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Rethinking Rural Resistance in China a Case Study of the 2011 Wukan Incident in Guangdong Province

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Rethinking Rural Resistance in China a Case Study of the 2011 Wukan Incident in Guangdong Province Rethinking rural resistance in China A Case Study of the 2011 Wukan Incident in Guangdong province Anne Christine Lie MA. Thesis (60 credits) Chinese Society and Politics Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Spring 2014 II Rethinking rural resistance in China A Case Study of the 2011 Wukan Incident in Guangdong province Anne Christine Lie III Copyright Anne Christine Lie 2014 Rethinking rural resistance in China A Case Study of the 2011 Wukan Incident in Guangdong province Anne Christine Lie http://www.duo.uio.no Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo IV Abstract Rural protests and mass incidents are crucial to our understanding of China’s state-society relations, the possibility for economic and political reform and the future of the Chinese Communist Party regime. The widespread abuse of collective land ownership rights since the reform era is a major cause of rural unrest in China, and mass incidents will likely continue to increase. The Wukan Incident is one of many cases of rural unrest that illustrate the growing gap between urban and rural development, the deep-seated problems of local government corruption and the desperate need for land rights reform. I will do a case study of the 2011 Wukan Incident, in which people protested the illegal sale of their farmland and subsequently demanded local village committee elections, which had not been held in Wukan for many decades. It is the aim of this thesis that a qualitative study of the Wukan case can contribute to our understanding of rural unrest in China. This thesis will consider the theory of rightful resistance, as put forth by Kevin O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, an influential theory in the field of popular resistance in China. O’Brien and Li have found that the central government shows a willingness to tolerate local protests as long as they do not directly challenge the Party’s claim to power. This thesis is based on qualitative research methods such as interviews and observations from fieldwork in Wukan village, Guangdong province. Other primary sources include messages from the social media site Sina Weibo. Furthermore, I have relied on a wide variety of written texts, including news media reports and academic articles. My findings show that the Wukan Incident can be considered a case of rightful resistance. However, based on these new empirical findings, I will argue that there may be other variables that can add to the theory of rightful resistance. First of all, I have argued that the geographical location of Wukan had a significant influence on how protesters viewed opportunities for protesting and subsequently how they made use of allies. Secondly, the Wukan case highlights the growing importance of social media and online activism in cases of rural unrest in China. V VI Acknowledgements First of all I would like to thank my thesis advisor Prof. Mette Halskov Hansen for her clear and useful comments, and for opening my eyes to the possibility of conducting fieldwork research. This has been a very valuable experience for me, and I am truly grateful to have had you as my advisor. Your feedback always made so much sense, and you even managed to make it fun to discuss my mistakes and misconceptions. I would also like to give sincere thanks to the China Programme at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights for a scholarship and the connections needed for a long stay in Guangzhou. Valuable sources, constructive feedback and news updates about Wukan were generously provided by Cecilie Figenschou Bakke, Anne Kari B. Johansen and Wang Yi. The fieldwork was quite challenging, but I am so happy I got to meet and interview some of the wonderful people in Wukan village. The trip would not have been possible without the help of Prof. Yang Songcai. I am deeply grateful to you and your colleagues at the Guangzhou Human Rights Research and Education Center, for insightful comments and useful contacts. The generous hospitality of Mr. Wang Kun at the Center in Guangzhou will not be forgotten. My fellow student Kristian Espelid has acted as sounding board for ideas and has been a major help in finding good sources. I would also like to thank Prof. Koen Wellens for news alerts and useful sources, and Prof. Pang Cuiming for teaching me how to conceptualize and structure a thesis. I want to thank my family for proofreading and moral support, all the way from Australia. Many, many brave little commas did not make it back, but a lot of friendly advice did. Thank you, Mamma and Pappa. Jonas, I could not have done this without you. You have helped me immensely as a proofreader and in finding good sources. You have demanded progress and excellence, yet you have also been very sweet and supportive during this whole process. Never has any man amassed as many ‘uscados’ (or goodwill points) as you. I am deeply grateful to all those who have helped me proofread and better understand the Wukan Incident and rural protests in China, but the errors that remain are my responsibility alone. VII VIII Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................... V Acknowledgements ........................................................................................ VII Introduction ................................................................................................... 1 Definitions and terminology: “Mass incident” ....................................................................... 2 An overview of the following chapters: ................................................................................. 4 1 Research Methodology ............................................................................... 6 1.1 Qualitative research and the case study method .............................................. 6 1.2 Interviews ............................................................................................................. 7 1.3 Observation .......................................................................................................... 10 1.4 Written texts and other materials ...................................................................... 11 1.5 Studying sensitive research topics ...................................................................... 12 1.6 Staying with a host family in Wukan village ..................................................... 14 1.7 Self-censorship and interviewer expectations ................................................... 16 1.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 16 2 The Wukan Incident and rural unrest in China ..................................... 17 2.1 Background: The Wukan Incident .................................................................... 17 Prelude .................................................................................................................................... 17 The Wukan Incident of September 21, 2011 .......................................................................... 19 Period of self-governance ....................................................................................................... 20 Further demonstrations and subsequent arrests ...................................................................... 21 Aftermath ................................................................................................................................ 23 2.2 Media coverage of the Wukan Incident and the ‘Wukan model’ ................... 23 2.3 Chinese academic articles: The Wukan case as a land problem ..................... 24 2.4 Land issues and property rights in China ......................................................... 25 2.4 How does the Wukan case compare to other mass incidents? ......................... 29 2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 31 3 Theoretical framework: Rightful resistance ............................................ 33 3.1 What is rightful resistance? ................................................................................ 34 3.2 Key concepts ......................................................................................................... 35 Rightful claims ....................................................................................................................... 35 Unpacking the state ................................................................................................................ 36 Reliance on allies and mobilization of support from greater public ....................................... 38 3.3 Strengths and limitations of the theory of rightful resistance ......................... 38 3.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 40 4 Analysis Part I: Perceptions of the local and central government in Wukan village ................................................................................................ 42 4.1 Perception of local government: Nameless corruption .................................... 43 4.2 Perception of central government: Abstract savior.......................................... 46 4.3 Perception change over time ............................................................................... 47 4.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 49 IX X 5 Analysis
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