Functions: Selection and Mechanisms SYNTHESE LIBRARY

Functions: selection and mechanisms SYNTHESE LIBRARY STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Editors-in-Chief: VINCENT F. HENDRICKS, University of Copenhagen, Denmark JOHN SYMONS, University of Texas at El Paso, U.S.A. Honorary Editor: JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Boston University, U.S.A. Editors: DIRK VAN DALEN, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands THEO A.F. KUIPERS, University of Groningen, The Netherlands TEDDY SEIDENFELD, Carnegie Mellon University, U.S.A. PATRICK SUPPES, Stanford University, California, U.S.A. JAN WOLEN´ SKI, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland VOLUME 363 For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/6607 Philippe Huneman Editor Functions: selection and mechanisms Editor Philippe Huneman IHPST (CNRS/Université Paris I Sorbonne) Paris, France ISBN 978-94-007-5303-7 ISBN 978-94-007-5304-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London Library of Congress Control Number: 2012956316 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, speci fi cally the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on micro fi lms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied speci fi cally for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher’s location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a speci fi c statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com) Acknowledgements This book has been possible because of the activity of a research group at the Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (CNRS/Université Paris I Sorbonne), which addressed philosophical issues about functions in the framework of two funded projects (CNRS and ANR) entitled “Functions and functional explanations in biomedical sciences.” Some of the contributors authors actively contributed to seminars or workshops held by the group. I warmly thank all of them here. The research group greatly also bene fi ted from the input of other philosophers closely associated, among them Tim Lewens, Elodie Giroux, Françoise Parot, Denis Forest, Peter McLaughlin, Francesca Merlin, Christophe Malaterre and Thomas Pradeu. Along those years, Marie-Claude Lorne has been a constant stimulation and inspi- ration for our research. She tragically left us in 2008. This book is dedicated to her. v Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 Philippe Huneman Part I Biological Functions and Functional Explanations: Genes, Cells, Organisms and Ecosystems – Functions, Organization and Development in Life Sciences Evolution and the Stability of Functional Architectures ............................. 19 William C. Wimsatt Mechanism, Emergence, and Miscibility: The Autonomy of Evo-Devo ........................................................................... 43 Denis M. Walsh Does Oxygen Have a Function, or Where Should the Regress of Functional Ascriptions Stop in Biology? .................................................. 67 Jean Gayon Part II Biological Functions and Functional Explanations: Genes, Cells, Organisms and Ecosystems – Functional Pluralism for Biologists? How Ecosystem Evolution Strengthens the Case for Functional Pluralism ................................................................................ 83 Frédéric Bouchard A General Case for Functional Pluralism..................................................... 97 Robert N. Brandon Weak Realism in the Etiological Theory of Functions ................................ 105 Philippe Huneman vii viii Contents Part III Psychology, Philosophy of Mind and Technology: Functions in a Man’s World – Metaphysics, Function and Philosophy of Mind Functions and Mechanisms: A Perspectivalist View ................................... 133 Carl F. Craver Understanding the Sciences Through the Fog of “Functionalism(s)” ...................................................................................... 159 Carl Gillett Part IV Psychology, Philosophy of Mind and Technology: Functions in a Man’s World – Philosophy of Technology, Design and Functions Artifacts and Organisms: A Case for a New Etiological Theory of Functions ........................................................................................ 185 Françoise Longy Functions as Epistemic Highlighters: An Engineering Account of Technical, Biological and Other Functions ............................... 213 Pieter E. Vermaas and Wybo Houkes Epilogue ........................................................................................................... 233 Larry Wright Introduction Philippe Huneman Abstract This introduction presents general issues about functions and functional explanations, and the frameworks within which they had been handled by philosophers since four decades. It sketches the current state of the art, indicates areas in biology, cognitive science, philosophy of science and metaphysics, that call for further investigations about these topics, therefore explaining the project of this volume. It ends by describing the general articulation of the book and providing an overview of the contributions that the reader will fi nd here. 1 The Theories of Function and the Current Issues This collection of chapters aims at re fl ecting upon the metaphysics of function and the various problems that functional explanations raise. The question of function and functional explanations has certainly been extensively dealt with by philosophers of biology, as well as by philosophers of action and philosophers of mind. Since the early 1970s, the concept of function, as used in biology, psychology, and related disciplines, has indeed continuously been under philosophical scrutiny. The origin of these discussions is to be found in the two papers published by Larry Wright and Robert Cummins in 1973 and 1975 respectively. These papers renewed the debate, with two innovative analyses going in different directions. The etiological theory of functions (or “selected effects” functions (Neander 1991 ) , or “teleo- functions,” or “proper functions” (Millikan 1984 ) ), which stems from Wright’s paper, holds a realist concept of function and, in the case of Wright himself, aims at a uni fi ed theory of artifacts and biological entities. Against this realistic claim, P. Huneman (*) IHPST (CNRS/Université Paris I Sorbonne) , Paris , France e-mail: [email protected] P. Huneman (ed.), Functions: selection and mechanisms, Synthese Library, 1 Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 363, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_1, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 2 P. Huneman Cummins defended a concept of functions (as “causal role” in a system) that makes them relative to an explanatory strategy, which has to de fi ne a system within which the functional item is embedded. Both acknowledge that “function” is a concept used in some explanations, but they diverge from the fi rst step because the etiological account thinks that the function of X being Y explains the presence of X, whereas for the causal-role theorist, the function of X being Y explains or contributes to an explanation of the general proper activity of a system which includes X. The etiological theory faced several objections and was re fi ned through numerous debates in the two last decades (e.g., Godfrey-Smith 1993 ; Kitcher 1993 ; Buller 1998 , etc.). Similarly, the causal-role theory of functions increased in sophistication, as researchers were fi nding new patterns of explanation that made use of it for par- ticular cases, for example, when Amundson and Lauder (1994 ) emphasized its major role in functional morphology. Given that the two analyses seemed to be adequate in distinct areas of biology, and that, moreover, those two analyses accounted for different functional ascriptions of a same item that could be met in one given fi eld of this science, important papers such as Kitcher (1993 ) , Millikan ( 2001 ), or Godfrey-Smith (1993 ) considered ways of articulating the two approaches and many authors subscribed

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