9

Round One: — Negotiations 1980

Questions surrounding the Constitution of with regard to the control and pricing of natu- Canada had for decades caused problems ral resources. For the most part these differences between and within the political parties of were papered over when the provincial sections Canada. Indeed, as Michael Kirby said to Prime of Alberta and Saskatchewan reached a deal with Minister in his briefing document the federal NDP on the matter in 1973. When Ed of September 1980, “it should be borne in mind Broadbent became leader of the national party in that there is nothing more difficult to arrange, 1976, the party seemed much more united than it more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to had been in the past. However, natural resource carry through than initiating changes in a state issues continued to simmer below the surface, constitution.”1 especially when the Supreme Court ruled criti- cal resource legislation in Saskatchewan to be This “danger” was particularly evident ultra vires of the provincial legislature. It was among the political parties during the patria- not surprising, therefore, that natural resource tion process in 1980-81. The initiative caused questions, and in particular energy pricing headaches within the parties as they tried to issues, should be part of the negotiations on the reconcile various ideological factions as well as Constitution after 1980.3 regional pressures. It was compounded by the fact that the parties also had to contend with While constitutional negotiations were in federal and provincial sections, which were large part fueled by regional ethnic concerns sometimes discrete entities and sometimes inter- emanating from Québec, some provincial related, although not always in a hierarchical sections of the NDP, especially those in manner. Saskatchewan and Alberta, saw the negotiations as a way to redress regional economic inequalities These latter divisions were particularly evi- in Canada. Thus, while the federal government dent within the Progressive Conservative Party was mostly interested in combating separatism and the (NDP). The for- in Québec by reinforcing national institutions, mer suffered serious splits among provincial entrenching a national language policy, and sections, and between the federal and some pro- strengthening the role of the federal government vincial sections. In particular, the Conservative over the whole country, many of the provinces governments of and Alberta had been were more interested in redressing regional eco- at odds for several years over energy pricing in nomic differences and problems. Indeed, Prime Canada, so it was not surprising that they would Minister Trudeau seemed at first not to under- be on opposite sides of Prime Minister Trudeau’s stand the importance of these regional pressures constitutional proposals.2 in western Canada. With his eye focused on Québec, he tended to vacillate between charac- For the most part the NDP had been free of terizing western demands as a minor annoyance, such internal splits over policy matters. How- to accusing them of being “enemies within.” ever, as with the Progressive Conservative Party, the energy pricing disputes of the 1970s opened As mentioned above, the New Democratic up new regional fissures surrounding the proper Party under managed to negotiate role of the federal and provincial governments these regional shoals with a minimum of damage­

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to the party as a whole. With the election of the in Canada, we must be cognizant of that Clark Progressive Conservative government in Canadian political phenomena [sic] and align the spring of 1979, pressure for constitutional ourselves in such a way that social democratic change was temporarily lessened as the new governments at both the federal and regional federal government sought to find its way on a level are able to affect necessary social change. I do not think that this entails the degree of number of other issues. Nevertheless the fed- decentralization proposed by the Tories, but it eral New Democratic Party Council in August must recognize that there are probably “many of 1979 decided to set up a committee in order roads to socialism.”6 to update the party position on the Constitution and national unity issues.4 The National Coun- He went on to warn that if the party did not pay cil of the NDP met on October 19, 1979. The close attention to regional concerns, it would find Council decided that rather than concentrating itself isolated and the political base of the party on Québec, they would broaden their discus- in western Canada would undoubtedly erode.7 sion to include constitutional change in gen- eral. There seemed to be sympathy for the idea These were quite strong views and undoubt- that the party should be less centralist in nature. edly caused Broadbent some concern. In spite However, it was surprising that while this initia- of these differences, Romanow wanted to keep tive