Secularization and Religious Backlash: Evidence from Turkey

Seyhun Orcan SAKALLI*

February 25, 2019

Abstract

How do people react to a public policy that targets a cultural identity? This paper examines the effects of a top-down secularization-of-education reform on education and religiosity outcomes in Turkey. After the secularization, residents of provinces with higher pre- secularization levels of religiosity were less likely to send their children to secular schools relative to others. I provide evidence consistent with the mechanism that pious parents avoided sending their children to secular schools in order to better transmit their religious identities. They forewent economic beneﬁts of education to achieve this goal and started giving more frequently religious names compared to others after the secularization. Taken together, my ﬁndings suggest that education policies that target a cultural identity might result in a backlash and highlight the importance of schooling choices made by parents in transmitting their identity to their children.

JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: O10, O43, P48, Z12 Keywords: Culture; Religion; Secularization; Education; Ethnic Cleansing

*University of Lausanne, Department of Economics. Quartier UNIL-Dorigny, Bâtiment Internef, Ofﬁce 501.1, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. Phone: 0041 21 692 34 84. E-mail: [email protected]. I am grateful to Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Mathias Thoenig, Denis Cogneau, and Thierry Verdier for their advice and support. I am thankful to Pauline Grosjean, Claudio Ferraz, Anett John, Sylvie Lambert, Karen Macours, Elias Papaioannou, David Yanagizawa-Drott, and participants at PSE, AMSE, EDP Jamboree, NEUDC 2014, the University of Munich, CEA 2015 Annual Conference, the EBRD, and the Galatina Summer Workshop for their helpful comments and suggestions. An earlier version of this study was distributed under the title “Coexistence, Polarization, and Development: The Arme- nian Legacy in Modern Turkey.” The DHS data used in this study was made available by the Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, under permission for data use no. 2014/10. I acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the ERC Starting grant GRIEVANCES-313327. All errors are mine. 1 INTRODUCTION

Culture is a persistent determinant of economic performance and political stability.1 Under- standing whether policies can affect culture, in particular how people react to a public policy that targets a cultural identity, is therefore crucial. Religion is one of the most important components of culture; as a social identity, it strongly affects the self-evaluation, beliefs, and values of billions of people worldwide. At a societal level, religion and politics intersect. In both autocratic and democratic countries, religious groups inﬂuence the political trajectory. Religious beliefs are at the core of debates on social issues such as abortion, contraceptives, and same-sex marriage. On the other hand, public policies can shape the beliefs and worldview of people and therefore affect the salience of religion. In many different contexts, rulers challenged religious institutions as a part of state-building efforts (e.g. France and the Soviet Union after their respective revolutions). Education policies have always been a fundamental part of the state-building process. Through schooling, states can teach children values that they deem important for social cohesion and a sense of unity. This paper provides novel evidence for the interaction between secular-state-building-reforms and religiosity by examining the effects of a top-down secularization-of-education reform that was implemented in the 1920s in Turkey. It analyzes whether residents of localities with varying levels of Islamic religiosity reacted differently to the secularization-of-education reform in terms of schooling decisions and religiosity outcomes. To these ends, it exploits an extensive, novel dataset that combines historical population data with contemporary political and socioe- conomic data, at both the village level and different levels of administrative subdivision. Turkey provides an ideal context for studying this question. After World War I (WWI), the Ot- toman Empire, a religiously plural multiethnic empire, transformed into the Republic of Turkey, a nation-state. Founders of the Republic of Turkey implemented a series of top-down modernization reforms. Secular nation-building was one of the main pillars of the reformation. In the Ottoman Empire, religion was the main social group identiﬁer and played a central role in the administrative organization (Göçek, 1993).2 Secularization reforms aimed to rupture the Ottoman traditions and institutions and promote a national identity. The founders abolished the institution of the Caliphate, secularized the education system (closed Muslim religious schools), and adopted the Latin alphabet, which replaced Arabic script, between 1924 and 1928. Turkey was thus a predominantly Muslim country (97.4 percent of the population in 1927) that transitioned from having religious education at all levels of schooling to abruptly lacking religious instruction

1See Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales(2006), Nunn(2012), and Algan and Cahuc(2013) for literature reviews. 2Greeks and Armenians, the two largest Christian minority groups, constituted 9.7 percent and 7.2 percent of the Ottoman population in 1914, respectively. Almost all Armenians and Greeks were forced to leave Turkey through the deportation and persecution of Armenians in 1915–1916 and the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923–1925.

1 in the nation’s curricula for over two decades, until the opening of vocational religious junior high schools in 1951. I exploit historical exposure to non-Muslims as a source of variation in the level of religiosity of Muslims prior to the secularization. I document that historical Armenian presence is positively correlated with the level of religiosity of Muslims across villages in close proximity and across districts (second-level administrative subdivision) that are farther apart, both in the short and long run. Then, I examine the effect of secularization of education on literacy and primary school completion rates across provinces (first-level administrative subdivision) with varying levels of religiosity before the secularization, using as a proxy the share of Armenians in 1914. Employing a difference-in-differences estimation strategy that exploits variation in Islamic religiosity levels before the secularization and in exposure to secularization across five-year birth cohorts, I find that secularization leads to a decrease in education outcomes in provinces with higher pre-secularization religiosity relative to other provinces. The estimated negative effect is not driven by pre-secularization levels of development of provinces, supply of secular schools, selective migration or mortality, or spatial correlation between residuals across provinces.3 The relative decrease in education levels occurs immediately after the secularization and is unlikely to be driven by other contemporaneous reforms. The estimated effects are substantial: a one- standard-deviation increase in the share of Armenians in 1914 increases the share of illiterate population by 12.2 percent and the share of the population without a primary school education by 9.6 percent. I propose and test for a mechanism to explain the negative effect of secularization on education outcomes: The secularization reforms led to a religious backlash and hardened the religious identity of pious Muslims. After the secularization, in order to better transmit their religious values to their children, pious parents became less likely to send their children to school compared to other parents, as children’s exposure to secular values at school can crowd out religious values transmitted within the family. Consistent with the imperfect empathy of parents in the cultural transmission model of Bisin and Verdier (2000; 2001), pious parents forewent their children’s potential social and economic success through secular education in favor of raising offspring who are religious, i.e., who reject secular norms and attitudes.4 I provide several pieces of evidence consistent with this mechanism: First, I construct a time- varying measure of religiosity at the province-of-birth and five-year birth-cohort levels using male first names. Using a similar difference-in-differences strategy as before, I find that secularization leads to a relative increase in the share of religious male first names in provinces

3Instrumenting the share of Armenians in 1914 with walking distance to Mt. Ararat, where Armenians believe that the founder of their nation, Hayk (Hayg), settled after his ﬂight from Babylon, produces similar results. 4Imperfect empathy implies that parents socialize their children to their own cultural trait instead of the trait that maximizes the children’s success.

2 with higher pre-secularization religiosity compared to those with a lower level. Second, after the opening of religious junior high schools in 1951, the take-up of religious instruction was higher in provinces with higher religiosity before the secularization, suggesting a greater demand for religious instruction, than it was in other provinces.5 Third, I find that completing primary school increases labor income among the male population that attended primary school between 1924 and 1951, when there was no religious instruction in the nation’s curricula. This positive association is stronger in provinces with higher pre-secularization religiosity compared to other provinces, which suggests that pious parents forwent economic benefits of education even though economic incentives to invest in the education of their children were higher where they lived. Last, I show that completing primary or secondary education reduces the positive effect of having been raised pious on the self-reported importance of religion and frequency of attending religious services. This finding highlights why pious parents who value having religious offspring would be less likely to send their children to secular schools compared to others. Then, I consider the economic effects of the Armenian genocide as an alternative mechanism. Armenians were overrepresented in human-capital-intensive occupations such as trade, credit, and industry. Their departure created a shock in the composition of the population. If the negative shock to the size of middleman occupations persisted over time, it might have partly explained the low rates of schooling in districts with a higher historical Armenian presence relative to others. I find that the share of Armenians in 1914 has a negative and statistically significant impact on the share of the population with a profession in industry and commerce in 1927. This negative effect dissipates over time, suggesting that vacancies in these sectors were filled by the Muslim population. It is still possible that the quality of the existing human capital deteriorated in the localities that were inhabited by Armenians. However, in the Ottoman Empire, schooling system was segregated across religious identities, and Armenians could not serve as teachers in Qur’anic schools that majority of the Muslims attended. Therefore, it is unlikely that the persecution of Armenians leads to a lower educational attainment of Muslims through a negative shock in teacher supply or a deterioration in the teacher quality, as was the case with Jewish teachers in Germany (Akbulut-Yuksel and Yuksel, 2015). Finally, I consider the cultural effects of the historical Armenian presence and their persecutions as an alternative mechanism. It could be that competition between Armenians and Mus- lims in close proximity reduced general trust or trust towards outgroup members, or increased intragroup trust (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Grosfeld, Rodnyansky and Zhuravskaya, 2013). Also, persecutions could lead to a deterioration of local institution and lower trust levels in state institutions given that they were orchestrated by the state. However, given that both secular ed-

5Moreover, giving religious names is negatively associated with primary school completion rates conditional on province-of-residence and ﬁve-year-birth-cohort ﬁxed effects, but only after the secularization of education. Simi- larly, it is positively associated with enrollment rates in religious junior high schools.

3 ucation and religious instruction were provided and controlled by the state, one would expect a change in trust levels to affect the take-up of both of them in the same direction, contrary to what is observed. Nevertheless, intragroup competition and deterioration of local institutions due to violence could lead to tighter kinship ties, which could reduce the demand for education. How- ever, unless having tighter kinship ties is positively correlated with being pious, it should affect the demand for secular education and religious instruction in the same way, contrary to what is observed. Overall, my findings suggest that an assimilation policy that targets a cultural or ethnic identity might cause a backlash. Pious parents forewent economic benefits of secular education to reduce the exposure of their children to a set of values and beliefs that contradict theirs. The relative low take-up of secular education by religious Muslims compared to others contributed to the persistence of higher salience of religiosity among them. More important, the secularization of education created cleavage between pious and other Muslims in terms of level of education. This study contributes to various bodies of economic literature. First, it contributes to the literature on the effect of assimilation policies by showing that a top-down secularization reform can lead to a religious backlash. Bisin et al.(2011) present a model that highlights the importance of segregation in terms of role models for the persistence of oppositional identities (i.e., rejection of mainstream values) among a minority group. Carvalho and Koyama(2016) show that minorities will underinvest in education to preserve their culture if education serves as a means of transmission of the identity of the majority. Carvalho(2013) predicts that bans on veiling can increase the religiosity of Muslim women if veiling serves as a commitment mechanism to religious standards of behavior and reduces the social cost of women’s economic integration. To the best of my knowledge, Fouka(2018) is the only other empirical study that identifies a backlash due to an assimilation policy. She finds that Germans affected by the prohibition of German in U.S. schools after WWI were more likely to marry endogamously and give their children distinctly German names and were less likely to volunteer in World War II. Her findings differ from mine in one important aspect: she identifies a positive impact of education reform on schooling, whereas I find a negative one. My findings highlight the importance of schooling choices made by parents in transmitting their identity to their children, consistent with the predictions of Bisin et al.(2011) and Carvalho and Koyama(2016), through affecting the exposure of their children to alternative role models and identities. Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between religiosity and education by showing that a secularization-of-education reform that restricts access to religious instruction could lead to a lower educational attainment among children from more pious background. Meyersson(2014), using RDD design for 1994 municipality elections in Turkey, shows that having been ruled by an Islamist mayor increases female education. He argues that Is-

