry” words of Cyrus Moody, a senior manager that lie at the root of the problem, countries (or flags of convenience/ with the International Maritime Bureau, notably poverty, underdevelopment and FoCs) such as Belize, Honduras, Liberia, “If someone onboard a ship pulls a gun, above all a lack of internal governance. Panama, the Bahamas and Bermuda— will the other side pull a grenade?”37 all of which are characterized by Such a prospect has definitely informed Dr. Peter Chalk is a Senior Policy Analyst considerably more lenient standards the threat perceptions of shipowners, with the RAND Corporation, Santa and legal requirements. As noted, this with most “happy” to pay ransoms Monica, California. He has worked on a is already occurring in Europe. If the rather than contemplate the costs that range of projects examining transnational trend continues, it will exacerbate what could result from a major firefight that security threats in Latin America, Africa is already a remarkably opaque and leads to the wholesale loss of a vessel, and Asia. He is Associate Editor of Studies unregulated industry.33 its cargo and crew.38 in Conflict and Terrorism—one of the foremost journals in the international Fourth, PSCs are expensive. Providing Finally, there is no public registry security field—and serves as an Adjunct a robust external escort costs between of the different companies providing Professor with the Naval Postgraduate $10,000 and $50,000, depending on armed guards to commercial vessels, School in Monterey, California. the length of the accompanied trip, which makes auditing the standards and personnel of these entities difficult. 29 “Private Security Firms Join Battle Against Somali In most cases, shipping companies Pirates”; Houreld; Jontz. are forced to rely on the “sales pitch” 30 See, for instance, Nick Blackmore, “New Tricks: Ex- amining Anti-Piracy Tactics,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 21, 2009. 34 Personal interviews, International Maritime Bureau, 31 “Suez Gun Law Catches Carriers in Cross Hairs,” London, May 2009 and private security consultant, 39 Houreld; Steven Jones, “Implications and Effects of American Shipper Magazine, August 12, 2010. Hong Kong, February 2010. See also Tim Fish, “Pri- Maritime Security on the Operation and Management of 32 See, for instance, Peter Chalk, Laurence Smallman vate Security Firms Step Up Anti-Piracy Ops in Gulf of Vessels,” in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and and Nicholas Burger, Countering Piracy in the Modern Era: Aden,” Jane’s Navy International, August 18, 2010. Peter Lehr, Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security Notes from a RAND Workshop to Discuss the Best Approach- 35 Chalk, Smallman and Burger, p. 3. (London: CRC Press, 2009), p. 107. es for Dealing with Piracy in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, 36 Gettleman, “Somali Pirates Seize Up to Five More 40 The International Marine Contractors Association CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), p. 5; “Ships Need Armed Ships”; Blackmore. (IMCA) has produced a simple checklist to evaluate a po- Guards.” 37 Cyrus Moody, cited in “Private Security Firms Join tential PSC’s suitability. The auditing document includes 33 For an interesting analysis on the use of open regis- Battle Against Somali Pirates.” such matters as the contractor’s company structure, try countries and their potential interplay with crime 38 Comments made during the “Countering Piracy in the their recruitment standards, training procedures and and terrorism, see Catherine Meldrum, “Murky Waters: Modern Era: The Best Approaches for Dealing with Pi- competency/professionalism of their guards. Although Financing Maritime Terrorism and Crime,” Jane’s Intel- racy in the 21st Century,” workshop, RAND Corporation, somewhat useful, the checklist necessarily defaults to a ligence Review, May 15, 2007. Pentagon City, Virginia, March 2009. self-evaluation, which may or may not be accurate.

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Al-Qa`ida’s Key Operative: of the most formidable and effective are conflicting accounts on whether he jihadist commanders operating today. was a member of the Pakistan Army’s A Profile of Mohammed special forces, known as the Special Ilyas Kashmiri This article profiles Ilyas Kashmiri, Services Group (SSG), or whether he providing background information served in the military at all.9 Whatever By Seth Nye on his early years and how he became his military role, Kashmiri later proved involved in fighting jihad. It looks at adept at recruiting members of the on august 6, 2010, the U.S. government his break with the Pakistani state and Pakistani military to his cause. identified Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri as identifies concerns related to Kashmiri’s a specially designated global terrorist increasing connections to transnational Following Afghanistan, Kashmiri joined for his role and actions in Harkat-ul- jihadist terrorism threatening the the Kashmir conflict as part of HuJI.10 He Jihad-al-Islam (HuJI) and al-Qa`ida.1 West. Most worryingly to U.S. and was appointed HuJI’s “chief commander Prior to the U.S. government’s decision, European authorities, Kashmiri has of Jammu and Kashmir” with his unit Pakistani, Indian and Afghan authorities been directly linked to terrorist plots known as Harkat-ul-Jihad Brigade 111 were already well acquainted with in the United States and Denmark (also known as Brigade 313).11 As amir Kashmiri, whose militant operations through his connections to David of HuJI’s Kashmir wing, he earned a stretch back decades. Kashmiri is Coleman Headley, Tahawwur Hussain reputation as a ruthless and skilled number four on the Pakistani Interior Rana, Raja Lahrasib Khan and unnamed commander, and he trained his cadre at Ministry’s most wanted terrorist list, a European operatives.4 Kashmiri now a camp outside Kotli in Azad Kashmir.12 significant feat considering the number appears fully engaged in transnational Kashmiri’s operatives were considered of jihadists operating in the country.2 terrorist activity, and he has become a an elite group of jihadists who launched a He has emerged as a key operational key component in al-Qa`ida’s strategy daring series of cross-border operations commander for al-Qa`ida and a major to conduct attacks against the West.5 into Indian-controlled Kashmir. During player overall in the Pakistan-based one of these raids, Kashmiri was jihadist scene. His deep involvement in Early Years and Joining the Jihad captured and imprisoned for two years the Kashmir jihad, close associations Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri was before escaping.13 Describing his tactics, with jihadists based in the Federally reportedly born in either January or Kashmiri explained in 1999, Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), February 1964 in Bhimber in Azad relationship with al-Qa`ida and ties to Kashmir.6 He attended Allama Iqbal I have learned the art of war from Punjabi militant organizations allows Open University in Islamabad where the Arabs. The Arabs fighting in him to link together these various strands he studied communications, but left Afghanistan, including Egyptians of the Pakistan-based jihadist movement. after becoming embroiled in jihadist and Palestinians, have adopted a activities.7 In the 1980s, he fought against separate style combining the war Kashmiri has been tied to recent the Soviets in Afghanistan, losing an eye strategies of the Russians and assassinations of Pakistani generals, and a finger on the battlefield.8 There Americans. I am an expert in that transnational terrorist plots and suicide style. We have trained our boys also bombings in Pakistan. There is also 4 Headley conducted surveillance operations in Den- in that mode so that they can fight speculation that Kashmiri was involved mark on behalf of Kashmiri, discussed conducting at- better than India’s regular army 14 in the suicide attack on the Central tacks there and met with Kashmiri’s contacts in Europe. commandos. Intelligence Agency’s Camp Chapman Headley directly assisted Lashkar-i-Tayyiba in the prep- in Afghanistan’s Khost Province in aration for the Mumbai attacks of 2008 by conducting tant Leadership Monitor 1:1 (2010). 3 December 2009. All of these factors surveillance and reconnaissance operations. 9 Kashmiri may have been trained by Pakistan’s military have earned him a reputation as one 5 Raja Khan, for example, claimed that Kashmiri wants or the ISI. In Kashmiri’s most recent purported inter- to train operatives to conduct attacks in the United States. view, he appears to deny that he was ever in the SSG. For 1 Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam was founded by Qari Saiful- See “Chicago Man Charged with Providing Material Sup- that interview, see Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief lah Akhtar in the early 1980s. It has been active in Af- port to al Qaeda by Attempting to Send Funds Overseas,” Lays Out Strategy.” Hamid Mir wrote that Kashmiri was ghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangla­desh. HuJI was U.S. Department of Justice, March 26, 2010. Kashmiri’s an SSG member. See Hamid Mir, “How an Ex-Army also designated as a “foreign terrorist organization” own rhetoric makes clear that he views the United States Commando Became a Terrorist,” , by the United States. For details, see “Designations of as his central enemy. September 20, 2009. Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI) and its Leader Moham- 6 “United States Targets Terrorist Organization Oper- 10 Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strat- mad Ilyas Kashmiri,” U.S. State Department, August ating in India and Pakistan in Joint Terrorism Actions, egy.” 6, 2010. The United Nations added Ilyas Kashmiri and Treasury, State Designate Harakat-ul Jihad Islami And 11 Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations HuJI to their 1267 Committee Sanctions List. For details, Its Senior Leader Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri,” U.S. in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004). The 111 may see “The Consolidated List Established and Maintained Treasury Department, August 6, 2010. Physically, he is refer to one of the branches of HuJI, all of which would by the 1267 Committee with Respect to Al-Qaida, Usa- described as more than six feet tall, well built and has a add up to 313, which references the number of Muslims ma bin Laden, and the Taliban and Other Individuals, long white beard dyed with reddish henna. For details, who fought alongside the Prophet Muhammad at the Groups, Undertakings and Entities Associated with see Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Battle of Badr. Them,” United Nations, August 6, 2010. Lays Out Strategy,” Asia Times Online, October 15, 2009. 12 Jamal, “South Asia’s Architect of Jihad: A Profile of 2 Amir Mir, “The Top Ten Most Wanted Jehadis,” The 7 Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strat- Commander Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri.” News International, September 1, 2009. egy.” 13 Mir, “How an Ex-Army Commando Became a Ter- 3 Amir Mir, “US Seeks Harkat Chief for Khost CIA At- 8 Ibid.; Arif Jamal, “South Asia’s Architect of Jihad: A rorist.” tack,” The News International, January 6, 2010. Profile of Commander Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri,”Mili - 14 Bill Roggio, “Ilyas Kashmiri, Then and Now,” The

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In 1994, Kashmiri took part in an Services Intelligence (ISI).22 After 9/11, and the military.”27 Kashmiri resumed operation utilizing the group cover name Pakistan began limited crackdowns his activities and reentered the jihadist al-Hadid with the future kidnapper on jihadist groups, restricting their world. of Daniel Pearl, Omar Saeed Sheikh.15 activity in Kashmir and shutting down They kidnapped four Western tourists training camps. The clearest challenge Today, Kashmiri is thought to be closely (including an American), brought to the Pakistani state came with involved with a series of suicide attacks them to safe houses outside New Delhi assassination attempts on President in response to events at Lal Masjid and and demanded the release of militant Musharraf in 2003, organized by HuJI Pakistani military incursions in FATA.28 commanders in Indian prisons.16 In a operative Amjad Hussain Farooqi.23 He is further suspected in spreading police raid, Saeed was shot and detained, The ISI detained Kashmiri on a number suicide operations into Azad Kashmir.29 while Kashmiri narrowly escaped.17 of occasions for his alleged role in Two major operations attributed to these attacks, links to al-Qa`ida and Kashmiri include the mid-2009 attack Kashmiri’s notoriety greatly increased in refusing to shut down his operations against ISI offices in Lahore, and the February 2000 after he led a gruesome in Kashmir.24 Although a major suspect assassination of a former commander attack on an Indian military post in in the attacks, Kashmiri was released, of the SSG, General Amir Faisal Alvi, which he allegedly beheaded an Indian apparently due to lack of evidence or in 2008.30 Kashmiri is also thought to soldier.18 Pictures of Kashmiri holding pressure from other Kashmiri jihadist have been involved in the attack on the the head circulated through the press, leaders.25 He transferred his operations Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters and it was reported that he received a from Kotli to Ramzak in North in Rawalpindi in October 2009.31 A personal reward after presenting the Waziristan Agency in 2005 where he purported interview with Kashmiri head to General .19 was back on familiar ground from his offers important insights into his This action made Kashmiri a hero among days fighting the Soviets.26 thinking and significance among jihadists fighting in Kashmir. Pakistan-based jihadists. When asked In 2007, the situation changed again for why he is now fighting the Pakistani Kashmiri’s more extreme views were Kashmiri when Pakistani authorities military, he answered, “It was never evident in these early days. In 1999, raided Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in the Pakistan Army that was against when asked what he would do if the Islamabad. Zahid Hussain, a Pakistani me, but certain elements who branded conflict in Kashmir were resolved, he security analyst, explained that “the Lal me as an enemy to cover up their responded that there were many other Masjid incident was the turning point weaknesses and to appease their parts of India left to conquer.20 He further for Pakistani militant groups when masters.”32 stated that his fighters could continue they declared jihad against the state their war in Chechnya, Palestine or elsewhere, elaborating, “we folks have taken an oath from Mullah Omar and 22 In 2000, Kashmiri had already come into conflict with we consider him as Ameerul Momineen. a Pakistani general when he refused orders to join the We have absolute permission from him newly created Jaysh-i-Muhammad. For details, see Mir, to go to any place and engage ourselves “How an Ex-Army Commando Became a Terrorist.” As 27 Zaffar Abbas, “Khwaja’s Murder Points to Home 21 in jihadi activities.” with a variety of jihadist groups that interacted with the Truths,” Dawn, May 3, 2010. Pakistani military and intelligence units for operations in 28 Asad Kharal, “LJ, HJI, TTP Behind Recent Attacks in Breaking with the Pakistani State Kashmir, the relationships were complicated. Many were Punjab: Report,” Daily Times, July 12, 2010. Following the 9/11 attacks and the happy to receive arms, training and funding, yet resisted 29 A previous base of operations for Kashmiri along with toppling of the Taliban, Kashmiri turned government control of their operations. many other jihadists, Azad Kashmir remained largely his sights once again to Afghanistan and 23 Amir Mir, The True Face of Jihadis (New Delhi: Roli untouched by the violence plaguing Pakistan until these the internal dynamics of Pakistan. As Books, 2006), p. 166. Farooqi was later killed in a shoot- recent attacks. For more details, see Mir, “Kashmiri Be- with many Pakistani jihadists, Kashmiri out with Pakistani security forces. hind Khawaja’s Murder?”; Amir Mir, “Lashkar-e-Zil Be- was reexamining his relationship with 24 Mohammad Imran, “Government Releases Maulana hind Azad Kashmir Suicide Hits,” The News International, the Pakistani military and the Inter- Ilyas Kashmiri,” Daily Times, June 9, 2004. A demon- January 11, 2010. stration of Kashmiri’s continued stature among Kashmir 30 “Designations of Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI) and Long War Journal, October 26, 2009. jihadists was evident when Syed Salahudin, head of Hizb its Leader Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri,” U.S. State De- 15 Jamal, “South Asia’s Architect of Jihad: A Profile of al-Mujahidin, personally intervened with Pakistani au- partment, August 6, 2010. Kashmiri developed a plan to Commander Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri.” thorities to get him released. See “Militant Leader Ilyas kill Pakistan’s current chief of army staff (General Ash- 16 Ibid. Kashmiri Released,” Daily Times, February 2, 2004; faq Parvez Kayani), a plan that even al-Qa`ida at the time 17 PranabDhalSamanta, “Omar Sheikh’s Pak Handler Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strat- was supposedly reluctant to carry out. See Syed Saleem Ilyas Kashmiri also Handled Headley,” Indian Express, egy.” Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda Keeps its Eyes on Afghanistan,” November 15, 2009. 25 Mir, “How an Ex-Army Commando Became a Terror- Asia Times Online, May 22, 2009. 18 Jamal, “South Asia’s Architect of Jihad: A Profile of ist”; Mir, “The Top Ten Most Wanted Jehadis.” 31 This attack was thought to have been carried out in re- Commander Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri.” 26 Amir Mir, “Kashmiri Behind Khawaja’s Murder?” venge for the killing of TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud. See 19 Ibid. Ranjani Raghavan, “Dead Sepoy’s Village Doesn’t The News International, May 1, 2010. In September 2009, Amir Mir, “Cursing the Nurse,” The News International, Know his Killer is Killed in Pakistan,” Indian Express, a drone strike in the Machikhel area of North Waziristan October 18, 2009. September 23, 2009. Agency was thought to have killed Kashmiri, yet he sur- 32 Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strat- 20 Roggio. vived. For details, see “Pakistani Al Qaeda Leader Killed egy.” It is impossible to verify the accuracy of this inter- 21 Ibid. in U.S. Strike,” Los Angeles Times, September 18, 2009. view.