came mainly from western provinces, it also the lines of communication open and to keep came from Ontario. This new direction met with Broadbent and his caucus informed of the some resistance from Broadbent, who wanted to Saskatchewan government position at all times. ensure that any devolution of power would not He instructed his intergovernmental affairs make it less likely for the federal government to department to ensure that the federal leader be able to provide a unifying force for the coun- and caucus received all press releases and mate- try.5 However, a number of speakers took him to rials sent out by the Saskatchewan govern- task for this position, providing a preview of dis- ment, and that whenever they were in , cussions in the following year. Saskatchewan ministers should make a point of meeting with the federal leader and members of With the re-election of the federal Liberals in the caucus. As a corollary, he wanted to ensure as early 1980, discussion of the referendum and the well that federal MPs should feel free to approach Constitution began again in earnest. It was agreed the government of Saskatchewan where con- that Roy Romanow would be the Saskatchewan fidentiality did not dictate otherwise. He also representative to a newly reconstituted federal asked the Saskatchewan NDP office in Ottawa committee in April of 1980. This committee was to send out a monthly information package to under the direction of Bill Roberts, who later the federal leader’s office. Finally, he noted that came to work for the provincial government of in the longer term the new Ottawa office, which Saskatchewan. Unfortunately, Romanow was would be staffed by , would become unable to attend the first meeting of the commit- the intermediary for communication. tee but he did send his overall assessment of con- stitutional reform to Broadbent. He made two It was obvious from these instructions that, general points. The first was that he felt that the while the provincial NDP government wanted to 1977 constitutional statement by the NDP down- maintain open relations with the federal party, graded the importance of constitutional reform it was unwilling to back away from its more and was patronizing in its approach. His second decentralist view of Canada. point related to the overall approach of the NDP As we know, events moved very quickly in toward the roles of the federal and provincial the spring of 1980. The referendum in Québec governments. In his letter he stated: was called, and the Parti Québecois (PQ) ini- I sincerely believe that strong feelings of tiative was defeated soundly. As a result, the regionalism are a fact of life in Canada and Prime Minister and his cabinet decided to move are unlikely to recede in the near future. quickly on the constitutional promises made Accordingly, if we are to effect social change during the campaign. Trudeau called a meeting

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of the First Ministers in Ottawa for June 9, 1980. While taking account of accelerated Having just been re-elected, and having defeated constitutional events, the working group found the PQ in its referendum, the Prime Minister it necessary to reject all unilateral actions was determined to move ahead quickly on his emanating from Parliament and the federal constitutional agenda, which was now quite dif- government for constitutional change. In addition, the working group viewed with deep ferent in tone and approach from the last time he concern the setting of short deadlines within met with the First Ministers in the early winter of which to achieve constitutional renewal. It was 1979. Trudeau now insisted that two new items considered that a full process of constitutional - more central control over the economy and revision would require speed but not haste. a statement of common principles that would Such a process would thus demand 18 to 24 act as a preamble to the Charter of Rights and months as a minimum in order fully to involve Freedoms - be included. As well, he withdrew the Canadian public and achieve equitable and some concessions that he had made at the bar- long-lasting change.10 gaining table in February of 1979. Needless to say, he was far less amenable to provincial proposals Thus, the committee was unequivocal in its for decentralization of certain federal powers rejection of unilateral action and particularly a over natural resources and the fisheries. Finally, process that would seek to make changes in the he emphasized the need for speed in dealing with fall. On this matter the NDP in Saskatchewan was the Constitution, and hinted broadly that the in complete agreement with the federal party. federal government would not wait long for the However, the committee also recommended a provinces to agree to a set of proposals.8 rather elaborate process for the involvement of members of the legislatures of Canada, as well as other groups, in the broad process of constitu- This new, aggressive approach displeased tional