<<

TAB B

LANDING BEACHES ON

1. APARRI - 30 mile beach, in vicinity of coastal road, wide and sandy, low wooded shoreline broken "by cultivated sections, low-lands lie "behind coast. Exposed to N.E. monsoon, heavy surf / usually affected "by typhoons during Oct0 and Novo Most favorable to land during June - Septo En­ trance to river obstructed by sand bars0

2. VTGAN - Landing beach at PANDAN, Quitivated narrow coastal plain, bar in mouth of ABRA River passes 3/k fathom at high ^ide0 Within 1 l/2 miles from coast there are 3 shoals which can be cleared by landing craft0 Heavy surf arid ground swells with strong N and NE wind0 North current tends vessels to lie in trough of sea0 Exposed to S.W, monsoon, usually affected by typhoons occurring during Sept0, 0cto, and Nov0

3. - 52 miles wide continuous sand beach on E and S coast, extensive and exposed. Chain of shoals with 3 l/2 to 6 l/2 fathoms clearance extends half way across entrance of gulf from SAN FERNANDO Pt, to CAPE BOLIANO, East coast foothills rise short distance from shore. Inland from South Coast terrain is flat and extends So beyond to de BAY, Parallel coastal highways connect with vital areas of LUZON, skirt the E and S coast. Prevailing wind for greater part of year is S0E. During N,E, monsoon occasional strong N and NOE, gales „ During SoWo monsoon periodic gales lasting 3 to 15 days. Usually af­ fected by typhoons occurring Sept„, Oct,, and Novc

ko DASOL-IBA BAYS - There is a total of 31 miles of sandy beach, DASOL BAY has numerous scattered reefs and shoals. Coast from IBA south for 6 miles is low and sandy. From BOTOLAN POINT to CAPONES POINT, 27 miles of shoreline are steep-to with sandy beach, IBA has sheltered anchorage during N,E, monaoon, .but is open to S,W0, which is affected by typhoons occurring during Sept,, 0cto, and Nov, Cultivated areas extend several miles back from shore to foothills and mountains„ Coastal road parallels beach from DASOL BAY to CAPONES POINT which leads to LINGAYEN and MANILA0

5, SUBIC BAY - The shore extends eight miles northeast. Some shoal water off GRANDE ISLAND and CAYMAYAN POINT, PORT OLONGAPO is all weather har­ bor. Cultivated lowlands NOW, of SUBIC and upland to Eo of SUBIQ BAY, Good road leads to MANILA,

6, MANILA BAY - 39 miles of beach on E, shore of BATAAN Peninsula and Eo and SoEo shore of bay. Tidal currents do not affect landing craft except at lower end of PASIG River, Launches of shallow draft can pass up the river to LAGUNA de BAY, which is fringed by highways leading from beaches. During S.E, monsoons periodical local storms blow from SOW, to Wo accom­ panied by violent squalls and much rain lasting several days. Typhoons occur during Oct,, Nov., Dec, The bay is bordered by the extensive plain of LUZON which iB cultivated and thickly populated, LUZON (MANILA) em­ braces vital area of the islands. The Wo , Eo , and SOEO shores are fringed by first-class roads connecting highway system of N. and S, LUZON,

yo - BAY - 23 miles of low sand beaches N, from LEMERY and north from MAINAGA COVE cut by numerous suall rivers. Sand and gravel beach from CALUMPAN River S, for h miles. Bays are spacious, well shel­ tered throughout the year. 6 miles N,*from MAINAGA COTE, the coast is steep, rocky and wooded. Vessels of all sizes can anchor close off sand

13-2(2)

146 "beaches. Tidal currents at BATANGAS run parallel to shore S.E0 during flood. Typhoons occur during Oct., Nov., Dec, Cultivated lowlands ex­ tend along shores at head of bay. From NABOLED POINT to MATOCO POINT, highlands skirt the coast and boulders and steep-to coral reefs fringe the shore. A network of roads spread to E0N. and Wo of BATANGAS0 The southern extension of MANILA Railway terminates at this point. 8. BA Y- Low sand beach extends for 20 miles N. and E. from CALUBOUB, 6 miles No of BANTIGUI POINT to TAYABAS POINT. Beach at PITOGO k$ miles SE 'of . Numerous shoals lnW, part of "BBLJO Reef extends for 7 mlleB fr

9« LEGASPI, GULF - Sandy beach about 6 miles long extends No from LEGASPI PORT. There are a number of reefs off LEGASPI PORT which will pass k l/2' draft. Heavy during N.E. monsoon„ Typhoons occur dur­ ing Oct., Nov., Dec* Extensive cultivated lowlands. Road parallels beach from LEGASPI to LIBOG. LEGASPI is S o terminus of MANILA Railway, 10. SAN MIGUEL BAY - There are 8 miles of gentle curving sand beach, clear of shoals and reefs. The coast is fringed by cultivated lowlands and high­ lands, partially open to N.E. monsoon. Typhoons occur Oct., Novo, Dec Roads lead inland connect with MANILA Railway at SIPOCOT and LIBMANANo

11. LAMON - LOPEZ BAY - MAUBAN has sandy beach to 3 miles S o of PETISA POINT. Deep water close-to, wooded highlands fringe coast, N.E. monsoon, partial­ ly protected by off-lying islands. Typhoons occur during Oct., Novo, Dec Road leads from MAUBAN Inland to connect with S, LUZON highway system. - sandy beach extends 2 miles N. to . Is well protected, but usually affected by typhoon occurring during Oct., Novo, Dec Culti­ vated highways back from coast with many trails crossing to TAYABAS BAY, MANILA Railway and road parallel the beach at various places. SANGIRIN BAY - Village of PERES on E. shore of bay, 2 large reefs bare at low water l/2 mile S. of bar. Protected from N.E. and S.W. monsoons0 Typhoons occur during Oct., Nov.,. Dec. The terrain is cultivated along the low­ lands which are backed by highlands. Partially constructed road runs a­ long S.W. coast of island. HONDAGUA beach extends l/2 mile above and l/2 mile below harbor, which is well protected, but is affected by typhoons occurring during Oct., Nov., Dec. Coast is fringed by cultivated lowlands and highlands. Roads lead inland and connect with MANILA Railway.

13-2(2)

147 PASALEN6 BAY 8 Ml. (NORTH) SPECIAL STRATEGIC MAP Seal* 1:2,000.000 60 7O 10 90 100 110 120 130 140

20 Q 20 40 60 10 100 120 1«O 1*0 IB^W I

UnW I Cofrtormal Conic Pto^clion St.od.rd PtralMi V mni 20* HEIGHTS IN FEET

BEACHES

LINGAYEN GULF 52 Ml.

