Air Force Chief of Staff Gen John P. Jumper Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Donald G. Cook http://www.af.mil Commander, Air University Lt Gen Donald A. Lamontagne Commander, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education Col Bobby J. Wilkes

Editor Col Anthony C. Cain http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil Senior Editor Lt Col Malcolm D. Grimes

Associate Editors Lt Col Michael J. Masterson Maj Donald R. Ferguson

Professional Staff Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Larry Carter, Contributing Editor http://www.au.af.mil Mary J. Moore, Editorial Assistant Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager Air and Space Power Chronicles Luetwinder T. Eaves, Managing Editor The Air and Space Power Journal, published quarterly, http://www.cadre.maxwell.af.mil is the professional flagship publication of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innova­ tive thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of na­ tional defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanc­ tion of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, Visit Air and Space Power Jour nal on-line the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line. at http://www.airpower .maxwell.af.mil or E-mail to [email protected] Fall 2003 Volume XVII, No. 3 AFRP 10-1

A Word from the Chairman: Shift to a Global Perspective ...... 5 Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF

Prelaunch Notes ...... 11

Flight Lines Regional Security and Air and Space Power ...... 12

Richochets and Replies ...... 13

Ira C. Eaker Award Winners ...... 14

Features Who We Are and What We Do: The Evolution of the Air Force’s Core Competencies ...... 15 Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF

Cost-Benefit Economics: Enhancing National Security and Air and Space Power ...... 27 Lt Col Michael R. Weeks, USAF

Latin American Countries with Space Programs: Colleagues or Competitors? ...... 39 Lt Col Robert D. Newberry, USAF

Air Expeditionary Access: The African Connection ...... 47 Col Brian K. Hall, USAF

Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance: Developing Training Partnerships for the Future of Africa ...... 57 Col Russell J. Handy, USAF

China and India: Friends or Foes? ...... 65 Lt Col Mona Lisa D. Tucker, USAF

The Chinese Air Force and Air and Space Power...... 73 Lt Col Thomas R. McCabe, USAFR

Iraq, Preemption, and the Views of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary ...... 84 Col Gordon R. Hammock, USAF

The Benelux Deployable Air Task Force: A Model for EU/NATO Defense Force Integration ...... 93 Lt Col Dave L. Orr, USAF

Words and Weapons: The Power of Discourse ...... 99 Lt Col Edith A. Disler, USAF Net Assessment American Airpower Comes of Age: General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s World War II Diaries ...... 107 Maj Gen John W. Huston, USAF, Retired, ed. Reviewer: Dik Alan Daso

On War and Leadership: The Words of Combat Commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf ...... 108 Owen Connelly Reviewer: Lt Col Robert B. Kane, USAF

P-40 Warhawk Aces of the MTO ...... 109 Carl Molesworth Reviewer: Lt Col Robert Tate, USAFR

Billy Mitchell ...... 109 James J. Cooke Reviewer: Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired

American Military Aviation: The Indispensable Arm ...... 111 Charles J. Gross Reviewer: Lt Col Paul D. Berg, PhD, USAF

A Dance with Death: Soviet Airwomen in World War II ...... 111 Anne Noggle Reviewer: Guillaume de Syon

Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo ...... 112 Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray, eds. Reviewer: Dr. David R. Mets

The Warriors: Reflections of a Fighter Pilot, Test Pilot, and Veteran of the Air Wars over Vietnam ...... 113 Robert E. Ross Reviewer: Capt Jay Hemphill, USAF

Knights of the Air: Canadian Fighter Pilots in the First World War ...... 114 David L. Bashow Reviewer: Lt Col Martin A. Noel Jr., USAF, Retired

Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 ...... 114 Tami Davis Biddle Reviewer: Dr. William Dean

Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment ...... 116 Jeffrey A. Larsen, ed. Reviewer: Lt Col Charles E. Costanzo, USAF

We Have Capture: Tom Stafford and the Space Race ...... 118 Thomas P. Stafford with Michael Cassutt Reviewer: Lt Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF Vietnam Air Losses: United States Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973 ...... 119 Chris Hobson Reviewer: Ron Fuller

Swedish Signal Intelligence, 1900–1945 ...... 120 C. G. McKay and Bengt Beckman Reviewer: Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired

Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World ...... 121 Ralph Peters Reviewer: Lt Comdr Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN

War of the Aeronauts: The History of Ballooning in the Civil War ...... 121 Charles M. Evans Reviewer: Col Allan W. Howey, USAF, Retired

The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers ...... 122 Ryan C. Hendrickson Reviewer: Maj Paul Niesen, USAF

Airwar: Essays on Its Theory and Practice ...... 123 Phillip S. Meilinger Reviewer: Kenneth P. Werrell

Mission Debrief ...... 126 Air and Space Power Journal Board of Reviewers

Prof. Tami Davis Biddle Dr. Tom Keaney US Army War College School of Advanced International Studies Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF, Retired Johns Hopkins University Melbourne, Florida Prof. Theodore Kluz USAF Air War College Col Matthew Caffrey, USAFR Operations Directorate Dr. Charles Krupnick Headquarters USAF US Army War College Brig Gen Phillip D. Caine, USAF, Retired Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth Monument, Colorado RAND Dr. Don D. Chipman Lt Col David MacIsaac, USAF, Retired USAF Squadron Officer College Montgomery, Alabama Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Dr. Karl P. Magyar US Army War College Montgomery, Alabama Dr. Mark Clodfelter Col Edward Mann, USAF, Retired National War College Colorado Springs, Colorado Dr. Jerome V. Martin Dr. James Corum Peru State College USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Col Phillip Meilinger, USAF, Retired Dr. Conrad Crane Science Applications International Corporation Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College Prof. John H. Morrow Jr. University of Georgia Dr. Dik A. Daso National Air and Space Museum Dr. Daniel Mortensen Smithsonian Institution USAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education Dr. Lee Dowdy Alabama State University Prof. James Mowbray USAF Air War College Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired Dr. Karl Mueller USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies RAND Brig Gen Charles Dunlap Jr., USAF Dr. Richard R. Muller Staff Judge Advocate USAF Air Command and Staff College USAF Air Combat Command Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Dr. Stephen Fought Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University USAF Air War College Dr. Reina J. Pennington Col David M. Glantz, USA, Retired Norwich University Journal of Slavic Military Studies Dr. James Smith Col Thomas E. Griffith Jr., USAF USAF Institute for National Security Studies USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Col James Spencer, USAF Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. USAF Academy The Ohio State University Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired Dr. Grant T. Hammond Toffler Associates Center for Strategy and Technology Air University Dr. James Titus USAF Academy Prof. Daniel Hughes USAF Air War College Col Mark Wells, USAF Dr. Thomas Hughes USAF Academy USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell Lt Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Christiansburg, Virginia Space Division Dr. Harold R. Winton USAF Weapons School USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

4 A Word from the Chairman Shift to a Global Perspective

GEN RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF CHAIRMAN,JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

In ancient India, six blind men encountered an elephant for the first time and quickly began to squabble about the nature of elephants. The first blind man bumped into the elephant’s side and declared that the beast was like a wall. The second, discovering the ear, concluded it was like a fan. The third blind man came across the tail and thought the elephant to be very much like a rope. The fourth, encountering the elephant’s leg, was sure the animal resembled a tree. Finding the tusk, the fifth blind man proclaimed the elephant to be like a spear. And the sixth, grasping the elephant’s trunk, concluded the giant pachyderm most resembled a snake.

E ALL KNOW from the ancient Trends in the Global-Security Oriental story of the six blind men and the elephant that how Environment we perceive something deter- During the last decade of the twentieth minesW our understanding of it and, by impli century, we witnessed dramatic shifts in the cation, our response to it. With that in mind, global-security environment. Revolutionary the US military must shift from a regional to technological advances and monumental po a global view of our security environment in litical changes rendered our world safer in order to better understand and respond. In some ways, though less predictable and ar the past, America’s security needs were served guably less stable. While students of interna adequately by having its uniformed leaders in tional affairs debated the broader meaning Washington maintain the global vision, while and impact of globalization, defense profes the majority of US military organizations sionals worked to understand the security im maintained a regional or functional focus. plications of these global trends. However, to provide effectively for the na Technological changes since 1990 have oc tion’s defense in the twenty-first century, we curred at an extraordinary pace. Consider for must all come to understand and appreciate a moment where you were and what you were the global perspective. Examining trends in doing as the Berlin Wall came down. How the global-security environment and the ways many people at that time owned a cellular in which the US military has organized to phone or a personal computer, had logged deal with past challenges provides the foun onto the Internet, or knew what a global po dation for understanding the implications for sitioning satellite system was? Whereas televi America’s armed forces today, as we trans- sion news coverage of the Vietnam War took 36 form our military into one that is ready to ef to 48 hours to reach American viewers, stories fectively provide missile defense, information of the Gulf War were broadcast around the operations (IO), space operations, and other world instantaneously. During the Gulf War, capabilities that do not respect our tradi Cable News Network was unique in providing tional regional boundaries. continuous coverage of global news. Now, sev-

5 6 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 eral major networks in the United States cover Historical Context global events as they happen—24 hours a day, 365 days a year—not to mention the variety of As we chart our way ahead, we do not international news programs produced and begin with a clean sheet of paper. We must broadcast by foreign broadcast corporations. first know how we arrived at our current way Al-Jazeera provides programming that shapes of organizing for national security in order to perceptions of the United States in much of understand why we are better off organizing functionally or globally for some mission areas the Arabic-speaking world. Imagery satellites rather than relying entirely on regional com capable of better than one-meter resolution batant commands. At the same time, we should were at one time the sole purview of super- appreciate, not abandon, the value of regional powers but are now operated by companies in expertise in implementing our national secu the United States and Europe for the benefit rity strategy and national military strategy. of whoever is willing to pay for the images. In The experiences of the Second World War August 2002, commercial-satellite images of and early Cold War helped dispel lingering il airfields in the Horn of Africa were broadcast lusions about America’s security and its pro around the world, allegedly showing poten clivity for isolationism; those experiences drew tial staging areas for attacks against Iraq. For America’s new international responsibilities those who missed the news, the satellite pho into tighter focus. Responding to America’s tographs were available on the Internet. changed role in the world, Congress passed Political changes in the 1990s were no less the National Security Act of 1947, creating staggering. As a fighter pilot, I spent the first the National Security Council, the Central In 25 years of my Air Force career studying So telligence Agency, and the Department of De viet fighter aircraft that the North Atlantic fense (DOD). While Congress legislated the Treaty Organization (NATO) would have to overarching security structure, President confront in deadly combat if the Cold War Harry Truman established the first Unified ever heated up. Now Soviet fighters that could Command Plan (UCP), which established our be seen in the West only in classified photos regional and functional combatant commands. are performing at air shows over America’s Among these newly created commands were heartland. Today, officers from the former US European Command (USEUCOM), US Soviet Union attend professional military edu Pacific Command (USPACOM), US Atlantic cation at our staff colleges and war colleges, Command (USLANTCOM), and Strategic Air and three former Warsaw Pact members have Command (SAC). The containment policy our joined NATO. The end of the Cold War low armed forces helped to support was a global one, but, arguably, little need existed for our ered the threat of nuclear Armageddon and regional commanders to focus globally. In brought an end to many of the proxy wars any case, the regional commanders lacked through which the two sides struggled to exert the technological means needed to gain and their influence. But the Cold War imposed a maintain a global perspective. certain element of stability and predictability The first UCPs merely codified the com to international affairs that no longer exists. mand structures that existed at the end of the Alarming numbers of customers—including Second World War. What had once been state and nonstate actors—seek to acquire Gen Dwight Eisenhower’s command became weapons of mass destruction and the means USEUCOM; Gen Douglas MacArthur’s com to deliver them, including long-range ballistic mand became Far East Command; and Adm missiles. In short, the technological and politi Chester Nimitz’s command became USPACOM. cal changes that have improved our quality of Other regional commands had responsibility life and brought us all closer together can for Alaska, for the Caribbean, and for guard also be perverted to empower those who ing the northeastern air approaches to the would do us harm. United States, but vast areas of the world re- SHIFT TO A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 7 mained unassigned to any combatant com- were finally placed within our combatant com mand.1 When our first combatant commands manders’ areas of responsibility (AOR). Now, were established, the service chiefs played an the entire globe is encompassed within the active role in the commands and served as the AORs of our five regional combatant com Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (JCS) executive agents mands—USEUCOM, USPACOM, US Central in overseeing the commands. Command (USCENTCOM), US Northern From the outset of the Cold War, regional Command (USNORTHCOM), and US South- commands focused on their regions while the ern Command (USSOUTHCOM). JCS kept a global perspective. Although this In addition to regional combatant com arrangement served the nation well enough mands, the United States has had functional to see us through the Cold War, signs of trou combatant commands since the inception of ble appeared as early as 1951, when President the UCP. In fact, SAC was technically the first, Truman dismissed General MacArthur in the formally becoming a combatant command just midst of the Korean War. After serving as two weeks before USPACOM, USEUCOM, chief of staff of the Army in the 1930s, and USLANTCOM did so. Still, today’s func MacArthur lived in Asia until his dismissal. He tional, unified combatant commands are first served as military advisor to the Philippine relatively recent creations that began with government and then was made commander the establishment of US Space Command of US troops in the Southwest Pacific area (USSPACECOM) in 1985.4 In the 15 years during the Second World War. After the war, that followed, successive administrations es MacArthur became military governor of Japan, tablished US Special Operations Command overseeing its occupation and reconstruction. (USSOCOM), US Transportation Command With the outbreak of the Korean War, General (USTRANSCOM), US Strategic Command MacArthur’s Far East Command provided the (USSTRATCOM), and US Joint Forces Com US underpinning to the war effort of the mand (USJFCOM). The rise of these func United Nations. In response to MacArthur’s tional commands highlights the reality that protest against limited objectives in the Ko some military missions or responsibilities can rean War—“no substitute for victory”2—Gen be better fulfilled by carving out functions Omar Bradley, chairman of the JCS, informed from our regional commands’ responsibilities Congress that he and the joint chiefs unani than by having the functions dispersed mously agreed that in the global struggle among our regional commands. against communism, a wider war in Asia rep The newly established USSTRATCOM— resented “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at formed by joining its capabilities and re- the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”3 sources with those of USSPACECOM—is tak Though partly a clash over the utility of lim ing on some missions that have been ited objectives in war, the disagreement unassigned previously and that overlap the re largely reflected the two sides’ differing per sponsibilities of our regional combatant com spectives—MacArthur’s Asia-centric regional mands. USSTRATCOM’s nuclear focus broad view and the joint chiefs’ global outlook, which ened considerably with the latest Nuclear had to account for Europe as well as Asia. Posture Review (NPR), signed by the secre In the 56 years since the first UCP, our tary of defense in December 2001. In addi combatant-command structure has been ex tion to specifying the road ahead for America’s panded geographically and empowered legally. nuclear arsenal, the 2001 NPR introduced a The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense new strategic triad. The old triad of interconti Reorganization Act of 1986 strengthened the nental ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, role of our combatant commands, and with and submarine-launched ballistic missiles has UCP ’02, the last remaining unassigned regions given way to a triad of strategic offensive ca of the world—Russia, the Caspian Sea, Antarc pabilities, strategic defenses, and the infra tica, and the countries of North America— structure and research and development 8 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 needed to sustain America’s strategic capabili ence around the globe; they are the keys to ties. Strategic offensive capabilities include successful theater-security cooperation with nonnuclear, even nonkinetic, strikes as well as our allies and friends; and they form the basis the traditional employment of nuclear force. for pursuing multinational interoperability As described in the NPR, the new triad is en and military coalitions. In both peace and abled by command and control (C2), intelli war, our regional combatant commands give gence, and planning capabilities. The presi direction to and exert C2 over US military ac dent’s decision to join USSPACECOM and tivities around the world. The challenge for USSTRATCOM to form a new US Strategic our armed forces today is to balance these re Command was a major step in fulfilling the vi gional responsibilities with the need to address sion for a new strategic triad. Despite the fa missions that are global in nature. miliar name of the new command, it is as dif Whether we divide our combatant com ferent from the former USSTRATCOM as it is manders’ responsibilities and authorities along from the former USSPACECOM. It is an en functional lines and address them on a global tirely new command—and greater than the basis or whether we choose to deal with them sum of its two predecessors. Obviously, the along regional lines, we create seams—discon new USSTRATCOM will have global respon tinuities where one command’s responsibili sibilities, and its commander and staff must ties end and another’s begin. These are un have a global perspective for dealing with avoidable unless we take the impractical step threats to US security. of making one commander responsible for USSOCOM has also been given new re everything, everywhere, all the time. How- sponsibilities and a greater role in the global ever, seams can become vulnerabilities that war on terrorism. The very phrase global war our adversaries might exploit. Therefore, on terrorism highlights the global approach when organizing our combatant commands, needed for dealing with the problem of ter we strive to place seams where it makes the rorism. At the first DOD press conference of most sense to place them—where they pro- 2003, the secretary of defense announced the vide us the greatest effectiveness and efficien change of focus at USSOCOM, pointing out cies and present our adversaries with the least that “Special Operations Command will func opportunity to do us harm. tion as both a supported and a supporting Missions that cross all regional boundaries command.”5 In the past, USSOCOM, with require a global approach. One of those is very few exceptions, has been the supporting computer-network defense. Electrons do not command to our regional combatant com respect geographic boundaries, and requiring mands. Obviously, terrorist networks today each of our geographic commands to plan in- have a global presence, with members and dependently for protecting computer networks cells around the world, and we can no longer would create unacceptable seams. Thus, we as- adequately counter the scourge of terrorism signed the lead for computer-network defense by relying solely on regional strategies. We to USSPACECOM in 1999. This assignment also need a global approach to the problem. of a global mission to a commander with a global perspective was a precursor of the new missions assigned to the new USSTRATCOM. Implications for the US Military Many inherently global military-mission The establishment of a new USSTRATCOM areas are of increasing importance to our se and an expanded role for USSOCOM does curity and cannot be addressed well from a not come at the expense of our regional com regional perspective. Such inherently global batant commands. This is not a zero-sum areas include (1) integration of missile defense equation. Our regional combatant com across AORs; (2) certain elements of IO; (3) mands provide essential regional expertise; space operations; (4) global strike operations; they represent an enduring basis for US pres (5) certain intelligence, surveillance, and re- SHIFT TO A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 9 connaissance (ISR) activities associated with role space operations play in global commu global strike, missile defense, IO, and space nications, one cannot always determine pre operations; and (6) counterterrorism. cisely where space operations end and IO be- Missile defense is a responsibility of all of gins. In the past, the supported-supporting our regional combatant commands. However, relationships between regional combatant no such command, including the newly es commands and USSPACECOM were pre- tablished USNORTHCOM, is more suited than dominantly one way, with the latter support any other to integrate missile defense opera ing the regional commands. In the future, we tions across AORs in support of the presi are much more likely to see regional com dent’s stated goal of providing protection for mands supporting the new USSTRATCOM to deployed US forces, allies, and friends. When ensure the success of military operations tak missiles in a distant theater can be used ing place in space. This change in roles will against targets anywhere on the globe, the require our regional combatant commands to United States needs global ISR and global C2 develop a deeper appreciation for the global to integrate its missile defense capabilities, perspective of America’s security needs. which, by the way, include offensive capabili Given the nature of threats facing America ties to preempt or prevent missile attacks. We in the twenty-first century, including fleeting cannot afford to think of missile defense targets such as mobile ballistic missiles or merely in terms of actively intercepting mis leaders of terrorist networks, we must develop siles after launch. the ability to take appropriate military action Similarly, certain elements of IO require a rapidly, anywhere on the globe. The instru global perspective and better integration of ments of such action include today’s long- our nation’s capabilities. Although IO should range bombers, shipborne weapon systems, become a core war-fighting capability of all and special forces, but we will need new our combatant commands, certain IO activi global capabilities in the future. Regional ties could create effects of such magnitude that combatant commands could play either sup- focusing on regional consequences would be- ported or supporting roles in global strike op come unnecessarily restrictive and ultimately erations, depending on the scenario and unhelpful. Even when the effects of IO are weapon systems involved. However, one need limited to a single AOR, we will need a global look no further than our current global war perspective to ensure that theater IO is com on terrorism to appreciate the need for a patible with IO in other AORs. A global per global perspective in planning for and prose spective will often provide the essential starting cuting global military operations. point for success, whether we are attempting We will need global ISR activities for gath to get a message across to an audience that ering indications and warning data and for spans more than one theater, conducting otherwise enabling global strike, space opera electronic warfare (EW) activities to inhibit tions, certain elements of IO, and integrated long-distance communications, performing missile defense. Moreover, we need global C2 computer-network operations, or carrying capabilities to enable integrated global mis out military-deception programs. Even within sile defense, facilitate global strike, integrate a single theater, USSTRATCOM will add regional operations with global operations, value to the regional combatant commands and integrate regional operations in one by integrating efforts previously stovepiped in AOR with those of another. Knitting together different organizations (e.g., C2 warfare, psy various regionally focused ISR activities is un chological operations [PSYOP], EW, and likely to yield a coherent global perspective. computer network attack [CNA]). Simply put, we cannot obtain a relevant global Space operations present another military- perspective without ISR activities that, to some mission area requiring a global perspective degree, are globally coordinated and di rather than a regional focus. Given the vital rected—a function performed by the Defense 10 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

