R E A L I T Y C H E C K Civil Society in Uganda Broadening Understanding of Uganda’s Civil Society Ecosystem and Identifying Pathways for Effective Engagement with Civil Society in the Development Process

CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA POWERING UGANDA’S TRANSFORMATIOAN A Reality Check

Civil Society in Uganda Broadening Understanding of Uganda’s Civil Society Ecosystem and Identifying Pathways for Effective Engagement with Civil Society in the Development Process

REALITY CHECK 11

Civil Society in Uganda Broadening Understanding of Uganda’s Civil Society Ecosystem and Identifying Pathways for Effective Engagement with Civil Society in the Development Process

Published by: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung | Centre for Development Alternatives

Authors: Michael Mugisha | Yusuf Kiranda | Michael Mbate

CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA I Acknowledgement Table of Contents

1 Executive Summary 1 1.1 Central Argument of the Report 4 The Reality Check 11 research project was implemented by the Team at the Centre for Development Alternatives (CDA) in collaboration with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. The 2. Defining Civil Society: A Global Perspective versus Traditional Perspective 7 Team was led by Yusuf Kiranda and other contributing authors included Michael Mugisha 2.1 The global discourse on civil society 8 and Michael Mbate. 2.2 Institutional differences in the definition of CSO 8 2.3 Analysing trends in the civil society ecosystem 9 2.3.1 The decline of global institutions 9 CDA is grateful to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) for the generous financial support 2.3.2 Technological advances 10 without which this study would not have been possible. Special thanks to Ms. Verena 2.3.3 Shifts in demographics 10 Kasirye for her dedication to ensuring that the project is delivered in accordance to the 2.3.4 Shifts in financing models 11 agreed timelines. 2.4 The role of civil society in driving inclusive development 11 2.5 Global shifting patterns of civil society and the challenges they pose to the The qualitative analysis that informed the writing of the report benefitted enormously realisation of inclusive development 12 from input of Civil Society Organisation (CSOs) that were invited to the consultative 2.5.1 Demonstrating impact 12 workshop in January 2019, National Organisation of Trade Unions (NOTU), Interreligious 2.5.2 Government restrictions 12 Council of Uganda, Uganda National NGO Forum, Uganda Registration Services Bureau 2.5.3 Accountability and independence 13 (URBS), Uganda Coffee Farmers’ Alliance (UCFA), and Ministry of Trade, Industries and 2.5.4 Changing funding climate 14 Cooperatives. 3. Problematising the nature of civil society in Uganda: A critical analysis of the historical evolution of the civil society space and ecosystem and its performance on democratic Max Walter and Ester Kovandova read the first manuscript and provide valuable governance and inclusive development in Uganda 15 comments that informed the revision of the subsequent drafts. We would also like to 3.1 The changing nature of civil society in Uganda from pre-independence to the present day 16 appreciate Julius Ocwinyo for the excellent editorial work. 3.1.1 The beginnings of civil society in Uganda 16 3.1.2 Independence, post-independence and early confrontation of the independence state and workers’ unions 21 3.1.3 During the reign of terror (1971-1981) 22 3.1.4 Troublesome 1980s and civil society 23 3.1.5 Structural adjustment reforms and the old CSOs roll-back 23

3.2 Implications of shifting patterns in the development approach to civil society composition and performance 25

4. Accounting for the nature and performance of civil society in realization of inclusive development: Analytical Framework and Practical Evaluation of the performance between traditional (old) and new civil society 29 4.1 A conceptual framework to evaluate the performance of civil society 30 4.1.1 Dimension 1: Civic engagement 32 4.1.2 Dimension 2: Level of organisation 32 4.1.3 Dimension 3: External environment 33 4.1.4 Dimension 4: Values 33 4.1.5 Dimension 5: Impact 34

II CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA III Civil Society in Uganda 5. Evaluation of civil society contribution to inclusive development in Uganda: A comparative analysis between traditional and new civil society 35 Broadening Understanding of Uganda’s Civil Society Ecosystem and Identifying Pathways for Effective Engagement with Civil Society in the Development Process 5.1 Dimension 1: Civic engagement 36 5.2 Dimension 2: Level of organisation 38 5.3 Dimension 3: External environment 40 5.3.1 Legal context 40 5.3.2 Political context 41 5.3.3 Socio-economic context 42 5.3.4 Social-cultural context 43 5.3.5 Dimension 4: Values 44 5.3.6 Dimension 5: Impact 45

6. Binding constraints on civil society performance and proposed measures for lifting the constraints 47 6.1 Binding constraints on Uganda’s civil society 48 6.1.1 Binding constraints on internal governance 48 6.1.2 Constraints on citizen mobilisation, participation and representation 50 6.1.3 Constraints on public policy influence 52 6.2 Lifting the constraints on civil society capacity to shape Uganda’s inclusive development agenda 53 1. 6.2.1 Proposed measures for strengthening internal governance of CSOs 55 6.2.2 Proposed measures for strengthening citizen mobilisation, participation and representation in civil society organisations 55 6.2.3 Proposed measures for strengthening public policy influence 55 Executive Summary

7. References/Bibliography 57

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1: Union growth in Uganda, 1955-1958 19 Table 2:Growth of trade unions in Uganda, 1952-1961 20

Figure 1: Analytical framework for evaluating civil society performance 31 Figure 2:Binding constraints on CSOs in Uganda 49

1 IV CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Efforts to support the development However, as political events shifted adjustment reforms. By the mid-2000s, of support provided. For example, some of civil society organisations (CSOs) between 1970 and the 1980s, so did the as Uganda was once again attempting pundits have argued that civil society actors in Uganda as a third pillar of inclusive contours of the CSOs. First, Idi Amin’s reign to return to a multi-party political continue to register limited traction in development date back to pre-colonial of terror triggered and sustained the flight dispensation, NGOs were as many as (if not influencing government policies and many and post-independence Uganda, although of many key leaders of CSOs, particularly more than) state agencies and were seen organisations face internal challenges accelerated momentum is witnessed those that challenged the state, and as largely independent and incapable of which undermine the ability to deliver on 2 from the 1990s onwards. During the resulted in a regression of the CSOs’ role in succumbing to state control. their mandates. heyday of state intervention in the 1950s shaping the governance and development and 60s, both the colonial and post- trajectory of Uganda. Second, the ravages When the multi-party political dispensation Until now, though, existing analyses have independence governments used a set of of the 1980-86 civil war accelerated the was ushered in in 2006, development stopped at suggesting ideas around how laws to encourage as well as regulate the formation of new forms of community- agencies again turned to NGOs as a civil society could increase its influence efforts of CSOs. CSOs, particularly those in and socially-driven CSOs that dominated dependable force for cultivating citizen without probing the binding constraints agriculture and other formal sectors of the the provision of social services, such as engagement to promote political that hold back the necessary change in civil economy, were seen as critical in the task education and health, of which citizens accountability, which was required to society engagements and the opportunities of mobilising citizens to foster economic were in desperate need after the civil war. deepen democratic governance in that can be leveraged to overcome these production, promote a sense of nationalism Third, the shift from a state- to a market-led Uganda. Indeed, as financial aid increased constraints. This civil society Reality Check and drive economic transformation. development paradigm characterised by towards promoting the ‘good governance research project aims to fill this gap. It is the sweeping implementation of structural agenda’ in Uganda, so did the number of designed to provide a deeper exploration of As a result, many producer organisations adjustment reforms (also commonly known NGOs that became increasing focused on Uganda’s civil society ecosystem as a way of or cooperative societies and labour unions as SAPs) and complementary poverty implementing political activities. By 2013, identifying effective pathways for engaging were encouraged to organise, in part eradication action plans (PEAP) between the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that with civil society in driving Uganda’s representing the changing dynamics of 1995 and 2008 spurred the formation there were over 12,500 registered NGOs inclusive development process. Uganda’s economy from a predominantly of ‘community-based’ organisations or from a paltry 200 in 1986. agrarian to an industrialising and services what is famously now known as NGOs. The report is structured to achieve three economy. Indeed, by 1961, there were over Indeed, as NGOs witnessed a sharp rise Therefore, development support towards main objectives: civil society from 2006 to date has been 39,000 registered organisations across all in numbers, the former production- (i) Generate a deeper understanding of premised on the assumption that CSOs sectors of the economy, rising from 259 based organisations, such as cooperative the different actors in Uganda’s civil can serve as a platform for mobilising organisations in 1951. These organisations societies and trade unions, regressed. This, society ecosystem and their levels of and facilitating citizen participation in became launching pads for ascension in part, reflected the impact of structural influence; to political power (for those seeking adjustment reforms; that is to say, as the political, economic and social processes (ii) Identify the binding constraints political power) and political control burgeoning agricultural and industrialising aimed at promoting transparency and holding back representativeness, (once in power). Regarding the latter, a revolution that had started in the 1970s accountability in governance. This coherence and accountability with set of instruments, ranging mainly from began to retreat, so did the organisations was presumed to foster a rules-based civil society as well as the realistic statutory laws to financial support, were that evolved in the wake of this process. governance structure, promote peace and opportunities that can be leveraged to used by state actors to keep CSOs, at the stability and, ultimately, achieve economic overcome these constraints; and time, under control. For example, there is Indeed, government and development transformation. However, there has been evidence that many cooperative societies, aid was targeted towards sustaining an growing frustration with the fact that (iii) Establish more effective pathways whose leaders politically supported the economic liberalisation process that despite the substantial investments made for bolstering civil society’s role as a state-received financial credit through state started in 1995 and NGOs to complement in supporting the development of Ugandan shaper and driver of inclusive devel- development banks, were not obliged to state efforts in closing the gap in service civil society over the years, there is not opment. repay, which later, in part, contributed to provision left behind by the destructive much on the ground to show for the scale the 1980 fiscal crisis. 1 nature of the 1980 civil war and perhaps the ‘collateral damage’ of structural 1 See Bates (2014). 2 See Oloka-Onyango & Barya (1997).

2 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 3 1.1 Central Argument of the Report such as organised demonstrations against shift in contextual conditions represents corruption and advocacy in support of or a clarion call for rethinking a strategy The report argues that the underlying in the 1990s. A striking feature of the against a legislative process, these events for building an empowered, effective, explanation for CSOs’ inability to shape neoliberal economic restructuring process are usually random and devoid of a robust less foreign aid-dependent and more and drive institutional change in Uganda has been the increasing channelling of organisational structure for sustaining membership-based civil society. is related to the current structure and development aid towards the development citizen efforts in ensuring that advocacy composition of civil society in Uganda, of the NGO sector as a vehicle for efforts deliver their core objectives. However, leveraging these opportunities which in itself is explained by a structural supporting the ‘good governance agenda’ demands a pragmatic approach that shift in the organisation of social and necessary for ensuring that the neoliberal However, the report observes a rare targets interventions as close as possible economic life that started nearly 30 years agenda delivers on its promise of opportunity to recast our civic efforts to the binding constraints. The report ago. The report specifically observes expanding economic freedom, democratic towards an agenda for supporting identifies three main binding constraints that Uganda’s civil society landscape is governance and economic prosperity. This, membership-based organisations. This on civil society growth and performance dominated by NGOs which (by the nature however, has fostered the proliferation of opportunity can be seen in a number of in relation to inclusive development. of their formation) are not member-based the NGO sector at the expense of member- ways. These are (i) internal governance of organisations and, thus, are incapable of based organisations such as professional CSOs; (ii) inability to stimulate and sustain mobilising and sustaining broad-based organisations and producer organisations, First, there is now a softening of hegemonic citizen mobilisation, participation and citizen participation and engagement in to mention but a few. tendencies in the championing of representation; and (iii) lack of capacity activities that are necessary for driving developmental ideas. Few believe that to influence public policy. We believe institutional change and democratisation. Indeed, a historical and comparative integrating old CSOs into the state that these constraints are somehow NGOs tend to be elite-led and supply- analysis that draws a distinction between apparatus, thereby complicating their interconnected in a vicious circle. For pushed organisations in their conception, member-based or what we also call old political and economic governance, example, to strengthen civil mobilisation, 3 formation and survival. They are pushed CSOs and NGO-based or what we call can work anymore. At the same time, participation and representation, internal by the availability of development aid new CSOs reveals that the shift in the the neoliberal era has produced rising governance must be strengthened. This to supply specific social and sometimes development approach has produced unemployment levels, poverty and should build trust and confidence in CSOs, political services such as health, education, a lacklustre economic transformation income inequality, thus creating conditions thus attracting and retaining membership. advocacy on electoral processes, process. This has further impeded for social and political instability. This However, in order to strengthen internal corruption and so forth. They lack an the creation of conditions that would now threatens citizen cohesion and governance, citizen mobilisation, ideological basis for stimulating citizen produce and ensure an organic and trust, the building blocks of democratic participation and representation must affinity and drive to become part of these sustained process of broad-based governance.4 This presents an opportunity increase. Furthermore, advocacy and civic organisations and, indeed, drive and shape citizen participation and engagement for a progressive debate and conversation activities must be embedded within an their agenda. Consequently, whereas in economic and, ultimately, political around the best way to embed society and organisation’s system and depersonalise occasionally they will claim to be citizen- processes. Many Ugandans continue to live the economy in the values and systems of a the organisation from the founder or based, beneath the working team of any in rural areas and survive on agriculture developmental state. strong leader’s capture. In light of this, we specific NGO there is hardly any base to largely for subsistence purposes; the suggest measures for addressing the above Second, there is increasing frustration with rely on to hold government accountable industrial process that started in the constraints: the unsustainable and continuous funding or ensure that their advocacy work delivers 1960s has been in regression since the of NGO activities that have not produced (i) Instituting project-based superviso- any substantial gains. beginning of the neoliberal era. This has any structural change in governance. ry boards appointed by the donors undermined the structural conditions Corruption in government, and more to oversee programme design and Our analysis further highlights that the necessary for ensuring and sustaining recently in NGOs, abounds, economic budget expenditures related to dominance of NGOs in Uganda’s civil the organisational development required growth has stagnated or, in some cases, civic activities. These boards would society ecosystem has been produced by a to produce member-based civil society. regressed and there is a growing apathy serve until the end of the project life fundamental shift in development thinking Consequently, whereas citizen participation within the citizenry about civic work. This but would ensure that a culture of from state-led economic programmes to might occasionally be witnessed in well- 3 See Rodrik (2007). accountability is cultivated within the neoliberal economic policies that started coordinated political and civic events 4 See Stiglitz (2015).