negotiation. many of the provincial governments. Neverthe- less, at the end of the meeting the First Minis- In a letter to Broadbent’s office on July 28, ters agreed on both a process and an agenda for 1980, Romanow thanked the federal party for intense talks during the summer of 1980. The the opportunity to express views on the federal CCMC, a continuing committee of ministers constitutional position and agreed with its rejec- from all governments, under the joint chairman- tion of unilateral action in particular. Beyond ship of Jean Chrétien and Roy Romanow, was that, however, he was “cautious” about any given the task of delivering a comprehensive set model involving a large number of legislators of proposals, which could be further negotiated and groups in the constitutional process. He said: and agreed upon, to the First Ministers in Sep- tember. I would in summary urge the committee to alter its report to make perfectly clear that constitutional negotiation should be carried The accelerated federal-provincial negotia- on by the duly elected governments of the tions meant that the opposition parties in the provinces and the federal government. Wider House of Commons were required to examine public participation in the constitutional and reassess their own position with regard to negotiation should be achieved not by both the process of constitutional negotiation reducing the role of the First Ministers’ Conference but through procedures which and ultimately the revision of the Constitution would allow interested parties to participate in itself. The federal NDP began that process in early intergovernmental negotiations.11 June, prior to the meeting of First Ministers. On June 5 Bill Roberts, on behalf of Ed Broadbent, This was the first sign that there might be sub- sent Premier a copy of an interim stantial differences between the two parties. report that outlined a tentative position for the federal NDP caucus.9 The report contained As we know, events quickly overtook these recommendations on both process and sub- internal party negotiations. The CCMC was stance. The first paragraph read: unable to deliver a unanimous report to the First

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Ministers’ Meeting of September 1980, and the in Saskatchewan. He received qualified support meeting itself was unproductive, to say the least. from the first three leaders, but Blakeney was undecided, for three reasons. First, he really did The failure of the First Ministers to reach not want someone else negotiating for him. He agreement at the First Ministers’ Conference set believed this to be especially true since the legal in motion a crisis that was to last until Novem- issues involved were highly complex and of great ber of the next year. Determined that the lack of importance to the province. Second, he was also agreement with the provinces would not prevent bothered by the fact that the federal government him from achieving some constitutional change, seemed to want to negotiate through Broadbent, Prime Minister Trudeau decided to move ahead and not directly with the province. Third, he was on a package of proposals. In order to do so he troubled by the fact that the initiative would not needed at least some provincial support, as well have the approval of a majority of provinces. as support in the House of Commons from west- Accordingly, he called his senior advisers and ern Canada. He was able to secure the support asked them to be prepared for the Prime Minis- of Premier William Davis (Ontario) and Premier ter’s address the next day. Richard Hatfield (New Brunswick) for a patria- tion package. While useful, this left him with On October 2, 1980, Prime Minister Trudeau no support in Western Canada. He therefore set announced that he would patriate the Consti- about trying to get the agreement of the federal tution, including an amending formula and a NDP. Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The next day On October 1, 1980, the day before he Ed Broadbent announced that he and his party planned to make public his intention to would support the initiative. This came largely patriate the Constitution without the approval as a result of the Prime Minister agreeing to of the provinces, Trudeau had a lengthy conver- support an amendment that would include an sation with Ed Broadbent. He outlined his pro- agreed-upon text covering ownership and con- posals and, with some reservations and amend- trol of natural resources, a key matter for western ments, secured Broadbent’s approval. The key Canadian provincial sections, most importantly amendment had to do with provincial control Saskatchewan. In Trudeau’s mind, Broadbent’s of natural resources, and was largely inserted so support would provide much-needed support that the provincial sections in western Canada, for patriating the Constitution. and in particular Saskatchewan, could support the Trudeau initiative. On October 7, Allan Blakeney and Pierre Trudeau spoke on the phone about the