4 lamist mayors increase female education through giving more construction permits to religious foundations, which build schools that often allow girls to attend extracurricular religious courses that complement secular education. This is consistent with my findings that pious parents send their children less to purely secular schools. In a different historical context, Squicciarini(2018) provides evidence of a positive correlation between religiosity levels and demand for religious schooling. She finds that the share of Catholic private schools was relatively higher between 1850 and 1901 in French districts with a higher level of Catholic religious intensity around the time of the French Revolution. On the other hand, many studies in the literature show that extension of compulsory schooling reduces religiosity levels (Gulesci and Meyersson, 2016; Cesur and Mocan, 2018; Mocan and Pogorelova, 2017; Hungerman, 2014). My findings also relate to the literature on the impact of coexistence and cross-cultural interaction of different groups. Grosfeld, Rodnyansky and Zhuravskaya(2013) find that the coexistence of Jews and Gentiles in the Russian Empire leads to a persistent antimarket sentiment among Gentiles as a reaction to distinctive features of their rivals, i.e., Jewish overrepresentation in middleman and liberal professions. Okunogbe(2015) exploits a policy that randomly posted college graduates to different states in Nigeria for a year of national service and shows that those who served in a state where their ethnic group is not the majority identify themselves more with their ethnic group compared to others. Luttmer(2001) finds that individuals increase support for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group rises. DellaVigna et al.(2014) show that the exposure of Croats to nationalistic Serbian radio broadcasts intended for Serbians triggers ethnic hatred toward Serbs in Croatia. Dippel(2014) finds that the forced integration and coexistence of Native American subtribal bands through the reservation system has a long-term negative effect on the welfare of reservations. On the other hand, Jha(2013) shows that Indian ports with a history of cooperation between Muslim and Hindu merchants witnessed fewer violent conflicts between 1850 and 1950. Arbatli and Gokmen(2018) estimate a positive effect of historical Greek and Armenian presence on long-term development in Turkey. They argue that this positive effect operates through the contribution of non-Muslim minorities to local human capital of the Muslim population. However, their study relies only on cross-sectional variation and is likely to suffer from self-selection of more able Muslims into living in close proximity with non-Muslims who were overrepresented in sectors that require human capital, such as commerce and industry. The paper proceeds as follows. Section2 summarizes the historical background. Section 3 describes the data. Section4 examines the effect of secularization on education outcomes. Section5 discusses the mechanisms. Section6 concludes.

5 2 BACKGROUND

2.1 NON-MUSLIM MINORITIESINTHE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state founded by Turkish tribes circa 1299 and dissolved in 1922. At the peak of its power, it stretched from Southeast Europe to the Caucasus, from the Middle East to North Africa. During its territorial expansion, it incorporated many non-Muslim peoples, including Christians of different denominations and Jews. Religion played a central role in the social and administrative organization of the Ottoman Empire. Non-Muslims had a lower social status than Muslims; they had to pay a special poll tax and endure certain legal restrictions (Göçek, 1993).6 Each monotheistic non-Muslim community, e.g., Orthodox Christians, Armenian Apostolic Christians, Roman Catholics, and Jews, had autonomy in the administration of their schools and regulation of certain branches of civil law, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance (Masters, 2009). These institutional features made religious identities salient. The social stratiﬁcation across religious identities was stable until the nineteenth century. Two factors contributed to its breakdown and led to political polarization. First, non-Muslims beneﬁted disproportionally from increasing international trade and industrialization. The success of Muslim merchants persisted only in overwhelmingly Muslim areas (Kuran, 2004).7 Sec- ond, Christian subjects of the Empire started to revolt, demanding the right to political self- determination. In 1856, the Ottoman bureaucracy responded to these demands by declaring Muslims and non-Muslims equal citizens before the law. This reform increased the religious polarization, as Muslims resented losing their centuries-old superior social status (Göçek, 1993). However, it failed to prevent the secession of its European territories, leaving it a predominantly Muslim country in the wake of World War I (WWI). The policies of the WWI era and its aftermath ended the centuries-old presence of the Arme- nian and Greek minorities in Turkey.8 After the Empire’s defeat in the First Balkan War, in 1913, the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) party, also known as the Young Turks, seized control of the government with a coup d’état. They entered WWI aiming to secure the territorial integrity of the Empire (and to create a Muslim middle class). However, the Caucasus campaign against Russians resulted in a catastrophic defeat (Erickson, 2001, pp. 51–65). Histo- rians argue that, in March 1915, anticipating a Russian counterattack and fearing a cooperation

6A non-Muslim male could not marry a Muslim woman, whereas a Muslim male could marry a non-Muslim woman. Non-Muslims’ testimony was not accepted against that of a Muslim in an Islamic court. They were prohib- ited from building or occupying houses near a Muslim place of worship, which led to residential segregation. 7Greeks and Armenians, despite making up only 9.7 percent and 7.2 percent of the population in 1914, accounted for 43 percent and 23 percent of the 18,053 local traders and 40 percent and 30 percent of the 6,507 industrial man- ufacturers and craftsmen in 1912, respectively (Sonyel, 1993, pp. 258–259). 8See AppendixA for a brief history of Armenians and Greeks in Asia Minor and their persecution during and after WWI.

6 between Ottoman Armenians and the Russian army, the CUP decided to liquidate the Armenian population in order not to lose control of the Armenian Plateau (Akçam, 2004, pp. 165–166). The Armenian genocide began on April 24, 1915, with the arrest of the Armenian elite in Is- tanbul; in June 1915, it expanded, targeting all Armenians irrespective of gender, age, or political involvement. By the beginning of 1917, more than 800,000 Armenians had already been forced to march to the deserts of Syria under deplorable conditions.9 Many deportation convoys were attacked and sacked by paramilitary groups. Adult male deportees were killed, and young female deportees were often abducted and taken as wives by government officials or those involved in massacres. Government officials waged a propaganda campaign that portrayed Armenians as “domestic foes” to reduce the resistance of locals to deportations. They also used religious discourse to increase the participation of Muslims in massacres where they took place (Kévorkian, 2011, pp. 289–621). According to an American consulate report, 486,000 deportees reached their destination, but many of them died in concentration camps in Syria due to malnutrition and epidemics (Sarafian, 2004, pp. 489–490). The exact number of survivors is unknown. The Treaty of Lausanne, a peace treaty signed on July 24, 1923, marked the definite end of the centuries-long presence of non-Muslims in Asia Minor. With this treaty, Turkey rejected the re- turn of Armenians en masse, and Turkey and Greece agreed to exchange the Muslim population in Greece and the Orthodox population in Turkey. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure D1 in Supplemen- tary AppendixD present the distribution of Armenians in 1914 and 1927, respectively. Similarly, Panels (a) and (b) of FigureD2 present the distribution of Greeks in 1914 and 1927. There were almost no Armenians and Greeks left in Turkey in 1927, except for those living in Istanbul who were exempted from both the Armenian genocide and the forced population exchange between Greece and Turkey because their departure would have crippled the economy.

2.2 SECULARIZATION REFORMSINTHE REPUBLICOF TURKEY

The Republic of Turkey was proclaimed in October 1923, following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after WWI. The founders of the Republic implemented a series of top-down modernization reforms covering all aspects of life, ranging from the abolishment of the Caliphate and the adoption of western dress codes to the declaration of Sunday instead of Friday as the day of rest.10 Secular nation-building was one of the main pillars of the reformation. The secularization

9Bardakçı(2008) published a booklet that was found in the personal archives of Talaat Pasha, who was the Min- ister of Interior during WWI and orchestrated the deportation and massacre of Armenians. This booklet, known as the Black Book, lists the number of Armenians in 1914 and the number of remaining Armenians at the time of its preparation, which is February 1917, according to Saraﬁan(2011, pp. 7–8). It shows that out of 1,112,614 Armenians residing in Turkey in 1914 only 284,157 were still in Turkey in February 1917. Moreover, it states that the Armenian population should be inﬂated by about 30 percent due to an undercounting problem. 10See Table D1 in Supplementary AppendixD for a list of major reforms implemented in Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s.

7 reforms aimed to rupture the Ottoman tradition by subordinating the religious identity to a national one. Secularism was interpreted and “implemented as the removal of religion from public life and the establishment of complete state control over religious institutions” (Platteau, 2017, p. 357). The government implemented its secularization reforms between 1924 and 1928. The Unifi- cation of Education Law (Tevhid-i Tedrisat) of 1924 closed the Qur’an schools (sibyân mektepleri), where the sole aim of education was to teach students to read and recite the Qur’an (Berkes, 1998, pp. 465–467; Somel, 2001, pp. 17–20). The government passed a law that abolished the institution of the Caliphate on the same day it promulgated the Unification of Education Law. Over the next few years, the government gradually phased out religious instruction from the primary school curriculum. In 1928, the government promulgated a law that replaced Arabic script with the Latin alphabet and removed the instruction of Arabic from the curriculum (Winter, 1984, p. 77).11 Between 1928 and 1949, there was no religious instruction in the school curricula. In 1949, one year before the first fair multiparty election, the government inaugurated Imam- Preacher (Imam˙ Hatip) vocational programs to meet the electoral demand for religious instruction and services.12 These ten-month-long programs were to train preachers and religious functionaries under the authority of the Ministry of Education. In 1951, the new government con- verted the training program into a seven-year school system comprising junior high school and high school and incorporated it into the formal education system (Yavuz, 2003, p. 123). The Imam-Preacher (Imam˙ Hatip) schools have been controversial in the debate about the secular state in Turkey since their inauguration. After the politicization of Islam in the 1970s, they became a major policy battleground between the secular establishment and Islamists.13

3 DATA

ETHNIC ORIGINOF VILLAGESAND HISTORICAL POPULATION. I use two sources of variation to identify the historical presence of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. The ﬁrst source is information on linguistic origin of the historical names of villages provided by Ni¸sanyan(2010). 14 I use this information to classify villages as a former Armenian village, a former Greek village, a Muslim village, an Arabic village, or a Kurdish village. The second source is Ottoman population data at

11Also, the government abolished the Sharia courts in 1924, closed religious covenants and dervish lodges in 1928, and removed the article of the 1924 Constitution stating that “Islam is the state religion” in 1928. 12Turkey has had a multiparty regime since 1945. 13See Supplementary AppendixB for a brief history of political Islam and religious education in Turkey. 14In the 1950s, the Turkish government set up a commission to replace locality names that sounded foreign with Turkish ones. The commission changed the names of more than 12,000 villages and parishes. Sevan Ni¸sanyan, a linguist and writer of Armenian origin from Turkey, compiled the list of the localities whose names were changed and identiﬁed the linguistic origin of their historic names.

8 the district level, i.e., the second-level subnational division.15 The Ottoman Empire registered its citizens according to their religious affiliation. I use the official Ottoman population data of 1914, first published by Karpat(1985), to identify the spatial distribution of Armenians, Greeks, and Muslims in 1914.16 I use the 1927 census of the Republic of Turkey to identify the spatial distribution of Kurds and Arabs at the district level.17 Panels (a), (b), and (c) of Table D2 in Supplementary AppendixD present the data on ethnic origin of villages and the historical population data at the district level and at the province level, respectively.

