Download Thesis
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ Towards a hybrid theory of Property Entitlement, from a combination of Lockean and Humean elements. Humphries, Simon James Awarding institution: King's College London The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 29. Sep. 2021 Towards a hybrid theory of Property Entitlement, from a combination of Lockean and Humean elements. Simon J Humphries PhD Philosophy The copyright of this thesis rests with the author, and no quotation from it, or information derived from it, may be published without proper acknowledgement. 1 Table of Contents: Preface 4 Chapter 1: Basic Assumptions 7 Chapter 2: The Lockean Approach: The arguments for property rights in a state of 44 nature Chapter 3: The Lockean Approach: The ‘enough and as good’ proviso 105 Chapter 4: The Humean Approach 143 Chapter 5: Conclusion 185 Acknowledgements 189 2 ABSTRACT John Locke’s approach to property rights is often seen as inherently unsatisfactory in today’s world, because of problems in a number of areas, significant amongst which are difficulties in tracing a historical chain from just initial acquisition to current title and a certain imprecision which seems unavoidable within the theory. As a result, a more conventional approach has tended to predominate. This might be thought to be exemplified by the writings of David Hume. In this essay, I argue that liberal rights assumptions can give rise to genuine Lockean-style property claims, because these seem to do justice to a number of our ethical intuitions, and that these need to be incorporated in our ideas of how property title is justly acquired. I suggest that these intuitions relate to the genesis of property rights, whilst Humean thoughts are often more relevant when we are unable to properly trace such genesis. I also suggest that conventionalists should not dismiss Locke, nor vice versa . Instead we need a hybrid theory that incorporates both elements. I do not reach a final conclusion on how the two might be brought together, but suggest a way forward for this endeavour. Locke’s theory is one about how property gets going – so indeed is Hume’s. But thoughts about property rights today are not so much about how they get going, but about how they are properly instantiated in today’s world. These thoughts seem to demand a conventionalist approach. But no such approach can avoid thoughts about the genesis of such rights. My thesis departs from the current day emphasis, because it focuses on the genesis of property rights and suggests that considerations around such matters are not to be avoided. I do not claim to have the final solution to this problem: my purpose is to bring this intellectual conflict to people’s attention. I seek to point the way to a complex theory of property rights and give some support to it. 3 PhD. Thesis: Simon Humphries (Tutor: Tom Pink) Title: Towards a hybrid theory of Property Entitlement, from a combination of Lockean and Humean elements. PREFACE John Locke’s approach to property rights is often seen as inherently unsatisfactory in today’s world, because of problems in a number of areas, significant amongst which are difficulties in tracing a historical chain from just initial acquisition to current title and a certain imprecision which seems unavoidable within the theory. As a result, a more conventional approach has tended to predominate. This might be thought to be exemplified by the writings of David Hume. In this essay, I argue that liberal rights assumptions can give rise to genuine Lockean-style property claims,1 because these seem to do justice to a number of our ethical intuitions, and that these need to be incorporated in our ideas of how property title is justly acquired. I suggest that these intuitions relate to the genesis of property rights, whilst Humean thoughts are often more relevant when we are unable to properly trace such genesis. I also suggest that conventionalists should not dismiss Locke, nor vice versa . Instead we need a hybrid theory that incorporates both elements. I do not reach a final conclusion on how the two might be brought together, but suggest a way forward for this endeavour. Locke’s theory is one about how property gets going – so indeed is Hume’s. But thoughts about property rights today are not so much about how they get going, but about how they are properly instantiated in today’s world. These thoughts seem to demand a conventionalist approach. But no such approach can avoid thoughts about the genesis of such rights. My thesis departs from the current day emphasis, because it focuses on the genesis of property rights and suggests that considerations around such matters are not to be avoided. The thought is that these rights are natural and 1 I call this approach quasi-Lockean, for reasons which will be detailed in Chapter 2. 4 based on the idea that labourers, using their own resources, or where no just prior ownership in the resources they use can be justified, have a right to what they invest in. This is based on the thought that, to deny them this right, would represent a theft of their labour. When I talk of ‘labour-mixing’ in a ‘Lockean’ sense, this is what I shall be referring to – not an idea that labour is literally being mixed with the physical object in question. The thought that the two approaches might be melded is perhaps counter-intuitive since Locke starts from a position of land aplenty while Hume commences from one of scarcity. Modification to both approaches is thus required. Additionally, I suggest that, provided, we do not depend on any reference as to what God’s wishes for mankind may be, the so-called ‘Lockean Proviso’ is not an essential part of the labour-based theory. Since my approach does not depend on the existence of God, any such omission is not pertinent to my argument. My claim is not for a natural right to property: I claim rather that property rights arise, in part, through an amalgamation of certain ‘natural’ rights in the person and acts with regard to the external world, together with the incorporation of certain conventional elements. Pre-supposed however, within this approach is a natural right to the practice of private property, which in turn arises from the fact that, prior to human intervention, the external world is unowned. My argument starts from a Lockean position, amends it, and then adds certain conventional elements drawn from Hume and attempts to see how the two might be joined and further attempts to identify where areas of conflict seem to arise. Because I suggest that rights in property can arise through a natural process, I am generally averse to the thought that utility can usually overrule such rights – I do suggest however, that such trumping might be appropriate in a minority of cases. I state at the outset that my approach is an exploratory one. I do not claim to have the final solution to this problem: my purpose is to bring this intellectual conflict to people’s attention. I seek to point the way to a complex theory of property rights and give some support to it. In line with Robert Nozick, I agree that “there is room for words on subjects other than last words”.(Anarchy, State and Utopia , 1974, xii) My key point is that we need to take a Lockean-type, natural right to property, under certain conditions, into account in any theory of just property ownership. 5 In Chapter 1, I outline a case for a set of liberal rights in the person. I follow this in Chapter 2, by suggesting that such rights can generate rights in the external world, when persons, or groups of persons, labour on raw materials that no-one can claim any right to. I do suggest that the Lockean approach is not always precise as to the extent of such rights. In Chapter 3, I suggest that the so-called ‘Lockean proviso’ does not undermine previously established property claims, except in very constrained circumstances. I suggest, too, that the Lockean account relies not only on just initial acquisition, but a chain of voluntary transfers, if the initial acquirer no longer owns the rights. In Chapter 4, I investigate similarities and differences in the Humean approach, and suggest a way the two may be brought together.