consti- Unfortunately, Broadbent did not contact all tutional initiative. There are no recordings of the provincial leaders prior to giving his tentative conversation but we do have the handwritten approval to the Prime Minister. As Judy Steed notes taken by Blakeney during the conversation. stated in her biography: Discussion began with what Blakeney con- What he did not do, however, was leave Trudeau sidered to be a major point. He made it clear on hold at the last minute in order to consult to the Prime Minister that he and Ed Broad- his advisers and provincial NDP leaders — bent were not acting in concert. That is, the which later came to be seen as his major sin. “He should have said, thank you very much, I agreement by Broadbent to support the will take this under consideration and get back constitutional initiative did not mean that to you,” says a former aide.12 Saskatchewan would support it. As he said in his notes, “We are far from free in accepting this Instead, he consulted with some senior package. I hope he stated that but… .”13 Blak- members of his caucus and telephoned a number eney went on to say that Broadbent had called of provincial leaders, including Howard Pawley him on Wednesday and told him about the pack- in Manitoba, Dave Barrett in , age and the approach by the Prime Minister. He Grant Notley in Alberta, and Allan Blakeney reemphasized that he and Broadbent were not

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in agreement. More particularly, he said, “[I am] At the end of the discussion it was clear that not sure it reflects Western concerns.”14 there were major differences in detail, as well as in substance. At one point Blakeney turned Blakeney stated that he had looked at the to his assistant and shook his head in disbelief, package and he found that there were “prob- indicating the depth of the disagreement or mis- lems.” In particular he outlined differences on communication between the two leaders. At the the resources section, the amending formula — end of the discussion Blakeney suggested that he especially section 42 — and on the equalization would issue a statement, although it would not section. He was troubled by the international be definitive. He then asked the Prime Minister proposals on resources and how the province not to respond to Broadbent immediately; stat- would be accommodated within it. On section ing his belief that taking a few days to review the 42, regarding the use of a referendum in order matter would not detract from the process. Blak- to affect constitutional change, he said that he eney told Trudeau that he wanted to send a few was “upset” for a number of reasons. He went on people to Ottawa to look at the proposed amend- to say that he viewed referenda as “the weapon ment in detail. He also indicated that he did not of conservatives.” He ended by saying that the accept the Broadbent amendment at the time inclusion of a referendum provision suggested and would press further to see what could be that “provinces do not speak for the people but done, and that he did not mind if Trudeau told 15 that the federal government does.” Broadbent about their conversation. Blakeney concluded by saying that Roy Romanow and his Blakeney went on to discuss problems with officials would be in Ottawa by Thursday. The the equalization section, the lack of entrench- Prime Minister agreed to make Jean Chrétien ment of the Supreme Court, and matters of available.20 “Native” concern.16 Prophetically, he also noted that he thought that the process itself, “unilateral action,” was likely to extend the battle. He ended For the NDP these few days were pivotal. by reviewing his points with the Prime Minis- Blakeney was determined not to allow Broadbent ter.17 to negotiate for the Saskatchewan government; he was unwilling to allow anyone else, including At this point Trudeau responded to each one Broadbent, to speak for him. He believed that of Blakeney’s points. On the matter of whether or the federal leader and his officials did not have not Ed Broadbent spoke for Allan Blakeney, the a good understanding of the Saskatchewan posi- Prime Minister appears to have told the Premier tion and the detail associated with it. In short, that he (Trudeau) understood that Ed Broad- he believed that although Broadbent had a good bent was speaking for him (Blakeney).18 On the broad understanding of constitutional issues, he matter of natural resources the Prime Minister tended not to pay attention to the implications appears to indicate that he could be flexible with inherent in detailed constitutional change. For regard to some further changes. Concerning the his part, Broadbent felt that his work in getting referendum provision in the amending formula, a natural resources section into the agreement, the Prime Minister was adamant that it would pending a negotiation of details, was a major con- be included. He was amenable to changes with cession from Trudeau and that the Saskatchewan regard to the equalization portion, changes