Waking the Tiger

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THE BATTLE FOR MGA, 22 SEPTEMBER 1942 THEME WAKING THE TIGER In August 1942, following the dismal failure of the Spring Offen- sive, the Soviet high command ordered the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts to combine in an offensive designed to break the German stranglehold over Leningrad. The goal was to seize the Sinyavino heights, which dominated the southern shore of Lake Ladoga. By Eoghan Kelly he Soviets launched the third The Soviets were not aware that their Sinyavino offensive on 19 Au- offensive had preempted a German gust 1942, attempting to drive operation named Nordlicht (Northern toward the Neva River; this was Light), which meant that the Germans followed by the Volkhov front had also been building up resources Tlaunching its attack on 27 August. The and that the Soviets had in effect blun- 8th Army led the offensive with five di- dered into a much larger force than visions supported by five independent they had expected. By 10 September, Advance units crossed the causeway, tank battalions and a tank brigade. This the fighting had all but ground to a entering Mga from the north-east. was supplemented by the 4th Guards standstill with the German defensive These units consisted of three BA- Rifle Corps (supporting) and the still- lines on the heights absorbing eve- 10 armoured cars and some infantry reforming 2nd Shock Army. Whilst the rything thrown at them. On the ap- squads scouting the flanks of the road. 8th Army threw itself against the Ger- proaches to Mga, the Soviet troops dug As they entered the centre of Mga, spo- man positions on the southern side in and prepared to see out the autumn. radic fighting broke out, with German of Lake Ladoga, elements of the 2nd troops firing from their positions, occu- Army moved further south in an at- On 21 September, their relative pying the station, militia barracks, and tempt to cut German supply lines. Lead tranquility was shattered when the defensive trenches they had prepared elements of the 327th Rifle Division Germans launched a counterattack at the outset of the Soviet offensive. probed south through the heavy woods masterminded by Field-Marshal toward Mga to determine the possibil- Manstein. The two-pronged offen- ity of crossing the river there. Fighting sive aimed at driving the Soviet forc- SOVIET FORCES was heavy all across the Volkhov front, es back beyond their starting posi- Placed at the eastern side of Mga: in forested and marshy terrain. tions. In the Mga area, the Soviets of • 3 x BA-10 armoured cars. Expe- the 1102nd, probing for rienced crews. Blocking the Soviet advance were lead a route to turn the flank • 6 x infantry squads equipped elements of the Wehrmacht's 170th of the German 170th with a mix of PPD-40 and Infantry Division, which Division, made an PPSh-41 submachine guns. The had forward-deployed the alarming dis- squads are inexperienced. 391st Infantry Regiment. covery… Eastern end of the causeway: • 2 x 45 mm anti-tank guns, mod- el 1937. Crews are experienced. • 10 x inexperienced squads equipped with a mix of PPD-40 and PPSh-41 submachine guns. Each squad possesses a PTRD- 41 anti-tank rifle. Infantry are not dug in and are deployed in three columns: four squads on each side and two squads on the road itself. A column of early Tiger I's argames oldiers trategy pass through a section of W , s & s 114 x 1 Russian forest in 1942. © Bundesarchiv / Bild 101I-455-0009-15 The Soviets make good time, despite the boggy ground. Alarm! The Communists are attacking! The Soviets approach the village of Mga and engage the Germans. Hatches closed and buttoned-up, the Tiger prepares to roll. Special weapons retreated from Mga. A squad may pre- weapons, whilst plentiful, wasn’t al- Each column has a PM M1910 heavy pare 6" of thick undergrowth in a turn if ways at the right location. This meant machine gun being pulled by its it does nothing else. This undergrowth many tank formations were sent into crew. The crews are experienced. counts as difficult going for infantry action with little ammunition for their and may conceal a special weapon or main armament. Check each T-34 A mortar unit is following the infan- anti-tank gun. It also acts as light cover. whenever it fires. On a 5 or 6 on a D6, try. This unit is equipped with three it suffer lows ammunition. This will 37 mm spade mortars – although Reinforcements mean the tank has D6 rounds left. obsolete, these are the only mortars Once the Germans advance along or the Soviets could use on the swampy alongside the causeway, a reduced GERMAN