Intelligence Agency. The new factor is that, pursuit of American security, and the array of given the low-density/high-demand nature of possible command relations between combat- many of our ISR resources, regional combat- ant commanders should not be constrained ant commands are more likely than before to unnecessarily. To the extent we can harness be required to conduct ISR activities in sup- the ability to observe and operate globally, port of global operations tasked to USSOCOM without self-imposed artificial limitations, we or USSTRATCOM. will generate new military capabilities to add to the ones we have today, thereby yielding a greater number of military options from Conclusion which the president can choose. The president and secretary of defense Often, discussions about the need to shift must maintain a global perspective, and so from a regional focus to a global perspective must the military officials charged with sup- lead to debates about supported-supporting porting them. Communications from the pre relationships. Inevitably, someone will make the sident and secretary of defense to the com claim that functional combatant commands batant commanders normally pass through the should always support regional combatant chairman of the JCS, but the joint chiefs and commands. Implied, if not stated, is the belief the chairman are not in the chain of com that conducting operations or executing mis mand. If ever a time existed when our na sions is the sole purview of regional combat- tion’s security could be adequately provided ant commands and that no functional com for by having uniformed leaders in Washing- batant command should conduct operations ton maintain a global perspective while com in a regional combatant commander’s AOR. mands around the world focus exclusively on Such hard-and-fast rules have never existed, their regions, that time has long since passed and supported-supporting relationships con into history. To fulfill faithfully the “com tinue to depend on the situation and mission mander’s intent” from the president on down, objectives. That is why supported-supporting combatant-command staffs, service staffs, the relationships are spelled out in planning or Joint Staff, and US officials serving on allied ders, deployment orders, execution orders, the staffs must appreciate our commander in Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, operations chief’s perspective—a global one. If we attempt plans, and concept plans. Moreover, the term to do otherwise, we will surely end up like the supported does not imply sole responsibility for six blind men of the ancient Eastern parable execution. A supporting combatant com in their first encounter with an elephant, end mander can execute or conduct operations in lessly disputing the nature of something we support of the supported commander—some fail to perceive fully. By shifting our view from thing USTRANSCOM does every day. Ulti a regional to a global perspective, we will bet mately, our combatant commanders support ter comprehend and respond to America’s se the president and secretary of defense in the curity needs in the twenty-first century.

Notes

1. Ronald H. Cole et al., The History of the Unified Command mands (i.e., all of their forces came from a single service). SAC Plan, 1946–1993 (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Febru was an example of a specified command. The last specified com ary 1995), 11–15. mand, US Forces Command (USFORSCOM), became the Army 2. Gen Douglas MacArthur, speech before Congress, 19 April component to USLANTCOM in 1993 (USLANTCOM became 1951, reproduced in Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New US Joint Forces Command [USJFCOM] in 1999). York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 459. 5. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, transcript of a 3. Gen Omar Bradley, testimony to Congress, 15 May 1951, DOD press conference, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 7 Janu cited in Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair Jr., A General’s Life: An ary 2003. See Elizabeth G. Book, “Rumsfeld: Special Operations Autobiography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 640. Command Slated for Growth,” National Defense, February 2003, 4. Prior to the formation of USSPACECOM in 1985, purely on-line, Internet, 13 June 2003, available from http://www. functional combatant commands tended to be specified com nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1033. APJ

COL ANTHONY C. CAIN,EDITOR

UMMER WAS A very busy time for PhD in management information systems the staff of the Air and Space Power from Auburn University and extensive Journal. In June we bid farewell to college teaching and research experience. the director of the Airpower Re- We on the ASPJ editorial staff look for- Ssearch Institute (AR), Col Allan W. Howey, ward to a new academic year, anticipating who retired from the Air Force. He will many new, insightful articles and reviews be greatly missed! We take this opportunity in our quest to publish the best in air and to welcome his replacement, Col Dale space power thought. We are always seeking Hayden, to Maxwell Air Force Base. Col quality articles. If you are interested in onel Hayden will assume the responsibili submitting an article for publication, ties of running the day-to-day business of please refer to our guidelines in the “Mis AR at the College of Aerospace Doctrine, sion Debrief” section of this issue, or check Research and Education (CADRE). Addi the submission instructions on our Web tionally, he will utilize his extensive expe site: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ rience as an Air Force Fellow at Harvard airchronicles/howto.html. Additionally, University to oversee AR’s Air Force Fel we invite you to sample some new and very lows Program. exciting books that are appearing on the We also welcome Lt Col Michael J. market by reading our reviews, both in Masterson, our new associate editor, to the published version of ASPJ and on-line ASPJ. Colonel Masterson comes to us from at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ Headquarters Air University, where he was airchronicles/bookmain.html. If you the military assistant to the chief academic would like to write a review for us, please officer. He brings with him 20 years of refer to the guidelines on our Web site. As operational and analytical intelligence you can see, you have many opportunities work in his Air Force career, as well as a to contribute to your Journal.

Be unabashedly proud in your passion for your profession, your re­ lentless commitment to the mission, and your readiness to lead flaw- less execution. That commitment and attitude thus far has earned the deep respect of superiors and leaders of the entire US Air Force. —Gen Michael P. C. Carns, USAF, Retired

11 APJ

COL ANTHONY C. CAIN,EDITOR Regional Security and Air and Space Power

S THIS ISSUE of ASPJ goes to press, the plexity that challenges policy makers daily. The strategic and operational situation in daunting problems of security, terrorism, internal much of the world has changed once strife, disease, and humanitarian relief that con- again. The challenges to US security and front African nations provide airmen the impetus interestsA are simultaneously real, intense, and ill to consider how to plan for access and for the ca defined. US forces find themselves engaging a wide pabilities that forces may require to participate in spectrum of military tasks from training to humani rapidly changing conditions on that continent. The tarian relief, peacekeeping, small-scale contingency volatile security situation on the Asian subconti operations, combat, and both conventional and nu- nent represents more than just a nuclear standoff clear deterrence missions. All of these tasks occur between India and Pakistan. Air and space power against the backdrop of the ongoing global war on planners must understand the long-term percep terrorism, tensions on the Korean peninsula, and tions of Hindu, Muslim, Indian, Chinese, Pakistani, the search for a peace process in the Middle East. and European parties if they are to anticipate how The challenges that characterize this environment to support US interests in that region. compel air and space power professionals to be in It would be an understatement to declare that timately familiar with security issues in nearly every policy makers may not yet fully understand the region. Air and space power’s global reach and the strategic and operational implications for the Mid imperative of establishing what Gen Gregory S. dle East that will occur as a consequence of the Martin calls “geopresence” provide the rationale dramatic collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime and for our focus on regional-security issues as seen military in Iraq. The articles that explore questions from an air and space power perspective. related to this region reveal the interconnected Each academic year, the Air War College class global-security concerns that one must understand completes a Regional Studies course as part of the in order to employ force effectively in that troubled core resident curriculum. Faculty and students area of the world. Additionally, we may see a new study the most important economic, social, strate factor emerging in Eastern Europe as Poland, the gic, military, and cultural issues within various re Czech Republic, and Hungary engage in global af gions. These seminars plan site visits to countries fairs in new ways. within their assigned regions to conduct firsthand Thus, air and space power advocates and prac research into relevant air and space power issues. titioners face a paradox—the capabilities that we The course culminates with a research paper that have advertised for nearly the entire history of our captures lessons from the classroom and the on- field appear to be within our grasp just as we must site visits. In this issue we include some of those transform our understanding of those capabilities students’ papers to share with the rest of the Air to meet the demands of a dramatic shift in the Force the insights they gleaned from such an in- international-security environment. We have refined tense experience. our technological capability to affect the full spec Although we can publish only a small selection of trum of combat and noncombat tasks to a point the findings from this year’s Regional Studies pro- that few would have imagined 10–15 years ago. gram, what emerges is an impression of the com The demand for those capabilities, however,

12 RICOCHETS 13 stretches our forces beyond limits that we may have ment in nearly every region that we must approach thought possible. Now more than ever, airmen must the tasks set before us as a unified team—a team spend time reflecting on what air and space power equipped intellectually and technically to do the brings to the strategic, operational, and tactical right mission the right way at the right time. fight. The stakes are so high with every deploy-

APJ

We encourage your comments via letters to the editor or com­ Desert Storm, Deliberate Force, Allied Force, and ment cards. All correspondence should be addressed to the now Iraqi Freedom, in which the interdiction and Editor, Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault close air support mission categories did not capture Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. You can also send airpower’s contribution to counterland operations. your comments by E-mail to [email protected]. We re- The intent of raising the issue was to establish serve the right to edit the material for overall length. an appropriate mission area entitled “battlefield air operations (BAO)” for all the reasons that are EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE identified in Colonel Haun’s article. With respect I was so inspired by Lt Col Sharon Latour and Lt to the name, “direct attack (DA)” will work just as Gen Bradley Hosmer’s article (“Emotional Intelli well as BAO. As a result of discussion of the issue gence: Implications for All United States Air Force with the Chief and the general officers present at Leaders,” winter 2002) that I felt compelled to write the spring 2002 conference, a white paper was writ- ten on the subject. The bottom line for why we a short message of thanks! To be honest, I was de- need to formally establish this new mission cate lighted to see the Journal’s dedication to the leader- gory is to highlight a critical capability for joint ship topic in this issue, and it was interesting to read force commanders; to ensure proper organization, this article in particular. With a psychology back- training, and equipping for the mission; to ensure ground and interest in human behavior, I wanted to that appropriate supported/supporting relation- learn more about emotional intelligence (EI), so I ships are established for execution; and to provide ran out and purchased two books by Dr. Daniel Gole appropriate command and control arrangements. man: Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Air Combat Command (ACC) recently hosted Than IQ (his original book on EI) and Primal Leader- (June 2003) an Air Force–wide conference to up- ship: Realizing the Power of Emotional Intelligence (writ- date AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland. The conclusions were ten with Richard Boyatzis and Annie McKee). I had as follows: (1) the USAF needs to add a new mis heard about EI before, but this was the first I had sion area, direct attack, to Counterland, (2) killboxes heard about its application to leadership—and, of should be established in joint and Air Force doctrine course, it makes perfect sense. Thanks again for the as the primary Airspace and Fire Support Coordi spark needed to ignite my passion to learn more nation Measure, and (3) strike coordination and recon­ about EI. I look forward to seeing Air Force leaders naissance (SCAR) should replace Killer Scout. These continue to embrace EI. issues will now be fully developed at the Air Force Capt Alejandro “Alex” Garcia Jr., USAF Doctrine Working Committee (AFDWC) session for Hickam AFB, Hawaii AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland, on 5–7 August 2003. While there are those who do not believe that DIRECT ATTACK: A NEEDED CONCEPT some of these changes are necessary, I believe that My compliments to Lt Col Phil Haun on his well- the preponderance of the empirical data and the written article “Direct Attack—A Counterland Mis logic, with respect to how these initiatives can en sion” (summer 2003). Well done. Your readership hance the war-fighting capability of a joint force may be interested to know that this particular sub commander, will carry the day. Keep those great ject was raised at the Hap Arnold Doctrine Sympo ideas and articles coming! sium of spring 2002. It was raised as a direct result Maj Gen Dave Deptula, USAF of air operations experience in Afghanistan, but it Director, ACC Plans and Programs is not a new issue—there are many examples from Langley AFB, Virginia Ira C. Eaker Award Winners for the 2002–2003 Academic Year

First Place Sendcond Place Place Third Place Lt Col Kenneth Keskel Lt Col (sel) S. Didi Kuo Lt Col Merrick E. Krause “The Oath of Office: “High Ground over the Home- “Attack Operations: First A Historical Guide land: Issues in the Use of Space Layer of an Integrated to Moral Leadership” Assets for Homeland Security” Missile Defense” (Winter 2002) (Spring 2003) (Spring 2003)

Congratulations to this year’s winners! The award honors airpower pioneer Gen Ira C. Eaker and is made possible through the sponsorship of the Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation. If you would like to compete for the Ira C. Eaker Award, submit a feature-length article to the Editor, Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428 or via E-mail at [email protected]. All US military personnel below the rank of colonel (O-6) or US govern­ ment civilian employees below GS-15 or equivalent are eligible.

