UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 27 Date 06/06/2006 Time 11:29:19 AM
S-0902-0002-03-00001
Expanded Number S-0902-0002-03-00001
items-in-Africa - Question of Namibia - implementation of Security Council Resolutions 319, 435, 439, and 473 - reports of the Secretary-General
Date Created 15/11/1972
Record Type Archival Item
Container s-0902-0002: Peacekeeping - Africa 1963-1981
Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit UNITED NATIONS Press Section Office of Public Information United Nations, N.Y. (FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA. -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)
Press Release SG/SM/iySl • , • - ' SC/3370 • 28 November 1972
TEXT OF STATEMENT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL ON QUESTION OF NAMIBIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL.ON 28 NOVEMBER >
Following is the text of a statement by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim on the question of Namibia to the Security Council on 28 November 1972:
Madam President, , . } / ' I have not had the opportunity to address the Security Council since you assumed the presidency of the Council, It therefore gives me great pleasure to eirtend to you ray congratu3.ati.ons. It is of special significance that you should, earn the distinction of being the first woman to preside over the Council during its twenty-seven years of existence. It is also fitting that you should preside at a time when the Council has been primarily concerned with the problems relating to the great continent of Africa, In the few months that you have represented your country 'at the United Nations, and in particular during the present month as .President of the Security Council, you have not only given able leadership, but also made constructive contributions to the deliberations of the Council. In paying tribute to you, Madam President/ we are also honouring the Government and people of Guinea for their outstanding contribution to the work of the United Nations. ~ ' • ' ' . • \
Members of the Council will recall that the discussions which led to the adoption in Addis Ababa of resolution 309 (1972) on k February 1QJ2 first took place in the Council during its debate on Namibia in October 1971- *n that resolution, the Secretary-General vas 'entrusted.with the'mandate of initiating contacts with the parties concerned, which, inter alia, entailed meetings with the representatives of the people of Namibia and the Government of South Africa. • . _ •
.In compliance with my mandate, I initiated the necessary contacts and' reported to the Security Council on 17 July 1972 (S/10738).. On the basis of my report,'the Council, by resolution 319 (1972) of 1 August 1972, invited me to continue contacts with all parties concerned, "with a view to establish- ing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principles of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."
(more) Statement by the Secretary-General on the question of Namibia at the l6?8th meeting of the Security Council on Tuesday, 28 November 1972
Madame le President, N'avant pas~eu jusqu'a. la pre'sente seance I1 occasion de prendre la parole devant le Conseil de securite depuis que vous en-avez assume' la presidence, c'est avec un tres grand plaisir que je vous presente aujourd'hui mes felicitations, II me semble particull element significatif que ce soit-a vous/que revienne 1'honneur d'etre la premiere femme qui aifr-ete' appeiee a presider aux deliberations du Conseil depuis vingt-sept ans qu'il existe et c'est une coincidence des plus heureuses que vous ayez pris la presidence au moment ou le Conseil se preoccupe avant tout des problemes relatifs au grand continent africain. Au cours des quelques mois ou vous avez represente votre pays aupre~s de I1Organisation des Nations Unies et plus particulierement au cours du mois ou vous avez exerce la presidence du Conseil, vous avez su non seulement diriger les deliberations du Conseil avec competence, mais aussi apporter a ses debats des contributions des plus construc- tives. L'hommage que nous vous rendons, Madame le President, est--egalement un-honneur que nous rendons au gouvernement et au peuple de Guinee pour leur contribution exceptionnelle a 1'oeuvre de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies. Statement by the Secretary-General on the question of Namibia at the 1678th meeting of the Security Council on Tuesday, 28 November 1972
Madam President, I have not had the opportunity before this meeting to address the Security Council since you assumed the presidency of the Council. It therefore gives me great pleasure to extend to you my congratulations. It is of special significance that you should earn the distinction of being the first woman to preside over the Council during its twenty-seven years of existence. It is also fitting that you should preside at a time when the Council has beenprimarily concerned with the problems relating to the great continent of Africa. In the few months that you have represented your country at the United Nations, and in particular during the present month as President of the Security Council, you have not only given able leadership, but also made constructive contributions to the deliberations of the Council. In paying tribute to you, Madam President, we are also honouring the Government and people of Guinea for their outstanding contribution to the work of the United Nations, Iw """ Members of the Council will recall that the discussions which led to the adoption in Addis Ababa of resolution 309 (1972) on 4 February 1972 first took place in the Council during its debate on Namibia in October 1971. In that resolution, the Secretary-General was entrusted with the mandate of initiating contacts with the parties con- cerned, which, inter alia, entailed meetings with the representatives of the people of Namibia and the Government of South Africa. In compliance with my mandate, I initiated the necessary contacts and reported to the Security Council on 17 July 1972(3/10738). On the basis of my report, the Council, by resolution 319 (1972) of 1 August 1972, invited me to continue contacts with all parties concerned, "with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principles of human equality,to exercise ft their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." — 3 —
In conformity with paragraph 5 of the same resolution,
I appointed Ambassador Alfred Martin Escher of Switzerland to assist me in the discharge of my mandate. He spent seven weeks in carrying out his task. His report on the results of his contacts with the parties concerned is annexed to my report (S/10832), which is now before the Council. Within the time available, the representative was able to make an extensive tour of Namibia and to mset with and obtain the views of a wide cross-section of the population of Namibia. The evidence gathered during these contacts, as summarized in Section II of the representa- tive's report, will,I am sure, be of assistance to the Council.