4 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 5 Civil Society in Uganda NGO and other civic organisations (v) Leveraging the capacity of existing Broadening Understanding of Uganda’s Civil Society Ecosystem and Identifying Pathways for dealing with accountability challenges. research institutes to build, expand Effective Engagement with Civil Society in the Development Process and strengthen the capacity of CSOs (ii) Expanding funding to member- to conduct research for advocacy ship-based civic activities to include work. Research institutes can be traditional CSOs such as churches interested in adapting their annual and business associations, for instance research planning activities to include Uganda Small Scale Industries Associ- the research needs of CSOs at the ation. However, funding should be forefront of advocacy work. This can subordinated to the project-based be achieved through coordinated boards suggested above. This will efforts that bring together research have the twin benefit of building institutes and CSOs leading advocacy accountability capacity within such work. organisations while at the same time boosting their financial capacity to The report is structured as follows: Section expand the reach of their member- two of the report defines civil society and ship. As a matter of fact, these organ- explores the tensions in the literature isations hold the potential to embark arising from the classification of civil on a financially self-sustaining path society as ‘old’ and ‘new’ civil society once their membership network produced by the shifts in global patterns 2. has expanded and once they have of civic organisation. Section three traces become entrenched in a set of values the origins of civil society and underlines and membership-focused civic activi- the drivers of civil society development ties. in Uganda; this section also discusses the Defining Civil Society: (iii) Supporting old and new CSOs origin of the problematic relationship to create regional coordina- that has existed (and continues to exist) A Global Perspective versus tion networks. This could start with between the Ugandan state and its civil Traditional Perspective profiling all existing CSOs by region, society. Section four lays out the analytical thereby leading to the construction framework against which to evaluate the of a database which could serve as performance of Uganda’s civil society a basis for building such networks. in relation to the realisation of inclusive These networks can then become development. Section five assesses the the platform for mobilising citizens performance of Uganda’s civil society to participate in civic activities within in promoting inclusive development. their respective regions. This section specifically contrasts the performance between old and new civil (iv) Identifying moderate voices within society. Section six concludes the report government. Moderate voices always by examining the binding constraints exist and can prove to be valuable on Uganda’s civil society to contribute when broaching difficult debates. to inclusive development and proposes Working closely with such moderate measures for lifting these binding voices can stimulate the government constraints in order to create a revitalised to begin to view CSOs as partners civil society poised to support inclusive rather than enemies of development. development in Uganda. 7 6 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 7 DEFINING CIVIL SOCIETY: A Global Perspective versus Traditional Perspective

between new or NGO-based CSOs that with governments and donors owing to Although the role of civil society in proceeds to assess the channels through mostly encompass international NGOs that their potential to advocate public service promoting inclusive development is well which civil society can drive inclusive work in conjunction with local partners, delivery as well as influence the design and acknowledged in both academia and policy development in the context of developing and traditional CSOs that involve grass- implementation of government projects.15 circles, what constitutes civil societies is still countries. It concludes by examining the roots organisations that are mostly small, contested. This section begins by exploring shifting patterns of civil society and the informal and community-driven. Second, In a broad sense, CSOs include: the tensions in the literature concerning challenges these pose to achieving their organisational factors related to their (i) NGOs, which have a well-defined the definitions of civil society. It then mandate. size, scope and degree of influence have operational structure and are regis- also contributed to the lack of a clear and tered as per a country’s law and 2.1 The global discourse on civil society unified definition.12 Third, these institutional regulations; differences are also driven by the type Civil society organisations (CSOs) as a their members or others, based on ethical, (ii) Faith-based associations such as of activities that CSOs engage in, with a development alternative emerged in the cultural, political, scientific, religious or religious leaders and churches; major distinction between CSOs that offer 1970s and 1980s following the failure of philanthropic considerations’. Relatedly, public services and those that deal with (iii) Trade unions and cooperative associa- state-led development approaches in the African Development Bank7 relies on advocacy.13 tions that represent workers; promoting inclusive development. The the definition of ‘a constellation of human main conjecture regarding CSOs rests and associational activities operating in the (iv) Social media, online forums and the Despite these differences, civil society press; on the premise that they can deliver public sphere outside the state’. The World is widely viewed as an organised innovative and people-driven approaches Economic Forum8 defines CSOs as ‘the structure that has the core objective of (v) Private sector and business associa- to public service delivery, advocacy and area outside the family, market and state’ enhancing collective action to improve tions as well as social entrepreneurs; empowerment.5 At the global level, CSOs and includes civil society actors who differ engagement with the government as a and have been an important voice in shaping in terms of their objectives, structure and means of influencing and driving inclusive (vi) Cultural, sports and leisure associa- bilateral relationships between and organisation, membership requirements development.14 At the global level, CSOs tions such as youth groups, football within governments by influencing the as well as geographical coverage9 while are increasingly establishing partnerships clubs, performing arts groups etc. selection and implementation of major VanDyck10 defines CSOs as‘an ecosystem policies. However, there is significant of organized and organic social and cultural variation and understanding of what relations existing in the space between the 2.3 Analysing trends in the civil society ecosystem CSOs are as they vary in size, structure, state, business, and family, which builds The role of civil society is rapidly changing, highlights the key trends shaping the civil level of organisation and formality. For on indigenous and external knowledge, as are its scope and mode of engagement society ecosystem at both the global and instance, the World Bank6 defines CSOs values, traditions, and principles to foster with different stakeholders such as citizens, local levels. as collaboration and the achievement of ‘non-governmental and not-for-profit governments and donors. This section organizations that have a presence in public specific goals by and among citizens and life, expressing the interests and values of other stakeholders.’ 2.3.1 The decline of global institutions

2.2 Institutional differences in the definition of CSO There seems to be a general consensus represent.16 While the civil society among civil society actors on the declining ecosystem was historically dominated The lack of a clear institutional definition several conceptual issues can shed light on role of CSOs in directly influencing state by international organisations, there is is largely due to several factors that are this tension. behaviour, and an emerging consensus a growing emphasis on the importance related to changes in the environment regarding the importance of inclusive of grass-roots organisations, especially in which such organisations operate.11 First, numerous academics and models of governance, grounded in more religious groups, due to their ethical Although there appear to be similar practitioners rely on different school of inclusive and participatory organisations principles, values and morals, which can be patterns across all different definitions, thought. For instance, there is a distinction that possess local contextual knowledge leveraged for enhancing collective action.17 5 See Banks and Hulme (2012). 9 See WEF (2013). and that support the constituents they 6 See World Bank (2013). 10 See VanDyck (2017). 7 SeeAfDB (1999). 11 ibid. 12 See Banks & Hume (2012). 14 Ibid. 16 See WEF (2013). 8 See WEF (2012). 13 See Cooper (2018). 15 See AfDB (2019). 17 See Cooper (2018). 8 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 9 2.3.2 Technological advances 2.3.4 Shifts in financing models

Developments in technology, especially platforms, in part owing to complexities The growing uncertainty regarding with the private sector. These changes in relation to online forums, is emerging in understanding the various types of funding opportunities is likely to affect in conditionality imply that CSOs have to as a critical tool shaping the way civil technologies as well as the associated the capacity of CSOs to attain their innovatively explore alternative sources society interacts with citizens. Emerging risks.19 objectives. In the wake of the 2008 global of finance in order to enhance their trends, such as social media and financial crisis, CSOs have continued to sustainability. At the same time, CSOs are expert blogs, now offer faster modes of While presenting a novel opportunity face a reduction in funding from donors, also witnessing an increase in new forms disseminating information and a non- for CSOs, online platforms can also due to austerity measures triggered by of financing models from philanthropists hierarchical mode of communication have a disruptive role due their power fiscal pressures, government debt and and social entrepreneurs, a feature that where CSOs can respond directly to to misinform, thus generating divisions economic crises in developed countries.23 provides an opportunity to maximise the citizens, regardless of their geographical rather than cohesion. Emerging evidence In addition, most donors have modified available resources at both the local and location.18 Unlike traditional forms of shows that social media and other online their financing models to include stringent global levels. engagement such as rallies or physical platforms have been associated with illegal requirements, such as forging partnerships assemblies, technological advances offer political campaigns, election interference an innovative platform where barriers to as well as radicalisation.20 As such, these 2.4 The role of civil society in driving inclusive development entry for new civic organisations are low platforms can act as tools to disseminate and an environment where CSOs are able false information, given the difficulty for Bebbington (2004) has argued that Civil society organisations are also viewed to capture and simultaneously engage a citizens to verify the authenticity of online CSOs play a key role in promoting as service providers. In most countries, wide audience, and thus be able to identify information. If such distortions have a inclusive social, economic and political CSOs are involved in the provision of a information that is crucial in influencing negative impact on the credibility of development by acting as alternatives variety of public services such as health government behaviour. That said, most CSOs, such forums can pose a threat to to a state apparatus.CSOs are often and education services, or more targeted CSOs have been slow in transitioning their enhancing democratic participation.21 seen as advocates of the poor through efforts towards emergency response, operations towards technology-intensive their participatory and citizen-driven conflict management and advocating the approach that has the potential to deliver rights of marginalised groups in society. 2.3.3 Shifts in demographics bottom-up approaches to development.24 Not only do CSOs complement the state in The prominence of civil society is to a service provision, they are posited to have a Across most developing countries, there is the state.22 For instance, the International large extent grounded in their ability to comparative advantage due to their ability a significant shift in the demographics that Civil Society Centre (2015) forecasts enhance collective action. The literature to innovate through experimentation, CSOs will be required to take into account that web-based activities are likely to be on democratic governance argues and flexibility to adopt new approaches, as they forge strategies that can effectively the dominant mode of engagement for that CSOs promote collective action by programmes and modes of engaging enable them to attain their objectives. The the youth in developing countries, an increasing opportunities for interaction, with the state and citizens, as well as their demographic distribution is increasingly aspect that will also shape donor policies networking and consensus-building among ability to promote the sustainability of becoming skewed towards the youth, which regarding the support of traditional CSO citizens.25 The resulting social capital plays projects by boosting citizen participation.26 will have significant implication for the activities such as physical mobilisation of an important role in forming networks The close proximity between CSOs and social, economic and political needs of this individuals and funding digital technologies between different ethnic and social groups. the constituents they represent is thus cohort as well as the means through which for civil engagement. Such networks are perceived as channels important in providing the freedom to young people are likely to engage with that enhance the flow of information, thus discuss, select and implement projects promoting dialogue and the representation that are aligned with local needs, leading of citizens’ interests. As such, CSOs emerge to a bottom-up approach to development as crucial mediation structures to address that is anchored in effective participatory collective action problems that hinder mechanisms. political participation. 18 See WEF (2013). 21 See Williams (2018). 19 See Williams (2018). 22 See WEF (2013). 23 Ibid. 25 See Putnam (1993). 20 See Zannettou et al. (2019). 24 See Bebbington (2004). 26 See Banks and Hulme (2012).

10 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 11 Another important role of civil society is of relationships between CSOs and most Second, in the quest to promote rights advocacy or peacefully oppose the their emphasis on improving the political governments. In most instances, CSOs inclusive development, CSOs also face state without the very real risk of attack, environment.27 Civil society organisations have been viewed as competitors and as government restrictions in terms of legal imprisonment or death’.36 have been viewed as organisations that acting in opposition to the government representation. Across most authoritarian enhance the interests of marginalised which, at times, limits their ability to regimes, CSOs often face the threat of Third, CSOs face challenges in establishing groups in the political arena. However, a influence government policies. deregistration, while civil society workers their legitimacy vis-à-vis citizens and key contentious issue is the complexity are often tortured, arrested or placed donors. Some governments have under continuous surveillance.33 For established ‘government-organised NGOs’ 2.5 Global shifting patterns of civil society and the challenges instance, data from the International that have the mandate to imitate authentic they pose to the realisation of inclusive development Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) CSOs and crowd out the real CSOs’ suggests that more than 60 laws and voices by engaging in malpractices that This section examines the challenges that factors that can be addressed through regulations were implemented by delegitimise the latter.37 CSOs face in realising tangible change in targeted policies. governments in 2015 to restrict the civic society, with a special focus on structural space for CSOs.34 In Uganda, the Minister Fourth, CSOs face challenges in terms of Internal Affairs recently announced of government restriction on accessing 2.5.1 Demonstrating impact the planned deregistration of over 10,000 foreign funding. Some foreign-funded NGOs on the allegation of conducting CSOs are labelled as threats to national An emerging problem faced by CSOs addition, evidence shows that CSOs’ impact ‘unscrupulous operations’.35 Crackdowns sovereignty through interference in is the increasing pressure by donors to is incremental and manifests itself in the on civil society actors and organisations domestic affairs by outside interests. CSOs demonstrate value for money through long term, which sharply contradicts with as well as the detention and arrest of also face funding restrictions through their impact on government policy.28 This donors’ expectations of short-term impact activists are also prevalent across the caps on the amounts they can receive. has proven to be a daunting task from as a condition for continued access to civil society ecosystem. For most African These restrictions are often imposed the perspective of civil society due to funding.29 countries, available data shows that CSOs through stringent reporting and disclosure the difficulties in measuring impact. In face a ‘closed’ space where it is ‘next to requirements.38 impossible for activists to conduct human 2.5.2 Government restrictions 2.5.3 Accountability and independence In many countries, CSOs are facing CSOs face relates to stigmatisation by the different formal and informal strategies government, especially through tactics Good governance is critical for the regard to accomplishing its objective.40 employed by the government to restrict that undermine their credibility. Some effective functioning of an organisation. However, CSOs’ accountability frameworks their effectiveness.30 These restrictions are governments use state-owned media to As such, for CSOs to maintain credibility, are unclear. On the one hand, these not only aided by laws that are enforced sponsor campaigns that label CSOs as they must operate in a transparent, organisations should be accountable by various government agencies, but they undemocratic or representative of outside accountable and inclusive manner.39 From to their constituents, as this generates are also disguised in administrative and interests that contradict national values.31 a theoretical perspective, accountability incentives for CSOs to be effective in bureaucratic practices. These restrictions CSOs are also accused of being corrupt implies that CSOs must be answerable to holding the government accountable and are more pronounced for CSOs that and working for foreign entities as spies. some recognised entity, and the literature promoting inclusive development. On the advocate the rights of marginalised These campaigns tend to weaken the differentiates between CSOs’ upward other hand, CSOs are required to comply communities and ethnic groups in the credibility of CSOs before citizens and accountability to donors, downward with donor funding requirements. This political sphere. In addition to these donors.32 accountability to the constituents they often skews the link of accountability as restrictions, a common challenge that represent, and internal accountability with CSOs answer to donors as a first priority

33 See World Movement for Democracy (2019). 37 See WEF (2013). 27 See White (1999). 29 See Cooper (2018). 31 See Popplewell (2018). 34 See ICNL (2016). 38 See World Movement for Democracy (2019). 28 See Vandyck (2017). 30 See WEF (2013). 32 Ibid. 35 See Niba (2019) . 39 See Banks & Hulme (2012). 36 See Kreinenkamp (2017). 40 See Ebrahim (2003).