14 APJ

Who We Are and What We Do The Evolution of the Air Force’s Core Competencies

COL CHRIS J. KRISINGER, USAF

Editorial Abstract: Colonel Krisinger analyzes the process that produced the Air Force’s original core competencies and offers insights into how recent changes to them will affect the air and space power culture. The degree to which airmen can communicate their culture and capabilities both to themselves and others will determine the scope and per­ sistence of transformation initiatives.

Air Force core competencies are who we are and what we do. —Lt Gen John Jumper, 1996

N THE INAUGURAL issue of his policy concepts of operations and capabilities con letter, The Secretary’s Vector, Secretary of tinually evolve, so also does the way we articu the Air Force James Roche publicly de late Air Force competencies.”3 buted an evolving construct for the Air The new definition hinges on perceiving IForce’s core competencies.1 A similar state three new core competencies—developing air- ment by the Air Force chief of staff in an issue men, adapting technology to war fighting, and in­ of the Chief’s Sight Picture closely followed this tegrating operations—as a deeper refinement of pronouncement.2 Influenced by the corporate- the fundamental elements that identify the management style of today’s Department of Air Force as a service. Further rationale offered Defense (DOD) as well as his own experiences in support of the new definition notes the re in the defense industry, the secretary helped tention of the previous six core competencies explain the change to the service’s own asser but characterizes them as “distinctive capabili tion of its identity by saying that “just as our ties.” In fact, this definition points out that

15 16 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 the three new underlying institutional core With so much riding on the core-competency competencies make the six distinctive capa concept, such a course correction should be bilities possible. the topic of robust Air Force discussion, pos One of the underpinnings of the Air sibly conducted through the more formalized Force’s current war-fighting doctrine publica and accepted doctrine-development process of tions, as expressed in the keystone Air Force today, to ensure that the changes are well un Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic derstood and used for maximum institutional Doctrine, is the delineation of six core compe advantage. This article represents one voice in tencies (now capabilities): air and space superi­ the discussion of the new competencies by ority, global attack, rapid global mobility, precision reaffirming the value and soundness of the engagement, information superiority, and agile basic idea behind core competencies and by combat support.4 This set of core competencies, remembering that the earlier Air Force work to whose introduction coincided with the Air define the six core competencies was visionary, Force–wide invigoration of war-fighting doc- contains much that remains valid, and passes trine and the establishment of the Air Force the doctrinal test of “learned experience.” Re Doctrine Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, taining the original six competencies as dis Alabama, in the mid-1990s, lay “at the heart tinctive capabilities affirms their value as parts of the Air Force’s strategic perspective and of a framework that (1) defines the key com thereby at the heart of the Service’s contribu ponents of air and space warfare, (2) identi tion to our nation’s total military capabilities,” fies unique Air Force contributions to war according to AFDD 1. They were a statement fighting, (3) assists the Air Force in managing of functions “that can be accomplished only the intellectual properties of air and space by air and space forces” and “that confer ad- warfare, and (4) shapes the Air Force budget vantages to the nation when performed by air as well as plans and programs for the future. and space forces.”5 Put simply, the Air Force To correlate the concepts of competencies intended its core competencies to encapsulate with capabilities, the new definition goes to the what distinguished the Air Force from the very heart and soul of the Air Force. The ser vice must understand that the new competen other services in terms of war fighting. cies are intuitively necessary but not necessarily These evolving Air Force perspectives on the unique to it. As defined, the core competencies concept of core competencies and capabilities have much that could apply to the other ser are more substantive than any codification of vices. Thus, failure to fully grasp the new core a definition of the service’s identity. The new competencies may result in a missed opportu intellectual course will manifest itself across nity to help airmen understand the separate the full range of efforts to “organize, train, but interlocking components that comprise the and equip,” and will affect budgets, force conduct of air and space warfare and distin structure, operations, training, and command- guish the Air Force’s contribution to joint war- level decisions. More specifically, the new defi fare. In other words, the common language im nition could complicate the Air Force’s con plied in the new core competencies enhances a tinuing search for optimum alignment of its larger DOD joint vision, but airmen must be ar organizations and structure for managing ticulate enough to merge the new language and employing air and space power. The first with the six capabilities to communicate air- noticeable manifestation of the changed per power’s unique contribution to the joint force. spective on core competencies—tied to “de veloping airmen”—is the recent announce ment of the new force-development initiative, Origins of the Air Force’s Core which will fundamentally change the way the Competencies service prepares its future leaders and will in clude substantially increased resources de- In 1995 the secretary of the Air Force in voted to officer development.6 troduced the idea of core competencies to WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO 17 the service in an article published in Armed Business-School Definition of Forces Journal International; they appeared in their final six-item format in 1996 (table 1).7 Core Competence The new Air Force definition draws upon Table 1 “The Core Competence of the Corporation,” an article written by professors C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel in the prominent business- Air Force Core Competencies: school journal Harvard Business Review in Original (1995) and Present (since 1996) 1990.9 At the time of its publication, many considered it a landmark article in the field Air Force Air Force of strategic management—and arguably one Core Competencies Core Competencies of the most influential published in the (1995) (1996 to Present) 1990s. Later reviews of its relevance were Air Superiority Air and Space Superiority mixed, primarily due to questions about the Space Superiority Global Attack long-term profitability of corporations held Global Mobility Rapid Global Mobility up as models, but generally the article had a Precision Employment Precision Engagement Information Dominance Information Superiority strong effect on diversified organizations Agile Combat Support such as the Air Force. The entrance of the term core competency into the lexicon and the timing of its introduction suggest the article’s One can also trace their origins to the Air influence on the Air Force’s search to define Staff’s Strategy Division, directed by Maj Gen its own core competencies. Robert E. Linhard during Gen Ronald R. Military professionals should use caution in Fogleman’s tenure as chief of staff.8 Addi applying lessons from the private sector (where tionally, germination of the competency con profit is the driving motive) to government in cept was spurred by the Air Force’s internal stitutions, particularly when scholarly work intellectual debates on the service’s place in appears to support one’s own beliefs. With joint warfare, brought on by work of the that caveat in mind, after reading Prahalad Commission on Roles and Missions in the and Hamel’s article, one is struck by how its mid-1990s, as well as the first publication of examples, assertions, and conclusions could the Joint Staff’s Joint Vision 2010 in November contribute to Air Force discussion and debate 1995. The concept’s development included on the relationship between (obviously) com efforts by both civilian and military agencies, petencies and capabilities, even though the coordinated with the secretary and chief of authors do not specifically discuss capabilities. staff. Much effort, study, and thought went Their central argument is that corpora into the development of the core competen tions should not view themselves as “bundles cies, and even the current set underwent con of businesses” that make products. Rather, tinual evaluation from within the Air Force. companies must fashion themselves around a Introduction of the core-competencies con handful of specialized and unique talents at struct also coincided with a concerted effort which they must excel. The authors maintain to invigorate the Air Force’s corporate focus, that top executives need to “identify, cultivate, its understanding of war-fighting doctrine and exploit the core competencies that make centered on the air campaign, and establish growth possible.”10 Such unique specialties ment of an Air Force Doctrine Center, men are neither the products they sell nor the pro tioned above. Evolution of the core compe duction process for those products. Instead, tencies spurred debate marked by inputs these “core products” take the form of spe from a cross section of the Air Force and at cialization in key and integral areas, includ tracted senior-level involvement seeking to ing a full understanding of their advantages influence how the service thought of itself. and limitations, coupled with deep insight 18 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 into how these areas can be integrated with Air Force has articulated six specialized capa each other to produce new products. bilities for airmen to understand fully, culti A case study that compares corporate deci vate, and exploit in their creation of the core sions by the electronics companies GTE (now product (i.e., applying air and space power to Verizon) and NEC (originally, Nippon Electric achieve strategic, operational, and tactical ob Company) in the 1980s provides the point of jectives). The superiority of that product stems departure for the article’s thesis. On the one from the necessary and effective fusion of the hand, the authors acknowledge NEC’s wise six distinctive capabilities with the core com corporate decisions, which articulate a strate petencies, which produces the Air Force’s gic intent to “exploit the convergence of com ability to employ air and space power like no puting and communications,” with success other air force in the world. dependent upon acquiring competencies— Our service’s contribution of air and space particularly in semiconductors. NEC’s man power to an integrated, effective joint cam agement made expertise in semiconductors paign by combining the six distinctive capa the company’s most important core product bilities then becomes the service’s core product and acquired the specialty of staying ahead of provided to the military “businesses.” Continu its competitors in fully comprehending semi- ing the analogy, these businesses include such conductors. On the other hand, Prahalad and entities as the combatant commanders of US Hamel chide GTE, saying that “no such clarity European Command (EUCOM), US Pacific of strategic intent and strategic architecture Command (PACOM), or US Central Com appeared to exist at GTE.”11 mand (CENTCOM). The creation of addi By themselves, semiconductors were not tional markets, customers, and products in the products NEC sold to consumers; how- the air and space power example involves the ever, the competency to produce and inte ability to conduct tailored operations across grate them into the production of superior the spectrum of conflict to meet the combat- products such as TVs, telecommunications ant commanders’ requirements for varying equipment, and computers was the core contingencies and crises (e.g., noncombatant product integral to NEC’s overall business. evacuation operations [NEO]; humanitarian Core competencies help exploit core products. relief operations [HUMRO]; intelligence, The new Air Force definition of core com surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]; and petencies clearly draws from the business ex- interdiction). Similarly, air and space opera ample. Prahalad and Hamel define their core tions are also effectively integrated into joint competencies as the “collective learning in the operations as part of the overall US military organization” (i.e., developing airmen); the effort. Put simply, air and space power is to a ability to “coordinate diverse production skills” combatant commander what semiconductors (i.e., integrating operations); and the ability to are to televisions, telecommunications, and “integrate multiple streams of technology” (i.e., computers. adapting technology to war fighting).12 One can translate this relationship among Although one can apply many points of core competencies, capabilities, core products, this NEC-GTE study to the Air Force and the businesses, and end products discussed in the idea of competencies rooted in air and space business example to the military air and space power, one must be careful about transferring power example (figs. 1 and 2). One can use a business/industry interpretation to the mili the corporate model, as represented in the tary case. As with NEC, the original Air Force Prahalad and Hamel article, to depict how concept used core competencies to help ex the Air Force’s core competencies and capa ploit core products. However, the difference bilities are integrated in order to create the now lies in the mix of the terms core products core product (air and space power), which is and core competencies, along with the entrance then made available to the combatant com of the term capabilities into the dialogue. The manders. The ability of the Air Force to pro- WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO 19

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Business Business Business Business 1 2 3 4

Core Product 2

Core Product 1

Competence Competence Competence Competence 1 2 3 4

Figure 1. The Corporate Model (Adapted from C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, “The Core Competence of the Corporation,” Harvard Business Review 68 [May–June 1990]: 84). Busi­ nesses use core competencies to help exploit core products, which they then use to develop new markets and products.

Examples of tailored operations derived from the "core product." HUMRO NEO ISR Presence Joint Operations Interdiction 7 8 9 10 11 12

Business Business Business Business 1 - European Command 2 - Pacific Command 3 - Central Command 4 - Northern Command

Core Product 2 Focused Air and Space Power

Core Product 1 Focused Air and Space Power

Distinct Capability Distinct Capability Distinct Capability Distinct Capability Distinct Capability Distinct Capability Air and Space Superiority Global Attack Rapid Global Mobility Precision Engagement Information Superiority Agile Combat Support

Air Force Core Competencies: Developing Airmen, Adapting Technology to War Fighting, and Integrating Operations