FORCES ground. These crews are all average. platoon of 2 x T-34 M1940 enters play. Deployed in and around Mga town. Random Soviet troop quality These are inexperienced and must en- Half of the squads must be deployed in Once a Soviet platoon has engaged in ter play on a road or a plank trackway. buildings overlooking the main road. combat, roll a D6. On a 4 it becomes Two squads must be deployed one at average quality, on a 5 it becomes ex- Supply issues each river bridge. The remainder must perienced, and on a 6 veteran. This Abysmal roads and some truly awful be deployed north of the railway line. reflects the patched-together units of planning meant ammunition for heavy © Rocío Espin © Rocío the 2nd Shock Army and how some units vastly outperformed expectations whilst others remained poor. This test is performed only once (although it doesn’t have to be after its first combat). Field works The Soviets can place a plank trackway on the board. It must start on the east- ern side (not edge) of the board and can run to the centre of the board (but not cross the rail line). This plank road counts as open ground for tank movement purposes. Soviet defensive positions may be prepared once they have Wargames, soldiers & strategy 114 2 The game is twelve turns long. The Soviet player moves first. VICTORY The Soviets have a major win if they control Mga and both bridges at the end of the game. The Germans have a major victory if there are no Soviets remaining on the board. If a Tiger is destroyed (not broken down), the Germans can only have a minor victory. If a broken-down Tiger is in Soviet hands at the end of the game, then the Soviets will have a A line of Soviet T70 tanks roll ever onwards towards Mga, passing their most recent victim, a Stug III. minor victory. • 10 x German grenadier squads. repair. If the dice roll is a double and AFTERMATH Armed with a mix of K-98 rifles below the BP value, then it has bro- The fighting around Mga was piece- and MP-40 submachine guns. ken down beyond the crew’s ability. meal and the use of the Tigers was a Five squads are veteran and five If the dice roll is a double and over surprise for the Soviets as they had as- are experienced. the BP value, then the vehicle may re- sumed correctly that the ground around move a BP point (but only if the point Mga was far too swampy to use heavy Special weapons was acquired off-road). armour. All four broke down, and one Four sMG-34 teams (MG34 on • was captured. Stubborn resistance by tripod). The crews are veteran. SCENARIO DETAILS Soviet infantry blunted German at- Two mortar teams equipped • Weather: Dry and cloudy. tempts to force them from the field, but with 8 cm GrW/34 mortars. elsewhere the Germans met with more Ground: Anywhere that is not town, success and Leningrad would have to In the main square railway, or road is swampy scrub wait till 1943 for any reprieve at all. The ace up the sleeve is a pla- land with thin woods and under- • In 1944 the siege was lifted and 2nd toon of Tigers from 502 sPzAbt. growth. Anywhere not a surfaced Shock Army rebuilt. WS&S They are numbers 111 to 114, highway is poor ground for vehicles. commanded by Hauptmann Meanwhile, the Tiger drove headlong Wollschläger (inspired leader). Plank trackway: Soviet vehicles and in- into the annals of military legend… The crews are veteran for morale fantry may use this as if it is a surfaced Our thanks to Ade Deacon for help- purposes but green for handling road; only German infantry may use it ing with the photos at very short of the vehicles. the same way. If a Tiger tries to use it then it will destroy that section of the notice. We hope you'll overlook the Tiger reliability plank highway and gain another BP. lack of Panzer Grey on the Tiger! This was only the second deployment of the Tiger, and technical issues were causing significant problems. As a re- sult, each time a Tiger moves off road, turns (on any surface), or moves at more than half speed (off road counts as double), it will acquire a break- down point (BP). Each time a BP is acquired, the controlling player rolls 2D6. If the result is equal to the cur- rent BP score then the vehicle stalls for that turn. If the score is less than the BP score, it breaks down. Once broken down, repairs can be made – it will take a number of turns equal to the amount below the BP score to repair. For example, a tank with a BP score of 8 rolls 6 and so it will take two turns to Oh nein, our Tiger tank has broken down - again! Hans, do you remember your Tigerfibel by heart? 3 Wargames, soldiers & strategy 114.
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