to government should not be so fussy about what he section 41, non-discrimination clauses, and some perceived to be minor drafting problems. What small changes to part four of the package. He is absolutely clear is that neither Broadbent nor did not buy Blakeney’s argument about whether Blakeney believed that they were part of a pack- or not the Senate reference case was binding. age deal. Obviously, Broadbent had informed the Finally, except for small changes, Trudeau indi- Prime Minister that he felt that his provincial cated to Blakeney that he was not willing to go sections would agree with the proposal if there further on the resources section without some were some modifications, but at no point did he commensurate concessions on powers over the indicate that he could definitively speak for pro- economy.19 vincial leaders, especially Allan Blakeney. Never-

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theless, the Prime Minister chose to believe that Romanow was quite upset by this, and decided Broadbent did speak for his entire party and that not to contact Broadbent that night. the two men were attempting to “play him” by appearing to be against one another. The meeting was set for the following morn- ing at 10:00 a.m. Chrétien and his people arrived about 15 minutes late: Thus, at the end of the conversation, while the Prime Minister agreed to have Chrétien meet He was very cool and informed Roy that he with Romanow, there was little enthusiasm on had only an hour or so to pursue this and the federal side, and less expectation of being “Why were we there?” Roy started out by able to make a deal with the Saskatchewan gov- indicating that Broadbent did not speak for ernment: us again. That there were a number of things that concerned us, like equalization. He gave a short explanation of equalization and then The Prime Minister obviously felt he was in a launched immediately into section 42. Roy sense being double dealt. He clearly had [been] gave the long pitch on section 42. Chrétien given to understand by Broadbent, either responded by indicating that it was a deadlock deliberately or inadvertently, that Broadbent breaking mechanism and that Canada needed spoke for Premier Blakeney and for the a deadlock breaking mechanism. Roy pointed government of Saskatchewan, and therefore out the obvious difficulty with that given the was committing both of us to the process fact that they could launch a referendum under and to support the package if resources were section 42 at any time that they wanted, and included. When he explained that … to the that there was no “reciprocity” provision in that Premier, the Premier set the record straight on should all 10 provinces agree on something that particular point. But obviously the federal and the federal government be the one causing government felt that Saskatchewan was now the deadlock.22 about to “up the ante” on the whole process [and] that they had sent Broadbent out front to It was not a good beginning. do the initial work and were now coming down to “get what they could” over and above what What ensued was a back-and-forth between 21 Broadbent had agreed to. the two groups, attempting to clarify their dif- ferences. It was finally agreed that the lawyers Allan Blakeney sent Romanow, his minister should meet to discuss possible drafts. The two and Deputy Premier; me (as Romanow’s deputy delegations were to reconvene again at 4:00 p.m. minister); and two constitutional lawyers, John In the meantime Romanow, Proctor, and I met Whyte and George Peacock, to Ottawa imme- with Broadbent and gave him a full account of diately. Romanow and I developed a strategy the meeting. Romanow was quite positive about on the flight. It included putting forward one or the initial contact, which pleased Broadbent. He two the small items, like equalization at first, and told him that the meeting would reconvene at then outlining the more serious matters, like sec- 4:00 p.m. tion 42 in the referendum provision, turning to resources, and then completing the process with When the two groups reconvened there was a return to some of the smaller items. It should some hard discussion over the amending formula be noted that these negotiations were considered and international trade, especially surrounding to be secret, and it was understood by Premier what were called administrative arrangements. Blakeney that the Prime Minister would not After about an hour Romanow and Chrétien share the negotiations directly with Ed Broad- met privately. Following that meeting Chrétien bent. Even the meeting times and places were to attempted to phone Trudeau but was not suc- be of a “clandestine nature.” Upon their arrival, cessful. He then suddenly left the meeting to go however, Romanow and company were told by to a cocktail party, leaving Romanow and me in the director of the Ottawa office, Dick Proctor, the room by ourselves. that Chrétien had already informed Broadbent of the meeting and most of the substance involved.