Figure 2. The Air Force Example. Core competencies are fused with the six distinctive ca­ pabilities and then applied to the creation of the core product: focused air and space power. 20 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 vide focused air and space power comes from to say that, because the core competencies the appropriate fusion of the six distinctive are “not optional” for the Air Force, they capabilities and is influenced by the core com serve as a mandate for its “organize, train, petencies. Focused air and space power—the and equip” efforts and thereby guide key Air core product provided to the combatant com Force and DOD decisions on personnel, manders—can be further tailored to necessary force structure, and operations.13 operations across the spectrum of conflict. Correspondingly, the newly minted defini tion of core competencies has a more inward, institutional focus. That is to say, its three Different Interpretations of components—developing airmen, adapting tech­ Core Competence nology to war fighting, and integrating operations— focus on how the Air Force internally devel The inclusion of the original six core com ops its capabilities for joint war fighting. The petencies in current published doctrine is de new definition further reasons that, in fact, cidedly centered around air and space power, these “underlying competencies” make the but the message can be externally focused to six distinctive capabilities possible. In the new assist the Air Force in communicating the language, “these three [new] air and space message of its unique contribution to our na core competencies form the basis through tion’s total military capabilities. Indeed, a which we organize, train, and equip and from major theme of today’s war-fighting doctrine which we derive our strengths as a service.”14 defines for airmen and the public what the Airmen must become fluent in the relation- Air Force uniquely brings to the joint war- ship between competencies and capabilities fighting capability of the United States through the employment of air and space power. so they can convey characteristics that distin Nowhere was this message more noticeable guish the Air Force from other services, as than in the budget process. When the Air well as communicate to the larger defense Force introduced core competencies in 1995, community areas in which the Air Force has they were recognized for their value in com chosen to excel. The best example is the first municating the service’s priorities to the body new competency, developing airmen, which is with the greatest influence over Air Force re not particularly different than what all ser quirements: the Joint Requirements Over- vices must accomplish. It is definitely not an sight Council, which decided whether Air optional task; however, it is similar to feeding Force requirements were valid. Core compe troops three times a day—something every tencies were the vehicle for transmitting what organization must do. All of the services must the Air Force could bring to the joint table. recruit, train, educate, and retain competent Core competencies extend the template for and qualified personnel. The other services the Air Force to plan and think about its fu take similar actions to develop soldiers, ture; however, they must now remain insepa sailors, and marines. One can debate how rable from the distinctive capabilities in any well the Air Force develops airmen, but the discussion of what distinguishes the Air Force Air Force corporately decides the importance from the other services. of doing it well at each step. If the Air Force Admittedly, AFDD 1 notes that the original wishes to thrive both today and tomorrow, six core competencies are not doctrine per se then the importance of developing airmen is but “are at the heart of the Air Force’s strategic intuitively understood. perspective and thereby at the heart of the . . . The other two new competencies—adapt contribution to our nation’s total military ca ing technology to war fighting and integrat pabilities.” They are the “basic areas of ex ing operations—have a similar internal focus, pertise or the specialties that the Air Force intuitive importance, and commonality to brings to any activity across the spectrum of other services (although in their own service- military operations.” The document goes on unique forms). History’s respected military WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO 21 forces have placed great importance on de may connote other ideas to individuals out- veloping new technology and speeding it to side the Air Force. Analogies with sports and the war fighter. Similarly, the great captains of business can make the military usage easier to history have intuitively understood the need understand. to integrate multiple aspects of operations ef For example, one might say, “He is a com­ ficiently and effectively. petent quarterback” or “He is a competent There is no doubt about the importance of weight lifter.” What makes the player a compe­ these three concepts to the Air Force. Yet, by tent quarterback? The answer is that he has themselves, these new competencies cannot certain capabilities that contribute to that com­ provide all the clarity and vision needed for petency. For instance, he is capable of throwing the priority of efforts. Because the competen the football 60-plus yards, capable of avoiding cies are so important, yet so woven through the rush, and capable of running a 40-yard all that the Air Force does, they cannot be- dash in 4.3 seconds to outrun defenders. Simi come the sole source of the service’s answer larly, what makes a competent weight lifter? An to its own critical question, What are the priori individual who knows everything about train ties for the “organize, train, and equip” mission ing, nutrition, and equipment can be a tal of the Air Force? In that regard, the six distinc ented, competent weight lifter but can still be tive capabilities provide the priorities and guid only capable of lifting a certain number of ance so the Air Force can frame its “organize, pounds. Proper weight-lifting technique train, and equip” efforts around the ability to would be another capability required of this provide focused air and space power. If a new individual. technology, initiative, or mission does not con- An assertion from these analogies is that a tribute to the distinctive capabilities necessary capability is bounded. It has elements of quan for war fighting, the Air Force would cast a very tification, so one knows with some precision jaundiced eye on pursuing the resources nec what exactly can be done. Another assertion essary for implementation. holds that a competency involves a set of capa bilities and that one can learn how to fuse those Defining and Understanding capabilities most effectively for a greater pur pose. To use an Air Force analogy, one might Competence and Capability say, “Air Mobility Command (AMC) is compe­ Another aspect of the discussion about the tent at the air-refueling mission” or “Air Com newly launched core competencies is simply bat Command (ACC) is competent at precision the common understanding and context for engagement.” What makes AMC competent at using key words to shape the overall concept. the air-refueling mission? AMC is capable of re- The new definition clearly differentiates core fueling “X” number of aircraft, or, conversely, competencies from capabilities, yet Air Force AMC is not capable of refueling every fighter in people must understand the inseparable but the Air Force at once. A KC-10 Extender is only subtle relationship between the terms if they capable of off-loading X-thousand pounds of are to take maximum advantage of the possi fuel on one flight. Likewise, ACC is competent ble internal and external messages they rep at precision engagement or the ability to de- resent. In this regard, the Air Force may have liver weapons to an intended target with great more institutional work ahead to refine its accuracy. The capabilities associated with pre own understanding of the concepts. cision engagement are defined by more pre Here is why. If one uses root forms of the cise measurements, such as circular error word (e.g., competent and capable) instead of probable or by the precise accuracy and tol variations and plural forms, a possible discon erances of the Global Positioning System. nect appears. This is particularly noticeable In the air-refueling analogy, as in the sports in understanding the term capabilities, a word example, a capability is bounded and can be widely used throughout DOD and one that measured and defined. Competency implies pos- 22 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 sessing a set of capabilities and a learned knowl Why are these definitions so important? edge of how to use them effectively. The dic Communication and language are based on tionary definition of competency describes hav the shared understanding of words. Writers of ing a “suitable or selective skill” (e.g., air the original Air Force definition of core compe­ refueling), but a capability is bounded by spe tencies were truly visionary in their under- cific abilities. One does not say that a person standing of the opportunity to explain “who has “unlimited competency” but that he or she we are and what we do,” not only to an Air has limited, or unlimited, or X amount of ca Force audience, but also to the larger DOD. pability. For a corporation—such as the local The new definitions represent an attempt to power company—customers presume that it is refine the original vision. As the Air Force competent to deliver power to them, but its capa­ embraces the new language, a more complete bility can be measured by the number of institutional understanding of the meaning megawatts of power it can generate. and relationship between competencies and ca­ Examples of the importance of definitions pabilities must evolve so that the service’s mes distinguishing competency from capability in sage to both the users of its core products— clude the annual programming and budget the combatant commands—and the public ing decisions. In the more common vernacu understand air and space power’s unique lar of everyday usage, the Air Force knows contribution. The Air Force, therefore, what competencies it must have to prosecute should not discount the valuable service that air and space warfare, regardless of resource today’s six distinctive capabilities perform by constraints. However, faced with finite re- communicating to both an internal Air Force sources, it must prioritize and then decide audience and larger DOD audiences the spe how much of each capability to buy. For each cialized contributions made by air and space particular competency, the service needs sev power to the American way of war. eral associated capabilities. For instance, the concept of rapid global mobility requires multiple capabilities, such as aerial refueling, Aligning Air Force airdrop, and en route structure. Information Organizations and Structure superiority requires capabilities in such areas as computers, electronics, and telecommuni with Intellectual Properties cations. Service leaders and airmen at all lev The concepts behind the new distinctive els must translate the new language of com capabilities also perform another important petency and capability for each other and for role, based on their ability to communicate the joint community. They must understand the message of “who we are and what we do.” that a competency uses a set of capabilities; it The Air Force (as do all the services in their is not overtly based on a set of capabilities. own ways) constantly evaluates itself to im Competency describes what one must be prove its expertise in air and space power. It able to do in a certain specialized area, while does so by making decisions that align orga capability indicates the bounded limits of nizations and structures to develop, nurture, what can or cannot be done. Also, specific ca and care for the intellectual properties (e.g., pabilities could change but not the require missions, roles, tasks, functions, concepts, ca ment for the competency. For example, infor­ pabilities, technologies, etc.) of air and space mation superiority, rapid global mobility, and agile power. Even with the newly minted six dis combat support (previously defined as core tinctive capabilities, the existing alignment of competencies) will always be critical to the Air Force organizations and structures with Air Force’s success, yet the capabilities com the intellectual properties of air and space prising those competencies may undergo power deserves further attention. changes, either in technology advancements Prior to the new definition, the Air Force had or resource availability. six core competencies, seven programming- WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO 23 function concepts of operations (CONOPS) its organizations and structures with the intel that did not correspond to the core compe lectual properties of air and space power. tencies, and seven Air Force–wide battle labs Adding three new core competencies to the that did not match either the core competen mix could increase pressures to focus an ad cies or the seven CONOPS. Further inter ditional or a disproportionate share of re- spersed within the Air Force are 17 defined sources on the new competencies themselves, air and space power functions (ideas) and even though they are intuitively necessary for several warfare centers (organizations). the Air Force. Doing so could potentially lead These intertwined organizational structures, to a loss of focus on the critical components competencies, CONOPS, and so forth also do necessary to construct the air campaign. not necessarily align with the existing major If one accepts the idea that the key contri commands (MAJCOM), several of which are bution of the Air Force to joint war fighting is functionally oriented (table 2). the ability to apply airpower to a broad range As the Air Force institutionalizes the new of strategic, operational, and tactical chal definition of the core competencies, it must lenges, then it follows that the newly defined realize that the competencies could complicate distinctive capabilities are the necessary com the service’s pursuit of optimum alignment of ponents for that campaign. Therefore, it may

Table 2

Current Air Force Organizations/Structures Related to the Intellectual Properties of Air and Space Power

Six Core Competencies Seven CONOPS Seven Battle Labs Global Attack Air and Space Expeditionary Forces Air Expeditionary Rapid Global Mobility Global Mobility Task Force Air Mobility Information Superiority Global Strike Task Force Information Warfare Air and Space Superiority Air and Space Command, Control, Communications, Space Precision Engagement and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Agile Combat Support Reconnaissance Task Force Force Protection Global Response Task Force Command and Control Homeland Security Task Force Nuclear Response Task Force

17 Air and Space Power Functions Nine MAJCOMs (Four Functional) Strategic Attack Air Combat Command Airlift Air Mobility Command Air Refueling Air Education and Training Command Counterinformation Air Force Materiel Command Space Lift Air Force Space Command Command and Control Air Force Special Operations Command Counterair Pacific Air Forces Counterspace United States Air Forces Europe Counterland Air Force Reserve Command Countersea Combat Search and Rescue Navigation and Positioning Special Operations Employment Weather Services Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance 24 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 be worthwhile to explore the connections of time with myriad inputs, albeit without and alignment of the 17 air and space power today’s formal doctrine development. functions under the six capabilities. In fact, Since the introduction of the core-competency these capabilities may actually be better focal concept in the mid-1990s, the Air Force has points for the programming and budgeting adopted a more formal and mature doctrine- cycles than the relatively new CONOPS. In development process that utilizes continuous any case, the three new competencies by evolution to develop, deploy, and employ air themselves may not be able to contribute to a and space power doctrine, as well as clarify better organizational scheme to manage the service’s positions on joint and multiservice these relationships. doctrine. Lessons learned through corporate Air Force experience over time are key com ponents of this process, which entails intel Use of the lectual investigation as well as practical appli cation. It employs a variety of mechanisms to Doctrine-Development Process develop Air Force doctrine, including the ac If the Air Force is to embrace the revised ademic resources of the service’s educational definition of its core competencies, its cur- system and the operational experience gained rent doctrine publications, as well as other in the field through actual operations, exer public documents, will need revision. The cises, war games, and periodic assessments. concepts behind the six redesignated distinc As this cycle works in the full development tive capabilities have proved valuable, and the and understanding of the three new core capabilities themselves have held up well competencies, we Air Force members can rea since their original introduction as compe sonably expect to witness discussion of the re tencies. Indeed, they remain in a variety of lationships between competencies and capa publications, such as AFDD 1 (which is await bilities. We should consider the impact on ing revision), where they are prominently dis possible programming and budgeting deci cussed, and they appeared as recently as 2002 sions; compare the new competencies to the in the Air Force Posture Statement. Even originals and discuss the differences, as well more recent publications, such as 50 More as determine if there are advantages to the Questions Every Airman Can Answer, include new definitions; and take the new language to the six core competencies.15 They have the joint community and gauge its reaction gained institutional acceptance and influence for new insights. But, above all, we must use the intellectual rigor of the educational and by the doctrinal definition of “knowledge doctrine-development vetting processes to gained primarily from . . . experience.”16 make sure the Air Force “has it right” for this The Air Force appears poised to institu stage in its evolution. tionalize the revised definition of core com petencies without having used an institutional vetting process and a public-information cam Conclusions and paign to allow for discussion, debate, and earned acceptance by the larger Air Force Recommendations community. If it does so, it will have bypassed No matter how the evolution of the Air the current doctrine-development process Force’s core competencies proceeds, they re- that has taken time, effort, and command main a significant influence on today’s ser focus to establish. Assurance and validation of vice, as well as on tomorrow’s. There is no widespread acceptance of such a conceptual doubt that the three new core competencies idea require that vetting within the air and are essential and intuitively necessary for the space power community take place. We must success of the Air Force. Institutional under- remember that the original set of Air Force standing of the symbiotic relationship be- core competencies developed over a period tween competencies and capabilities will also WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO 25 have an enormous impact. Taken together, of an opportunity to frame the contributions these concepts will remain integral to the of air and space power to joint warfare. To ability of the Air Force to employ airpower— gether they help explain air and space power the service’s central contribution to joint war to the war-fighting combatant commanders. fighting. Therefore, people affiliated with the For airmen, they provide a sensible construct Air Force and air and space power must un whereby the components necessary for em derstand this relationship. ploying airpower are identified and fused. Does the new evolutionary construct for They also help reveal the core of institutional core competencies and capabilities offer com foundations that are intuitively necessary for plete understanding of the Air Force’s iden the Air Force and all the services. The Air tity? No. Does it raise additional, important Force should continue to embrace the im questions? Yes. Nonetheless, the articulation portant concept of core competencies. The of today’s new core competencies, combined early sound byte that touted their institu with further acknowledgement of the value of tional value still applies. The core competen the concepts behind the six redesignated Air cies truly contribute to the definition of “who Force distinctive capabilities, takes advantage we are and what we do.”

Notes

1. Dr. James G. Roche, secretary of the Air Force, The Secre­ 10. Ibid., 79. tary’s Vector, 14 January 2003. 11. Ibid., 82. Interestingly, GTE surpassed NEC in terms of 2. Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the Air Force, Chief’s profitability throughout the 1980s and 1990s. By the mid-to-late Sight Picture, 15 January 2003. 1990s, NEC found itself struggling after it replaced its chief execu 3. Roche, 1. tive officer (who championed NEC’s “core competence”) and the 4. For a more complete definition of the current Air Force new one steered the company away from its core competence in concept of core competencies and an explanation of the six core competencies, see Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air attempts to regain profitability. Force Basic Doctrine, September 1997, 27–35. 12. Ibid., 81–83. 5. Ibid., 27. 13. AFDD 1, 27. 6. Gordon Trowbridge, “Shooting for the Stars,” Air Force 14. House Armed Services Committee, Posture Statement of the Times, 11 November 2002. Honorable James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force, and General John P. 7. Sheila Widnall, secretary of the Air Force, “Beyond the Jumper, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, before the 108th Congress, Drawdown: U.S. Air Force Is Prepared to Support the National House Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 27 February Military Strategy,” Armed Forces Journal International, September 2003, on-line, Internet, 17 April 2003, available from http://armed 1995, 43–45. services.house.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/ 8. Maj Steven G. Seroka, “In Search of an Identity: Air Force Core Competencies” (thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Stud 108thcongress/03-02-27airforce.html. ies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., June 1997), 10. 15. Frederick L. “Fritz” Baier, 50 More Questions Every Airman 9. C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, “The Core Competence of Can Answer (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Force Doctrine Center, dis the Corporation,” Harvard Business Review 68 (May–June 1990): tributed by Air University Press, April 2002), 12–13. 79–91. 16. AFDD 1, 1.

This is what I think is the essence of transformation: to leverage the nation’s technology to create the maximum asymmetrical advantage. —Gen John P. Jumper Chief of Staff of the Air Force NAVSTAR GPS “Where Am I? Are We There Yet?” ASPJ STAFF* For centuries, military com manders and travelers have wanted to know their loca tion, objective, and—per haps more commonly— whether they had yet arrived. The answers to their questions became clearer and more precise in the 1960s with the deploy ment of the Navy Naviga tion Satellite System, also known as the Transit System, developed at Johns Hopkins University. Transit proved invaluable to military planners and operators, but demands for greater accuracy set the stage for the Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging (NAVSTAR) Global Positioning System (GPS). Still in the ex perimental phase in 1990–91, the system nevertheless proved its worth when it helped coalition forces find their way through Iraq’s vast, faceless desert during Operation • Indoor-outdoor personnel-location/lost-child systems. Desert Storm. • Antisubmarine warfare. NAVSTAR GPS is a dual-use system consisting of a constellation of 24 satellites, plus spares, orbiting at an •� Nationwide joint operations with civilian emergency responders in the homeland-security environment by altitude of approximately 12,600 miles. Initially built by virtue of the common grid (Military Grid Reference Rockwell and declared fully operational in April 1995, System/US National Grid). the radio-based system’s ability to pinpoint objectives ac •� Determination of current and remote position by spe curately enables military planners to use weapons such as cial-forces forward observers. the Joint Direct Attack Munition in highly lethal attacks •� Delivery of Joint Direct Attack Munitions and Joint that produce devastating effects. Standoff Weapons. Civilian use of NAVSTAR GPS has grown significantly in the decade since it became operational. At first, the mili •� Updating and improvement of maps for military/ community planning and the placement/location/re- tary intentionally degraded the system’s signal for all non- location of utilities. US military/allied users, restricting its accuracy to 100 me • Mine/minefield location. ters. In 2000, however, the government permitted capable civilian systems to obtain accuracies of three meters or less, •� Precision, all-weather navigation of military/commer thus opening NAVSTAR GPS to use by law-enforcement cial ships, vehicles, and aircraft. personnel, outdoor enthusiasts, travelers, and traditional • Pedestrian navigation. maritime/aviation civilian counterparts. New applications • Remote control of unmanned land vehicles. that capitalize on the technology continue to appear on •� Weather sensors for weather forecasting and sea-state the market. Some current and future military/civilian ap determination. plications of NAVSTAR GPS include the following: • Unmanned aerial vehicles such as Global Hawk.