^ -•/i^fe;:;::^^ jit

0AS0L BAY 6 Ml. W :*~ ^^ DINGALAN BAY 12 Ml. U Z 0 N

BOTOLAN PT.

CA PONES PT.

SAN MIGUEL BAY 8 Ml.

S I B U Y lA Ml TAB C

PRESENT ESTIMATED PORT CAPACITIES OF PORTS AND ANCHORAGES IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

LUZON

Port or Base Estimated Port Capacity and Ships toeing LT/lO Renarks f Location worked hr day

Philippine Is-Luzon

Aparri Open exposed (unlimited) anchorage in 18°2O »K 2 at anchor , 600 30 to 60' and deeper sand and mud 121°U0°E "bottom. Bar over river mouth prevents entrance to deep draft vessels„ Hwy to Manila0 Principal port No Luzon, Exposed to northerly winds0"

Puerto Real Anchorage over mud 'bottom in 30 to lW-0»N ' 1 at anchor 300 102' for 5 vessels. Pier for light­ 121°37°E erage with k knot current along face of wharf at falling tide. Exposed to So No rwy0 Road connections to general Luzon road system,, Pan American formerly operated radio "beacon for its trans-Pacific clippers„

Nauban Small port, open anchorage over mud 2 at anchor 600 "bottom for 6 vessels in 30 to 60' or 9 E approxo h sq mi0 with 120" or less. Some protection from N "but exposed SE winds o Stone "breakwater and landing 9 wind 10 deptho Lighterage onlyo Road connection,, Rock northward of landing.

Hondagua 2 at anchor 600 Good anchorage in 42° to 102% mud "bottom, for 2k or more vessels0 Rwy 13°57 'K 1 alongside ^00 8 22201k VE 1000 wharf 15 to 30' alongside„ Rwy and hwy to interioro Exposed to NWO Good seaplane "baseo

Jose Panganlban 1 alongside 200 Large area of good anchorage in any "N 1 at anchor 300 desired depth soft sand "bottom„ Light­ 500 erage and limited alongside "berthage0 No rwy0 Roads to So considerable swell with NW winds0 No typhobn shelter, reduces usefulness of other portion of "bay. Concrete pier, 306 depth for alongside "berthage - good road connec­ tions „

13-2(2) 5M

149 rort or Bade Estimated Fort Capacity and Ships being Lr/lO Remarks Location worked hr day

Tabaco 1 alongside 500 Anchorage for 5 vesselB in 150• to 13°22«N 1 at anchor 500 l60» depths 600 to 7508 off Tabaco ° 080 Wharf0 Ample anchorage in excessive depth (300 to 360«)o Good road con- • neetions and by short distance to rwyo Additional lighterage piers could be constructedo Exposed to KE winds. *

Legaspl Bad anchorage due to great depth (102 13°09«N k at anchor 1200 to 132 ft) at 9OO9 offshore and irregular bottom in patches affording poor holding groundo Several wharves of light construction for lighterage,, Good rvy and road connections. Anchorage open eastward to heavy seao Formerly considerable Improvement and construction of sheltered basin. Aloneros Anchorage for 10 or more vessels In f 13°59 » 1 at anchor 300 30 to 36» over mud bottom „ Exposed to 182022"E Stf monsoons. Rwy wharf, 2k9 depth, Rail and road connections to interior. Long haul by lighter (over 5 ml) limits development possibilities,, Batangas Good anchorage for large number of 2 at anchor 600 vessels (over 20) in 90 to 108 ft with 121°05»E good mud holding bottom,, Concrete pier for lighterage. Exposed to SVT monsoon. Air facilities, all weather. Hwy and rwy to interior.

Cavlte 2 alongside Naval station formerlyo Anchorage In 5 at anchor 12 to 19 * over mud. Extensive docking facilities for ocean .craft and smaller vessels. Ewy connections to Manila and interior. No rwy. Manila 25 at anchor 7500 Anchorage area approx. 2 sq. ml partly lfc°35f» 10 alongside 1*700 enclosed by breakwater. Unlimited 120°58»E 600 deep water anchorage outside breakwater, 2 coasters 12800 Excellent alongside berthage (formerly k steel and concrete, piers), a bulkhead wharf and lighterage facilities. Ex­ cellent rwy (no direct connections to piers) and hwy system. Formerly much narbor construction and improvements were being made. Small tidal currents, ntftTinrnm tidal range 5o2 ft.

Marlveles Safe anchorage for 9 vessels In 30 to lk°28«N 1 alongside 300 96' depth, good mud bottom holding 120°29»E ground. 1 wharf with 25 to 28* depth. Exposed to S.E; hwy but no rwy connec­ tionso

13-2(2) 150 Port or Base Estimated Port Capaeity and Ships being Ifl?/lO Remarks Location worked hr day

Olongapo 3 alongside 900 Safe ample anchorage, good holding 11+ U9'N 1 at anchor 300 groundo Southward from the Navy yard 12O°16«E 1200 in* 72 or 78' depth, mud bottom. Piers with varying depths for alongside and lighterage of cargo„ No rwy0 Good road connections,, Inner harbor of Olongapo good typhoon shelter0

Maeinloc Anchorage for 5 or more vessels in 30 15°32»H 3 at anchor 900 to 78" depths (more vessels in greater 19' 57'E depths) over mud "bottom holding ground0 Beefs are marked "by discolored voter0 Concrete wharf with 60' face, 37" alongside, No rwy0 One coastal road system. Exposed to the west0 Tidal range "between higher high water and low tide ko3\

Santa Cruz Anchorage for 8 or more vessels in 30 13°29'N 1 alongside 300 to 60' mud "bottom holding ground „ Ex­ 122°02»E posed to west0 Shoals in "bay. Wooden wharf, 30" depth end of fender piles at the end of pier0 There are coastal road connections o No rwyo Tidal range between higher high water and low tide ko2\

Poro Anchorage in 30 to 60' in open bay ex­ (San Fernando) k at anchor 1200 posed NW for 7 vessels or more, over 6°37'N muddy bottom, good holding ground. In 120°l8'E heavy northerly weather vessels anchor S of peninsula at Poro about 300° off beach in h2 to U8' muddy bottom for several vessels„ Rwyo Pier with 26" alongside. Ships tackle used for cargo by lighterageo Formerly oil storage tanks on beach0

Iaizon Woather: Extending from Nov to Apr, there is the northeast monsoon, with • i«md Andflftft "breezes blowing regularly interrupted by NE gales. This is the dry season on the west coast of Central Luzon, but the rainy season on the east coast (Oct to Mar) with heavy rainfall and poor weather up to Jan0

The rainy season on the west coast of Central Luzon Is during the SW monsoon roughly fraa June until Oct0 Gales blow frcm SW to the west, usually lasting from 3 to 15 days, accompanied by torrents of rains. The weather on the east coast at this time (from May to Sept) Is usually excellent and the calmo

The worst season in Manila Bay is from Sept until the end of Oct when typhoons fre­ quently occur.