RELIGIOSITY. I consider the support for Islamist parties as a measure of religiosity and collect data on every parliamentary election in which at least one Islamist party participated, namely in 1973, 1977, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015.18 I deﬁne an Islamist party as one whose ideology is derived from or shaped by Islamic ideas and that mobilizes its supporters on the basis of shared religious identity (Yavuz, 2009, p. 7). Parliamentary election results come from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) and are available for all elections at the district level and from 1991 onward at the village level. I match 87.3 percent of 36,319 villages that existed in 1991 to rest of the data set. Panels (a) and (b) of TableD3 in Supplementary AppendixD present the election data at the village level and at the district level, respectively.

I consider religious first names as a proxy for religiosity. Data on first names, birth place, and birth year come from the Ministry of Interior (EGM) and cover the entire adult population as of 2009. I classify three types of male first names as a religious name: (1) the variations of the name of the Islamic prophet in its Arabic form — Muhammad (Muhamed, Muhamet, Muhammed, Muhammet)19; (2) first names in the form of “...of Allah (God in Islam)”, i.e., names ending with “–(u)llah”; (3) first names in the form of “servant of...”, i.e., names beginning with “Abd–” and ending with an attribute of Allah.20 Then, I compute the share of religious male first names at the province-of-birth and five-year birth-cohort levels and consider them as time-varying measures of religiosity. Panel (c) of Table D3 in Supplementary AppendixD summarizes the name data;

15The number of districts increased from 369 in 1914 to 957 in 2015. New districts were created to facilitate the public administration as the population increased. I traced border changes and matched 1914 district boundaries to those in subsequent years. See Supplementary Appendix C.1 for more information on the matching procedure and sources used. 16I consider the Armenian Patriarchate’s census of 1913–1914 and Ottoman census of 1881–1893 as alternative data sources to identify the spatial distribution of Armenians and check the robustness of results to using these sources. 17I impute the shares of Kurds and Arabs in 1914 by multiplying their respective shares in 1927 (with 1 minus Armenian population in 1914 over total population in 1914), assuming that the population growth of Kurds, Arabs, and Armenians would have been the same in the absence of WWI and the deportation of Armenians in 1915–1916. 18Two elections where held in 2015: the first in June, the second in November. I include both of these elections in the sample. 19I consider the name Mehmet, i.e., the Turkish form of Muhammad, as a nonreligious first name. 20Alternatively, I also consider the names of Allah that are used as male first names as a religious first name. I don’t include these names in the baseline list of religious names because some of them have lost their religious connotation, e.g., Adil (fair, just), Alim (wise, scholar).

9 Figure D3 in Supplementary AppendixD visualizes the trends in the share of religious names.

EDUCATION. I use the 5 percent microdata samples of the 1985, 1990, and 2000 censuses of the Republic of Turkey provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) project. These data provide information on respondents’ birth year and province of birth, along with literacy status and the highest degree obtained. Using this data set, I test whether the secularization of education has a different impact on literacy and primary school completion rates of Muslims across provinces with varying levels of religiosity. I complement this data with information on the number of schools in 1927 and 1945. To isolate the demand for secular education, I create measures of school supply — the number of primary schools per school-age children in the 1926–1927 school year and the growth in the number of primary schools per school-age children between 1927 and 1945. Moreover, I collect data on the number of religious vocational junior high schools and the number of students enrolled at the school-year level for the period between 1951 and 1997 to examine the demand for religious instruction once it is reintroduced. The data on school supply in 1927 and 1945 and those on religious junior high schools come from published education statistics. Panels (d), (e), and (f) of TableD3 in Supplementary AppendixD present the data on literacy and primary school completion at the individual level, on school supply in 1927 and in 1945 at the province level, and on enrollment in religious junior high schools at the province and school-year levels, respectively.

OTHER OUTCOMES. I collect additional data on outcomes that might be affected by the disappearance of Greeks and Armenians and might have an impact on education independently of the secularization of education. First, I collect data on population levels between 1927 and 1960 at the district level and compute the population growth between 1914 and a given census year. Second, I collect data on professional structure at the district level and compute the shares of the population with a profession in industry and commerce for years in which they are available: 1927, 1945, 1985, 1990, and 2000.

4 EFFECT OF SECULARIZATION ON EDUCATION

In this section, I examine the effect of secularization of education on literacy and primary school completion rates across localities with varying levels of religiosity before the secularization. The absence of data on observed levels of religiosity of Muslims before the secularization poses a challenge of ﬁnding proxies for it. To derive measures of pre-secularization religiosity, I hypoth- esize that coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, which ended before the implementation of secularization reforms, might affect the pre-secularization levels of

10 religiosity of Muslims.21

4.1 MEASURESOF RELIGIOSITYBEFORETHE SECULARIZATION

I start my empirical analysis by examining whether residents of Muslim villages that are closer to former Christian villages support Islamist parties more than residents of other Muslim villages do. I use the linguistic origin of historic village names to identify which villages are former Ar- menian villages and Muslim villages (Ni¸sanyan, 2010).22 I focus on villages that are within 15 kilometers of former Armenian villages in the treatment sample shown in panel (a) of FigureD1 in Supplementary AppendixD. I pool all the parliamentary elections for which village-level results are available – namely, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015 elections, and employ a ﬂexible parametric estimation strategy to compare the support for Islamist parties across the Muslim villages within 15 kilometers of former Armenian villages. I estimate the following equation:

IslamistVotev,t α βAr meni anv δDistanceArmenian0 = + + v (1) ElectionF E Pr ovinceF E γX 0 ² + t + v + v + v where IslamistVotev,t stands for the support for Islamist parties in village v in election year t. Ar meni anv is a dummy variable indicating that the village is a former Armenian village. DistanceArmenianv is a vector that includes ﬁve dummy variables indicating whether the nearest former Armenian village is within 0 to 2 kilometers, 2 to 4 kilometers, 4 to 6 kilo- 23 meters, 6 to 8 kilometers, or 8 to 10 kilometers. ElectionF Et stands for election ﬁxed effects.

Pr ovinceF Ev stands for province ﬁxed effects. Xv , the vector of controls at the village level, consists of dummy variables indicating whether the village is a Kurdish village and whether the village is an Arabic village; walking distances to the nearest province and district centers and to the nearest river and stream; altitude of the village; and suitability indices for wheat, olive, and cotton cultivation.24 I correct standard errors for spatial correlation across villages following

21According to intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954), repeated and multiple social interactions across group boundaries under certain conditions, such as equal group status and intergroup cooperation, could promote a culture of tolerance. On the contrary, social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) emphasizes that group members make more intergroup comparisons when the perceived ability to move from one group to another is limited and the perceived legitimacy of the status difference between groups is questioned. Coexistence under such conditions makes group identities more salient. 22 Muslim villages are deﬁned as villages whose former names are not identiﬁed as Armenian, Assyrian, Bulgarian, Georgian, Greek, Russian, or Serbian. 23Figure D4 in Supplementary AppendixD presents an example of the isodistance curves drawn around former Armenian villages to construct the comparison group and the set of indicator variables included in the vector DistanceArmenianv . Panel (a) of Figure D5 in Supplementary AppendixD presents the number of Muslim villages by distance to the former Armenian villages. 24Panel (a) of Table D5 in Supplementary AppendixD describes the data, i.e., distribution of villages by ethnicity and geographical controls, for the sample of villages within 15 kilometers of former Armenian villages.

11 Conley(1999). I assume that the spatial correlation is null between villages that are more than 15 kilometers apart. Identification stems from the variation in distance to former Armenian villages across Mus- lim villages. The Muslim villages within 10 to 15 kilometers of former Armenian villages are the control group. Table1 presents the impact of the coexistence of Armenians and Muslims on election outcomes.25 I normalize the vote share of Islamist parties by election-specific sample mean. Point estimates can be interpreted as a percentage change in support for Islamist parties. Column 1 shows the effect of the coexistence of Armenians and Muslims on support for Islamist parties. The residents of Muslim villages in close proximity to former Armenian villages vote more for Is- lamist parties compared to the residents of the Muslim villages in the control group. The impact is statistically significant for the villages that are within 6 kilometers of former Armenian villages. The size of the estimates varies from 6.9 to 14.2 percent and gets smaller as the distance to former Armenian villages increases, consistent with the argument that the likelihood of interaction between Armenians and Muslims increases if they live close to each other.26 Also, Muslims living in former Armenian villages, i.e., Muslim migrants who replaced the deported Armenians, support Islamist parties by about 13.7 percent more than the residents of the comparison villages do. During WWI, the Ottoman government settled Muslim refugees who fled from the Balkans and the Caucasus into the former Armenian villages after their deportation. Such refugees who were potentially victims of ethnoreligious persecution might have overidentified themselves with their in-group identities, such as ethnicity and religion, as a result. Results are robust to the introduction of interaction terms between dummy variables indicating the distance to the nearest former Armenian village and a dummy variable indicating whether the village is a Kurdish village (Column 2).27

25Given that I couldn’t match 12.6 percent of the villages that existed in 1991 to rest of the data set, selective attrition of villages from the sample is a threat to identification. TableD6 in Supplementary AppendixD presents the mean test between the villages that are in the balanced sample – the sample for which the results are reported, i.e., the villages for which outcomes of all elections are observed over the period 1991–2015, and those that are in the un- balanced sample, i.e., the sample that includes all village-election pairs including the villages that existed in 2015 for which election data for some years is missing. There is no significant difference between the two samples in terms of election outcomes or distance to the nearest Armenian village, which suggests that vector δ would not be biased because of a selective attrition of villages from the sample over time. 26Propaganda might have also played a role in the increased identification of Muslims with their religion. Religious discourse was a part of the propaganda campaign waged by the Ottoman officials during the genocide to reduce the resistance of locals to deportations and to increase the participation of Muslims in massacres where they took place. If the intensity of propaganda was greater in Muslim villages that are closer to former Armenian villages, it could also explain why the size of the estimates gets smaller as the distance to former Armenian villages increases. In the absence of data on propaganda efforts, it is impossible to differentiate the effect of coexistence from that of propaganda. 27These interaction terms capture the differential impact of distance to former Armenian villages for Kurdish villages compared to other Muslim villages that are at a similar distance to former Armenian villages. Such differential impact might be due to ethnic voting among Kurds or a difference in the nature of coexistence between Kurds and Armenians and a differential rate of participation in massacres across Kurds and other Muslims. The coexistence of Armenians and Kurds does not have a statistically significant differential impact on support for Islamist parties.