At the outset, I should like to say that the report of the representative leaves unanswered or unresolved a number of issues which continue to occupy the minds of all - 4 - of us. The most pressing of these is the question of clarification by South Africa of its policy of self- determination and independence with regard to Namibia. In this regard the Security Council insists that the ob;jectives of self-determination, national unity and independence be first agreed upon and clearly stipulated and the measures for achieving them worked out subsequently, The South African Government on the other hand has expressed the view that a detailed discussion of the interpretation of self-determination and independence could be undertaken with better results pjice_fc]ie_ne_cessary conditions are established and the inhabitants have had more administrative and political experience. In other words South Africa places priority on measures for achieving political advancement without defining the ultimate goal. It speaks of "self-determination and r m la»<**B****&
I recognize that they do not measure up to the expectations of the members of the Council. Other proposals put forward by Prime Minister Vorster would seem to be in conflict with the principles which guide the United Nations in dealing with the problem of Namibia and would require further clarification before they could be properly assessed. Having made these brief comments on the report, I should like to refer to some points which appear to have been incorrectly interpreted in some quarters. It has
been alleged that an agreement has been concluded between the Prime Minister of South Africa and the representative of the Secretary-General. I should like to emphasize that there has been no such agreement. The 1 J m •— ri iiaOJ-iaT^''"''"' rmi[rrntf«htfTr* * *~iiiijiir>< representative of the Secretary-General had no mandate to enter into any agreement with any of the parties and he has not done so. It will be noted from paragraph 13 of the representative's report, that what is contained therein is a record of the substance of the discussion. It is nothing more than a summary record. As regards paragraph 13(e), let me assure the Council that in all my efforts, I have been guided by the decision •- 7 — of the United Nations that the Namibiarvpeople should be enabled to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in/united Namibia without delay. ^r_.J-_~*— Accordingly, whatever further efforts are necessary to solve the Namibian~problem/will be made with this objective in mind. As I said at the beginning, the efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General have been at the invitation of the Security Council. I have been fully aware of the sensitive and complex nature of my task and of the terms of my mandate. It was with these considerations in mind that my representative undertook his mission. I was never optimistic that it would be possible to obtain quick, clear-cut results. Most of the issues on which positive responses were sought have so far been resisted by the South African Government, and therefore progress could not be expected without protracted discussion, Of course, I recognize the desire of the Council for an early and precise answer from the Government of South Africa to some of the basic questions and I would be the last to agree to any procedure which would permit that •» " » -* - 8 -
Government to delay a clarification of its position indefinitely. In paragraph 10 of my report to the Security Council, of 15 November 1972, I stated that there were elements in the report of Ambassador Escher which the Security Council might wish to pursue. I have already referred to parts of the report which have given rise to some objections and misgivings. But there are elements in the report which should not be overlooked or dismissed. I have in mind my representative's extensive tour of the territory and his discussions with a wide cross-section Vl4isaa.Ji1aii!Oii»«tti»«^»'**H of the population on their political future. This is the first time that the Security Council has been able to obtain first hand information on the political demands of the inhabitants. In this connexion I have taken note of the assurance of Prime Minister Vorster that no one will be victimized for seeing the representative or for any declaration made to him. It will further be noted that Mr.Vorster has stated his readiness to consider removing certain restrictions on freedom of movement and to permit "legitimate political - 9 - activity including freedom of speech and the holding of meetings." One would have hoped for an unequivocal decision to institute fully these fundamental rights, but it might be useful to ascertain the precise nature of the proposed measures and their possible effects on the political life of the territory. / While it may be too early to speculate on the future course of events in the territory, it would appear desirable that in the months ahead the United Nations should remain in touch with developments. Having regard to all circumstances, and inspite of the gap that remains between the position of South Africa and that of the United Nations, it is my view that the door should not be closed to further contacts, It is, of^rourse, for the Security Council to decide Should the Council wish the contacts to be continued, I hope that it'would be possible to count on the help and advice of the Group-of-Three/established by the Security Council, whose assistance in the past has proved so invaluable. CONFIDENTIAL
Analysis of.the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council on Resolutions 309 and 319> concerning the question of Namibia and contacts with "all parties concerned".
NBi Material in this analysis may be used freely, without attribution.
CONCLUSIONS The conditions specified by the Security Council have not been observed, mainly because of the refusal of the South African Government to.negotiate in good faith. '
In the attempt to establish a "dialogue" with- South Africa^ the United Nations has come dangerously close to contravening the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, and all the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on Namibia. If the dialogue is continued, this could become worse,' with incalculable consequences for the status of the United Nations and its resolutions. * . .,t " ." . • South Africa has been able to threaten the UN Secretary- General and his representative, .and so humiliate and confuse the United Nations Organisation. It is also continuing to suppress the human rights of. the people of Namibia. It is also violating the obligations defined by the International Court of Justice by .continuing its illegal occupation, proceeding with the process of annexation and implementing the "Bantustan" policy. . ...:. ... - - . f . .' •_ . The negotiations with South Africa should therefore be •terminated immediately, and mounting pressure should be organised to oblige South Africa to comply with its obligations, and leave Namibia. There are many specific proposals for •* . immediate action which should be put into effect once the dialogue"has been terminated.
ARGUMENTi Failures to comply with the conditions for the negotiations.
1. Argentina's basic assumption, that South Africa wanted to transfer power. The representative of Argentina, when introducing Resoluton 309 in the Security council.at Addis Ababa, stated that there were few reasons for optimism about the outcome, but that the. Resolution was based on the hopeful assumption that South Africa may have decided to abandon its occppation of Namibia, in which case it would need to be offered some means of- transferring, power* CONFIDENTIAL 2
However, South Africa has refused to discuss the transfer of power? . on'the contrary, Dr. Escher reports that the South African Prime Minister, Mr.' Vorsteri "would assume over-all responsibility for the Territory as a whole." (S/10832, * Annex II, Part I, para. 13(f) ). '".."'