12 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 13 Civil Society in Uganda owing to their over-reliance on foreign of accountability has been widened by the Broadening Understanding of Uganda’s Civil Society Ecosystem and Identifying Pathways for funding. For instance, several studies growing gap between CSOs and citizens, Effective Engagement with Civil Society in the Development Process document high dependence of CSOs whereby local constituents do not have on donor funding, estimating that donor a significant voice and influence in the support accounts for more than 80 per operational structure of such organisations. cent of CSOs’ incomes.41 As such, there is CSOs – often located in urban areas – a trade-off between top-down and bottom- have not engaged with their constituencies up accountability. This is compounded in a frequent and meaningful manner by the fact that these organisations are to forge sustainable connections. There supposed to be independent in order to is growing evidence that CSO are being avoid any outside interference and special established in response to the availability of interest.42 donor funding, that their agenda is shaped by such resources rather than the necessity Banks and Hulme (2012) suggest that some to address the needs of their constituents.43 CSOs are not responding to the needs of Even worse, some studies that examine the constituents they claim to represent but how CSOs spend their resources document are rather accountable to donors owing to evidence of significant wastage and 3. funding requirements. In addition, the lack corruption.44 2.5.4 Changing funding climate Problematising the nature Most CSOs are operating in an and working closely with authoritarian environment where financial resources governments to combat terrorism. of civil society in Uganda: are shrinking. Not only is this being driven by shifting donor priorities, but These issues have not only posed A critical analysis of the historical evolution of governments in developed countries are significant barriers to the operational the civil society space and ecosystem and facing tighter fiscal space and budget activities of CSOs, but have also generated its performance on democratic governance cuts. Donors are increasingly imposing an atmosphere of resource competition, stringent requirements on CSOs for which has resulted in division rather than and inclusive development in Uganda funding, including the need to demonstrate cohesion.46 In addition, CSOs are often impact and diversification of funding incentivised to design their programmes sources. At the same time, calls to combat in line with donors’ interests and priorities, terrorism financing and capital flight have thus shifting away from local needs and prompted governments in both developed preferences. While there is a proliferation and developing countries to initiate strict of new donors in the civil society restrictive measures on CSOs’ financing.45 ecosystem, these new sources of funding In some countries, the focus on the ‘war have proven volatile and unpredictable. As against terrorism’ has led to a trade-off a result, CSOs are increasingly concerned between restricting the scope of CSOs about their sustainability as the resulting in their quest to scrutinise the state as reduction and uncertainty of funding pose a means of enhancing public security a significant barrier to their operational capacities.47

41 See Tyedt (2006). 44 Ibid. 46 See WEF (2013). 42 See Banks and Hulme (2012). 45 See Rutzen (2015). 47 See CIVICUS (2018). 43 Ibid. 15 14 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 15 PROBLEMATISING THE NATURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA: A critical analysis of the historical evolution of the civil society space and ecosystem and its performance on democratic the Transport and General Workers Union untouched in these favourable conditions governance and inclusive development in Uganda was registered. The motivation was to form as urban and plantation labour was in a comprehensive union for all workers in short supply. Even large-scale migration 3.1 The changing nature of civil society in Uganda Uganda. Once again, the core members from Rwanda-Urundi, the western areas from pre-independence to the present day were Kampala taxi drivers, although and later from Kenya did little to ease the recruitment was also successful among shortage. The employers were forced to Civil society organisations of varied forms development. In this section, we analyse transport workers in Busoga. At the same compete for the scarce commodities by have been pivotal to Uganda’s development the historical evolution of the civil society time, Musaazi also founded the Uganda offering reasonable pay and conditions. trajectory, particularly as far as institutional ecosystem in Uganda dating from the pre- African Farmers’ Union with the aim of Only the sugar plantations, using the reforms are concerned. In some cases, independence period, through to the ‘reign opposing the Protectorate’s marketing system of direct recruitment from western the political environment has been of terror’ during the 1970s as well as the boards and monopoly over cotton and and northern border areas, could dictate instrumental in creating the preconditions period before and after the civil war in the coffee.52 Scott (1966) suggests that both harsh terms. Significantly, it was only for their rise (especially the old forms of 1980s and 1990s that marked the beginning organisations were purely political in aim on these plantations that serious strikes CSOs such as trade unions and FBOs). of structural adjustment, the rise of the and involved themselves in further political occurred as workers sought to improve NGO sector and the fundamental shift in In other cases, the shift in development disturbances in 1949. Once again, unions their relatively poor working conditions.55 thinking and the accompanying shift the optics of civil society as a movement in were banned and the leaders exiled. Uganda. in donor financing have dictated their The bulk of the workforce, in their short interest in specific areas of governance and In the meantime, there was little interest spells away from agriculture, seemed to in the formation of trade unions outside have found the conditions reasonably 3.1.1 The beginnings of civil society in Uganda the realm of party politics. This was satisfactory. As a result, they had very mainly because the concept of unionism, little interest in official attempts to sponsor The historical formation of any civil society However, later activities suggest that, in which had been imported from Europe, union organisations or the rabble-rousing in Uganda is traceable to the colonial fact, the union did exactly what a trade was synonymous with industrialising activities of politicians. An official report in period, mainly through the work of trade union is expected to do: represent its economies with clear class interests, and 1951 summed up the situation: unions, youth organisations, women’s members. For example, in 1945, the union therefore unions were seen as vehicles organisations and ethnic associations. organised numerous strikes and riots over for counterbalancing the excesses of Under local conditions in which Although the British colonial government wages, although the colonial government one class over another. Introducing ties of family and locality are still had a colonial policy encouraging the generally argued that the strikes and riots the concept in many colonial African dominant and where few of the development of viable trade unions, were more political than economic. In countries was bound to encounter serious African population have yet to interest in indigenous trade union growth the wake of the strikes, the union leaders difficulties. For instance, when the British seek paid employment in order to did not start until after the Second World like Kivu and Musaazi were deported to Protectorate government was aggressively live, it is not expected that much War.49 The first trade union, the Uganda Karamoja and the union wound up its encouraging the formation of unions, most interest will be shown in trade African Motor Drivers’ Association, was activities.51 farms produced enough food for family unionism, economic prosperity plus formed in 1938 by James Kivu and Ignatius subsistence with a surplus for cash sale. an unsatisfied demand for labour, Musaazi, who both later became prominent However, the causes of the 1945 strikes From 1938 onwards, cotton and coffee which means that a man has a full politicians in Uganda and Buganda.50 Many had not been addressed. Young Baganda cash crops fetched high prices owing choice of employment, continue suggest that this union rarely performed radicals still chafed at the policies of their to the wartime shortages and the post- to serve as an insurance against the functions of a true trade union in own rulers and the union was still the only war boom.54 There was little incentive to unrest. (Labour Department Report, terms of representing the interests of its vehicle for political expression. Musaazi was leave the traditional agricultural economy 1951, p.16 cited in Scott, 1966, p.11). constituent members, but instead that eventually released in 1946 and returned their activities were politically motivated. to the union to reorganize it. In April 1949,

48 See NGO Forum. (2015). 49 See Goodman (1976). 52 See Scott (1966). 50 See Orr (1966). 53 See Goodman (1976). 51 See News brief from Amalgamated Transport and General Workers’ Union Uganda, can be 54 See Scott (1966). accessed on their website here, https://www.africaefuture.org/atgwu/pagweb/82.html. 55 UP. (1942) in Scott (1966).

16 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 17 Throughout this early stage, the railway would be followed by annual inspections workers were the only group organised and the submission of financial returns. Table 1: Union growth in Uganda, 1955-1958 into genuine trade unions, free from party politics. With the extension of the railway, A number of existing organisations Year Workers Unionists Union a large number of Kenyan workers were protested against what appeared to be transferred to Uganda. They brought with onerous conditions for registration, and 1952 200,000 259 2 them the ideas of unionism already well against the degree of government control. 1955 224,782 783 13 developed among Kenyan railwaymen and The extent of this control was to prove minimal in practice for some time, but a branch of the Kenyan union was set up 1958 257,400 4,784 13 in 1946. Initially, this seemed to have been non-industrial unions were effectively a multi-racial organisation but the Labour discouraged. The first union registered Department records that a Railway Asian under the new ordinance was the Kampala Source: Scott (1966, p.18) Union was registered separately in 1948. Local Government Staff Association. The Africans continued to operate from This proudly proclaimed its multi-racial their headquarters in Nairobi. As late as character but was mainly composed of 1956, the Railway African Staff Union was Europeans and higher paid Asians. The Table 2 demonstrates the rapid growth smelters near Jinja; petroleum, central still considered to be the only effective union was regarded as upper class and in both the number of unions and union government workshops and college junior union in Uganda.56 colonialist by African civil servants who membership in the period between employees in Kampala; copper mines and looked on the only African member as an 1952 and 1961. As might be expected in a tea plantations in the western province; and It is hypothesised that the transition to the ‘Uncle Tom’ and a social climber. country in which communications were cement in Tororo. The public services also second stage of unionism development generally poor and literacy rates were low, accounteds for a large percentage of union After eight months of protesting against occurred between 1952 and 1955. It the earliest and strongest unions were membership but, with the exception of the the new legislation, the Busoga African was assisted by the liberal regime of Sir based on workers grouped in industries railway workers, the unions concerned Motor Drivers Union finally registered. Andrew Cohen, and then by a depression at a particular location. Apart from the were relatively passive. Craft unions never This union appears to have been the first in agricultural prices. A trade dispute Railway African Union, the most important made any progress whatsoever, and encouraged by Musaazi’s organising ordinance had been enacted earlier to unions in terms of activity and paid-up general unions dealing with a number of activities before the 1949 riots. Its members provide simple measures for conciliation membership were located in industrial minor employers were a relatively late were mainly middle-aged ex-servicemen and voluntary arbitration. The absence centres: electricity, sugar plantations, development. employed as lorry drivers by the cotton of unions or formal industrial relations textiles, tobacco, breweries and copper mechanisms meant that the trade ginneries, taxi-drivers and chauffeurs. dispute ordinance was not used much. A local labour officer who provided Cohen sponsored the 1952 Trades Union assistance to the union regarded its Ordinance. The primary purpose of the members as ‘moderates’, not at all upstart ordinance was to prevent unions from nationalists. For a number of years, it was being used for purely political purposes. ineffective largely because it could find An attempt was made to ensure that the no organisation of employers with which it organisations were backed by a specific could negotiate in general terms. body of industrial workers. Consequently, By 1958, over 13 trade unions representing provisions required all union members over 250,000 workers had registered except the Secretary to have been with the government Labour Department employees of the industry concerned for (see Table 1). However, the largest growth at least three years and that membership in union organisations was witnessed of more than one organisation was illegal. between 1958 and 1961 (see Table 2). Registration was to be compulsory and