13-2(2) 5M

151 "°'° Aparri lugal 600 HA HI'VAN CHANMHI. PHILIPPINES (NORTH) SPECIAL STRATEGIC MAP Cap* Boi*adoi Scale 1 :2,000.000

lo o 10 /o 30 vi so y TO; m to 100 IIOI M n o 140 MII «

20 O ?0 4 0 fiO 80 100 I?O 140 160 180 ?O0 Kilometer*

Lambert Conformal Conic Protection Standard Parallels 7 and 70 HMGr 'S IN Hf r

LEGCND

PORT CAPACITIES INDICATED IN LONG TONS PER DAY

Santa Cruz 300 Santiago I Bolinao

U Z O N Puerto Real Masinloc 300 900 Olongapo O 1200 Patnanongan I Jomahg I Jose Panganiban Mauban Mariveles 500 300 Los Cochinas I Corrcgidc Oapdap Pt J '» • '«««•»*•• Manila labat I J 12,800

LUBANG T Catanduanes I ISLANDS Tabaco 250 0 Cape Calavite " MT 800 Batangas 600 Legaspi Hondogua MINDO R 1200

MI*C0 Maestre de Campo I IOOO &. f ,, .,y

7 \ RotnMon I Cape rspintu Santo

Tablas I ]/..

Dalupifi I ', ; Coconongon M A/R'V^ /:;:;;' Pagbirlungan Pt SAM AH CALAMIAN SKA • MTC»JIY»» GROUP S*m.fa,,l 15 2 "0 •' Ca-abao I" Tagapula I

1211* Sl'RET

THl 'HIEF Ok T. OI.P..HTA710B

CAPACITY IN SHORT TOMS PER DAY Or THC HIGHWAYS ON CCMTRAL LUZON XSLANO (PHILIPPINES) THAT PROVIOC POR MOVEMENT TO MANILA

153 TAB E

TERRAIN AND CLIMATIC CONDITIONS

PHILIPPINES

TERRAIN.

Strategically, politically, and commercially, central LUZON ia the most vital area in the PHILIPPINE Archipelago. It may "be described as that part of LUZON extending 130 miles to the southeastward from LINGAYEN GULP to MANILA BAY and to the large fresh water lake, LAGU1TA de BAY0 Topo­ graphically, this area divides into the ZAMBALES MOUNTAINS on the west coast, the great central plain, and the SIERftA MADRE MOUNTAINS on the east.

MANHA, the focus of all the principal highways and railroads of LUZON, lies at the strategic center of gravity of the PHILIPPINE Archipelago. From MANILA, control of the islands and the island waterways can be most readily exercised, MANILA is, therefore, the principal geographic objective of operations leading to the recapture of LUZON, and to regaining control of the PHILIPPINE Archipelago.

The ZAMBALES MOUNTAINS, rising to altitudes of more than 6,000 feet, form an almost uninterrupted chain on the whole western coast of central LUZON, the only low level land, except that immediately bordering the coast, lying between the PAMATUAN and ST0o TOMAS BITERS Just north of SUBIC BAY.

The SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAIN RANGE, with elevations up to U,500 feet, parallel the bold and rocky east coast of LUZON at distances from the shore varying from 5 to 7 ™il©8» These mountains extend 350 miles northward from LAGUNA de BAY to the northeastern tip of the is land. They virtually deny over­ land access to central LUZON from the eastward, except near BALER, DINGALEN BAY, and INFANTA, where there are low passes between the PACIFIC and western LUZON.

LINGAYEN GULF is of great strategic importance, offering one of the best areas for extensive landing operations and the deployment of large forces against MANILA, 130 miles to the southeastward. MANILA BAY and SUBIC BAY are of likewise vital strategic importance to central LUZON.

In general, landings on the west coast of central LUZON can be made easily only during the northeast monsoon (November to March). During the southwest monsoon (May to October), landings are difficult and sometimes impossible„ In addition to LINGAYEN GUIF, landings can be made on the west coast between the PAMATUAN and STO. TOMAS RIVERS, in the vicinity of IBA, in PAIAUIG BAY, between the NAYOM BrVER and TAMBOVE ROADS; along the coast Just south of the BALINGAGUIN RIVER, and in that river „ The MANILA-0L0NGAP0 ROAD, paralleling the west coast of central LUZON about 2 miles inland, furnishes the only ready route of advance on SUBIC and MANILA Bays, since the land back of the road is high and rugged.

The northern part of LUZON is divided into three longitudinal belts by the CORDILLERA CENTRAL MOUNTAINS on the west, the SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINS on the east, with the long, broad CAGAYAN VALLEY separating the twoo The southern end of this valley is enclosed by a Juncture of the eastern and western mountain ranges. There are a few landing beaches on the northwest coast. The north coast presents a broad expanse of lowlands where extensive landing operations are possible, but the route of penetration therefrom leads south along the easily defended CAGAYAN Valley roads.

13-2(2)

154, , Landings on the northeast coast are rendered virtually impracticable by the DOld and rocky shoreline, hacked by the SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINSo There are no overland communication facilities in the northeast region.

The areas of greatest strategic importance in south LUZON lie in the vicinity of LAMON and LOPEZ Bays, on the east coast, TAYABAS and BATANGAS Bays on the south coast c The "beaches at MAUBAN and ATIMONAN on LOPEZ BAY are ideal for landing operations. The highlands behind thesevbeaches present natural bar­ riers, but primary highways through them facilitate penetration to vital areas to the westward. During the northeast monsoon (from September to March) the weather would probably be unfavorable for landing operations at MAUBAN and ATIMONAN more than 50 per cent of the time.

