AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF
Nargiza Osmonova for the degree of Master of Science in Water Resources Policy and
Management presented on June 12, 2020.
Title: Understanding the Sustainability of Cooperation in Sharing Transboundary Watercourses: A Case Study of the Chu and Talas River Basins
Abstract approved: ______
Jenniver Sehring Mary V. Santelmann
This research is conducted to identify factors that contribute to understanding the relations between states and increasing the cooperation between countries which share transboundary watercourses, and enable countries to continue, also in difficult periods, cooperation in mutually beneficial relationships in a sustainable manner. This is an important issue especially in the region of Central Asia, with abundant water resources and inability to agree to manage those water resources as a common good. However, considering the vulnerability of these resources and the different approaches of countries to the issue of effective and equitable use, cooperation between the newly independent countries has been challenging.
This research focused on two countries of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, who made progress in bilateral cooperation and have established the only bilateral joint water Commission in the region. The relevance of the topic is evidenced by the increasing growth in the number of publications in the fields of cooperation, hydro-politics, and integrated water resources management. This study was conducted with the aim of a more detailed consideration of one specific case using scientific findings to identify the stability of relations between states. By using the conceptual framework of Savenije and Zaag (2000), I focused on three major “pillars” for sustainable cooperation: (1) institutions, (2) politics and (3) technical cooperation. The first pillar conceptualizes the management of shared rivers in the Chu-Talas basin through institutions. The second pillar is focused on the understanding of politics; it provides an overview of the emergence of bilateral arrangements between riparian countries building on the historical past as well as considering the existing political situation. And the last pillar focuses on technical cooperation between countries that is conducted by water professionals who are directly related to water distribution and who make daily decisions regarding operation and maintenance problems. The findings presented here support the conclusion that in this particular basin context, the three pillars of sustainability vary in their importance for sustainability of cooperation – the political pillar is of critical importance, whereas institutions are not critical, but they are important for promoting technical cooperation.
©Copyright by Nargiza Osmonova June 12, 2020 All Rights Reserved Understanding the Sustainability of Cooperation in Sharing Transboundary Watercourses: Case of the Chu and Talas River Basin by Nargiza Osmonova
A THESIS
submitted to
Oregon State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
Presented June 12, 2020 Commencement June 2021 THIS THESIS HAS ALSO BEEN SUBMITTED TO
IHE-Delft, The Netherlands
and the
University for Peace, Costa Rica
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science (IHE-Delft) and Master of Arts (University for Peace)
in Water Cooperation and Diplomacy Master of Science thesis of Nargiza Osmonova presented on June 12, 2020
APPROVED:
______Co-Major Professor, representing Water Resources Policy and Management
Co - Major Professor, representing Water Resources Policy and Management
Director of the Water Resources Graduate Program
Dean of the Graduate School
I understand that my thesis will become part of the permanent collection of Oregon State University libraries. My signature below authorizes release of my thesis to any reader upon request.
Nargiza Osmonova, Author ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I want to express my profound gratitude to my main advisor and main inspiration, Dr. Jenniver Sehring from IHE-Delft Institute for Water Education, for all her time and patience, because it was really hard work with me. She believed in me and to teach to pursue my topic of interest. Thank you for your support, it was interesting to research the topic because following your comments I have learned a lot including small details. You have shared with me your knowledge in this area and helping me craft my thesis. I have had an absolute pleasure learning with you!
My special appreciation goes to Dr. Mary Santelmann from the Oregon State University, who was my co-advisor, and help me a lot. You taught me not to be afraid, not to give up and believe in yourself. I valued your every comment which helped me improve my thesis and I was able to go forward. Thank you so much! I am also grateful to my wonderful committee members. Dr. Aaron Wolf from Oregon State University, Dr. Juan Carlos Sainz-Borgo from University for Peace, and Dr. Devlin B. Montfort my Graduate Council Representative from Oregon State University. Thank you for your support and understanding of all my situation when I changed many times my plan. I would like to say a very warm thank you! I am very grateful to all individuals from the three Universities involved in the Water Cooperation and Diplomacy program. All my lovely professors Dr. Todd Jarvis (from OSU), Dr. Michael Campana (from OSU), Dr. Amr Abdalla (from UPEACE), Dr. Olivia Sylvester (from UPEACE), Dr. Zaki Shubber (from IHE), Dr. Frank Jaspers (from IHE), Dr. Susanne Schmeier (from IHE) and Dr. Lynette de Silva (from OSU). I am very grateful for everything you have done for me, I really have learned so much. Thank you for being patient and helping me improve my skills I would like also to say thank you to Fatima Taha (Program Assistant from OSU). Thanks for your selfless care for each of us! I would like to thank my marvelous friends who were always to me, and helped me at the beginning of my journey for choosing a topic - Bota Sharipova, Aminjon Abdulloev, and Nataliya Chemayeva! You are the best friends ever! Thank you to my best classmates! I would like to thank Steve Brown and all Rotarians. Thank you for this opportunity to be better. Lastly, I would like to thank my mother for your presence in my life! TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Chapter I. Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Background and justification ...... 1 1.2 Conceptual framework and Methodology ...... 3 1.3 Research question ...... 7 1.4 Reflexivity ...... 7 Chapter II. Case study ...... 9 2.1 Chu-Talas River Basin ...... 9 2.2. Water management before independence ...... 12 2.3 Physical and non-physical dimensions ...... 13 Chapter III. Institutions ...... 15 3.1 Legal mechanism: scope of agreement ...... 16 3.2 Inclusiveness of International aspects ...... 20 3.3 The role of the Joint water commission ...... 21 3.3.1 Secretariat and participation ...... 26 3.3.2 Financing ...... 29 3.4 Conclusion ...... 31 Chapter IV. Politics ...... 33 4.1 History of the relationship ...... 34 4.2 Independence in post-soviet era ...... 35 4.3 Political development of cooperation ...... 36 4.3.1 Cross-border integration ...... 38 4.3.2. Sectoral integration ...... 40 4.4 International collaboration ...... 42 4.4.1 Recognition of riparian interests...... 43 4.4.2 Joint activities ...... 44 4.4.3 Turning a crisis into an opportunity ...... 45 4.5 Conclusion ...... 46 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Chapter V. Technical cooperation ...... 49 5.1 The role of hydraulic infrastructure ...... 49 5.1.1 Operational issues: water distribution ...... 51 5.1.2 The operation and maintenance of infrastructure ...... 54 5.2 Joint projects ...... 56 5.3 Human resources development ...... 59 5.4 Data and information sharing mechanisms ...... 61 5.5 Conclusion ...... 63 Chapter VI. Discussion and Conclusions ...... 64 Bibliography ...... 69 Appendix ...... 75 LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. The conceptual framework developed by Savenije and Zaag (2000) ……………….15
2. The Chu-Talas Basin ……………………….……………...... 9
3. The Chu-Talas River Basin with border line …………………………………...…...10
4. Organizational structure of the Chu-Talas Commission ………………………...…..22
5. Kirov reservoir ………………………………………………………………...….....50
6. Orto-Tokoy reservoir ………………………………………………….………...…..51 LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Participation of Kazakhstan (KZ) and Kyrgyzstan (KG) in various international agreements on transboundary water resources ……………….5
2. List of transboundary water sharing agreements and related agreements for the Chu-Talas River Basin ……………………………………………………..11
3. Provisions on water allocation Chu and Talas rivers by 1983 ……………………..13
4. List of transboundary water sharing agreements and related agreements for the Chu-Talas River Basin ……………………………………………………...17
5. Organizational Structures Assessment of effectiveness ……………………………23
6. The list of participants of the 24th Meeting of the Chu-Talas Commission of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Kazakhstan …………….28
7. Attributes of agreements that reflect their alignment with key Helsinki Principles and the likelihood that they will be sustainable ………………..31
8. The significant executive bodies related to water management …………………….41 LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix Page
1. The AGREEMENT between the Government of the Kazakh Republic and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas …………………………………74
2. STATUTE of the Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas …………………………………………………………………………...76 DEDICATION To my dear parents, who always support me in pursuing my dreams. 1
Chapter I. Introduction 1.1 Background and justification
There are 310 internationals rivers in the world that cross political borders between two or more countries (McCracken & Wolf, 2019). These basins, in which about 40 percent of the world's population live, cover about half of the earth’s surface (Wolf, 2005). A wide range of problems are associated with the management of international water resources such as rivers or lakes. Although each riparian state has its own national management and plan, long-term results of realization cannot be derived without considering the complex system of integrated river basin management with participation of all riparian states (Giakoumis and Voulvoulis, 2018). An analysis of 1,831 international water-related events shows that two thirds of these events were of a cooperative nature (Postel, S., Sandra, L.; & Wolf, A., 2001). The results of this analysis suggest that despite national interests, states realize that they cannot resolve the complex problems of water management alone, and more often than not, cooperate and achieve mutually beneficial objectives. Also, Turton (2002) argued that water is likely to be a catalyst for cooperation, since the cost of war between states is essentially higher than that of negotiating sustainable cooperative compromises. Countries may, therefore, summarize benefits from cooperation, based on perceived engagement in cooperative solutions and different joint actions. According to Sadoff and Grey (2002) all this effort of cooperation aims to get different kinds of potential benefits. In other words, states work together, and when doing so it offers economic and political advantages. These benefits can include environmental benefits to the river (such as improved water quality); economic benefits from the river (such as increased food production); the reduction of costs because of the river (such as reduced geopolitical tensions); and benefits beyond the river (such as entrenching wider cooperation and economic integration). In this context, cooperation is considered as a positive act between parties that provides opportunities to increase benefits and work coherently in the future. Widely recognized international principles of sharing transboundary water resources can help to adapt to the norms of international law, because cooperation can foster the greater good for all the riparian states. Although states acknowledge the necessity of joint actions and may enter into an agreement, the agreement does not guarantee that parties will cooperate as in the planned manner, that the
2 cooperation is beneficial to all, and that commitments would be sustained through time (Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008). Therefore, it is important that parties’ work towards a cooperative manner is based on a compromise, and that cooperation is not only oriented to the benefit of a powerful country, which would may be perceived as injustice by others. Cooperation over shared water resources, by providing an example of theoretical points, can potentially be related to arguments of the behavior of parties. However, in order to serve, the process of cooperation between parties requires observations over time on their activities in implementation of agreements, to the point when all parties to cooperation continue to perceive the agreement as fair and beneficial (Kumar& Dissel, 1996). Especially, in the case of sustainable cooperation, conditions might develop that promote trust between parties and allow them to think about other perspectives of collaboration. Thus, “sustainable cooperation” in this context refers to situations that emerge when cooperation passes to a level of deeper engagement by establishing and maintaining a relationship, which yields increasing benefits that persist over time. When cooperation occurs, the complexity of space, changing political regimes, and time should be taken into consideration (Zeitoun & Mirumachi 2008). It is important to realize that all joint efforts require time for effective implementation and to see real results, and moreover, to assess them. Although once cooperation has started, it is supposed to develop further, reinforcing commitments and demonstrating benefits from coherent actions, it is not always a smoothly flowing process. Changes of political character inside the country, in the region and on a global scale, as well as due to natural phenomena are some of the factors which can influence the continuity of cooperation. Having said that, I argue that in contrast to prerequisites and initial steps of cooperation, sustainability of cooperation through time has been understudied among scholars of transboundary water management. Literature reviews have identified that there has been little research done on analysis of sustainability in the context of mechanisms of cooperation. For example, I used the Web of Science database and typed in four required keywords: international, transboundary, water, cooperation. I got the result of 928 academic papers in the period of 1965-2020. After that, I did a search with adding the word "sustainable" for the same period. As a result, I got 32 academic papers, and most of them related to development, water management and climate change context. In this research, I focus on strong and weak aspects of the activities between riparian parties in transboundary river basins in order to facilitate identification of sustainability of cooperation. 3
First, the research argues that the factors and threats to sustaining cooperation through time are different from those that occurred at the time when the decision to cooperate was made. I assert that the analysis of these elements would contribute to understanding and increasing the cooperation. As shown in practices of different transboundary basins, cooperation has its own prerequisites and can be started and developed for various reasons. Speaking about the environment, one of the triggers for starting cooperation can be the consideration of joint adaptation measures for addressing climate change, a sharp reduction in the amount of water resources or pollution of a common transboundary river. Also, economic factors are often seen as benefits that can be obtained through basin cooperation. Sadoff and Gray (2008) considered the benefits from the river as the growth of the economies of both countries. In this context, financing for maintaining infrastructure, and national contributions to cooperation, are studied. With respect to socio-political aspects, historical facts accompanying cooperation, cooperation on turning a crisis into an opportunity, for example, when natural, technological, environmental or man-made disasters have happened, countries improved international cooperation to deal with the consequences. In any case, there is no single accepted definition of transboundary water cooperation (Tarlock 2015; Saruchera and Lautze 2015), and measuring the scope of transboundary cooperation is complex, in terms of the type and level of collaboration (McCracken, 2019). Second, adaptability and resilience of cooperation to external and internal changes are important influences on sustainability of cooperation. This investigation helps to realize which elements of resilience should be considered from the beginning for effective and successful long- term cooperation. Third, the research investigates weaknesses inherent in initial cooperation mechanisms that can prevent building solid long-term relationships. The gaps identified in this analysis could be useful to inform future cooperation agreements.
1.2 Conceptual framework and Methodology
A number of conceptual models have been developed to analyze cooperation over transboundary water resources. Savenije and Zaag (2000) used a symbolized temple, Figure 1, to illustrate their conceptual framework for management of shared river basins with the Integrated
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Water Resources Management (IWRM) principles for comparing case studies in the European Union (EU) and the South African Development Community (SADC).
Figure 1 - The conceptual framework developed by Savenije and Zaag (2000)
In Figure 1, the roof of the temple is the sharing of international water resources. It is based on three core pillars – politics, technical cooperation and institutions. Technical cooperation is the central pillar as one fundamental basis of cooperation, and the two side pillars are the political environment and institutional responsibility. The authors argue that joint management would be sustained even if the two supportive pillars are not fully functioning, but without the central column (technical cooperation), the temple would fail (Savenije and Zaag, 2000). This temple is like a whole complex of transboundary water resources distribution and their management, and the roof that is hold by the three pillars demonstrates an integrated approach. The authors highlight that sharing international rivers should be done in an integrated water resources management manner, which is a foundation for efficient management and strengthening cooperation between states. However, riparian countries have their own views while framing laws and policies, including their own perceptions of interstate relationships. Institutions can be important in the creation of capacity to manage conflict, and can be functional without a formal river basin organization. Typically, according to Milic and Varadi (1999), river basin agreements illustrate a situational response in which the significant problems of each nation become central.
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However, sometimes even well-developed agreements can be inefficient and lead to weak cooperation (Wolf, 2003). And in the end, technical cooperation does not resolve all the issues in transboundary rivers without support from decision makers with diplomatic skills on a high level. The conceptual framework of Savenije and Zaag (2000) emphasizes that all three pillars are necessary to arrive at a balanced and equitable distribution of costs and benefits, but the technical pillar which they have located in the center is more important in terms of actions started in the field and addressing challenges on the ground. The analyses of interdependency allow to identify which pillar is the most independent, and thus, create enabling environment for the other pillars. Thus, the pillar which is independent from others is considered as crucial. Today, the issue of cooperation in water resources management is one of the important issues on the agenda of countries who share transboundary water resources. Many steps are being taken at the political level to develop agreements. For instance, basin councils and joint working groups are being created, new technologies are being introduced, and countries are actively joining the UN Watercourses Conventions (see Table 1).