12 Armenians were not only a religious minority but also an ethnic minority. A concern is that the support for Islamist parties might partly capture an increased identification with one’s ethnicity. Column 3 of Table1 presents the effect of the coexistence of Armenians and Muslims on support for nationalist parties. The current residents of former Armenian villages support national parties more than the Muslims in control villages do but those of Muslim villages closer to former Armenian villages do not. Only the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating whether the nearest Armenian village is within 2 to 4 kilometers is statistically significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent level. However, this positive effect is not robust to the inclusion of interaction terms between dummy variables indicating the distance to the nearest former Armenian village and a dummy variable indicating whether the village is a Kurdish village (column 4). These results confirm that the coexistence of Muslims and Armenians increased the identification of Muslims with their religion and not with their ethnicity.28 The positive relationship between historical Armenian presence and religiosity of Muslims also holds when comparing localities that are farther apart from each other. Figure D6 in Supplementary AppendixD visualizes the positive correlation between the share of Armenians in 1914 and the average support for Islamist parties between 1973 and 2015 at the district level, conditional on pre-secularization levels of development and other observable characteristics of districts.29 In Supplementary Ap- pendixF, I investigate this positive relationship more formally using an Instrumental Variables (IV) strategy.30 Next, I consider share of religious male first names as a proxy for levels of religiosity of Mus- lims. FigureD8 in Supplementary AppendixD portrays the share of religious male first names by five-year birth cohort for a sample of individuals born between 1914 and 1988 in three subsamples defined by terciles of the share of Armenians in 1914. The share of religious male first names is higher in provinces with a greater historical Armenian presence than it is in other provinces for all five-year birth cohorts. Moreover, Figure D9 in Supplementary AppendixD presents the

28I replicate the same analysis for residents of the Muslim villages within 15 kilometers of former Greek villages and report the results in Supplementary AppendixE. Residents of Muslim villages within 2 kilometers of former Greek villages support Islamist parties more relative to residents of Muslim villages within 10 to 15 kilometers of former Greek villages, but only in the Pontus region, where the degree of persecution of Greeks during the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922 was substantial. Moreover, I find a positive statistically significant effect of historical coexistence of Muslims and Greeks on the support for nationalist parties not only in Pontus region but also in Cappadocia region. Both of these regions were under the control of the Turkish nationalist forces during the Greco-Turkish War of 1919– 1922. Therefore, I focus on the historical Armenian presence as a source of variation in the level of religiosity of Muslims. 29Panel A of Table D4 in Supplementary AppendixD summarizes the district-level geographical and historical controls. FigureD7 in Supplementary AppendixD visualizes the positive correlation between the share of Armenian villages and the share of Armenians in 1914 at the district level. 30I instrument the share of Armenians in 1914 with walking distance to Mt. Ararat. See footnote 37 and Supple- mentary AppendixF for more information on the instrumental variable strategy, i.e., construction of the instrument and the identification assumptions. In Supplementary AppendixF, I also consider frequency of performing religious activities as another set of religiosity measures and document a positive relationship between historical Armenian presence and frequency of praying and fasting.

13 positive correlation between the share of Armenians in 1914 and the share of religious male ﬁrst names given between 1919 and 1928 at the district level, conditional on pre-secularization levels of development and other observable characteristics of districts. Overall, historical Armenian presence is positively correlated with the level of religiosity of Muslims both in the short and long-run, and not only across villages that are in the same province but also across districts that are farther apart. Therefore, in the remainder of the paper, I consider the share of Armenians in 1914 as a proxy for the levels of religiosity of Muslims before the secularization.31

4.2 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION STRATEGY AND RESULTS

Next, I explore the impact of secularization on education outcomes across provinces with varying levels of religiosity, using as a proxy the share of Armenians in 1914. I estimate the following difference-in-differences average treatment effect (ATE) speciﬁcation:32

Education α βReligiosity Post δW 0 δX Post 0 λ γ tφ ² (2) i,p,c = + p × i,c + i + p × i,c + c + p + i,p + i,p,c

where Educationi,p,c is a dummy variable indicating whether individual i born in five-year birth cohort c in province p is literate or completed primary school. Religiosityp stands for 33 the share of Armenians in 1914 in province of birth p. Posti,c is a dummy variable indicating whether individual i born in five-year birth cohort c attended primary school after the secularization of education, i.e., those born after 1913. Wi , the vector of individual-level controls, includes a dummy variable indicating whether individual i is female and a dummy variable indicating whether individual i resides in an urban area. The interaction between the religiosity measure, i.e., the share of Armenians in 1914, and the post-secularizaton dummy is my main variable of interest. The coefficient on this interaction β is the difference-in-differences estimator of the effect of secularization on literacy and primary school completion rates across provinces with varying levels of religiosity. In order to estimate

31Alternatively, the share of religious male ﬁrst names given between 1914 and 1923 could have served as a proxy for pre-secularization religiosity. However, name data include information only on adults observed in 2009; and the number of observations in the older cohorts is very limited. There are only 48,680 males born between 1914 and 1923 in the data, residing in 63 different provinces; the median number of observations by province is 654. 32I exclude Istanbul from the analysis for two reasons. First, residents of Istanbul were exempted from both the deportation of Armenians and the population exchange between Greece and Turkey. Second, it was the capital of the Ottoman Empire for almost ﬁve centuries, and hence has a different development trajectory. I also exclude from the sample the districts in northeast Turkey that were under Russian rule between 1878 and 1918; two islands in the Aegean Sea that joined Turkey in 1923; and Hatay Province in the south, which was a part of Syria between WWI and 1938. (See the districts marked as ‘No Data’ in FigureD1.) 33Panel (a) of Figure D10 in Supplementary AppendixD visualizes the share of Armenians in 1914 at the province level.

14 this parameter consistently, I control for macroeconomic shocks, unobservable characteristics of provinces, and regional trends. λc stands for five-year birth-cohort fixed effects, and γp stands for province-of-birth fixed effects. As different regions are expected to have different development trajectories, I control for 20 subregion-specific time trends tφi,p . Each of the subregions comprises several provinces that are considered to have similar economic and geographic characteristics.34 To account for correlations between the share of Armenians in 1914 and pre-secularization levels of development and other observable provincial characteristics, I control for the interactions between the post-secularization dummy and the set of province-level controls. Xp , the vector of controls at the province level, consists of the shares of Greeks, Kurds, and Arabs in 1914; proxies for pre-Ottoman levels of religiosity — the share of districts in each province that fall within the territories of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum (extensive margin) and the number of monuments related to religion or religious education built by the Seljuks, normalized by the surface area of the province (intensive margin);35 pre-secularization levels of development — population density in 1914; the share of districts of each province that are within one-and-a-half days of the major nineteenth-century ports; the share of districts of each province that had access to a rail- road network in 1914; and geographical controls — travel distances to Constantinople (Istanbul), to the coast, and to the eastern border; length of rivers and streams, normalized by surface area of the province; suitability indices for wheat, olive, and cotton cultivation; and mean altitude and latitude of the province.36 The main identifying assumption is that there are no systematic differences in the trends of education among provinces with different pre-secularization levels of religiosity conditional on all other covariates, including subregion-specific trends. I test this by replacing the interaction term between the religiosity measure and the post-secularization dummy with a series of interaction terms between the religiosity measure and a number of dummies indicating different pre-secularization and post-secularization five-year birth cohorts.

I follow Bertrand, Duﬂo and Mullainathan(2004) and cluster error terms, ²i,p,c , within each birth province. This system of clusters accounts for autocorrelation in residuals within each birth province. However, it does not account for spatial correlation. As a robustness check, I also report Conley(1999) standard errors, which account not only for autocorrelation in residuals within each birth province but also for spatial correlation across birth provinces that are less than 200 kilometers apart using the procedure developed by Colella et al.(2018).

34See Supplementary Appendix C.3 for the deﬁnition of geographical regions and subregions and Figure C2 for their visualization. 35The Islamization of Asia Minor took place mostly during the reign of Seljuk Sultanate of Rum, which existed from 1077 to 1307. 36Panel B of Table D4 in Supplementary AppendixD summarizes the province-level geographical and historical controls.

15 I also use an IV strategy to estimate equation2. I instrument Religiosity Post with p × i,c the interaction of walking distance to Mt. Ararat with the post-secularization dummy. The idea behind using walking distance to Mt. Ararat as a part of the instrumental variable is to predict where Armenians settled once they had migrated from their ancestral homelands, conditional on the cost of traveling.37 This instrument is excludable because, walking distance to Mt. Ararat is orthogonal to the changes in educational attainment around secularization conditional on pre- secularization levels of development and other observable provincial characteristics. In order to disentangle the effect of the two components of the secularization of education – namely, the secularization of the content of education and the supply of secular schools – I include in the list of covariates the log number of schools per school-age children in the 1926–1927 school year, around the time of the implementation of the secularization reforms, interacted with the post-secularization dummy. Alternatively, I include the growth rate of the number of schools per school-age children between 1927 and 1945 interacted with the post-secularization dummy. Table2 presents the estimated effects of the secularization on the likelihood of being literate (panel (a)) and completing primary school (panel (b)) for a sample of individuals born between 1893 and 1967.38 The results yield strong and robust evidence of a substantial negative effect of the secularization on education outcomes in provinces with a higher share of Armenians in 1914, i.e., the pre-secularization level of religiosity. The first column presents the results of the most basic OLS specification, with no additional covariates beyond province-of-birth and five- year birth-cohort fixed effects. In column 2, I add controls for pre-secularization levels of development and other observable provincial characteristics interacted with the post-secularization dummy and for subregion-specific time trends. In column 3, I instrument my main explanatory variable with travel distance to Mt. Ararat interacted with the post-secularization dummy. The instrument is a strong predictor of the interaction between the share of Armenians in 1914 and the post-secularization dummy with F-statistics above 19.39 In columns 4 and 5, I add controls to

37Armenians believe that the founder of the Armenian nation, Hayk, settled in the region of Mt. Ararat after his ﬂight from Babylon (Kurkjian, 2008, p. 42). Mt. Ararat was the geographical center of the ancient Armenian kingdoms. (See, for instance, maps 6, 7, and 9 in Bournoutian(2002), showing Yervanduni Armenia in c. 250 BC, Arteshian Armenia in c. 150 BC, and Arsecid Armenia in c. 150 AD, respectively.) To capture the cost of traveling in ancient times, I neglect both modern and past road networks and assume that travel cost depends solely on topogra- phy. Panel (a) of Figure D11 in Supplementary AppendixD visualizes walking distance to Mt. Ararat at the province level. See Supplementary Appendix C.2 for more information on the construction of distance measures. 38Tables D7 and D8 in Supplementary AppendixD present the estimates using the Armenian share in 1913–1914 according to the Armenian Patriarchate’s data and the Armenian share in 1881–1893 according to the Ottoman data. I restrict the difference-in-differences analysis to the microsample of the 1985 census and I don’t include those of the 1990 and 2000 censuses because of the limited size of the number of individuals who attended primary school before the secularization in the later census years. Tables D9 and D10 in Supplementary AppendixD present the robustness of results to using all three censuses together. 39Panels (a) and (b) of Figure D12 visualize the correlation between walking distance to Mt. Ararat and the share of Armenians in 1914 without and with controls, respectively. Table D11 in Supplementary AppendixD presents the ﬁrst-stage estimates. Column 1 presents the effect of interaction of distance to Mt. Ararat with the post- secularization dummy on the interaction of the share of Armenians in 1914 with the post-secularization dummy

16 the OLS specification for the interaction of the post-secularization dummy with the log number of schools per school-age children in the 1926–1927 school year and growth rate in the number of schools per school-age children between 1927 and 1945, respectively. Last, in column 6, I show the robustness of the results in column 2, allowing for residuals to be spatially correlated across provinces that are less than 200 kilometers apart. In all specifications, I find a negative and statistically significant effect estimated by the coefficient on the interaction term between the proxy of pre-secularization levels of religiosity, i.e., the share of Armenians in 1914 and the post-secularization dummy.40 The magnitude of the coefficient of interest is larger in the IV specification compared to the OLS specifications for primary school completion, although point estimates of the OLS specifications are well within the confidence interval for the IV point estimate. Such a downward bias is consistent with the self- selection of Armenians into localities where the Muslim population was less religious and also with attenuation bias due to measurement error. Also, the results indicate that the negative effect of the secularization of education in birth provinces with higher pre-secularization religiosity is not driven by a differential investment in secular education in these provinces or by the presence of spatial correlation in residuals. The estimated effects are substantial. To present the magnitudes, I rely on the IV estimate from column 3 of Table2, which factors out subregion-specific time trends and differences in educational attainment due to pre-secularization levels of development and other observable provincial characteristics. A one-standard-deviation increase in the share of Armenians in 1914 in a province before the secularization (i.e., an increase in the share of Armenians in 1914 of 7.6 percentage points in the 5 percent microsample from the 1985 census) led to a decrease in the likelihood of being literate of 3.2 percentage points, which equals 12.2 percent of the illiteracy rate in the sample. Similarly, it led to a decrease in the likelihood of completing primary school of 3.2 percentage points, which equals 9.6 percent of the primary school noncompletion rate in the sample. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure D14 in in Supplementary AppendixD visualize the trends in literacy and primary school completion, respectively. The figure portrays the rates of literacy and primary school completion by five-year birth cohort for a sample of individuals born between and the corresponding F-stat. Columns 2 and 3 present the estimated first-stages using alternative historical data sources. 40Table D12 in Supplementary AppendixD presents the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms between the post-secularization dummy and the shares of Greeks, Kurds, and Arabs in 1914, along with the estimated coefficients on the interaction term between the post-secularization dummy and the share of Armenians in 1914. Sec- ularization of education doesn’t have a statistically significant effect on education outcomes across provinces with varying levels of Greek, Kurdish, or Arabic presence. Moreover, Figure D13 in Supplementary AppendixD reveals that the shares of Greeks, Kurds, and Arabs in 1914 don’t have a positive effect on the support for Islamist parties between 1973 and 2015 at the district level. Combined together these results are in line with the argument that the negative effect of historical Armenian presence on education outcomes after the secularization operates through its positive effect on religiosity levels.