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Beyond these attacks, he reportedly Khan expose Kashmiri’s connections to the future.”44 When further asked if he turned to kidnap-for-ransom activities Western operatives in North America meant attacks against the United States for funding, such as the October 2008 and Europe. These cases also point to and Israel, he reportedly replied, “As a kidnapping of a film producer.33 Another the significant role Kashmiri is playing military commander, I would say every kidnapping operation believed to have in al-Qa`ida’s international operations target has a specific time and reasons, had Kashmiri’s backing was the capture and his connections to Lashkar-i- and the responses will be forthcoming of former ISI operatives Khalid Khwaja Tayyiba and the Mumbai operation. accordingly.”45 and Sultan Amir Tarar (also known as Headley allegedly met with Lashkar Colonel Imam), along with a British member Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed The separate case of Raja Lahrasib Khan Pakistani journalist.34 As a result of (also known as Pasha), a close associate reveals Kashmiri’s intent to support these operations, Kashmiri’s networks of Kashmiri’s, who instructed him to attacks in the United States. Khan is are believed to have garnered millions conduct surveillance in Denmark.38 a Pakistan-born U.S. citizen who was of dollars in ransom payouts.35 In Europe, Headley allegedly met arrested in Chicago in March 2010 with Kashmiri’s contacts there to gain and charged with providing material Transnational Plots and Kashmiri’s Western assistance in planning and supporting support to al-Qa`ida.46 Khan claimed to Operatives attacks in Denmark against locations and have known Kashmiri for 15 years, met In addition to South Asia plots, Kashmiri individuals associated with the Prophet him numerous times and learned that appears to have more recently focused Muhammad cartoon controversy.39 he wanted to train operatives to strike his attention on plotting attacks in the During a February 2009 meeting in the United States.47 Khan discussed West. According to a recent purported in Waziristan, Kashmiri allegedly attacking a stadium in the United States interview, the jihadist leader explained informed Headley that he could provide with an unnamed associate, although it how his focus changed from regional the manpower, weaponry and funding does not appear he was doing so under jihads in places such as Kashmir to a for the Denmark operations.40 orders from Kashmiri.48 In recorded more global jihadist strategy with the discussions, Khan also seemed to United States as a central target. “The Following the Mumbai attacks, intimate that Kashmiri was at one time real game is the fight against the great Kashmiri also wanted Headley to return part of the Pakistan Army and developed Satan [U.S.] and its adherents,” he to India to conduct surveillance on an international network.49 Khan also reportedly said.36 Providing further Israeli targets in response to events discussed Kashmiri’s ties to al-Qa`ida insight into why he joined with FATA- in Gaza in 2009.41 Kashmiri told and said that Kashmiri acts under Bin based militants, Kashmiri explained Headley that “the elders,” supposedly Ladin’s orders.50 that “a unified strategy is compulsory. referring to the al-Qa`ida leadership, The defeat of American global hegemony were extremely unhappy with Israel’s Various other international connections is a must if I want the liberation of my Gaza activities.42 Furthermore, the to Kashmiri and HuJI have been homeland Kashmir, and therefore it targeting of the Nariman House and reported. The Central Intelligence provided the reasoning for my presence Israeli Jews in the Mumbai attacks may Agency has reportedly documented the in this war theater.”37 have demonstrated involvement by presence of Brigade 313 operatives in Kashmiri’s Brigade 313, as that name various European cities.51 According Kashmiri’s threats against the West was referenced in phone intercepts to Pakistani prosecutors, the five appear to have come to fruition. The between the attackers and handlers.43 men from the Washington D.C. area cases of David Coleman Headley, When asked if more Mumbai-style who were arrested in December Tahawwur Rana and Raja Lahrasib attacks would be carried out, Kashmiri 2009 in Sargodha made contact with responded, “That was nothing compared Kashmiri’s fellow HuJI commander 52 33 Retired Pakistani Major Haroon Rasheed (also known to what has already been planned for Qari Saifullah Akhtar. All of this as Abu Khattab) was charged for his role in this opera- tion, along with two others, but was acquitted in June 38 U.S.A. v. David C. Headley, Northern District of Illi- 44 Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strat- 2010 by an anti-terrorism court in Pakistan. See “3 Ac- nois, 2009. egy.” quitted of Former SSG Commandos Murder,” Dawn, 39 Ibid. 45 Ibid. June 16, 2010. 40 Ibid. Kashmiri felt that as part of the Denmark opera- 46 Those al-Qa`ida charges were for his assistance to 34 Arif Jamal, “The Asian Tigers – The New Face of the tion a suicide attack should be conducted along with be- Kashmiri. Khan’s case is unrelated to that of Headley and Punjabi Taliban,” Terrorism Monitor 8:20 (2010). Fol- heading anyone captured. Rana, aside from the links to Kashmiri. lowing the claim by the Asian Tigers, a group called 41 Sagnik Chowdhury, “Post-26/11, Headley Scouted 47 Khan’s meetings with Kashmiri took place in both “Lashkar Jhangvi al-Alami, Abdullah Mansour” claimed Israeli Targets in India to ‘Avenge’ Gaza War,” Indian Miran Shah (North Waziristan) and Kotli (in 2008) indi- responsibility for this operation with a video release of Express, April 6, 2010. cating Kashmiri traveled out of FATA in recent years. Colonel Imam. See “Video of Pakistani Colonel Imam 42 Ibid.; Tejas Mehta, “The Importance of Being Ilyas 48 “Chicago Man Charged with Providing Material Sup- Sultan Amir Tarar,” Flashpoint Partners, July 26, 2010. Kashmiri,” NDTV, August 7, 2010. port to al Qaeda by Attempting to Send Funds Overseas,” 35 Kashmiri specifically stated to the Pakistani major 43 Ibid. Headley’s associate, Tahawwur Rana, met with U.S. Department of Justice, March 26, 2010. who led the operation that the militants’ financial situ- Abdur Rehman in Dubai before the attacks in Mumbai 49 U.S.A. v. Raja Lahrasib Khan, Northern District of Il- ation was dire. For details, see S. Raza Hassan, “Tale of and learned they were going to take place. See U.S.A. v. linois, 2010. Militants’ Motivation and Reach,” Dawn, April 14, 2009. Tahawwur Hussain Rana, Northern District of Illinois, 50 Ibid. 36 Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strat- 2009. The revitalized Brigade 313 is thought to be differ- 51 “I-Team Report: Brigade 313,” ABC Local, January 28, egy.” ent from the one Kashmiri led in the Kashmir days and 2010. 37 Ibid. now has members from a variety of groups. 52 Akhtar reportedly encouraged them to come to Paki-