Table 1. Participation of Kazakhstan (KZ) and Kyrgyzstan (KG) in various international agreements on transboundary water resources
Convention KZ KG
The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary + - Watercourses and International Lakes (Helsinki, 1992)
The Protocol on Water and Health (part of the UNECE Water + + Convention, London,1999)
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary + + Context (Espoo, 1991)
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of industrial Accidents + -
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[Helsinki, 1992]
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision- + + making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters [Aarhus, 1998]
The Convention on Wetlands of international importance, especially as + + Waterfowl Habitat [Ramsar, 1971]
The UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries + + Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa [1994]
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [1992] + +
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on + + Climate Change [1997]
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International _ _ Watercourses [New York, 1997]
However, there is still debate about the best pathways towards cooperation. In order to try to find an answer to this question, this work uses an application of theoretical knowledge in determining the effective levers of sustainable cooperation. Specifically, this work uses the Chu- Talas Interstate Water Commission established between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as an example of existing long-term cooperation currently operating on a bilateral level. The purpose for selecting a qualitative case study method for this research is to ensure that the context of understanding the water negotiation process will not be viewed through one lens. Rather, the topic was evaluated using a variety of different sources of literature in order to allow a deeper exploration of that topic. This method helps to describe a case and explore transboundary water
7 cooperation in the Chu-Talas river basin through consideration of the variety of factors with the help of the conceptual framework (Savenije and Zaag, 2000) The empirical basis of the research will be composed of historical data for analyzing the process up to the present, including official political documents and statements. In addition, analyses of provisions on existing limits on water sharing, protocols of joint Chu-Talas Commission, international reports, and review of pertinent newspaper articles were also instrumental for conducting the primary research. Data derived from internet sources, such as the official webpages of Governments of both countries, official webpages of International organizations, as well as internal communications on interstate level, internal documents for internal purposes, and scientific articles were used to supplement the primary research. It must be recognized that some of these documents are difficult to access and they have some level of sensitivity. Some documents can be accessed in Russian and Kyrgyz languages only.
1.3 Research question
The main objective of the research is to analyze the sustainable arrangements for water cooperation between the subject countries. In this study, sustainable cooperation focuses on cooperation persisting over time; consequently, the main research question is: Which factors contribute to sustainable long-term cooperation in sharing transboundary watercourses?
To answer the question, the following sub-questions are posed:
1. How does the initial cooperation between countries transform into sustainable cooperation?
2. Which elements of cooperation are the most important for sustaining cooperation through time?
1.4 Reflexivity
My experience in the water sector of Kyrgyzstan and good relations with colleagues from other countries inspired this research the writing of this work. The choice of the Chu-Talas basin was based on the fact that I took a direct part in the work of the Commission. As an example of close cooperation in the region, this case provided an opportunity to apply theories and investigate current theories concerning sustainability of cooperation.
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For me, the choice of cooperation is significant. I started my professional career in the State water resources agency under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic more than 7 years ago. I observed both internal and external practical actions taken by the parties at the national and interstate levels in the distribution of water resources. Unfortunately, these steps did not strengthen the relationships between countries, but rather accumulated claims and grievances between the parties. The current situation in Central Asia specifically requires a reconsideration of the existing discourse on water governance. Obviously, there is no universal solution to the problems that arise in the water field, but I was always interested to know which approaches are more effective and which mistakes should be avoided when managing water resources at the interstate level. This study, which was the result of my master's program in water cooperation and diplomacy, helped me to step back and consider the existing situation from a theoretical point of view, and to understand the importance of negotiation processes, the concept of sharing benefits, and the cost of losses arising from inaction. I believe that this study will help improve our understanding of the positive and negative effects of various factors on the formation of interstate relations in the sharing of water resources. I am deeply convinced in the need for such studies. Since I represent Kyrgyzstan, a country rich in water resources allocated in a flow formation zone in Central Asia, I understand that well- informed decisions and related actions adopted now can contribute to a positive shift towards cooperation in the future, and conservation of water resources should be a common concern. Having more practical experience in understanding the Kyrgyz position in transboundary water management I wanted to also develop a deeper understanding of the motives for acting in a cooperative manner on both sides, with the goal of improving performance of cooperative agreements overall. I am being a representative of Kyrgyzstan that might lead to bias, and for me actually more understandable of the Kyrgyz position than for the Kazakh position. Therefore having data from the Kyrgyz part I can write more about its position and needs than for the Kazakh side.
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Chapter II. Case study
2.1 Chu-Talas River Basin The transboundary Chu-Talas river basin has two major rivers: the Chu and Talas, with a variety of water network forms: constant watercourses, minor rivers, dry riverbeds of alluvial plains and artificial constructions, distributed between two independent states: Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 – The Chu-Talas basin (adapted from UN, 2011)
The main river basin is the Chu with a total area of 62,500 km2 including 26,600 km2 (42.5 percent) in Kyrgyzstan and 35,900 km2 (57.5 percent) in Kazakhstan. The Talas river basin is smaller, with an area of 52,700 km2 including 11,430 km2 (21.7 percent) in Kyrgyzstan and 41,270 km2 (78.3 percent) in Kazakhstan (Ragettli et al. 2018). According to hydrographic features, the Chu river is divided into three parts: the upper portion is the part of the river before it exits the Boom Gorge mountain in Kyrgyzstan, the middle part is the Chu valley that flows through a large area of Kyrgyzstan too, and the lower part is located in the desert regions of Kazakhstan. The Talas river is formed from the confluence of the Karakol and Uch-Koshoy rivers, originating in the glaciers of the Talas Range, which is located on Kyrgyz territory, then flows into and is lost in the Moynkum sands, which are located in Kazakhstan (Wegerich, 2008).
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Thus, the Chu-Talas river basin can be divided in two parts: the upstream part in the Kyrgyz Republic where both of the rivers are mainly formed, and downstream in Kazakhstan which is the dissipation zone.
Figure 3 – The Chu-Talas river basin with border line (Ragettli, Herberz & Siegfried, 2018)
The basin is characterized as having a continental climate with hot, dry summers and moderately cold winters (Nikitin, 2009). Due to global warming, intensive ice melting contributes to adverse effects on the water flowing in the basin (Hagg et.al. 2013) particularly in Kazakhstan with the large area of deserts and steppes that are more sensitive to these changes (Zhupankhan et.al. 2018). The Chu-Talas basin is very important to this region of Central Asia in socio-economic respects. For both countries, it provides the basis for developing the agricultural industry in support of food security, especially in Kazakhstan. As one of the largest countries in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has a high sensitivity to irrigation water demand because much of its territory is characterized as desert. Particularly, in the south of this country, many farmers depend on water coming from Kyrgyzstan. While the Chu and Talas Rivers are formed in Kyrgyz territory, they provide water to both countries. The irrigated land area in Kazakhstan that lies within the Talas basin is 63 000 ha or 35% of the irrigated area, and in the Kazakhstan portion of the Chu River Basin irrigated land covers 131 000 ha, making up 27% of the irrigated area. The irrigated territory of these basins in Kyrgyzstan is around twice as large (see Table 1).
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Most of the basin’s population are farmers who live in rural areas. The main source of the economic well-being of families is farming and selling their products. Agriculture is the main activity in both parts of the basin, and many villagers depend on the rivers’ water for household needs as well. Water scarcity in the region is exacerbated by population growth, climate change, and old infrastructure. During the growing season increasingly, concerns over water shortage are raised on both sides (Carius et.al, 2004). High dependence of the wellbeing of local population on water from the both rivers and growing water shortages creates sensitivities associated with water, and reveals the conflictual potential between two countries.
Table 2. Irrigated land area under Chu-Talas River Basin, 2008
Characteristics Talas river basin Chu river basin
Irrigated land area, thousand ha 178 493
Kazakhstan, ha 63 000 131 000
Kazakhstan, % 35 27
Kyrgyzstan, ha 115 000 362 000
Kyrgyzstan, % 65 73
*Source: Nikitin A.M. Lakes of Central Asia, Hydrometeoizdat, 1991. Report “On the activities of the commission RK and KR on the use of water facilities for interstate use on the Chu and Talas rivers in the period 2008 - 2009, 19 pp.
Additionally, the basin is characterized by the number of unfavorable socio-economic conditions – the privatization of land, creation of Water User Associations (WUAs) as independent non-governmental organizations, high rates of unemployment, consequences of migration from the rural area to cities or outside. As illustrated above, the basin faces many challenges and dependencies are conducive to fact-finding over shared resources. These facts require attention during the process of analyses.
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2.2. Water management before independence
Before 1991, all Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, had been part of the Soviet Union under control of the government in Moscow, the capital of the USSR. The principles governing distribution of water resources among Central Asian countries were developed in 1975-1980 as described in the document "Schemes of complex using and protection of water resources". Under this scheme, water quotas were split according to the proportion of irrigated land under each state. Under the conditions imposed by Moscow, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were supposed to supply water for irrigation, particularly to cotton fields; downstream countries Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were to supply the Central Asian region with gas and electricity; and coal to satisfy energy consumption was to be provided from Kazakhstan (Grebnev, 2009). The maintenance and operating costs of dams were fully covered by Moscow. However, after independence these exchange mechanisms collapsed, because each state established their own rules and plans for development on the basis of their own national needs and interest. All main water infrastructures in the Chu-Talas Basin had been also planned and built in the Soviet era. Most of the significant and strategic water infrastructures were located in the upper parts of the basin. The original concept on which water infrastructure development was based relied on the exchange of water and energy between Central Asian countries. Thus, dams in upstream republics were constructed for irrigation purposes rather than to produce hydropower, and in return, downstream countries would guarantee to provide energy and gas to upstream countries in the winter time. Thus, in the Chu-Talas River Basin, two reservoirs were built that are intended for irrigation: the Kirov reservoir of seasonal regulation with a volume of 550.0 million m3 that is located on the Talas River in Kyrgyzstan, and the Orto-Tokoy reservoir with a volume of 470.0 million m3 located on the Chu River in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, many canals, wells and drainage systems were constructed to distribute water throughout the system. There are four important canals which are part of the water-sharing infrastructure in the basin: Chumysh waterworks, Western and Eastern Big Chui by-pass canals, and Chu bypass canals, all of these water canals are located on the Chu river of Kyrgyz side and they are part of the water distribution infrastructure between countries. In the Soviet era, water resource sharing occurred within the Kirov and Orto-Tokoy reservoirs across the borders of the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics (USSR) based on Provisions for Water Allocation on the Chu and Talas Rivers published on January 31, 1983 in Moscow.
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According to those provisions (which were separate for the Chu and Talas Rivers), all water resources of the Chu River Basin are subject to division of water between the republics, distributed to the Kazakh SSR (42%) and the Kyrgyz SRR (58%), and in the Talas river basin from the Kirov reservoir to Kazakh SSR (50%) and for Kyrgyz SRR (50 %) (see Table 3).
Table 3. Provisions on water allocation Chu and Talas rivers by 1983 (after Wegerich, 1997) Rivers in Chu-Talas basin, annual flow Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan
Chu river basin (6.6 mln.m3) 48% 52%
Talas river basin (1.6 mln.m3) 50% 50%
This aspect of technical coordination will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5 on technical cooperation.
2.3 Physical and non-physical dimensions
At the beginning of the analyses presented here, it is important to first define the concepts of physical and non-physical dimensions. Clear definition of what is meant by these terms is a necessary precondition for considering and discussing water resources development. The physical dimension is divided into three important areas of the resources: type of the water, geographic location, and quality (Savenije and Zaag, 2000). The non-physical dimensions are related to human activities, and include national plans and performance, which bring socio-economic development and represent interests of different water users. With respect to both dimensions in the Chu-Talas case, we can see a direct link between surface water and the agriculture sector, with difficulties arising due to redistribution of water between upstream and downstream riparian countries. Water quality and quantity issues are too difficult to combine together in terms of planning and managing within river system boundaries (Tir and Stinnett, 2011). Analyses of conflict events in transboundary rivers shows that 86% of all these conflictive situations were associated with two problems - infrastructure or the amount of water (Wolf et.al., 2003). Thus, the research presented here focuses on surface water and its quantity rather than on water quality. The analyses will focus
14 on identifying shifts in perspective over time, as well as how these dimensions changed over time, and will help to understand the dynamic nature of cooperation in the Chu-Talas basin. With respect to the non-physical dimensions, a key attribute of the Chu-Talas basin is an economy based on agrarian development. Agriculture is economically important for both countries, forming an important part of the export and import market, food security, and the source of daily livelihoods in rural areas in both countries (Abazov, 2010); (Zhupankhan et.al. 2018). Regarding the physical dimensions related to water resource development, geographic location and physiography are key factors. Kyrgyzstan is an upstream country where water is generated, and it has sufficient water resources with high potential capacities for development of hydropower generation. In contrast, Kazakhstan is a downstream country, and because of uneven distribution in the region, has a problem in water scarcity (Zhupankhan, Tussupova & Berndtsson, 2018). In terms of control, in the Chu and Talas Rivers, physical control of water is mostly conducted from the Kyrgyz side, but some parts of the rivers which go through Kazakhstan are controlled by entities in Kazakhstan. In the next chapter the physical and non – physical conditions introduced above will need to be taken into account and discussed together in order to understand the national water management strategies of the states, particularly as they influence the political, technical, and institutional levels of cooperation.
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Chapter III. Institutions
According to Gopalakrishnan et.al. (2005), without well-functioning and effective institutions it is not possible to implement any programs for integrated water management. Typically, strong regional institutions and a modern legal framework help to achieve mutually beneficial cooperation, strengthen relations and solve problems (UNECE, 2011).
Figure 4 - The conceptual framework developed by Savenije and Zaag (2000)
There have been a number of definitions of what is meant by the term institutions. For example, Pejovich (1995) defines institutions as administrative, legal and ordinary mechanisms on the basis of engagement with society. Ruttan and Khayami (1984) consider “institutions as certain rules of behavior in civilization or organizations that help to coordinate between individuals and forming expectations that can be supported by a person in relations with others.” In the work presented here, the term institutions refers to rules, characteristics of behavioral norms that assist to regulate relationships and human interaction; moreover, they represent a standard of behavior when people formulate rules of the game to interact and coexist in society (North, 1989). In this research, this definition is best applicable to consider the interaction between countries in the creation of the joint Commission, the legal mechanisms of cooperation, inclusiveness of norms of international law, and effectiveness of connection to all participants.
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As noted in the previous section, analyses of conflict events in transboundary rivers shows that 86% of all these conflictive situations were associated with two problems - infrastructure or the amount of water (Wolf et al., 2003). In fact, both of these problems formed the basis of the agreement in the Chu-Talas basin, which shows both the concerns of parties, and on the other hand, commitment to solving them in a peaceful manner. Therefore, I will argue here that the creation of a joint body and the development of agreements based on a legal framework helped to prevent a possible conflict, which has changed the situation at the regional level. The analysis also will discuss institutional features in the basin and their influence on the strengthening of cooperation. Further, it will investigate how institutions that implement cooperation based on firm commitments produce benefits towards further cooperation. To this effect, it is first necessary to consider states' rights and obligations which were laid down through legal mechanisms.
3.1 Legal mechanism: scope of agreement
In this section, I discuss one of the important institutional components of cooperation, legal mechanisms. Among the institutional components that result in a duty to cooperate are legal mechanisms or legal tools, which provide a legal basis for its water policy work and willingness to follow them. Especially, the “willingness to follow” component defines the success of cooperation on the basis of its compliance (Wolf, 2003). In practice, particularly in Central Asia, decision-makers often change their positions, introducing their own views and modifications to water development plans. For example, people recognized that after the new President of Uzbekistan, S. Mirziyoyev, came into power in 2016, there was a positive shift in the political arena including solving water-related issues on transboundary context (Sattarov, 2018). That is why I argue that binding long-term agreements are necessary, in order to lay the foundation for long-term cooperation. In the Chu-Talas case in 2000, a bilateral “Agreement On The Use Of Water Facilities For Interstate Use On The Chu And Talas Rivers” was signed. It was developed in accordance with the Agreement on the creation of a single economic space between the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan, signed in the city Cholpon-Ata on April 30, 19941.