'•-.': : » • .••.•-'"'•._--•''•:." « 2. Acceptance of Resolution 3Q9.« " • "The contacts ... should always be conducted with- the .-•mandate of resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972)." (Aide- Memoire to the Secretary-General by the Group of Three on 26 September 1972i S/10832, Annex I, para. 2.) "As an initial step the Government of South Africa should inform the Secretary-General of its acceptance of reolution 309 (1972) . so as to enable further efforts on its basis.i (Aide-Memoire -from the Group of Three; S/10738, Annexl, para. 8;)
It is quite clear from both reports that the South ' '; African'Government has not accepted even resolution 309. On the contrary, the South African Government invited the Secretary-General and his representative as individuals • ... on the same basis as the invitation to U Thant to visit South Africa and Namibia* which was repeatedly declined. (See S/10738, paras. 6,- 11; and the Secretary-General's reply to the Group of Three Aide-Memoire, Annex I, para. 8.) The terms of reference for the special representative of the .S-G, repeated by Dr. Escher at the start ofhis negotiations with the South African Government, include no reference to resolution 309- (See S/10738, para. 21, and S/10832, Annex II, Part I, para.. 5») ...-"' ' • • .-.-.•
3._Importance of other UN resolutions and the Advisory Opinion of the_International ^ourt of Justice of 21 June 19.71* "All United Cations resolutions adopted on the question of Namibia stand firm;and valid and should be actively pursued." .(Aide-Memoire of the Group of Three, S/10832, Annex I, para. 1.) Furthert "Resolution 309 (1972) is consequently linked to all other Security Council resolutions on Namibia and, through them, to relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the . Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice r which all- together constitute one legal, political, organic whole." (S Aide Memoire of the Group of Three, S/10738, Annex I, para. ID) * Resolution 309 cannot therefore be pursued in such a way as to und.ermine any other part o£ this whole. The ICJ opinion is in danger of being undermined,' in that the UN Secretary-General might appear to be setting an unfortunate example to member-States, which "are under obligation to recognise the illegalisty of South Africa's presence in Namibia - and theinvalidity of its acts on behalf of or -concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the . legality of ... such presence and administration." This may be the interoretation of "Dr. Escher's discussions with the Smith CONFIDENTIAL • • . • ' \;,
African Government of its policy for Namibia,.and expressing agreement for some or all of that policy. (See S/10832, Annex II, • Part I, para. 13(e)i/ "This (the policy of "regionalisation" under the South African Prime Minister; seemed to me acceptable in principle.") ..-'..- The South African attitude towards the UN resolutions "' regarding Namibia is clearly one of non-acceptance. This was ... made clear at the start by Mr. Vor&tert "..» if (the S-G) wishes to come to South Africa to act as a mouthpiece for the extremists of the OAU and others, and decisions taken in that cohnectioni he will nevertheless "be welcome and still "be very courteously received bya us but I can tell him in advance that he will be wasting his time." (House of Assembly, k February 1972j • • quoted in S/10738, para. 6.) Mr. Vorster issued a.statement, following the release of the S-G's first report, which repeats the stand taken against the basic UN and ICJ position on Namibiai- "South West Africa has been" entrusted to us as an - integral part of South Africa ... We do not recognise any United Cations rights over South West Africa." (Soiith African - . Diges't, 16 June 1972.) . • . . :_-.,;.. .'-."!
4. "All parties concerned". " . . • * . . J-,r Resolution 309 "invites the Secretary-General ...to initiate as aoon as possible.contacts with all parties concerned".« The Group of Three originally defined the parties concerned ast South Africa, the Council for Namibia, the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee -' of the Security Council, and representatives of the political organisations of the people of Namibia. The representative of Argentina, in Restatement to the Security Council at Addis Ababa, had reflet to the Security council itself, and "all persons and entities who could be useful" as parties concerned* The Group of Three also decided that "the President and Secretary- General of the OAU should be included among those consulted." (S/10738, Annex I, para.?.) . - . , - However, the two reports deal almost exclusively with .. • South Africa. The other parties concerned have no more than a brief mention each, and apart from SWAPO no account is given as to their views. This is particularly serious in the case of the UN Council for ^amibia, which was authorized by the General Assembly ± in resolution 22^4-8 and subsequent resolutions- to administer the territory of Namibia. The negotiations with South Africa have at least temporarily wtkened its .legal claims. South Africa is not in fact a party with any legal right to discuss the future of "Namibia, since its mandate was terminated in 1966. Its involvement stems from its illegal occupation. It can therefore be concerned only to the extent of negotiating . withdrawal. However, neither report contains any discussion of a time-table, fir withdrawal, and certainly no agreement in . principle. . CONFIDENTIAL
5» Definition of "self-determination".