17 september 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 9 leads to further evidence of HuJI’s and that al-Qa`ida in Kashmir carried Kashmiri’s links to Pakistani Taliban Brigade 313’s involvement with Western out the February 2010 bombing in militants, al-Qa`ida operatives, and jihadists.53 Pune, India, which killed 16 people Punjab-based militants62 who have at a German bakery.59 Following that fought in Kashmir places him at Role with Al-Qa`ida and Other Jihadist attack, Brigade 313 issued threats against the crossroads of all these groups, Organizations internationally connected events, such demonstrating his danger. He has Following HuJI’s and Kashmiri’s as the 2010 Hockey World Cup and improved the ability of militants to recent designations, State Department the Commonwealth Games.60 Kashmiri strike in Pakistan’s interior and has counterterrorism coordinator Daniel himself stated that attacks conducted created important logistics routes Benjamin stated, “The linkages in India were part of a larger strategy of throughout the country. between HUJI and Al-Qaeda are clear, striking at the United States regionally.61 and today’s designations convey the Kashmiri is described as an exceptional operational relationship between Conclusion guerrilla fighter who “turns the strategic these organizations.”54 On a number Kashmiri brings a wealth of advantages vision into reality, provides the resources of occasions, both Headley and Raja to al-Qa`ida and associated groups. His and gets targets achieved, but he chooses Khan stated that Kashmiri worked for decades of experience and contacts with to remain in the background and very low and was in contact with al-Qa`ida’s Pakistani jihadist networks are deep and key.”63 Kashmiri himself stated that “I leaders.55 Kashmiri further confirmed widespread. He has directly participated have always been a field commander and his involvement when asked why he in and supported a range of insurgent I know the language of battlefields.”64 joined al-Qa`ida, purportedly stating, and terrorist operations in Afghanistan, Having honed his skills from years of “We were both victims of the same Kashmir and India. Involvement with warfare and commanding an insurgent tyrant. Today, the entire Muslim world transnational terrorist plots in Denmark group in Kashmir, Ilyas Kashmiri is is sick of Americans and that’s why and the United States proves he has now transferring the same tactics and they are agreeing with Sheikh Osama.”56 developed international contacts willing experience to other theaters of jihad.65 Aside from al-Qa`ida, Kashmiri is to carry out and support attacks in the known to have close relationships with West. Kashmiri also offers al-Qa`ida Seth Nye is currently an instructor with the a multitude of jihadist groups including a route into Kashmir and India; this is Combating Terrorism Center at West Point’s the Haqqani network and the TTP.57 the first time that al-Qa`ida has placed Practitioner Education Program and an a longtime Kashmir jihad veteran—and Adjunct Professor at New York University In a posthumous audio statement an ethnic Kashmiri—in such a central (NYU), where he teaches a graduate course released in June, former al-Qa`ida role in their operations. on terrorism and insurgencies. He spent operative Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid referred four years as an Intelligence Analyst and to Kashmiri as a part of al-Qa`ida, Team Leader for the New York City Police saying that he heads “Qaedat al-Jihad Department’s Counterterrorism Bureau and in Kashmir.”58 Al-Yazid further claimed Intelligence Division. Prior to the NYPD, Mr. Nye was a Navy Intelligence Officer where stan. See “American Suspects Linked to Militants: Prose- Behind February 2010 Attack in India; Complains of among various positions he was assigned cutor,” Dawn, April 17, 2010. Kashmiri joined HuJI when Shortage of Funds,” Middle East Media Research Insti- to the Combined Joint Special Operations it was under Akhtar’s leadership and served as leader of tute, June 15, 2010. A group claiming to be al-Qa`ida in Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) and HuJI operations in Azad Kashmir. Interestingly, the U.S. Jammu and Kashmir announced itself in 2006, and an- a F/A-18F Super Hornet squadron (VFA- designation of Kashmiri appears to portray him as the other individual claiming to represent al-Qa`ida in India 102). He deployed to Afghanistan and served overall commander of HuJI. emerged in June 2007. See “CD Announces Qaeda He- on the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt as part of 53 An additional case of interest is that of Bangladeshi- had in India,” Economic Times, June 9, 2007. Operation Enduring Freedom. born British citizen Golam Mostafa, who is described as 59 “Sahab: Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid in Posthumous Au- the UK amir for HuJI-B (Bangladesh). dio Message,” Middle East Observatory, June 15, 2010; 54 “US, UN Declare Harakat-ul Jihad al-Islami a Ter- Jane Cowan, “Two Men Arrested Over India Bomb At- rorist Group,” Agence France-Presse, August 7, 2010. tack,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, September HuJI’s relationship with al-Qa`ida dates back more than 8, 2010. a decade, and HuJI-B’s leader signed Bin Ladin’s 1998 60 The message did not specifically claim responsibil- fatwa declaring war on the United States and Israel. ity for the attack. See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda 55 “Chicago Man Charged with Providing Material Sup- Chief Delivers a Warning,” Asia Times Online, February port to al Qaeda by Attempting to Send Funds Over- 10, 2010. Kashmiri may have delivered on these threats seas.” when two bomb blasts occurred outside a cricket sta- 62 The Punjabi Taliban is said to consist of operatives 56 Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strat- dium in the Indian city of Bangalore. See Syed Saleem from Lashkar-i-Jhanghvi, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan and egy.” Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda Chief Delivers a Warning,” Asia Jaysh-i-Muhammad. For details, see Hassan Abbas, 57 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Pakistan Has its Own Battle Times Online, February 10, 2010. “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel to Fight,” Asia Times Online, July 28, 2010; “Harkatul Ji- 61 Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out 2:4 (2009). had-e-Islami Merges With Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Strategy.” Baitullah Mehsud was said to have also been 63 Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strat- Preparing Suicide Bombers Squad,” Daily Express, Sep- working with Kashmiri on expanding operations into egy.” tember 20, 2008. India. See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Afghanistan: The Neo- 64 Ibid. 58 “Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid in Posthumous Audio Mes- Taliban Campaign,” Le Monde Diplomatique, October 1, 65 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “The Rise and Rise of the Neo- sage Urges Attacks in U.S.; Says Al-Qaeda in Kashmir 2008. Taliban,” Asia Times Online, April 1, 2009.