To Learn More . . . GPS World. On-line. Internet. Available from http://www.gpsworld.com/gpsworld. Lachow, Irving. “The Global Positioning System: Managing the Tensions between Defense Needs and Civilian Applica tions.” PhD diss., Carnegie Mellon University, 1994. Rip, Michael Russell, and James M. Hasik. The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002. Sellers, Jerry Jon. Understanding Space: An Introduction to Astronautics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994. Spires, David N., et al. Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership. Rev. ed. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Force Space Command in association with Air University Press, 1998.

*The information presented here is adapted from material available in various USAF NAVSTAR GPS fact sheets and from Michael Russell Rip and James M. Hasik’s The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002). Cost-Benefit Editorial Abstract: The changing calculus of di­ rect and indirect costs associated with warfare Economics implies a need to alter strategy and doctrine. New technologies, the varying character of com­ Enhancing National petition between states, and the proliferation of nonstate actors increase the difficulty of defining Security and the effects desired during military operations. Viewing such strategic elements through a cost- Air and Space Power benefit lens helps refine critical decision-making tasks for those who participate in the process. LT COL MICHAEL R.WEEKS, USAF*

To defeat this [terrorist] threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—mili­ tary power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous ef­ forts to cut off terrorist financing. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. —President George W. Bush The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

HE LATEST VERSION of the na tional security strategy is a sweep ing document that lays the ground- work for traditional defense roles Tas well as the campaign against terror opera tions and terrorists.1 After the Bush adminis tration published its new security strategy, the mainstream press focused on the idea of preemptive action.2 Michael Kelly referred to this new strategy as “nothing less than a re-imagining of the American role in the world.”3 Although this idea of preemptive action may be new to the words of the secu rity strategy, it is certainly not new to the deeds. The actions in Grenada and Panama were preemptive in nature but did not spur this level of debate. Even Kelly admits as much when he says that “preventive wars are not new, and neither is the American im pulse to better the world by air power.”4 The preemptive aspect of the strategy might not be completely new; nevertheless, the pre emptive nature of the strategy, as well as other aspects of the document, should spur

*I would like to thank Lt Col Scott Dierlam, USAF, and Col Edward Mann, USAF, retired, for their helpful comments and sugges tions on earlier drafts of this article.

27 28 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 some reflection. If this new national strategy cuses on General Deptula’s idea that absolute is going to better the world through the use destruction may not be necessary to achieve of airpower (in the context of joint opera the effects required for the campaign.8 De- tions), how might we airmen contribute to spite widespread discussion of these ideas, US this cause? forces have not applied such concepts with The new strategy also reflects some cur- any degree of consistency.9 As technology im rent realities. Technological improvements proves, the ability to make more precise deci have lowered the costs of warfare for devel sions with more reliable results means that oped nations, both in terms of dollars and our doctrine must continually evolve. human lives, but they have also lowered the costs for terrorists.5 This economic situation requires that we reexamine how we decide Direct versus Indirect Costs on appropriate courses of action—especially General Deptula’s work reflects the natural in situations that have traditionally resulted evolution of doctrine, given the technical in long-term sanctions. National security de progress made in all areas of warfare. The cisions are not necessarily economic in na nuclear age gave us the ability to annihilate ture; however, an economic framework can an enemy completely, yet that power has been provide a clearer picture for analysis of the held in check for over 50 years. The paradox choices inherent in many security dilemmas. of the nuclear age stemmed from the percep This article examines how the use of an eco tion that using nuclear weapons spelled nomic view can help develop air and space doom—not only for the enemy, but also for power doctrine to support the national secu the entire world. Improved targeting tech rity strategy. Toward that end, it examines di nologies have led to a reduction in the collat rect costs, indirect costs, marginal costs, and eral damage of conventional warfare. The investments. next step is a more careful examination of the desired effects of a given action. Is complete The Evolution of Doctrine destruction required, or will incapacitation be sufficient to achieve the desired objective? Do not let us split hairs. Let us not say, “We Frequently in the past, only destruction will only defend ourselves if the torpedo suc­ could assure incapacitation, but that may not ceeds in getting home, or if the crew and the always be the case as we move forward tech passengers are drowned.” This is the time for nologically. We must make new assessments of prevention of attack. our capabilities and consider both direct and —President Franklin D. Roosevelt indirect costs. In this context, direct costs are 11 September 1941 the traditional costs of war, including those for equipment, transportation, and human ca Modern concepts of the application of air- sualties that always accompany war’s violence. power are represented in The Air Campaign: Indirect costs include such items as improved Planning for Combat by Col John A. Warden homeland-security initiatives and lives lost III, USAF, retired.6 Technological advance through the actions of totalitarian regimes. ments have meant that even a relatively re- Collateral damage of direct military action cent book such as this one, with its discussion could be considered either a direct or an in- of the serial destruction of centers of gravity, direct cost, depending upon one’s perspective. has become somewhat dated. However, The Improved targeting accuracy brings two Air Campaign laid the groundwork for more dilemmas of warfare to the forefront. The first refined doctrine that uses effects-based war- is the fact that improvements in technology fare. Maj Gen David Deptula, for example, lower the direct costs of warfare. For example, advocates a forceful case for parallel warfare we require fewer bombs and sorties to achieve with precision weapons.7 Further work fo a given objective. The traditional economic COST-BENEFIT ECONOMICS 29 consequence is that lower cost increases de ability to harness the new capabilities. For ex- mand. The fact that we can do much more ample, Intel continues to improve micro- with fewer resources may lead to hasty deci processor technology in line with Moore’s sions to use military force—a situation akin to Law;10 however, many customers find that new the risk of “moral hazard” presented by many processors do not help them improve the per types of commercial-insurance situations. The formance of common business applications reduction in collateral damage (indirect costs) such as spreadsheets and word processing.11 may have the same effect. Moreover, the lower Similarly, our modern Air Force has the ability direct costs of warfare also mean that, when it to target with extreme precision in all-weather needs to, the United States can take action conditions. Future improvements in weapons- (preemptive or otherwise) against enemies delivery technology are not likely to pay the who have formerly remained inviolable. Unfortunately, technological advances that large dividends that we have reaped in the past lower the costs of warfare for developed na few decades. We can already put a 500-pound tions do the same for terrorists, which causes bomb through a window; will choosing a the second dilemma. Because terrorists have particular windowpane within the window im the ability to wield massive destructive power prove our performance? Further, potential ad with very few resources, the indirect costs of versaries have devised new countermeasures inaction for developed nations have increased that thwart some of the advantages of stealth dramatically. In other words, because most and precision. For example, some states have terrorist groups operate without the constraints opted to place their most important resources of legal conventions that govern war between in deeply buried facilities, thus reducing the states, they can achieve potentially greater in- effectiveness of conventional aerial attack. Work direct effects against the societies they target. remains to be done with precision weapons, Terrorist attacks can cause widespread damage but future results are unlikely to have the but also create huge ancillary costs—for ex- transformational effects of the past. Previously, ample, the massive expenditures necessary for improvements in precision weapons have improving airline security in the United States. driven the revolution in military affairs, but as we move into the twenty-first century, im Doctrinal Implications provements must come from other fronts. In order to continue our advance as a fight The changing calculus of the direct and in- ing force, the principles of effects-based war- direct costs of warfare means that our strategy fare must also move forward to achieve our and doctrine must evolve. The [Caspar] objectives. Improved targeting technologies Weinberger- [Colin] Powell Doctrine requires demand that we also improve data-collection overwhelming force as a prerequisite for ac and data-processing capabilities (i.e., intelli tion, but new technology has changed our per gence and command/control) in order to ceptions of overwhelming force. With precision make the right decisions at the right time, as weapons, we can achieve more effective results well as meet the demands of the modern with less cost than was possible a mere 10 years ago. Even if one commits to the overwhelming- geopolitical environment and the new national force doctrine, one must continually reevalu security strategy. As previously mentioned, we ate what constitutes the threshold for over- have the ability to put a bomb through a par whelming force. ticular window. What we don’t always have is Even though technology has improved the technology to decide which window we dramatically since the Gulf War of 1991, we should choose. We talk of information domi now face a problem that is common in some nance, but we have yet to find a way to truly high-technology industries—the fact that tech achieve it.12 Clearly, this area must become a nological advances outrun the organization’s priority for future doctrine efforts. 30 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

Evolution of the through the use of international sanctions, which would weaken Saddam and, hopefully, National Security Strategy lead to his downfall or at least keep him in We no longer live in a world where only the check. Unfortunately, we miscalculated. A rig actual firing of weapons represents a suffi­ orous economic examination of the situation cient challenge to a nation’s security. might have resulted in a different outcome. —President John F. Kennedy First, we erroneously believed that sanctions Cuban missile crisis would weaken the regime’s power over the Iraqi people. Sanctions have rarely affected a Some of the concepts that we need to de totalitarian regime enough to force its capitu velop in order to use this economic view in lation. North Korea has endured sanctions clude direct and indirect costs (mentioned for 50 years, but its fundamental form of gov earlier), as well as marginal costs and invest ernment remains unchanged.15 Sanctions ments. During the Gulf War, the US adminis against Cuba have yielded similar results. tration identified its objectives (among them, Such dictatorial regimes become stronger be- the liberation of Kuwait) and sought to cause the general populace—weakened by achieve them with overwhelming force. Such famine, lack of access to medical care, and limitations on the war’s purpose created a other problems brought about by sanctions— postwar situation that left Saddam Hussein in can neither resist nor overthrow the oppress power, still able to threaten both the region ing government. and the world. Coercive economic measures can have Thus, during the course of the war, the other perverse effects, such as the creation of United States had a clearly articulated goal of smuggling activities and black markets. In fact removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Its objec Gen Wesley Clark, supreme allied commander tives did not include a regime change in Iraq, Europe during the Balkans campaign, points which did not seem necessary for accomplish out that “in the Balkans, for example, the eco ing US aims in the region, even though the nomic sanctions implemented against Serbia Iraqi leadership clearly constituted a center during the early 1990s are widely credited with of gravity. Indeed, Warden points out that helping Serb President Slobodan Milosevic “command is a true center of gravity and strengthen his control through the encourage worth attack in any circumstance in which it ment of black market and smuggling activi can be reached.”13 Moreover, Gen H. Norman ties. At the same time these sanctions imposed Schwarzkopf, commander of the coalition burdens on neighboring countries like Bul forces, makes the point that, although killing garia, Macedonia, and Romania, whose lead or removing Saddam was not an aim of the ers were unanimous in opposing any exten war, he “wouldn’t have shed any tears” if the 16 Iraqi dictator had been killed during the sion of the sanctions regime.” course of the war.14 However, the concept of Second, we mistakenly counted on suffi limited war that prevailed at the time meant cient consensus to ensure international com that, once the coalition had liberated Kuwait, pliance with the sanctions program. Evidently, it could not set its sights on Saddam. the sanctions had some effect on Saddam’s At the time, risking military and civilian ability to maintain his weapons programs, but lives to remove the Iraqi regime seemed un his constant search for sources yielded some necessary. After all, we had established our fruit—specifically, the revelation that the objective and achieved it. Why risk destabiliz Ukraine supplied antiaircraft systems to Iraq.17 ing the region and setting ourselves up for a Although such systems are not weapons of nation-building responsibility? The first Bush mass destruction, it seems that, given enough administration took what appeared to be the time and money, the determined dictator was sensible approach. We would contain Iraq able to find sources for such materiel. COST-BENEFIT ECONOMICS 31

The third miscalculation assumed the ef •� display no regard for international law, fective monitoring of developments within threaten their neighbors, and callously Iraq. But Saddam’s government, willing to lie violate international treaties to which at every turn, easily manipulated the inspec they are a party; tion plan. Germany also circumvented the •� are determined to acquire weapons of utility of sanctions after World War I by using mass destruction, along with other ad many of the same tactics.18 vanced military technology, to use as threats or offensively to achieve their ag Rogue States and gressive designs; Preemptive Action • sponsor terrorism around the globe; and As noted previously, the media focused on •� reject basic human values and hate the the apparent sanctioning of preemptive action United States and everything for which by President Bush’s national security strategy. it stands.19 Such action certainly seems an attractive These actions give a clearer understanding of strategic option in some cases to ensure na which countries may provoke the United States tional security. The rise of nonstate actors to action. However, it is extremely unlikely (i.e., terrorist organizations) means that unless that the war on terrorism would lead us to our containment efforts with “rogue states” armed intervention in every state that shares are effective, the release of weapons of mass many, if not all, of the above attributes. destruction into the wrong hands could hap- If we are to make efficient decisions about pen quite easily. where to intervene, we must be able to assess The efficacy of containment operations is the costs and benefits of such actions. Which extremely difficult to predict; therefore, once countries pose the greatest threats and are we decide to take action (preemptive or other- likely to require intervention? Those countries wise) we should have a strong bias toward that have access to valuable natural resources regime change as a necessary condition for are the most probable candidates since they success. If a regime’s actions are so provoca are likely to have the ability to finance their tive that they require armed intervention by operations and make an impact beyond their the United States, we should give strong pref borders. Countries with significant natural re- erence to removing that regime as part of the sources may also threaten modern economies intervention. Clearly, every case does not call (especially within a region) by withholding for regime change, but it seems to be a good access to those raw materials. We also should “default” position. The British did not force a assess potential threats on economic as well as regime change after the Falklands War, but moral and foreign-policy grounds. Neverthe neither did they see a need to continue sanc less, totalitarian regimes whose countries lack tions in order to contain Argentina in the fu natural resources are not likely to produce ture. A discussion of the costs of the Gulf War smoothly functioning economic systems that later in this article will explain how an eco generate substantial wealth; therefore, most of nomic view can lead to this proposition. these rogue states will not have the means to What defines provocative actions? The Na­ pose a substantial threat to the United States.20 tional Security Strategy spells out five attributes We may choose to engage these countries on that rogue states tend to share. Specifically, moral grounds (e.g., to prevent genocide) or they to help friends in the region, but a direct se •� brutalize their own people and squander curity threat to the United States is less likely their national resources for personal in these cases. On the other hand, countries gain of the rulers; that do have access to valuable natural re- 32 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 sources such as oil can use them to sponsor losses occur in both the military and civilian mayhem around the globe. populations. Postconflict losses are minimal but still happen due to incidents that arise during nation-building efforts. The costs of nation Costs versus Investments building are significant, but the total expense is likely to be less than that of the other scenarios. As we implement this new security strategy, we must take the long view of the conse Scenario two: minimal objectives are met for the con­ flict and a long-term containment strategy is adopted quences of our actions. For example, one ar afterward. Initially, marginal losses are nil for gument for terminating the Gulf War of 1991 both the military and indigenous civilian popu prematurely was that we did not want to desta lations. However, containment costs are exten bilize Iraq and be forced into bearing the cost sive in terms of both fiscal resources and human (in terms of both money and personnel) of a lives. Fiscal costs are easy to visualize, especially lengthy nation-building effort. This concern, if the containment period is lengthy. The cost however, turned out to be a false economy. In- in human lives is not as easy to predict since it stead of conducting a nation-building cam includes not only losses to the civilian population paign that could lead to a self-sufficient coun from direct actions of the totalitarian regime, try, we had to maintain large numbers of troops but also indirect losses from the hardships pro duced by sanctions. Military losses include both in the region to contain Iraqi actions. The increased training losses and those due to terror United States needs to clarify its analysis of ist actions that become feasible when forces are the debate over containment versus nation placed in high-risk environments for long peri building. Containment actions result in costs, ods. Examples include the losses associated with whereas nation-building expenditures are the bombing of the barracks in Dhahran, Saudi more akin to investments that pay dividends Arabia, and of the USS Cole.22 in the future. But we need not go on a massive Scenario three: minimal objectives are met for the con­ nation-building campaign throughout the flict and a containment strategy is adopted afterward; world. We should simply clarify our analysis of however, at some later date, a regime change occurs the costs of nation building versus sanctions, due to the actions of internal forces. The marginal especially regarding containment operations. costs of this strategy can be minimal, but the This dilemma demonstrates the differences type of regime that replaces the original govern between costs and investments. Costs tend to ment may be just as problematic for American maintain the status quo, but investments pro- interests as the original antagonist. vide increased returns and economies of scale Scenario four: minimal objectives are met for the con­ in the future.21 flict and a containment strategy is adopted afterward; however, at some point in the future, the actions of the totalitarian regime become so provocative that regime Marginal versus change becomes necessary. Obviously, this is the most Containment Costs costly of all the scenarios. These scenarios are not necessarily compre The crux of this argument is that the mar hensive, but they provide a fairly good view of ginal costs of forcing a regime change once the possibilities in many potential conflicts. In an armed conflict occurs are almost always less algebraic terms, MC + NBC < CC reflects the than those of a shorter campaign followed by idea that the marginal costs (MC) of regime a containment strategy. This assumes that the change plus the nation-building costs (NBC) costs of undertaking the first part of the con are frequently less than the containment costs flict are “sunken” once the decision for armed (CC) for many scenarios. This assertion is es intervention is made. The following conflict pecially true for scenario four, in which the scenarios illustrate this point: containment-costs term consists of the expense Scenario one: regime change is forced during the of a new campaign for regime change plus that course of the initial conflict. Additional marginal for nation building as well. COST-BENEFIT ECONOMICS 33