The S-G made -if 'clear at the start that "reaff irmation of South Africa's declared policy of self-determination and independence for the peoples of Namibia could not serve as a "basis for continuing the contacts envisaged in resolution 309 (1972).". (S/10738, para. 1*N) "The main task of the representative should be to obtain a complete and unequivocal clarification from the Government of South Africa with regard to its policy of "self-determination andi independence for Namibia." (Group of Three Aide-Memoire, S/10832, Annex I, para. 3«) "Namibia can only achieve independence and self- determination when the ^outh African illegal administration has completely pulled out of our country." (SWAPO London office statement, October 1972.) In fact there can be no doubt as to South Africa's definition of "self-determination" and of "independence". Bsoth concepts are carefully defined in the relevant legislation enacted by the South African Parliament. The debates regarding. these- items of legislation also provide clarification of the South African Government's policy. It is clear that "self-determ- ination" and "independence" refer to aspects of the Bantustan policyt and bear no relation to the use of the terms in United Nations resolutions. The South African definitions could only be changed by new legislation. f . However/ Mr. Vorster refused to clarify the outh African ' Government's policy to Dr.. Escherx, "who reportsi" "The Prime '. Minister indicated that .-., . in his view this was not the i appropriate stage too go into a detailed discussion of the interpretation of self-determination and independence." (S/10832, Annex II, Part I, para. 13 ("b).) Furthermore, there is a clear implication that discussion of "self-determination" can come only after. the Bantustans have become a fait accompli t tThis (discussion of self-determination and independence) could ; f "be done with better results, once the necessary conditions are established and the inhabitants have had moreadministrative and political experience.... The Prime Minister believed that experience in self-government was an essential element for eventual self-determinationo" (Paras. 13(t>) and (d).) From a study of the Bantustan policy in. ^outh Africa, it is clear that "self-government" is used by the South African Government to indicate an advanced stage in the process of establishing Bantustans. ' The Transkei, for example, is described as having "been given "self-government;11 - in spite of the fact that it is. totally controlled by the ^outh African Government, and has "been under a state of emergency since 1960. There appears to be little possibility of doubt that the "regional basis" for self-government (para. 13(d).) is a euphemism for the Bantustans. The Argentinian representative anticipated this in his statement to the Security Council at Addisxi HWe believe that H& in acceding to independence Namibia should preserve its national unity and its territorial integrity, without any type of separation, "be it regional or local." (Emphasss added) - .-:.•' The conclusion that the South African Government's policy of "self-determination" is one of creating Bantustans is confirmed "by the statement released "by Mr. Vorster after the S-G's first report; in defending the establishment of "homelands" in the Eastern Caprivi and Ovambolandt "they are simply part of a process by which the peoples (sic) concerned are being politically prepared to"exercise at the appropriate time their right of self-determination." • • It is also clear, from a study of the Bantustan programme in South Africa (see "South Africa's 'Bantu Homelands1 ", published :by the International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1972)that it is based on the provision of labour 'reservoirs for white areas, the labour supply being regulated by "influx control" (the requirement that all Africans must carry a pass). The suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms is a result of the policy of "influx control", which is itself essential to the whole- "Bantustan" policy. Mr. Vorster himself acknowledged this fact; Dr., Escher reports: "The. Prime Minister stated that, to a large extent, curbs on freedom of movement were necessitated by the need to exercise influx control .. •> He would examine the possibility of removing restrictions without impairing influx control7"(Part I of S/10832, para. 13(h).Emphasis added.)"
6, The question of South Africa's good faithi threats ta break off the negotiations? - The French representative, who stated to the Security Council at Addis Ababa that the idea behind the Argentinian resolution (309) had initially been put forward by France in October 1971i further explainedi "from the conception of the Mandate stemmed the capital obligation for South Africa to negotiate sincerely ' :"- with the United Nations the establishment of an international ..regime permitting the interested populations to choose their own destiny freely ... it .is an obligation that we do not want south Africa to be able to* evade." " « • . ,~ ..-_.• -".•*, * *
: South Africa's" sincerity in desiring to fulfil the obligation, described by the French representative appears to to be put into question, not only by its failure to negotiate an international regime, or even to recognise the obligation to discuss this; but also by- the repeated threats to break off -the negotiations for reasons unconnected with their stated purpose. The incidents ;-. .are as follows i • ~ • . -..'••" .-'"'.. ""' * . (a)• Mr. Vorster stated tod the Transvaal. National Party Congress that South Africa would not continue its negotiations'wit the UN for another day if a "double standard" was applied over international action against terrorism - as he inferred from news. 'reports that*the S-G had not included.any reference to "terrorism" in Southern-Africa. His repaS* T§ tl\6eUN obtained a denial from ^the S-G about the accuracy of these reports.. Mr. Vorster told the Party Congress that he hoped the S-G would learn his lesson "and in future be specific about such a delicate matter; "If . , at any time now or in the future any doule standards are applied in regard to terrorism, then South Africa does not see its way to •:.-.