BATANGAS and TAYABAS Bays on the south coast of LUZON, both of which have rail and highway connections with MANILA and the LAMON-LOFEZ BAY areas, may be regarded as strategic entrances „ , between the southeastern tip of LUZON and SAMAR ISLAND is the most important sea passage in the ARCHIPELAGO, being the shortest route between HAWAII and MANILA, SQRSOGON BAY, with a safe anchorage capacity for a large fleet, holds a flanking position on the direct route from MANILA to SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT,, The seizure of MASBATE and SAMAR Islands, together with southeastern LUZON, will provide control of this strategically vital passage. Landing opera­ tions are practical at the head of ALBAY GULF, and in SAN MIGUEL BAY.

Mangrove thickets form a narrow band on tidal flats near mouths of streams and along muddy shores of protected bayso These swamps are difficult to traverse because of intertwining branches and projecting root systems, except where channeled at river mouths. Landings can be made by passing through these channels, and disembarking behind the swamps, or by traversing them in amphibian tractors.

Except for the PASIG and CAGAYAN, the rivers in this theater are of little importance for transportation, being generally swift and shallow.

The Island of LUZON is volcanic.

II. CLIMATEo

The climate of this region is tropical, with temperatures at sea level ranging from 60° to 100° F.. and averaging 8l° F. Except in more or less enclosed spaces, temperatures as high as 100° F. are quite rareo The year may be divided into three seasons: the first, cool and dry, commencing in November and extending to March; the second, hot but still dry, commences in March, the greatest heat being experienced from April to the end of May; the third, which is exceedingly wet, runs from June to November. During the wet season, inundations are frequent, and traveling in the interior is difficulto Flying conditions are generally good.

Winds and tides. The trade wind, reaching this area from the eastward, blows more or lees strongly throughout the year. . It is moderate in force. For fc months from June to September, the southwest monsoon prevails; May being the month in which the winds veer from east to southwest, while October is the month of change to the northeast. The northeast monsoon prevails from November to April. This area is In the typhoon belt, and typhoons may form during any month of the year. Typhoons are most prevalent from June. to November, inclusive, and one-fifth of all the typhoons occur during September. About 20 typhoons are recorded annually, but the destructive area of any one storm Is quite limited.

13-2(2) 5M

155 From June to September, the period of southwest winds, there is little natural difficulty in landing upon topographically favorable beaches along the east coast of LUZON „ The period of northeast monsoons (November to April), is best for landings on the west coast. Landings on the south coast of LUZON, and on the interior islands of the ARCHIPELAGO, such as CEBU, BOHOL, MASBATE, PANAY, and NEQROS, are feasible at any season, if beaches which lie to leeward of the winds prevailing during the monsoon are favored.

13-2(2)

156 TAB F SPECIAL PROJECTS LIKELY TO BE REQUIRED ENGINEER CORPS 1. Repair, improvement and constructipn of port facilities at Manila, Legaspl, Batangas, Tayabas Bay and Lingayen Bay0 2. Construct mountin'g area for five divisions, Manila Bay area. 3» Restore,v improve and construct airfield facilities to accommodate 57 1/2 air groups o k0 Repair and restore the railway lines. 5» Repair, improve and construct 300 miles of highway. 60 Construct tent camps for 700,000 men. 7. Water supply system 120,000 gals per hour. 8O Construct general hospitals and station hospitals 15,000 "beds TH/O type. 3/ Construction of gasoline storage and distribution systems. 10. Construct Class I, II and III warehouses, 60 days supply. 11. Construct ammunition storage depot, 100 magazines 26' x U0'. TRANSPORTATION CORPS 1. Tugs, lighters and harbor craft for operation of five ports. 2. Railway rolling stock for operation of railways. ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT 1. Tools and equipment for base armament and vehicle maintenance. 2. Handling equipment and dunnage for ammunition depot. 3. Arms, vehicles and equipment for re-arming Filipino Army. QUARTERMASTER CORPS,

l0 Handling equipment and dunnage for Class I, II and III depots. 2. Clothing and tentage for Filipino Army. 3. Laundries TH/O type for 700,000 troops. ka Salvage repair depot TH/O type. MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

lo Medical laboratory 50' x 100'. 2. Medical supplies and equipment for Philippine Army. 3. Medical supplies and equipment for liberated prisoners of War. SIGNAL CORPS

lo Fixed wire installations between camps and airfields. 2 O Signal equipment and supplies for Philippine troops. CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

l0 Impregnating plants for U.S. and Philippine troops. 2 0 Chemical supplies for Philippine troops.

13-2(2)

167 RESTRICTED Copy No. 4 , 2nd EDITION COMPARISON OF THE LOGISTIC FEASIBILITY OF OPERATIONS AGAINST LUZON AND FORMOSA

WJ>. HQ. A. S. F. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO

BY AUTHORITY OF THE CG Nome H£R3ERr G. K Rank Lt. Colonel Office Intelligence Div., ASF Date tifc

Planning Division, Offlee of Director of Plans and Operations Army Serviee Forces • War Department

Appendix &-y 158 Stratofla I*floti** Plaaalag Dirltioa, A,S.?. :30 Aa^aat.-1:944

00*AJU90H Of fHf LO0I3TIC or LU2W AID IOW03A

•a axaaiaatioa of teaohot iadloatos that thoy art adoqaato for full-ooalo oporatieao that far oonttaplattd for oltfaor fOfiMDSA or LU2OI.

*•

£0209 ID8N&S*

Port oapaoltloo art adoquato to rap­ Port oapaeltloo ara adoqtiata to port air operation* and aaiatcaaneo of port oltaor liaitod or oapaaftod opor­ foroot ooattaplatod to garrison L0201\ atiomo on fQBHiSk aad OBBOoqnomt aad to aotut approxlBatoljr 6 Airitloaa wpport of garrison forooo asd fLX for onliaoqttoiit operations. Oapaoltj oporationo thorofroa, aad aovatlac of aoloetod porte oa UJZOI it at fol­ 6* 7 diriiiottt. ffao oapacity of tao io v«j amia ports of JOHMOSa !• ao follow*I

a^K/lfisJULkJstHt LT/10-hr. Bar KAVXLA 18,800 DDttOIG 13,300 QATXYI 2,100 oosw 3,700 QLOIOAPC l»300 908EXJHI 4,800 PO» 1,300 YAXAD 15.000 MASINLOC. 900 32,700 XJf/10-hr. Bay 1ASAS9A8 ipp 01 84,800 W/10-hr. Say 901,000 IS/Honth 01 T44.000 Lf/*>ata latraaoo to 1AKJtt Voiac oaly 340 foot via* oaa oo oaoily tlootao* ^y alakiac a ooacroto ladaa * % (UWHr «i»») idaioa i t it ottlaatod will tako 10 dart to two wools to