17 1893 and 1967, separately in three subsamples defined by terciles of the share of Armenians in 1914. There is an increasing trend in both education outcomes in all terciles. However, the gap in educational attainment across provinces with varying pre-secularization levels of religiosity, i.e., the share of Armenians in 1914, emerged after the secularization of education. I proceed to testing the main identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences estimation strategy, i.e., whether there are diverging pre-trends in education outcomes among provinces with varying pre-secularization levels of religiosity. I estimate the coefficients of 14 interaction terms between the pre-secularization level of religiosity, i.e., the share of Armenians in 1914, and dummy variables indicating five-year birth cohorts, including three before the secularization (leaving the 1908–1912 birth cohort that attended primary school just before the secularization reforms as the comparison group). In this specification, I include the same controls as in column 2 of Table2. Figure1 depicts the results by plotting the coefficients on the interaction terms between the proxy of pre-secularization levels of religiosity and dummy variables indicating five-year birth cohorts along with their 90 percent confidence intervals by five-year birth cohorts – panel (a) for literacy and panel (b) for primary school completion.41 The results indicate the absence of pre-trends across provinces with different levels of religiosity – there are no significant effects before the secularization reforms. A decrease in education levels occurred immediately after the secularization. The estimated coefficient on the interaction between the share of Armenians in 1914 and the 1913–1917 birth cohort, which consists of individuals who were primary school-age while secularization reforms were gradually being implemented between 1924 and 1928, is close to zero. For cohorts that started primary school after the secularization, the estimated effects are always negative and significant (except for the 1918–1922 cohort for primary school completion, for which the p-value of the estimated coefficient is 0.134).42 A concern is that lack of diverging pre-trends might be because of low levels of education and lack of variation in education outcomes across provinces before the secularization reforms. The average literacy and primary school completion rates were only about 30 percent and 20 percent for the cohort born between 1913 and 1917, i.e., the cohort that was at primary-school age when the secularization reforms were implemented. To address this concern, I focus on different subgroups that are more educated: males and urban residents.43 Absence of diverging trends in education before the secularization among these subgroups would reassure that the absence

41Table D13 in Supplementary AppendixD presents the results in table form. 42Figures D15 and D16 in Supplementary AppendixD show that the results are robust to using the Armenian Patri- archate’s data from 1913–1914 and the Ottoman data from 1881–1893 to identify the historical Armenian presence. The estimated coefficient on the interaction term between the share of Armenians in 1914 and the 1918–1922 cohort for primary school completion rate is statistically significant at 90 percent confidence intervals using both alternative data sources. 43Figures D17 and Figures D18 in Supplementary AppendixD visualize the trends in literacy and in primary school completion by different subgroups (males, females, urban residents, and rural residents), respectively.

18 of diverging pre-trends depicted in Figure1 was not driven by lack of variation in the education outcomes. Figures D19 and D20 in Supplementary AppendixD replicate the analysis in Figure 1 separately for each subgroup, i.e., males, females, urban residents, and rural residents, for literacy and primary school completion, respectively. There are no signiﬁcant effects before the secularization of education for any of the subgroups.

4.3 THREATS TO IDENTIFICATION

4.3.1 CONTEMPORANEOUS REFORMS. Many other reforms were implemented around the same time as the secularization reforms.44 My difference-in-difference estimates might capture the effect of contemporaneous reforms if religious people reacted to these reforms differently than others did. Some of the reforms that are not directly related to secularization of education, such as the new civil code, which gave more equal rights to women compared to the Islamic law it replaced, and voting rights to women, might have an impact on education outcomes through their effects on the returns to education for women or on the bargaining power of women in the household. For example, if religious people were also more conservative about women’s rights and sent their female children less to school after women’s emancipation compared to others, my estimates would capture this negative effect and attribute it to secularization. Among the reforms that emancipated women only the new civil code was implemented at the same time as the secularization reforms. Figures D19 and D20 in Supplementary AppendixD reveal that if anything the immediate effect of secularization materialized only for males, which rules out the possibility that the estimated negative effects of secularization are driven by a potential relative negative effect of the adoption of new civil code on women’s education in more conservative provinces. However, one observes that share of Armenians in 1914 has a negative effect on the education of women who were born after 1923 and attended primary school after women were granted the rights to vote and to be elected in municipality elections. I formally test whether women’s suffrage can explain the estimated negative effects of secularization on education by augmenting the speciﬁcation in column 2 of Table2 by adding a triple interaction term between the pre-secularization religiosity, a dummy variable indicating whether an individual attended primary school after women’s suffrage, and a dummy variable indicating whether an individual is female, controlling for triple interactions of all province-level controls with a dummy variable indicating whether an individual attended primary school after women’s suffrage and a dummy variable indicating whether an individual is female. Table D14 in Supplementary Ap- pendixD presents the effect of secularization on education controlling for the differential effect of women’s emancipation on female education. Controlling for the effect of women’s emanci-

44TableD1 in Supplementary AppendixD presents a list of major reforms implemented in the 1920s and 1930s in Turkey.

19 pation reduces the effect of secularization on literacy rate and primary school completion rate by about 25 and 20 percent, respectively. Nevertheless, the effect of secularization on education remains statistically signiﬁcant at 5 percent level using all three data sources on historical Arme- nian population as a proxy for pre-secularization level of religiosity.

4.3.2 SELECTIVE MIGRATION BY EDUCATION LEVEL. If among people who are affected by the secularization reforms, educated ones who were born in provinces with higher pre-secularization religiosity migrate out more often than their counterparts who were born in other provinces do, this would lead to a downward bias in the estimates. I would observe lower levels of educational attainment in provinces with higher pre-secularization religiosity in 1985 than those that were actually attained after the secularization and attribute this fall in education to the effect of secularization. To address this concern, I investigate whether the secularization reforms increase the relative likelihood of migrating among individuals who were born in provinces with higher pre- secularization religiosity. Figures D21 in Supplementary AppendixD shows that those who were born in provinces with a higher pre-secularization level of religiosity are less likely to migrate out compared to others after the secularization. However, if migrants who are born in provinces with higher pre-secularization religiosity are more educated than other migrants are, this could still explain the observed gap in education that emerged after the secularization. Figure D22 in Sup- plementary AppendixD reveals that migrants born in provinces with varying pre-secularization levels of religiosity were comparable in terms of education before and after the secularization reforms. These results indicate that there was no selective out-migration of educated people from provinces with a higher pre-secularization levels of religiosity after the secularization.45

4.3.3 SELECTIVE MORTALITY BY EDUCATION LEVEL. Similarly, if among people who are affected by the secularization reforms, educated ones who were born in provinces with higher pre-secularization religiosity die more often than their counterparts who were born in other provinces do for some reason, this would lead to a downward bias. I would not observe the educated people who died in the data and attribute the observed lower educational attainment in

45Moreover, I replicate the analysis in Figure1 by excluding migrants from the sample and ﬁnd that the estimated negative effects of secularization are bigger and more precise among the sample of nonmigrant population (Figure D23 in Supplementary AppendixD). (Columns 3 and 4 of Table D13 in Supplementary AppendixD present the results (excluding migrants) in table form for both literacy and primary school completion rates, respectively.) This is consistent with the fact that those who were born in provinces with higher pre-secularization religiosity are less likely to migrate out than others are after the secularization and that migrants are on average more educated compared to nonmigrants. In section5, I provide evidence showing that returns to education was larger in provinces with a higher pre-secularization level of religiosity after the secularization, consistent with the fact that the share of educated population was relatively lower in such provinces. This could partly explain why out-migration rate is lower in these places compared to others after the secularization.

20 provinces with a higher pre-secularization level religiosity due to mortality to secularization. To address this concern, I test whether the change in the observed educational attainment between 1985 and 1990 vary across provinces with different levels of religiosity before the secularization. I combine the 5 percent microsample from the 1985 census with that from the 1990 census and restrict the sample to individuals born between 1898 and 1927, i.e., the three five- year birth cohorts before and after the secularization. I augment the specification in column 1 of Table2 by adding a triple interaction term between the pre-secularization level of religiosity, a dummy variable indicating whether an individual attended primary school after the secularization of education, and a dummy variable indicating whether an individual is observed in 1990, controlling for interactions of all controls and fixed effects with a dummy variable indicating whether an individual is observed in 1990. A negative coefficient on this triple interaction term would suggest that, among cohorts that are affected by the secularization, mortality rate of educated people between 1985 and 1990 is relatively higher among those were born in provinces with higher pre-secularization religiosity. Table D15 in Supplementary AppendixD presents the estimates. Columns 1 and 2 report the results on a sample of individuals born between 1897 and 1927; columns 3 and 4 report the results on a sample of nonmigrants. Estimated coefficients on the triple interaction term are not statistically different from zero suggesting that selective mortality by education level did not play a major role between 1985 and 1990. This suggests that the estimated negative effects of secularization are unlikely to be driven by selective mortality by education across provinces with varying levels of pre-secularization religiosity.

Overall, secularization led to a relatively lower educational attainment in provinces with higher pre-secularization religiosity compared to other provinces.46 The relative decrease in education levels occurred immediately after the secularization; and it is not likely to be driven by pre- secularization levels of development of provinces, supply of secular schools, contemporaneous reforms, selective migration or mortality, or spatial correlation in residuals across provinces.

5 MECHANISM

In this section, I consider several mechanisms that could potentially explain my results. I start with the presentation of the mechanism that is consistent with the evidence and then discuss why alternative mechanisms are not fully consistent with the data.

46Furthermore, in Supplementary AppendixG, I investigate the effect of parental religiosity on education outcomes of children in a two-generation setup. I ﬁnd that, still today, a child with a parent from a more religious province is less likely to complete primary school. See Supplementary AppendixG for the estimation strategy and results.