• continue with the negotiations for a day longer." (The Star, weekly, Johannesburg, 16 September 1972.) Dr. Muller, the South African Foreign Minister, has also warned that. "Our future relations with the United Cations will to a large extent be determined by the outcome of the discussions about South West Africa." He implied that the UN would have to reverse some of its policies, such as condemnation of §outh Africa and the'seating of liberation movements as observers in the Fourth Committee. (Interview on South African Broadcasting Co. radio programme, reported in Windhoek Advertiser, 16 October 1972.) : " (c) In August, immediately_after the Security Council had . passed Resolution 319» awttiHKiKin^xtkHxaEjiiaxHiiffEMixBifxaxspaKiHix XE|^2Si£x±a±±XHXHxx:tksxSK&x which "approves the proposal of the Secretary General to proceed, after necessary consultationst with .the appointment of a representative to assist him in the discharge of his mandate».." (emphasis added), Dri Muller threatened to -break off negoitaadiions if SWAPO were to be consulted about the appointment of a special representative. Dr. Muller quoted a UN spokesman as saying, that a special representative would "be appointed very soon, "and . (d) Mr. Vorster .also threatened publicly to break off the talks with Dr. Escher. Reports had been given to the local press about personal observations made by Dr. Escher in a meeting in Namibia, that "certain aspects" of separate development could not be proceeded with; and that South Africa was far behind the rest . of the world ...in its attitudes. Mr. Vorster said that if the 'reports were correct, then Dr. Escher was.acting outside his brief, and consequently his mission could be of no value and discussions with him would be fruitless. - After urgent communications with the S-G, Dr. Escher agreed in a meeting • with Dr. Muller not to say anything more about separate development. (The Times, London, 21 October. 1972») PRECEDENTS ' - * There have been three similar attempts to dispose of the question of Namibia by appointing mediators acceptable to the South African Government. All of them were failures resulting CONFIDENTIAL • . ' : 7 * s. in humiliation and confusion for the UN, and were finally repudiated." A brief account of each of these attempts is attached at. Annex I. •• . • * . + ' 7» Violations of human-rights in Namibia. "The-Government of South Africa should discontinue the application of so-called "homelands" policies and abolish any repressive measures in Namibia... This would create conitions in which the representative could perform his tasks." (Aide- Memoire from the. Group of Three, 8/10832, Annex I, para. 5») «. - "The Prime Minister (of 'South Africa) strongly deled.that there had been any such victimization ..» the Prime Minister gave me the "assurance that nobody would be victimized for coming to see me or for any declarations made to me." (S/10832, Annex II, Part I, para.- 7.) ,•:-•• , • ••:• :-•--*.-;,. . . -•-..- - < The evidence . : ' *. • : * . - "•*, '."'-" Contrary information is available from.press reports and 'individual accounts reaching New York by various means. * *• • Africans who. met Dr. Waldheim, or demonstrated in .favour of independence- and the UN during his visit, have been arrested and given considerable sentences, . or dismissed from their jobs. In one case, a. letter was sent to the S-G informing him of the victimization. The letter never arrived. * " Already there has been at least afae case of victimization following -°r. Escher'^s visit.- Chief Kapuuo has protested strongly at the reported dismissal of a Herero garage employee, Mr. Alex Ngaruka, in Otjiwarongo.. Kappuo said that-he was informed that. Mr. Ngaruka "was sacked by his employers because - he v/as among these people welcoming Dr. Escher." (Windhoek Advertiser, 19 October 1972«) - : In late',July the Vice-President of SWAPO, Mr. Nathaniel Maxhuilili, v/as deprivedaf of some of his rights under a five-year banning order, apparently the first in Namibia. There was no trial, no explanation, and no appeal allowed. He is not allowed to discuss politics, attend meetings, visit the harbour, "native hostel or compound" or factories, and is confined to the. local area. He wa-s allowed to meet Dr. Escher, and immediately put back under the banning order» • - ' ' Ovamboland, home of over half the Africans in Namibia, has been under a state of emergency since 4- February - the last day of the Security Council meeting which authorised the dialogue. Under the emergency regulations, any person can be arrested and detained without trial if he has taken part of "intended to take part" in any of the offences-lasted. All" political meetings are forbidden; no-one may enter or leave without a permit} it is an soffence "to make any statement or act intended or likely to have the effect of interfering with the authority of the State. Under the' proclamation,- 213 people had been detained by early June, for a total of over 7,000 days. (Daily Telegraph, London, CONFIDENTIAL 8 8 June 1972) . There have been many violent clashes, often involving police shooting aj unarmed peonle. The state of emergency allows the South African police to detain anyone atany place until the officialr; are satisfied that he has answered "fully and truthfully" all questions put to him. The use of torture to force people to answer questions is commonplace, and includes electric shocks powered "by a Japanese Honda machine. The S-G has been1informed by the ICFTU (International Confederation of -•- Free Trade Unions), in a letter of lA September 1972, of reports that' Namibian workers and others are being'victimised. For some • . reason, this letter has not been published as a UN document. It states that between 15 December 1971 and 31 January 1972, seven Africans were shot dead in Windhoek, four in Okahandja, ten in Tsumeb,-and over fifty in Ovambolarid. An unknown number was wounded, arrested, or unaccounted for. The letter also refers to-reports of mass graves^n Omundaungilo, Eastern Ovamboland, and of many women looking for their missing husbands. T '•' '••••".•"•- •», . ' . - •"- The General Secretary of the Lutheran Would Federation, Mr. Appel, has stated to the Council for NamfcMa that since the visit of- the S-G to South Africa earlier in the yearm,t&ere had been more and more violations of' human rights. (Council for Namibia press • release NAM/23, 11 September 1972.) The Bantustan policy continues to be pushed forward. The Damara people, second largest African community, have resisted very strongly, complaining that the "Bantustan1" offered is nothing * but a "chicken run". To overcome their opposition, the South African Government has offered to exchange it for an alternative piece of land; but without informing thems'that the former piece contains minerals, for which extensive concessions have already . been granted to South African and other foreign companies. (Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 4 August 19?2.) -. •* . - i . •-., ; ALTERNATIVES Pressure on certain.States to observe their obligations Francei At Addis", the French representative specifically stressed the six-month time limit attached to Resolution 309> because of the fear that talks would involve deifying tactics and procrast- V ination. In the discussion of resolution 319» he made nox reference to this factor. • ' . - . . • Behind the scenes, France had been promising to support the - OAU on the question of Namibia, following the anticipated failure of the negotiations with South Africa. At Addis, the French representative repeated the commitment made several times in the -Security Council during the 1971 debate, thatiKif "South Africa failed to abide by tts strict obligation dsf negotiating with the UN a new international regime for South West 'Africa, France could draw the conclusions concerning the illegality of an administration maintaining itself under such conditions." CONFIDENTIAL 9 , '" It is now therefore a question of refusing to allow the * French_commitment to be forgotten. France mjist be pressed for a statement on its. new'position - in particular, whether it now accepts the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ. •..