3. maroiAfnai oy uraoi hat nooottafy vjaita for aooootary CUTCtOA win aaro to oaploy la«y

L020I fOSNOSA load oapaftltltt of 1-020* aro adofaato to fao road systta of oomthora olaar all aajor aad alaor ports. Aa lo ooaoidorod adoqoato to oloar tao 8,0Q0»toa oapaolfty road oxtoado aorthward ia,00O-toa capacity of tao part of fraa KASXLA to UBftATHI 00U aroa aad a TAXAO looally. As opt rat Was oxtoad 4#000»toa road oxtoadt •ovthoattward froa aorthward tao road oapaoitloo will oo KAVZLA, Ooatral LUaDV hat aa oxaolloat radsaod to approxliiaioly 3,800 *ort HQ A. S. F. CLASSIFIC/r:iJN CHANGED TO

RESTRICTED BY AUTHORITY OF THE Name hEEPERT G *°* Lt. Colonel ^mce Intelligence Div., AS 159 (**?• 4, load eUaraaoat, OoaVd)

WVM (Coat'd) 1UM08* (Ooat'd) • f vtadt foodla* tato or omt of , it it

laad J^L^SSf* «o*W l*adiat la­ Wmrd ttAUU fro. pttttUt laadUft aw , talt will to ta« road *«ta» MMl l a* amtham W2OI , oxtoadla* MHh fro. fAUuD W tt» pa«lty auid Ar^doa of lli% d U1 f l iU l for fro« «uk MI I0SM0S4 it Uaitod U 2 for tl» mrmtmt of tmont •trwtlom of ^rUco* tariag MM»m em Iho to«d ijstos urthnit of 9O8IEX Md oou«h of KDHT0, road oloaranoo fr«« K&SLUa, port of MrtUn IOXM03At lo Opomtioat la ootrttoia ••ITO «*M«lBft IEo Tory YAK38Z RlTor. XB «h* •Ulallgr •* wd& M^wy ««i railway torldcoa It oror ome «ilo l 8.

WJ20I us on sir­ Aa oataainaftiwi «f tk* alrflold «um will M %U« of JfcWOSA 4»UMUO fJto oo^lAi«d air, p It alM bat croaUr «op*elt7 uaa all tf partlflftlarly vlto yttpMt to VUl t»Q» fO»t>aa ALL *>BM>at Alrllold f MWl 3 11 umm JOL uaot n » u Mi 10 it n tut IT o s n

fl*U8 «om t*m tUl&m aot a#tdad for VIA***

rams* loraatlac aad roaakUlUtlaa avoaa for unoV^Mvamilag aad rahabtli%*Uoa artat for laaattd atirit aad ttmla of MAIIILA, to ao- 1UMDSA to aaataatdato 7 dlTioloat, 8 aaawdato ft dlrltioat («0.000 ata taah). omrta af fACAO, a aorth of tAlAD. aad t$m ***** tar «oaatru«ttoa o«tlaat«d at S la taa aorthars aiator #f «ewoaa.

timg

160 T. f a. With tfe* va? etatUalag la lOTTI Ifeara viU »a * ther**** af ltm m h aa US aa pas, ftuaiy Imk i *~toa, «t«al trca&najr VrMrfaf, «* partattoi for tail tort&fUff. *h* SiflPA Uli t ralaUvaljr fcattar potlUta vita r««p«et to hMKty arttllarf Uua PttA. SMW tbt aljkar priority tfctaWr », It • faMtWa at U vh«th«r acy »f «&••• itnt aut W f^rmitMl. tterUft «f •rUlUix atr «r»k«alljr >MMM a mrU** ?ro*lm far IM «oad»H af a»%taitt laaa •pantiioas «aiflh will o««ai? U

aadlaa aaA h**tj aamaltloa It owrraatlr botaf r»tloaoA to fa* fifth Angr la HAW U orAor to pivriAo taa aaaatoary supply far tho WU0OO0

Cm «AU bo fait* «atltf«at»vf far aparatloa la oltttor 1WA w fOA WMA aa taa prttoat rtflnft aaA aUaoatlaa* aaatwlatcA far lao roaalaiar ^t taa raar 1044, aaA tfco pratoat oj^aaAltara raia. Il^VtatH «aA 140BB •JHaaltlaa la PQA !• a»t aa •atltfaatary as 0VA« fte proatat stataa af aamaltlaa aa aaat aai allooatoA to taa af 1044 1* <«Aflat tod fa r

174.000 MeOOO 112,000 a9ooo 71.000 40,000 110,000 SBBLtOOO 00,000 473.000 Sf*A 013,000 au.ooo 401,000 MA 0 4,000 4,000 «TA 10,000 I f ,000 40,000 POA 0 4,000 4,000 1.400 0,000 7.300

vAU ro««Lra a»ro oadaaar affort tafOJM&iA. la KOB1A will W faat taat •paratloaa will lawrtro tao araaalat of taa vary *loa la taa rUlaltr af «ao aala It oa* alia po^alraaoato far taatloal arldclac wKltt aaA far %o aa Olaaa XT otaak tdll bo atiallr aa^araUa far # WWK laaal aatarlal «fallaal# 10MDSA«

UD20I

JItOlatlaato UaltftA Q»or*U«a MydUtoi 10,000 11,000 4,400 • 0,fOO 0,404 1T. 10,404 T.10O tl,001 27.115 10,090 •i^ltals 00,110 14f8?» I f 300 4» 10,110 ••400 4,040