21 5.1 RELIGIOUS BACKLASH

Secularization reforms resulted in a decrease in education outcomes in provinces that started off more religious compared to others. I put forward the following mechanism to explain this pat- tern: Secularization reforms hardened the religious identity of the pious Muslims and led to a religious backlash. After the secularization of education, pious parents wishing to transmit their religious values to their children, became less likely to send their children to school compared to other parents. Horizontal transmission of secular values (across individuals of the same generation) through schooling can crowd out religious values vertically transmitted within the family (from parents to offspring) through socialization. Imperfect empathy of parents in the cultural transmission models of Bisin and Verdier (2000; 2001) implies that religious parents would re- gret their children having to accept secular norms and attitudes to achieve social and economic success, despite caring about their success. Consistent with imperfect empathy, pious parents forewent economic beneﬁts of secular education that their children could have enjoyed in order to have children who were religious.

RELIGIOUS NAMESAND RESISTANCE TO SECULARIZATION. I consider religious first names as a time-varying measure of religiosity and explore the effect of the secularization reforms of the 1920s on the likelihood of giving a religious first name to male children across provinces with different levels of religiosity before the secularization. Figure D3 in Supplementary AppendixD portrays the share of religious male first names and the share of the first name Muhammad among religious names by five-year birth cohort for a sample of individuals born between 1914 and 1988. There is a decreasing trend in the share of religious male first names until Turkey adopted multi-party regime in 1945. The share of religious male first names is stable between 1945 and 1974. However, it starts to increase after 1974 – the year in which an Islamist party participated in a coalition government for the first time. Moreover, there is an increasing trend in the share of the first name Muhammad among religious first names throughout the period. FigureD8 in Supplementary AppendixD portrays the share of religious male first names, separately in three subsamples defined by terciles of the share of Armenians in 1914. Seculariza- tion reforms led to divergent trends across provinces with varying levels of religiosity before the secularization. Between 1924 and 1944, the share of religious names decreases by about 20 percent in provinces that started off less religious (bottom tercile), whereas it stagnates in provinces that started off more religious (top tercile). Given that on average less religious first names were adopted during the period, the fact that the share of religious male first names is stable in the top tercile suggests that pious parents in these provinces gave religious first names more frequently after the secularization to compensate for the overall secularization trend in names. Also, after

22 1974, the share of religious male first names increases more in provinces that started off more religious than it does in other provinces. I examine the relationship between the secularization reforms and religiosity by estimating a difference-in-differences specification that allows for effects to vary by five-year birth cohorts. The identification strategy relies on the variation in pre-secularization levels of religiosity, using as a proxy the share of Armenians in 1914, across provinces of birth and in exposure to secularization reforms across five-year birth cohorts. I estimate the following equation:

ReligiousName α βReligiosity Cohor t δX Post 0 λ γ tφ ² (3) c,p = + p × c + p × i,c + c + p + p + c,p

where ReligiousNamec,p is the share of religious male first names among those born in five- year birth cohort c and in province p. Religiosityp stands for the share of Armenians in 1914 in province of birth p. Cohor tc is a vector of dummy variables indicating five-year birth cohorts.

λc stands for five-year birth-cohort fixed effects, and γp stands for province-of-birth fixed effects. tφp is a vector of twenty subregion-specific time trends. Xp , the vector of controls at the province level, is the same as in equation2. I follow Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan(2004) and cluster error terms, ²c,p , within each province of birth. Figure2 depicts the results by plotting the coefficients on the fourteen interaction terms between the share of Armenians in 1914 and dummies indicating five-year birth cohorts along with their 90 percent confidence intervals (leaving the 1919–1923 birth cohort as the comparison group).47 It presents the estimated effect of the secularization on the share of religious first names among the male population. Estimates for the cohort born between 1914 and 1918 indicate that there was no statistically significant pre-trend in the share of religious male first names across provinces. The share of Armenians in 1914 has a positive and statistically significant impact on the share of religious male first names after the secularization. Figure D25 in Supplementary Ap- pendixD shows that results are robust to including the names of Allah (God in Islam) that are used as male first names in the list of religious first names. A concern about this analysis is that necronym is a common practice in Turkey. Parents who hold more traditional values might give names of their dead parents or relatives to their children more often compared to others who adopt new and modern names. If old and traditional names are more likely to be religious than modern names on average, giving religious first names more frequently might capture the effect of holding more traditional values rather than that of being pious. However, if parents who hold more traditional values bestow necronym without caring for religious meaning of the name they give, one would expect them to give nonreligious traditional names as frequently as religious traditional names. I test whether this is the case by investigat-

47Figure D24 in Supplementary AppendixD shows that the results are robust to using the Armenian Patriarchate’s 1913–1914 data and the Ottoman 1881–1893 data to identify the historical Armenian presence.

23 ing the effect of secularization on the likelihood of giving Arabic names (and nonreligious Arabic names) because all the names I classify as religious are Arabic names and most of the modern secular names that are adopted after the reforms implemented in 1920s and 1930s are Turkish names. To identify the linguistic origin of names, I use the “Dictionary of Proper Names” provided by the Turkish Language Association (Türk Dil Kurumu), the official regulatory body of the Turkish Language, which offers a list of more than 10,000 first names (out of which 7,000 are male first names).48 95.5 percent of the male first names given between 1919 and 1988 can be matched to the names that appear in the dictionary. Figure D26 in Supplementary AppendixD visualizes the trends in Arabic names. Panel (a) portrays the share of Arabic male first names by five-year birth cohort for a sample of individuals born between 1914 and 1988; panel (b) portrays the share of Arabic male first names, separately in three subsamples defined by terciles of the share of Armenians in 1914. The share of Arabic names among the first names given between 1919 and 1954 is stable except for a fall in the 1934- 1938 period, when government encouraged adoption of Turkish names through the Surname law of 1934. After 1954, there is a decreasing trend in Arabic names until 1974 – the year in which an Islamist party participated in a coalition government for the first time. Importantly, there was no difference in the trends in Arabic names across provinces with varying levels of historical Armenian presence. Figure D27 in Supplementary AppendixD replicates the analysis in Figure2 considering as outcome variable the share of Arabic names and the share of nonreligious Arabic names in panels (a) and (b), respectively. The share of Armenians in 1914 has no statistically significant impact on the share of Arabic male first names or on the share of nonreligious Arabic male first names neither before nor after the secularization. These results indicate that bestowing necronym, as an expression of traditional values (that are unrelated to religiosity), cannot explain the relative increase in the share of religious first names in provinces with a greater historical Armenian presence after the secularization. Overall, results indicate that residents of provinces with a greater level of religiosity prior to the secularization reforms reacted to them by more frequently giving religious names to their male children relative to residents of other provinces.

ENROLLMENTIN RELIGIOUS JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS. Next, I turn to the demand for religious instruction and test whether enrollment rates in religious vocational junior high schools are higher in provinces with higher pre-secularization religiosity. Two features of the vocational religious education system suggest that it served to satisfy the demand of pious Muslims for religious instruction. First, 65.8 percent of religious vocational schools were entirely ﬁnanced by social and cultural associations, while 9.65 percent of these schools were constructed using only pub-

48Dictionary of Proper Names can be accessed online through the following link: http://tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_kisiadlariview=kisiadlari. Last accessed on January 14, 2019.

24 lic funds (with the rest being ﬁnanced with a mix of public and private funds) (Yavuz, 2003, p. 127). Second, even though women cannot serve as preachers or religious functionaries, 41.1 percent of students enrolled in religious vocational junior high schools in the 1996–1997 school year were female. Figure D28 in Supplementary AppendixD presents the trends in the number of religious junior high schools and the number of students enrolled in these schools between 1951 and 1997, until the closure of the junior high school part of religious vocational schools. The number of religious junior high schools increased substantially in the periods when Islamist parties participated in coalition governments, i.e., 1974–1978 and 1996–1997.

To examine the effect of pre-secularization religiosity on the enrollment rate in religious vocational junior high schools between 1951 and 1997, I follow an approach akin to a ﬂexible ﬁrst- difference estimation strategy that allows for effects to vary by school year, and I estimate the following equation:

Enrollement α θReligiosity SchoolY ear λ γ ² (4) s,p = + p × s + s + p + s,p where Enrollements,p stands for the enrollment rate of junior-high-school-age primary school graduates in school year s in province p. Religiosityp stands for the share of Armenians in 1914.

SchoolY ears is a vector of dummy variables indicating the school year. λs stands for school-year

fixed effects, and γp stands for province fixed effects. I cluster the standard errors, ²s,p , at the province level. I interact the measure of pre-secularization level of religiosity with dummy variables indicating the school year, without excluding any given school year.49 Therefore, the estimated coefficients on interaction terms, the vector θ, should be interpreted as the effect of pre-secularization religiosity on the enrollment rate in religious vocational junior high schools in a given school year, and not as the differential effect of pre-secularization religiosity on the enrollment rate in religious vocational junior high schools in a given school year compared to its effect in the excluded school year. Figure3 visualizes the estimates by plotting the coefficients on the interaction terms between the religiosity measure and the dummy variables indicating the school year along with their 90 percent confidence intervals by school year.50 Results indicate that enrollment in religious vocational junior high schools is higher in provinces with a greater pre-secularization level of religiosity than it is in other provinces. The size of the effect gets smaller after 1974, the year in which an Islamist party participated in a coalition government for the first time, which resulted in an un-

49No school year can serve as a comparison period, as we cannot observe the enrollment rate in religious junior high schools before their opening. 50Figure D29 in Supplementary AppendixD shows that the results are robust to using the share of Armenians in 1913–1914 according to the Armenian Patriarchate’s data and the share of Armenians in 1881–1893 according to the Ottoman data.

25 precedented expansion of the religious junior high school system in terms of number of schools and students enrolled. The effect becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero in the 1990s. The results suggest that residents of provinces with a higher level of pre-secularization religiosity expressed their preference for religious schooling more compared to residents of other provinces, especially when access to religious instruction was limited.

To illustrate the importance of parental religiosity for demand for secular and religious education, I create a panel dataset at the five-year cohort and province level that consists of share of given male first names, primary school completion rate, and enrollment in religious junior high schools. These measures are matched such that they reflect parental decisions made at the same time. For example, parents simultaneously decide on the name of their 0- to 4-year-old children, the primary school completion rate of their 7- to 11-year-old children, and the enrollment in religious junior high school of their 12- to 15-year-old children. Table3 presents the relationship between the share of religious male first names given by parents and the likelihood of completing primary school and the enrollment rate in religious junior high schools, conditional on five-year cohort and province fixed effects. The share of religious first names in a given cohort is negatively correlated with completion of primary schools in that cohort, but only for the cohorts that attended primary school after the secularization of education. Also, the share of religious first names is positively correlated with the enrollment rate in religious junior high schools. Controlling for province-specific time trends reduces the point estimate for the primary school completion rate by two-thirds and that for the enrollment rate in religious junior high schools by one-half, but estimates remain statistically significant at conventional levels. These results show that pious parents who more frequently gave religious first names to their children demanded secular education less and religious instruction more for them.

FOREGONE INCOME. Then, I focus on the economic implications of the schooling decisions made by parents for their children and test whether parents forewent economics beneﬁts of education as implied by the imperfect empathy of parents in the cultural transmission models of Bisin and Verdier(2000, 2001). In particular, I investigate the effect of primary school completion on wages and its differential effect across provinces with varying levels of religiosity before the secularization. I focus on a sample of males that were born between 1913 and 1939 who attended primary school when no religious instruction was available in the curriculum. I use the 5 percent microsample of the 1985 census and impute hourly wages by assigning to each occupation-profession pair a value representing the median hourly wage of all males with that particular occupation and profession according to the 2002–2006 Turkish Labor Force surveys. Table4 presents the estimated effects. Completing primary school increases hourly wages

26 by 25 percent compared to the sample mean, conditional on five-year birth-cohort and province fixed effects. Moreover, the positive effect of completing primary school on hourly wages is higher in provinces with higher pre-secularization levels of religiosity. This finding is consistent with the fact that in these provinces the primary school completion rate was lower after the secularization compared to other provinces, and thus returns to being educated were higher given the relative scarcity of educated people. Therefore, if anything, parents in provinces with higher pre-secularization religiosity had greater economic incentives to invest in the education of their children. Results are robust to the inclusion of province-specific time trends.51 Overall, these findings confirm that pious parents forewent economic benefits of education to be able to transmit their religious identity to their children.