The formula is not meant to describe some to mind. The first is an investment in improved sort of “natural law.” The four scenarios are information-processing capabilities, and the all predicated on the fact that the decision to second is an investment in education for our engage in armed conflict has already been most important resource—our people. I use made. The formula represents some of the as the term investment very deliberately here. sessments that must be conducted to deter- Both of these strategies should provide divi mine the appropriate course of action; it is dends and increased economies of scale for certainly within the realm of possibility that the future force. the marginal costs of regime change could be If we are to dominate future adversaries, greater than the potential containment costs. our information-processing capabilities must The primary point is that we should make a continue to improve. This is especially true as full accounting of the elements in the equation we try to engage decentralized, nonstate ac in order to arrive at the appropriate decision. tors such as terrorist organizations. Our rapid The United States has used containment improvement in precision-targeting technolo strategies successfully in the past, especially gies has provided great benefits, but we are during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. reaching a point of diminishing returns. In In this situation, the marginal costs of regime what types of technologies should we invest? change likely would have been complete nu- Three stand out: visual recognition, speech clear war. Clearly, these costs would exceed recognition, and artificial intelligence. In order the containment costs—even though the con to maintain the “full-spectrum dominance” tainment period lasted for almost 50 years. called for by Joint Vision 2020 with smaller, more agile forces in the future, these technolo gies will be essential.24 Speech recognition and Implications for the Future artificial intelligence are especially critical. Our The new security strategy relies upon con data-collection technologies have advanced to tinued development of effects-based warfare the extent that we cannot hope to analyze all doctrine—especially since difficult regime- of the collected information with traditional change operations may become more likely human analysis. Language-screening programs in the future. The question then becomes, that do the initial analysis would better enable How do we continue to develop our doctrine us to target our resources worldwide. Of course, and capabilities as we reach the limits of im these programs must work in a variety of lan provements in precision targeting? guages and dialects—a task not currently fea Previous research makes a powerful argu sible. Nevertheless, successful investments in ment that much of our success in the Gulf these areas could pay huge dividends. War of 1991 stemmed from our ability to pro Improved data processing and artificial in ject an image of omniscience, omnipresence, telligence will go only so far, however. We must and omnipotence to the Iraqi forces.23 Of improve our understanding of other languages course we were none of these, but many of and cultures in order to make effective use of the Iraqi soldiers on the ground (remember, these technologies. Precision targeting re- there were none in the air) felt otherwise. quires precision knowledge of the local envi Our responses to Iraqi battlefield movements ronment—especially the language and culture. were so quick and overpowering that most We currently develop our leaders (both officer soldiers realized that resistance was futile. In and enlisted) with a superb system of profes fact, we were unprepared for the large num sional military education (PME). Recently, Gen bers of surrendering Iraqi soldiers. John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the Air Force, If we move our effects-based doctrine for- implemented a broadened concept for PME ward with the idea of dominating the battle called developmental education. This is a space, how does that affect our cost-benefit necessary leap as we seek to groom leaders for analysis for the future? Two possibilities come the more complex environments of the future; 34 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 however, we can expand recent movements to- vestments in education would be more likely ward developmental education even more.25 to pay dividends when commanders find them- For one of the more successful efforts at selves involved in planning complex opera achieving enhanced military education, one tions. In addition to the foreign-language in need only look to the School of Advanced Air struction at in-residence PME, we could add a and Space Studies (SAASS) at Maxwell AFB, more advanced course to the curriculum, thus Alabama. Lt Gen Donald A. Lamontagne, complementing SAASS. One could call the commander of Air University, recently ob new program the School for Advanced Lan served that “SAASS graduates have always been guage and Culture Studies (SALCS), offering in high demand for key staff and command intensive language instruction followed by positions, but the day after Sept. 11, my phone study abroad at a university. Commanders can was ringing off the hook. People responsible readily locate SAASS graduates, but we need for planning for this new kind of war wanted to increase the number of officers with exten to know where the SAASS grads were.”26 SAASS sive doctrine knowledge, coupled with an un is a great example of successful investing in our derstanding of local language and culture. people. When commanders must consider se If we are to move forward with effects-based rious actions, they want graduates with high- concepts, we must develop precision knowl level expertise in doctrine and planning. edge of the environment to complement the Unfortunately, finding people with exper other advances. The actions mentioned here tise in the local language and culture is more should help with all steps of the effects-based difficult. In 1996 the Air Force set a goal that planning model developed by Col Edward 10 percent of officers should have proficiency Mann, USAF, retired; Lt Col Gary Endersby, in a foreign language by 2005.27 Recent fig USAF; and Tom Searle. Those steps include ures show that we are only halfway there, and researching the strategic environment, deter- it seems unlikely that we will achieve this tar- mining policy goals, parsing and integrating get by the specified deadline.28 Programs such the mission, and assessing effects.29 as those for foreign-area officers and Olmsted scholars help achieve this goal, but they fall outside the normal military developmental- Limitations of the Economic View education process. We should add foreign- As with any economic approach, the con language instruction to our traditional PME clusions depend heavily upon the assumptions programs, thereby merging language and cul made to develop the arguments. Ironically, one ture studies with doctrine studies. Currently, ex- of the most problematic assumptions of this posing our people to both types of knowledge idea is that one can calculate the costs of war- environments is difficult. Moreover, we should fare and national strategy with any precision. consider creating a similar program for se Certainly, we can’t put some sort of economic lected enlisted personnel. “Study abroad” pro- value on human lives; furthermore, moral de grams, offered by most undergraduate insti cisions must override economic decisions. tutions, represent a wonderful opportunity Thus, the economic approach presented for some of our enlisted personnel who are here does not imply that we can calculate all seeking an undergraduate degree. of the costs and benefits of our actions with These expensive education programs may perfect certainty—especially in the fog of war. seem extravagant, but we should view them as However, the difficulty of calculating costs and investments. One can acquire such precise cul benefits does not mean that we gain nothing tural knowledge only through experience—we from this approach. Even chaotic systems tend must invest as much in this type of knowledge to behave within some boundaries.30 Under- as we do in technical knowledge. A more in standing the cost-benefit structure that shapes tegrated approach to our developmental- these boundaries should prove a useful exer education efforts would mean that such in- cise for decision makers now and in the future. COST-BENEFIT ECONOMICS 35

Another underlying assumption of an eco nomic view can help us use our resources ef nomic approach also merits some discussion fectively to meet the challenges of the mod- in this context. Typically, economic models ern world. are based on an assumption of rational be Postconflict containment by means of sanc havior by the relevant actors in the situation. tions is mostly a failed policy, and its costs are Certainly, many tyrants do not adhere to our enormous. We should consider such contain notions of rational behavior. However, we can ment a preconflict—not postconflict—strategy. still derive advantages from this model if the As in all things strategic, this is not a hard-and- behavior of the antagonist is reasonably ra fast rule. Sometimes the costs associated with tional. The model can in fact provide some regime change will prove too great, but we must insight without an assumption of rational be be more realistic in calculating those costs. havior. Indeed, irrational behavior by the Finally, in order to further develop our enemy can make a much more compelling concepts of effects-based warfare, we must im case for action in some situations. Even by as prove our information-processing capabilities, suming rationality on only one side of the sit which include strategies for both collection uation (ours), we can nevertheless undertake and analysis. Traditional evaluations of poten an assessment of costs and benefits that will tial targets must provide a richer picture of have significant value for decision making. the total environment in order to see further gains in our application of effects-based doc- trine. Improvements in our PME system are Conclusion necessary to provide this enhanced picture. This article does not imply that the United Clearly, some of the ideas articulated in States has used cost-benefit analysis unsuc this article fall into the realm of national- cessfully in the past. The primary point is that strategy decisions that are not traditionally we must reassess how we calculate those costs the purview of military officers. We imple and benefits in the future due to the impera ment the strategy decided upon by our civil tives imposed on us by the new national secu ian leadership. However, as key players in the rity strategy, and we must use that analysis to development of security strategies, we fre make our doctrine more effective. Moreover, quently provide an opinion and a likely out- we must increase our investments in resources come from a given course of action. It is in that allow us to make more effective assess this role as “trusted advisors” and participants ments of those costs and benefits. in developing strategy that these ideas can en Technology has radically changed the face hance our national security. of warfare in the modern age—with signifi cant consequences for decision makers. New Postscript technology allows the United States to use force with more precision and less cost in Currently, the cost-benefit question of Op terms of fiscal resources and lives. However, eration Iraqi Freedom, which occurred after improved technology also enables terrorists this article was written, is receiving great at to wreak havoc with very few resources. These tention in the press. The costs of the conflict changes have led to a new national security proved generally less than anticipated, but the strategy that reflects these problems. An eco benefits also seem to be less than expected— nomic view of these new realities can clear a at least at this early stage. Specifically, US forces sometimes muddy picture, leading to two con have not yet found conclusive evidence of clusions: (1) we must continue to develop our weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in notions of effects-based warfare, and (2) tech Iraq—a problematic situation since the Bush nological improvements in the future are likely administration used the near-certainty of find to come from sources other than precision ing them as a central argument for going to weapons. Further development of the eco war. Despite its treatment in the press, this 36 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 lack of evidence does not necessarily mean ability of finding such weapons in Iraq. Even that we erred in using WMDs as the basis for if we never find them, an expected-value analy the decision to remove the Iraqi regime. sis suggests that we made the correct decision. Once again, an economic framework proves The costs of the conflict were less than the ex useful here. Economists frequently use a tool pected value of finding WMDs. Further, given called “expected value” to assess situations of the size of Iraq, it is still very possible, even uncertainty. The idea is relatively simple. If an likely, that we will find the evidence we seek. investment has a 90 percent probability of What lessons can we learn from this expected- paying $100, then the expected value of the value viewpoint? The most obvious is that the investment is $90. For simplicity’s sake, let’s reliability of our probability function is critical. assume that the other 10 percent probability Achieving an accurate assessment of the prob is that the value of the investment will be $0. abilities of various outcomes further strength- It makes economic sense to choose the invest ens the “precision knowledge” arguments made ment for all costs less than $90 (this also as previously in this article. Effective use of these sumes that we will play the investment “game” cost-benefit tools, even in uncertain environ repeatedly). However, choosing the investment ments, requires the best possible intelligence. at a cost less than $90 doesn’t necessarily mean Second, although intelligence information will we will make money. Chance may dictate that never be perfect, we can still base our decisions our actual return on the investment is $0. on sound reasoning. An unexpected outcome (Variations exist on how one chooses to ap does not necessarily mean that we have made proach a situation such as this one, based on a bad decision. After the conflict, we can assess risk tolerance, but I have chosen one of the our actions carefully to see where we might simplest strategies to keep things straight- improve in the future. We tend to conduct this forward.) If our actual return is $0, did we process well, in both our successes and failures. make a bad decision? No. It is easy to fall into Currently, low-level conflict continues in Iraq, the “bad outcome equals bad decision” fallacy and it is probably a little early to make con here, but in this example we made a sound clusive judgments about Iraqi Freedom; never decision, based on the available information.31 theless, in terms of the economic viewpoint One can apply the expected-value analysis outlined in this article, it would be difficult to to the question of WMDs as well. Available in declare it anything other than a success. telligence pointed to an extremely high prob-

Notes

1. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United tion Foundation, 2001), on-line, Internet, 4 December 2002, States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September available from http://www.aef.org/pub/psbook.pdf. 2002), on-line, Internet, 4 December 2002, available from 8. See Col Edward Mann, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Tom http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. Searle, “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Operations,” Aero­ 2. See, for example, D. Milbank, “Cheney Says Iraqi Strike Is space Power Journal 15, no. 3 (fall 2001): 92–100, on-line, Internet, Justified,” Washington Post, 27 August 2002, A1; and J. A. Mayer, “A 4 December 2002, available from http://www.airpower.maxwell. Doctrine Passes,” New Yorker, 7 October 2002, on-line, Internet, 11 af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/fal01/vorfal01.html. October 2002, available from http://www.newyorker.com. 9. See Maj T. W. Beagle Jr., Effects-Based Targeting: Another 3. Michael Kelly, “A Doctrine of Armed Evangelism,” Wash­ Empty Promise? (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, Decem ington Post, 9 October 2002, A31. ber 2001), on-line, Internet, 8 December 2002, available from 4. Ibid. https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2001/saastheses/ 5. See Maj Gen David A. Deptula, “Air Force Transformation: beagle.pdf. Past, Present, and Future,” Aerospace Power Journal 15, no. 3 (fall 10. Gordon Moore, one of the cofounders of Intel, formu 2001): 85–91, on-line, Internet, 4 December 2002, available from lated Moore’s Law, which states that the number of transistors on http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/ a chip (and, consequently, the processing power) will double fal01/phifal01.html. every 18–24 months. 6. John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat 11. See David Coursey, “Does Intel Still Matter? Yes, but . . . ,” (San Jose, Calif.: toExcel, 1998). ZDNet Anchordesk Online, 24 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 7. See Brig Gen David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: February 2003, available from http://www.zdnet.com/anchordesk/ Change in the Nature of Warfare (Arlington, Va.: Aerospace Educa stories/story/0,10738,2911357,00.html. COST-BENEFIT ECONOMICS 37

