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You aren't signed in Sign In Help Home The Tour Sign Up Explore The Indian Peace keeping Forces (IPKF) Uploaded on February 9, 2008 arrived in Sri Lanka by 'South Asian Foreign Relations' 'South Asian Foreign Relations''s photostream 1,390 uploads ¡ 1 gallery contains this photo ¡ 4 people call this photo a favorite Tags The Indian Peace keeping Forces Copyright © BHARAT RAKSHAK arrived Sri Indo­Sri Lanka accord was signed in Sri Lanka on 29 July 1987. This was to be upheld by Lanka an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). The first phase envisioned the supervision of the surrender of arms by the various militant groups. Soon some 24 AN­12s and AN­32s flew into Palaly carrying two Indian Army battalions constituting the IPKF. Additional Information On July 30th, Lieutenant General Depinder Singh, the Indian Army's GOC­in­C Southern All rights reserved Command flew into Jaffna to discuss arrangements with the Sri Lankan forces. The next few days saw the bulk of an infantry brigade comprising the Sikh Light Infantry, the Maratha Anyone can see this photo Light Infantry, the Mahar Regiment plus supporting elements had landed in northern Sri Lanka. By August, the 54th Infantry Division under the command of Maj Gen Harkirat Singh ¡ Taken on February 9, 2008 and the 340th Indian Inf Bde had landed in Sri Lanka. ¡ Viewed 4,192 times The initial phase of the agreement called for the disarmament of the various militant groups followed by the formation of the Interim Administrative Council. This was to have proportionate representation from various groups but the LTTE wanted to dominate it. Part of this fascist outlook was the massacre of political rivals and Sinhalese groups. A group of captured LTTE militants committed suicide in the custody of the Sri Lankan Army. These gave the LTTE the excuse it wanted. A political decision was taken to disarm the LTTE if necessary by force. Meanwhile on October 8th, the LTTE carried out mortar and machine gun attacks on IPKF patrols. Following a high level Defence Ministry meeting on October 10th, the IPKF commenced its operations, code named 'Pawan' on the night of 11/12 October 1987. The rules of engagement for this operation were strict and once again tied the Indian Army's hands. Use of artillery, heavy weaponry and offensive air support was forbidden to minimise civilian casualty and damage to property. The Indian Army's plan was to cripple the LTTE guerrilla network by capturing its headquarters in Jaffna City, a task the Sri Lankan Army had tried this for many years but had not succeeded. Pushed by the political/bureaucratic establishment the Army made a hasty plan. However it had only 91st Brigade under Brigadier J. Ralli consisting of only three battalions. One was at the front, one at point Pedro and one west of Palaly. Furthermore each battalion was staffed to only 50% and had none of its heavy weapons as they had not been expecting a fight. The IPKF push into the city was contested by the LTTE at every nook and corner. It had to fight against heavily armed guerrilla, in a heavily built up and densely populated urban area already fortified and extensively mined during the three years of war with the Sri Lankan Army. Both sides took heavy casualties. Furthermore all the approach roads were pitted with Claymore mines or huge drums filled with explosives, buried in the ground. The whole area was flooded with IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) which could be detonated by remote or radio control from over a kilometre away. One such explosion killed 29 IPKF personnel. The attack took place along five axis to the city. Jaffna University (JU) was the tactical headquarters of the LTTE. The Indian military leadership planned a quick commando raid to round up the leadership and thus cut short the Battle for Jaffna. The JU area was extremely built up. From the air the city was packed with the red & green of tiled roofs and palm trees. There were just two open patches, a football field and a smaller playground. The plan was to land a company of 70 men from 10 Para Cdo. to secure the football field. A second wave was to follow with a company of the 13th Sikh LI. If all went to plan the heliborne troops would be linked with troops coming by land. But unknown to the IPKF, the LTTE had intercepted IPKF radio communications and knew the plans. It had sighted the landing zone and was waiting. The first wave of Mi­8 flew in and began disgorging the Para Cdos. They immediately came under heavy fire especially from 0.50 machine guns. The LTTE had the range and position right. Sepoy