•"-_•'«* •• * . . : ' Britain! A French change of position would isolate Briatin as the only major power which-refuses to accept the Opinion. It may be*useful to recall the following British statements! (a) "Now that t£je Opinion has been obtained most delegates : - would wish to accept it in order to uphold the authority, of the Court which was the prinaip&ifc judicial organ of the UN. Not to - do os would be a blow to the authority and standing of the Court and the Assembly in a matter vital to the future of the United Nations.' - xi It would also show scant respect for the rule of law. It would be absurd for the Assembly merely to noste the Opinion of the Court when it had expressly asked for authoritiative guidance." ••• "*•. This statement was made by the British represenktive in the General Sssembly, in connection with the Advisory Opinion of the • 'ICJ on "expenses", in 1962. ^£b). In 1966, following the vote on Resolution-214-5 which xgsMiiSxE& the Mandate^ t?le British representative . explained that his negative vote reflected merely a disagreement over the practicality of the move; there was no disagreement on the legal principle.'' Brita.in recognized that "by her.( actions, 'South Africa has forei^ed the right to administer the Manflate." However, there was a lacuna in international law on this point, . . which would have -to"be resolved by the ICJ. In refusing to accept the Advisory Opinion on Namibia,' therefore, Britain has shown that its claim to uphold the rule of law is .false. -British legal opiniofl is apparently based on political expediency. In the case of -amibia, the British commitment is almost entirely .based" on the contract between the UK Atomic Energy Authority and Rio Tinto-Zinc's South African subsidiary, for the purchase of uranium from a mine in Namibia which starts production in 19?60 The contract was authorised in 1970 by the .previous Labour Government; the Minister concerned, Mr. Wedgewood Benn, recently admitted in Parliament that it had been an .unfortunate mistake. The present Conservative Government has so far refused to revoke the contract, although it could do so • on the grounds of force ma;jeurev West Germanyi It appears probable that West Germany will apply for membership of the UN soon. Since it is very heavily involved in Namibia, the UN should initiate a detailed study of the German commitment to South Africa's illegal occupation, in order to evaluate utL1. eligibility for membership. Y/est Germany is also of course violating UN sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. 10 Detailed fact-finding The Security Council should invite the S-G to make an exhaustive enquiry Into the relations of merrber-States with the South African illegal administration in Namibia, taking a stage further the preliminary enquiries made in 1970. If properly conducted, there is an enormous amount of detailed questioning that needs to be put to fe various member-States. As a small example, the US does not publish statistics for its trade and investment in Namibia as distinct from the overall statistcis for ^outh Africa. How can this be reconciled with stated American policy? . • ' . . ~' * • " • * • . Resolution 310 ' . ' • This calls on MSM States to use all available means to ensure that their nationals and corporations in wamibia conform- in thgir policies of hiring Namibian workers to the basic provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This resolutions was passed a& the same time as Resolution 3091 bjrt while the S-G has been very busy implementing 309 and 319, hardly anything has been done to implement 310> this should be rectified immediately. UN organs and specialised agencies . • The UN should insist that-South Africa must not be allowed to represent Namibia in any UN organ'or agency.. 'Where there is doubt, the South African delegation should be required to clarify its claims to representation. V/ith the backing of the ICJ Opinion, which is binding on many international organisations, the agencies would probably be force to comply with this demand* The same criterion obviously applies to the General Assembly next year. , « . . • . - . --.•«. • " /_-'"•"'•-' * . - .' - " - ":-"--- " - '•'.' •'_•'•'..-- • •'• --.'..-'•-• - . * * - .'."•' ' • # International treaties ' : - * The S-G should immediately approach all relevant Governments .and organisations to insist on the exclusion of South Africa as representative of Namibia from all international treaties and conventions. Where this is implied in the worSing of the treaty, but not explicit, there should, be insistence on complete clarification. Particular attention should be paid to ±sKsi±EsiH treaties or agreements, which allow South Africa to export Namibian products under favourable conditions. - ^ " Go-operation with the Council for Namibia and Commissioner for Namibia. The Security Council should mako it clear that it will work in close co-operation with the Council for Namibia, and will have a free exdnnge of information with it. It should also approach the Commissioner for Namibia, v/heri appointed, for the detailed research and background material required for its activities. Duplication of effort, and conflict between different UN bodies, can benefit onlu South Africa. . CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX I PRECEDENTS . ^^- t * • * • • 1. • Lengthy, negotiations between the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on South West Africa and South Africa, 1951 -53. This was an attempt to> bring Namibia under the authority of the UN by a negotiated settlement, after South 'Africa had rejected the iCJ's 1950 Advisory. Opinion that the Mandate remained in . existence, with the UN taking over the role of the League of Nations. •••''.' ' South Africa 2 refused to negotiate with the Sub-Committee. The US suggested a three-power committee (US, Britain and France) could become a UN Committee, as South Africa might not with to negot- iate with the three'powers if they were UN agents. Howeverf the identity of the party to negotiate with South Africa was never - agreed upon. South Africa-refused to accept the Sub-Committee's 'substantive proposals. * . ' *-«i. •'""-. ' '." ''.