1 The common economic space between the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan in order to implement joint programs to deepen economic integration between the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan for
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Table 4. List of transboundary water sharing agreements and related agreements for the Chu- Talas River Basin Title of Agreement Signatories and Date Abbreviation Signed Regulation on the Kyrgyz-Kazakh Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Intergovernmental Intergovernmental Council 2009 Council (2009)
Statute of the Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Statute (2006) Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on the Use 2006 of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas Water Code Kyrgyzstan, 2005 Water Code (2005) Water Code Kazakhstan, 2003 Water Code (2003) Agreement between the Government of the Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Agreement (2000) Kazakh Republic and the Government of the 2000 Kyrgyz Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas Protocol between the Committee on Water Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Protocol (1998) Resources 1998 Republic of Kazakhstan and the Department of Water resources of the Kyrgyz Republic on operation water facilities interstate use in the basins of the Chu and Talas rivers Agreement on the use of water and energy Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Agreement (1998) resources in the Syr Darya River basin Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 1998 Agreement on the creation of a single economic Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Agreement (1994) space between the Kyrgyz Republic, the Uzbekistan 1994 Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan, signed in the city Cholpon-Ata Agreement on joint action to address the Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Agreement (1993) problem of the Aral Sea and surrounding areas, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, environmental improvement and socio-economic Turkmenistan, 1993 development of the Aral Sea region Agreement on cooperation in the joint Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Agreement (1992) management, use and protection of water Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, resources of interstate sources Turkmenistan, 1992 Provisions on water allocation Chu and Talas Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Provisions (1983) rivers 1983 Schemes of complex using and protection of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Water schemes water resources Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, (1975-1980) Turkmenistan 1975-1980
1994 2000, provides the free movement of economic goods, services, capital, labor and ensures an agreed credit – accounting , budget, tax, pricing, customs and foreign exchange policies.
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This was the first fundamental bilateral water agreement in Central Asia in that time, which defines the international principles of “equitable and reasonable water use” in the beginning in Article 1 of the Agreement (2000) (see Table 4). The adoption of the agreement by both governments happened immediately and demonstrated, to an extent, the possibility of finding a compromise under new and challenging conditions. Wolf (2007) stated that any agreement on sharing international rivers should have adaptable management structure, clear and flexible criteria for water allocations, equitable distribution of benefits, concrete mechanisms to enforce treaty provisions and detailed conflict resolution mechanisms. In the Chu-Talas Agreement, parties acknowledge norms of international principles, also the right to compensation (Article 3), the expenses of operation and maintenance of water facilities (Article 4), and create permanent commissions (Article 5). They also implement joint activities (Article 7), identify joint research and development activities (Article 10), and dispute resolution mechanisms (Article 12). Additionally, Marty (2001), like others before him (Chapman, 1963), also claims that international river management is more successful if cooperative arrangements are flexible so as to allow for adaptation and changing interests of riparian countries. With respect to the equitability in the distribution of benefits, it is important to note that states within the Chu-Talas river basin have different levels of socio-economic development. There are also differences in the political climate on both sides. In this context, the robustness of Agreement is determined in part by the willingness of the parties to confront these external and internal factors such as economic, social, and geopolitical factors, rather than suspending the Agreement. Based on this, the analysis of implementation Agreement (2000) in the Chu and Talas river basin has a few bright examples of interventions. For example, there have been economical interventions- currency devaluations in Kazakhstan which took place in 1999, 2019, and 2015 (source: informburo.kz, 2019). There have also been political interventions. Kyrgyzstan has undergone a regime change two times, with major revolutions in 2005 and 2010. The consequences to these revolutions bring economic instability and political transformation. From this perspective, political bargains can be very sensitive and related to the stability of countries at the national level. However, the Agreement has been relatively robust despite these major challenges, because up to the present, sessions of the Commission have been held twice a year, regarding the statute of the Commission (The general principles for the establishment of the Commission) were not interrupted. The Chu-Talas case also illustrates a degree of flexibility, for example, the Agreement (Article 13) allows the parties the
19 opportunity for bringing relevant changes and additions in the form of separate protocols, which allows parties to have a guarantee of modified or clarified some points to the agreement. Other important institutional component of the cooperative arrangement, were to establish a Commission with a separate Statute (2006) (see Table 4) identifying the commission’s scope of activity, including general principles, powers, and operation procedures. All joint activities, projects, and details of rules based on the rules of Statute (2006) then opened opportunities to initiate projects by supporting international donors and strength forward. To illustrate the equitable distribution of benefits according to the agreement, parties unanimously endorsed the principles of equal rights and mutual assistance on an equitable basis. Especially, Articles 3 and 4 of this agreement included the right to compensation and sharing of the expenses of operation and maintenance of water management facilities. These principles of equity helped to achieve the first step of consensus between parties and set up a connection between mutual interests of the parties, despite that later they implementing partly. Since hydraulic infrastructure is located on the territory of the Kyrgyz partner, the Kyrgyz side is responsible for carrying out a full calculation of costs of operation and maintenance of the water infrastructure, and provides the complete bill of the funds required. This information is incorporated into the minutes recording the outcomes of the sessions, and these minutes also report actual receipts of funds from Kazakhstan. All costs are calculated annually and determine the proportion of required contributions from the parties. According to this agreement, the parties agreed that the side which is the owner of the hydraulic structures - Kyrgyzstan - has the right to compensation from the beneficiary side - Kazakhstan. Thereby Kyrgyzstan ensures the serviceability of these structures for timely water supply. It is also important to note the obligation of notification that the parties have determined that all actions must be agreed upon and carried out jointly. In the Chu-Talas Agreement the parties indicated that they recognize the norms of international law:
“…[M]utually aspiring to find a more unassailable and fair solution to the efficient use of water management facilities in compliance with generally acknowledged norms of international law on water resources”.
According to the norms of international law and the agreement itself, the parties agreed that Kyrgyzstan is the owner of the hydraulic infrastructure and has the right to get compensation from Kazakhstan as a user obtaining water from this infrastructure, and who is ready to pay for
20 maintenance and operation of them. Also, the interpretation of the term “equitable” is that parties equally share expenses with the operation and maintenance of water infrastructure, as a result both getting benefits equivalent to half of the water resources through this infrastructure. To summarize, in the case of the Chu-Talas River Basin, the Agreement (2000) signed by the Governments in which compliance is mandatory, have a positive effect on sustainable cooperation.
3.2 Inclusiveness of International aspects
The purpose of international law is to prevent disputes and promote peaceful solutions to common problems by finding consensus based on the principles of justice (Jaspers et al., 2017). The international law is not only set up to identify certain rules, it is also relies on building common understanding of issues through communication. Unfortunately, parties often aim to get more from the other side, in that situation, international law must have its own mechanisms for establishing a dialogue and common standards and points of understanding which are acceptable to all parties. According to Kliot et al. (2001), the three conditions necessary for Agreements between states who share international rivers are: active support from political level with long-term obligations, mobilization of existing legal - social aspects and good preconditions in the state. . Under these conditions, a basin is ready for effective international cooperation and coordination. Thus, international law is a set of rules and principles, the action of which is mandatory for civilized states in their relations with each other (Brown-Weiss, 2019). In discussing the international aspect of water sharing, we should understand that current situations are coming after tested experience or practice from the specific situations of sharing international rivers. In general, international water law is linked to the Helsinki Rules, which were first adopted in Helsinki in 1966 as the "Rules for the Use of Waters of International Rivers" by the UN General Assembly (Abu-Zeid, 2001). These rules allow the regulation of waters in a transboundary context, following guiding legal principles and internationally recognized obligations. The fundamental principle is the principle of “reasonable and equitable use”. While the interpretation of what is reasonable or equitable can be absolutely different by different parties, still, it is generally agreed that the essential meaning is that each state has equality of rights which accommodates the needs and uses of water for each party (Report of UNECE, 2011). When signing
21 the Agreement (2000), the parties indicated that, in accordance with generally recognized norms of international law, they agreed to be guided by it, as evidenced by the following phrase "mutual benefit on a fair and reasonable basis" (Article 1).
Another principle in international water law is the principle that parties sharing transboundary rivers require mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus, one of the important attributes of the Agreement is the specification of conflict resolution mechanisms, which are according to Gramberge (2001:pp. 3-5) defined as structured informal negotiation processes outside the court environment. In other words, a dispute resolution mechanism should be given in the Agreement. In the case of the Chu-Talas River Basin, Article 12 of the Agreement provides this mechanism where solutions should be found by using negotiations and consultations. The next principle refers to the manner of cooperation on the exchange of data and information. According to Schmeier (2013), when states in transboundary rivers are ready to share data and information, they can ensure that river basin management decisions are taken, implemented, and monitored for their effectiveness. This mechanism was clearly defined in the Commission’s principal objectives (Appendix 2, Statute of the Commission), parties started to apply the transparency of shared water distribution between states according to Provisions on water allocation Chu and Talas signed by parties in 1983. Given the above, parties decided to exchange meteorological information to regulate water in the vegetation period and started a hydrological newsletter.
3.3 The role of the Joint water commission
According to Hooper (2006), there can be many types of basin water management structures, including: committees, commissions, associations, councils, corporations, tribunals and federations. The differences between them are their structural features and functional obligations. The goals of creation, formats and mandates of the river basin organizations (RBOs) can be very different, depending on the issue at hand, and according to Schmeier (2013), establishment of this kind of organization comes from existing problems in this basin, in other words, this organization is a platform where parties can find solutions together. However, sometimes the actions of a RBO do not correspond to the original objectives set out at the beginning of the establishment of this institutional framework to serve the particular needs for the basin.
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In Article 5 of an Agreement (2006), the parties consider establishing a permanent water commission. According to Hooper (2011), the Commission is an authorized body, members are delegated by the parties. The Commission consists of two parts: the Kazakhstan part, whose chairman and members are nominated by the Government, and their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan. This joint Commission is intended to be a guarantee of implementation of obligations, coordination and monitoring all activities in the basin with dedicated staff and technical secretariat (see Figure 5).
Figure 5 - Organizational structure of the Chu-Talas Commission
If we look to the historical background as a context for the current agreements, the countries of Central Asia had already existing experience with the basin approach. As mentioned before, Kazakhstan is one of the first countries in the promotion of IWRM in Central Asia in work on the basin level. At the turn of 2000, all the prerequisites have been taken, in particular, a key role and power in water management was transferred to the Committee for Water Resources (CWR) of Ministry of Agriculture and to eight Basin Water Management Departments (BWOs), which had authority. However, at that time their significant work required organizational capacity building (Sokolov, 2000). Also, according to Article 43 of the Water Code (2003) the Aral-Syrdarya Basin Council (ASC) was established as a consultative advisory body to Interstate Council for the Aral
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Sea (Mirzaev, 2019). This demonstrates that the establishment of the Chu -Talas Commission for Kazakhstan fitted in their general policies for water management and was not an unfamiliar approach. At the same time, the 2005 Water Code of Kyrgyzstan stipulated to organize the National Water Council and the State Water Administration with creation of two types of basin organizations: basin water administrations and public basin councils. However, this process of water management reform is going slowly. Only in 2013, the first meeting of the National Water Council was held, where the main five water basins and their administrations with areas of responsibility were reviewed and approved. Thus, in the Kyrgyz Republic there was an attempt to implement water management on the basin approach. Unfortunately, insufficient funding and neglect of the importance of water management had slowed the development of the water sector. Despite this, Kyrgyzstan agreed to sign the Agreement creating a Joint Commission based on regional basin principles.
There is no single template for the ideal working of an RBO, because the problems in every transboundary basin are different. In order to assess the degree of contribution of the Commission to sustainable cooperation in the case of Chu-Talas, I selected assessing RBO effectiveness based on the factors identified by Schmeier (2013) and Wingqvist & Nilsson ( 2015).
Table 5. Organizational Structures Assessment of effectiveness
Factor Provisions in Agreement Implementation
Membership The principle of equal Meetings are held stably representation of the parties; despite of external and Headed by the Chairman of internal factors in countries; the Committee from two the level of chairmen can be sides; composition of its different; it depends on two delegation is appointed by the factors 1) often in relation to Governments of the countries, employment of the Head of respectively, the level and the department 2) lowering or obligations are high; meetings raising the status of water organized twice a year. institutions in countries.
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Functional scope The rational water The parties never broke their distribution and cost sharing obligations to contribute of the maintenance of water money and ensure the infrastructure, stipulated water limits, although often disputes rise over transparency of financial statements, an increase of financial contributions and about water availability in certain years. In other issues, parties expanded every year their activities through joint projects and joint action. Legal foundations The agreement was signed by The bodies were created, but governments of the countries, unfortunately until today as result should have neither the Commission nor mandatory execution and the Secretariat has a legal creation of the Commission status, and as a consequences and Secretariat with clear do not have bank accounts, statement of the functions, which greatly affects the joint tasks and rights of both work in terms of salary of the parties. commission members and the transfer as direct funding from donors who are ready to provide support for the implementation projects. Organizational bodies The Commission is created on The commission was over a parity basis and operates time extended to fulfil the under the leadership of two objectives accordance to the co-chairs appointed by the protocol after every meeting. Parties, as well as a Secretariat In the beginning the issues
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that implements addressed were of an organizational and technical operational nature; over time, measures to ensure the work the activities included those of the Commission and the linked with water quality, implementation of all ecosystem issue and other decisions taken at the meeting. problems in the basin. The Secretariat is a permanent executive body of the Commission.
Financing The National Secretariats are Neither the Commission, nor legal entities, they have the secretariat has legal status, current and estimated in other words, the Regulation accounts in national and has not been approved by the foreign currencies. This also Governments, and this issue applies to Commission. has not been completed.
Assessment of effectiveness for Chu-Talas river basin based on criteria offered by Schmeier (2013) and further operationalized by Wingqvist and Nelsson (2015); a set of criteria offered by Hooper (2006).
According to Table 4, membership is permanent, in any case, the decision-makers and those who are authorized by the respective government authorities to conduct dialogue on an equal footing are delegated to the meetings. The functional scope shows that parties adhere to the agenda and try to resolve operational issues in order of importance. Organizational bodies were created and operate under the Agreement. The legal foundations and financing factors do not function fully governing the respective basin. Schmeier (2013) emphasizes the importance of having financial resources to fulfill their mandate and govern their respective watercourse. However, in the Chu- Talas basin, parties have been able to manage without contributions from member states to the RBO’s budget, while international organizations have constantly supported this platform of cooperation ignoring the fact that it creates dependency. In consequence, many names of international organizations are associated with the Chu-Talas basin as assisting in the process of international transboundary cooperation, but real outputs of sustainability in terms of institutional
26 design of independency is challenged. For example, the salary of staff at the Chu-Talas Secretariat depends on existing projects.
3.3.1 Secretariat and participation
Another important element in the relationship among commission, politics, and stakeholders is the Secretariat, which organizes this connection with support to all procedures. The secretariat has been created according to the Statute of the Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas (Statute, 2006).
Figure 6 - Organizational structure of the Chu-Talas Commission
In this research, actors are presented on three levels as participating members in the process of cooperation, such as high level (decision-makers), Commission with Secretariat (inter-state coordination), and stakeholders. In the case of the Chu-Talas River Basin, the secretariat provides support to the work of Commission in terms of implementation of all decisions taken as a result of negotiations in the meetings. The participatory approach of involving all actors helps to increase the understanding of their roles in terms of their influence and importance for sustaining
27 cooperation. In fact, the argument for engagement in the process might be to protect their own interests, needs, rights, and obligations, but the degree of involvement and connection between the secretariat and participation of different actors in the Chu-Talas basin implies a human capacity in institutional pillars.