Lok Ram recounted, "We thought everything was fine but as we were sliding out of the helicopter we came under heavy fire from all sides. It was an impossible situation, as people would come out of the houses fire at us and disappear right back. There were gunmen on tree tops including coconut trees. Since we were ordered not to use heavy weapons it was impossible to advance. We were fighting an enemy we could not even see." Heavy and sustained machine gun fire pinned down the commandos killing six of them instantly. The Mi­8s were damaged but made it back to base. What followed is the most painful story of the Battle of Jaffna. In the dark with heavy machine gun fire the second wave of choppers brought in a platoon of Sikh LI and landed on the other smaller playground. This was a few yards from the Jaffna University but is separated by several lanes of booby trapped buildings. The Sikhs soon realized something was wrong as they landed smack on the LTTE's battlements. Bullets rained on them. The three helicopters were hit and pilots barely managed to nurse them back to Palaly. Their grim assessment: The platoon was likely to be wiped out as would any reinforcements. The commanders made the devil's choice: leave the platoon to its fate. Fate was hopelessly cruel to the young commander of the platoon, Major Birendra Singh. The first man to get hit on landing was the radioman. This severed contact from Palaly. They could reach the commandos on short range walkie talkies. The commandos asked him to join them. But like a good infantryman he waited for the rest of his company. Little did he know that it was not coming. And by the time he knew he was encircled. The first assault came at dawn. The troops fought valiantly and repelled it. As more assaults were launched the situation became grim. Each assault left them with less men and ammunition. Finally at 11:30 a.m. on October 12th, with the last bullet fired the troops led a bayonet charge. They were cut down to the last man but one. That man, Sepoy Gora Singh, was taken POW and later released. Sepoy Singh helped to reconstruct one of the most poignant battles in the history of the Indian Army. For the LTTE this was a morale booster. The Sikhs were stripped of their weapons, uniform and equipment. Their bare bodies were displayed at the nearby Nagaraja Vihar temple and then burnt with a barrel of oil. The battle field was littered with pieces of Sikh LI's uniforms and equipment along with thousands of .50 MG shells. Meanwhile the commandos were still holding out. Their commander, Lt. Col. Dalbir Singh, led a rescue mission with three T­72 tanks. The roads were hopelessly booby trapped. The commander of the tank group, Major Anil Kaul, improvised brilliantly. Knowing the rail tracks passed behind Jaffna University, he drove his tanks on the Palaly­Jaffna rail line. Passing through the narrow lanes, an RPG­7 fired on him, hitting the turret. The explosion severed his wedding ring finger. Splinters hit him in the eye and arm. His men put him on morphine and they fought their way to the Para Cdos. A little later the 4/5 Gorkhas and remainder of the 13 Sikh LI linked up. The Para Cdos superior training saved the day. They conserved ammo and even picked up all their dead and weapons. For 18 hours they prayed and fought. The LTTE leadership came perilously close to getting wiped out. It's Chief, Prabhakaran, was injured in the foot. The 13 Sikh LI now holds a special Ardas & Akhand Panth on October 12th every year to honour their 30 lonely and gusty comrades on the brutal killing fields of Jaffna University. At this point the major operational base for the IPKF was Palaly airbase. This was a hub of LTTE activity and therefore a constant battle to secure it from guerrilla attacks. The IPKF was badly overstretched. On October 15/16 it halted its advance to stabilize its front. A massive airlift was undertaken to reinforce it with 3 brigades and heavy equipment. These included T­72s and BMP­1s. The improvised controllers worked round the clock to fly in troops and equipment. While the IL­76s and An­12s moved the heavy equipment the AN­ 32s, Hs.748s and Indian Airlines B737s brought in the troops. So heavy was the traffic that the runway in Tamabaram (Madras) cracked with the repeated take offs and landings. The Mi­8s and Mi­25s, as well as Cheetahs, were flown in. By end of October the IAF flew 2200 tactical transport and 800 helicopter sorties. Operation Pawan resume Now reinforced the fighting resumed. In some areas the anti­personnel mines were countered by rolling BMP­1s and T­72s over them.

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