100,140 10* CAlflQ

••* *** ooatUttoo Utd 1946 with AfUOTXO obiapla* doamado "•2I omffidoat ohippia* eaa bo a^TauSTTE that doflolto oa tao «rd*r * of to* 5 mtho f m Sopto*. . # r,, ?ro» febrau? 1WB oaward, ta« PACIFIC *•****• «**«*«llr « * lAU prorldo for oom laoidtat to otl li. 4ta4\at ffl LU2C* JOiWDM XXX of 8ZB0 T (Jaaaofy — Pobnarjr) 120 A?A'o will bo raqalrod oat of 96 APAU of tao 139 aTailablo at avullablo for tbo llaltod opera fcioa, Uao. 76 APA'o wUl bo requlrod for lavolrlaf a Uft for 10 dlrlolofto. If X? (April 1945) of tao 194 that i t theOTCoptratloao la Jtaso III aad XV io oottaotod will ba available at tbat art ooadaotod ao ladloatod* thoa ouf<» Uao. Xf tho fOftttSA oporatloa It eoa- fioltat lift will aot bo ar&iUblo to daotad with a targot data of IS Pohroarr eoaduat aitfcor a llaltod or oxpaaAod 1949 tho abora aoaUeaod aisamlt obJppla* tvsm&k oporatloa* Xa April 1949 190 womU aot to aTailablo U tho fall axtaat APA»3 wUl bo available for tao JOBttaA repaired. WPA «dn haro ottffloioat ea­ pMbiomo lift for ohoro-to^oaora opera* Uoao for 9 diridamt wbotaor IOW0SA oparatloa io ooadaotod amaemijoatly *r aot. KmJLroBoato t*r aooaalt ohlppiac aro baood oa U oparatioa aad IS APA»o for tlTA oporatloao afalaat lD2Xm. 12 APA't dooo aot prorldo a ovffioiaat rooorro par diwioioa in eaoo lotoo« of ara iaoarrod* O^onatlac oTor oxtoadod liaoo of ooMBualeatioa aad tho Jopaaooo hoaolaad, JOBI03A w&«t bo oo ooatldarod, otroac roaatloa would bo o^ootod froa tho Japaaaoo, A roaark, Yorjr portlaoat to thia oporatloa» ooataiaod U JPi 49T/1 valoA gHw aa ootlaato of oi^hibioao lift for PA3Z710 oporatioao, otataa "Xt io probable that Japaaooo roaotioa to aa Ixwaftloa of thoir hoo«l«ad ««r to oo rlaloat at to roqalro oabataatial roiaforooaoat of our forooo «ad la «gr oaoo tho roaalroaoato for roplaooaoato of toth partoaaal aad aatorlol are tar« to to fetor/," Xaoarroo will aot to roadily at haad la oaoo additional forest aro raqulrad to aaloo a ooaooaoful lod^Mat oa KUWOSA. Bwoa thov^ rooorr* forooo sl«^t to avail* able f m SWA la. tho ooatnd P8XLXPPXBB9 tho tiao oloaoat Ur orfaaliiaf a aovly araatad rooarro froa thlo atom aad tho tiao oloaoat of rotnraiac aooamlt obtpplaf twm K)J9»aAt i f tho aoaamlt oatppiaf i« availatU, wiU oaaao a ooaoidarablo dolay la aottlac tho roqalrod raiaforoaaoata to IOB»8A, Bovaror, la aaao of a ooKbaok tho fcriao foraoo aot up for oporatioao acOaot AWT ooald bo dJbrortod to oopport o«#ratioao oa Po»a>3A aad a portloa of that foteo ootild bo dlrortod to ooloo ^B90AD0tBS whloh« thorny aot ao doolrabU ao AMDT far a aoval b&oo. obotOd bo oaW iofaotory.

. oporailaao aoriac ap throT^ oo«4h*ni Xa ~*"^« ^ZiSSSZ'^Z SS*^1 * ooatral P8XLXF^XHS will prorldo a aaalaat 702M08A, OXKPOA will h«ro to larioo of taaoo for oar air forooo to dapaad «poa oaa amla taoo, lAVAXX, appros •Mtaat tar lfn^ of iaaaiHotti9 aad a taatol? 6 000 alloa distoat, with a p*a» F 9 !Trrr_ tT^k yfr^ iwoayvas «am to oafoljr oiblo atiUaatioa of aa latoraodiat* too* roiaforo* opooatloao ao i t tiioam at OttJU thio aaaatfurttlobla* m od llao of oa—Hoolioao owhioot to load taood alroraft baood oa .litaooo oitkor la UB0I or tao BWIW, 13. RESERVES. Recent operations ia the UiRIANAS haw given a definite indication that an adequate reserve nutat be at band to accomplish a successful assault and lodgment on any extensive land anas. On SAIPAN we suffered 17,000 casualties against as estimated force of 20,000* 0*2 eetiaetee indioato that by the tine we conduct operations against FORMOSA the Japanese will have a eonhat foroo of approximately 150,000. If our casualties are aa heavy in comparison as those on SAIPAK we will hare a definite need for strong reinforcements which met bo readily available* On the ease baeie aa SAIPAK our casnaltiee on FORMOSA would bo approximately 125.000* Reserves for operations against LU20M mere readily available than for FORMOSA duo to the shorter distance and leaa exposed lino of communications* 14. LOCAL ASSISTAKCE. LUZ01I FORMOSA OB LUZON considerable aesietanoo can bo Of the total 6 Million population oa expected from the organised goerrillae FORMOSA approximately 300,000 are that are oow ia botag* The eonatabolary Japanese, 150,000 Aborigenese (aead foroo» though aaall, la well organised huators), and the rcaaiader Chiaese­ and oaa eaoao oonsidorable diantptioa ForBoeano. Their attitude toward our to the Japanese amanmiloatloaa* Local forces will depend upon our initial aaalstanoe with respect to labor should success and a continuation of opera* bo considerable* tione that will show the Ghiosse- Foraooans that wo definitely have the upper hand* Initially too amah as­ sistance cannot bo expected either ia disrupting Japanese lines of coasBwnioa­ tioa or rendering such labor aaoietaaee aa we need ia the conduct of supply oporatione. VS WtXM Bath ahip-to-ahore and ahoro-to-ohoro Oporatieas against FOJUIOSA will neceo­ oporations will bo conducted against LB5&GJI, aarily have to bo ahip-to-shore beeause of the greater distances involved over seaborne lines of ccsniunicatien*

LAMP BASSD AJH L0XO« FORHOSA Oporationa agalnot U3Z0H will hav« the against F0RH08A will have advantage of land baeod air support oatab* to depend prinarily upon carrier based llahod U the aoutkorn and central aircraft for support* CIHOPOA estinates FHILIPPHK8 areao. that the air foroes operating from southern and oontral PfclLIPPIKKS oan so oontinuoiualy engage the enony air forces on LUZOV aa to prevent its of* f ootlvo intorf oronoe with POA oporationa agalact