12. See Prof. George J. Stein, “Information Warfare,” Airpower 22. One could argue that the United States would have had Journal 9, no. 1 (spring 1995): 31–39, on-line, Internet, 8 Decem these forces in the region, regardless of a regime change in Iraq. ber 2002, available from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ However, the number of forces could have been less had the re airchronicles/apj/stein.html. gion become more stable by means of a regime change. 13. Warden, 46. 23. Edward C. Mann III, “Inbound and Ready: Controlling an 14. H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, General H. Nor- Adversary and Shaping the Battlespace for Decisive Operations” man Schwarzkopf: The Autobiography: It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New (unpublished paper, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Airpower Research Insti York: Bantam Books, 1992), 319. tute, 2001). 15. The North Korean situation illustrates the difficulty of 24. Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, maintaining comprehensive sanctions. In the early 1990s, as the 2000), on-line, Internet, 4 December 2002, available from http:// sources of support (especially the Soviet Union) for the Korean www.dtic.mil/jv2020. regime evaporated, we provided some aid to North Korea in re- 25. See “Chief’s Sight Picture: Total Force Development,” 6 turn for concessions concerning its nuclear-weapons program. November 2002, on-line, Internet, 25 February 2003, available New evidence reported in the press seems to show that this deal from http://afas.afpc.randolph.af.mil/pme/docs/Total%20 had little or no effect on reducing that program. Force%20Development.doc. 16. Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and 26. “Strategy School Changes Name, Expands,” Air Educa the Future of Combat (New York: Public Affairs, Ltd., 2001), 11–12. tion and Training Command News Service, February 2003, on- 17. A. Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Rogue President,” Wall Street line, Internet, 24 February 2003, available from http://www.af. Journal Online, 9 October 2002, on-line, Internet, 9 October 2002, mil/stories/story.asp?storyID=22003482. available from http://online.wsj.com. 27. “Air Force Provides Opportunities for Foreign Service,” 18. George F. Will, “A Retrospective on Disarmament,” Wash­ Air Force News Service, 31 August 1998, on-line, Internet, 24 Feb ington Post, 15 December 2002, B7. ruary 2003, available from http://www.af.mil/news/Aug1998/ 19. Bush, 14. n19980831_981311.html. 20. Although oil is the most likely resource to provide rogue 28. Amy Parr, “Opportunities Available for Officers to Ex states significant income in the immediate future, other resources, pand Global Skills,” Air Force News Service, 22 June 2001, on- such as diamonds or drugs, could do so in the future. One should line, Internet, 24 February 2003, available from http://www.af. also note that, as technology improves the threshold of resources mil/news/Jun2001/n20010622_0836.shtml. required to sponsor terror, the threat is likely to become lower. 29. See Mann, Endersby, and Searle. North Korea seems to be the notable exception to this rule. That 30. See Maj Michael R. Weeks, “Chaos, Complexity and Con country, despite a crippled economy, has managed to assemble a flict,” Air and Space Power Chronicles, 16 July 2001, on-line, Internet, credible threat largely due to cash generated from weapons sales 24 February 2002, available from http://www.airpower.maxwell. and the support of other nations to help meet its goals. af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Weeks.html. 21. This does not imply that investments carry no risks. Un 31. See Robert H. Frank, Passions within Reason: The Strategic certainty exists, no matter the course chosen. Nevertheless, in- Role of the Emotions (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989). vestments have a positive “expected return.” Strategic Airlift The C-5 Galaxy ASPJ STAFF The C-5 is a formidable­ aircraft. The giant “T-tail”­ entered the active inven ­ tory on 17 December 1969­ and has been a source of­ national strength, pride,­ and worry ever since. Its­ dramatic successes, such as­ Operation Nickel Grass­ (airlift to Israel during the­ 1973 war), have been­ bounded by design limita ­ tions and high operating costs that have earned the air-­ craft severe criticism from outsiders and insiders alike.­ The original program combined new technologies, “first­ by approximately 10 feet and enables easier cargo transit ever” capabilities, and concurrent development with an­ to/from truck beds and a lesser ramp angle for drive-on excess of unlikely requirements. Because of early prob ­ loading. The C-5 can carry any of the Army’s current lems, the original “buy” was curtailed at 81 aircraft, and­ equipment, including the 74-ton mobile scissors bridge, in an unprecedented move, the badly flawed wing on­ the 70-ton M1-A2 Abrams tank, and helicopters up to the every C-5A was removed and replaced with one from a­ H-53 class. The C-5 also has an aft upper deck that seats new design. Despite its faults, the C-5 still showed huge­ up to 77 passengers. In an emergency, the main deck can potential; in fact, a decade after the Galaxy production­ be configured for passengers as well. The 12 internal fuel line closed, it was reopened, and 50 new C-5Bs were­ tanks hold over 50,000 gallons of fuel, giving the airlifter added to the inventory. Regardless of subsequent im ­ vast range in all mission profiles—and in-flight refueling provements, many aimed at raising the C-5A to the “B”­ gives it unlimited range. standard, the C-5’s operating cost continued to be among­ The future of the C-5 fleet appears to have two dis the highest for all Air Force aircraft. However, the suc ­ tinct alternatives. First, the Air Force Fleet Viability Board cesses kept coming as well. Most recently, in Operation­ at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, is currently analyzing the Enduring Freedom, the C-5 flew approximately 30 percent­ C-5A’s operating costs, remaining structural life, and ca of the missions and delivered approximately 48 percent­ pabilities as part of its charter to assess aging aircraft. of the cargo. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, it flew approxi ­ This detailed comparison of costs and values will provide mately 23 percent of the missions and again delivered ap ­ decision makers the data they need to determine the proximately 48 percent of the cargo. By way of compari ­ practicality of retaining the C-5A in the Air Force inven son, the C-5 moved more cargo and more passengers, on­ tory. Second, two significant upgrades—the Avionics average, per mission than did either the C-17 or the C-141. ­ Modernization Program (AMP) and the Reliability and The C-5 has a maximum takeoff weight of approxi ­ Reengining Program (RERP)—have been funded through mately three-quarters of a million pounds with a cargo­ the test phase for both the A and B models. These modi maximum of just over a quarter of a million pounds. The­ fications will directly address the C-5’s most serious limi unique opening “visor” in front and cargo ramp/doors­ tations: avionics, parts, and engines. Success with these in back allow rapid drive-through loading and unload ­ new technologies may finally allow the “C-5M” to achieve ing, facilitated by the aircraft’s ability to “kneel” at the­ the full potential envisioned for it these past decades. If load/unload point. This feature lowers the access point­ so, it will be around for years to come, say until 2040.

To Learn More . . . Aviation Week and Space Technology: 1999 Aerospace Source Book 150, no. 2 (11 January 1999).­ ­ “C-5 Galaxy.” Global Security.org, 8 November 2001. On-line. Internet, 2 July 2003. Available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/­ ­ military/systems/aircraft/c-5.htm. Norton, Bill. Lockheed C-5 Galaxy. Warbird Tech Series, vol. 36. North Branch, Minn.: Specialty Press Publishers and Wholesalers, 2003. “Photos and Fact Sheets.” USTRANSCOM, 30 November 2001. On-line. Internet, 2 July 2003. Available from http://www.transcom.mil/ images/photos/c-5-front.cfm. “Strategic Airlift: Improvements in C-5 Mission Capability Can Help Meet Airlift Requirements.” GAO: United States General Accounting Office, 20 November 1995. On-line. Internet, 2 July 2003. Available from http://www.fas.org/man/gao/gao9643.htm.­ ­ USAF Fact Sheet: C-5 Galaxy, November 2000. On-line. Internet, 2 July 2003. Available from http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/­ ­ C_5_Galaxy.html. Latin American Editorial Abstract: Colonel New- Countries berry’s three-tiered analysis of Latin American space programs with Space identifies (1) owner/operator states with mature space programs, (2) material participants with well- Programs developed research and intellec­ tual capabilities, and (3) countries Colleagues or that willingly participate in space programs with other nations by Competitors? means of intellectual or capital contributions. LT COL ROBERT D. NEWBERRY, USAF

PACE TECHNOLOGY, NOW taken for country in Latin America has access to a wide granted, is an accepted part of mod- variety of space-based services. Telecommuni ern life. Space-derived products and cations are available through International services for communications, imagery, Telecommunications Satellites (INTELSAT), Snavigation, and weather forecasting are avail- International Maritime Satellites (INMARSAT), able to everyone around the world, even in less- and Iridium telephones, in addition to many developed and underdeveloped regions. Every satellite television and radio broadcasts

39 40 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 throughout the hemisphere. News reporters Latin American space needs and purposes. routinely use satellite-communications video- With an eye toward formulating a new space phones for live reporting in remote areas of policy for the region, this article reviews the Latin America. Space-derived imagery prod most significant space programs in Latin ucts are available from indigenous regional American countries and categorizes those na satellites, several commercial-imagery satellites, tions as either colleagues or competitors of and the Internet. The Global Positioning Sys the United States. tem provides free navigation services, and that This article also rates the space capabilities system’s receivers are prevalent throughout of Latin American countries on a decreasing Latin America. Regionally specific weather in- scale from three to one. Level three includes formation is available from space-based sys those countries with a mature space program tems. These space services have become per and an indigenous capability to own or oper vasive due to their relatively low cost and the ate space systems. They do not have the capa ability to access most of them by means of bility to independently produce large-scale handheld units, small-dish antennae, or the spacecraft and launch them, but they do have Internet. As a region, Latin America has the infrastructure and technical capability to shown significant interest in developing in develop spacecraft hardware. Level two de- digenous space capabilities to assist with man- scribes those countries that have the research aging resources and exercising sovereignty. capabilities and intellectual capital needed to Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, engage in a space program as material partici Paraguay, and Peru in particular have partici pants. They can contribute design ideas and pated in space programs beyond the level of some hardware to a space program, and they merely subscribing to a satellite service. have the resources to process and analyze The United States should routinely review space-derived products. Level one refers to Latin American space programs to ascertain countries that are willing participants in their impact on its national-security interests. other space programs and that can contribute The primary such interest at stake with foreign either intellectual or financial resources to a space developments is the dual-use nature of collaborative venture with another space-faring space-launch technology. Space-launch mis country. These nations are collaborators to siles are inherently capable of being used for others’ space programs. attacks against the United States. To date, the US ballistic missile defense program has fo cused on launches coming over the North Level Three: Owners/Operators Pole; those originating from south of the bor Brazil and Mexico are the largest owners der could significantly complicate missile de and operators of space systems in the region fense operations or render current plans in- and are the most space-capable countries. effective. A secondary US national-security However, the similarity ends there, as the two concern involves understanding the technical have developed highly individualized, unique sophistication of foreign space systems to en- space programs. Brazil, the dominant space sure that countermeasures can be developed power in the region, is the major player in to mitigate any military advantage they offer. terms of funding and technical scope. Its In Based on these two interests, the United stituto Nacional De Pesquisas Espaciais has States has pursued a policy of thwarting Latin undertaken an aggressive and long-term American countries’ missile developments space program dating back to 1979 with the while generally ignoring their space pro- inauguration of the Missao Espacial Completa grams, considering them technically unso Brasileira (MECB).1 The three objectives of phisticated. Such a policy may not serve US the MECB are to (1) design and build its own long-term interests and should be reconsid satellites, (2) possess an indigenous manufac ered, based upon a better understanding of tured rocket, and (3) develop a launch center LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WITH SPACE PROGRAMS 41 on its own territory.2 The MECB identifies re- Implementation of the MECB initially put mote sensing as the major Brazilian interest Brazil at odds with the United States due to its in space. The Brazilian government intends objective of developing a rocket. The United to use space capabilities to perform the fol States invoked the Missile Technology Con lowing functions: trol Regime (MTCR) in 1995 with the discov ery that Russia was selling advanced missile 1. Investigate and monitor natural re- technology to Brazil. Russia agreed to stop sources. sales to Brazil, which cast the United States in 2.� Map the Amazon and track the rate of a role of trying to stall that country’s space deforestation. program.7 The fact that Brazil also explored the purchase of Cyclone missiles from the 3. Monitor agricultural production. Ukraine and missile technology from China 4. Provide communications to remote further irritated the United States. Brazil Amazon and Andean regions.3 eventually decided not to oppose the United States and signed on to the MTCR in 1995. Brazil developed a three-phase program to But agreeing to the MTCR did not open the purchase needed space technologies while doors to missile technology, and the United developing an indigenous capability to even States insisted that Brazil agree to a Technology tually replace the need for outside support. Safeguard Agreement (TSA) to allay concerns The first phase, which ran from 1973 to 1984, about technology transfers to third parties, included the purchase of US Earth-resources particularly China.8 Although the executive data from the land satellite (LANDSAT) pro- gram and a program to develop information branches of both countries were able to reach technologies to receive, record, process, ana agreement on the TSA, the Brazilian Congress lyze, and disseminate the information. The has not ratified it because of significant con second phase, from 1985 to 1994, expanded cerns about the effect on Brazil’s sovereignty. the sources of imagery products, including Brazil halted plans for developing an indige the French Satellite Pour l’Observation de la nous launch capability at Alcantara to appease Terre satellites and the European Earth Re- US concerns and is now developing a com mercial space-launch facility to compete with sources Satellites. This phase invested addi 9 tional money in indigenous capabilities to French Guiana for business. The US Air Force build laboratories for space-imagery research, planned to use Alcantara to launch a satellite simulation, mapping products, and the devel on a Pegasus rocket but moved to Kwajalein opment of geoprocessing techniques. The Atoll since the TSA had not been ratified at 10 third phase, which started in 1995, will ex the time of the January 2003 launch. pand the technology base to other imagery The second area of US concern about products, such as microwave sensors, and the Brazil’s space program is its codevelopment operation of their indigenously produced im of space technology with China. The initial agery and communications satellites.4 Unable CBERS development did not particularly to produce a large-scale imagery satellite on trouble the United States since it considered its own, Brazil eventually entered into a joint- the satellites relatively unsophisticated. At the development project with the Chinese Acad time, China relied on the Fanhui Shi Weixing emy of Space Technology for the China-Brazil imagery satellites, which used film capsules Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS).5 Brazil also with one-meter-quality images and had to be codeveloped the companion Scientific Cien de-orbited from space.11 For CBERS, China tifico (SACI) satellites in collaboration with funded 70 percent of the project and both the United States and China as a tech launched the satellite from its own territory nology test-bed activity.6 The tremendously using the Long March rocket; Brazil con successful MECB has provided Brazil with a tributed the rest of the funding, mostly tied to robust and very capable space program. development of the 20-meter imaging pay- 42 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 load.12 The main concern of the United States trated on communications services. Like most was that China was gaining a near-real-time countries, it was an early participant in the reconnaissance capability instead of taking an INTELSAT and INMARSAT programs and average of three days to recover and process subscribed to US systems for telecommunica film capsules. Since the United States, France, tions services for domestic audiences. In 1997 European Union, and others already offered the Mexican government created the Satelites commercial imagery of better quality, the Mexicanos, S.A. de C.V. (Satmex) to oversee United States did not consider CBERS a sig its satellite operations. Satmex teamed with nificant threat to its interests. This attitude Loral to operate the Morelos, Solidaridad, and changed somewhat in November 2002, when Satmex telecommunications satellites Mexico China and Brazil announced their follow-on purchased from the United States.18 In 1996 agreement to produce CBERS-3 and -4 to fund the National Autonomous University (UNAM) the program on 50-50 shares and improve the launched the UNAMSAT-B microsatellite it had imaging payload to five meters.13 The new developed with the Radio Amateur Satellite agreement will also explore the feasibility of (AMSAT) organization.19 In general, Mexico’s jointly developing a geostationary weather main space involvement has entailed financ satellite based on the CBERS model.14 ing space communications programs and Partly as a consequence of the difficulty of contracting with US companies for their op working with the United States, Brazil has in- eration. Because Mexico has taken a decid dependently pursued its space program; how- edly cooperative stance with the United States ever, its relationship with the United States in the development of space capabilities, it is has not been completely characterized by one of America’s space colleagues. conflict, and Brazil has continued to partici pate in US-led space programs. For example, Brazil was the third country to participate in Level Two: Material Participants the US LANDSAT program and is the third Argentina and Chile are both capable of largest user of US-provided satellite imagery.15 developing small satellites but have to team It is supplying $120 million worth of hard- with other countries to undertake larger-scale ware over five years to the International Space space programs. Both nations are more fis Station,16 has an astronaut in the National cally constrained in their space spending than Aeronautics and Space Administration’s the level-three countries and do not have com (NASA) space-shuttle cadre, and continues to pelling national-security or economic inter participate in the hitchhiker program to place ests that would drive a dedicated or more ro experimental payloads on the space shuttle. In bust space program. Since their participation addition to collaborating with the United States in space programs is not downward-directed, on microsatellite technology, Brazil has also based on government priorities, they have teamed with other US allies such as the been free to participate in a wide variety of United Kingdom.17 Although one might justi programs without having to commit to the fiably categorize Brazil as both a US colleague long-term operation of any particular system. and competitor, it is principally a competitor. Both Argentina and Chile, therefore, have Mexico, on the other hand, has a much pursued a strategy of breadth over depth, em less ambitious space program than Brazil’s phasizing the development of their intellec and a very different focus. Its major space in tual capital over specific hardware. terests involve integrating the country with Argentina’s Comision Nacional de Activi telecommunications services for governmen dades Espaciales (CONAE) had ambitious tal command and control of resources and space-development plans prior to the devalu pursuing commercial activities such as bank ation of the Argentine peso in January 2002. ing and entertainment. Therefore, instead of In the 1980s and early 1990s, Argentina was emphasizing imagery, Mexico has concen developing an indigenous rocket program LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WITH SPACE PROGRAMS 43 called the Condor, which had space-technology Chile has taken an approach similar to Ar applications. The Condor raised significant gentina’s but on a smaller and more sustain- concerns in the United States due to its viola able scale. First, Chile has proceeded at a tion of the MTCR and the potential for tech slower pace and did not pursue domestic mis nology transfer to Iraq.20 As did Brazil, Ar sile programs, a course that would have chal gentina eventually concluded that its interests lenged the MTCR. Second, the Chileans have would be better served by cooperating with been flexible in their teaming arrangements the United States on the MTCR. Thus, in without committing themselves to funding 1995 Argentina joined the pact, cancelled the large space developments over long periods Condor program, and began pursuing a of time. Third, Chile has become more aligned space program with the goal of integrating with the United States in high-technology with the Brazilian program.21 Over time, Ar programs by purchasing F-16 aircraft. So, al gentina developed contacts with other coun though Chile has explored coparticipating tries and joined an AMSAT program, enter with Brazil and China on space programs, it ing into a codevelopment program with has done nothing to cause the United States Chile, Spain, and Brazil for the Cesar satellite, significant concern. which has agricultural, water-management, Unsurprisingly, then, bilateral military co and environmental-monitoring applications.22 operation with Chile may expand into the area Argentina has also signed an intergovern of space. Its main interest in space programs mental agreement with China for bilateral concerns scientific collaboration on Earth re- space cooperation.23 sources. Chile has recently formed a space This competitive stance changed somewhat agency and has opened dialogue with NASA. In addition to the Cesar satellites, mentioned in 1998 after President Bill Clinton named above, the Fuerza Aerea de Chile (FACH) en Argentina the only “major non-NATO ally” in tered into a collaborative program with the Latin America.24 CONAE had already partici University of Surrey in the United Kingdom pated with NASA in the development of the to build the FASAT-1 scientific Earth-resources Satellite de Aplicaciones Cientifico (SAC) 28 25 microsatellite, launched in 1998. In 2002 microsatellites as a space-research project. As Chile opened discussions with the United Argentina continues to seek closer military ties States for a follow-on collaborative program with the United States, mainly through peace- in this scientific area. Initial discussions have keeping operations, its space program now occurred between the FACH and US Air Force appears more cooperative with that of the although future collaborative arrangements United States. Its plans to develop the Satel would include NASA and the new Chilean lites for Observation and Communications space agency.29 (SAOCOM)-1A radar satellite include Italy— Chile’s lightweight satellite (Lightsat) ini 26 another NATO ally of the United States. tiative has been discussed as a bilateral devel Also, the United States views the launch of opment by the United States and Chile. In Latinsat-A and -B by Aprize Satellite in 2002 June 2002, United States Strategic Command as a commercial endeavor with no national- offered to sponsor a joint microsatellite ex security implications.27 One reason the Ar periment with Chile. United States Southern gentine space program is now perceived as Command endorsed a proposal, and mem more pro–United States is that most funding bers of Strategic Command and the FACH ex- for programs with US competitors has largely changed visits in the summer of 2002. This stopped as a result of the government’s fiscal proposal has completed staff-to-staff coordi crisis and lingering economic problems. Con nation and is awaiting endorsement by the sidering its continuing links to competing, US Air Force’s Senior Steering Group for In non-US space programs, one can consider Ar ternational Space Cooperation.30 The program gentina both a US colleague and competitor. is consistent with Chile’s past involvement in 44 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 space initiatives insofar as it will continue to (MERCOSUR) and Andean Pact neighbors. gain technical expertise with space operations Brazil has generally served as the lead country but not commit itself to funding large budgets in proposing multilateral space programs or operating space systems over a long period with these countries, but, to date, their partici of time. Chile’s space program appears to be pation has involved little more than technical- changing from a competitive to more coopera interchange meetings.31 Their major interest tive relationship with the United States. in such programs is more academic and sci entific than political, economic, or military. Also, hard fiscal realities and other pressing Level One: Collaborators national priorities will likely mute their in Uruguay, Paraguay, and Peru participate in volvement as significant players in space pro- the space programs of other countries with- grams for many years to come. out developing stand-alone space capabilities Latin American countries with space pro- of their own. (One could argue that nearly grams have a largely collegial relationship every other Latin American country also fits with the United States (table 1) even though into this category.) These countries have not the latter has generally thwarted their missile allocated many resources to a space program developments and ignored their satellite tech and have no compelling national interests nology. Continuation of the current policy that would cause them to embark on one. does not serve long-term US national-security They are participants of convenience with interests since it could become a self-fulfilling others’ space programs and merit only pass prophecy by causing Latin American coun ing mention as interested parties. French tries once again to pursue space programs that Guiana is omitted from this list since it is a work more directly against those interests. “department” of the French government and One readily identifiable consequence of past not a sovereign country. US policy is the depth and breadth of contact Uruguay, Paraguay, and Peru have dis that has developed between countries in the cussed options for participating in space pro- region and China. Positioning China as the grams with their Mercado Comun del Sur dominant Latin American space partner does