56 See Scott (1966).

18 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 19 Table 2:Growth of trade unions in Uganda, 1952-1961 Union Number of Members 3.1.2 Independence, post-independence and early confrontation of the independence state and workers’ unions 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 Railway Union 97 91 97 98 60 60 60 114 114 103 The March 1960 founding of the Uganda as a potential source of opposition and as a Postal African 127 135 138 160 164 190 365 285 285 742 Peoples’ Congress (UPC), a progressive hindrance to economic development. The Kampala Local Gov’t 35 68 78 40 60 50 50 150 150 102 mass nationalist party under the leadership production- and nation-oriented viewpoint Busoga Drivers 350 135 135 410 * * * of Dr. Apollo Milton Obote, and the of the government was incompatible with emergence in Africa of the Cold-War the consumption- and group-oriented Clerical 150 43 82 49 110 110 162 labour struggle between the western- viewpoint of the trade union movement. Medical Assistants 157 68 290 291 201 201 148 dominated International Federation of In Uganda, this incompatibility was quickly Shoemakers 36 52 52 50 50 50 50 Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the communist- realised by Obote and the UPC. 59 Railway African 951 1500 3000 3000 4000 5000 5000 dominated World Federation of Trade Makerere Unions and its African Associate the All The government put increasing pressure 440 470 470 380 380 600 Employees African Trade Union Federation (AATUF), on the UTUC while supporting the FUTU. The Journalists 7 7 7 7 7 ** made it extremely difficult for the United FUTU was recognised as a spokesman of Printing 180 250 ** ** ** Trade Union Congress (UTUC) to continue the Uganda trade union movement by the Tobacco 42 470 460 460 1090 avoiding political issues.57 government and international agencies. Transport & General 226 271 1200 3200 2600 Within the FUTU, a reorganisation aimed In 1961, several trade unions in Jinja at centralising control and increasing Teachers Asian 227 227 ** ** formed the Uganda Federation of Labour the influence of the government was Textiles 400 500 500 2300 (UFL) as a rival central labour body to undertaken after a series of unauthorised Teachers Lango 100 110 3400 10200 the UTUC. The UFL received substantial strikes.60 The freedom of action still Lango Transport 38 250 785 assistance from the AATUF, but the greater possessed by the UTUC was severely limited Cooperatives 180 180 180 financial resources of the ICFTU and its in a series of legislative enactments. For Bugisu Local Gov’t 320 320 226 support of the UTUC prevented the spread example, in December 1963, the Uganda Lango Teachers 220 * * of UFL influence. In mid-1961, the UFL was Public Employees Union (UPEU), a UTUC reorganised as the Federation of Ugandan affiliate, lost its position as representative Bukedi Local Gov’t 1100 1100 318 Trade Unions (FUTU), with the help of the of higher-scale government workers. The Bank Employees 100 800 UPC and its youth wing. The assistance right of government workers to strike Building 500 382 of the UPC in the FUTU was based on its was revoked and the existing grievance Cement 82 987 opposition to the foreign influences in and workers’ committees were made Electricity 330 1020 the UTUC and its resentment of the UTUC subordinate to the respective ministers. Hotel & Domestic 600 7000 policy of avoiding political associations. As The Trade Disputes Act enacted in 1964 Plantations 2206 620 independence grew imminent in October limited all employees in their right to strike; Breweries 336 1962, tension between the UPC and its as a precondition to initiate a strike it was UTUC mounted. 58 made necessary to exhaust the dispute Busoga Local Gov’t 600 mechanism, and in fact to receive the Petroleum 2141 With the acquisition of power, the mass Minister of Labour’s approval of the strike Road Construction 35 party turned its attention to the practical action. The conflict between the FUTU and Ginnery & Mills 198 aspects of economic development. In its the UTUC was used as an excuse for greater Busoga Co-op new role as a nation-builder, the party government interference in trade union viewed the independent union movement organisation. 61 Total 259 664 683 1642 2529 4784 7370 10862 20965 39862 57 See Goodman (1969). 60 See Goodman (1969). Source: Scott (1966, p.22) Notes: *Amalgamation into another union; **Figures not available 58 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 59 See Orr (1966).

20 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 21 Through its actions, the government In 1966, official registration of the UTUC and 3.1.4 Troublesome 1980s and civil society eliminated the right to strike, supported the FUTU was revoked by the government, dual unionism, and suppressed any and the organisations were dissolved. A When President Museveni launched revolution. When President Museveni attempts within either the FUTU or the new national centre, the Uganda Labour a guerilla war to fight the Obote II took power, the RCs were integrated and UTUC to assert union independence of the Congress, was formed and a caretaker government, the National Resistance assimilated with the state apparatus in part governing bureaucracy – it emasculated committee of 12 was appointed by the Army (NRA), the political organisation/ for fear of their disruptive capacity. Once the union movement. The stage was set for government. The independent trade union army he helped to create and lead, again, we see a situation where political the coup de grâce, the actual absorption of movement in Uganda ceased to exist. A formed Resistance Councils (RCs), elites created and organised civil society the union movement into the government. movement that through most of its life held which resembled cells for mobilising groups and used them to advance political Obote declared that “many of us do not economic objectives paramount was made and sensitising citizens to the causes and goals but once these goals were achieved, understand what is meant by separation subordinate to the mass party and the ultimate objectives of the guerilla war. civil society groups were then perceived as between the government and your [the interests of economic development.63 However, RC leaders were also responsible ‘lurking enemies’ of the state that must be trade union] movement.” 62 for mobilising financial support for the dealt with.70

3.1.3 During the reign of terror (1971-1981) 3.1.5 Structural adjustment reforms and the old CSOs roll-back

When Idi Amin took over power, a ‘reign powerfully illuminated by the murder of Between 1990 and 1995, President apparent that the government lacked the of terror’64 descended upon the country the Archbishop of the Anglican Church of Museveni’s government, under pressure resources to continue channelling funds in ways that seriously impacted the civil Uganda, Janani Luwum.67 from the Bretton Woods institutions, towards financially distressed cooperative society movement, which at that stage introduced structural adjustment reforms unions and yet the fear of their destructive largely affected trade unions that were In 1980-81, Obote returned to power, that perhaps have had the most irrevocable capacity remained eminent.73 well advanced on a development path. but the election that preceded his re- impact on the development of civil society Economic production collapsed because ascendance to political power left the in Uganda.71 Historically, Uganda’s economy Consequently, the government decided of the regressive economic policies that country divided by ethnic cleavages.68 The has thrived on agricultural exports – mainly to liberalise the economy and allow were adopted and implemented by Amin’s civil society movement was not spared; coffee, cotton, tea and sugar. The colonial competition against cooperative unions government.65 Many farmers who were it was, in fact, drawn into the corrosive policy had encouraged the organisation of by opening the door of coffee trade to the largely active in the coffee sector either politics of the time. Because of their farmers into primary cooperative societies private sector. Many cooperative unions ran fled the country or gave up agricultural coverage, many trade unions were seen as that were coordinated and regulated bankrupt and collapsed. 74 production.66 Other leading elites that instruments for political mobilisation and through agricultural cooperative unions.72 had spearheaded work in the trade union the majority established connections with Prior to the structural reforms of the 1990s, A World Bank risk assessment of Uganda’s movement fled the country as they saw the political elites in power in order to gain these unions represented many farmers coffee value chains found that, following themselves as targets of a murderous direct access to the financial support they and thus formed the bulk of the civil liberalisation, many primary cooperative regime. Only one key leading relic of the desperately needed to get into the business society movement, which was routinely societies and their unions failed to cope civil society movement, the Church of of coffee trade. Indeed, many of the trade courted by the government for political with the ‘influx of competitors’ that entered Uganda, stood up against Idi Amin’s regime unions received financial support in the support. Indeed, previous governments the market. They eventually ran into and directly called out the President on form of credit that they often failed to pay had spent a lot of money propping up unmanageable debts and collapsed.75 By his murderous tendencies and gross back, thus worsening the country’s fiscal failing cooperative unions to keep them 2011, only 345 primary cooperatives existed violations of human rights. Ultimately, position. 69 in operation and stem any potential in the industry, many of which persisted they paid a price for this, which was recruitment by the opposition. In the largely in name instead of possessing early 1990s, agricultural prices collapsed. any functioning network of farmers. 62 Ibid. 65 See Walter, Kiranda & Mugisha (2017). With an economy struggling to recover Therefore, the collapse of agricultural 63 Ibid. 66 See Museveni & Khadiagala (1977). 64 In Michael. T. Kaufman’s 2003 New York Times 67 Ibid. from a destructive civil war, it became cooperative societies further shrank the article, he describes Amin’s regime as a “reign of 68 See Museveni (1997). terror”, see full article here: https://www.nytimes. 69 See Bates (2014). 70 See Museveni (1997). 73 Ibid. com/2003/08/17/world/idi-amin-murderous-and-erratic- 71 See Kuteesa et al. (2010). 74 See World Bank (2011). ruler-of-uganda-in-the-70-s-dies-in-exile.html. 72 See Scott (1966). 75 Ibid.

22 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 23 largest segment of the embryonic civil governance.78 often formed alliances with politicians, of the NGOs, especially in areas related society movement, leaving only a relic particularly during election periods. They to improving governance, which has of a few trade unions in the urban areas NGOs were preferred by donors also lobbied for numerous legislative raised questions around the governance that represented teachers and health because they were seen to be closer reforms and opposed certain laws that and internal accountability of NGOs.81 workers. In addition, during the same and more responsive to citizens’ needs were presumed undemocratic. Indeed, Several research publications, mostly period of economic restructuring and as well as swifter in the delivery of public the situation described is aptly captured by with an international focus and some reforms, growing suspicion of the size goods and services because they were the statistical growth of the NGO sector; with a local focus, have highlighted the of the state reached its climax, as the unencumbered by bureaucratic red tape. from just 200 registered NGOs in 1986, to challenges related to NGO accountability. World Bank 1997 Development Report on Subsequently, as donors’ developmental what the Ministry of Internal Affairs records Most crucially (and perhaps in part due ‘the state in the changing world’ stated. interests shifted so did the formation of suggest were 12,500 registered NGOs by to these publications but also due to The report forcefully argued for the roll- new NGOs and the programmatic focus 2013.80 the threat NGOs pose to state power), back of the state on the premise that of existing NGOs. For example, in 2004, the Government of Uganda passed the an ever-expanding state had been the the World Bank published another one In the subsequent years, there has been NGO Act in 2016 aimed at governing the source of the numerous state intervention of its serialised development reports growing frustration with the performance activities of NGOs. failures that had blighted many African entitled Making Services Work for the Poor, countries.76 A number of reforms, such which made a strong case for improving 3.2 Implications of shifting patterns in the development as the retrenchment of the civil service, governance from the bottom through approach to civil society composition and performance the merging of various ministries, and decentralisation and generally promoting the privatisation of formerly state-owned deepening democratic governance aimed The shifting patterns of the civil society 1980s’ civil war, many informal groups, enterprises, were implemented to trim the at strengthening rule-making processes movement in Uganda discussed above known as Resistance Councils (RCs), were size of the state. in many African countries.79 The report raise key lessons and implications formed and used to mobilise society to specifically emphasised that in order to about understanding of the civil society fight the Obote II regime. In the 1950s, a Whereas these reforms have been begin to realise the benefits of structural movement and ecosystem in general in the deliberate colonial policy was fashioned credited for restoring macroeconomic adjustment reforms, there was a need following ways. to facilitate the organisation of workers stability and improving fiscal prudence, to support the deepening of democratic and society generally into trade unions as this was achieved at the cost of significantly processes in developing countries. First, the civil society movement in a way to create a mechanism for limiting reducing the state’s capacity to provide Democratic processes were a necessary Uganda has been shaped by variegated political dissidence. These trade unions public goods and services to citizens.77 condition for anchoring the structural factors, ranging from the hostile political (as we now know them) later became a Poverty rates remained high and the dire adjustment reform process in order to environment and the desire to supplant crucial vehicle of economic production shortage of social services made a strong guarantee and sustain the ‘gains’ from the it, and government policy to shifting and political change. In the 1990s, however, case for the promotion of the ‘third sector’ Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs); patterns in paradigmatic thinking in the when development thinking shifted from (i.e. NGOs) to intervene to plug the gap and again, NGOs were turned to as the development approach. As illustrated direct state intervention to a minimalist in service delivery that the state had left best vehicle for achieving these goals. above, the early formations of the civil state approach (or neoliberal market- behind in the wake of these reforms. society movement in the 1940s were based approach), the NGO approach took Arguably, as much of the development Funding for the provision of public goods motivated by the desire to achieve political control of the civil society space and many aid went towards deepening democratic and services through the NGO sector independence. In the 1970s, during the of the previously established groups, such governance programmes, the enthusiastic became the ‘new game in town’. In the reign of Idi Amin, although vast sections of as trade unions, suffered because the entry of political activists, practitioners years that followed, a vast amount of the civil society movement retreated for new forces of reform changed the terrain, and policymakers in Uganda’s NGO development assistance went to NGOs in fear of authoritarianism, some sections, making it difficult for them to survive. sector working either as consultants or nearly all development areas, including particularly the Church, remained representatives of mushrooming NGOs, health, education, water and sanitation, instrumental in fighting the authoritarian based mainly in Kampala, was marked by environment, gender, research and tendencies of the regime. Similarly, in the interest in such programmes, too. NGOs

76 See World Bank (1997). 78 Ibid. 80 See Uganda NGO Forum. (2015). 77 See Kuteesa et. al. (2010). 79 See Devarajan & Reinikka (2003). 81 See Ebrahim (2010) & Ebrahim (2003).