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The Role and Significance This article will show how the ISI’s Instead, the ISI has executed a patchwork insurgent campaign was interrupted in of smaller profile-raising attacks. In of Signature Attacks in the March 2010, when the insurgent group response to the April 18, 2010 deaths of Iraqi Insurgency lost a key operational leader. As a result, ISI leader Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi and large-scale simultaneous bombings al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) chief Abu Ayyub By Michael Knights on strategic targets have given way to al-Masri, the ISI launched a hasty series sporadic and sometimes ineffective of five car bombs on Shi`a mosques in on august 31, 2010, the United States attacks on individual targets. It will Baghdad on April 23, striking crowds declared an end to combat operations then disaggregate the different strands of worshippers as they left Friday in Iraq.1 In recent months, however, of Iraq’s interwoven insurgencies to prayers.10 Fifty-eight people were there has been a stubborn perception gain a better understanding of the role, killed.11 In June and July, the ISI sought that security in Iraq is suffering a significance and future evolution of to humiliate the government by storming downturn.2 Yet the raw numbers of signature attacks in Iraq. government-protected buildings in monthly security incidents reveal a the capital. On June 13, ISI fighters significant decline in year-on-year Interrupted Campaign in Baghdad stormed the Central Bank of Iraq, using comparisons. The key reason for the Throughout 2009, the ISI was fixed three suicide vests to defeat the guard difference between perception and in a pattern of quarterly car bombings force and then rampaging through the reality is the rising incidents of so-called (spaced three months apart) on clusters building.12 On June 20, a twin car bomb “signature attacks” that capture the of government buildings in Baghdad. attack killed 26 people queuing outside media’s attention. These high-profile On August 19, 2009, the Ministry of a government immigration office near attacks involve tactics such as suicide Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance the International Zone.13 On July 26, vest bombings, suicide car bombings were both seriously damaged, resulting the ISI claimed a car bomb attack on and other attempted mass casualty in at least 90 deaths.5 On October the Saudi-funded al-Arabiya television attacks. In October to December 2009, 25, 2009, the Ministry of Justice and channel.14 On July 29, an ISI assault for example, the average number of Baghdad Provincial Council were struck force overran a police checkpoint in attempted or completed signature by car bombs, killing 155 people.6 On Adhamiyya, a predominately Sunni attacks in Iraq was 15 per month. By the December 8, 2009, five car bombs were part of northeastern Baghdad, and then second quarter of 2010 (April-June), the detonated in car parks and public areas ambushed government reinforcements monthly average increased to 23. The in the government district just outside with a series of roadside bombs.15 The month of July 2010 witnessed 34 such Baghdad’s International Zone, killing July 29 attack, in which a number attacks and was claimed by the Iraqi 127 people.7 On January 25, 2010, three of security personnel were killed, government to have been the deadliest major international hotels were attacked generated widespread publicity due month since May 2008.3 in Karrada, near the International Zone, to the ISI’s ability to literally plant its killing 15 people.8 This campaign was flag in Baghdad during daylight hours.16 Typically for Iraq, the rise in signature interrupted on March 11, 2010, when Other attacks targeted security force attacks can be viewed in two ways. To the ISI amir in west Baghdad, Munaf headquarters in Baghdad in July and some analysts, the attacks signal a partial `Abd al-Rahim al-Rawi, was captured. August. recovery of movements such as the Islamic Although one further “concept” attack State of Iraq (ISI). To others, including flowed through the operational pipeline, Although these acts are troubling for Iraqi government spokesmen and U.S. there have been no major coordinated the government, they represent a more military leaders, the attacks represent attacks against government targets in manageable problem than the highly increasingly desperate attempts by such Baghdad since al-Rawi’s arrest.9 effective, quarterly strikes against groups to demonstrate that they remain government ministries that unfolded in 4 active and strategically relevant. Musawi characterized the attacks as the “hysterical” 2009. attempts of surviving al-Qa`ida cells to “prove their 1 Although the U.S. combat role in Iraq officially ended existence and their influence.” See Aseel Kami and Sua- on August 31, 2010, approximately 50,000 U.S. troops dad al-Salhy, “Attacks Kill Over 100 in Iraq, al Qaeda remain in the country. Blamed,” Reuters, May 10, 2010. Also see General Ray 2 All statistics in this article are derived from Olive Odierno, news briefing, U.S. Department of Defense, July Group’s database of more than 130,000 geo-located in- 21, 2010. 10 “Bombings Across Iraq Target Shiite Mosques, Leav- cidents. This data suggests that reported monthly inci- 5 “Blasts Bring Carnage to Baghdad,” BBC, August 19, ing 58 Dead,” Fox News, April 23, 2010. dents have decreased from 1,562 in July 2008 to 873 in 2009. 11 Ibid. July 2009 and finally to 330 in July 2010. The database 6 “Baghdad Bomb Fatalities Pass 150,” BBC, October 26, 12 Suadad al-Salhy and Muhanad Mohammed, “Gun- is maintained by private security company Olive Group 2009. men, Bombs Target Iraq Central Bank, Killing 15,” Reu- and represents data gained through more than 2,000 7 Steven Lee Myers and Marc Santora, “Election Date Set ters, June 13, 2010. days of consecutive on-the-ground operations in Iraq. in Iraq as Bombs Kill Scores,” New York Times, December 13 “Twin Baghdad Car Bombs Kill 26, Wound 53,” 3 Iraqi figures of 535 Iraqi deaths and 1,000 other ca- 8, 2009. Agence France-Presse, June 20, 2010. sualties reflect the impact of all security incidents in the 8 Haider Kadhim, “Baghdad Bombs Kill 36, Chemical 14 “4 Killed, 10 Injured in Al Arabiya Suicide Bombing,” country during July 2010, not just mass casualty attacks. Ali Hanged,” Reuters, January 25, 2010. al-Arabiya, July 26, 2010. The U.S. government queried the figures, claiming that 9 The last “concept” attack was the April 4, 2010 assault 15 Tim Arango, “Iraqi Insurgents Plant Qaeda Flag in 222 Iraqis were killed and 782 were wounded. on four diplomatic targets west of the International Zone, Baghdad,” New York Times, July 29, 2010. 4 Government spokesman Major General Qassim al- which left 42 dead. 16 Ibid.

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Reaching into the South Such theories may be correct, but the bribery targeting significant numbers The declining scope and scale of ISI south is hardly impenetrable to the ISI of key community leaders and security attacks in Baghdad have been offset to or other Sunni Arab militant groups. force members.20 Where mass casualty some extent by the series of attention- Baghdad’s southern “belts”—Babil and attacks are undertaken, they tend to grabbing attacks launched on May Wasit provinces—have long functioned target the security forces. In eastern 10 and August 25, 2010. The May as a base for attacks against Shi`a Anbar (the Ramadi-Falluja-Abu attacks involved coordinated car bomb communities and particularly pilgrim Ghurayb corridor), for instance, there explosions in Baghdad, Hilla and processions moving between Baghdad have been 22 mass casualty attacks since Iskandariyya (in Babil Province, south and the shrines in Karbala and Najaf. August 2009. Twelve of these were of Baghdad), and Basra. The August 25 Indeed, there are precedents for mass aimed at security force checkpoints attacks were mass casualty bombing casualty attacks in Iraq’s “deep south”: and bases, while only two were focused attempts in Mosul, Kirkuk, Tikrit, Dujail on June 10, 2009, a car bomb was on civilian targets.21 This approach to (near Saddam’s birthplace), Ba`quba, remotely-detonated in a Shi`a market targeting stands in marked contrast to Muqdadiyya, Ramadi, Falluja, northern town west of Nasiriyya, with the vehicle AQI’s use of chlorine vehicle bombs to Baghdad’s Adhamiyya and Kadhimiyya later traced back to a Basra safe house coerce the population in the same area districts plus the southern cities of where booby-trapped children’s toys in 2007 and 2008.22 Karbala, Kut and Basra. Although only had previously been found on May 2, the latter attack on August 25 was 2009.19 Although Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi claimed by the ISI, some ISI elements and AQI leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri were probably involved in both of Disaggregating Iraq’s Interwoven were killed in Tikrit, the Tigris River the series of attacks, which claimed a Insurgencies Valley (TRV) has not been an intensive combined total of at least 140 lives.17 In any given month, at least half (and theater of mass casualty attacks in usually a greater proportion) of mass the last year. Once again, more subtle The unique feature of the attacks was the casualty attacks are spread across the methods are being utilized to increase inclusion of so many southern targets, provinces in non-coordinated attacks. the operational space for insurgent particularly in Basra, which is nearly The mainstream media erroneously groups as the U.S. drawdown creates 370 miles by road from the nearest major aggregates these incidents with opportunities to influence uncertain Sunni Arab concentrations. Although coordinated attacks to give the sense of Sunni Arab communities. The TRV and only soft targets were selected across a unitary Sunni Arab insurgency that the foothills of the Hamrin Mountains the south—typically Shi`a civilian is guided by a single controlling hand. to the east continue to be a