•••' . ' '*••••' 2. "Good Offices Committee on South West Africa", Mission to South Africa, 1958. . • * The committee was set up by General Assembly Resolution 11^3 (XII) to discuss the international status of Namibia with South Africa; the members were the UK, US and Brazil. South Africa maintained that the bad relations between =the UN. and South Africa were large].y due to resentment in South Africa over UN""interference" in South Africa and Namibia.. South Africa was not willing to accept the UN as the second party to an agreement. Partition was discussed, with the Northern- (black) areas under UN trusteeship, and the Southern (white) areas annexed to South Africa. It was agreed that_South Africa would "investigate" the feasibility of partition. The Committee stated that partition, might form the basis for an agreement, although it might be outside theCommittee1s terms of reference. In 19&0, the General Assembly" . overwhelmingly rejected the idea. • • . 3. Visit of the C* hair man and Vice-bhairman of the Special Committee . for South V/est Africa (Carpio and de.Alva) to South Africa and South West Africa, 1962. - - ". . The mission was arranged to "find'a way out of the impasse!' over Namibia (South African version), or an "exchange of views" whi^ch might lead to the "peaceful implementation of Resolution 17&2(XVI) .(Special Committee version). On arrival in Pretoria, the outh African Government demanded, and received, an assurance that the visit would be used for fact-finding only, and not to implement other aspects of Resolution 1702. It also obtained a public denial from Mr<> Carpio of a reported statement that the mission constituted an admission by South Africa of UN authority over NamiTbaa. ; " No substantive discussions took place, because of the public CONFIDENTIAL 2 scandalover Carpio's signature of a joint communique"with the South African Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, and the Foreign Minister, IJdr. Eric Lou'w, raying that there was no threat to international peace and security in South West Africa; no militarism.! and no extermination of the indigenous people." Caipio denied later that he had agreed to thic, and hinted that he Had been drugged by the South Africans with the aid ± of the UN Secretariat members. However, it was well-known that his problem was alcoholic in nature. The staff members had reported that all "non-whites" heard by the mission were dissatisfied, although they v/ere fearful of reprisals by the Administration or their employers. UNITED NATIONS Distr. 'GENERAL SECURITY S/10832/Corr.l 21 November 1972 COUNCIL ENGLISH ORIGINAL:' ENGLISH/FRENCH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 319 (1972) CONCERNING THE ' QUESTION OF NAMIBIA Corrigendum 1. /Concerns the French text only_._/ ' 2. /Concerns the French text only./ • ' 3. Annex II, page 20 ' . Add the following after paragraph 53: (iv) Views expressed "by the Association for the Preservation of Tjamuaha/Maharero Royal House • < 5^. Representatives of the Association for the Preservation of Tjamuaha/ Maharero Royal House led by Rev. B. G. Karuaera vere heard in Windhoek on 13 October arid in Okakarara on 18 October. They stated their opposition to a unitary state for Namibia, because, they said, the Territory had never formed a single entity. They further contended that the one-man-one-vote procedure would create disunity" among the various ethnic groups. They suggested that the Territory be divided into three geographical and political regions namely: the Northern region consisting of Ovamboland, Kavango and other areas in the north; the central region comprising Hereroland and . Damaraland; and the Southern region which would consist of Namaland. People in each of these three regions should -be helped so that they could work out their political and constitutional future according to their wishes and aspirations. They supported the contacts now taking place between the United Nations and the Government of South Africa. They further considered that negotiations should be initiated between the inhabitants of the Territory and the South African Government with a view to ensuring that "irritating petty apartheid" laws were repealed; that young people who had left the country.without passports for educational purposes should be allowed to return and that more educational institutions and hospitals should be built. 72-23337 UN/TED NATIONS Distr. SECURITY S/10832/Corr.l 21 Wovember C WO UI I INN Vf - I LI !*__£ 4 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: ENGLISH /FRENCH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY -GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 319 (1972) CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA Corri gendum 1. /Concerns the French text only_._/ • . • 2. /Concerns the French text onlyv/ ' 3. 'Annex II, page 20 Add the following after paragraph 53: i . (iv) Views expressed by the Association for the Preservation of Tjamuaha/Maharero Royal House , .• . .. 5^. Representatives of the Association for the Preservation of Tjamuaha/ Maharero Royal House led by Rev. B. G. Karuaera were heard in Windhoek on 13 October and in Okakarara on 18 October. They stated their 'opposition to a unitary state for Namibia, because, they said, the Territory had never formed a single entity. They further contended that the one-man-one -vote procedure would create disunity among the various ethnic groups. They suggested that the Territory be divided into three geographical and political regions namely: the Northern region consisting of Ovamboland, Kavango and ~~ other areas in the north; the central region comprising Hereroland and Damaraland; and the Southern region which would consist of Namaland. People in each of these three regions should be helped so that they could work out their political and constitutional future according to their wishes and aspirations. They supported the contacts now taking place between the United Nations and the Government of South Africa.' They further considered that negotiations should be initiated between the inhabitants of 'the Territory and the South African Government with a view to ensuring that "irritating , petty apartheid" laws were repealed; that young people who had left the country without passports for educational purposes should be allowed to return and' that more educational institutions and hospitals should be built. 72-23337 NACIONES UNIDAS Distr. GENERAL CONSEJO S/10832/Corr.l 21 noviembre 1972 DE SEGURIDAD .ESPAffOL . ORIGINAL: PRANCES- INGLES INFORME DEL SECRETARIO GENERAL SOBRE LA APLICACION DS LA RESOLUCION 319 (1972) DEL COKSEJO DE SEGURIDAD REIATIVA A LA QUESTION DE NAMIBIA Correcci6n 1. Se aplica solo al texto franees. 