24 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 25 Second, the ideation drive surrounding the the years, the NGO approach has tilted the Fourth, the shifting composition of the civil Therefore, these member-led organisations formation of civil society as well as agenda- pendulum of the civil society ecosystem society movement in Uganda following created socially rooted structures that setting have been largely dominated by from a bottom-up ideation approach to a the changing patterns of development increased and, indeed, encouraged ‘outsiders’ rather than ‘insiders’. With the top-down ideation approach, limiting the thinking and agenda has had a significant citizen participation and representation in exception of a few projects that have been broad-based participation of citizens in civic impact in terms of citizen participation the political and economic processes of led by Ugandan activists such as Ignatius activities with the potential to shape their and representation in shaping Uganda’s societal transformation. In contrast, the Musaazi and the Mabira movement, many destiny. institutional and governance trajectory. shift in development thinking and approach of the ideas shaping civil activism work In the 1950s and 1960s, development to a market-based economy in the 1990s have been shaped by outside thought Third, the civil society movement in Uganda thinking was dominated by a state brought with it structural reforms that leaders. This has serious implications for was used as a platform by many political intervention approach in organising society transformed how society and the economy imbuing citizens and civil society actors leaders to gain access to political office. and the economy, to drive economic were to be organised, with effects that with the necessary dispositions and value However, once in office, they have always transformation. Many policies that were extended to civil society construction in systems for shaping civic activism work very quickly become highly suspicious adopted and implemented during this Uganda. Service provision shifted from and ensuring its continuance even during of the organisational potency of the civil period encouraged the formation of trade unions, cooperative unions and FBOs politically challenging periods. society movement and often seek to absorb organisations which, in the words of Peter and became dominated by NGOs. it within the state apparatus and enact Evans, animated ‘an embedded economy’. When civil activism ideation is dominated laws that delegitimise it. For example, in As a result, the formation of trade unions In nearly all development sectors of by outside influence, civil society work the 1960s, President Obote used the trade as well as producer organisations, which the state, NGOs were seen as the new is often grafted upon partisan interests union movement to exert more pressure had started in the late 1940s and 50s, vehicle for the provision of public goods and, as a result, the direction and nature on the Protectorate government to grant gained momentum. In addition, FBOs, and services in partnership with the state. of civic activism shift with the shifting Uganda independence, which eventually particularly the Catholic and Anglican As donor financing increased, so did the interests of the strong players which, at catapulted him to political power. However, churches, expanded their roles in number of NGOs that were largely created times, might be parallel to national interests once in power, he passed laws that providing education and health services and led by elites with the exposure and around governance reform and political absorbed trade unions, particularly the to the population and created structures skills to connect and network with the accountability. This can confuse the overall cooperative societies, under the ambit of aimed at sustaining community efforts to expanding donor community. Increasingly goal and objectives of civil society work, statutory marketing boards, and those that ensure the provision of public goods and and over time, the civil society movement disgruntle dedicated actors and develop a challenged state policies were outlawed. services. In many schools, for example, that has come to dictate agenda-setting ‘sort of national wide cynicism’ about civil In the 1980s, President Yoweri Museveni, Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) for political and economic governance society work in general. Let us elaborate. In a former student organiser and leader, became the new norm with the objective in Uganda has been greatly shaped and the 1950s, the ideas that led to unionism in relied on the organisational work of the of creating an accountability structure for influenced by NGO leaders. These leaders Uganda were largely introduced to Uganda informal civic groups (the RCs) to mobilise maintaining effective service provision. are not nested in any form of membership by Kenyan railway workers and, as a result, large sections of Uganda’s population to These civil society structures, beyond base that they represent and thus limit the in 1955, Tom Mboya, a Kenyan trade union overthrow Obote’s second regime. Once mobilising citizens to actively participate participation and representation of citizens leader, was compelled to visit Uganda in power, his government absorbed the in critical processes for economic and in the governance discourse. and establish an amalgam group of trade RCs into the state intelligence gathering political transformation, also served as unions. In 1952, the colonial ordinance apparatus. Furthermore, his government ‘gatekeepers’ for thwarting any ideas that provided a legal basis for countrywide has increasingly grown distrustful of civil were contradictory to the development union formation and yet, in the 1990s, society, so much so that it has enacted laws, agenda established as necessary for similar legal instruments, encapsulated in such as the Public Management Order Act steering societal transformation. structural adjustment reforms, unleashed (POMA), aimed at weakening the capacity new forces that undermined the existence of civil society groups to organise and, of ‘socially rooted’ civil society groups in therefore, limiting their capacity to shape preference for the NGO approach. Over Uganda’s governance agenda.

26 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 27 Civil Society in Uganda Broadening Understanding of Uganda’s Civil Society Ecosystem and Identifying Pathways for Effective Engagement with Civil Society in the Development Process 4. Accounting for the nature and performance of civil society in realization of inclusive development: Analytical Framework and Practical Evaluation of the performance between traditional (old) and new civil society

29 28 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 29 ACCOUNTING FOR THE NATURE AND PERFORMANCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN REALIZATION OF INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT: Figure 1: Analytical framework for evaluating civil society performance Analytical Framework and Practical Evaluation of the performance between traditional (old) and new civil society

Dimensions of This section provides an analytical to identify the factors that have potential in CSO Performance framework to assess the performance influencing the extent to which civil society of CSOs with respect to attaining can attain its role in increasing citizen’s their objective of promoting inclusive participation and representation, political development. The framework is designed accountability and good governance.

4.1 A conceptual framework to evaluate the performance of civil society

The conceptual framework in this section dimensional approach. Using a large is adopted from the Civil Society Index body of theoretical, empirical and policy (CSI) – an analytical tool to assess the literature on CSOs, this section focuses Civic Level of External performance of CSOs by CIVICUS, as on five key dimensions of civil society. Engagement Organisation Environment Values Impact discussed and interpreted in Mati et These include: (1) civic engagement; (2) al. (2010) and Melena and Heinrich its structure; (3) its external environment; (2007). It consists of conceptualising the (4) its values; and (5) its impact. The performance of civil society as a function conceptual framework and its five central of its internal aspects (such as its laws, dimensions of assessment of CSO norms and bureaucratic structure) as well performance are constructed on the as external aspects, broadly defined as the premise laid out in section two, which breadth of citizen internal political respon- environment in which the CSO operates. sees CSOs as important building blocks for participation governance context transparency siveness This is the framework that underpins the coordinating the collective action required CSI. Given the difficulties inherent in to drive citizen participation and advocacy depth of basic citizen support freedoms gender influencing defining civil society, as highlighted in for institutional reform. This is the basis for participation infrastructure and rights balance public policy section two, any framework that aims to sustaining democratic accountability and account for the nature and performance inclusive development. holding diversity of civil society should adopt a multi- self- legal poverty the state & within the regulation environment eradication private sector civil society accountable

human, socio- decision- financial & economic making empowering technology context process citizens resources

socio- commu- cultural evironment nication context standards

international labour linkages regulation

Source: Author’s construction following Mati et al. (2010) ideas

30 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 31 The above Figure 1 is explained below. (iii) Self-regulation: This assesses the (v) Communication: This assesses the extent to which CSOs are able to extent to which different CSOs engage 4.1.1 Dimension 1: Civic engagement self-regulate by adhering to a code of with one anothor, share information conduct. and cooperate in order to address Civic engagement, also referred to as The CSI captures the civic engagement common issues. (iv) Human, financial and technolo- active citizenship, is an important factor dimension through three key indicators: gy resources: This assesses whether (vi) International linkages: This assesses in assessing the performance of civil (i) Breadth of citizen participation: This CSOs have the necessary human how local CSOs are linked to interna- society. Civic engagement refers to both assesses the proportion of citizens skills, financial and technological tional networks as well as the nature the formal and informal activities and who are involved in the activities of the resources and equipment to attain and quality of such linkages. participation by individuals to collectively CSOs, either as members, volunteers their objectives. advance their shared interests, and involves or financers. both socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.82 Socially-based (ii) Depth of citizen participation: This 4.1.3 Dimension 3: External environment engagement refers to activities which assesses the frequency of and extent Accounting for the nature and (ii) Basic freedoms and rights: This enhance social capital by facilitating to which citizens engage in civil society performance of civil society also includes involves examining the nature of rights exchanges within the public to advance activities. assessing the social, economic and political and freedoms that are preconditions general social objectives, and often involve (iii) Diversity within the civil society: This environment in which CSOs exist. Evidence for a thriving civil society such as the activities such as volunteering. On the assesses the extent to which civil shows that the presence or absence of availability of information and liberties other hand, politically-based engagement society reflects different aspects of the certain factors has both a direct and (freedom of speech, media, expres- refers to activities that aim to promote general population it represents, such indirect effect on the performance of civil sion and association). interests that have a political objective, as distributions in gender, ethnicity, society. For instance, several factors, such and often involve activities such as (iii) Legal environment: This assesses geographical representation and as the presence of social values and trust demonstrations and signing petitions. whether the legal framework and socio-economic background. As such, among members, play a catalytic role in institutions in which CSOs operate are it aims to examine the representation enhancing social capital, which is critical for supportive of their activities. of different social groups within the building collective action, while restrictions civil society arena. such as freedom of expression, association (iv) Socio-economic context: This aims to 4.1.2 Dimension 2: Level of organisation and the media and economic depression capture the level of social-econom- inhibit the growth of civil society. Some of ic status in a country and its effect on This dimension aims to examine the (i) Internal governance: This assesses the the elements of the external environment the civil societies. This includes several performance of civil society by assessing formal organisational and manage- include: aspects such as poverty and inequal- its organisational systems in terms of ment structure of CSOs, including the ity levels, literacy rates, civil wars and (i) Political context: This assesses the complexity and sophistication as well as selection and roles of individuals at conflicts. political context in which CSOs the frameworks that guide how different the managerial level. operate and establishes the level of (v) Socio-cultural context: This aims CSO interact with one another. As such, (ii) Support infrastructure: This assesses democratic principles such as citizens’ to capture the level of association it involves an analysis of civil society’s the support mechanisms that political rights, the rule of law, corrup- and cooperation within society by infrastructure to examine its financial underpin a thriving civil society, such tion and state effectiveness. assessing trust levels between CSOs stability as well as the capacity for as federations and umbrella bodies. and citizens as well as among citizens. collective action.83 It also assesses their effectiveness, as evidence, suggests that they can be 4.1.4 Dimension 4: Values The CSI captures the organisational used to restrain the activities of CSOs. development of civil society through six Providing a holistic perspective of the of the CSOs. This dimension focuses on the indicators: performance of civil society also involves principles and values that are practiced

82 See Mati et al. (2010). assessing the internal practices and values and advocated by civil society actors, and 83 Ibid 32 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 33 Civil Society in Uganda assesses the extent to which they are the CSOs promote gender equity in Broadening Understanding of Uganda’s Civil Society Ecosystem and Identifying Pathways for progressive and coherent with the ideals society. Effective Engagement with Civil Society in the Development Process of the civil society to enhance inclusive (iii) Poverty eradication: This assesses development. The CSI considers the whether the objectives of CSOs are following as some of the key aspects under pro-poor. values: (iv) Decision making process: This (i) Transparency: This aims to measure examines the process of making the level of financial transparency and decisions within a CSO. corruption across CSOs. (v) Environmental standards: This (ii) Gender balance: This assesses assesses whether the policies of CSOs whether the practices of CSOs are environmentally friendly. are gender-sensitive (for instance in relation to employment condi- (vi) Labour regulations: This examines tions) and whether the objectives of policies regarding equal opportunities and membership in labour unions. 4.1.5 Dimension 5: Impact 5. A final measure of the performance of (iii) Holding the state and private sector civil society is to examine its impact on accountable: This aims to examine society. This rests on the premise that CSOs the extent to which civil society holds Evaluation of civil society engage in enhancing collective action to government and private sector entities bring change in people’s lives. Some of accountable for their actions. contribution to inclusive the notable aspects that the CSI captures (iv) Empowering citizens: This aims to include: assess how CSOs are effective in development in Uganda: ensuring that citizens have more (i) Responsiveness: This assesses the choices and leverage to make their A comparative analysis between impact of civil society in addressing own decisions through the provision of the most challenging and important traditional and new civil society education on topics of public interest, concerns within a country. building social capital and the capacity (ii) Influencing public policy: This aims to for collective action. capture how successful civil society is in influencing the design and imple- mentation of public policies.

35 34 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 35 EVALUATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY CONTRIBUTION TO INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA: A comparative analysis between traditional and new civil society been running a programme that takes involving participation in riots and care of HIV/AIDS orphans and vulnerable demonstrations. For example, in 2012, women for over 20 years. In addition, it has following post-election inflation that was been involved in post-war reconstruction presumed to have resulted from the ruling In this section, we apply the above preoccupation of the World Bank good interventions in northern Uganda, where party’s misuse of public resources, several analytical framework and reflect on the governance agenda in developing it has implemented a skills development new CSOs88 came together and organised experiences of CSOs (both old and new) countries.85 They instead can take their programme aimed at equipping victims a demonstration campaign dubbed and assess their contribution to inclusive own form aligned with the specific of the war with skills to live a productive ‘Black Monday’.89 The Black Monday development in Uganda. As earlier contextual conditions existing in Uganda life. All these interventions have been movement went on for several months defined, our understanding of inclusive and still achieve the same objectives possible through the mobilisation of church and was used as a galvanising strategy for development is one that aligns with the that institutions in western societies have members to volunteer as well as extend citizen participation to demand political definitions laid out by North et al. (2013) delivered, that is, increasing opportunities, financial contributions to these activities.87 accountability and increased efforts by the and Sen (2001) as a progressive and freedoms and rights enjoyed by all In addition, the AIDS Support Organisation government to fight corruption and theft sustained shift from political, economic citizens and promoting transparency and (TASO), founded in 1987, has been pivotal of public funds. Another related collective and social institutional arrangements accountability in the use of authority by to the extension of care and support to action by new CSOs that organised citizens that constrain opportunities, rights and those in power. In what follows, we assess persons affected with HIV. Many other to participate in political activities was freedoms of majority of citizens to those the performance of old and new CSOs new CSOs are involved in implementing witnessed in April 2007, when a group of that expand them.84 The form of these along the five dimensions described above: interventions ranging from maternal opposition leaders, environmentalists and institutions, however, need not converge civic engagement, level of organisation, and reproductive health to agricultural religious leaders organised demonstrations towards institutions prevalent in western external environment, values and impact. production, political governance and against the proposed government decision societies, which has been the obsessive others, services that aim to empower to give away part of Mabira Forest for and build the capabilities of citizens to the expansion of a sugarcane plantation 5.1 Dimension 1: Civic engagement participate in political, social and economic by the Mehta group of companies.90 The processes as well as deal with forms of challenge is that these demonstrations are Citizen engagement has been relatively the Rotary Club of Uganda, with over social exclusion and deprivation. What is normally organised and spearheaded by a high and diverse in both old and new 400 clubs spread across the country, has common to new CSOs, however, is that few groups of new CSOs that are politically CSOs, varying from participation in social been very consistent in mobilising certain they are not member-based organisations driven in their activities. Very often, they to political activities, although it appears to sections of the population to raise money or, in the words of Kiranda and Kitamirike can gain momentum in their initial stages be higher in old CSOs than in new CSOs. and volunteers to address community (2018), are largely ‘socially rootless’. They of formation and very quickly peter out In new CSOs, it has been more visible problems such as access to education rely heavily on external donor financial once government unleashes its repressive during organised demonstrations and and health by the socially deprived support to implement activities and very capacity to stop the demonstrations. In riots challenging unpopular government members of the community.86 In addition, rarely explore the possibilities of raising some cases, they have achieved some decisions such as the giveaway of Mabira FBOs have been traditionally involved in finances locally. measurable success91 but most times less Forest to sugarcane investors, exposing community service and undertake this so because of their inability to marshal and state corruption as illuminated by the Black through the mobilisation of members of Citizen participation in new CSOs has sustain citizen demonstrative effort due to Monday movement, or mobilising citizen the congregation for voluntary work and occasionally been witnessed with those their ‘socially rootless’ nature. participation in the electoral process as funds for the implementation of specific involved in political activities, sometimes seen through The Democratic Alliance community-based activities. In the era (TDA) campaign in the 2016 election. In of HIV/AIDS, both new and old CSOs 87 See Watoto Church 2015 Annual Report, accessible here, https://www.watotochurch.com/watoto/2015AnnualReport.pdf 88 These included Uganda National NGO Forum, Action Aid International, HURINET-U, Anti-Corruption many old CSOs, citizen civic engagement have been instrumental in taking care Coalition Uganda, DENIVA, Uganda Youth Network and Forum for Women in Democracy. has focused largely on social activities that of vulnerable children and widows. For 89 See newsletter published on NGO Forum, accessible here, https://www.ngoforum.or.ug/black-monday/ 90 See Monitor newspaper article by Sudir Byaruhanga published on February 12, 2018, accessible here, https:// promote community service. For example, instance, Watoto Church Ministries has www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/Mabira-disappearing-forest/688342-4301762-9vpi15/index.html 91 For example, in the wake of the ‘Save Mabira Forest’ demonstrations, the organisers were strategic in 84 See North et al. (2013). utilising a combination of on-street demonstrations and a clarion call to citizens to refuse purchasing 85 See Brett (2009). sugar sold by the sugar company to whom land was to be given. The impact of this demonstrative capacity 86 See Kiva (2019). eventually compelled the government to rescind its decision to give away Mabira Forest.