Ensuring participation of all members in the meeting, attendance is accepted in advance forming a delegation by each party. Additionally, it is to be noted that the Secretariat may make proposals in the list of participants to the Chairman, thereby, having an opportunity to create a list of a participants who can have a positive impact on effective negotiation. Moreover, this step introduces actors to each other, generates an idea of joint activities, and brings investment in terms of transparency of decision making and planning for the next step. International experience shows the importance of involving all stakeholders in decision-making and planning processes of an RBO (Tsakiris, 2017). In the case of the Chu- Talas River Basin, the Agreement, (2000) was signed by Governments of countries so that most of the authority is in the hands of the co-chairs who represent the Ministries of water resources management from both sides. Co-chairs have responsible sign Protocol of each session after it has been approved by the Commission, including approved the procedure and regulations of sessions. This top-down control places great importance on each session of Chu-Talas Commission. The secretariat has limited influence, I mean the decision-makers have more power like creating the list of participants in the Session, identifying the agenda, and approval of joint project implementation. However, taking into account the usual top-down approach in Central Asia, it is also referred to the Chu-Talas session. For the analysis in this chapter, I examine the list of participants of the 24th Meeting of the Commission of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Сhu and Talas Rivers in 2018 (see Table 5). The obligatory rules are that the co-chairs of meeting of the Chu-Talas Commission. are from the main Ministry in charge of water of both countries, as well as the participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Session, who responsible for external policy and only participant. (The сconcept of Foreign Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic).
Table 6. The list of participants of the 24th Meeting of the Chu-Talas Commission of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2018
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Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Head of the Department of Transboundary Rivers Director General Department of Water Resources of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Head of Environmental Monitoring Department Chief specialist Department of the State Department of Environmental Monitoring and Environmental Expertise and Environmental Information of the Ministry of Energy Management Head of the Department of the Chu-Talas Head of the Chui-Bishkek territorial department of inspection on regulation of water resources use the State Agency for Environmental Protection and protection and Forestry under the Government Deputy General Director of RSE "Kazgidromet" Head of the observations of the Office of the natural environment`s pollution, Agency on hydrometeorology under the Ministry of Emergency Situations Chief specialist of the Department of Natural Head of the Department of Hydrology Agency on Resources and Environmental Management of Hydrometeorology Akimat of Zhambyl region
Acting Head of the Department of Natural First Deputy akim of Chui district Resources and Environmental Management of the Akimat of Zhambyl region Head of Surface Water Analysis Department of Head of water resources, water management and RSE "Kazhydromet" interstate water allocation department Engineer of surface water data analysis of RGP Head of information analysis sector Department "Kazhydromet" of Water Management and Melioration Head of the Climate Research Department of the Head of Talas Basin Authority Research Center of RSE "Kazhydromet" Head of Orto-Tokoy and Kirov reservoir management Head of Kazakhstan part Secretariat of Chu-Talas Head of Kyrgyzstan part Secretariat of Chu-Talas Commission МА Commission Experts Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) United Nations Development Programm (UNDP) United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Swiss development cooperation (SDC) Asian Bank Development (ABD) Regional Environmental Center for Central Asia FinWaterWEI II Programme Global Environment Facility (GEF) Reporters
From Table 6, it is obvious that most of the participants consist of public officials from different departments of Ministries of both sides that have linkages with water resources management. The level of the position is also important in terms of taking seriously the format of
29 cooperation. The expertise and roles of participants in this kind of meeting illustrate the need to make operational decisions. Such meetings require participants who are competent to advise on the problem. In practice, the reason for the presence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also clear, because of their direct responsibility to control external action in a diplomatic manner. Their participation also guarantees the concerted action of their respective country. Based on the titles of organizations involved, we can see a wide range of issues in the basin. It is also interesting to note the many different international organizations participating as interested third parties in the negotiation process as observers. All these organizations contributed financial support to water- related projects to improve conditions in the basin and to the meetings of the Commission itself. Thus, donors sitting in the meeting can be aware of the outcomes of their own financial contributions Obviously, so many major players have their own interests in involvement, but it is also a fact that their investment is contributing to making the Chu-Talas Commission. more sustainable. Involvement of international donors is providing the impetus for the states to work together and, as a result, develop this kind of cooperative institution. The quantity of donors and projects found this agreement reliable in terms of the environment of negotiations, priorities of problems, and implementation of all tasks, thereby laying the foundation for trust. The role of the media is also important in terms of providing clear information for citizens concerning what occurs in the basin or how water managers achieve improvements, as well as by bringing transparency among parties, donors, and farmers. The involvement of the media also demonstrates the openness of the process, which helps increase the resilience of cooperation.
3.3.2 Financing
The lack of legal registration of the Chu-Talas Commission, which even today does not have a legal status, means that it cannot have a bank account. The financial component plays an important role at the beginning of the process of cooperation, as well as during the process of ongoing cooperation. When international organizations initiate assistance, this, in turn, implies primarily financial support. According to Schmeier (2013) one of the requirements for establishing a river basin organization (RBO) is legal recognition as an organization for conferring legal status, which makes it possible to fulfill its mandate and manage the corresponding watercourse (Schmeier, 2013). Although financing could be from a different source, having an internal budget
30 that includes equal contributions by the national budgets of the states, in addition to external finance by donors, helps to develop a RBO in terms of reliability of funds as well as water resources activities. Kauffman (2015) emphasizes that funding varies by the size and scale of the RBO, but in most of the examples (Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission, Delaware River Basin Commission), parties have their own budget automatically with the signing of the Agreement. Many well-known examples of agreements on transboundary rivers such as the Mekong River Commission, the Treaty between Pakistan and India, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, were financially supported by large investors and donors. All of these agreements have had some success in achieving results (Alaerts, 2015). Therefore, it is important for the Commission to have a reliable platform in the form of legally fixed actions so that donors can directly transfer funds to support the activities of the Commission. In the Secretariat of the Chu-Talas Commission, the parties do not receive revenue, nor does the Secretariat provide salary for office staff (Chu-Talas Secretariat). Although the Statute of the Commission states that the Secretariat is a legal entity with its own account, in actuality, this is not the case. The regulation financing was not approved by the Governments of both sides regarding identifying a common budget. According to Raadgever et.al. (2008) the lack of a budget means the agreement is not viable in the long term. Cooperation is dependent on donors, making the work of the Commission vulnerable. I argue that cooperation is occurring, but that current conditions and structures create some uncertainties with respect to transparency and accountability of project money coming from international organizations. These uncertainties also affect the job security of employees who lack confidence in the future, thereby they focus more on donor dependence and fear, rather than on the development of the process of cooperation in the basin. In other words, there is a lack of motivation, and projects cannot guarantee constant income to those attempting to implement them. This, of course, affects the sustainability of cooperation, which may be reflected in the near future if appropriate measures are not taken. Also, the current situation reinforces the tendency to seek support of donors each time a project is required, and focus efforts on obtaining bits of help. The parties did not consider the options of membership fees of states based on the sharing of costs in the case of the Chu-Talas Commission. The reason behind this lack of engagement in financing
31 could be the low budget allocations in both countries, and the absence of clear justification to each Government about the necessity and benefits of providing their own funding to projects, leading to the failure to place this issue on the agenda of the meeting Chu-Talas Commission..
3.4 Conclusion
The unique nature of this case of cooperation was the creation of the only Commission on bilateral level in Central Asia today. The viability and sustainability of the agreement was illustrated by the fact that after the signing of the Agreement, the implementation of institutional and legal mechanisms were carried out in accordance with the agreements reached. It must be said that while the Agreement is a continuation of previous cooperation at the interdepartmental level on shared participation in the operation of water facilities (in the years 1998-2000), the parties signed the Intergovernmental Agreement thereby moving to the next level. The analysis presented here shows that the principles of equality and mutual assistance were initially developed and laid down, as demonstrated by specific practices such as monitoring the implementation of agreements regarding water distribution, the distribution of costs and expenses on an equitable basis, the presence of mechanisms for resolution of disputes (see Table 7).
Table 7. Attributes of agreements that reflect their alignment with key Helsinki Principles and the likelihood that they will be sustainable
Agreement Adaptable Clear and flexible Equitable Concrete Clear and management criteria for water distribution Mechanisms to Detailed structure allocations of benefits Enforce Dispute (seen as Provisions of Resolution equitable by the Agreement Mechanism all parties) Agreement - - - + + - (1992) Agreement + - - - Russia - (1993) Agreement + - (economical + + (signed by - (1994) issue) Presidents) Agreement + - + - + (1998) Agreement + (Art 13) + (Article 4) + (Article 1) + (Government) + (Article 12) (2000)
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Factors assisting riparian states in the development of cooperative management networks adapted by (Giordano and Wolf, 2003) +/- mean that these attributes to the presence in the Agreement and provide prerequisites that cooperation will be sustainable.
International experience and assistance were incorporated into this Agreement (2000), the basic components necessary for the functioning of the Commission were included, which also contributed to the flexibility and speed of implementation. However, some non-functional elements were identified related to the internal processes of the Commission. The work of the Secretariat as an executive body was clearly set forth in a statement of responsibilities, which also helped to promote cooperation. The openness of meetings and the presence of donors, media, and experts showed good dynamics regarding the transparency of cooperation and opened up opportunities for attracting investments. Finally, the issue of financing for members of the Secretariat has not been completely resolved, which of course affects the productivity of the work, and cooperation in terms of wage stability. Also, there is no legal status yet, which is a fundamental prerequisite for sustainability.
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Chapter IV. Politics
Different interpretations and definitions are given to the management of water resources when it is viewed through the prism of politics. According to Mollinga (2001, p.2), “water is politics”. Miromachi (2015), states that it is important to understand who has used power, and how it has been used, focusing on elite decision-makers. Why are we increasingly starting to consider and associate water with politics? As mentioned by the Zwarteveen et al. (2015) today “water governance at heart is about political choice”, where, when and by whom the water should be managed or delivered, through the norms, rules and laws which is established by the politics of this country. In a dictionary definition, the term politics refers to “the activities of the government, members of law-making organizations, or people who try to influence the way a country is governed” (Cambridge University Press, 2020).
Figure 7 - The conceptual framework developed by Savenije and Zaag (2000)
The social, economic, cultural, environmental importance of water for each country is different. In describing Menga (2018) emphasizes that conflict and cooperation depend on a variety of power dynamics and asymmetries. Specifically, these difficulties are manifested in the
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Central Asia region in terms of newly independent states, geographical location, issues of water demand and differences in economic development among states.
4.1 History of the relationship
In the history of the relationship between the Kyrgyz and Kazakh people until the middle of the 19th century, there were periodic attacks on the Kyrgyz people by the Kazakh khans approximately near the Chu-Talas River Basin. Among the reasons for confrontation and struggle were the striving to increase territory ownership, the desire to own natural resources and as a result, obtain more power or domination in terms of expansion of the territory (Anon. n.d. “История КР - 19. Кыргызско-Казахские Взаимоотношения в 18-19в.в. - Wattpad”) During the periods of conflict, both sides suffered great losses and territorial integrity was of great value especially for Kyrgyzstan, which defended its territories (Aytmatov et al., 2004). In fact, historically, resource use in the region was under an open-access regime, in which no one owns or exercises control over the resources (Кыргызско-казахские взаимоотношения в 18- 19в.в., История КР). However, the parties could achieve peace, and finally signed a Peace Agreement in Qapal Kazakhstan, in the 1850s. In this process, the ruler of Russia as a mediator was involved and helped both sides to reach the agreement. History shows then that until the Soviet era, parties lived without war and conflict (Aytmatov et al., 2004). Often, when resolving problems on a high political level or mitigating them, one of the motivations mentioned is kinship linking the countries “Kyrgyz and Kazakh are brotherly peoples.” It implies that the parties should not be in conflict with each other, and instead should try to compromise. At first glance, this assumption seems true, because there is substantial similarity between the Kyrgyz and Kazakh peoples, such as similar culture, history, traditions and language. An interesting fact is that although they are not actually more related genetically to one another than to other peoples in the region (Sabotov, “Являются ли казахи и кыргызы генетическими братьями?”vlast.kz, 2017), the concept of brotherhood among peoples is very strong and has been used in politics (for example, in the speech by the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayevгазета «Эркин тоо» № 70 от 14.08.2012 / стр. 3).
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4.2 Independence in post-Soviet era
The Central Asian countries during the period of Russian and Soviet power had central governance by Moscow with a precise plan mostly focused on developing the agrarian sector and using the “Scheme of Complex Use and Protection of Water Resources” (Annex 6). After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly independent states of Central Asia (including Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan), received the opportunity to govern themselves. All of the newly independent countries faced the need to start the process of designing a constitution, formulating their own political strategy, and building an interstate relationship for managing existing water infrastructure. The first water-related agreement signed between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan was the Agreement (1992), signed by all countries on the highest State level. This agreement represented the political choice to continue working together according to historical preconditions that water resources should be shared in common, keeping the previous water quotas for each republic and considering all countries’ interests. This action was crucial in terms of initiating regional cooperation. Subsequently, many significant Agreements were signed (see Table 4).Only the agreement between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was signed on a bilateral level. As illustrated above, many agreements and initiatives have been undertaken in the region, and efforts have been made to create a strong legal framework for cooperation among states in shared river basins. However, regional cooperation, especially at the multilateral level, has not been successful in terms of following the implementation of the agreements listed above (UNECE, 2010). What exists now in Central Asia are numerous agreements without a clear mechanism for mutually beneficial settlements (Djailobaev, 2010). Additionally, reversion to actions made in national interests (as reflected in the legislation of member countries that contradict these agreements), have undermined the agreements. As a result, later parties have found many gaps in these agreements, ignoring obligations and creating new problems of misunderstanding (Valentiny et.al., 2004). In summary, water management has become highly politicized in the region, and parties have begun to require changes to rules and new approaches to water resources management. Only
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Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan demonstrate a commitment to change strategic behavior, putting their efforts into their bilateral Agreement, which was already a big step forward for sustainability.
4.3 Political development of cooperation
In January 2000, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan signed the Agreement between the Government of the Kazakh Republic and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas. On the politicians’ level - where it is more about power, decision making, and policy preferences - we can see that this agreement was achieved based on the political commitment between the Governments of both sides. It follows that parties agreed:
“…[T]he Government of the Kazakh Republic and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, hereinafter referred to as Parties, guided by the Treaty on the Establishment of Common Economic Space, of April 30, 1994, signed by the Kazakh Republic, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbek Republic in Cholpon-Ata; acknowledging the social, economic and environmental value of water resources; attaching high Importance to mutually beneficial cooperation in the use of water resources and to the reliability and safety of water management facilities of intergovernmental status; mutually aspiring to find a more unassailable and fair solution to the efficient use of water management facilities in compliance with generally acknowledged norms of international law on water resources; respecting the principles of good neighborly relations, equality and mutual assistance”.
In this case, the Governments of both countries have power in terms of the right to sign this kind of interstate documents. Today, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are unitary states, each with a presidential election. Both have a parliament. The parliament of Kazakhstan has two Chambers: Senate and Mazhilis, and the Kyrgyz Republic has Jogorku Kenesh, as its legislative body and the government as the executive body, to which all ministries and agencies (including committees on water resources) report. Overall, the structure and composition of the political systems in the two countries are very similar and that presumably helped to create the perquisites to easily enter into negotiation.
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Moreover, the condition for a common knowledge base for understanding regulation of water resources management was already reflected in a few legal acts for regulating water issues: the law “On water” of the Kyrgyz Republic (1994); the law “On drinking water” of the Kyrgyz Republic (1999); the “Water Code” of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1993). Article 12 of the Water Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Article 11 of the Law On Water of the Kyrgyz Republic on the regulation of water relations with foreign states highlight the importance and role of government as political forces in the process of signing the agreement. However, the level of economic development in Kazakhstan is much greater. Economic growth in Kazakhstan has been rapid, due to the abundance of natural resources such as oil and coal. This economic growth, in turn, has provided opportunity for market-oriented reforms (Wandel, 2009). In order to open the door for international oil companies, attract investments in the business sector, and promote a liberal system with political and economic freedom, Vakulchuk and Overland (2018) assert that it was important for the Kazakh government to project a positive image on the international stage. This image was critically important to getting constant capital while meeting expectations of investors. For this reason, Kazakhstan began to strengthen its position in all sectors on regional equality at the international level. Also, in that time it initiated national strategies such as the “green economy”, and “Integrated water resources management (IWRM)” which are based on international experience with donor support. According to Zhupankhan et al. (2018), Kazakhstan's social problems are all related to water scarcity. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan, which is called “The Switzerland of Central Asia” because it shares many similarities with Switzerland, such as having no access to the sea, the size of the territory, mountains, the liberal political system, and an abundance of water and mineral resources, and an abundance of water and mineral resources Despite the fact that Kyrgyzstan was the first country in the region to establish a democracy and the institutions of civil society, and was the first country to join the World Trade Organization (Knyazev, 2012), economic growth has been modest. Additionally, two revolutions which removed active Presidents made the political climate of the country unstable (Bajrektarevic and Brletich, 2013). Consequently, political uncertainty and instability have had an impact on all sectors in terms of frequent changes in political positions and interruptions of reforms which had been started.