logistical, gatherings targeted with multiple car In fact, there are clearly a number of transportation and rest and recuperation bombs—the coordination involved in regional insurgencies operating largely area for Sunni insurgents.23 The only the attacks is noteworthy at a time independent of each other within Iraq, significant use of car bombs in the TRV when the ISI and other groups continue with each making different use of mass between Baghdad and Beyji has been in to suffer significant attrition to their casualty attacks to meet their own areas south of Balad, where eight car leadership cadres. There are various objectives and reflecting local tactical bombs have been used in the last year to theories to explain this contradiction. conditions. attack Iraqi Army checkpoints and U.S. Ba`athist and mercenary elements have convoys on Main Supply Route Tampa played a major role in bombings claimed In some Sunni Arab areas, little use is North (Highway 1).24 by the ISI. Separately, some suggest made of mass casualty attacks. The ISI that Iranian intelligence support has and related movements have largely The Diyala River Valley (DRV) is a far facilitated some bombings in an effort moved away from the use of vehicle more active theater for mass casualty to destabilize Prime Minister Nuri bombs against civilian targets to attacks. Diyala is known as “Little Iraq” al-Maliki’s claims to have improved collectively punish and intimidate Sunni because the province mirrors Iraq’s security in Iraq.18 Arab communities. Instead, such groups mountainous Kurdish-Arab northeast are attempting to rebuild operational

17 “Dozens Dead in Iraq Attacks,” al-Jazira, August 25, sanctuaries and recruitment areas using 20 For a good recent account of how the ISI and other 2010. Also see “Dozens Killed in Wave of Bombings more selective tools such as “night groups undertake such intimidation campaigns, see Across Iraq,” BBC, August 25, 2010. The casualty figures letters” (warnings), assassination, and Richard Spencer, “Now it’s Every Iraqi for Himself,” have been adjusted to reflect more accurate totals later Daily Telegraph, August 31, 2010. provided by contacts in the Iraqi Security Forces. Hameed, “Iraq Arrests Former Baathists in Baghdad 21 This data is based on Olive Group’s statistics. Contrast 18 Ba`athist involvement has been a persistent theme in Bombings,” Los Angeles Times, August 22, 2009. Specu- this with the composition of 29 mass casualty attacks car- government announcements during the past year, rang- lation concerning Iranian involvement in mass casualty ried out in the last year in the nine southern Shi`a prov- ing from the August 2009 to the August 2010 bombings. attacks is commonly voiced by Iraqi generals and politi- inces, of which 27 were aimed at civilian targets. This is not just a political issue (where the government cians in private. The only open source discussion of the 22 Michael Knights, “Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency seeks to rouse fears of a Ba`athist return), but it also re- issue was the official U.S. attribution of responsibility to Centre Briefing: Chlorine Bombs in Iraq,” Jane’s Terror- flects the sophistication and professionalism of some at- Iran for market bombings in Iraq in November 2007. See ism and Insurgency Center, March 2007. tacks, which point to the involvement of former regime comments by Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, the deputy 23 For details on AQI’s longstanding use of the Hamrin intelligence officers. For details, see Ned Parker and Ri- spokesman for Multinational Corps-Iraq in a press brief- Mountains, see Michael Knights, “Endangered Species - yadh Mohammed, “Iraq Car Bombings, Other Attacks ing on November 25, 2007. Al-Qaeda in Iraq Adapts to Survive,” Jane’s Intelligence Kill 51: Al-Qaida, Baathists Blamed for Bloodshed,” Los 19 Personal interview, U.S. Marine Military Training Review, April 2008. Angeles Times, August 26, 2010. See also Liz Sly and Saif Team adviser, Basra, Iraq, July 2009. 24 This data is based on Olive Group’s statistics.

20 september 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 9 and its fertile Shi`a-Sunni center and This has given the insurgency in these Vehicle-borne devices are getting south.25 Diyala also continues to be the provinces the ability to effectively smaller; whereas devices of more than scene of a war within a war, including target armored mobile targets (such as 800 pounds of military explosives were 40 mass casualty attacks in the last individuals marked for assassination) the norm in previous years, devices year. The DRV was the operational and also to achieve optimal detonation now usually comprise 50-150 pounds headquarters of AQI for at least the of vehicle bombs during attacks on of homemade or bulk explosives in a first three years of the occupation, hardened checkpoints. Around a quarter sedan car or even a motorbike.30 Larger and it continues to see high levels of of mass casualty attacks continue payloads are increasingly rare and are violence in areas such as the provincial along the corridor linking Mosul to the difficult to transport due to the density capital Ba`quba, Khalis, Muqdadiyya, Syrian border, which includes the hard- of checkpoints. Military munitions are and the Lake Hamrin villages of Jalula, hit Turkoman city of Tal Afar—the likewise becoming harder to procure Saadiyya and Qara Tapa. In Ba`quba, recipient of a triple suicide bombing at a and transport, driving partially where there have been 16 mass casualty football match on May 14, 2010. The key successful efforts by many cells to attacks in the last 12 months, five were targets are Kurdish-led security forces switch to Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil carefully targeted attacks on provincial and ethnic minorities, who are viewed for their main explosive charges, and leadership, five on Shi`a civilians, by the insurgents as Kurdish proxies in leading the government to consider its and the remainder on security forces. the area. first explosives security regulations Across the province, these proportions regarding fertilizer sales.31 Instead, the are mirrored in the split of effort among Conclusion most effective attacks in Iraq continue the ISI’s key opponents.26 The May 10 and August 25, 2010 serial to be suicide vest bombs, particularly mass casualty attacks were significant when utilized by female bombers or by A subtle difference is observable in feats of coordination, but they are only pairs of bombers acting in a coordinated Ninawa and Kirkuk provinces, where the part of a broader picture. Leadership manner. ISI and Ansar al-Sunna predominately casualties appear to have interrupted target Kurdish security forces and an intensifying series of ISI attacks on Dr. Michael Knights is a Lafer fellow at The Kurdish civilians. In raw numbers, there the Iraqi government in Baghdad and Washington Institute for Near East Policy, were 63 mass casualty attacks in Ninawa diverted the group onto a different path: specializing in the military and security and 12 in Kirkuk since August 2009. In targeting soft civilian targets in Shi`a affairs of Iraq, Iran, Yemen, and the Gulf both provinces, Islamist militants are areas. Most of the other mass casualty Arab states. Dr. Knights has been writing more integrated into the broader anti- attacks that occur in Iraq are not about internal security in Iraq since the Kurdish and anti-American resistance coordinated and are directed by local 1990s and has worked extensively with the forces. The insurgency in Mosul is cells for tactical reasons. In some areas, Iraqi Security Forces and private security mounting roughly the same number of they are fully integrated with other companies in Iraq. He is the author of four monthly car bombs and suicide vest military means of resistance and there books and the editor of one anthology on attacks as it did over a year ago. The five has been a marked movement away from Saddam-era and post-war Iraq. or six mass casualty attacks undertaken coercive mass casualty strikes on Sunni each month in the provinces represent civilians. Kurdish, Shi`a and ethnic a sub-set of the 90 or so major attacks minority civilians remain fair game to launched by insurgents in the two almost all Sunni Islamist groups. provinces (combined).27 In most parts of Iraq, the use of In the urban fight against the federal increasing numbers of remotely- and Kurdish-led security forces, car detonated vehicle bombs against soft bombs and suicide vest attacks are still targets has allowed greater numbers of utilized as heavy weapons with which to attacks to be carried out and has given attack bases and hardened checkpoints. cells greater longevity and survivability To a greater extent than any other part than networks specializing in suicide of Iraq, suicide attacks remain the operations.29 This should not be norm in Ninawa and Kirkuk. Whereas confused with a resurgence of the remote-detonation of car bombs and insurgency. The effectiveness of mass truck bombs is the identified means casualty attacks is arguably declining. of initiation in around half of mass casualty attacks across the country is declining considerably, with almost all suicide attacks in the last year, they only account for falling into two categories: suicide vest attacks or suicide 28 12% of attacks in Ninawa and Kirkuk. car bomb attacks on moving convoys, both modes of at- tack where suicide operations are a prerequisite, not a 25 For a discussion of Diyala as an operational environ- choice. Very few attacks witness insurgent groups delib- ment, see Michael Knights, “Pursuing Al-Qa`ida into erately expending valuable martyrs on targets that can be Diyala Province,” CTC Sentinel 1:9 (2008). attacked using other means. 26 This data is based on Olive Group’s statistics. 29 This data is based on Olive Group’s statistics, blended 30 Ibid. 27 Ibid. and cross-referenced against numerous open source re- 31 “Bombers Used Fertilizers – BOC,” Aswat al-Iraq, 28 Ibid. The number of true suicide-detonated devices ports of individual bombings. April 7, 2010.