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After a short debriefing Romanow called ference. The Saskatchewan group then went for Blakeney and described the events. He was much dinner with their lawyers at around 10:30 p.m. more pessimistic than earlier. The lawyers were After considerable discussion they concluded to meet again at 7:00 p.m. to look at some further that there was very little to be gained from wording. In the meantime, Proctor, Romanow, continuing the process. It seemed obvious that and I went to see Broadbent at his home: the federal government was unwilling to move in any substantial way on several of the key points What ensued there was a very interesting for Saskatchewan. It was also clear to them that discussion. Notwithstanding all of the “Trudeau was going to win either way.”24 If he agreement that the government of went ahead with including a natural resources Saskatchewan was negotiating for itself now, with the federal government, Broadbent and section he would probably get Broadbent’s sup- company continue to interrupt, intervene, and port. If Broadbent decided not to support him, insert themselves into the process. The chief after the offer of the natural resources section, insertion was around 6 p.m. when Broadbent Trudeau would appear to be reasonable to the and Trudeau spoke about the negotiations of Canadian public and have succeeded in badly that day. As it turns out it was a good thing that splitting the NDP. they did speak because we got a clear picture of what they thought was happening and [it] was The next morning Romanow and Chrétien not what we thought was happening. had a short discussion in which Chrétien said that there was not much more to discuss, that Trudeau told Broadbent that Chrétien had he had the Saskatchewan drafts, and would call reported that Romanow was there with no real later if Romanow was still in town. Romanow mandate to make a deal and that Saskatchewan then called Broadbent to say that there might be had [word whited out] in a number of places, and that in his opinion we were not serious. another meeting but that in any case Trudeau Further, that it was obvious to Chrétien that should go ahead with his press conference. He we were there simply to “portaging themselves also urged Broadbent to tell the Prime Minister over the weekend,” in order that Blakeney could that Chrétien should be instructed to negoti- go to the premiers meeting having said he ate in good faith. At this point Broadbent spoke tried to do something but was unable to do so, one more time with the Prime Minister. The and therefore keep his Captain Canada image Saskatchewan delegation waited for the outcome: intact. Trudeau wondered what he should do at that point. He was willing to go ahead with his We then sat 15 anxious minutes waiting while deal with Broadbent and announce resources Broadbent and Trudeau spoke. Broadbent in the morning. Broadbent replied by saying then called us back. Trudeau had agreed that he did not have the same understanding that he would delay the announcement on of the process. That it was obvious to him that resources, and that he would not give it at his Romanow was there with the mandate and press conference at 10 a.m. He also agreed to wanted the deal. Why would he be there with send Chrétien back to negotiate in good faith lawyers and officials if he were not? It seemed one more time. However he indicated to Ed silly to Broadbent for him to come with all [Broadbent] that he would expect Blakeney to these people if it was just window dressing. make an announcement before the weekend — Accordingly, Broadbent asked Trudeau to wait that is before the Premiers meeting of October at least until the morning on an announcement 14 — of support if a deal was worked out.25 on inserting resources into the package. By then he would have spoken to Romanow.23 The Saskatchewan delegation then had a discussion about whether or not there was any After Broadbent had concluded this discus- chance of gaining substantial concessions from sion with Trudeau there was a long discussion the federal government during these nego- with Romanow about whether or not the Liber- tiations. At this point I proposed an alternative als were simply playing a game with Saskatch- strategy, urging the government of Saskatchewan ewan. Romanow agreed to call Broadbent in the not to jump one way or the other right away. I morning before Trudeau’s 10:00 a.m. press con- pointed out that the Premier’s announcement