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4.3.1 Cross-border integration
Subramanian, Brown & Wolf (2014) recognize that the opportunity to access new benefits is indeed a determining factor in a riparian’s decision to cooperate, especially when those benefits outweigh associated costs. But besides that, Bilder (1981, p.14) writes, “[the] decision to enter into an international agreement will involve considerations of risk. Countries may, therefore, discount benefits, based on perceived risks of engagement in cooperative solutions". According to Sadoff and Grey (2002), all these efforts to cooperate aim to get different kinds of potential benefits. In this view, most cooperative efforts are based on the cost-effectiveness approach, in which parties assess the agreement from an economical perspective and use market-oriented principles to make decisions about cooperation. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have demonstrated that they can work jointly in that way. On continuous of cooperation in 16 June 2009, the first Kyrgyz-Kazakh Intergovernmental Council was held, chaired by Prime Ministers from both countries (19 October 2007 Government resolution of Kazakhstan No. 297 and 20 March 2008 Government resolution of Kyrgyzstan No. 95). This political collaboration allowed both countries to cover many aspects and issues of common interest, including trends in economic cooperation, custom services, industry, education, tourism and the water-energy sector. According to Sadoff and Grey (2002), one type of cooperation can be “beyond the river benefits”, when cooperation on a transboundary river could be better if countries create opportunities to develop other joint sectors rather than focus only on the transboundary river. However, Savenije and Zaag (2000), in their framework for the sharing of international waters argue that downstream countries are more interested in cross-border integration and cooperation in the basin, which for them are necessary because they depend on the actions of upstream countries for their access to water. In the context of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz Intergovernmental Council, the countries acknowledge that bilateral trade, economical business, cultural and humanitarian cooperation between countries help improve relations. In fact, nowadays around 46,6% of the financial activities in different sectors of Kazakhstan’s investors contribute to Kyrgyzstan's economy. At the same time, 247 cooperative ventures are registered in Kazakhstan with Kyrgyz capital (The Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic to the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2019).
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It seems that the establishment of diplomatic channels provides real and mutually beneficial cooperation. For Kazakhstan, which is one of the largest and richest countries in the region, but faces water dependency from upstream countries, access to water is the first thing on the agenda. It is important to note that the Strategy of Kazakhstan (2016) recognized the issue of water for them - this is a security issue, which means that they are strongly motivated to pursue a foreign policy for promotion and strengthening their position on this. Supporting that statement is an excerpt from the speech of President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev:
“…bilateral trade relations between our countries are developing along an ascending path. Over the past two years, trade has consistently exceeded one billion US dollars. About 86 percent of all electricity, 90 percent of dairy products, 56 percent of fruits and vegetables that Kyrgyzstan exports are sent to Kazakhstan. Almost 100 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s need for wheat imports, 97 percent of flour, 70 percent of mineral raw materials, 53 percent of inorganic chemicals are provided by Kazakhstan”. In turn, Kyrgyzstan promised to clearly implement the agreement to provide to Kazakhstan water for irrigation during the growing season”.
(Kazakh president's official website, on 7 November 2014)
Additionally, from analyses of the minutes of the 3rd (2012), 4th (2013) and 8th (2019) meetings of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz Intergovernmental Council and those Protocols, we can see that at every meeting, the parties addressed water-energy issues, particularly the activity in the Chu and Talas River Basin. For Kazakhstan, this alliance is critically important for different sectors, in most of which they are suppliers of products or services to Kyrgyzstan. As a result, this interdependence is intended to guarantee that there should be no problem with getting water. At the same time, to Kyrgyzstan, water is considered a symbol of national dignity and pride. Further, Kyrgyzstan tries to demonstrate good water governance, which means according to Sehring (2009), they operate through the political dimension of democracy. Demonstrating good water governance assumes that decision-makers want to demonstrate openness, ensure equitability and efficiency of water management on the interstate level, as well as to show progress through their actions to their citizens.
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4.3.2. Sectoral integration
According to Savenije and Van der Zaag’s framework (2000), shared international water resources management should be based on the concept of Integrated water resources management, which is defined by the Global Water Partnership as:
“Process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (GWP, 2000, p. 12).
This process is about involving all water users and stakeholders to consider their interests and needs for effective water management. This level of integration is also important to find consensus between absolutely different needs and competing users. According to the Dublin Principles on Water and the Environment (1992), Principle No.3 says: “Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners, and policy- makers at all levels”. In the next section, I will apply this statement in the context of the Chu-Talas River Basin and will analyze the structure of different organizations involved and their interaction. The significant executive body responsible for water management in Kazakhstan is the Ministry of Ecology, Geology and Natural Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which provides control and protection of natural resources. Under this Ministry, there are two main bodies dealing with water, the Department of Transboundary Rivers and the Committee for Water Resources. The first body facilitates cooperation between riparian countries on transboundary rivers, and the second has the role of implementation of the state policy in the field of water resources management (see Table 8) .
Table 8. The significant executive bodies related to water management Topic Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Water resources The Ministry of Agriculture of the The State Water Resources Agency (surface) Republic of Kazakhstan, under the Government of Kyrgyz Republic
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Environment The Republican State The State Environmental and Organization, the Committee for Forestry Agency at the Government Environmental Regulation and of the Kyrgyz Republic Control at the Ministry of Ecology, Geology and Natural Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan; The Information and Analysis Center for Environmental Protection Land The Committee for Land The State Agency for Land Resource Management Resources at the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic; The State Design Institute on Land Management Ground Water the Statistics Committee, the The State Committee for the Committee of Geology and Mineral Reserves of the Kyrgyz Subsurface Use at the Ministry Republic for Investment and Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Hydrology and The Republican State Enterprise The Hydrometeorological Agency at Data “Kazhydromet” the Ministry of Emergencies of the Kyrgyz Republic Energy The Ministry of Energy of the JSC “National energy holding Republic of Kazakhstan company”
In Kyrgyzstan, the responsibilities related to management of water resources used to be housed within the Ministry for Agriculture, Food Industry and Land Reclamation of the Kyrgyz Republic, and there with the Department of Water Management and Melioration. In 2019, the Department was transformed into the State Agency for Water Resources under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic. This change means that the status and importance of water has increased. The management is carried out with seven basins of water management related having seven provisions. On the ground (local level) in terms of water distribution and implementation, there are many entities involved in managing water; including those managing water use by municipalities (ayil okmoty), engineers (murab) and water user associations (WUA). As shown above, many sub-national bodies play a role in water management, each having different functions, in addition to the entities involved at the national level of water governance. Unfortunately, implementation of the Water Code in the countries faces many gaps and contradictions in legislation, difficulties in development of new national water strategies, lack of interconnections between ministries at the national level, and challenges to implementation of
42 any new approach. As a result, IWRM (Integrated Water Resources Management), has faced more difficulties in Kyrgyzstan than in Kazakhstan (Dzhayloobaev, 2008; G. Sarsenbaeva, 2005). In the past, during the Soviet era, Central Asian countries were guided by the Integrated Schemes of Water Resources Protection and Use Plans (SCWRUP). According to Abdullaev and Rakhmatullaev (2016), these SCWRUP have similarities with IWRM. However, the IWRM concept has a wider scope in terms of size and scale of basin, comprises hybrid issues, prioritizes environment components and considers economic tools in its implementation. Kazakhstan launched IWRM in 2004 by developing its “National plan for IWRM and water efficiency”. This plan focused on a basin-wide approach to water management (Xenarios et.al. 2020). Kazakhstan was the first country in the region to initiate this process at a political level and take steps for implementation. In parallel, Kyrgyzstan - despite having a Water Code which provided for basin water management through the establishment of Water Basin Councils, the implementation of the integrated water management moved more slowly than planned (Sehring, 2009). However, the country started the process of the National Policy Dialogue on IWRM in 2007 which was supported and financed by the European Commission. This multi-stakeholder dialog on the national level allows sitting together at one table to discuss existing water problems with applying best practices and develop an action plan. Later, in 2010, Kazakhstan initiated the same National Policy Dialogue process in the country (OECD, 2013). Kazakhstan started to actively promote IWRM in their basins and announce their commitment to follow that process at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 (Kenshimov, 2004). Despite that Government's bodies faced intricate contradictions and concerns, the sectoral integration helped to conciliation between all interests.
4.4 International collaboration
According to Savenije and Van der Zaag (2000), specific actions and forms of cooperation can be neighborliness, recognition of riparian interests, development of joint activities, and turning a crisis into an opportunity. The main point of this section is to look behind the national scope, for improved understanding of the expression of national interest in international cooperation.
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4.4.1 Recognition of riparian interests
According to Wolf (2005) countries claim their rights based on the past, which means that these claims are based on legitimacy, history, or something that has changed. It follows that Kazakhstan, which is interested in the primary provision of its water allocation quotas, focuses on historic claims to those prior allocations. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan has been developing a national water resources plan in the water-energy context, which is directly linked with socio- economic stability for them. This contradiction in terms of the different national interests of development in each country happened as a consequence of historical conditions that were established in the Soviet era. At that time, the distribution of water was based on the regional goals that Kyrgyzstan should focus on livestock production and develop this sector. In contrast, the goal for downstream countries (in this case Kazakhstan) was to bring new lands under irrigation and to develop the agricultural sector. As a result, the distribution of water was based on the principle of exchange (The Agreement On Cooperation In The Joint Management, Use And Protection Of Water Resources Of Interstate Sources (1992), where rules of the relationship between the countries designated that downstream countries would ensure a supply of cheap fuel and gas to upstream countries, while upstream countries would maintain former water allocations (quotas) and provide water without interruption to downstream countries. Equally important with respect to the allocation of water in the Chu-Talas River Basin which is also related to Provisions (1983). However, these rules were disturbed and in reality, in results water continues served according to Soviet quotas, in contrast, the impossibility to have gas and oil due to a higher price than in Soviet time. I mean that water availability should be periodically reviewed because the situation is changing due to external factors. Thus, Kyrgyzstan as an upstream country started to develop a water-energy sector, when Kazakhstan as a downstream country became concerned about the stability of getting water to the irrigation sector. Based on this, although both countries had their own different interests, the states showed the possibility for negotiation through joint deliberations of relevant issues. To summarizes, the recognition of riparian interests was achieved as an understanding of the situation in terms of needs. As an action, it was decided that Kyrgyzstan would have financial
44 support from Kazakhstan for the maintenance and operation infrastructure in Chu-Talas basin, whereas Kazakhstan was provided water for irrigation purposes.
4.4.2 Joint activities
According to the legislation, the Governments of both Republics are responsible for using and protecting the water resources. As mentioned above, in the Kyrgyz Republic the authorized body is the Agency on Water Resources under the Government (until 2019 the Department of Water Resources Management and Melioration), and regional water administrations. In Kazakhstan, it is the Committee on Water Resources under the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic. The basin councils are very developed in Kazakhstan compared to Kyrgyzstan where only in 2018 with the support of the World Bank was established the Chu and Talas Basin Council. The countries implemented this action in accordance with legislation, but in fact, there is no joint transboundary basin council for the Chu and Talas Rivers. Overall, analyses show that all actions in the Chu-Talas Basin are to some extent assisted by national Governments, but most of the assistance to interaction between states was given by donors through water‐related projects. Accordingly, Agreement (2000) on the bilateral level was established with international support, where the states were required to directly acknowledge joint water management and take joint action. Also, many Global Conventions were signed by both countries and they jointly understand the possibilities of working together in terms of bringing investments for further development through project finds. After the political agreement, many international organizations such as World Bank, Global Environment Facility (GEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and others carried out joint activities in the Chu-Talas river basin. The activities included development of guidelines to seek solutions, to identify problems, and to link needs with national interests. The international collaboration also occurs in stimulating collective thinking, creating the opportunity for getting various types of benefit beyond the boundaries of the river (Sadoff and Grey, 2004). This means that parties easily express initiatives to work on other complex transboundary environmental and technical problems
45 in or out of the basin, therefore converging toward cooperation and bypassing more sensitive issues. For instance, in 2004, a booklet about Chu-Talas Basin activity was published in Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Russian and English within the project “Support to the creation of the Commission on the Chu and Talas Rivers between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan”. In October 2006, parties created an official website of the Chu-Talas Basin, then a special video “Water area of common interests” was produced, in which highlights of the cooperation between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan of sharing of water resources of the Chu and Talas rivers were shown. Joint study tours for representatives of the water departments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were organized. There were also five long term projects: The UNECE project of “Dam safety in Central Asia: capacity building and regional cooperation”, the ADB project “Improving Water Management in Central Asia” 2005-2013, the project of the Swiss Cooperation Office "Promotion of interstate cooperation on water resources management of the transboundary Chu River, the UNECE / UNDP / EU joint project on adapting the use of water resources of the Chu and Talas river basins to climate change and last one the projects were “Promoting Transboundary Cooperation and Integrated Water Resources Management in the Chu and Talas Basins” (GEF) and “Improving Resilience to Climate Change and Adaptation Capabilities in the Transboundary Chu-Talas Basin” (UNECE) within implementation period 2015-2018. As a result, the countries have moved forward step by step, strengthening interstate cooperation in terms of achieving some results together and moving to the next one. As we can see above, parties actively promoted joint activities, which means that they have an opportunity to create trust, elaborate on joint water objectives, and to solve basin problems, as well as building capacity and to attract investment. 4.4.3 Turning a crisis into an opportunity
The sharing of international water resources happens not only in a manner of collaborative or political commitment, but also can occur in response to a specific situation which calls for urgent action. For example, natural disasters can be catalysts of improved cooperation between states (Kris van den Berg, 2017). Expanding the issues under consideration on various aspects of cooperation, accordingly, can create a certain environment by increasing the level of cooperation and interaction between countries. Thus, working on a solution to one problem within the basin
46 sometimes promotes the practice of joint work and increases the possibility of moving to more difficult issues, in particular on water management and distribution. Qaddumi (2008) gives examples, of instances when countries conclude agreements on one of the less sensitive issues and conduct work, which in the future helps them to more easily integrate in the achieve cooperation on issues. For example, the Columbia River Treaty is held of 1961, the US paid Canada for flood control and Canada was granted rights to provide water between the Columbia and Kootenai for hydropower purposes. Also, Project on the Senqu/Orange river basin used a number of mechanisms, as direct payments for water and financing arrangements. Also in the mentions of Ansell and Gash (2008), the cooperation cycle tends to develop when cooperation forums focus on “small victories” that require time and trust.
In the Chu-Talas basin, there are undeniably many questions that the parties can easily deal with, for example, joint measures for shore protection measures from flood protection and floods. Cooperation on these less sensitive issues could help achieve successful cooperation in other issues.