FORMAL EDUCATION VS RELIGIOUS VALUES. Last, I focus on the interaction between formal education and religious values transmitted within the family. I use the second and third waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), conducted in 1991 and 1996, which provide information on whether the respondent was raised pious. Using conditional ordered logit model, I investigate whether having completed primary or secondary education has a differential impact on the importance of religion and frequency of attending religious services for respondents who were raised pious relative to those who were not. Table5 presents the estimated effects, conditional on a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is female, respondent’s age as a second-order polynomial, and dummy variables indicating income-level brackets, survey year, and region fixed effects. Having been raised pious is positively correlated with reporting a greater importance of religion and a higher frequency of attending religious services. The interaction of having been raised pious with having completed primary or secondary school is negatively correlated with reporting a greater importance of religion and a higher frequency of attending religious services. Half of the estimated coefficients on these interaction terms are statistically significant at 95 percent confidence intervals. Formal education reduces the efficiency of vertical transmission of religious values, i.e., the positive effect of having been raised pious on self-reported religiosity, by about 30 percent.52 These results do not provide direct empirical evidence showing that secular values transmitted in formal education crowds out religious values transmitted within the family. However, they highlight why religious parents might consider not sending their children to secular schools

51TableD15 in Supplementary AppendixD presents the robustness of results to the exclusion of migrants from the sample. 52These estimates should be interpreted as a lower bound for two reasons. First, among respondents who were raised pious, those who completed formal education are likely to be children of parents who did not have a strict preference for having pious children over having economically successful children. Second, 86 percent of the respondents in the sample were born after 1940 and had access to religious instruction within the formal education system.

27 if they prefer having pious children over broadening their economic prospects.

5.2 ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS

5.2.1. THE EFFECT OF PERSECUTIONOF ARMENIANSON HUMAN CAPITAL LEVELS. The short time interval between the Armenian genocide (1915–1916) and the implementation of secularization reforms (1924–1928) raises the concern that the break in trend in schooling outcomes across provinces in the 1920s could be driven by the disappearance of Armenians. Armenians were overrepresented in middleman occupations such as trade and credit, as in crafts and industry, and had higher levels of human capital. Deportation and persecution of Armenians thus led to an abrupt change both in the size and the composition of the local population. Had these negative shocks persisted, they would have partly explained the occurrence of the gap in education across districts with different levels of historical Armenian presence. Table D17 in Supplementary AppendixD presents the estimated effect of the share of Arme- nians in 1914 on the distribution of industry and commerce using the IV strategy employed in Supplementary AppendixF. The disappearance of Armenians has a negative and statistically significant impact on the share of population with a profession in industry and commerce in 1927. However, this effect dissipates over time and becomes statistically insignificant by 1945, which suggests that vacancies in these sectors were filled by the Muslim population. Commerce and industry require more human capital compared to agriculture. If anything, the take-up of more human-capital-intensive professions should have increased the demand for education on average in the absence of secularization of education.53 Despite the fact that the regions that are affected by the persecution of Armenians catch up with others in terms of the share of population with a profession in industry and commerce in the long run, it is still possible that the level and quality of existing human capital deteriorated in these regions. However, until the Unification of Education Law of 1924, the schooling system was segregated across religious identities, and Armenians could not serve as teachers in Qur’anic schools that majority of the Muslims attended. Therefore, the persecution of Armenians is unlikely to lead to a lower educational attainment of Muslims through a negative shock in teacher supply or a deterioration in the teacher quality, unlike the case of Jewish teachers in Germany (Akbulut-Yuksel and Yuksel, 2015). Moreover, a lower level or quality of human capital due to persecution of Armenians per se cannot explain the relative increase in the share of religious male first names after the secularization in provinces with a greater historical presence of Armenians. Overall, shocks to occupation structure and human capital levels due to the deportation and

53Table D18 in Supplementary AppendixD presents the estimated effect of the share of Armenians in 1914 on population growth using the same IV strategy. Similarly, the disappearance of Armenians has a negative and signiﬁcant impact on population growth after the genocide. However, this effect does not persist in the long run — it decreases over time and becomes insigniﬁcant after 1945.

28 persecution of Armenians could not consistently explain the changes in trends in educational attainment and naming patterns across provinces with varying levels of historical Armenian presence after the secularization.

5.2.2. CULTURAL EFFECTS OF HISTORICAL ARMENIAN PRESENCEAND PERSECUTIONS. His- torical Armenian presence and their persecutions during WWI can have effects on the Muslim population through channels other than destruction of physical and human capitals. Given the intergroup competition between Muslims and non-Muslims living in close proximity, historical Armenian presence might reduce general trust or trust towards outgroup members and increase intragroup trust (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Grosfeld, Rodnyansky and Zhuravskaya, 2013). Also, the fact that the persecutions were orchestrated by the state and that some local Muslims participated in them might lower trust in government (in state institutions in general) and dete- riorate local institution. Moreover, deterioration of local institutions and intragroup competition might lead to tighter kinship ties among local Muslims. However, if lower levels of trust (in state institutions) in localities with greater historical Arme- nian presence reduce take-up of secular education, one would expect it to also have a negative effect on the take-up of religious instruction given that it was provided and controlled by the state, contrary to what is observed. Nevertheless, tighter kinship ties could reduce the demand for education. For example, if having tighter kinship ties is correlated with holding more traditional values, it could lead to a relative fall in demand for education for female children. But unless having tighter kinship ties is positively correlated with valuing having religious offspring more, it should affect the take-up of religious instruction in the same way it does that of secular education, contrary to what is observed. Similarly, it’s not a priori obvious why having tighter kinship ties would increase the likelihood of giving more traditional religious names to offspring while not affecting that of giving more traditional (Arabic) nonreligious names, unless it is correlated with being more pious. Overall, other potential cultural effects of historical Armenian presence and persecutions, such as a change in trust levels and in importance of kinship ties, fail to consistently explain the evidence on lower take-up of secular schools and greater take-up of religious instruction and on naming practices in provinces with a greater level of historical Armenian presence.

6 CONCLUSION

This paper examines the effect of a top-down secularization-of-education reform implemented in the 1920s on the long-run level of education and religiosity in Turkey. I exploit the historical coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims, which ended after WWI, as a source of variation in re-

29 ligiosity levels of Muslims. I document a positive effect of the historical Armenian presence on religiosity of Muslims both in the short and long run and use it as a proxy for the pre-secularization level of religiosity. I find that, after the secularization, residents of localities with a higher level of religiosity prior to the secularization sent their children to secular schools less often compared to others. My findings suggest that religious parents resisted secularization reforms and avoided sending their children to secular schools in order to better transmit their religious values to them. After the secularization, residents of localities with a higher level of religiosity prior to the secularization gave religious names to their children more frequently relative to others. Moreover, take-up of religious instruction was higher in provinces that were more religious to begin with after its reintroduction in the 1950s relative to others. Parents forwent economic benefits of education to transmit their religious identities to their children; meanwhile completing primary school increased the labor income among males who attended primary school when there was no religious instruction in the curricula. Also, survey data reveals that completing formal education reduces the positive effect of having been raised pious on an individual’s self-reported religiosity. Broader implications emerge from this analysis. An assimilation policy that targets a cultural or ethnic identity might backlash. A low level of take-up of the policy by the targeted group, i.e., for whom the targeted identity is salient, would contribute to the persistence of the cultural trait among them. Moreover, it might widen the gap across groups if the policy reduces the salience of the targeted trait for the compliers. More important, assimilation policies might create cleavage between compliers and noncompliers in other dimensions that they affect. For example, a secularization-of-education reform, or a national-education reform that prohibits a specific language as language of instruction, might lead to a divergence in education levels across regions with varying levels of salience of the targeted treat. Policies based on voluntary participation, ac- companied by incentives to increase take-up by the targeted group (e.g., a lower discrimination in the labor market for minorities, which would increase the returns to education) might be more effective in achieving a targeted goal than compulsory assimilation policies.

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33 Figure 1: THE IMPACTOF SECULARIZATION ON EDUCATION: FLEXIBLE DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES

(a) Outcome: Literacy

.6 Point estimate 90% CI

−.3 Secularization of education

Change in percentage points −.6

−.9

1893−97 1898−02 1903−07 1913−17 1918−22 1923−27 1928−32 1933−37 1938−42 1943−47 1948−52 1953−57 1958−62 1963−67 Armenian share in 1914 x Cohort

(b) Outcome: Primary School Completion

.6 Point estimate 90% CI

−.3 Secularization of education

Change in percentage points −.6

−.9

1893−97 1898−02 1903−07 1913−17 1918−22 1923−27 1928−32 1933−37 1938−42 1943−47 1948−52 1953−57 1958−62 1963−67 Armenian share in 1914 x Cohort

Notes. Data sources: A 5 percent microdata sample of the 1985 census for education outcomes and Karpat(1985) for the 1914 population. The vertical axes in panels (a) and (b) represent the change in the rate of literacy and the change in the rate of primary school completion, respectively. The horizontal axes represent the interaction of five- year birth cohorts with the share of Armenians in 1914. The variation in the share of Armenians in 1914 is at the province-of-birth level. The vertical line represents the cutoff point between the cohorts that are affected and not affected by the secularization of education. Point estimates and confidence intervals at 90 percent are from OLS estimates, conditional on five-year birth-cohort fixed effects, province-of-birth fixed effects, and subregion-specific time trends, and the interaction of a dummy variable indicating whether an individual attended primary school after the secularization reforms with a set of control variables included in columns 2 to 6 of Table2, and dummy variables indicating whether the respondent is female and whether he or she lives in an urban area. Standard errors are clustered at the province-of-birth level.

34 Figure 2: HISTORICAL ARMENIAN PRESENCEAND RELIGIOUS NAMES: FLEXIBLE DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES

.15

.05

-.05 Secularization of education Change in percentage points Islamist party in the government

-.1 Introduction of multiparty regime

Point estimate 90% CI -.15

1914-18 1924-28 1929-33 1934-38 1939-43 1944-48 1949-53 1954-58 1959-63 1964-68 1969-73 1974-78 1979-83 1984-88 Armenian share in 1914 x Cohort

Notes. Data sources: The Ministry of Interior (EGM) for name data and Karpat(1985) for the 1914 population. The vertical axis represents the change in the share of religious male first names. The horizontal axis represents the five- year birth cohorts and the interaction of five-year birth cohorts with the share of Armenians in 1914. The variation in the share of Armenians in 1914 is at the province-of-birth level. The vertical lines represent the timing of secularization of education (1920–1924), of the introduction of multiparty regime (1945), and when an Islamist party participated in a coalition government for the first time (1974–1978). Point estimates and confidence intervals at 90 percent are from OLS estimates, conditional on five-year birth-cohort fixed effects, province-of-birth fixed effects, and subregion-specific time trends, and the interaction of a dummy variable indicating whether a cohort was born after the secularization reform with a set of control variables included in columns 2 to 6 of Table2. Standard errors are clustered at the province-of-birth level. The 1919–1923 birth cohort is the excluded cohort.