36 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 37 5.2 Dimension 2: Level of organisation but a few. However, in cases where the – human, financial, technological and board represents members incapable of otherwise – that both new and old CSOs We assess the performance of new and to hold the executive or cooperatives’ holding it to account, the board is more need to function effectively. Scholars old CSOs’ level of organisation in terms management secretariat accountable, inclined to kowtow to the CSOs’ managing such as Francis Fukuyama have suggested of internal governance, and existing which has led to the flight of constituent executives. This is the case with the Uganda that inadequate resources for building a supporting infrastructure like umbrella members particularly because, in the era Taxi Operators and Drivers’ Association vibrant civil society arise from a lacklustre bodies, self-regulation, communication of liberalised market-driven economy, (UTODA) 95 and Uganda Coffee Farmers’ state of the local economy that fails to and international linkages. The level of ‘exit’ options exist for farmers to trade Alliance (UCFA).96 produce a dynamic middle class.99 A organisation in nearly all CSOs (both old their commodities through alternative middle class, to Fukuyama, is a sine-qua- and new) has remained problematic with market channels provided by independent Umbrella bodies for most old CSOs non condition for an organisationally only a few exceptions. There are strong traders.93 Our analysis suggests that the exist and include, for example, UMSC competent and well-resourced civil society. tendencies towards the ‘strongman’ challenges that boards face in performing for the Muslim Community, UNATU, the Whereas we do not necessarily dispute syndrome where the functionality of the their oversight function in both old and Interreligious Council of Uganda (IRCU), Fukuyama’s argument, it offers very little organisation remains locked around the new CSOs stems from two possible UCFA and Uganda NGO Forum, to mention help for shaping civil society in resource- control of founders. Many old CSOs, such explanations. but a few. However, they are also bedevilled constrained environments. However, our as trade unions, cooperative societies, by the same accountability challenges that reading of Uganda’s political and economic and professional associations have First, most boards, particularly in new undermine the very organisations they history reveals that the 1960s and 70s was independent boards elected by members CSOs, are appointed by the founding represent. Representation and participation a period when existing civil society groups of the organisations that often serve for a members of the organisations, a practice of constituent member organisations were more impactful than today. And tenured period. The board members are often undertaken to comply with a legal in affairs of the governing councils and yet Uganda was then less economically mandated (on behalf of the members) to requirement. In this context, the founding boards of umbrella organisations are advanced than it is today. Therefore, we provide oversight and hold those involved members retain a lot of influence on board voluntary, making it difficult to develop argue that whereas resources (human, in the day-to-day management of the decisions. In some cases, the founding and implement institutional arrangements technological, financial) matter, the organisation accountable. Statutes exist members of the CSOs serve both as that coordinate internal regulation across dispositions or value systems that underpin that require such organisations to appoint managing executives as well as board CSOs involved in the same activities. For the functional objectives of civil society independent boards.92 In many old CSOs, members, thus failing to create a clear example, under IRCU, all leaders of key matter more. It is these that provide the some of the boards indeed perform accountability structure.94 FBOs have a permanent seat at the council, coordinating framework for the effective their oversight function and are fairly yet the council does not possess a registry use of all resources at the disposal of a independent, especially in traditional FBOs Second, the performance of the board of all organisations that members of the CSO, however insufficient they might be. such as the Catholic and Anglican Church in oversight functions also depends on council represent.97 In fact, such is the Let us elaborate. of Uganda. In other old CSOs, such as the the nature of the organisation and the challenge that certain members of the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC), members they represent. Whenever the council have recently lobbied and worked From the 1960s through to the 1980s, there have been accountability challenges board represents the interests of capable with the government Minister of Ethics nearly all schools had PTAs which served from the boards themselves, so that the and exposed members with the power and Integrity for a law that would ensure a as members of the board of each school. failure to resolve them ended up creating and ability to hold the board to account, uniform code of conduct and practices as Not many board members of these a split within the Muslim community in the board, in most cases, will prioritise the well as qualifications for those aspiring to schools were well exposed or schooled Uganda. interests of the members. This is commonly be leaders of FBOs.98 in the mores of governance and yet the case with professional associations such school performance and accountability in In many cooperative societies across the as the Uganda Law Society (ULS), Uganda There are other organisational challenges schools then were much better than they country, there have been challenges of National Teachers’ Association (UNATU) and that stem from inadequate resources are today. What explains the difference is accountability. The boards have failed Uganda Medical Associations, to mention 95 See Brett (2017). 96 Insights from interview with some of the members of Uganda Coffee Farmers’ Alliance. 97 Extracted from the observatory interaction with the Secretariat of the Council. 92 See 1991 Cooperatives Act; Non-Government Organisations Act 2016; Labour Unions Act, 2006. 98 See New Vision news article by Kitubi Martin published on December 6, 2018, accessible here, https://www. 93 See World Bank (2013). newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1490841/religious-clerics-obtain-formal-theological-training. 94 See excerpts from the Democratic Governance Facility (2015) evaluation of Uganda Youth Network Programmes Report. 99 See Fukuyama (2011). 38 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 39 that parents and teachers alike knew why in many CSOs today, both old and new, is permitted by the Uganda Police.104 This law of law in a campaign known as the Anti- these associations existed: to continuously the failure to perceive and subsequently is presumed to contravene the provisions POMA campaign.105 Despite POMA, there improve the learning of their children.100 clearly communicate to their members why of the Constitution related to fundamental are many other existing opportunities such Notably, teachers were inclined to offer they exist and what they seek to achieve. freedoms and civil liberties related to as building stronger association networks services effectively because they knew This has inhibited their ability to attract public assembly and association. In that, legally speaking, CSOs can leverage parents had the capacity to hold them to the necessary resources to facilitate their the wake of its enactment, many CSOs to influence inclusive development. account. The biggest resource shortage growth and performance. organised to challenge it in the courts

5.3 Dimension 3: External environment 5.3.2 Political context

In this section, we assess how the shifting cultural contexts in Uganda have affected The political context has gone through register those organisations that might legal, political, socio-economic, and social- the performance of old and new CSOs. shifts and turns with serious implications prove troublesome. These measures, for the performance of civil society. In the experts argue, have ensured that CSOs, 5.3.1 Legal context early days of the NRM regime, President especially the new CSOs, exercise caution Museveni sought to establish a broad- in choosing where to focus their advocacy The legal context in Uganda provides framework for CSOs to exist, although based coalition in a framework that and influencing activities, being careful not a mixed outlook for the operational some of them, particularly the NGO Act was known as a ‘no-party’ (movement) to antagonise the government. performance of CSOs. The 1995 2016, have been criticised as attempting system.106 This implied that after a half- Constitution of the Republic of Uganda to curtail the freedoms of certain types of decade-long civil war and economic In the 2001 elections, the government provides for and protects the freedoms CSOs, especially those of NGOs.102 The law decline, many social and economic groups came under strong pressure when a of expression, speech and assembly. now mandates all NGOs to be registered that existed (which were more allegiant faction of the ruling elite whose members Article 29 of the Constitution guarantees with the NGO Bureau, domiciled at the to the former regimes) would be stripped had exited the coalition attempted to protection of these rights, which include Department of Immigration, as well as of any opportunity to organise.107 Many unseat President Museveni.108 Some CSO freedom of the press, media practitioners, ensuring they declare all the donations have argued that the ‘no-party state’ that leaders allied with leading opposition CSOs and political parties.101 Additional they receive, both local and foreign. Many existed during this period had a damaging members and indulged in political activism laws have also been enacted to further civil society activists see this move as effect on old CSOs and seriously regressed aimed at achieving regime change, such guarantee and specify how these civil intended to curtail the ability of CSOs to all the dispositions and endowments as electoral campaigns for prominent liberties are supposed to be exercised. independently execute their function of necessary for building stronger CSOs. For opposition leaders. In the wake of these These include: holding government to account.103 example, Golooba-Mutebi and Bukenya events, CSOs, especially those involved (i) the 2006 Labour Union Act, which (2019) posit that NRM government- in political activities, were viewed as Further, in the wake of the intensification provides the right for employees enacted legislation, such as the 1989 real threats to regime survival. Faced of demonstrations and riots organised to organise and employers not to NGO Act, ensured that the potentially with the threat of losing power, the NRM by opposition parties jointly with some interfere with their associations. ‘troublesome’ civil society sector would government and the president in particular, CSOs, in 2013, the government proposed be kept in check. Using this legislation, the has been deploying a combination of (ii) the NGO Act, which was first enacted the Public Order Management Bill which government also required CSOs to renew electoral violence and disbursing ever- in 1989 and amended in 2006 and was passed into law in 2013 as the Public their registration annually, which ensured increasing sums of money to fund political 2016. Order Management Act (POMA). The that the government could spell out what activities, especially during electoral law forbids the convening of any public 109 These laws have provided the legal the CSOs could and could not do. Annual campaigns, to maintain public support. assembly or meeting that has not been registration allows the government to de- It has reduced electoral contests to 100 See Monitor news article by Godfrey Lugaaju published on May 16, 2017, , accessible here, https://www.monitor.co.ug/ 104 See New Vision news column by Fred Muwema published on May 4, 2019, accessible here, https:// News/Education/Parents-have-a-stake-in-decision-making-in-schools/688336-3926490-u1w5f3z/index.html. www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1499717/public-management-act-chaos 101 See article published by Denis Kwizera and Hillary Asasira on the Cepa website on June 30, 2018, accessible here, 105 See Anti-POMA Campaign newsletter published on February 18, 2019, accessible https://cepa.or.ug/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/300460141-ARTICLE-29-THREATENED-A-CRITICAL-DISSECTION-OF- here, https://solidarityuganda.org/the-anti-poma-campaign/ VARIOUS-LAWS-PASSED-THAT-UNDERMINE-FUNDAMENTAL-FREEDOMS-OF-SPEECH-EXPRESSION-ASSEMBLY.pdf 106 See Bukenya & Golooba-Mutebi (2019). 102 See NGO Forum (2018) Annual Report, accessible here, http://www.ngoforum.or.ug/wp-content/ 107 See Hickey, Bukenya, Izama & Kizito (2015). uploads/2019/04/2018-State-of-Civil-Society-Report-Executive-Summary-and-Info-graphics.pdf 108 See Kobusingye (2010). 103 Ibid. 109 See Golooba-Mutebi & Bukenya (2019).