4.5 Conclusion
With respect to the framework of (Savenije and Zaag, 2000) , in the politics pillar we can see how shared water management is directly related to policies in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with politics playing a large role in terms of the dependence of economic sectors, social welfare and stability in the country. As a results, the interests represented in foreign policy directly depend on the actions and decisions taken by politicians whose efforts are legally binding. Therefore, the signing of the Agreement (2000) was designed specifically for the contribution of political will and the crisis of water relations of that time, which prompted the parties to try to cooperate against the backdrop of the emergency situation as well as choose the correct time for when to negotiate. Overall, since 2000, international relations have developed in a positive way. However, it is important to note that the history of interactions between the countries has contributed to present- day relationships, sometimes restraining conflicts or, in contrast, by increasing competition. Unfortunately, disputes are likely to be a constant, arising from the point of a common border and need for shared resources. Yet to be resolved is whether the countries of the region have the ability
47 to solve the issues at hand in a civil manner within the law, or whether they will repeat the mistakes of the past. Demonstrating independence in the political arena on both sides shows that states can discuss sensitive issues in a diplomatic manner within the law. In times of weak cooperation in the region, having similar legislation, and a political system which explicitly reflected the intention of helping create more trust helped move the countries forward in terms of signed agreements, in spite of their differences with respect to external development policies. The parties to these agreements strengthened their cross-border cooperation. The resulting sectoral integration served as a driver towards sustainability in cooperation. This kind of integration in the Chu-Talas River Basin has continued to fuel positive relationships in the region. Additionally, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan actively promote democracy, which has helped smooth the way for new initiatives. An example of this is that compared to other agreements in the region, the agreement “The Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas” brings a new approach to the norms of international law – “equitable and reasonable water use”. The cross-border integration has also had a positive influence in terms of economic benefit for both parties. Interruption of cooperation would thus bring risk to those benefits, and affect entire economies. Thus, the high degree of political attention in the economic sector on having open dialog helps to move them forward in taking into account issues of water resources. Regarding the IWRM approach, which is the basis of sharing international rivers in this research, sectoral integration contributed to collaborative policy consensus in terms of similarity of institutional rules, and shared norms with using this approach are fundamental to its success. Use of the Integrated Schemes of Water Resources Protection and Use Plans in the past by both countries made it easy to transfer and apply the concept of IWRM in this collaboration as a result of the similarity between them. The initiation of a national water dialogue focusing on IWRM brought together all sectors related to water issues in both countries. As a result, IWRM helped formulate common views in water resources management on political as well as sectoral levels. As has been noted Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have different interests in using and developing integrated water resources management. However, in starting their cooperation they started with an exploration of interests rather than ultimatums. This case study indicates that the approach in Kyrgyzstan was to announce the state positions, whereas Kazakhstan used a mutual
48 gain position as its approach. It means seeing each other not as a competitive partner, but rather as a vital ally. At the same time as they initiated this first step, they achieved recognition of interest in the political arena, and then developed policies that were solution-seeking. Later, the interest- based negotiations showed that recognition of riparian interests and interdependencies is not enough to promote sustainable cooperation. In order to strengthen cooperation, parties must deal honestly with one another, and focus their efforts on win-win solutions, which helps build more trust. Obviously, the joint activities in the basin assisted in producing small successes in cooperation. As we can see, cooperation takes many years, and requires hard work with a versatile approach. Political support for these activities contributes to international experience, and to consideration of other advantages of cooperation. Examples of successful cooperation also increases credibility of both parties with donors. With respect to the sustainability of cooperation, political support exerts a positive influence in terms of providing a variety of opportunities for solving basin problems and achieving some shared goals together. However, most assistance comes from international donors and not from the national governments, making the sustainability of cooperation vulnerable.
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Chapter V. Technical cooperation
Technical cooperation activities reveal how countries can cooperate beyond political issues and achieve some positive results. In transboundary rivers, with riparian countries seeking to cooperate on the basis of benefit-sharing mechanisms, it can be very difficult to define solutions that are win-win in character. Basically, countries tend to try to initiate cooperation from different perspectives in parallel, and do not forget their own interest. Here technical cooperation as an alternative to noncooperation could be a trigger to cooperate further, because technical cooperation is usually related to prestigious projects, national strategies, and programs as well as joint actions involving many actors for improving existing infrastructure. Moreover, many significant projects are ready to contribute to supporting national development aspirations in water facilities.
5.1 The role of hydraulic infrastructure
To begin with, I would like to distinguish between the concepts of water resources management and the management of hydro-technical infrastructure, which have different meanings. While the first one refers to national strategies of planning, regulating, and developing water resources by decision-makers, the second one refers to the technical regulation of activities related to the operation of technical infrastructure by engineers. Overall, in Central Asia, the operatio and management of water infrastructure is a very sensitive and unresolved issue. In particular, most of the disputes are related to the recent delimitation of national borders within shared river basins. In the Soviet era, water was managed without consideration of national borders within Central Asia, but after independence, countries started to take national ownership of the water facilities within their borders. However, some water facilities were located on controversial borders. This last aspect is not an issue regarding water infrastructure in the Chu-Talas Basin. The parties clearly defined the border. It was also important that the list of water facilities subject to interstate regulation were agreed upon and included in the Agreement (2000). Most of the major dams, canals, and water systems in Central Asia were built in the Soviet era (Valentini et. al., 2004). Thus, the water management infrastructure of Central Asia consists of hundreds of reservoirs, irrigation systems, pumping stations, canals, and integrated water
50 networks. For this reason, infrastructure has been in use for several decades and is often deteriorated and in need of renovation. In addition, , they suffer great losses in evaporation and infiltration.
In the Chu-Talas basin, as already mentioned, the main water distribution facilities are the Kirov and Orto Tokoy reservoirs, a number of canals and a hydroelectric facility.
Source: K-news Figure 8 – The Kirov reservoir The construction of the Kirov reservoir took ten years; it was built during the 1960s -70s on the Talas River, and was put into operation in 1976. The Kirov reservoir is located on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic with a volume of 5500 million cubic meters. The reservoir is managed by the Kirov Reservoir Administration under the State water resources agency under the Government of Kyrgyz Republic. The Kirov Reservoir Administration, as well as Kazakh Dzhambul Regional Water Management Directorate, are responsible for the calculation of water distribution and monitoring of factual water flow. Then they are to report to Central Ministries of both countries. The Orto-Tokoy reservoir is located on the Chu River. This was the first reservoir built in Kyrgyzstan in 1956. Its length is about 18 km, and the volume is more than 4700 million cubic meters. (Ragettli, et.al., 2018)
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Source: k-news
Figure 9 – The Orto-Tokoy reservoir
Both reservoirs are considered strategic, which means that they are state property having the social and economic significance of a national character. Kazakhstan is located downstream of Chu and Talas rivers as a riparian state, and is dependent of water release from the reservoirs which are located upstream and have transboundary significance. Therefore, technical cooperation is a key issue in this case for both of the countries in terms of bargaining.
5.1.1 Operational issues: water distribution
The successful operation and maintenance of water networks means getting a sufficient quantity of water of sufficient quality for the intended use. The countries of the region care deeply about water as a life-sustaining resource for their own welfare, making themselves stronger in terms of food security, health, and independence. In contrast, the loss of water from water networks, and lack of attention to and action on water problems makes countries of the region vulnerable and sensitive. For this reason, most of the countries in Central Asia have initiated huge projects for strengthening and improving water-related issues, in particularly reconstruction or building of dams, canals and water networks (Valentini et. al., 2004) Here, it should be noted that the World Bank has actively supported Central Asian countries in the idea of construction and reconstruction of water facilities with the aim to see an improvement in water resources management(Valentini et. al., 2004)
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Water distribution requires daily operational decisions, control of implementation on the local level, as well as political intervention in a transboundary context. Many external factors affect the quantity of water available for distribution, such as infiltration, evaporation, climate change, and water scarcity, which exacerbate the situation of delivery of water to the consumer. Water distribution, operation, and maintenance of water infrastructure is the main issue of cooperation in the Chu-Talas River Basin. According to the Agreement (2000), parties recognize efficient use of water management facilities as significant for obtaining water (Article 9). At the beginning of their cooperation, the countries understood the importance of a peaceful relationship as neighbors and their interdependent costs and benefits of sharing common resources. Indeed, this cooperation concerns not only an official decision in the form of political will but also was manifested later in the form of daily decisions and actions to comply with obligations and agreements. Daily decisions related to the monitoring and delivery of water by Kyrgyzstan as the upstream country, and the role of Kazakhstan as a consumer of water for irrigation purposes. In the Chu-Talas Agreement, parties emphasize joint activities to protect water management facilities, following the Provisions for sharing the Chu and Talas Rivers (1983), in which the amount of water (limits) for the republics was very clearly figured out, taking into account possible losses. An analysis of the Provisions (1983) of the Soviet era shows that the foundation of technical cooperation was laid at this time. For example, in the Protocol of the meeting of the parties on the division of the flow of the Talas River (July 18, 1983), parties had been discussing the elimination of infiltration, problems of wastewater elimination of Dzhambul city, ending with the construction of canals and joint anti-filtering measures. The provisions (1983) show the calculations of the volume of water, and at what specific point or hydropost (where water is distributed and where the measurement takes place) flow volumes must be met. After independence, countries further complied to these limits, based on which annual schedules of water supply are developed. While the Kyrgyz side supplies water, Kazakhstan, by its gauging stations, controls incoming volumes. However, over time, water distribution started to create some disagreement, and relationships began to change. The evidence for that includes many media publications such as (Мегаролис «Как кыргызы с казахами воду не поделили», 2013), Радио Азаттык «В приграничной зоне снова наблюдается дефицит воды» (2014), 24 KG “Реки Чу и Талас:
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акватория интересов Кыргызстана и Казахстана (2017)”. If the Kazakh side spoke of non- compliance to these limits, the Kyrgyz side would argue that these accusations were not true. In the next section, I consider in more detail the issue of water distribution, around which there are many disputes between the countries. Many scholars interpret this problem as emerging as a result of pressure by the Kyrgyz side (Demydenko, 2004), Others link these disagreements to the changing of the management regime for dams in this basin (Wegerich, 1997). According to Demydenko (2004), the quantity of water in the Kirov reservoir and its outflow was changed in the period from 1994 to 1998 on the basis of activities such as water discharge in the non-growing season by Kyrgyzstan, which resulted in reduced water supply to agriculture in Kazakhstan during the growing season which is the most important time for them to receive water. Consequently, an interesting point was raised by Zinzani and Menga (2017), who argue that the Agreement was signed due to the willingness of Kazakhstan to get a stable water supply regarding limits. In order to achieve this, they were ready to accept to contribute to the cost of maintenance and operation of water facilities. However, Wegerich (2007) argues that the arrangement did not have a close enough link with the equitability of distribution of money and distribution of water. Moreover, the Agreement in 2002 did not help the Kazakh side to get special privileges. In other words, perhaps each party, in the beginning, interpreted cooperation, not as a common good in the development and stability of relations but rather as an achievement of their own purposes. During the cooperation, a basket of benefits started to be more about opportunities and alternatives. In fact, the 1970-1980 “Schemes for the integrated use and protection of water resources” which was developed in the Soviet era for all major rivers of Central Asia, (including the Chu and Talas River Basins) took into account groundwater and renewable water within the boundaries of each river basin. Thus, the water share (quota) for the republics was based on these numbers. The quotas set in the 1970s do not reflect current conditions in terms of intensive climate change as both a consequence and driver of water scarcity in the region. Additionally, the volume of water available for allocation is directly related to the quality of the infrastructure, which requires constant maintenance and improvements. Kyrgyzstan has experienced technical difficulties as deterioration of infrastructure within in meeting obligations for releasing water to downstream countries, which creating difficulties of
54 providing water in the vegetation period to farmers and ensuring water supply to the downstream country. Also, the situation heated up in response to external factors when Kazakhstan began to take advantage of rising prices of oil, coal, and gas for import to upstream countries. Kyrgyzstan, in turn, began to alter water flows from their hydroelectric facilities (Matie Izguierdo, et al., 2010). The document “The Water Relations in Central Asia dataset (2014)” shows the water relations among the countries in Central Asia, and illustrates that these types of events between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had been conflictive, especially before they signed the Agreement (http://wrcad.info). Generally, main issue of these disputes was about serious water shortage after Bishkek cut supplies in response to Kazakhstan’s failure to meet agreed upon energy supplies Thus, the operational issues of water distribution can bring some problems, but a signed Agreement helps to solve them within a legal framework and did not allow these disputes to escalate the conflict.
5.1.2 The operation and maintenance of infrastructure
This chapter continues the discussion begun in the previous section, because all technical cooperation in terms of interstate structures is connected with the process of cost of delivery of water and distribution as a financial component between countries. According to the World Bank study of “Irrigation in Central Asia, social, economic and environmental aspects” (World Bank, 2015), funding for operation and maintenance of irrigation and drainage systems in Kazakhstan decreased by 21 times after the 1990s, and in Kyrgyzstan, no more than one- third of the minimum costs of maintaining and technical inspection of these systems were covered from the state budget. However, for maintaining the complex water management system, each of the countries needs to regularly provide timely modernization of its hydro-technical infrastructure. Technical failure or poor functioning of hydraulic facilities contributes to the disruption of the implementation of interstate agreements on water allocation. In the Chu-Talas basin, it should again be noted that the mechanism was laid down in 1998 between parties that already had a Protocol about operation of water facilities for joint interstate use. It was the first document in which parties came to an agreement on shared participation in the maintenance and operation of water facilities in terms of interstate sharing and identifying main water facilities in the basin such as: Orto-Tokoy reservoir, the Western and Eastern Bolshie Chu Canals with the Chumysh Hydrosystem on the River Chu,
55 and the Kirov Reservoir on the River Talas. Financial expenses were designated as: operational, capital maintenance, amortization charges for the full restoration of fixed assets in proportion to the volume of water which each entity is getting. Moreover, parties together determined the amount of annual expenditure - 2,484 thousand dollars, or 26.7%, where rate of Kazakhstan is 663 thousand dollars, and Kyrgyzstan - 1821 thousand dollars or 73.3%. In addition, the parties agreed that, to ensure the safety and reliability of these water facilities, necessary capital investments would be made which provide approximately $ 16.5 million dollars per year (Agreement, 1998). The situation will be clarified when we understand in more detail the interdependence of the disputes around the distribution of water, specifically those associated with financing the infrastructure. The Kazakh side pays a 220 thousand dollars (last 5 years) of expense annually, and independently reviews and draws up a plan for the repair and maintenance of its part. The Kyrgyz side also contributes money for Chu-Talas basins infrastructure from the national budget, and as described in the previous chapter, water is distributed equally and every year according to established quotas (Agreement, 1983) In the case of the Chu-Talas river basin, “the Parties shall annually allocate necessary funds for operation and maintenance of water management facilities of intergovernmental status”(Article 6, Agreement (2000). . Kyrgyzstan itself has not the possibility to finance the remainder, thus there is no mechanism to cover the full cost of technical operations, and thus an impasse arises. The financial difficulties are related to the weakness of the national budget in Kyrgyzstan, particularly the lack of financing for the water sector. According to economic principles, the marginal benefit should be equal to the marginal cost in an efficient system; clearly the current system is not operating efficiently. Thus, we consider two dependencies: water distribution and financing. As mentioned earlier, the total amount which is needed to maintain all the construction in the Chu-Talas basin requires 663 thousand dollars annually, payment by the Kazakh side approximately consists of 220 thousand dollars, which is about 30%, from Kyrgyz side about 1555.4 thousand dollars which is about 50% (The Chu-Talas river basin Commission, N.D.). From this perspective, the amount of water flow that the Kazakh side is getting is more than they had funding for operation and maintenance. Here, the quantity of water depends on the condition of water facilities. This clearly demonstrates that increasing amounts of money does not mean increasing the volume of water to Kazakhstan, it is about amount of water which is provided via water networks
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and directly depends on the conditions of this infrastructure. The significant problem in this situation is that it is impossibile to cover all present-day costs of operation and maintenance due to underfunding from both of sides. As a consequence, the region is experiencing deterioration of the infrastructure. In addition, decreasing water discharges in the river are being caused by climate change (Nikitin, 2009), which exacerbates the situation in the both countries. Also, co- financing by Kazakhstan does not mean that the payment goes directly to Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, Kazakhstan performs certain contracted construction its own expense, in other words, the Kyrgyz side cannot claim and dictate its own operating costs. In fact, before the creation of the Commission, the Kyrgyz side did not have any reports of the activities of the Kazakh side, only confirmation of what was already done. According to the economic market allocation mechanism, driving resource allocation is at market equilibrium, the consumers (users) who value the good most highly are the ones who get it.