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Recent Highlights in outside the gates to the base, while an other people. – BBC, August 4; Bloomberg, estimated five other fighters opened fire August 4; Los Angeles Times, August 5 Terrorist Activity on the facility. – al-Jazira, August 3; Voice of America, August 3 August 5, 2010 (UNITED STATES): U.S. August 1, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): The Attorney General Eric Holder announced Netherlands withdrew its combat troops August 3, 2010 (IRAQ): Al-Qa`ida-linked charges against 14 people accused of from Afghanistan, handing its mission in gunmen overran a security checkpoint in supporting the al-Shabab militant group Uruzgan Province to U.S. and Australian Baghdad, killing five policemen. – Reuters, in Somalia. According to Voice of America, forces. – CNN, August 1 August 3 “Two suspects have been arrested, the rest are still at large with several believed August 2, 2010 (UNITED STATES): A August 3, 2010 (IRAQ): At least one car to be in Somalia fighting for al-Shabab.” federal court jury in Brooklyn, New York bomb exploded at an outdoor market in – Voice of America, August 5 convicted Russell Defreitas and Abdul Kut, Wasit Province, killing at least 12 Kadir of plotting to blow up jet fuel tanks people. – AP, August 4; Reuters, August 3 August 5, 2010 (UNITED STATES): at John F. Kennedy International Airport. The U.S. State Department released its – USA Today, August 2 August 3, 2010 (YEMEN): A suicide annual report on terrorism, stating that bomber detonated explosives at the police al-Qa`ida’s core in Pakistan remains August 2, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A headquarters in southern Yemen’s al- the “most formidable” terrorist group suicide bomber in a vehicle killed six Dali` Province. The explosion wounded at threatening the United States, along with children in Kandahar Province. It appears least eight policemen. Authorities suspect its affiliates in Yemen and Africa. – AFP, that the bomber tried to assassinate Haji that al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula August 5 Ahmadullah Nazak, the governor of Dand was responsible for the attack. – Yemen district, but his explosives detonated Post, August 3 August 5, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): early. – al-Jazira, August 2; New York Times, Taliban militants gunned down a August 2 August 3, 2010 (INDONESIA): An 10-member international medical team Indonesian court sentenced three men to in Badakhshan Province. Six Americans, August 2, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): prison for harboring terrorists involved a German and a Briton were among the Waheedullah Sabawoon, a prominent aide in the suicide bombings against the Ritz- dead. – Los Angeles Times, August 8 to President Hamid Karzai, was severely Carlton and JW Marriott hotels in Jakarta wounded when a bomb exploded next to in July 2009. – AFP, August 3 August 5, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A his vehicle in Jalalabad. – New York Times, suicide bomber in an explosives-laden August 2 August 4, 2010 (UNITED STATES): U.S. vehicle attacked a convoy of Afghan and authorities arrested Shaker Masri of international forces in Kunduz Province, August 2, 2010 (NORTH AFRICA): Chicago and charged him with attempting killing seven policemen. – Reuters, August 5 An al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb to support al-Qa`ida and Somalia’s al- (AQIM) leader released a new statement Shabab militant group. According to the August 5, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): threatening attacks against France and FBI, Masri, who was born in Alabama, was Taliban fighters shot down a Canadian Mauritania in retaliation for a July 22 joint arrested shortly before he was due to fly Chinook helicopter in Kandahar Province. military raid by the two states against an to Los Angeles, with Somalia as his final None of the crew members were seriously AQIM base in Mali. – al-Jazira, August 2 destination. Counterterrorism officials in injured during the emergency landing. Chicago had been secretly monitoring the – Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, August 7 August 3, 2010 (STRAIT OF HORMUZ): 26-year-old Masri for two years. – BBC, Jihadist militants belonging to the August 4; ABC News, August 5 August 5, 2010 (PHILIPPINES): A bomb Brigades of Abdullah Azzam claimed exploded at the Zamboanga airport in the credit for a suicide bombing against the August 4, 2010 (CANADA): A Canadian southern Philippines. Two people were Japanese oil tanker M.Star as it passed judge freed Abdullah Khadr from jail and killed by the blast. – AFP, August 5 through the Strait of Hormuz in late July. refused to extradite him to the United On July 28, the ship’s crew reported an States. Khadr has been indicted in the August 6, 2010 (GLOBAL): The United explosion shortly after midnight, but they United States on terrorism charges as States and United Nations designated were unsure of its origin. The explosion U.S. authorities allege that he purchased Pakistan’s Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam only caused minor damage to the ship, weapons for al-Qa`ida. The Canadian (HuJI) as a foreign terrorist organization which is owned by Mitsui O.S.K. It is government has not yet decided whether and blacklisted its commander, suspected that a suicide bomber detonated to appeal the decision. – al-Jazira, August 4 Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri. The U.S. a dinghy loaded with explosives near the Treasury Department said that Kashmiri hull of the ship. – AFP, August 3; BBC, August August 4, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A “provides support to Al-Qaeda operations, 6; UPI, September 3 suicide bomber assassinated a senior including logistical support for Al-Qaeda’s commander of Pakistan’s paramilitary terrorist attacks.” – AFP, August 6 August 3, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Frontier Constabulary in Peshawar. The Militants launched a coordinated attack commander, Sifwat Ghayoor, also had August 6, 2010 (ALGERIA): Islamist against Kandahar airfield, the main NATO served as Peshawar’s police chief. The militants assassinated the mayor of base in southern Afghanistan. A suicide Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility Baghlia village in Boumerdes Province. bomber first detonated his explosives for the attack, which also killed three The region is considered a stronghold

22 september 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 9 for al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb. August 14, 2010 (LEBANON): Lebanese company in Sangin district in Helmand – Reuters, August 7 security forces killed two senior members Province, killing approximately 25 of Fatah al-Islam during clashes in the workers and security guards. – Reuters, August 7, 2010 (IRAQ): A series of eastern Bekaa Valley region. The men August 20; New York Times, August 21 explosions ripped through the southern were identified as Abdul Rahman Awad Iraqi city of Basra, killing at least 43 and Abu Bakr. – AFP, August 18 August 21, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Six people. – BBC, August 8 policemen were killed in their sleep while August 14, 2010 (MAURITANIA): Omar manning a checkpoint on Ring Road in August 8, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber Sid’Ahmed Ould Hamma, a Malian Helmand Province. – New York Times, August killed six people in Ramadi, Anbar national convicted of kidnapping three 21 Province. – BBC, August 8 Spanish aid workers in Mauritania last year and handing them to al-Qa`ida, will August 21, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A remotely- August 9, 2010 (INDONESIA): Abu be extradited to Mali. According to Agence detonated bomb killed six anti-Taliban Bakar Bashir, one of Indonesia’s leading France-Presse, “The extradition appeared militia fighters in Mohmand Agency of radical Muslim clerics, was arrested on to be part of efforts to obtain the freedom the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. accusations that he played a part in setting of two Spaniards still in the hands of the – AFP, August 21 up a militant training camp in Aceh Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.” – AFP, Province. Bashir is one of the founders of August 14 August 21, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemeni Jemaah Islamiya. – New York Times, August 9 security forces announced that an al- August 17, 2010 (RUSSIA): A suicide Qa`ida operative, Ali Husayn Abdullah August 11, 2010 (UNITED STATES): A bomber detonated his explosives near a al-Tays, surrendered to authorities. Al- U.S. military court at Guantanamo Bay police checkpoint in North Ossetia, killing Tays was identified as a former detainee sentenced Ibrahim al-Qosi to 14 years in two police officers. – CNN, August 17 at Guantanamo Bay. – Yemen Post, August 21 prison. Al-Qosi, who was once a cook for Usama bin Ladin, had already agreed to August 17, 2010 (RUSSIA): A car August 22, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemeni a plea deal with prosecutors, so he could bomb ripped through a café in the city security forces killed seven suspected possibly serve a shorter sentence or be of Pyatigorsk in the Stavropol region, al-Qa`ida terrorists in Abyan Province. repatriated to Sudan. The details of that wounding 30 