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Democracies: in a League of Their Own? Lessons Learned from the Community of Democracies

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Democracies: in a League of Their Own? Lessons Learned from the Community of Democracies Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS POLICY PAPER Number 8, October 2008 Democracies: In a League of their Own? Lessons Learned from the Community of Democracies Theodore J. Piccone “The new League of Democracies would form the core of an international order of peace based on freedom. It could act where the U.N. fails to act, to relieve human suffering in places like Darfur.” —Senator John McCain1 “Well, I like the idea of the league of democracies, and only in part because I and others had proposed it about six years ago. What I like about it, it’s got a hidden agenda. It looks as if it’s all about listening and joining with allies, all the kind of stuff you’d hear a John Kerry say, except that the idea here, which McCain can’t say, but I can, is to essentially kill the U.N.” —Charles Krauthammer on Brit Hume Report2 1 Senator McCain Addresses the Hoover Institution on U.S. Foreign Policy, State News Service, May 1, 2007. 2 FOX Special Report with Brit Hume, Fox News Network, March 26, 2008. Democracies: In a League of their Own? Lessons Learned from the Community of Democracies In t r o d u c t I o n adhere to core universal values of freedom and hu- man rights and can thus speak with some legitimacy The laudable vision of “an international order of on the world stage. At the same time, my experience peace based on freedom” has become a perennial en- with the Community of Democracies tells me that if try in the sweepstakes of grand ideas and presidential the world’s democracies have so much trouble find- campaigns. In its latest version, proponents argue ing common ground in promoting democracy and that democracies, based on their shared values and human rights, then surely there is little hope for a system of government, are natural allies on a range of more ambitious agenda of cooperation, particularly international issues from climate change to humani- on issues that by their nature require the cooperation tarian intervention and should form the core of the of non-democracies. international system. The idea’s reemergence in the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign is testament to its In this paper, I will briefly sketch the different ver- endurance as a concept that appeals both to neocon- sions of the League of Democracies concept currently servatives, who believe in using U.S. power to assert in circulation. I will then provide a more detailed ac- our values abroad, and liberal internationalists, who count of the functioning of the Community of De- want to anchor the United States in an international mocracies since its inception in Warsaw in 2000, with system that favors cooperation over unilateral action. special attention to the question of how to determine Yet despite its superficial appeal to our better angels, who qualifies as a democracy. I will also offer some even some of its advocates acknowledge that its real recommendations for strengthening multilateral ap- purpose is to legitimize the use of U.S. military force proaches to the promotion of democracy and human and destroy the United Nations. For that and many rights, which should remain a central goal of any new other reasons, the idea will not fly in the current administration in Washington. Throughout the pa- geopolitical environment and will have to await the per, I will also offer some thoughts on what lessons day when the world is composed of many more like- policymakers can learn from the CD experience. minded democracies than currently exist. I come to this conclusion with some hesitation. After A co m m u n I t y , A co n c e r t A n d A Le A g u e o f spending over eight years working to shape the Com- de m o c r A c I e s munity of Democracies (CD), a more modest ver- sion of the League of Democracies Senator McCain The proliferation of names for what sounds like a is now advocating, I remain convinced of the merits simple idea is just one indication of the real com- of a multilateral forum for democracies—and those plexities involved in launching a new global forum aspiring to join—to support each other in strength- whose organizing principle is a government’s quali- ening and consolidating democracy. Such an orga- fication as a democracy and a shared commitment nization, if fully realized, would provide a powerful to collective action. The more ambitious versions of platform to strengthen ties among governments that the concept—the Concert of Democracies proposed Foreign Policy at Brookings 1 by such liberal thinkers as Anne-Marie Slaughter, “by harnessing the political and moral advantages of- John Ikenberry, Ivo Daalder and Jim Lindsey,3 and fered by united democratic action” to bring pressure the League of Democracies backed by neoconserva- on Burma, Zimbabwe and Iran.6 Building on the tives like Robert Kagan, Tod Lindberg, and Charles experience of U.S. leadership of NATO, a President Krauthammer4—share in common a deep frustra- McCain would convene a summit of the world’s de- tion with the inability of the United Nations, par- mocracies his first year in office to start the process ticularly the U.N. Security Council, to take action to of creating a League that would “advance our values address threats to collective security emanating from and defend our shared interests.” The idea’s propo- rogue dictators who antagonize their neighbors and nents, beyond this rough concept, have not spelled abuse their own people. Remarkably, neither camp out any details of their vision. Notably, the proposal appeared to study in much detail the experience of is couched only superficially in the language of de- a similar, though more modest initiative—the Com- mocracy and human rights promotion, with security munity of Democracies, a multilateral forum of over cooperation apparently its main concern. 100 governments launched in 2000 by a Convening Group of seven (and now 17) governments from ev- ery region of the world. th e co n c e r t o f de m o c r A c I e s , proposed among oth- ers by a group of foreign policy experts leading the Princeton Project on National Security, shares a simi- th e Le A g u e o f de m o c r A c I e s , according to Senator lar vision of creating a new institution to strengthen McCain, would link the more than 100 democratic security cooperation among the world’s democracies. nations around the world in one common organiza- “This Concert would institutionalize and ratify the tion working together for peace and liberty. In ad- ‘democratic peace.’ If the United Nations cannot be dition to tackling the crisis in Darfur, such an orga- reformed, the Concert would provide an alternative nization of like-minded states would cooperate “to forum for liberal democracies to authorize collective combat HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, confront action, including the use of force, by a supermajor- environmental crises, provide unimpeded market ity vote. Its membership would be selective, but self- access to those who endorse economic and political selected. Members would have to pledge not to use freedom, and take other measures unattainable by or plan to use force against one another; commit to existing regional or universal-membership systems.”5 holding multiparty, free-and-fair elections at regular It would complement rather than supplant the U.N. intervals; guarantee civil and political rights for their 3 Ikenberry and Slaughter propose a charter for the Concert of Democracies and describe it as “an alternative forum for the approval of the use of force in cases where the use of the veto at the Security Council prevented free nations from keeping faith with the aims of the U.N. Charter.” Ikenberry, John and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Final Report of Princeton Project on National Security, Forging a World Under Liberty and Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century, September 2006. Daalder and Lindsay originally proposed their idea in 2004 as “An Alliance of Democracies.” Their proposed organization would “unite nations with entrenched democratic traditions.” For their plan see Daalder, Ivo H. and James Lindsay, “An Alliance of Democracies,” The Washington Post, May 23, 2004. Daalder and Lindsay later expanded their idea, calling it “The Concert of Democracies.” Their proposed organization would have three major functions: helping democracies confront their mutual security challenges, promoting economic growth and development, and promoting democracy and human rights. See Daalder, Ivo H. and James Lindsay, “Democracies of the World, Unite,” The American Interest, Vol. II, No. 3, January/February 2007. 4 Kagan explains that the League of Democracies would give the world’s democracies the opportunity “to act in humanitarian crises when the U.N. Security Council cannot reach unanimity.” Kagan, Robert, “The Case for a League of Democracies,” Financial Times, May 14, 2008. Lindberg, an informal advisor to the McCain campaign, argues that “it’s time for the United States to join other democracies in adopting a new Treaty of the Democratic Peace.” Lindberg, Tod, “The Treaty of Democratic Peace: What the World Needs Now,” The Weekly Standard, Vol. 12 No. 12, February 12, 2007. Lindberg further explains that the League is a major foreign policy idea for Senator McCain and that “if elected it is meant to have an outcome.” See: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Event: “Is the League of Democracies a Good Idea?” May, 2008. Krauthammer argues that the best way to kill the U.N.
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