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What Is Science in Anthropology? AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST VITAL TOPICS FORUM What Is Science in Anthropology? Peter Peregrine, Yolanda T. Moses, Alan Goodman, Louise Lamphere, and James Lowe Peacock INTRODUCTION inductive–deductive, quantifiable public procedures or ‘op- Peter Peregrine Department of Anthropology, Lawrence Uni- erations’ subject to replication by independent observers.” versity, Appleton, Wisconsin 54912, and Santa Fe Institute, This definition seems so narrow that much of anthropolog- Santa Fe, NM 87501 [email protected] ical research—for example, field research done by a lone participant-observer—might not be included. Althoughdefinitionsofscienceinanthropologymaybein- ... “The purposes of the Association shall be to advance anthropology as congruous, there does seem to be a general agreement that at the science that studies humankind in all its aspects ...” AAA Statement of Purpose least two opposing modes of thought are present in anthro- pology: one focusing on logical, reasoned argumentation; the other on more inventive, insightful exploration (e.g., The governing documents of the American Anthropological Boyer 2003; see also Wolf 1964:1–3). The former tends Association repeatedly refer to anthropology as a “science.” to be called a “scientific” approach, the latter a “humanistic” What does science mean in this context? And is it true that or “interpretive” approach. But one has to question whether anthropology is a “science”? These are questions with which these two modes of thought are truly different. Are “human- anthropologists have wrestled for generations, yet no clear istic” approaches devoid of logic or reasoned argument? Are answer has emerged. That these questions are still important “scientific” approaches devoid of insight and inventiveness? was demonstrated following the 2010 AAA annual meeting. These kinds of dichotomies are found elsewhere in discus- The executive board removed the word science from the sions of science in anthropology and raise similar questions. association’s long-range plan and sparked a brief, though Science is said to be concerned with generalizations rather widely publicized, controversy. The important point is that than particulars; science is concerned with exploring evo- if members of the AAA did not find “science” in anthropology lution rather than history; science emphasizes theory at the important,thechangestothelong-rangeplanwouldnothave expense of context; science uses measurements and statis- been controversial. tics rather than words and interpretations; science employs Earlier discussions of science in anthropology suggest a hypotheticodeductive approach; science is empirical; sci- that anthropologists have always been confused about what ence is replicable, science is ...what? What is science in science means in the context of anthropology. Leslie White anthropology? (1949:3–7), for example, defined anthropological science as “sciencing”; that is, what people who call themselves an- thropological scientists do. Although this idea seems almost SCIENCE AND HUMANITIES: A FALSE prophetic of contemporary understandings of science, it is DICHOTOMY not a particularly useful definition. Eric Wolf (1964:13) Yolanda T. Moses Department of Anthropology, University provided a similarly ineffectual definition: “Anthropology of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521; yolanda.moses@ is both a natural science, concerned with the organization ucr.edu and function of matter, and a humanistic discipline, con- cerned with the organization and function of mind.” Psy- Science and humanities are broad terms used to convey ideas chologists might argue that the organization and function of and concepts about anthropology. We are a four-field de- mind is a scientific concern, and there are certainly those partment at the University of California, Riverside, and as in fields such as environmental ethics who would see a con- a faculty member I try to integrate a wide range of concep- cern with the organization and function of matter as an tual frameworks and methodologies to indicate a wide range obviously humanistic one. Marvin Harris (1979:27) defined of ways of knowing and understanding humans and human science in anthropology as “an epistemology which seeks to behavior. Science and the scientific method is a particular restrict fields of inquiry to events, entities, and relationships way of looking at existential phenomena to make sense of it. that are knowable by means of explicit, logicoempirical, It is useful, for example, when one is looking at large data AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Vol. 114, No. 4, pp. 593–597, ISSN 0002-7294, online ISSN 1548-1433. c 2012 by the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved. DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-1433.2012.01510.x 594 American Anthropologist • Vol. 114, No. 4 • December 2012 sets and trying to extrapolate patterns. The lens of the hu- physiological perturbations (commonly thought of as stress) manities is also a way of taking those patterns and exploring during the period of enamel formation: prenatally through what they mean on the ground in more nuanced culturally childhood. The number and location of DEHs provides a textured contexts. In doing so, one can call on the study of chronological history of early life stresses, and as such, they local knowledges and history (written and/or oral) as well are an established part of the toolkit of biological anthro- as discourse analysis. pology and bioarchaeology. I study hypoplasia patterns to This range of complex anthropological approaches must document nutrition and health changes associated with early be used to adequately explain how we got to be who we are agriculture, enslavement, globalization, and other forms of as humans by being able to track our social–cultural, eco- poverty and inequality. logical, and biological choices from prehistorical to modern For a century, ameloblasts, the enamel-forming cells, to postmodern societies. This continuum of ways of know- have been known to be under strong genetic control. They ing also provides us with a more robust way of bringing start enamel formation at a precise place and time and pro- an anthropological perspective to very complex societal and ceed methodically to secrete enamel protein matrix in an global problem-solving strategies in the 21st century. For orchestrated, well-timed fashion, some four microns every example, to answer the question “what is the meaning of day until the process is complete. Voila. race in contemporary U.S. culture?” means that we have to However, under stress the ameloblasts might stop se- take a look both diachronically and synchronically through creting enamel matrix, and the result is a permanent record the scientific lenses of culture, biology, archaeology, and of underformed enamel—the hypoplasia. The enamel devel- linguistics. The historical archaeology of diverse ancestral opment literature presents a uniformitarian explanation that communities provides a lens through which to examine the makes sense: if the perturbation is sufficiently severe and long spatial and material cultural implications of this socially con- lasting, all ameloblasts in the sheet-making enamel matrix structed edifice called the United States beginning in the will react in the same way and stop secreting enamel matrix. colonial era. Linguistics allows us to research the power Because enamel once formed cannot self-repair, a hypopla- of language and identity, especially exploring discourses of sia, an undergrowth of enamel, is the permanent result. power and appropriation. For example, how has the lan- But that is not what I observe. I see incredible variabil- guage of privilege and subjugation manifested itself in the ity in how enamel-secreting ameloblasts responded to the past? How does it continue to do so now? same perturbation. Even though the resulting hypoplasia is Biology shows in very concrete ways how science, pol- formed by the same sheet of ameloblasts, it is often thick itics, social norms, and religion colluded to create a very in some places, thinner in others, and in still other places, tightly controlled social construct about racial hierarchy the enamel appears unaffected. The ameloblasts that made a and inferiority that still exists today in the form of struc- particular line of enamel are specialized epithelial cells, ge- tural and institutionalized racism. Biological anthropology netic and developmental clones, whose purpose is to make demonstrates that race, or the concept that we call “race,” is enamel. They are bathed in the same blood-supplied soup of about explaining human variation. And cultural anthropol- chemicals. However, individual ameloblasts respond differ- ogy helps to make transparent how culture creates race and ently. Why is the response less uniform than the scientific how it continues to be perpetuated through institutionalized literature suggests, and at times downright chaotic? processes of subordination and domination. I do not think anyone knows why two genetically iden- Inourfutureanthropologicalengagements,wewillneed tical cells that are located right beside each other and are by to continue to utilize both the sciences and humanities to all measures exposed to the same environmental conditions provide the robust conceptual frameworks that will guide behave so differently. But when an anthropologist thinks our multilayered and multisited research and praxis projects. about it, the results should not be surprising. For it is only through utilizing both concepts that we will be Biologists once had a simple
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