35 Figure 3: HISTORICAL ARMENIAN PRESENCEAND ENROLLMENTIN RELIGIOUS VOCATIONAL JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS: FLEXIBLE COHORT-LEVEL ESTIMATES

-.1 Change in percentage points

Point estimate Islamist party

90% CI in the government -.2

1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 Armenian share in 1914 x School year

Notes. Data sources: Published reports of the National Education Statistics from the Ministry of Education for religious junior high school data, Karpat(1985) for the 1914 population, and the Ministry of Interior (EGM) for name data. The vertical axis represents the change in the enrollment rate in religious vocational junior high schools. The horizontal axis represents the interaction of school-year dummies with the share of Armenians in 1914. The variation in the share of Armenians in 1914 is at the province level. The vertical line represents the year in which an Islamist party participated in a coalition government for the first time. Point estimates and confidence intervals at 90 percent are from OLS estimates, conditional on province fixed effects and school-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the province level.

36 Table 1: FLEXIBLE PARAMETRIC VILLAGE-LEVEL ESTIMATES: SUPPORTFOR ISLAMISTAND NATIONALIST PARTIES (1991–2015)

Islamist Nationalist Dependent variable vote share (%) vote share (%) (1) (2) (3) (4)

Armenian village 0.137*** 0.142*** 0.085* 0.084* (0.029) (0.030) (0.046) (0.048)

Nearest Armenian v. is within 0 to 2 km 0.142*** 0.165*** 0.071 0.050 (0.041) (0.046) (0.069) (0.079) Nearest Armenian v. is within 2 to 4 km 0.110*** 0.103*** 0.075* 0.068 (0.026) (0.028) (0.043) (0.049) Nearest Armenian v. is within 4 to 6 km 0.069*** 0.077*** 0.028 0.024 (0.024) (0.027) (0.038) (0.043) Nearest Armenian v. is within 6 to 8 km 0.026 0.035 0.040 0.049 (0.024) (0.027) (0.040) (0.047) Nearest Armenian v. is within 8 to 10 km 0.024 0.041 -0.032 -0.024 (0.023) (0.026) (0.039) (0.046)

Nearest Armenian v. is within 0 to 2 km Kurdish -0.125 0.112 × (0.084) (0.131) Nearest Armenian v. is within 2 to 4 km Kurdish 0.043 0.042 × (0.054) (0.077) Nearest Armenian v. is within 4 to 6 km Kurdish -0.042 0.023 × (0.050) (0.070) Nearest Armenian v. is within 6 to 8 km Kurdish -0.049 -0.049 × (0.050) (0.069) Nearest Armenian v. is within 8 to 10 km Kurdish -0.091* -0.044 × (0.054) (0.072)

Province FE XXXX

Observations 59,678 59,678 52,227 52,227 R-squared 0.236 0.236 0.228 0.228 Mean of dependent variable 39.68 39.68 8.568 8.568 s.d. of dependent variable 32.50 32.50 12.95 12.95

Notes. Data sources: TurkStat for election results and Ni¸sanyan(2010) for ethnoreligious identity of villages. The unit of observation is village. The sample is restricted to former Armenian villages and the Muslim villages within 15 kilometers of them in the treatment sample shown in FigureD1 in Supplementary AppendixD. Mus- lim villages that are 10 to 15 kilometers from the former Armenian villages are the control group. The share of votes for Islamist parties and nationalist parties is normalized by the mean of each election. Islamist parties participated in elections in 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015. Nationalist parties participated in elections in 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015. Controls consist of dummy variables indicating whether the village is a Kurdish village and whether it is an Arabic village; walking distances to the nearest province and district centers, and to the nearest river and stream; altitude of the village; suitability indices for wheat, olive, and cotton cultivation. Standard errors are corrected for spatial correlation assuming that there is no correlation across villages that are more than 15 kilometers apart. *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1 < < <

37 Table 2: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ATE: LITERACYAND PRIMARY SCHOOL COMPLETION (1985)

Estimator OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Panel A: Outcome: Literate (mean = 73.83, sd = 43.95)

Armenian share in 1914 Post-secularization -0.488*** -0.417*** -0.419** -0.420*** -0.384*** -0.417** × (0.087) (0.111) (0.213) (0.111) (0.110) (0.204)

R-squared 0.338 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.339

Panel B: Outcome: Completed primary school (mean = 66.24, sd = 47.29)

Armenian share in 1914 Post-secularization -0.542*** -0.348*** -0.431** -0.349*** -0.324*** -0.348* × (0.102) (0.114) (0.198) (0.114) (0.114) (0.198)

R-squared 0.363 0.365 0.365 0.365 0.365 0.365

Province FE and Cohort FE XXXXXX Subregion-speciﬁc time trends XXXXX Controls Post-secularization × XXXXX School supply in 1927 Post-secularization × X Growth in school supply btwn 1927–1945 Post-secular. × X Conley correction X Observations 1,292,602 1,292,602 1,292,602 1,292,602 1,292,602 1,292,602 F-stat 19.45 Mean of Armenian share in 1914 7.38 7.38 7.38 7.38 7.38 7.38 s.d. of Armenian share in 1914 7.57 7.57 7.57 7.57 7.57 7.57

Notes. Data sources: A 5 percent microsample of the 1985 census for education outcomes and Karpat(1985) for the 1914 population. The unit of observation is the individual in columns 1 through 5. In column 6, data are grouped at the ‘province cohort gender urbanity status’ level and × × × estimation is performed by using group sizes as frequency weights. Dependent variable in Panel A is a dummy variable indicating whether individual is literate; that in Panel B is a dummy variable indicating whether individual completed primary school. The sample is restricted to individuals born between 1893 and 1967. Post-secularization dummy indicates whether an individual was born after 1913 and attended primary school after the secularization reforms. All specifications include province-of-birth fixed effects and five-year birth-cohort fixed effects, and individual-level controls. Individual-level controls consist of a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is female and a dummy variable indicating whether he or she resides in an urban area. Columns 2 through 6 include subregion-specific time trends and interactions of a dummy variable indicating whether an individual attended primary school after the secularization reforms with a set of control variables which consist of geographical-region fixed effects; the share of Greeks, Kurds, and Arabs in 1914; the share of districts of each province that fall within the territories of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum; the number of monuments related to religion or religious education built by the Seljuks, normalized by the surface area of the province; population density in 1914; the share of districts of each province that had access to the railway network in 1914; the share of districts of each province that are within one-and-a-half days of the major nineteenth-century ports; travel distances to Istanbul, to the coast, and to the eastern border; length of rivers and streams, normalized by the surface area of the province; mean elevation and latitude; and mean suitability indices for wheat, cotton, and olive cultivation. Column 3 reports 2SLS estimates using as an instrument the interaction of a dummy variable indicating whether individual attended primary school after the secularization reforms with travel distance to Mt. Ararat. Columns 4 and 5 include the interaction of a dummy variable indicating whether individual attended primary school after the secularization reforms with the log number of schools per school-age children in 1927 and with the growth rate of the number of schools per school-age children between 1927 and 1945, respectively. Residents of Istanbul province; Hatay province, which was not part of Turkey between 1920 and 1938; and the districts that joined Turkey in 1914 are excluded from the sample. In columns 1 through 5, standard errors are clustered at the province-of-birth level. In column 6, standard errors are corrected for spatial correlation, assuming that there is no correlation between provinces that are more than 200 kilometers apart. *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1 < < <

38 Table 3: PARENTAL DECISIONS:RELIGIOUS NAMESAND SCHOOLING CHOICES

Primary school Enrollement rate in Dependent variable completion rate religious schools (1) (2) (3) (4)

Religious name share 0.136 -0.117 (0.145) (0.133) Religious name share Post secularization -3.286*** -1.506*** 0.584*** 0.277* × (0.346) (0.300) (0.213) (0.151)

Province FE and Cohort FE XXXX Province-speciﬁc time trends XX Observations 924 924 525 525 R-squared 0.982 0.990 0.819 0.919 Mean of dependent var. 51.54 51.54 2.624 2.624 s.d. of dependent var. 29.75 29.75 2.742 2.742

Notes. Data sources: 5 percent microsamples of the 1985, 1990, and 2000 censuses for primary school completion rates, published reports of the National Education Statistics from the Ministry of Education for religious junior high school data, and the Ministry of Interior (EGM) for name data. Data from each data source is collapsed at the five-year-cohort and province levels to construct a panel dataset that re- flects parental decisions that are taken simultaneously. For a given five-year cohort, the share of religious names among 0- to 5-year-olds is matched with the share of population who completed primary school among 6- to 11-year-olds and with the share of primary school graduates who were enrolled in religious vocational junior high schools during that five-year period. The sample in columns 1 and 2 is restricted to individuals born between 1909 and 1978; the sample in columns 3 and 4 is restricted to individuals that attended junior high school between 1951 and 1988. Post-secularization dummy indicates whether parental decisions are after the secularization reforms. All specifications include province-of-birth fixed effects and five-year birth-cohort fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 include province-specific time trends. Resi- dents of Istanbul province are excluded from the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1 < < <

39 Table 4: FOREGONE INCOME:HOURLY WAGE (1985)

Dependent variable Log hourly wage (1) (2) (3)

Completed primary school 0.605*** 0.539*** 0.536*** (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) Completed primary school Armenian share in 1914 0.010*** 0.010*** × (0.002) (0.002)

Province FE and Cohort FE XXX Province-speciﬁc time trends X Observations 121,211 121,211 121,211 R-squared 0.109 0.110 0.111 Mean of dependent variable 2.444 2.444 2.444 s.d. of dependent variable 1.401 1.401 1.401

Notes. Data sources: A 5 percent sample of the 1985 census for occupations, professions, and education outcomes; microsamples of the Turkish Labor Force survey in 2002–2006 for wages. The sample is restricted to males born between 1913 and 1939 who attended primary school when no religious instruction was available. I impute hourly wages in 1985 by assigning to each ‘occupation profes- × sion’ group that existed in the 1985 census a value representing the median hourly wage of all males with that particular occupation and profession according to the Turkish Labor Force survey in 2002– 2006. Completed primary school is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual completed primary school. All specifications include province-of-birth fixed effects and five-year birth-cohort fixed effects. Columns 3 includes province-specific time trends. Residents of Istanbul province; Hatay province, which was not part of Turkey between 1920 and 1938; and the districts that joined Turkey in 1914 are excluded from the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the province-of-birth level. *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1 < < <

40 Table 5: CROWDINGOUT?: TRANSMISSIONOF RELIGIOUS VALUES WITHIN FAMILY VS.FORMAL EDUCATION

Frequency of attending Dependent variable Importance of religion religious services (1) (2) (3) (4)

Raised pious 2.172*** 1.734*** 1.407*** 1.400*** (0.292) (0.160) (0.280) (0.126)

Raised pious Completed primary school -0.605** -0.190 × (0.308) (0.290) Raised pious Completed secondary school -0.317 -0.454*** × (0.221) (0.174)

Completed primary school 0.189 -0.005 (0.251) (0.258) Completed secondary school -0.875*** -0.154 (0.175) (0.143)

Observations 2,181 2,181 2,141 2,141 Pseudo R-squared 0.158 0.177 0.129 0.132

Notes. Data source: The second and third waves of the World Values Survey. Conditional ordered logit estimates. The sample is restricted to native-born Muslims. Controls include a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is female; respondent’s age as a second-order polynomial; and dummy variables indicating income- level brackets, survey year, and region ﬁxed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported. *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1 < < <