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that he was considering the package had gone At which point Chrétien sat back and said “well over fairly well in the province and that his meet- I will tell you how I will go to my Cabinet. I ing with Premier Hatfield would indicate that will go to my Cabinet and I will say, mon there might be some ability to develop a third ami Romanow came to see me, he said I camp between Trudeau on the one side and have a problem with the resources section on international trade. I said I agreed. We will fix Lougheed26 on the other. that up through administrative arrangements I therefore told Roy I thought the strategy for him. Mon ami Romanow came to me should be one whereby we simply continued and he said we have a problem with linking consideration, that [when] the Premier and sections 41 and 42 and I said to him I will help Hatfield met they clearly indicate to the you out on that. My friend Romanow came press that there was a group or premiers who to see me and said we also have a problem on although objecting in principle to the federal this non-discrimination section and I said we action, thought that it might be made more will find words to accommodate that. Sounds acceptable and that we should attempt to get a pretty accommodating does it not?” To which positive result under what began in essence as I [Leeson] replied to Chretien “I thought we a very negative [sic] divisive action.27 would say something like the following, ‘We came to our friend Chrétien and we asked for After considerable discussion between some small test in trade and commerce and he Blakeney and Romanow on the telephone, they said no. We came to our friend Chrétien and agreed that the result of the meeting should be asked for a minor constitutional provision on that no deal had been struck between the two international trade and he said no. We came to our friend Chrétien and said should we not governments on the issue, but that this did not have simple reciprocity, a fair mechanism in 42 preclude an agreement at some future time. In so the federal and provincial governments are essence, Trudeau and Broadbent should proceed equal, and our friend Chrétien said no’.” as they saw fit. At that point we all agreed that politically we When the two delegations met again later in would interpret the meeting in different ways.28 the morning the atmosphere was distinctly cool. The result was that, after going through details, Both sides left the meeting at that point. there were still differences. Romanow telephoned Blakeney and then went to a meeting with Broadbent where he reported Romanow then candidly put the case to that there would be no deal. Broadbent was Chrétien that Saskatchewan’s support seemed clearly upset and worried about internal prob- to be buying the province nothing. Chrétien lems for the NDP.29 responded that he thought that was not the case, that Saskatchewan had in fact gotten resources, With the value of hindsight, it is not difficult and that that should be enough. Romanow indi- to see why problems developed. For his part, Ed cated that resources had already been gotten by Broadbent had reason to feel comfortable with Broadbent, and asked why Chrétien thought that what he had done. The proposed constitutional this should be enough: changes were not entirely in line with what he would like to have seen, but they were close It was at this point that in one of those bursts enough to both his beliefs and those of his party of spontaneity Chrétien looked across at to warrant general support. As well, he had been Roy [Romanow] and said words to the effect given assurances by the Prime Minister that he of, “Listen Romanow, we all know why you would have a veto over future changes and that are here, you are here on a salvage mission, Broadbent got out front too fast, you have no there could still be changes, especially to the cards left to play and you are willing to salvage Charter of Rights and Freedoms, that would make as much as you can get,” to which [Romanow] it even more acceptable to him and his party. replied, “I did not think that I was here on a Recognizing the internal strains and stresses salvage mission, I thought I was here on a that could cause problems within his party, espe- search and destroy mission” cially on the matter of natural resources, he had

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secured the approval of the Prime Minister for Finally, Blakeney was very uncomfortable what he [Broadbent] perceived to be an accept- with the process. He knew and understood able resources provision. He took these changes the arguments about unilateral action and the to party leaders in western Canada, albeit with- damage that this could do to a federal state like out details, and got support from three of them Canada. Notwithstanding this, he was willing — British Columbia, Alberta, and Manitoba. In to accede to the process if the substance of the the case of Saskatchewan, Allan Blakeney indi- agreement seemed to be overwhelmingly desir- cated that he would not accept or reject the pro- able. In other words, despite the conclusion posal, but needed more detail before he could of the Prime Minister that he was unwilling to agree. Finally, on the matter of process, that is, make a deal, and was playing for time, Blakeney moving ahead without the consent of the prov- could have been persuaded to sign on if Trudeau inces, Broadbent had reasonable assurances that had made a greater effort to accommodate his the process was entirely legal, and that polls concerns. showed the Canadian people were behind the initiative. All in all, he felt comfortable with what Thus, it is not difficult to see how he was doing. Blakeney and Broadbent, despite obvious good will between them, might come to a difference Allan Blakeney also had reason to feel com- of