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Iraq: Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy

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Iraq: Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy Order Code IB92117 Issue Brief for Congress Received through the CRS Web Iraq: Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy Updated April 16, 2003 Kenneth Katzman Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress CONTENTS SUMMARY MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 1997-1998 Crises Operation Desert Fox and Aftermath “Axis of Evil” and U.S. Policy Resolution 1441 Wartime and Post-War Inspections Nuclear Program Current Status Older Unresolved Questions Chemical Weapons Current Status Older Unresolved Questions Biological Weapons Current Status Older Unresolved Questions Ballistic Missiles Current Status Unresolved Questions Human Rights/War Crimes Issues War Crimes Trials International Terrorism/September 11 Iraq-Kuwait Issues Border Issues/Kuwaiti Sovereignty Kuwaiti Detainees and Property Reparations Payments U.S. Policy, Sanctions, and the Oil-for-Food Program “Smart Sanctions” Initiative Protecting/Supporting Iraq’s Opposition Military Action and Long-Term Containment Kurds/Operation Northern Watch (ONW) Shiite Muslims/Operation Southern Watch Costs of Containment IB92117 04-16-03 Iraq: Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy SUMMARY After accusing Iraq of failing to comply major combat against Iraq has wound down, with U.N. Security Council resolutions that the U.S. military is increasing its focus on require Iraq to rid itself of WMD, the Bush finding banned WMD programs in Iraq, Administration began military action against although no clear WMD finds have been Iraq on March 19, 2003. In the wake of the reported. September 11 attacks, there was heightened U.S. concern about the potential threat posed On November 10, 1994, as required, Iraq by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction pro- accepted the U.N.-designated land border with grams and alleged ties to terrorist groups, to Kuwait (confirmed by Resolution 833) as well which Iraq might transfer WMD. However, as Kuwaiti sovereignty. Iraq has not detailed many governments did not support U.S. the fate of about 600 Kuwaitis still missing military action to disarm Iraq because it failed from the war and has not returned all Kuwaiti to receive U.N. authorization. property taken. Iraq initially rejected a 1991 U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program to Part of the debate over U.S. policy address humanitarian needs, but it later ac- centered on whether Iraq’s WMD programs cepted a revised version of that plan, opera- could be ended through U.N. weapons inspec- tional since December 1996 but suspended tions. During 1991-1998, a U.N. Special due to the war. Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) made con- siderable progress in dismantling and moni- Iraq was widely deemed non-compliant toring Iraq’s but was unable to finish verifying in other areas, especially human rights issues. Iraq’s claim that it has destroyed all its WMD A U.S.-led no-fly zone provided some protec- or related equipment. Iraq’s refusal of full tion to Kurdish northern Iraq after April 1991. cooperation with UNSCOM eventually Since August 1992, a no-fly zone was en- prompted U.S.-British military action in forced over southern Iraq, where historically December 1998. All inspectors withdrew and repressed Iraqi Shiites are concentrated. The Iraq was uninspected during 1998-2002, zone was expanded in August 1996, but Iraq leaving uncertainty as to the status of Iraq’s nonetheless maintained a substantial ground WMD programs. At the start of military presence in the south. Iraq openly challenged action, many of the questions about those both no-fly zones after December 1998. programs remained unresolved. Now that Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress IB92117 04-16-03 MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS On November 8, 2002, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, giving U.N. weapons inspectors new authorities; inspections began November 27. After several reports by the U.N. weapons inspectors on their work, the U.N. Security Council did not agree to authorize use of force against Iraq. All inspectors were withdrawn, and the United States, Britain, and a few other allies began a military offensive against Iraq on March 19, 2003. Saddam Hussein’s regime vacated Baghdad on April 9. BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS In response to Iraq’s August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait, U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990) authorized the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait. After the Persian Gulf war (January 16 - February 28, 1991), a ceasefire was declared in Security Council Resolution 686 (March 2, 1991). The primary ceasefire resolution is Security Council Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991), which