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Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE FM 3-11.3 MCRP 3-37.2A NTTP 3-11.25 AFTTP(I) 3-2.56 FEBRUARY 2006 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOREWORD This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other commands as appropriate. STANLEY H. LILLIE J. N. MATTIS Brigadier General, USA Lieutenant General, USMC Commandant Deputy Commandant for US Army Chemical School Combat Development JOHN M. KELLY BENTLEY B. RAYBURN Rear Admiral, USN Major General, USAF Commander Commander Navy Warfare Development Command Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online <www.us.army.mil> and General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library at <www.train.army.mil>. FM 3-11.3/MCWP 3-37.2A/NTTP 3-11.25/AFTTP(I) 3-2.56, C1 Change No. 1 Headquarters Department of the Army United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Air Force Washington, DC, 30 April 2009 Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance 1. Change Field Manual (FM) 3-11.3/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-37.2A/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-11.25/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Interservice) (AFTTP[I]) 3.2.56, dated 2 February 2006, as follows: Remove old pages: Insert new pages: i through xiv i through xiv III-7 through III-20 III-7 through III-20 D-7 through D-22 D-7 through D-22 E-3 through E-10 E-3 through E-10 E-15 through E-22 E-15 through E-22 E-25 through E-30 E-25 through E-30 E-37 through E-38 E-37 through E-38 E-49 through E-50 E-49 through E-50 E-53 through E-56 E-53 through E-56 F-1 through F-4 F-1 through F-4 F-7 through F-16 F-7 through F-16 F-19 through F-20 F-19 through F-20 F-27 through F-28 F-27 through F-28 G-9 through G-10 G-9 through G-10 G-37 through G-38 G-37 through G-38 G-47 through G-48 G-47 through G-48 G-53 through G-56 G-53 through G-56 G-87 through G-90 G-87 through G-88 H-5 through H-12 H-5 through H-12 H-15 through H-22 H-15 through H-22 I-3 through I-4 I-3 through I-4 K-1 through K-2 K-1 through K-2 L-15 through L-24 L-15 through L-24 References-3 through References-6 References-3 through References-6 2. The purpose of this change is to implement recent changes that were promulgated with the release of NATO Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 45(C), Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazards Areas (Operators Manual), December 2005 (STANAG 2103), and NATO STANAG 2104, Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning (STRIKWARN), May 2003. This change publication will serve as current doctrine until the expected promulgation of ATP 45(D) in the future supports a full revision. Operationally significant/factual corrections to previously published errata are also included in this change publication. It does not, however, update administrative information such as reference publications, glossary terms, and addresses of program participants or Service signatories. 3. A pen-and-ink change should be made wherever the words line(s) (items) are currently used in the publication. Line(s) (items) should be changed to set or field depending on the context. For example, change “NBC Report or Message line(s) (items)” to “NBC Report or Message set.” 4. A bar (|) marks new or changed material. 5. File this transmittal sheet in the front of the publication. DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. FM 3-11.3/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.25/AFTTP(I) 3-2.56, C1 30 April 2009 By Order of the Secretary of the Army: GEORGE W. CASEY, JR. General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official: JOYCE E. MORROW Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0927206 DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 113829, requirements for FM 3-11.3. By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force MAX E. KIRSCHBAUM Colonel, USAF Commander Headquarters, Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency Air Force Distribution: F Marine Corps PCN: 144 00051 01 PIN: 083288-001 This page intentionally left blank. PREFACE 1. Scope This multiservice operations publication provides tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for conducting chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) avoidance. This document presents comprehensive TTP for passive and active avoidance measures. Users of this manual will be CBRN staff officers, CBRN noncommissioned officers (NCOs), non-CBRN personnel performing collateral duties as an additional duty CBRN officer or NCO, commanders and staff at the tactical through strategic levels, and civilian agencies. 2. Purpose The purpose of this publication is to provide commanders, staffs, key agencies, and service members with a key reference for planning and conducting CBRN avoidance. It provides the tools for CBRN defense personnel to implement active and passive CBRN avoidance measures and supports the decision-making process. It also serves as a key source document for refining existing training support packages, training center exercises, and service school curricula. 3. Application This publication is designed for use at the operational and tactical levels, but has implications at the strategic level in the implementation of Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2103/Allied Tactical Publication 45C (ATP-45C) and NATO STANAG 2104, Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning (STRIKWARN), May 2003. It will support command staff planning in preparing for and conducting CBRN avoidance operations. It also provides guidance to unit leaders and personnel for implementing CBRN avoidance TTP. 4. Implementation Plan Participating service command offices of primary responsibility (OPRs) will review this publication, validate the information, and reference and incorporate it into service and command manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows: Army. The United States Army (USA) will incorporate the procedures in this publication in USA training and doctrinal publications as directed by the Commander, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Distribution is according to Department of the Army (DA) Form 12-99-R (Initial Distribution Requirements for Publications). Marine Corps. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) will incorporate the procedures in this publication in training and doctrinal publications as directed by the Commanding General (CG), United States (U.S.) Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). Distribution is according to the USMC publications distribution system. Navy. The United States Navy (USN) will incorporate the procedures in this publication in training and doctrinal publications as directed by the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC). 30 April 2009 FM 3-11.3/MCWP 3-37.2A/NTTP 3-11.25/AFTTP(I) 3-2.56, C1 i Air Force. The United States Air Force (USAF) will validate and incorporate appropriate procedures according to applicable governing directives. It will develop and implement this and other nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publications through a series of USAF manuals providing service-specific TTP. Distribution is according to the USAF publication distribution system. 5. User Information a. The United States Army Chemical School (USACMLS) developed this publication with the joint participation of the approving service commands. b. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Please reference the specific page and paragraph, and provide a rationale for each recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to— ii FM 3-11.3/MCWP 3-37.2A/NTTP 3-11.25/AFTTP(I) 3-2.56, C1 30 April 2009 Army Commandant U.S. Army Chemical School ATTN: ATSN-TD 464 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 2617 Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8926 COMM (573) 596-0131, extension 3-7364 Web Site: https://www.us.army.mil/ Marine Corps Commanding General U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command ATTN: C42 (Director) 3300 Russell Road Quantico, VA 22134-5001 DSN 278-6234; COMM (703) 784-6234 Web Site: https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/ Navy Commander Navy Warfare Development Command ATTN: N5 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207 DSN 948-4201; COMM (401) 841-4201 Web Site: https://www.nko.navy.mil/ Air Force Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center ATTN: DJ 155 North Twining Street Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6112 DSN 493-7442; COMM (334) 953-7442 Web Site: https://www.doctrine.af.mil/ Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. This publication implements STANAG 2103, Edition 9, Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazards Areas-Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)45(C), December 2005, and STANAG 2104, Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning (STRIKWARN), 20 May 2003. 30 April 2009 FM 3-11.3/MCWP 3-37.2A/NTTP 3-11.25/AFTTP(I) 3-2.56, C1 iii *FM 3-11.3 MCRP 3-37.2A NTTP 3-11.25 AFTTP(I) 3-2.56 FM 3-11.3 US Army Training and Doctrine Command Fort Monroe, Virginia MCRP 3-37.2A Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia NTTP 3-11.25 Navy Warfare Development Command Newport, Rhode Island AFTTP(I) 3-2.56 Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 2 February 2006 Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..............................................................................................
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