5.2 Joint projects
Scholars identified that technical cooperation is achieved through joint work and initiatives of specialists who more deeply understand the specifics of the issue of the required operational solution on the ground (Alaerts, 2015). Because these water managers represent different sectors, the issues at the Chu-Talas Commission meetings cover many aspects of water management. As mentioned earlier, Integrated Water Resources Management requires comprehensive planning of water management tasks. As noted by Holbert (2006), the creation of the Commission and similar basin organizations usually creates the prerequisites for a sustainable platform with the engagement of investments from the international community. As an example, Chu-Talas River Basin shows this, with the agreement signed in 2000 it was opening opportunities to donors to engage within the framework of this cooperation. Shortly after the Agreement of 2000 was signed, the parties began to implement numerous joint projects with the active involvement of specialists from both sides. The most important and urgent problems in the basin were identified at the negotiating table, and then plans to address them were developed. For implementation of these plans, it is necessary to have national support as well as outside funding, given the limited budget from the states to the water sector. This case
57 demonstrates this fact, because of the number of jointly implemented projects increased starting from 2000 after signing the Agreement. After the Agreement was reached, it was a reliable platform for grants and support from donors. The first occasions of support were in 2003, the Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE), The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) initiated the project “Support to creation of the Chu and Talas River Commission between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan” (Chu-Talas I), funded by the United Kingdom, Sweden and Estonia. The project contributed to the creation of a bilateral Commission in 2006 and the development of the Regulation within Commission. This project has been implemented regarding basic principles of the Strategy for Cooperation on the Rational and Efficient Use of Water and Energy Resources in Central Asia, adopted as part of the UN Special Program for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA). As a continuation of this program, a separate project involving specialists for strengthening public participation in the decision-making process of river water resources was created. In parallel began the development of working groups within Commission of the Secretariat with specialists from the two states, for example the following working groups were initiated: working group on legal and institutional issues, distribution of water resources, economics, monitoring and data exchange working group, safety of hydraulic infrastructure and environmental protection group. But unfortunately, not all these working groups functioned as originally planned, only some of them were supported and developed as part of joint projects of the Chu-Talas Commission such as the working group on environmental protection, on quantity and quality of water resources, and on the safety of hydraulic infrastructure. In other words, in this project parties identify some priorities in the basin which require joint efforts to solve specific issues. In 2004, a study tour to Estonia was organized for representatives of water Agencies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (June 18-24). The aim of the study was to exchange experience to the Russian-Estonian Commission which also has similarities in terms of the transboundary context. This kind of visit demonstrates the possibility to give the question and to see future opportunities and to avoid mistakes in joint water management. In 2006, an international workshop “Transboundary Water Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the Chu-Talas river basin” took place in Almaty, as part of the
58 project of cross-border Cooperation Center, Estonia, and «Жалгас-Каунтерпарт» (Kazakhstan) and Counterpart-Sheriktesh ( Kyrgyzstan). Within this framework of the seminar, parties discussed problems of ensuring access to information and public participation in transboundary water management. In continuation of this project, as first attempt was created a website: www.talaschu.org, and later was transferred to the Commission for use as its official website. By the inauguration of the Commission, a special video was made, “Water area of common interests” in English and Russian languages. This step in a relationship shows bright advertising which makes a statement to the international community concerning some progress in cooperation. The next significant project was the UNECE Project “Dam Safety in Central Asia: Capacity Building and Regional Cooperation”. A joint expert group, which included experts from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Russia inspected some technical status of the Kirov reservoir, as well as other water infrastructure in the basin. Based on the results, the parties decided to work on this way further in terms of providing automation water monitoring system. For the first time, data of water quantity could be shown in real-time and allowed both side to see real situation on the ground. From 2005 to 2013, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has implemented “Improving Water Resources Management in Central Asia” Project. Under this project, all organizational, methodological conditions and financial support were created for the work of the Commission, its Secretariat and expert working groups in the beginning, also additionally all office equipment was purchased and installed. In April 2011, a trip tour for commission members to Thailand and Laos was organized and funded to share experience with the Mekong River Commission. In 2008 to 2015, the Project of Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) “Promotion of interstate cooperation on water resources management of the transboundary Chu River” was conducted. The purpose of this project was to increase the reliability and operational information on the availability of water flow and runoff, which is necessary for Chu-Talas Commission to decision-making process. The most recent and extensive joint activities are the Project of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) “Promoting Transboundary Cooperation and Integrated Water Resources Management in the Chu and Talas River Basins” and the project “Improving Resilience to Climate Change and Adaptation Capabilities in the Transboundary Chu-Talas Basin” (UNECE) with the implementation period 2015-2018. National specialists jointly with international experts
59 developed the transboundary diagnostic analysis (TDA) whereas priority parties selected key transboundary problems: quantity, water quality and ecosystem degradation. By the decision of the Commission, a new working group was established from nominated specialists’ counties’ Agencies and members of the Chu-Talas Water Commission. Further work of the project consists in demonstrating individual adaptation measures, assessing the economic efficiency and feasibility of adaptation measures, identifying priority measures through consultation processes, raising awareness of the potential impacts of climate change and adaptation options - communicating the results to audiences from local to international levels. Thus, a variety of projects shows how cooperation helps to go forward in terms of increasing quantity of them. They are very different appear related to the priority of problem solution. Definitely, these projects bring a positive shift because they allow experts from both sides being in touch, actively implement technologies that bring motivation and generate a common understanding ((The Chu-Talas river basin Commission, N.D.)Moreover, some projects create capacity building through broad awareness, knowledge and expertise.
5.3 Human resources development
As mentioned above, one way to strengthen cooperation is joint work on projects and working groups, which requires constant interaction between the parties for coordination and developing relationship, respectively. These joint efforts create a certain community of human relations based on expert views to solving problems in the basin. These relationships are often at the level of water experts who do not think about making a policy on this, or investing, or creating a separate organization, these are people who speak the same language - engineering and professionals in their field, their goal is to find an engineering solution to protect and provide water to the population. Indeed, joint trips, for example, to exchange experiences in the Danube river basin or participate in global water forums, create this kind of community who have the same understanding of issues (Haas, 1992). The shared experience and first-hand observation on the ground helps parties involved to see a problem from the same perspective, making the path to a solution easier to find. Bernauer (2001), looked at the question, “what efforts in transboundary water management lead to more successful and strengthened cooperation?”, and stated that it is necessary to understand the point of view of the partner in cooperation. Another author, Marty (1997),
60 concluded that collaboration begins by focusing on small things and solving problems on the operational level. In the Chu-Talas basin, water engineers and specialists play a major role. It is also necessary to clarify that public participation in this process is not well-developed, so the term specialists in this context means representatives of the different ministries and agencies of both parties who are related to water management. Usually the list of specialists in the Chu-Talas meetings includes a small group of the same people whose positions are related to the issues addressed in the meetings. Additionally, on very important working groups of Chu-Talas Commission within the framework of the current Commission experts can closely work together. Most of them successfully present results where we can see concerted action because these parties are continuously working together. Thus, it seems that the parties began to work on less sensitive aspects and moved forward when some results were achieved. For example, the Kyrgyz part presented their results on Water National Dialog of Kyrgyzstan (the discussion all water related issues)which occurs on a high level. Equally important is that their communication contributed to the strengthening of relations at a non-political level, this is evidenced by the interaction of specialists outside the official Chu- Talas session and friendly relations on a personal level. Indeed, common coordination of actions to support and develop integrated management depends on the quality of daily actions of such specialists. They are professionals in the water sector but have a limitation of power in terms of making a decision and impact on policy. In other words, they are key actors on an operational level and presenting the interstate result to politicians. At the same time, one of the observation related to the Chu-Talas River Basin is that while water managers with an engineering background exert a positive influence on technical solutions in the basin, they are also the product of Soviet education, with narrow thinking in terms of negotiation. Education in the Soviet era focused on hard science, but today, it is also important for water professionals to understand the negotiation process based on future perspective and broad thinking. In contrast, the younger generation who will be future water managers lack strong knowledge in the technical aspect, and they are less involved in cooperation in the basin. Thus, human resources development in the Chu-Talas basin has two sides. First, there is a need for water managers who can find technical solutions and bring them to the negotiation table, which helps to make communication easier in terms of understanding each other based on factual
61 knowledge, and second, capacity building. However, the previous section of this chapter illustrates that many joint projects focused on promotion of international examples of cooperation in development. Unfortunately, this effort by specialists does not directly influence cooperation flows, because of the final decision made by politics at a high level.
5.4 Data and information sharing mechanisms
Many discussions at a high level (such as UNECE, Global Water Partnership and Conferences related to transboundary water management) have recognized the importance of information exchange and data sharing mechanisms between countries (Report of UNECE, 2011); (Schmeier, 2013). Almost every developed Convention on Transboundary Water Cooperation considers this tool as a necessary one. For the Central Asian region, data and information sharing mechanisms are also a new approach. During the Soviet era, countries were not concerned about having control of these data, in that time it was more about collecting them, submitting them on time, and transmitting data to Moscow. After independence, the old and partly obsolete water measuring instruments, hydro posts, and laboratories for monitoring of water quality led to decreased collection of data. As a result, data are lacking that could provide full information on the condition of water resources in the region. According to Gerlak (2011) multilateral water cooperation in Central Asia was not successful, data and information sharing was not implemented as planned. Rather, quite the opposite has happened. A gap has been created due to political factors, mistrust, and economic issues. Overall, data and information exchange mechanisms in Central Asia are poorly developed, and motivation for improvement is lacking. Both ongoing mistrust and internal problems of weak monitoring systems did not allow updating the data bank.(reference)
Lack of shared data for water management has been very problematic for Kazakhstan as well as Kyrgyzstan. Although the mechanism for data sharing was embedded in the Commission’s Statute, the parties did not immediately begin to work following this statement. In outlining the Commission's principal objectives for data sharing, paragraphs 8 and 9 say: "Organize an exchange of hydrological forecasts and data related to water management in the Chu and Talas basins and other up-to-date information"
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and "Agree upon and coordinate the programs of monitoring water bodies, water and hydrotechnical facility assessment and water inventory in order to develop a common basin-based water monitoring and assessment system in the Chu and Talas basins". Thus, the parties clearly indicated what type of information they need and how this data will be managed. This specificity in the document further helped donors exactly to know where to invest and exercise project activities. Moreover, the parties began to see more advantages of this format of cooperation. For example, Switzerland has made commitments to the financing of more monitoring networks with automated control systems. As a result, SCADA systems were installed at 13 water facilities (10 in Kyrgyzstan and 3 in Kazakhstan), including five interstate facilities; this project also created centers for training and advanced training of specialists in the field of water accounting and automation. As a result, for the consistent and secure management of operational hydrological data and their analysis, an online web tool had been implemented. This tool included processing of daily data on river flows, building and changing operational water flow curves, daily hydrological bulletins, and automatically predicting river flows of different times. As a result, the parties decided to get out quarterly hydrological bulletins or newsletters (Appendix 1), where parties could analyze hydrological changes in the Chu and Talas Rivers, and more accurately make a decision in advance and during the vegetation period. Overall, we can see a growth trajectory in cooperation through the mechanisms of data and information exchange. The parties tried to develop cooperation via strengthening relations based on trust and social well-being. Trust was more important for the Kazakh side as the downstream country where they could see how much water really flows into the canals through the transparency of the current situation, and social well-being consisted of reducing tension between farmers who were arguing about the distribution of water on the field. It often seems that such openness of data makes the Kyrgyz side controlled by Kazakh side, in terms of reporting, but on the other hand, particularly in dry years and under increasing tension, the Kazakh side can see the real situation on the ground and understand why there is a shortage of water. Finally, parties have agreed that this tool helps the parties move forward through joint work and greater confidence.
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5.5 Conclusion
The technical aspect of cooperation has shown its importance for the Chu-Talas River Basin, which to this day has many unresolved problems. The significant one is hydraulic infrastructure and related to this are operational issues of water distribution. Both sides have their own view on this situation, and require referring to the agreements reached, which is also a positive resolution of the issue in the framework of peace negotiations, which makes cooperation a platform for resolving issues and not avoiding them. The trends of degradation of the irrigation systems of Chu-Talas basin could be irreversible in the absence of significant support from external donor organizations. The support from donors allows improving water facilities through priorities of concerns in the basin. Despite the fact that there have been major financial investments into the operation and maintenance of joint water infrastructure by parties in the water system, the basin still has disputes over water resources. However, the parties still show a commitment to work together on it through joint projects and capacity building. The existing variety of projects shows many different kinds of activities which bring together the interests of states on long-term basis, and commitment from donors to support robust interactions. Data and information sharing mechanisms illustrate possibilities for further cooperation in the Central Asian context based on trust and social well-being. The human resources development issues point to multiple needs for capacity building in the region, based on different levels of influence on cooperation. Water managers have tended to be more technical in nature, which is typical of the generation who received a Soviet education. While the common perspective provided by a similar background and technical focus enhances the ability of managers to understand each other, managers with other skills are needed to introduce “soft power” and flexibility in the negotiation process.
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Chapter VI. Discussion and Conclusions
The current paper is aimed at identifying the factors which contribute to sustaining long- term cooperation in sharing transboundary watercourses through investigating the question, how does the initial cooperation between countries transform into sustainable cooperation and which elements of cooperation are the most important for sustaining cooperation thought time? The analysis presented in chapters 2 through 5 above investigated a case study of cooperation over transboundary rivers in Central Asia: The Chu-Talas River basin.
Cooperation over shared transboundary rivers can take different forms. In this thesis, I scrutinized cooperation using the framework of Savenije and Zaag (2000), who conceptualized three pillars of integrated water management which provide a foundation for cooperation and ensure sustainability – institutions, politics, and technical cooperation. My analysis went beyond fitting the case study into the framework, but rather, I compared observed results with those expected from the framework and identified aspects where my analysis diverges.
Basically, all three pillars are hypothesized to be important elements for sustainability of cooperation over time, and the conceptual framework suggested by Savenije and Zaag (2000) illustrates the critical character of these elements for the cooperation over shared water resources. In the research presented, I attempted to analyze cooperation in the Chu and Talas river basins between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and identified which pillars are important for sustainable cooperation, by revealing dependencies among them, and changes in the relative importance of each factor over time. Generally, a history of cooperation under different political systems or institutions may provide some support for sharing transboundary waters. The reason why cooperation in the Chu- Talas basin was successful at first is because both sides realized that they had been able to cooperate before and so believed that they could successfully sustain that cooperation.
How does the initial cooperation between countries transform into sustainable cooperation? Historical analysis of the cooperation over Chu-Talas rivers between two countries in the research revealed that cooperation elements defined at the beginning of the bilateral relations
65 sustained through time. In the other words – political commitment, institutional settings and technical arrangements demonstrated durability in changing political relations, despite sometimes unfavorable regional climate. Technical cooperation even demonstrated progress and advancement through years.
Which factors contributed to sustainable long-term cooperation? In the case of Chu-Talas river basin all the three elements of cooperation - institutions, political commitment and technical collaboration contributed to sustainability of cooperation. I argue that these elements were all important for sustainability, but to varying degree. The institutions pillar demonstrated significant importance in the Chu-Talas basin, given the interest of the both parties to maintain created institutions and comply with the agreement. For both countries it was the first experience of creating joint water commission for bilateral interaction between parties. The organizational structures assessment of effectiveness (Table 5) showed that most of the factors of the Agreement are functioning and could be viable to solve current and future problems in the basin despite lacking formal organizational status, difficulties in funding, and internal political turbulence. However, the analysis also revealed that functioning of the cooperative institutions was highly dependent on political will and relations between the countries. It means that the signing of the agreement could not have been achieved without political determination and commitment. International organizations can help with the development of an agreement and financial support of collaboration, however, at the end an Agreement will only be signed and implemented when it is approved at the political level. For example, one of the attempts of international donors was to develop a water agreement between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but this Agreement was never signed and agreed by politicians, and as a result, it was not developed further (Дусик & Нурмамедова, 2015). In addition, despite the absence of national budget funding for the Secretariat, sessions are held at a high level with the mandatory participation of key national ministries and departments of the parties. In fact, the meetings were organized because of political commitment and instructions from the decision-makers. This again confirms the importance of politicians - without the instructions and support from decision-makers, it is difficult to bring and involve all national organizations together, often the meetings can be simply ignored.