40 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 41 competitive clientelism. For example, building projects. These practices have reforms imply that farmers who previously of functioning would-be trade unions. far from being won or lost on the basis of promoted divisions within civil society, produced collectively (which could have Therefore, the underlying structure of the competing visions of how to improve the making it difficult to construct an alliance resulted in the birth and sustenance economy has undermined the organic lot of the ordinary voter, the key decisive around the core functions of civil society of a socially and economically rooted process that would support the evolution consideration during elections has become such as promoting citizen participation, civil society) now produce as atomistic of ‘a socially rooted’ civil society. This money, with candidates who offer the representation and accountability. In individuals. In addition, the decline in left a vacuum to be filled and dominated largest amounts standing the best chance addition, the rise of competitive clientelism manufacturing has also forestalled the by the NGO sector that has arisen and of winning either in national or local has encouraged some CSO leaders to emergence of a robust trade union expanded thanks to the relentless flow of elections. 110 form organisations to attract the attention movement. As a matter of fact, professional development aid to the sector. of powerful agents in government in associations can be viewed as a relic Particularly, the introduction of multi-party order to negotiate their inclusion into the competition in 2005 further exacerbated clientelistic network. Many of these groups 5.3.4 Social-cultural context this situation and many CSOs, particularly sporadically mushroom just before or those with leaders that hold influence during the electoral period. For example, Prior to colonial rule, many communities However, inter-community interaction over the masses, have been co-opted in the 2016 general elections, the country in Uganda were organised around clan across ethnic lines often produced violent by the state to support regime survival. witnessed the rise of youth groups such associations, considered as ‘perfectly viable confrontations which limited any possibility For example, it has become common as the NRM-Poor Youth, whose leaders models of social order and integration’,116 of cross-ethnic cooperation. Indeed, practice for the president to preside over eventually ended up working for the through which community members the British took advantage of the lack of the installation of clergymen, where government. interacted with one another. Clan cooperation among the different kingdoms he often offers gifts and donations to associations were orderly, ascending in a and effortlessly introduced colonial hierarchical manner of ranked clan heads rule and policy in Uganda. The British 5.3.3 Socio-economic context that culminated in the king as the ‘head of colonial policy became characterised clan heads’. by preferential treatment for kingdoms/ Although Uganda’s economy has Political history suggests that dynamic communities that supported colonial rule expanded at an average annual rate of civil society results in the growth of the They are thus presumed to have formed and deprivation of regions that did not. This 6 per cent, this has led to little structural middle class and the expansion of the the most stable, cohesive and responsive resulted in much deeper social, economic transformation of the economy.111 middle class depends upon the growth of form of political and social order. In many and political impacts that bequeathed to Agriculture remains the leading employer the manufacturing sector.114 In any case, well-developed kingdoms of Uganda, such the country a negative legacy of ethnic of Uganda’s working population, with over the birth and, subsequently, production as Buganda and Bunyoro, this was the form division, skewed development, elite 70 per cent working in the agricultural of trade unionism which went on to shape of political and social order that existed polarisation, a narrow economic base, and sector.112 Over the past three decades, political reform in Western Europe is prior to colonial rule; and this is assumed a weak state apparatus.118 This has further the manufacturing sector has expanded traceable to the Industrial Revolution.115 to have been the origin of civil society.117 been exacerbated by post-colonial leaders; marginally and the expansion of the Viewed in this context, therefore, it can This social organisation around clan heads rather than reversing this negative legacy, services industry has stimulated and driven be argued that the economic policies that promoted intra-community inclusivity, they have, for the most part, aggravated the expansion of a large informal service have shaped Uganda’s economic structure social trust and cooperation. The clan it by inflaming further ethnic division and sector, domiciled mainly in Kampala.113 This have been inimical to civil society growth. heads formed a system of bottom-up and conflict, adopting an uncompromising is the phenomenon that has driven rural- Structural reforms that began in 1990s, top-down structures of political and social approach to issues of national importance, urban migration. Therefore, the current overall, have resulted in a progressive representation and accountability. In other marginalising or seeking to marginalise structure of the economy has attenuated decline in agricultural productivity and the words, clan heads indirectly checked the whole areas and ethnic groups and the contextual conditions necessary for the collapse of producer organisations and powers of the king and, in turn, members adopting disastrous economic policies, growth of a vibrant civil society. their unions. Liberalisation and privatisation of the community represented in a specific further weakening the already weak state clan checked the powers of the clan head. apparatus. The consequences of such 110 Ibid 113 Ibid. 111 IMF statistics. 114 See Fukuyama (2011). 116 See Karlstrom (1996). 112 See Ministry of Finance, Planning and 115 See Carothers & Barndt (1999). 117 See Karlstrom (1999). Economic Development (2014). 118 See Golooba-Mutebi (2008).

42 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 43 moves have been recurrent violence, not uncommon to find political and civil 5.3.6 Dimension 5: Impact economic decline and stagnation, and society leaders feuding and often playing perennial political instability.119 This has into the historic ethnic differences which, CSO impact is measured by their a reform agenda which is acceptable restricted opportunities for building social too often, have undermined the possibility contribution to influencing public policy to the government and has the skills trust across different groups, which is the of cooperation around issues of national decisions, legislative reforms that expand and technical expertise to develop well- bedrock of a functioning civil society. It is interest. citizens’ political, economic and social researched policy options.121 UMA has, in rights and opportunities for inclusive the past, successfully recommended policy 5.3.5 Dimension 4: Values development. Evidence suggests a marked changes or reductions in personal taxes, difference in terms of performance tariffs and import duties, the administration In her book How Institutions Think, Mary a strong role in shaping dispositions between old and new CSOs and within of value added tax (VAT) and the creation Douglas (1986) has highlighted the and value systems that encourage old CSOs. Although many traditional and of a tax tribunal. Barya (2000) has argued importance of values and dispositions transparency and accountability. There new CSOs have attempted to influence that a high degree of financial security in organisational development and are examples of NGOs in Uganda public policy, few have realised success in derived from membership subscriptions functionality. She defines dispositions as whose leadership has built a culture of influencing outcomes. and income-earning ventures has further ‘ideas and attitudes’ within organisations accountable leadership. A case in point strengthened the capacity for UMA’s from which a value system is constructed. is Watoto Church Ministries, despite Business associations have proved to be successful involvement in policy dialogue. This ultimately determines individual operating in an environment where the most influential in shaping public policy and collective interactions of members values of accountability and transparency on matters related to taxation, budget Other organisations such as the National within an organisation. Contextual and remain a challenge. Mass membership decisions and wage legislation relative to Organisations of Trade Unions (NOTU) environmental conditions can play a involvement in organisational agenda- mass-based organisations representing and the Uganda National Students’ crucial role in determining the nature of setting and ideological definition can play farmers, students and youth. In this regard, Association (UNSA) have not managed to dispositions and value systems that will a key role in introducing dispositions and the Uganda Manufacturers Association exert any influence on public policy, partly arise within organisations. As a result, value systems that promote accountability (UMA) has proved most impactful. It has because of financial and administrative insistence on issues of transparency and and transparency. Organisations that specialised departments responsible problems. NOTU, the Ugandan trade accountability within organisations and are not mass-member-based are likely for lobbying, advocacy and networking union federation, has sought to influence the compliance of leaders is driven by to be less accountable and transparent. and is driven by four key approaches government policy and legislation through the perceptions and attitudes members It is not surprising that many questions to influencing government policy. First, establishing tripartite organs constituted of the organisations hold about matters are now increasingly being asked about advocacy to change unfavourable by the government, union representatives of transparency and accountability. For transparency and accountability in policies or support those which it favours; in the national parliament and lobbying example, if the founder of an organisation Uganda’s NGO sector. second, consultations over government officials, but generally has not resorted to is believed to be above scrutiny proposals, especially in relation to tax and strike and demonstration action or extra- because they are the one who started In general, a corrosive environment budget; third, participation in government legal methods.122 NOTU has not had any the organisation, then a breakdown in that does not place strong emphasis on decision-making bodies, such as in the visible impact on government policy and accountability is highly likely. In addition, if accountability and transparency pervades annual budget conference; and fourth, plays only a marginal role in shaping and holding leaders accountable in a specific much of Uganda’s society today. This representation in government bodies promoting legislation affecting workers cultural context is presumed to be a stems from a historical cultural setting where UMA has a strategic interest, such by virtue of limited research and technical rebellious act of behaviour (as is often that exalts leadership whilst members as Uganda Revenue Authority (URA).120 skills, financial constraints and restricted suggested in FBOs), then the propensity within organisations have not yet, It has regular access to government access to information. While it has to build accountable organisations is conceptually, perceived the importance officials and makes recommendations on substantial membership among workers undermined. of such dispositions and value systems draft policy proposals such as the ‘Buy in formal workplaces, the fact that formal for organisational development. As a Uganda, Build Uganda’ business policy workers are only a small fraction of the However, sometimes organisations can result, building strong and internally well proposal as well as budget proposals. It is Ugandan population may also limit its defy a corrosive contextual environment governed organisations remains quite able to do so largely because it promotes influence.123 and its leaders and members can play challenging. 120 See Robinson & Friedman (2005). 122 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 123 See Barya (2001). 44 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 45 Civil Society in Uganda On the other hand, UNSA, a national for strengthening civil society’s role in Broadening Understanding of Uganda’s Civil Society Ecosystem and Identifying Pathways for student body, mainly focuses on issues advocacy and lobbying for change.125 Effective Engagement with Civil Society in the Development Process of concern to students in secondary and However, analytical evidence of Uganda’s tertiary institutions, such as representation NGO sector points to the contrary. For on school management boards or example, only five members of DENIVA, university councils, corruption and student a network of several hundred indigenous welfare. Similarly, Makerere University voluntary organisations, claim to be Staff Association (MUASA), Uganda Medical involved in advocacy and lobbying. This Workers’ Association and UNATU also suggests that NGOs in Uganda accord a low exclusively focus on issues concerning priority to these activities, which are mostly the workers they represent, with very little preoccupied with interventions in the areas attention to national policy advocacy. of poverty reduction and service provision. Although recent demonstrations by some DENIVA organises workshops to train NGOs associations, such as MUASA, UNATU and in advocacy and lobbying techniques, but the Uganda Medical Workers’ Association, engages in limited advocacy itself for fear have delivered some concessions from of being de-registered by the government. the government in terms of welfare Bazaara (2003) suggests that NGOs improvement for their members, generally express interest in lobbying and advocacy they have had a negligible impact on the not because they are deeply committed but development policy landscape in Uganda.124 because aid donors favour this approach. 6. DENIVA claims to represent the needs NGOs have been the most vocal and and concerns of the NGO sector to the visibly present section of civil society in government and meets officials regularly, the advocacy landscape and, as such, but has not registered any notable success Binding constraints on civil are widely presumed to play a key role in in influencing legislation or policy affecting influencing policy and legislation. They its members.126 society performance and have been the focal point of donor efforts proposed measures for lifting the constraints

124 See Bazaara (2003) in Robinson & Friedman (2005). 125 See Lister & Nyamugasira (2003) in Robinson & Friedman (2005). 126 See Robinson & Friedman (2005). 47 46 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 47 BINDING CONSTRAINTS ON CIVIL SOCIETY PERFORMANCE AND PROPOSED MEASURES FOR LIFTING THE CONSTRAINTS Members’ annual general assemblies leave their members to address some often turn into sessions of calling out of the administrative constraints they In this section, we perform a diagnostic well-governed and accountable to corrupt leadership instead of discuss- continue to grapple with. ing strategy, and occasionally end analysis of the binding constraints on civil guarantee members’ trust; and Though many new organisations without any conclusive decisions being society’s capacity to influence inclusive manage to attract some financing (iii) have the capacity to influence public 127 development in Uganda. As noted earlier, reached for further action. policy related to inclusive develop- that they rely on to hire staff, the in our understanding, civil society’s role in ment. As a result, many of these organisa- challenge is that most of the activities influencing inclusive development refers to tions pride themselves on having a they implement are project-based and all activities that determine and influence In view of the above laid out broad large membership in name, while in are thus time-bound. Their capacity improvement in political, economic and functions of civil society, we conduct a reality a majority have left the organ- to retain administrative staff is thus social institutions that guarantee and binding constraints analysis in relation to isation. Consequently, these organisa- inhibited by the nature of financing expand the rights and opportunities of 128 these main areas: (i) internal governance; tions are bereft of the opportunity to and the projects cycle they operate. citizens to live productive and prosperous (ii) citizen participation, mobilisation and lives. We believe that a civil society poised 127 During this research, some members of the research team had the opportunity of attending a members’ general assembly representation; and (iii) public policy for one of the producer cooperative in Mityana district where the event narrated above was witnessed firsthand. to execute and achieve this function is one influence. We believe this process is better 128 See Robinson & Friedman (2005). that: achieved by mapping out the composition (i) has a deep network of member-based of the civil society ecosystem in Uganda. organisations that can stimulate and Then, using selected cases, we shall Figure 2:Binding constraints on CSOs in Uganda sustain citizen mobilisation, participa- analyse the binding constraints related to tion and representation in civic work the above highlighted broad areas before or activities; identifying possible opportunities for lifting Constraints on the constraints in the last section of the (ii) has a network of member-based Constraints citizen mobilisation, Constraints on public organisations that are internally report. on internal participation and policy advocacy governance representation in and influence civic activities 6.1 Binding constraints on Uganda’s civil society

6.1.1 Binding constraints on internal governance Inability to conduct Administrative Personalisation of constraints, e.g. scientific research CSO, i.e. founder required for designing Internal governance of CSOs is essential because of limited budgets. Budget inability to attract and syndrome retain competent staff compelling advocacy for creating strong accountability constraints result from their inability plans and strategies structures, required for fostering to raise income from member- membership trust and strengthening ship subscriptions and voluntary Repressive state Informality cohesiveness within the organisation. donations from members. This, in turn, capacity Political of governing Analytical evidence, however, suggests stems from the weak accountability polarisation organs of CSOs that many CSOs in Uganda, both old and mechanisms that have undermined new, are constrained by a number of members’ trust and commitment to Poor coordination bottlenecks that inhibit their capacity to these organisations. This is particular- within CSO Financial constraints, networks build strong and accountable organisations. ly common with cooperative organ- e.g. reliance on one Weak coordination These include: isations such as Wamala Union and source of funding, within the CSO mostly donor aid network Cooperatives under UCFA. Although (i) Administrative constraints: Many Weak economic traditional organisations struggle to these organisations have existing base attract and retain well-qualified staff boards, many struggle to hold the executive or secretariats to account. Source: Authors’ conceptualisation