required Iraq – in return for a graduated easing of sanctions – to end its weapons of mass destruction programs, recognize Kuwait, account for missing Kuwaitis, return Kuwaiti property, and end support for terrorism. Iraq accepted the resolution. Iraq was required by Resolution 688 (April 5, 1991) to end repression of its people. In forty reviews (at 60-day intervals) of Iraqi compliance from the end of the Gulf war in 1991 until August 20, 1998, the U.N. Security Council maintained the comprehensive international sanctions on Iraq’s imports and exports imposed by Security Council Resolution 661 (August 6, 1990). After the breakdown of the original weapons inspections regime in December 1998, two additional major resolutions (1284 of December 17, 1999 and 1441 of November 8, 2002) were adopted in an effort to resume U.N. disarmament efforts. Including Resolution 1441, a total of 17 U.N. resolutions required Iraq’s complete dismantlement of its WMD programs. (See CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade; and CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, the Iraqi Opposition, and Post-War Iraq.) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) During 1991-1998, a U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attempted to verify that Iraq had ended all its prohibited WMD programs and to establish a long-term monitoring program of WMD facilities (Resolution 715, October 11, 1991). The monitoring program, accepted by Iraq in November 1993, consisted of visitations and technical surveillance of about 300 sites. Under Resolution 1051 (March 27, 1996), U.N. weapons inspectors monitored, at point of entry and at end-use destination, Iraq’s imports of any dual use items. Confrontations over access to suspected WMD sites began almost as soon as UNSCOM began operations in April 1991, prompting adoption of Resolution 707 (August 15, 1991) requiring unfettered access to all sites and disclosure by Iraq of all its WMD suppliers. During March 1996 - October 1997, Iraq impeded inspectors from entering Iraqi security service and military facilities, and it interfered with some UNSCOM flights. These actions, CRS-1 IB92117 04-16-03 which were not resolved by a March 1996 side agreement between UNSCOM and Iraq governing pre-notification of inspections of defense and security sites, prompted Resolution 1060 (June 12, 1996) and other Council statements (such as on June 13, 1997) demanding Iraqi cooperation. Resolution 1115 (June 21, 1997) threatened travel restrictions against Iraqi officials committing the infractions, and Resolution 1134 (October 23, 1997) again threatened a travel ban and suspended sanctions reviews until April 1998. 1997-1998 Crises. Six days after that vote, Iraq barred American UNSCOM personnel from conducting inspections, and on November 13, 1997, it expelled the Americans. Resolution 1137 ( November 12, 1997), imposed travel restrictions on Iraqi officials. (On November 13, 1997, the House adopted H.Res. 322, backing unilateral U.S. military action as a last resort. The Senate did not act on a similar resolution, S.Con.Res. 71, because some Senators wanted it to call for the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein.) In November 1997 and February 1998, Russia and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, respectively, brokered temporary compromises that enabled UNSCOM to resume inspections. The February 23, 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement provided for access to eight “presidential sites” by weapons inspectors and diplomatic observers. Resolution 1154 (March 2, 1998) accepted that agreement, threatening “the severest consequences” if Iraq reneged. Iraq allowed presidential site inspections (1,058 buildings) during March 26-April 3, 1998, the travel ban on Iraqi officials was lifted, and sanctions reviews resumed. Iraq subsequently refused to implement an UNSCOM plan for completing its work and, in August 1998, barred UNSCOM from inspecting previously inspected facilities. The Senate and House passed a resolution, S.J.Res. 54 (P.L. 105-235, signed August 14, 1998), declaring Iraq in “material breach” of the ceasefire. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1194 (September 9, 1998) demanding full unfettered inspections access and suspending sanctions reviews. On October 30, 1998, the Security Council offered an easing of sanctions if Iraq fulfilled WMD and other outstanding requirements, but Iraq demanded an immediate end to sanctions and it ceased cooperation with UNSCOM (but not the IAEA). The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1205 (November 5, 1998), deeming the Iraqi action a “flagrant violation” of the February 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement. On November 14, 1998, with the United States about to launch airstrikes, Iraq pledged cooperation, averting airstrikes but prompting President Clinton to openly declare a U.S. policy of
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