2. Se aplica solo al texto f ranees. I 3. Anexo II, pagina, 22. Agreguese lo siguiente despues del parrafo.53: . iv) Opiniones expresadas por la Association for the Preservai-ion of__the_ Tjamuaha/Maharero Royal House 5^« Los representantes de la Association for the Preservation of Tjamuaha/Maaarero Royal House, encabezados por el Rev. E.G. Karuaera, fueron reci- bidos en Windhoek el 13 de octubre y en Okakarara el 18 de octubre. Los represen- tantes expresarbn su oposicion a la formacion de un Estado unitario en Namibia porque, segun dijeron, el Territorio nunca habfa constituido una sola entidad. Alegaron ademas que el procedimiento de'un voto por persona crearia desunioa entre los diversos grupos etnicos. Sugirieron que se dividiera el Territorio en tres regiones geograficas y politicas, a saber: la region septentrional, compuesta por Ovamboland, Kavango y otras aonas del norte; la region central, formada por Hereroland y Damaraland, y la region meridional, que consistirfa en Namaland. Debla ayudarse a 16s pueblos de estas tres regiones para que pudieran determinar su future politico y constitucional segua sus deseos y aspiraciones. Apoyaoron los contactos que se estan realizando entre las Naciones Unidas y el Gobierno de Sudafrica y consideraron ademas que debian iniciarse negociaciones entre los habito.ntes del Territorio y el Gobierno sudafricano con miras a asegurar la abolicion de esas leyes "irritantes y mezquinas de apartheid", el regreso de la gente joven que habfa abandonado el pais sin pasaportes con motives educacionales y la construccion de inas instituciones educacionales y hospitales. 72-233^0 \ NATIONS UNIES ' 1 Distr+ . r r\ M C C I I /fl^$$5s^ GENERALE ^ ^J IN O C I L W^^Ul) S/10832/Corr.l n.c' CC^IIDITC KSHW • P1 novembre D E SECURITE W^bW FRMCAIS . ^^>^^ , ORIGINAL : ANGLAIS- FRANCAIS . RAPPORT DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL SUR L1 APPLICATION DE LA RESOLUTION 319 (1972) DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE CONCERNANT LA QUESTION DE LA v . NAMIBIE Rectificatif 1. . /We concerne q_ue le texte frangai^/ - > Rapport du Secretaire general9 p. 3, par. 10 : remplacer les mots "prendre en consideration" par le mot "suivre". . 2. /He concerne que le texte frangais_/ Annexe II (Rapport du representant du Secretaire general) a) Page k, troisieme alinea, remplacer les mots "1'entreprendre" par le mot "proceder". : \ b) Page 1|3 paragraphe T» huitieme ligne, remplacer le mot "inquietes" par le mot "brimes". ' • c) Page 5» paragraphe 11, derniere ligne, remplacer les mots "liberte politique" par les mots "liberte des activites politiques". d) Page 5> paragraphe 12, premiere ligne, remplacer les mots "reaffirme que son gouvernement etait pret et 'dispose a poursuivre" par les mots "reaffirme la volonte et le desir de-son gouvernement de poursuivre". e) Page 6, alinea e), remplacer les mots "en principe dans la mesure ou les -conditions necessaires a 1'exercice du droit a 1'autodetermination seraient remplies et ou serait creee" par les mots "en principe3 sous reserve que les. conditions necessaires a 1'exercice du droit a 1'autodetermination soient remplies et que soit creee".. • f) Page 6, alinea g), deuxieme ligne, inserer le mot "existantes" entre les" mots "limitations" et "a la liberte". ' g) Page 6, alinea h) , remplacer le mot "entrees" par le mot "mouvements". 72-23338 - - . . . -/... UNITED NATIONS Distr. GENERAL SECURITY S/10832 COUNCIL 15 November 1972 'ORIGINAL: .ENGLISH REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 319 (1972) CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA 1. At its 1656th and 1657th meetings held on 31 July and 1 August 1972, the Security Council considered my report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 309 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia (S/10738). At its 1657th meeting, the Security Council adopted resolution 319 (1972), the text of which reads as follows: "The Security Council? . , "Recalling its Resolution 309 (1972) of k February 1972, and without prejudice to other resolutions adopted on the question of Namibia, "Having considered the report submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 309 (1972) (S/10738),- "l. Notes with appreciation the efforts made by the Secretary-General in the implementation of resolution 309 (1972); "2. Reaffirms the inalienable and imprescriptible right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence; "3. Reaffirms also the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia; "h. Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation and close co-operation with the Group of the Security Council established in accordance with resolution 309 (1972), to continue his contacts with all parties concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principles of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; • • "5- Approves the proposal of the Secretary-General to proceed, after necessary consultations, with the appointment of a representative to assist him in the discharge of his mandate as set out in paragraph U above; 72-22662 UNITED NATIONS —Distr. GENERAL SECURITY S/10832 15 November 1972 COUNCIL I ORIGINAL: ENGLISH REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 319 (1972) CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA . - 1. At its 1656th and l657th meetings held on 31 July and 1'August 1972, the Security. Council considered my report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 309 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia (S/10738). At its 1657th meeting, the Security Council adopted resolution 319 (1972), the text of which reads as follows: "The Security Council., "Recalling its resolution 309 (1972) of U February 1972, and without prejudice to other resolutions adopted on the question of Namibia, "Having considered the report submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 309 (1972) (S/10738), "!• Notes with appreciation the efforts made by the Secretary-General in the implementation of resolution 309 (1972); "2. Reaffirms the inalienable and imprescriptible right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence; "3. Reaffirms also the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia; "U. Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation and close co-operation with the Group of the Security Council established in accordance with resolution 309 (1972), to continue his contacts with all parties concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principles of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; "5- Approves^the proposal of the Secretary-General to proceed, after necessary consultations, with the appointment of a representative to assist him in the discharge of' his mandate as set out in paragraph U above; 72-22662