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The Culture Wars & Political Polarization In THE CULTURE WARS & POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN PERSPECTIVE: WHY POLARIZATION AND ITS PERTURBATIONS ARE A PERSISTANT PUZZLE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE _______________________________________ A Dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of Missouri-Columbia _______________________________________________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy _____________________________________________________ by DONALD MICHAEL GOOCH Dr. John R. Petrocik, Dissertation Supervisor DECEMBER 2009 The undersigned, appointed by the dean of the Graduate School, have examined the [thesis or dissertation] entitled THE CULTURE WARS & POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN PERSPECTIVE: WHY POLARIZATION AND ITS PERTURBATIONS ARE A PERSISTANT PUZZLE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE presented by Donald Michael Gooch, a candidate for the degree of doctor of philosophy, and hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance. Professor John R. Petrocik Professor James Endersby Professor Marvin Overby Professor Jay Dow Professor Paul Speckman To my Mom & Dad Everything I am I owe to you. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would first like to thank my dissertation advisor, Professor Petrocik, for his tireless efforts on my behalf and the innumerable helpful suggestions and patient edits that have made this dissertation what it is today. I would like to thank Professor James Endersby for his service as co-chair of my dissertation committee. I would further like to extend my gratitude to the entire dissertation committee: Dr. Marvin Overby, Dr. Jay Dow, and Dr. Paul Speckman. This dissertation would have been impossible without them. I would also like to thank Mr. Ray Bacon and Ms. Marie Concannon for their above-and-beyond aid in navigating the Byzantine labyrinth that is SAS code and the variety of data sources I needed to access for this dissertation. Their patience and expertise was essential for completing this project. Finally, I would like to thank William Gooch and Sally Gooch who, in addition to serving in the roles of father and mother, doubled as editors, research assistants, and counselors in seeing me through to the end. I cannot express in words my appreciation for all of your efforts. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................... II LIST OF FIGURES....................................................................................................................... VIII LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... XI ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. VI CHAPTER 1: THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND THE CULTURE WARS ....... 1 Discovering the Culture War ................................................................................................. 5 Political Geography: A War of Red vs. Blue or a Nation of Olive Gardens? ........................... 10 Political Polarization:Trends in the Body Politic vs. Regional and Reference Group Trends .......................................................................................................................... 10 Polarized Elections & Nat. Issue Trends: Local Landslides vs the Continental Consensus 13 Godless Highbrow Bluebloods vs. Devout Country Rednecks: Income, Region & Issues ........................................................................................................................... 14 The Conventional Wisdom on Political Polarization ............................................................. 18 2: THE CULTURE WAR MYTHOLOGY: CRITICS OF THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ..................... 20 Nothing to See Here! Fiorina and the Culture War Myth .................................................... 20 Red vs. Blue? Polarization as an Electoral Phenomenon ..................................................... 23 Mass Polarization: Distribution Trends in the Electorate’s Attitudes & Valence vs. Policy .... 24 Dude, Where’s my Polarization? The DiMaggio Study on Political Polarization .................... 26 Wagging the Dog: Elites hold the Median Voter’s Leash and do all the Barking ................... 28 What’s the Matter with Thomas Frank? ............................................................................... 32 Blowback: Critics take on Fiorina’s Criticism of Polarization ............................................... 38 Skewering the Conventional Wisdom ................................................................................. 40 3: RIGHTS & WRONGS & CULTURE WARS: TOWARDS AN UNCONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON POLARIZATION ................................................................................................................... 41 Section I: A Pox on All Their Houses: What is Wrong with the Polarization Literature ........ 41 Purple Politics: Getting Beyond Red vs. Blue ................................................................ 41 The 50:50 Nation & Polarizing “Close” Elections: Being Right for the Wrong Reasons .. 44 Size [Density] Matters: Dispersion across a Distribution vs. Average Location ............. 46 Sorting v. Polarization: Squares v. Rectangles .............................................................. 47 Elites & Masses: The Paradox of Elite Polarization ....................................................... 49 iii Section II: Polarization as a Conceptual Problem: Formal & Empirical Foundations............ 52 Polarization Nuts & Bolts: Necessary and Sufficient Components ................................ 53 Political Polarization: From Consensus to Conflict ........................................................ 54 Political Polarization Requires Partisan Conflict ............................................................ 61 Section III: Measures of Political Polarization ...................................................................... 64 Dynamic and the Static: Polarization vs. Polarized ....................................................... 69 Measures of Political Polarization: An Empirical Assessment........................................ 69 4: EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF POLARIZATION .......................................................................... 76 Section1: Measures of Consensus, Conflict, Bimodality, and Dispersion ............................. 77 Method: Principles, Measures, & Expectations ........................................................... 77 Mean, Dispersion, and Bimodality Measures of Polarization ......................................... 81 Issue Dimension Measures for Party Likes and Dislikes & Mass Perceived National Problems ...................................................................................................................... 87 Section 2: Measures of Group Polarization......................................................................... 91 Models ......................................................................................................................... 92 Analysis & Measures .................................................................................................... 92 5: FROM CONSENSUS TO CONFLICT – GAY RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE WARS .......................... 96 The Growing Conflict over Gays and Gay Rights .................................................................. 96 Does Emerging Centrism on Gay Rights Prove the Culture War a Myth ................................ 98 Calm Seas – The Commanding Consensus, 1970 – 1988 ...................................................... 99 Sowing the Wind: An Emergent Social Conflict on Gay Rights, 1988 – 1991 ...................... 102 Reaping the Whirlwind: The Culture War on Gay Rights, 1991 – Present .......................... 103 Data Sources & Variables – Public Attitudes towards Gay Rights ........................................ 105 Data ........................................................................................................................... 105 Variables ................................................................................................................... 108 Analysis – Aggregate Polarization Trends in Public Opinion on Gay Rights ......................... 111 Conflict and Consensus Models on Specific Gay Rights Issues, 1971 – 2007 ....................... 113 Exploring the Path from Consensus to Conflict on Gay Rights ............................................ 119 A Comparative Analysis of Gay Rights Attitude Polarization on Select Measures ............... 123 Polarization Trends in Gay Rights Attitudes, GSS 1973 – 2006 ........................................... 126 Analysis – Partisan Polarization Trends in Public Opinion on Gay Rights ............................ 131 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 141 iv 6: MULTIDIMENSIONAL POLARIZED POLITICS: SOCIAL ISSUES, THE ECONOMY, & FOREIGN POLICY .............................................................................................................................. 143 Issue Polarization – ‘You can Have My Gun When You Pry It from My Cold, Dead Hands’ .. 143 Data ........................................................................................................................... 145 Variables ..................................................................................................................
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