DTD 5 ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 2 3 Technology in Society xx (xxxx) 1–23 www.elsevier.com/locate/techsoc 4 5 6 7 8 Understanding technologies of terror 9 a b,!, 10 Victoria Sutton , D. Allan Bromley * 11 a 12 Texas Tech University School of Law, 1802 Hartford Avenue, Lubbock, TX 79409, USA bYale University, P.O. Box 208124, New Haven, CT 06520, USA 13 OF 14 15 Abstract 16 17 The variety of weapons of mass destruction are intended to create the maximum possible fear, 18 death, destruction, and general terror in the target region or nation, particularly with new and creative 19 ways of using them. An understanding of how these weapons work, the ways they may be used, and 20 the scope of their destruction can contribute to effectively combating their effects. This article examines these weapons—nuclear, electromagnetic pulse, radiological, chemical and biological 21 technologies—as well as policy approaches to defending against them. The development of national 22 programs directed toward the understanding, potential use, and response to weapons of mass 23 destruction by the United States, Japan and the Soviet Union are reviewed and compared, as are the 24 international agreements that have thus far addressed the possible use of such weapons. 25 q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 26 27 Keywords: Nuclear and chemical explosives; Electromagnetic pulse weapons; Chemical and biological weapons; 28 Weapons of mass destruction; WMD 29 30 1. Introduction 31 32 The 20th century has witnessed dramatic changes in the kinds of weaponry available 33 for national and international conflicts as well as potential targets for that weaponry. 34 Although some of the agents have been known since the Dark Ages, the technologies 35 necessary for their development, effective use, and delivery have undergone major change. 36 In this paper, we focus on what are referred to generically as weapons of mass destruction 37 (WMD). This term includes nuclear, electromagnetic pulse, radiological, chemical, and 38 biological weapons of various kinds and because the American public has relatively little 39 40 41 * Corresponding author. Tel: C1 806 742 3990; fax: C1 806 742 0251. 42 E-mail address: [email protected] (V. Sutton). ! Deceased.UNCORRECTED PRO 43 44 0160-791X/$ - see front matter q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 45 doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2005.04.002 TIS 463—18/5/2005—21:55—SWAPNA—146064—XML MODEL 1 – pp. 1–23 DTD 5 ARTICLE IN PRESS 2 V. Sutton, D.A. Bromley / Technology in Society xx (xxxx) 1–23 46 information—and in some cases, substantial misinformation—about each of these 47 weapons, there is widespread confusion and misunderstanding that make it difficult to 48 develop coherent and effective policies for detection and response to future attacks. This is 49 especially true because attacks involving these weapons have widely different 50 characteristics, and each weapon system cannot be addressed effectively under any 51 generic WMD approach. 52 Policy makers and administrators, as well as our citizens, began to scrutinize our 53 approach to possible attack ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the 54 World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, and the subsequent 55 anthrax attacks on national leaders in both politics and the media. All these require a more 56 introspective examination of our national policy approach to responding to these threats. 57 As just noted, while anthrax has been known for a long time, the technologies for delivery 58 of this and other WMD, both long- and short-range, including intercontinental ballistic OF 59 missiles, cruise missiles, and the production of aerosols essential to weaponizing 60 biological agents, are of far-reaching importance. Table 1 compares the loss of life 61 involved in a wide variety of catastrophes and gives some context for this discussion. 62 Table 1 63 Comparison of life loss in major world catastrophes 64 65 Date location Cause No. of victims 66 1347–1351 Europe Black Plague, pandemic 25 million 67 1520 South America, Aztecs Smallpox brought by 35 million 68 Spaniards 1556 Shaanxi, China Earthquake 830,000 69 1815 Mount Tambora, Indo- Volcanic Eruption 160,000 70 nesia 71 1876–1879 Northern China Famine 10 million 72 1914–1918 Mainly in Europe First World War 20 million a 73 1918 Entire World 1918 Flu Pandemic 20–100 million 1917 Halifax Harbor, Canada Accidental chemical 1654 74 explosion 75 1931 Huang He Basin, China Flood 3.7 million 76 1939–1945 Entire World Second World War 40 million 77 1945 Hiroshima, Japan Nuclear Weapon 140,000 78 Explosion 1945 Nagasaki, Japan Nuclear Weapon 90,000 79 Explosion 80 1970 Bangladesh Cyclone 300,000 81 1980 Entire World AIDS O3 million persons per 82 year seropositive 83 1984 Bhopal, India Chemical Discharge 5000 1986 Chernobyl, Soviet Union Nuclear Power Plant 30,000 84 Accident 85 2004 Southeast Asia Tsunami 300,000 86 ? Entire World Nuclear War 1 billion perhaps 87 Sources: AdaptedUNCORRECTED from Sagan, Turco. A path where no man thought: nuclear winter and the end of thePRO arms race. 88 Random House; 1990. 