•5*

163 FUKFT SUPPORT­

I vmri0A of **»*i»S operations against FORMOSA ft large part of the ! »*«wity be engaged la providing strong Navy artillery support and neecosary fleet eceort for the carrier, involved in giving direct air sup­ port to our forees not oaly during tho critical period of landing operation, but Tor an extended period ef time which will bo required for tho leisure of cuffleisat land area in order to develop fighter fields for land based airoraft. Although we Bin* the euporior fleet this nay not deter the Japanese fleet from attacking ours, either with snail task foroee or with a full Japanese fleet* Th» withdrawal of oar supporting am i fores, all or in partf intentional or through fores of circum­ stance, would leave our land forees in a very precarious position* POA forees are aot tee strongly equipped with respect to heavy artillery. An sngagsKsnt with the Japanese fleet will at the SUBS ties involve withdrawal of carrier baeed air support frosi our land operations. In operations against LUZON where we will be conducting both ebors-to-shors and ship-to-shore operations, the withdrawal of fleet support in part or in full will not be as serious inasmuch as we will have land bessd air support for our landing and subsequent ground operations, particularly with our ahore-to-shore operations. CI3CF0A has previously commented on the faot that we should avoid dependence on carrier based airoraft for protracted land operations (CM-tt-2926). Operations against FORMOSA will involve protracted land operations. Without LDZOK la our peeeeeeion operations on FORMOSA oust depend entirely on oar* rier baeed airoraft.

IS* FUTOfg APVAHCB TMM LDZOK OR

a* The preeent strategy outlined iu JC8 924 to attack JAPAR by way of F0RU0SA-RTUKYU5-KT08HU will find our forees attacking an evei—inereasiag strength of Japanese defenses involving extended ope rat ion a, increasing lossss not oaly to our foreee involved in the land eaapalgns but to our naval forees required in direst support of -those operations and the protection of our lines of eosaataisatioa* 8ueh a definite line of advance will provide the Japanese with every opportunity for increasing the strengths of their positions* This coupled with an ever»increae* ing line of eeraauaieatieme will increase the difficultly of our eupply problems*

b* A direct advance against the Japanese homeland free a firmly established baee such as LUZON will find the Japanees less prepared to meet our attack, partle­ ularly if they have been reinforcing their garrisons on FORMOSA and in the RIU&TQ*, as has been indicated in tho latest 3-2 reports* «e nth a large operational air baee on UJZOH we will be able to effectively neutralise FORMOSA and pertioae of the RTUKTUS thue preventing their interference with our linee of eoRBuaieatloa to KTOSHU and at the same time we will be able to effectively cut their liaee af commualcation through the CHINA SEA and to the DOTGH KAST IXDZKS, BQRKKO, SU>.iATRA. ^APACITT AS BABES FOR FUTtTRE

LUZON FORMOSA Mounting area far 5 divisions* Port Mounting area for 7 divisions* Pert capacities net ae great as FORMOSA* capacities greater than LUZON. Although Airfield sapasity for strategic bombing airfield capacities act as great as greater than FORMOSA* Although Japanese LUZON, FORVOSA eaa support contemplated deployment ef 20 YLR groups* Closer shipping laaee south through CHINA SKA 1 can be effectively bombt4 from LUZON, to J&pamcse "Inner Zone * with resultant •ere effective werk eaa be dome fjrem incrsass in effective bombing operetless. FORMOSA because ef its better geograph- Better position to cut Japanese lines ef ical pesitism* Development ef LINQAIKH sommumisatloa to SOUTH CHINA «A, BORNEO, GULF area weald increase mounting SUMATRA, MALATA, sta. capacity by an additional divislsm.

. 6 .

164 20 . GERMAN DEFEAT AND NO DKFUT YS PACIFIC OPERATIONS.

LUZON FORKOSA Operations against LUZON can be son- With no defeat only limited opera* ducted whether GERMANY it or Is not tions oan be conducted ega,inat FORMOSA defeated aa the resources will be cur* due to lack of noecesary foreea to eon* rently available for target date 15 Feb- duct a full-scale operation* Operations ruary 1945 provided there ia no concur- to capture mil of FORUORA oust neces­ rent operation against FORMOSA. sarily depend upon the defeat of GERMANY in order to provide the necessary forces and resources. 21* qpWCLUSIQNS*

LUZON FORMOSA

a. BEACHES, Adequate. Adequate for either United or expanded operation.

b* PORTS* Adequate. Capacity 3t#8O0 Adequate. Capacity 32,700 LT/10-hr* Day or 744.000 LT/ LT/lo-hr. Day or 981.000 LT/ Ifonth* Month. Entrance to TAKAO port easily blocked. Tiae element to restore1 10 days to 2 weeks*

S. ROAD Adequate capacity. Better Adequate local clearance from CLEARANCES. network than FORMOSA. ports. North * south highways along west ooaat limited to 3*500 short tons per day or support of 4 reinforced divi­ sions.

d. AIRFIKLD Adequate for oonteaplated Adequate for oonteaplated CAPACITIES. operations* Graater capacity operations* Southern FORMOSA than all of FORMOSA. Central has capacity for approximate- LUZOK has capacity of 1^ VLR ly 4 VLR fields, all of FORMOSA fields and a total of 50 TLR sapaclty for 11 VLR fields. fields for all of LUZON a* MOUNTING ARFAS. Capacity 5 divisions (60.000 Capacity 7 divisions. Tiae aea each). Tiae eloaent for element for constructions 4 construction estiaated at D divisions capacity by D / 175, / 150. 6 divisions by D / 220, 7 divi­ sions by D / 250.

f . SUPPLIES* SVFA ia a relatively better Shortage of heavy artillsry position with respeet to heavy nay eventually become a ssrious artillery than POA. SWFA in problem* 155 Row and gun aa­ satisfactory position with •uaitioa satisfactory ia POA respect to 155 Row and gun, but vary limited aaouitt of and 8-i*©h and 240BJSI Row aa* 8-inch aad 240ma aanunltloa sAtnition. available or allocated.

TACTICAL Secondary roads and bridging Operations involve the cros- BRIDGING. ia LUZON will require sore sing of the very large SHIUO* engineer effort than in TA12SUI River in the vicinity FORMOSA due to large number of the Main highway and rail* of streaa crossings. Over* way bridges* Will require all taotical bridging require* •ajor bridge repairs and aajor asats are relatively the saas bridging equipaent. for LUZON aa FORMOSA* LUZON will have uore loeal naterial available than FORMOSA. • T ­

165 (Far. 21 CONCLUSIONS, Coat»4,

LUZON FOJUOfA h. CARGO a German defeat or r ith no Serman defeat and no Geraan defeat adequate the conduct of operations into cargo shirping can be ns.de the central PHILIPPINE area available for operations by SWPA forcea adequate cargo against LUZON provided no shipping can be furnished for concurrent F^RaoEA operation a liaited operation against la conducted. With a concur­ FORMOSA. With a Sensan defeat rent FORMOSA operation suf­ full-eeale operations against ficient shipping; can be made F^RVOSA can be supported with available to support SEPA the necessary cargo shipping. operations through central PHILIPPINES.

