9 Round One: Saskatchewan — Canada Negotiations 1980 Questions surrounding the Constitution of with regard to the control and pricing of natu- Canada had for decades caused problems ral resources. For the most part these differences between and within the political parties of were papered over when the provincial sections Canada. Indeed, as Michael Kirby said to Prime of Alberta and Saskatchewan reached a deal with Minister Pierre Trudeau in his briefing document the federal NDP on the matter in 1973. When Ed of September 1980, “it should be borne in mind Broadbent became leader of the national party in that there is nothing more difficult to arrange, 1976, the party seemed much more united than it more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to had been in the past. However, natural resource carry through than initiating changes in a state issues continued to simmer below the surface, constitution.”1 especially when the Supreme Court ruled criti- cal resource legislation in Saskatchewan to be This “danger” was particularly evident ultra vires of the provincial legislature. It was among the political parties during the patria- not surprising, therefore, that natural resource tion process in 1980-81. The initiative caused questions, and in particular energy pricing headaches within the parties as they tried to issues, should be part of the negotiations on the reconcile various ideological factions as well as Constitution after 1980.3 regional pressures. It was compounded by the fact that the parties also had to contend with While constitutional negotiations were in federal and provincial sections, which were large part fueled by regional ethnic concerns sometimes discrete entities and sometimes inter- emanating from Québec, some provincial related, although not always in a hierarchical sections of the NDP, especially those in manner. Saskatchewan and Alberta, saw the negotiations as a way to redress regional economic inequalities These latter divisions were particularly evi- in Canada. Thus, while the federal government dent within the Progressive Conservative Party was mostly interested in combating separatism and the New Democratic Party (NDP). The for- in Québec by reinforcing national institutions, mer suffered serious splits among provincial entrenching a national language policy, and sections, and between the federal and some pro- strengthening the role of the federal government vincial sections. In particular, the Conservative over the whole country, many of the provinces governments of Ontario and Alberta had been were more interested in redressing regional eco- at odds for several years over energy pricing in nomic differences and problems. Indeed, Prime Canada, so it was not surprising that they would Minister Trudeau seemed at first not to under- be on opposite sides of Prime Minister Trudeau’s stand the importance of these regional pressures constitutional proposals.2 in western Canada. With his eye focused on Québec, he tended to vacillate between charac- For the most part the NDP had been free of terizing western demands as a minor annoyance, such internal splits over policy matters. How- to accusing them of being “enemies within.” ever, as with the Progressive Conservative Party, the energy pricing disputes of the 1970s opened As mentioned above, the New Democratic up new regional fissures surrounding the proper Party under Ed Broadbent managed to negotiate role of the federal and provincial governments these regional shoals with a minimum of damage Constitutional Forum constitutionnel 9 10 to the party as a whole. With the election of the in Canada, we must be cognizant of that Clark Progressive Conservative government in Canadian political phenomena [sic] and align the spring of 1979, pressure for constitutional ourselves in such a way that social democratic change was temporarily lessened as the new governments at both the federal and regional federal government sought to find its way on a level are able to affect necessary social change. I do not think that this entails the degree of number of other issues. Nevertheless the fed- decentralization proposed by the Tories, but it eral New Democratic Party Council in August must recognize that there are probably “many of 1979 decided to set up a committee in order roads to socialism.”6 to update the party position on the Constitution and national unity issues.4 The National Coun- He went on to warn that if the party did not pay cil of the NDP met on October 19, 1979. The close attention to regional concerns, it would find Council decided that rather than concentrating itself isolated and the political base of the party on Québec, they would broaden their discus- in western Canada would undoubtedly erode.7 sion to include constitutional change in gen- eral. There seemed to be sympathy for the idea These were quite strong views and undoubt- that the party should be less centralist in nature. edly caused Broadbent some concern. In spite However, it was surprising that while this initia- of these differences, Romanow wanted to keep tive came mainly from western provinces, it also the lines of communication open and to keep came from Ontario. This new direction met with Broadbent and his caucus informed of the some resistance from Broadbent, who wanted to Saskatchewan government position at all times. ensure that any devolution of power would not He instructed his intergovernmental affairs make it less likely for the federal government to department to ensure that the federal leader be able to provide a unifying force for the coun- and caucus received all press releases and mate- try.5 However, a number of speakers took him to rials sent out by the Saskatchewan govern- task for this position, providing a preview of dis- ment, and that whenever they were in Ottawa, cussions in the following year. Saskatchewan ministers should make a point of meeting with the federal leader and members of With the re-election of the federal Liberals in the caucus. As a corollary, he wanted to ensure as early 1980, discussion of the referendum and the well that federal MPs should feel free to approach Constitution began again in earnest. It was agreed the government of Saskatchewan where con- that Roy Romanow would be the Saskatchewan fidentiality did not dictate otherwise. He also representative to a newly reconstituted federal asked the Saskatchewan NDP office in Ottawa committee in April of 1980. This committee was to send out a monthly information package to under the direction of Bill Roberts, who later the federal leader’s office. Finally, he noted that came to work for the provincial government of in the longer term the new Ottawa office, which Saskatchewan. Unfortunately, Romanow was would be staffed by Dick Proctor, would become unable to attend the first meeting of the commit- the intermediary for communication. tee but he did send his overall assessment of con- stitutional reform to Broadbent. He made two It was obvious from these instructions that, general points. The first was that he felt that the while the provincial NDP government wanted to 1977 constitutional statement by the NDP down- maintain open relations with the federal party, graded the importance of constitutional reform it was unwilling to back away from its more and was patronizing in its approach. His second decentralist view of Canada. point related to the overall approach of the NDP As we know, events moved very quickly in toward the roles of the federal and provincial the spring of 1980. The referendum in Québec governments. In his letter he stated: was called, and the Parti Québecois (PQ) ini- I sincerely believe that strong feelings of tiative was defeated soundly. As a result, the regionalism are a fact of life in Canada and Prime Minister and his cabinet decided to move are unlikely to recede in the near future. quickly on the constitutional promises made Accordingly, if we are to effect social change during the campaign. Trudeau called a meeting 10 Volume 26, Number 2, 2017 11 of the First Ministers in Ottawa for June 9, 1980. While taking account of accelerated Having just been re-elected, and having defeated constitutional events, the working group found the PQ in its referendum, the Prime Minister it necessary to reject all unilateral actions was determined to move ahead quickly on his emanating from Parliament and the federal constitutional agenda, which was now quite dif- government for constitutional change. In addition, the working group viewed with deep ferent in tone and approach from the last time he concern the setting of short deadlines within met with the First Ministers in the early winter of which to achieve constitutional renewal. It was 1979. Trudeau now insisted that two new items considered that a full process of constitutional - more central control over the economy and revision would require speed but not haste. a statement of common principles that would Such a process would thus demand 18 to 24 act as a preamble to the Charter of Rights and months as a minimum in order fully to involve Freedoms - be included. As well, he withdrew the Canadian public and achieve equitable and some concessions that he had made at the bar- long-lasting change.10 gaining table in February of 1979. Needless to say, he was far less amenable to provincial proposals Thus, the committee was unequivocal in its for decentralization of certain federal powers rejection of unilateral action and particularly a over natural resources and the fisheries. Finally, process that would seek to make changes in the he emphasized the need for speed in dealing with fall. On this matter the NDP in Saskatchewan was the Constitution, and hinted broadly that the in complete agreement with the federal party. federal government would not wait long for the However, the committee also recommended a provinces to agree to a set of proposals.8 rather elaborate process for the involvement of members of the legislatures of Canada, as well as other groups, in the broad process of constitu- This new, aggressive approach displeased tional negotiation.