opinion over whether or not to sign on to the fortable with his position. While he was grateful initiative. Indeed, again with the advantage of that the federal party had initiated the process hindsight, it is clear that there was a good prob- and had been successful in securing the Prime ability that the two would disagree. Minister’s agreement on a resources section, he understood better than most that the “devil was in the details.” That is, he wanted to ensure that the provision would solve the problems cre- ated by the overlap of federal and provincial Endnotes jurisdictions in the area. Most importantly, he 1 Ron Graham, The Last Act: Pierre Trudeau, the had made clear his position that agreement on Gang of Eight, and the Fight for Canada (: a provision by the federal NDP did not consti- Penguin Canada, 2011) at 63. Interestingly, Mr. tute agreement on behalf of his provincial gov- Kirby first noticed this quotation on a small ernment. Thus, when it became clear that the placard which I had on my desk in Regina. We had Prime Minister was, rightly or wrongly, inter- used the quotation and the placard at the Annual Premiers’ Conference in Regina in 1978. preting the federal NDP agreement to include 2 Several good books go into much more detail on agreement by Saskatchewan, he became rightly the internal discussions within the Progressive nervous. Conservative Party. See e.g. Robert Sheppard & Michael Valpy, The National Deal: The Fight for As well, Blakeney was less comfortable with a Canadian Constitution (Toronto: Macmillan what he considered to be a moving target. That Canada, 1984) at 78 [Sheppard & Valpy], who is, he understood that there would be further devoted an entire chapter to the issue. changes to the resolution in the future and that 3 Regional splits were particularly difficult for these might be at the request of other players. the New Democratic Party, since it prided itself This meant that he would constantly be in the on being a party that championed national position of having to say yes or no to other groups solutions for social and economic problems. For or governments. This allowed, in his view, the example, such programs as old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, Medicare, the Canada federal government to have maximum flexibility Pension Plan, and many others were considered and to put the government of Saskatchewan in the flagships of public policy in the party. the less enviable position of constantly being a Regional or provincial solutions to problems were negative player. He rightly recognized that this generally considered to be acceptable only if it was a very difficult situation and could prove to was impossible to get a national program. Hence, be extremely uncomfortable in the future.30 the establishment of Medicare in Saskatchewan

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was considered only as a precursor to a national 13 This summary and quotations are taken directly program. For a good summary of the CCF/NDP from the handwritten notes of Premier Allan positions on the Constitution, and the difficulties Blakeney, dated 7 October 1980 [Blakeney Notes]. of the 1970s, see Murray Cook, “Constitutional 14 Ibid. Confusion on the Left: The NDPs Position in 15 Ibid. Canada’s Constitutional Debates” (Paper delivered 16 Inclusion of the matter of Aboriginal peoples at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political presages his later concerns in November of 1981. Science Association, University of Manitoba, June 17 Blakeney Notes, supra note 13. 2004) [unpublished]. 18 This became, of course, a major matter throughout 4 In a letter to me on August 23, 1979, Ed Broadbent the next several months. asked if I could serve on this committee. On 19 Blakeney Notes, supra note 13. September 10, 1979, I wrote back thanking him 20 Ibid. for the invitation, pointing out that as the chief 21 Memorandum from Howard Leeson (14 October civil servant for Saskatchewan on the issue I felt it 1980) [Leeson Memo]. unwise to participate in a political party committee. 22 Ibid. Letter from Ed Broadbent, then Leader of the 23 Ibid. New Democratic Party, to Howard Leeson, then 24 Ibid. Deputy Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs for 25 Ibid. Saskatchewan (23 August 1979). 26 Premier Peter Lougheed, of Alberta and five other 5 Ibid. Premiers had agreed to fight the federal initiative. 6 Letter from Roy Romanow, then Deputy Premier Lougheed was generally considered to be the of Saskatchewan, to Ed Broadbent (3 May 1980). unofficial leader of the group. 7 Ibid. 27 Leeson Memo, supra note 21. 8 Sheppard & Valpy, supra note 2 at 40. 28 Ibid. 9 Letter from Bill Roberts, special assistant to Ed 29 Ibid. Broadbent, to Allan Blakeney, then Premier of 30 In the two weeks following the final patriation Saskatchewan (7 June 1980). agreement in November of 1981, when the federal 10 Ibid. government began to suggest changes to the 11 Letter from Roy Romanow to Ed Broadbent (28 agreement, Blakeney’s fears were certainly borne July 1980). out. 12 Judy Steed, Ed Broadbent: The Pursuit of Power (Markham, ON: Penguin Canada, 1988) at 245.

18 Volume 26, Number 2, 2017