ASSAULT With defeat or no defeat and Sufficient aaaault shipping SKIPPING. no concurrent FORMOSA oper­ available for the limited ation adequate aaaault ship­ operation baaed on 12 APA'a ping can be provided to sup­ per division which doee not port operation* against LUZON provide an adequate reserve. including a necessary reserve.

BASES. SVPA operation will provide a Main base, HAWAII, approx­ aeriea of bases in the advanoe imatel y 5,000 miles distant, towards LUZON. Land baaed air wit h an internedlate base at foroos will be in a position 3UAJ,'. Support (oust be rendered to protect the lines of oom­ over extended and expoaed lines •uaieation. of eoflwranioetion.

k. LOCA*. Organised guerrillas and con­ Initially too mueh assistance ASSISTANCE stabulary foree can render cannot bo expected frost the material assistance in dis­ very large Chineae-Fornosan rupting Japanese corarwunica­ population on FORMOSA until tions. Considerable local wo have shown that we hold the labor will be available. upper hand against the Japanese.

LAND BASED Operationa against LUZON can Operatione against AIR SUPPORT, be conducted under land based will have no land baaed air air support established in support but Bust depend primar­ southern and central PHILIP­ ily upon carrier based aircraft. PINES. Alao dependent upon neutralisa­ tion of hostile air on LUZON.

•• GERMAN DEFEAT Operations against LUZON are Full-scale operations against VS NO DEFEAT. not dependent upon defeat of FORMOSA are dependent upon 3KRMANT. defsat of HSRMANT. With no defeat a linited operation can bo conducted againet southern FORMOSA with SVPA foroes neutral­ ising Japanese air on LUZON.

II. LPfrON YS FORKQ?A AS BASF FOR FUTURE OPSRATIONSt (1) LUZON has greater airfield oapaeity. LUZON ha* bettor road system to support land and air operations. LUZON will provide wore looal eupport "because of friendly populace. (2) FORMOSA bas creator mounting capacity (FORMOf-A 7 Diva.| LUZON 5 Diva.). FORMOSA oore favorably located to out Japanese L/C to south and eloeer to Japanese "Inner Zone" for boebing operations. (3) Linea of oomunioation to LUZON relatively secure. Lines of cownunieation to FCRUOfA considered hasardoua if LUZON in handa of Japanese. - 8 ­

166 "" Aparrl 600 BABUYAN CHAN fEL PHILIPPINES (NORTH)

SPECIAL STRATEGIC MAP Capa BOL.OO. Scale 1 :2.000.000

'CTLXT5 »O. 30 30 40 50 60 70 SO 90 100 HO IM 1J0 140 Mria* HHM * • -fc^3zzri=^L i—-^ i a­ i 1 i——i " ^ I O O 1?O 14016 0 IK) 200

PORT CAPACITIES INDICATED IN LONG TONS PER DAY Poro I2OO

Santa Cruz 300

U Z O N Masinloc Puerto Real 900 1/ 300 Olongapo

200 Sampaloc Pi § I < Jose Panganiban Marlveles ** 500 IH Cachirw* I Coff•gidof i_ Manila

/ /T. j r * Catanduanes I Cavite Tabaco 250 0 800

Legaspi Hondagua 1200

\ ^^^^

MASBATE/^; Patbulunjan FtlyX CAPACITY IN SHORT TONS PER DAY OP THE HIGHWAYS OKI CENTRAL LUXON ISLAND (PHILIPPINES) THAT PROVIDE FOR MOVEMENT TO MANILA

581 169 170 Letter from CQ-, Central Pacific Base Command, to AC/S, OPD, WDGS, (and 1st Indorsement thereto), file AG 093. 01/6, dated12 Aug 44, subject: Special Requirements for Causeway (Project CP-SS)

Because this document is classified higher than "Restricted," it is bound in a separate rolume with other highly classified paper8.

Appendix 8-Z 171 Letter from CG, CPBC, to CG, POA, file AG 400.34/43, dated 18 Oct 44, subject: "Equip­ ment in Excess of T/E for the "A" and H B H Divi­ sions (Operational Project CP-45).

Because this document is classified higher than "Restricted," it is "bound in a separate volume with other highly classified papers.

Appendix 8-AA 172 Letter from CO, CPBC, to CG,, USAF, in POA, file AG 400.34/43, dated 18 Oct 44, subject: ••Procurement of Supplies and Equipment in Excess of T/E for the 98th Infantry Division (Operational Project CP-46).

Because this document is classified higher than "Restricted," it is bound in a separate volume with other highly classified papers,

Appendix 8-BB 173 Letter from CG, CPB.G, to CGj TJSAF.JLn POAr (and 1st Indorsement), file AG093401/-14,, dated/ 23 Oct 44, Subject:/ "Supplemental, Bequirements for CAUSEWAY (P^oiect CP-33a), v ";V- ^ i

Because this document is classified higher than "Restricted," it is "bound in a separate volume with other highly classified papers.

Appendix 8-CC Letter from CG, USAF in POA, to AC/S, OPD, WDGS, file AG 400.312/l84a, dated 4 Feb 45, subject: "Operational Requirements for Phases II and III ­ ICEBERG (CP-80).

Because this document is classified higher than "Restricted," it is "bound in a separate volume with other highly classified papers.

Appendix 8-DD 175 Letter from CG, USA? in POA, to AC/S, 0PD,u f, WDGS, file AG 093.06/172, dated 11 Veb 45, subject: "Operational Project for Base Development Phases II and III, ICEBEEG(CP-83).

Because this document is classified higher than "Restricted," it is bound in a separate volume with other highly classified papers.

Appendix 8-EE 176 Radio (paraphrase), to CG, USAFPOA, dated 11 Nov. 44.

Because this document is classified higher than "Restricted," it is bound in a separate volume with other highly classified papers•

Appendix 8-3PF 177 Letter from CO, USAFPOA, to CG, SPBC, file AG 400/218, dated 28 Nov 44 (and 3 indorsements), subject! "Equipping the 27th Infantry Division (Reinforced)."

Because this document is classified higher than "Restricted," it is bound in a separate volume with other highly classified papers.

Appendix 8-GG

1 nQ 25-76840-125