48 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 49 (ii) Informality of the governing organs: (iii) Financial constraint: Many of the quickly running out of steam once the the country, UPC went into ‘limbo’ Many CSOs have governing organs CSOs struggle to raise enough state unleashes a repressive force to put and has never been the same party that (in theory) should be building revenue to implement civic activi- down demonstrations. We identify four it was in terms of membership and and promoting a culture of account- ties. In old CSOs common sources of binding constraints on citizen mobilisation, representation across the country. able governance within the organ- revenue are membership subscrip- participation and representation and Similarly, when Dr. Kizza Besigye left isations. Nearly all organisations tion fees as well as commissions from these include: personalisation of the the Forum for Democratic Change’s have constituent boards to which the the provision of services to members, organisation agenda setting around a (FDC) party leadership, his successor, executives or secretariat is supposed especially by those CSOs involved founder; repressive state capacity; poor General Mugisha Muntu spent much to account. The challenge is that most in trade. With the exception of UMA, coordination within the CSOs network; and more time dealing with internal party of these boards are established to which has a large membership of a weak economic base. wrangles than defining the party’s fulfil a regulatory requirement and private companies operating in the strategy for moving the organisa- there is no real commitment from the manufacturing industry of Uganda, (i) Personalisation of the organisation tion forward. These wrangles reached board or the secretariat to promote many of the other old CSOs struggle agenda-setting around a founder – their peak in 2018, when a breakaway accountability within the organisation. to raise enough revenue.130 In part, this what we can call the ‘organisation faction emerged that exited the FDC In many new organisations, particu- stems from failure to properly account founder syndrome’: It has become under the leadership of General larly NGOs, the founders decide on for the collected revenue, which common for many CSOs in Uganda Mugisha Muntu to form a new organ- the constituent members of the board attenuates the membership base and to fail to emancipate themselves isation. and in this context, it becomes almost the commitment of members to make from the founder’s capture. Founders (ii) Repressive capacity of the state: impossible for the board members to future contributions. New CSOs rely of organisations are critical for The Ugandan state has historical- act independently. In old organisa- mostly on external donor financing, getting the organisations estab- ly been repressive of civil society. tions, whereas board members are and devote very little or no effort to lished, defining the ideology around During the colonial period, the British electable, the pecuniary benefits they raising funding domestically. Consid- which the members are organised, colonial government passed the receive for serving on the board often ering that most of the donor financing mobilising and inspiring members 1952 ordinance that aimed squarely paid out by the executive or secretar- shifts with changes in programmatic to remain involved in civic activities at curtailing the activities of civil iat imply that the boundary between focus, some new CSOs occasional- and galvanising members to build a society.135 Subsequent post-inde- the board and the executive becomes ly find themselves underfunded and value system that fosters cohesive- pendence governments inherited the completely blurred.129 have to scale back their operations. 131 ness within the membership. However, same state apparatus and maintained sometimes organisations have failed similar laws or modified them but still to emancipate themselves beyond the 6.1.2 Constraints on citizen mobilisation, participation and representation aimed at controlling the activities of founder’s lasting influence and, as a civil society.136 For example, the NRM result, have struggled to pursue their Citizen mobilisation is the basis for a Uganda, citizen mobilisation to participate government has enacted the 1989 long-term agenda. This has been the functioning civil society. A civil society in civic activities has historically been NGO Act, and amended it in 2006 biggest challenge with most political that can mobilise and sustain citizen erratic – easily excitable in the initial phase and 2019 with the intent to monitor parties in Uganda.134 The effects of participation in civic work is likely to realise stimulated by either the emergence of a the activities of the NGO sector that 132 founder’s organisation capture often significant gains in improving institutions charismatic leader or by a thematically has been visibly critical of president’s 133 becomes manifest when the founder that promote inclusive development. In attractive advocacy campaign but very long time in power. Specifically, the is no longer with the organisation. 127 During this research, some members of the research team had the opportunity of attending a members’ general assembly enactment of POMA emerged in the for one of the producer cooperative in Mityana district where the event narrated above was witnessed firsthand. For example, the Uganda Peoples’ 128 See Robinson & Friedman (2005). aftermath of the post-2011 election Congress (UPC) party was built around 129 Interview with members of one cooperative society that is part of the network of Uganda Coffee Farmers’ Alliance (UCFA). riots aimed at delegitimising all civil 130 See DENIVA (2006). the personality of Dr. Milton Obote; 131 See Robinson & Friedman (2005). society-organised public meetings if 132 In 2001, when Dr. Kizza Besigye, Uganda’s long-time opposition leader, launched his bid for the presidency, so when he was overthrown and fled directly challenging the incumbent President Museveni, many citizens excitedly participated in activities geared towards supporting Dr. Besigye’s candidacy. However, with time, they grew frustrated by his incessant riots, 134 See news column in the Observer newspaper by Sulaiman Kakaire published on October 17, 2018, particularly those organised during the post-2010 elections. Similarly, there is recent excitement about the accessible here, https://observer.ug/news/headlines/58928-after-muntu-who-is-loyal-to-fdc. arrival of Bobi Wine, the young and charismatic member of Parliament from Kyadongo East Constituency and 135 See Scott (1966). his prospective bid for the presidency in 2021 aimed at challenging President Museveni for political power. 136 See Golooba-Mutebi (2008). 133 Like the Save Mabira Forest campaign or the Black Monday campaign. 50 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 51 not granted permission by the police. (iv) Weak economic base: Uganda’s to conduct scientific research, political to be ‘anti-President’s stay in power’ The repressive force of the state has economic growth has not produced polarisation and weak coordination within are not likely to succeed in cabinet.142 been most visible during riots that structural transformation.138 The the CSO network. Political polarisation has crowded out very often turn violent, leading to economy remains deeply agrarian moderate voices within the govern- loss of lives and multiple injuries and with a miniscule manufacturing and (i) Inability to conduct scientific ment, subsequently gridlocking the arrests. This tends to heighten the services industry. The majority of the research:141 This is linked to budget process of public policy reform. transactional costs of delivering insti- citizens continue to live in rural areas, challenges that limit their capacity (iii) Weak coordination within the CSO tutional reform and yet the benefits limiting their involvement in civic work. to attract highly qualified research- network: Although many CSOs are are in most cases externalised. As a Although a multitude of communi- ers. Advocacy that is not backed by incapable of conducting high-qual- result, many citizens grow increas- ty-based organisations (CBOs) and strong analytical evidence results in ity scientific research, there are a ingly cautious about antagonising other voluntary economic organi- poorly drafted communication plans, number with well-qualified research- state actors, progressively limiting the sations, such as Village Savings and member mobilisation campaigns as ers within a number of research insti- participation of citizens in civic activi- Loans Associations (VSLAs), exist well as inability to compel moderate tutes in Uganda. Research institutes ties. in nearly every district in Uganda, voices within the opposition. Research, such as Advocates Coalition for Devel- regular meetings seldom happen, therefore, forms an inextricable part (iii) Weak coordination within the CSO opment and Environment (ACODE), and accountability issues that bedevil of developing strong advocacy plans network: Although there are many International Growth Centre (IGC) other CSOs are also replicated in and strategies. Consequently, many CSOs in Uganda, there is no nation- and the Economic Policy Research these organisations, forestalling their would-be policy engagements turn wide CSO coordination platform for Centre, to mention but a few, have capacity to retain members.139 Building into sessions of ‘spray-gun’ criticisms ensuring coordination of civic activ- proven their capacity to produce CSOs with deeper penetration in of government interventions, further ities of national importance. There high-quality publications that have the rural areas to involve rural citizens driving the would-be moderate voices are networks such as Uganda Youth potential to be pivotal to public policy has proved challenging. As a matter within from forming tacit or overt Network (UYONET),137 UCFA, NOTU and reform and advocacy. However, there of fact, recent theoretical evidence alliances with CSOs. others that represent specific groups is limited coordination with Uganda’s suggests that civil society vibrancy is such as the youth, coffee farmers and (ii) Political polarisation: This has been CSO ecosystem that would ensure consistent with a strong and emerging workers, but a nationwide coordination exaggerated by the ‘politics of ousting that collaborative frameworks are middle class.140 Therefore, the fact that platform does not exist. Poor coordi- President Museveni from power’. established to leverage the research the largest fraction of the economic nation inhibits effective planning of Recent research evidence suggests resources available within these actors in Uganda are excluded from civic activities of national importance, that any policy proposals spearhead- organisations to support the research the middle class implies that the which has resulted in minimum citizen ed or supported by any group of CSOs and public policy needs of various civil society network will continue to participation in civic activities. or CSO leaders that are presumed CSOs. struggle to increase citizen participa- tion in civic work. 6.2 Lifting the constraints on civil society capacity to 6.1.3 Constraints on public policy influence shape Uganda’s inclusive development agenda

Citizen mobilisation, participation and mentioned, although many CSOs exist in This report’s primary aim has been to other organisations, including NGOs. representation are more effective ifUganda, few have had any measurable broaden our understanding of civil society properly accompanied by well thought- impact on public policy change. We identify and subsequently examine its contribution The report also shows that the organic out evidence-based policy proposals three major constraints on public policy to inclusive development. A reality check developmental process of a deeply socially for alternative policy change. As earlier influence, and these include the inability on Uganda’s civil society has illustrated that, rooted civil society that began during far from being thought of as a purview of the period of deep state intervention in 137 Evaluation work, for example, a 2015 DGF UYONET evaluation report suggests that some of these networks have challenges related to a weak membership base, accountability issues and financial constraints and often the NGO sector, Uganda’s civil society is in the 1960s was abruptly halted by the shift struggle to ensure continuous member-organisation involvement in nationwide civic campaigns. fact broader than that, encompassing many to neoliberal economics in the 1990s.143 138 See Walter, Kiranda & Mugisha (2017). 139 Views from a focus group discussion conducted in Lwengo district. 141 See Robinson & Friedman (2005). 143 See Mkandawire & Soludo (2003) 140 See Fukuyama (2011). 142 See Mugisha (2019).

52 CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA 53 Therefore, the evolving organisational complicating their political and economic interconnected in a vicious circle. For increase. Further, advocacy and civic structures for embedding and entrenching governance, can work anymore.146 At example, to strengthen civil mobilisation, activities must be embedded within an civic values were cut short. The NGO sector the same time, the neoliberal era has participation and representation, internal organisation’s systems and weaned away eventually came to dominate the civil produced rising unemployment levels, governance must be strengthened. from the founder or strong leader’s society space, attempting to fill the vacuum poverty and income inequality, creating This should build trust and confidence capture. In the light of this, we suggest left behind by the deleterious effects of the conditions for social and political instability. in CSOs, thus attracting and retaining measures for addressing the above structural adjustment programme. This now threatens citizen cohesion and membership. But in order to strengthen constraints (though these are by no means trust, the building blocks of democratic internal governance, citizen mobilisation, exhaustive): The NGO sector was conceived as a governance.147 This presents an opportunity participation and representation must supplementary sector to the state and for a progressive debate and conversation was seen to complement the Ugandan around the best way to embed society and 6.2.1 Proposed measures for strengthening internal governance of CSOs state in providing social services that were the economy in the values and systems of a desperately needed by the citizens, as the developmental state. (i) Establishment of nstitute project-based serve until the end of the project life poverty report of the 1990s powerfully supervisory boards appointed by the but would ensure that a culture of illuminated.144 Therefore, by design, NGOs, Second, there is increasing frustration with donors to oversee programme design accountability is cultivated within the although largely portrayed as citizen- the unsustainable and continuous funding and budget expenditures related to NGO and other civic organisations responsive organisations, did not represent of NGO activities that have not produced civic activities. These boards would dealing with accountability challenges. the interests of citizens, since many do not any structural change in governance. have a grass-roots membership base. Their Corruption in government, and more 6.2.2 Proposed measures for strengthening citizen mobilisation, agenda is largely shaped by the donors recently in NGOs, abounds, economic participation and representation in civil society organisations to whom they occasionally account. The growth has stagnated or in some cases citizens to whom they provide services regressed, and there is growing apathy (i) Expansion of funding to member- on a financially self-sustaining path have limited opportunity for influencing within the citizenry about civic work. This ship-based civic activities to include once their membership network has their programmatic work or even providing shift in contextual conditions is a clarion traditional CSOs such as churches expanded and once they become feedback on service delivery.145 Essentially, call for rethinking a strategy for building and business associations such as entrenched in a set of values and the transition from membership-based an empowered, effective, less foreign aid- the Uganda Small Scale Industries membership-focused civic activities. organisations to NGO-led service delivery dependent and more membership-based Association. However, the funding (ii) Supporting old and new CSOs to has tacitly disenfranchised citizens from civil society. should be subordinated to the project- create regional coordination networks. actively participating in processes and based boards suggested above. This This could start with profiling all activities that shape their developmental However, leveraging these opportunities will have the twin benefit of building existing CSOs by region, thereby prospects. demands a pragmatic approach that targets accountability capacity within such constructing a database which could interventions as close as possible to the organisations while at the same time serve as a basis for building such However, there is now a rare opportunity binding constraints. The section above boosting their financial capacity to networks. These networks can then to recast our civic efforts towards an identified three main binding constraints expand the reach of their member- become the platform for mobilising agenda for supporting membership-based on civil society growth and performance ship. As a matter of fact, these organ- citizens to participate in civic activities organisations. This opportunity can be seen in relation to inclusive development. isations hold the potential to embark within their respective regions. in a number of ways. These are (i) internal governance of CSOs; (ii) inability to stimulate and sustain 6.2.3 Proposed measures for strengthening public policy influence First, there is now a softening of hegemonic citizen mobilisation, participation and tendencies in championing developmental representation; and (iii) lack of capacity (i) Identifying moderate voices within Working closely with such moderate ideas. No one believes that integrating old to influence public policy. We believe government. Moderate voices always voices can stimulate government to CSOs into the state apparatus, thereby that these constraints are somehow exist and can prove to be valuable see CSOs as partners rather than when broaching difficult debates. enemies of development. 144 See World Bank (1993). 146 See Rodrik (2007). 145 See Brett (2009). 147 See Stiglitz (2015).

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