people. – Reuters, August 17 The province has been the site of deadly deal remain secret. – AFP, August 11 clashes since August 19. – Saba, August 23; August 17, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber UPI, August 22 August 11, 2010 (SAUDI ARABIA): Said detonated explosives among dozens of al-Shihri, a leader of al-Qa`ida in the people at an Iraqi Army recruitment site August 23, 2010 (NORTH AFRICA): Al- Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), purportedly in Baghdad, killing at least 57 of them. The Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released a new audio statement, ordering Islamic State of Iraq took credit for the released two Spanish hostages who had supporters in the Saudi military to attack. – New York Times, August 17; Reuters, been held in captivity since November “collect information on everything related August 17; Reuters, August 20 2009. Al-Arabiya television reported that to the Saudi royal family.” In addition the release was linked to Mauritania’s to attempting to overthrow the Saudi August 17, 2010 (IRAQ): A bomb attached recent extradition of Omar Sid’Ahmed monarchy, al-Shihri also asked followers to a fuel truck exploded in a Shi`a Ould Hamma to Mali. There are also in the Saudi military to “carry your arms neighborhood in Baghdad, killing eight unconfirmed reports that the Spanish against Israel, which is only few kilometers people. – New York Times, August 17 government paid nearly seven million away from you. Whoever among you is euros to secure their freedom, along with a pilot should seek martyrdom in the August 18, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A another hostage who was previously skies of Palestine, and who works in the suicide bomber killed a district police released in March 2010. – Voice of America, navy should aim his weapon at the Jews commander and three officers in Kandahar August 22; Telegraph, August 24 there.” He further said, “You who work as Province. – New York Times, August 18 guards for tyrants, princes, ministers or August 23, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A teenage complexes where Christians live, or can August 18, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): suicide bomber detonated his explosives reach them, seek help from Allah to kill Gunmen assassinated Atta Khan Qadir at a mosque in Wana, South Waziristan them. Together, let’s overthrow the Al Wal, the director of tribal affairs for Zabul Agency, killing 25 people. Maulana Noor Saud family.” – Bloomberg, August 11 Province, as he returned from evening Muhammad, a former lawmaker and head prayers in Qalat. – New York Times, August of the Islamic school where the mosque August 12, 2010 (MALI): Al-Qa`ida in the 18 was located, was among the dead, and it Islamic Maghreb executed a guide working appears that he was specifically targeted for the Malian customs service. The guide August 19, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): by the bomber. – Los Angeles Times, August was abducted along with a Malian soldier Gunmen killed the chief of police for Burka 24 on August 10. The guide’s execution district in Baghlan Province. Abdul Haq apparently occurred after “militants was shot to death after gunmen entered August 23, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A found he was carrying documents from his home. – New York Times, August 21 remotely-detonated bomb ripped through a Western embassy based in the capital.” a school in Kurram Agency in the Federally – AFP, August 11 August 20, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Administered Tribal Areas. A number of Taliban fighters attacked a construction tribal elders were meeting in the school

23 september 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 9

at the time of the blast. Six people were laden vehicle into a military barracks at CTC Sentinel Staff killed. – Los Angeles Times, August 24 Nema in the eastern part of the country. The bomber was killed and there were no Editor-in-Chief August 24, 2010 (UNITED STATES): other fatalities. – AFP, August 24 Erich Marquardt The U.S. Treasury Department imposed Senior Editor, CTC sanctions on Muhammad Abdallah Hasan August 26, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Abu-al-Khayr, one of Usama bin Ladin’s At least 10 Taliban fighters raided a Editorial Board son-in-laws. The United Nations took a checkpoint just outside Kunduz city, COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. similar action. The Treasury Department killing eight Afghan police officers. The Department Head alleges that al-Khayr is a key leader of al- attack occurred while the officers were Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Qa`ida’s finance section. – AFP, August 24 asleep. – BBC, August 26; Reuters, August 26

COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. August 24, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide August 26, 2010 (IRAQ): Militants killed Deputy Department Head bomber killed two Iraqi police officers six members of a Sunni militia allied with Department of Social Sciences (West Point) and a civilian at a checkpoint in Ba`quba, U.S. forces against al-Qa`ida. The militia Diyala Province. – AFP, August 24 members were killed in Diyala Province. LTC Reid Sawyer – Voice of America, August 26 Director, CTC August 24, 2010 (SOMALIA): At least two al-Shabab militants stormed the August 28, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Christopher Heffelfinger Hotel Muna in Mogadishu, shooting at Taliban fighters dressed in U.S. military FBI Fellow, CTC lawmakers and their bodyguards who uniforms attacked two coalition bases were meeting inside the building. Both of in Khost Province. According to the the gunmen detonated explosives attached Washington Post, “The simultaneous to their bodies during the assault. The assaults on Forward Operating Base assailants, disguised as security force Salerno and nearby Forward Operating Contact personnel, killed at least 31 people. At Base Chapman in Khost province ended Combating Terrorism Center least six lawmakers were among the dead. with 21 insurgents killed but no U.S. U.S. Military Academy – Washington Post, August 24; Christian Science deaths, NATO officials said.” – BBC, August 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Monitor, August 24; Wall Street Journal, August 28; Washington Post, August 28; New York Times, West Point, NY 10996 25 August 28 Phone: (845) 667-6383 Email: [email protected] August 25, 2010 (CANADA): Ottawa August 30, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Seven Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ police arrested two men for alleged U.S. soldiers were killed in two roadside involvement in an al-Qa`ida-related bomb attacks in southern Afghanistan. No * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 terrorism plot. Authorities said that more details were provided about the incidents. arrests were expected. – Vancouver Sun, – AFP, August 30; AP, August 30 August 25; UPI, August 26 August 30, 2010 (SOMALIA): Insurgents August 25, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): launched a mortar strike at the An Afghan police officer shot to death presidential palace in Mogadishu, killing support two Spanish military trainers and an four African Union peacekeepers. The The Combating Terrorism Center would interpreter in Badghis Province. The killed peacekeepers were from Uganda. like to express its gratitude to its financial assailant was also killed. – Los Angeles – New York Times, August 31 supporters, for without their support and Times, August 25 shared vision of the Center products like August 31, 2010 (UNITED STATES): the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If August 25, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber Mahmoud Mamduh Salim, an alleged aide you are interested in learning more about in a vehicle attacked a police station to Usama bin Ladin, was sentenced to how to support the Combating Terrorism in Baghdad’s Qahira district, killing 15 life in prison in the United States. Salim Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. people. Most of the dead were police. The was charged for an assault on a New edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at Islamic State of Iraq later claimed credit York corrections officer on November 1, West Point’s Association of Graduates at for the attack. – BBC, August 25 2000, an incident that occurred while he 845-446-1553. was awaiting trial on conspiracy charges August 25, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide stemming from the al-Qa`ida bombings of bomber in a vehicle detonated explosives the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya outside a police station in Kut, Wasit in 1998. – CNN, September 1 Province, killing at least 19 people. The Islamic State of Iraq later claimed credit August 31, 2010 (IRAQ): The United for the attack. – BBC, August 25 States officially ended its combat The views expressed in this report are those of mission in Iraq. Approximately 50,000 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, August 25, 2010 (MAURITANIA): U.S. troops will remain in the country. the Department of the Army, or any other agency Mauritanian troops killed a suicide – Reuters, September 1 of the U.S. Government. bomber as he tried to ram an explosives-

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