89 a Gina Kolata, Flu: The story of the great influenza pandemic of 1918 and the search for the virus that caused it. 90 Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York; 1999. TIS 463—18/5/2005—21:55—SWAPNA—146064—XML MODEL 1 – pp. 1–23 DTD 5 ARTICLE IN PRESS V. Sutton, D.A. Bromley / Technology in Society xx (xxxx) 1–23 3 91 We will consider separately each of the weapon systems as potential threats. It is 92 essential to bear in mind that the purpose of a WMD is to create maximum fear, death, 93 destruction, and general terror in the target region or nation. For example, nuclear attacks 94 would cause both human deaths and infrastructure destruction; biological attacks would 95 cause human fatalities while keeping the infrastructure intact. All these weapons are 96 designed to cause terror and destruction in the target region and they become even more 97 frightening because of the new and creative ways that terrorists choose to use them. The 98 weapons used in the September 11, 2001 attacks—large, fully fueled jet airliners— 99 represent a new and unanticipated approach to terrorism. Cyberterrorism—the destruction 100 of communications infrastructure—can be used in conjunction with any of these weapons 101 systems to magnify their effectiveness. 102 WMD has traditionally been addressed as a singular threat by national security policy 103 analysts. Most terrorist activity had occurred outside the US, and little focus was placed on OF 104 domestic activity prior to September 11, 2001. National security concerns outside the US 105 were addressed by the CIA; terrorism inside the US borders was addressed by the FBI. 106 Then, via Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62 (PDD 39, PDD 62) [10], the Clinton 107 Administration designated the FBI as the lead agency to respond to acts of terrorism. The 108 FBI’s traditional mission, however, has been criminal investigation, which is not an 109 optimal approach for addressing situations involving WMD, each of which requires 110 knowledgeable leadership with a specific set of interdisciplinary and multi-agency 111 responses. 112 The Department of Homeland Security, established on March 7, 2003, is an important 113 component of the US response to terrorist attacks of all kinds (Fig. 1). From its inception, 114 the department realized there are many aspects of terrorist activity that are the clear 115 responsibility of the federal government. However, the balance of federal and state powers 116 117 Executive Secretary 118 Commandant of Coast Guard (1) 119 Legislative Affairs Secretary Inspector General 120 ----------------------------- Public Affairs Deputy Secretary 121 General Counsel 122 State and Local Coordination Civil Rights and Citizenship & Director, Bureau of Citizenship Civil Liberties 123 Special Assistant to the Secretary Immigration Service Ombudsman(1) & Immigration Services (1) (private sector) Director of the 124 Secret Service(1) Small & Disadvantaged National Capital Region Privacy Officer 125 Business Coordination Chief of Staff International Affairs 126 Shared Services 127 Counter Narcotics 128 129 Under Secretary Under Secretary Under Secretary Under Secretary Under Secretary Information Analysis Border & Emergency Science and 130 Management and Infrastructure Transportation Preparedness and Technology Protection Security Response 131 132 Note (1): Effective MarchUNCORRECTED 1st, 2003 PRO 133 134 Fig. 1. Organizational chart for the Department of Homeland Security (as of Aug. 2004). Source: !http://www. 135 dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/DHS_OrgChart_2004.pdfO. Site visited 03/21/05. TIS 463—18/5/2005—21:55—SWAPNA—146064—XML MODEL 1 – pp. 1–23 DTD 5 ARTICLE IN PRESS 4 V. Sutton, D.A. Bromley / Technology in Society xx (xxxx) 1–23 136 provided for in the US Constitution reserves exclusively to the states the powers to 137 regulate and manage public health except where there is a ‘substantial effect on interstate 138 commerce’ [11]. This separation of powers and its consequent lack of coherent planning 139 for response to any terrorist attack is one of the most serious weaknesses of our current 140 response policies. 141 142 143 2. Nuclear weapons 144 145 Nuclear explosives were first used by the United States in 1945 to end World War II in 146 the Pacific. The 10-kilotons uranium weapon (60 pounds of enriched U-235) detonated at 147 Hiroshima, and the 22-kilotons plutonium weapon (6 pounds of plutonium) subsequently 148 used at Nagasaki, essentially destroyed both cities, although both weapons were small and OF 149 crude by modern standards [5, p. 59]. 150 Because a typical nuclear reaction releases roughly one million times the energy of a 151 typical chemical reaction, the impact of a nuclear explosion is qualitatively different from 152 that of a chemical explosion.