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The analysis of cooperation in the Chu-Talas Basin illustrates that in some cases, the institutional pillar is highly dependent on the political pillar, and at the same time is relatively independent from the technical cooperation pillar. Indeed, the Commission, as well as the Secretariat, demonstrated effective institutional capacity for water management in coordination and implementation of many projects and working groups. In other words, as a joint body, this institution can solve technical issues and develop human potential. If an agreement has clearly spelled the mechanisms of cooperation, for example in the Chu-Talas basin (for example, by providing a monitoring system), then a separate pillar specifically focused on technical cooperation may not be necessary. The main issues concerning the distribution of water, and the maintenance and operation of water infrastructure, were discussed at the sessions of Chu-Talas river basin, and there was no need for another working group on technical issues. Results of the analysis of cooperation over time in this case study indicated that technical cooperation in Chu-Talas is dependent on both the political pillar and the institutions. The technical pillar was important in initiating sharing water resources in the basin, which means that the role of water infrastructure and delivery of water, as well as operational issues, are extremely important for both countries. From analyses of the events that make up the technical pillar, we can see weaknesses in the technical aspects surrounding cooperation, for example, some disagreements regarding water distribution, the financial contribution of maintenance, and operational water infrastructure between countries. Yet, despite the weakness of the technical cooperation in the basin, political strengths allowed the parties to solve or prevent potential conflicts. In other words, the importance of the technical cooperation pillar in this case depended on the politicians who have power to influence the final decision according to their countries’ policies. For example, the main reason the Provisions on water allocation in the Chu and Talas Rivers were not revised and renewed in 1983 was not due to technical information, but was simply because politicians did not decide to do this. Also, interdependencies between the two economies and established trade / exchange relationships were a powerful force promoting cooperation at least early on that.
Which elements of cooperation are the most important for sustaining cooperation thought time? The next argument regarding technical cooperation relates to the number of joint projects which show a positive shift in technical and human development in the basin. While these
67 projects can enhance cooperation, their implementation cannot occur without the permission of politicians for their activities in the basin. And finally, it should be noted that technical cooperation is closely connected with institutions, they depend on each other. In the other words, the Commission and its activities are aimed at resolving issues of a technical nature. However, it cannot be considered separately. The institutions as covering a technical collaborator, in terms of legislation, principles, rules and mechanisms help to solve issues and making execution mandatory. For instance, when technical efforts providing hydrological data and information in Chu-Talas basin were interrupted, parties referring to Agreement showed necessity continue to work and provide data.
Summary
The findings presented here support the conclusion that in this particular basin context, the three pillars of cooperation vary in their importance for its sustainability – the political pillar is of critical importance, whereas institutions are not critical, but they are important for promoting technical cooperation. And the latter, technical cooperation, is the weakest element in terms of its importance to sustainable cooperation and is highly dependent on the others. This finding is in contrast to the findings of the authors of the “cooperation temple” Savenije and van der Zaag. Their analysis of cooperation in the SADC region emphasized the crucial importance of the technical pillar of cooperation for the balance of the temple, while current research revealed central position of political “column”. The political pillar, with the strong influence of political will, was identified as the pillar with the least dependencies from institutions and technical cooperation. It was identified that this pillar has a strong historical beginning of mutual relations both before and after independence. Historically, the governance of water resources in Central Asia, equally, in Chu-Talas basin, has occurred through a top-down approach which forces parties to follow the chosen political strategy for the country's development. More research on the political aspects of Chu-Talas cooperation is needed to identify deeper political motives for cooperation. This finding suggests a strong dependency of water cooperation on the overarching politics and relations between the states. The latter argument does not pretend to ubiquity and should be tested in other contexts. As Savenije and van der Zaag came to different conclusion about the priority pillar in SADC region, most likely transboundary water cooperation demonstrates high dependence also on contextual factors. Political regimes of the newly independent states of Central
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Asia demonstrate strong authoritarian character (with the recent exception of Kyrgyzstan), and this fact may predetermine strong stress on political aspect in bilateral cooperation. Additional research is needed to prove or disprove this argument. Some scholars argue that donors funding plays important role in sustaining the cooperation through time in all the three pillars – political commitment, technical cooperation and institutions. However, this research is not covering this aspect to the extent to assess its influence on the official governments’ positions. Obviously, more research is needed to understand the role of donors in cooperative processes in the basin. The analysis presented here shows that the situation in the Chu-Talas Basin bears similarity to the existing framework for shared waters in many factors, including the IWRM approach as basic help for interaction. Over time, cross-border and sectoral integration strengthened cooperation. However, this political action occurred independently from technical issues and institutions in terms of the rationale which motivated those making decisions to cooperate. The reputation and image of the decision maker plays an important role. The rules of cooperation and the chosen strategies structuring cooperation are introduced through politicians, thereby the final decision to cooperate is essentially a political one. The findings also allow us to question conclusion about the relative importance of each of the pillars of cooperation in the sequence of events, or as priorities in sustaining cooperation. Unless it is embedded into appropriate political and institutional arrangements, technical cooperation cannot ensure long-term sustainable and comprehensive coverage.
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Appendix Unofficial translation AGREEMENT between the Government of the Kazakh Republic and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas The Government of the Kazakh Republic and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, hereinafter referred to as Parties, - guided by the Treaty on the Establishment of Common Economic Space, of April 30, 1994, signed by the Kazakh Republic, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbek Republic in Cholpon-Ata; - acknowledging the social, economic and environmental value of water resources; - attaching high importance to mutually beneficial cooperation in the use of water resources and to the reliability and safety of water management facilities of intergovernmental status; - mutually aspiring to find a more unassailable and fair solution to the efficient use of water management facilities in compliance with generally acknowledged norms of international law on water resources; - respecting the principles of good neighborly relations, equality and mutual assistance, have agreed on the following: Article 1 The Parties declare that the use of water resources and operation of water management facilities of intergovernmental status shall be aimed at the achievement of mutual benefit on the fair and equitable basis. Article 2 The Parties attribute to the water management facilities of intergovernmental status the following water management facilities owned by the Kyrgyz Republic: the Orto-Tokoiskoye Reservoir on the River Chu, the By-Pass Ferroconcrete Chu Canals on the River Chu from the Bystrovskaya Hydroelectric Power Plant to the city of Tokmok, the Western and Eastern Bolshie Chu Canals with the Chumysh Hydrosystem on the River Chu and the Kirovskoye Reservoir on the River Talas. Article 3 The Owning Party that possesses water management facilities of intergovernmental status has the right to compensation from the Utilizing Party that uses these facilities. The compensation shall cover necessary expenses to ensure their reliable and safe operation. Article 4 The Parties shall share expenses connected with the operation and maintenance of water management facilities of intergovernmental status and with other mutually agreed activities pro rata according to the amount of water they receive. Article 5 In order to ensure safe and reliable work of water management facilities of intergovernmental status, the Parties shall create permanent commissions to determine the working regimes and the range of necessary expenses for operation and maintenance. Article 6 The Parties shall annually allocate necessary funds for operation and maintenance of water management facilities of intergovernmental status. Article 7
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The Parties shall implement joint activities to protect water management facilities of intergovernmental status and adjacent territories from adverse effects of floods, mudflows and other natural disasters. Article 8 In emergencies arising on water management facilities of intergovernmental status due to unexpected natural disasters or technical catastrophes, the Parties shall immediately notify each other and undertake joint activities to prevent, extenuate and eliminate their effects. Article 9 In order to provide for the timely and efficient repair and restoration of water management facilities of intergovernmental status, the Parties acknowledge the need to use construction, repair, operation and industrial facilities of each other. Article 10 The Parties shall implement joint research and development activities on the efficient use of water resources and water management facilities. Article 11 The Parties shall create conditions for unimpeded and duty-free movement across their borders and territories of personnel, vehicles, equipment, raw materials and other objects necessary for the exploitation and maintenance of water management facilities of intergovernmental status. Article 12 The Parties shall resolve disputes and disagreements regarding the interpretation or application of the current Agreement through negotiations and consultations. Article 13 The Agreement may be altered or amended by joint decisions of the Parties in the form of separate protocols that shall become its integral parts. Article 14 The Agreement shall become valid from the date of the last written notification about the completion of all domestic procedures prescribed by the national legislation. The Agreement shall be valid for five years and shall be automatically prolonged for the next fiveyear period unless one of the Parties notifies the other Party in writing about its intention to cancel the Agreement not later than six months before the termination of the current five-year period. Signed in Astana on January 21, 2000 in two authentic copies, each in the Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Russian languages, all the texts equally valid. In case of disputes on the interpretation of the Agreement, the Parties shall use the text in the Russian language.
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Unofficial translation STATUTE of the Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas 1. General Provisions 1. The Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas, hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”, is established according to Article 5 of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas signed on January 21, 2000 in the city of Astana, hereinafter referred to as “the Agreement”. 2. The Commission shall be established to implement the goals and objectives of the Agreement. 3. The Commission shall base its activities on the Agreement and shall be guided by this Statute of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic Commission on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas, hereinafter referred to as “the Statute”. 4. The Statute shall regulate the principles and procedures of the Commission’s activities aimed at organizing cooperation of the Parties to ensure efficient use of water management facilities of intergovernmental status on the Rivers Chu and Talas. 5. This Statute shall define the principal objectives and functions, rights and responsibilities of the Commission, as well as the major procedures for organizing cooperation of the Parties under the Agreement. 2. Scope of Commission’s Activity 6. The scope of the Commission shall cover the following water management facilities of intergovernmental status owned by the Kyrgyz Republic: 1) Orto-Tokoyskoye Water Reservoir on the Chu River; 2) By-Pass Ferroconcrete Chu Canals on the Chu River from Bystrovskaya HPP to Tokmok; 3) Western Bolshoi Chu Canal; 4) Eastern Bolshoi Chu Canal; 5) ChumyshHydrosystem on the Chu River; 6) Kirovskoye Water Reservoir on the Talas River. 3. General Principles for the Establishment of the Commission 7. The Commission shall be established on a parity basis and shall operate under the leadership of the two co-chairmen appointed by the Parties. The membership of the Commission shall be defined based on the principle of equal representation of the Parties. 8. The Commission shall consist of the two parts: the Kazakh part of the Commission, consisting of a Chairman and its members appointed by the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz part of the Commission, consisting of a Chairman and its
78 members appointed by the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic. 9. The Commission Chairmen and members shall exercise equal rights and have equal responsibility. 10. The main form of the Commission’s activity shall be the sessions to be held at least twice a year. 4. Commission’s Principal Objectives 11. The following shall be the Commission’s principal objectives: 1) coordinate and consider the activities of the Parties related to the implementation of the Agreement; 2) develop and implement joint activities to satisfy the Parties’ public and business demand for water resources; 3) provide a comprehensive assessment and forecast of the status of water bodies, regulate water resource use to ensure mutual equitable and reasonable benefit sharing; 4) agree on the standard indicators of water consumption, water abstraction, water assessment and measurement; 5) agree on the documents regulating the procedures of organizing operation of the interstate use water facilities and cost-sharing of repair, operations, maintenance, flood control and other efforts, ensuring safety of these facilities; 6) agree on the operational regimes of water reservoirs and adjust the regimes and limits depending on the actual water content and water users’ needs; 7) establish a joint disaster response procedure, coordinate releases in the case of high water flows, flood control, mud slides control and other natural disaster control activities; 8) organize an exchange of hydrological forecasts and data related to water management in the Chu and Talas basins and other up-to-date information; 9) agree upon and coordinate the programs of monitoring water bodies, water and hydrotechnical facility assessment and water inventory in order to develop a common basinbased water monitoring and assessment system in the Chu and Talas basins; 10) organize joint scientific research and development in the area of interstate water facilities operation, maintenance and safety, as well as regulation and efficient use of the Chu and Talas water resources; 11) consider any other matters related to the Commission’s activities. 5. Commission’s Powers 12. In interaction with governmental and local authorities and agencies, local selfgovernments, public associations and citizens the Commission shall exercise the powers vested to it under the Agreement and this Statute. 13. In its activities the Commission shall also be guided by the previously approved documents on the interstate allocation of the Chu basin and the Talas basin water resources, including hydrofacilities, irrigation systems, canals and waterways, retaining the principles and structures of water allocation contained in them, and shall make them more detailed on an as-needed basis upon mutual agreement by the Parties. 6. Border Crossing Procedure 14. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Agreement, the Commission, in agreement with the border and customs services of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, shall establish the procedure of unhindered and duty free movement of personnel, vehicles, mechanisms, raw materials, materials and equipment, etc., intended for operation and maintenance of the interstate use water facilities through the borders and within the territory of
79 these states. 7. Commission’s Operation Procedure 15. At its sessions held interchangeably in the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, the Commission shall consider the issues raised by the Kazakh and Kyrgyz Parties or initiated by the Commission. 16. The Commission shall approve the draft agenda for the next meeting and its work plan for the next calendar year. As proposed by the Chairmen, the Commission may make changes in the work plan. The Chairmen of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz parts of the Commission shall preliminarily agree upon the issues to be included into the agenda of the session. The Chairmen may bring up additional issues to be considered at the session in addition to the ones earlier included into the agenda. The Commission shall make decisions regarding inclusion of such issues into the agenda. The tentative agenda shall be agreed upon by correspondence. If necessary, extraordinary sessions may be held upon a written request received from any of the Commission’s Chairmen. The procedure and regulations of extraordinary sessions shall be approved by the Commission’s Chairmen. 17. The venue and time of the next Commission session shall be decided upon at the previous session or in-between the sessions following a written proposal of one of the Chairmen. A response to the written proposal must be provided no later than 5 days after the receipt of the proposal. If the proposed time or venue for the Commission to be convened appears to be unacceptable for some reason, the respective Party shall communicate that in its response, suggesting desirable time and venue for the session. 18. The Commission session shall be chaired by the Chairman of the hosting part of the Commission. The Chairman of the other Party shall act as the Deputy Chairman. 19. The Commission shall make consensus-based decisions. In case of any disagreement regarding any issue, the Parties shall conduct additional consultations and consider the issue at the next session of the Commission. 20. At its first session the Commission shall consider and reach a consensus-based decision to adopt the procedures and regulations for the session and shall be entitled to add details to its rules of procedure. 21. The official languages of the Commission shall be the Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Russian languages. The working language at the sessions of the Commission shall be Russian. 22. The outcomes of the session shall be incorporated into the minutes, containing individual paragraphs covering individual issues. The minutes shall be done in two copies and shall record the course of discussion of the issues, the decisions made, as well as the implementers and deadlines. The Chairmen of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz Parties shall sign the minutes after it has been approved by the Commission. Each of the Parties shall be provided with a copy of the minutes. 23. At the sessions, the Commission Chairmen shall present the activities undertaken by the Kazakh and Kyrgyz Parties to implement the decisions made at the previous sessions of the Commission. 24. The Commission can decide to establish a permanent Secretariat. The Commission can attract experts of specialized, scientific and research, design and exploitation organizations on temporary and permanent basis, establish temporary or permanent working groups.
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25. The Commission may assign the experts of the Parties to develop proposals on various issues to be considered at the Commission’s session. 26. The Commission members and engaged experts may, if required, familiarize themselves with the status of affairs on-site and are entitled to unhindered visits of organizations and facilities of the Parties regardless their affiliation and forms of ownership. 27. Each of the Parties shall archive the documents of the Commission. 28. Annually the Commission sums up the results of the previous year and adopts the plans of activities for the next year. Based on the results of a year´s activity the Commission considers and adopts annual reports. 29. Any secondment, travel and maintenance expenses of the Commission members, working group representatives and experts shall be borne by the state of each of the Parties. 30. Any expenses related to organizing and conducting the sessions of the Commission or meetings of experts shall be borne by the state of the hosting Party.