Table 1

Summary of Findings

Level Country Priorities Status

Three: Owners and Brazil Imagery and Communications Mostly Competitor Operators

Mexico Communications Mostly Colleague

Two: Material Argentina Microsatellite Technology Moving from Competitor to Colleague

Chile Microsatellite Technology Moving from Competitor to Colleague

One: Collaborators Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru Academic Not Assessed LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WITH SPACE PROGRAMS 45 not serve US national-security interests. The tional Security Council, it appears that the United States should act now to forge more needed change may be taking place as a natu bilateral and multilateral ties with its Latin ral evolution of US policy. If the Chile Light- American neighbors, encourage Latin Ameri sat initiative is successful, then it should be- can space development, and integrate re come the model for cooperation and gional space aspirations with its own. Even integration between US and Latin American without a specific policy review by the Na- space programs.

Notes

1. English translation: Brazilian Complete Space Mission 16. Braun, “South American Space,” 16. (BCSM). 17. This refers to the development of the Abracos rainfall- 2. Frank Braun, “South American Space: The Brazilian Space monitoring satellite being developed with the United Kingdom. Program in Review,” Ad Astra, November–December 2002, 16. For a description of it, see the Instituto Nacional De Pesquisas 3. Ibid.; Marcio Nogueira Barbosa and Decio Castilho Ceballos, Espaciais’s Web site at http://www.inpe.br. “The Brazilian Observation Satellites,” Acta Astronautica 37 18. See the Satmex Web site at http://www.satmex.com.mx (1995): 505–7; and Decio Castilho Ceballos, “The Brazilian Space for a description of the Mexican satellites. For a description of Program: A Selective Strategy for Space Development and Busi Mexico’s domestic space market, visit http://www.tradeport.org/ ness,” Space Policy, August 1995, 203. ts/countries/mexico/isa/isar0055.html. 4. Brazil has an impressive record of producing its own small- 19. For a description of UNAMSAT-B, see UNAM’s Web site scale satellites, such as the Date Collection Satellites (SCD)-1, -2, at http://serpiente.dgsca.unam.mx/unamsat/unameng.htm. and -3, as well as the Brasilsats (B1, B2, B3, and B4). Brazil also 20. “Missile Proliferation Developments in Brazil and Ar plans to field remote-sensing satellites (SRR-1 and -2) and ECO-8 communication satellites in low earth orbit. gentina,” MIIS Seminar Series on Nonproliferation, 12 Decem 5. Barbosa and Ceballos, 505–7. ber 1991. 6. J. A. Neri et al., “The Brazilian Scientific Microsatellite 21. “Space Offers Fast Track to Technology Mainstream,” Avia­ SACI-1,” Acta Astronautica 39, nos. 9–12 (1996): 707–9. The tion Week and Space Technology, 4 March 1996, 49. United States provided a $4.6 million grant for SACI-1, launched 22. Taverna, 126. For more information, see the Cesar Web in 1999 by the Chinese along with the CBERS-1 satellite. site at http://quidel.inele.ufro.cl/cesar1. 7. R. Jeffery Smith, “U.S. Waives Objection to Russian Missile 23. Virtual Information Center, 22 May 2002, on-line, Inter- Technology Sale to Brazil,” Washington Post, 8 June 1995, A23, A27. net, 12 June 2003, available from http://www.vic-info.org. 8. Braun, 17. 24. See Presidential Determination no. 98-9, 6 January 1998, 9. Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, statement to the on-line, Internet, 12 June 2003, available from http://www.access. Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peace gpo.gov/su_docs/fedreg/a980126c.html. ful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE Three), 20 June 1999, on- 25. SAC-B (1996), SAC-A (1998), and SAC-C (2000) were all line, Internet, 12 June 2003, available from http://www.un.org/ launched successfully. For a description of SAC-A, see the NASA events/unispace3/speeches/20bra.htm. Web site at http://sspp.gsfc.nasa.gov/hh/saca/mission.html. 10. Frank Dirceu Braun, “Romancing the Skies,” Brazzil, Octo 26. For a description of SAOCOM-1A and other CONAE pro- ber 2002, on-line, Internet, 23 June 2003, available from http:// grams, see CONAE’s Web site at http://www.conae.gov.ar. www.brazzil.com/cvroct02.htm. 27. For a description of Latinsat, visit http://www.latintrade 11. A description of Fanhui Shi Weixing satellites is available satellite.com. For a description of Aprize satellite, visit http:// on-line at http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/military/imint/ www.aprizesat.com. index.html. 28. For a description of FASAT, visit http://www.fasat.cl. 12. Wei Long, “China, Brazil Continue Remote Sensing Co operation,” Space Daily, 28 September 2000. 29. Brig Gen Simon “Pete” Worden, SMC/TR, Los Angeles, 13. The 50-50 cost share and improved imaging performance Calif., to author, E-mail, subject: Latin American Space Programs, had been announced previously. Xinhua News Agency publicly 30 April 2003. released the formal start of the follow-on CBER-3/4 on 28 No 30. Lt Col Juan Berrios, US Embassy DATT staff, Santiago, vember 2002. Chile, to author, E-mail, subject: Latin American Space Programs, 14. Long. 19 March 2003; and Maj Jim Szczur, US Strategic Command, Col 15. Michael A. Taverna, “Pacts with China, Italy Spotlight orado Springs, Colo., to author, E-mail, subject: Latin American Latin American Space Ambitions,” Aviation Week and Space Tech­ Space Programs, 23 April 2003. nology, 9 October 2000, 125. 31. Taverna, 126. Robbie Risner CHARLES TUSTIN KAMPS

When the term American hero comes to mind, so does the name Robbie Ris­ ner. Born into modest cir cumstances in 1925 in Arkansas, James Robinson Risner enlisted in the US Army Air Forces in 1943. After getting his wings, he was assigned to duty in the Panama Canal Zone and thus missed the “action” of World War II, eventually pass ing into the Oklahoma Air Guard in 1946. His subse quent career, however, more than made up for this in- auspicious start. Captain Risner arrived in Korea in May of 1952. Flying F-86s with the 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing, he became an ace by downing five MiGs in less than four months. All told, he shot down eight communist jets before the end of the war. Becoming an ace fighter pilot is a great accomplishment, but Robbie Risner displayed courage and skill that went beyond tactical competence. aircraft artillery severely damaged his plane. Risner On 22 October 1952, he and Joe Logan, his wingman, nursed the stricken “Thud” to a safe landing at Da Nang, were screening a group of fighter-bombers close to the but the Thanh Hoa defenses got him during a return Yalu River and ended up penetrating Chinese airspace all visit on 16 September. On that day, Robbie Risner be- the way to Antung. Returning toward the Yalu after a low- came one of 104 American pilots shot down trying to level kill, the pair caught flak, and Logan’s jet was shot up drop the bridge over the course of the war, a fraternity badly. Losing fuel and hydraulic fluid, it would not be that includes such company as Jeremiah Denton and able to fly the 60 miles to the nearest air-sea rescue point. James Stockdale. Sizing up the situation, Risner had Logan shut down his Risner was a prisoner of war (POW) until 1973, spend engine while Risner nosed his own F-86 up to the tailpipe ing four and a half years of that time in solitary confine and literally pushed the crippled plane through the air at ment. As a POW, he uplifted his brother officers and 190 knots! In spite of this heroic effort, Risner’s friend served as an inspiration and example of leadership. After drowned after bailing out of the stricken F-86 and be- repatriation he received a promotion to brigadier general. coming entangled in the parachute lines. In his own words, “During my imprisonment the things Lieutenant Colonel Risner’s tour in Vietnam took a that sustained me to the greatest extent were my faith in decidedly different—and longer—turn. Flying F-105s with God, the American people, my commander in chief, my the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Korat, Thailand, fellow POWs, and my wonderful wife. I never lost hope, he was leading a strike against North Vietnam’s infamous and never did I despair of coming back alive. . . . We Thanh Hoa Bridge on 3 April 1965, when fire from anti- came back stronger, better men.”

To Learn More . . . Frisbee, John L. “When Push Came to Shove.” Air Force Magazine 66, no. 12 (December 1983). On-line. Internet, 24 June 2003. Available from http://www.afa.org/magazine/valor/1283valor_print.html. Hammel, Eric M., ed. The American Aces Speak. Vol. 5, Aces in Combat. Pacifica, Calif.: Pacifica Press, 1998. Risner, Robinson. The Passing of the Night: My Seven Years as a Prisoner of the North Vietnamese. Duncanville, Tex.: World Wide Printing, 1999. Air Editorial Abstract: Nearly a decade of in- creasing globalization has reached Africa Expeditionary in fits and starts, leaving a legacy of social tensions, poverty, disease, and conflict. US Access national-security strategy hinges on deal­ ing with such conditions in an appropriate The African Connection manner. For air and space power, a com­ prehensive access plan becomes a critical COL BRIAN K. HALL, USAF component for success.

We cannot predict where the next Desert Shield will occur. It could easily be in a place where we have no troops and no infrastructure—no bases or support systems in place. We will have to take with us everything that we need, including shelter, maintenance facilities, hospitals, and food and water. —Lt Gen Michael A. Nelson, USAF “Aerospace Forces and Power Projection”

S THE STRATEGIC access the United other areas at Africa’s expense. Not only was States attained in Africa during the Operation Desert Shield successful and monu 1980s possible today after more than a mental at leveraging access in the Middle East, decade of foreign-policy neglect? Access but also it validated US airpower doctrine and Iremains somewhat constant or is increasing emerging joint-warfare concepts. Moreover, on four of the world’s five major continents. transformational concepts were reflected in The one region at highest risk from reduced the Air Force’s new concept-of-operations ini US engagement is sub-Saharan Africa.1 The tiative. The greatest lesson learned from Desert United States has chosen to concentrate in Shield is that no future crisis will be handled

47 48 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 successfully without the continued access of 1994, does the US public turn its attention to the Air Force’s expeditionary forces. The wide Africa. Just one year earlier, the American access enjoyed during that operation made media graphically filled television sets with the possible the decisiveness of Operation Desert Somalia disaster, which undoubtedly reduced Storm. The Air Force has mastered most of both subsequent coverage and US direct- the intricate facets of major expeditionary assistance programs. warfare; nevertheless, rapid-deployment opera Over the last 10 years, experience has proven tions in response to small-scale contingencies, that air expeditionary deployment to Africa humanitarian-assistance operations, and peace- remains an immature science—one that fol support operations remain relatively ad hoc lows a neglected foreign policy. Oftentimes, because they are more reactionary than de- innovative airmen applied artful solutions to liberate. Much remains to be done to refine contend with the unique challenges posed by our nation’s rapid-deployment capability in what can still be considered the “Dark Conti support of foreign-policy objectives. nent.” Oddly enough, due to the limited pres According to The National Security Strategy ence of US government agencies in Africa, (NSS) of 2002, “the presence of American airmen became our nation’s ambassadors of forces overseas is one of the most profound goodwill in areas cut off from normal diplo symbols of the U.S. commitment to allies and matic channels and limited activities of non- friends.”2 The NSS also emphasizes how US governmental organizations (NGO). The ne forces must prepare for more such deploy cessity of perfecting air expeditions to contend ments by developing assets and capabilities with low-end conflicts will not diminish any- reflective of expeditionary forces. At the high time soon. In fact, it is more likely that out-of- end of conflict, regional combatant command area-based forces will see more frequent expe ers will require forces to bring unique capa ditionary deployments as our nation contends bilities to the fight and will expect those forces with the pervasive global war on terrorism, a to be combat ready upon arrival in-theater. fight that may well take this nation and its allies Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) stands deep into Africa. The sub-Saharan region has as an example of a nonstandard mix of air become a proverbial breeding ground of human and ground assets joining the fight against suffering caused by pandemic HIV/AIDS; terrorism without an abundance of doctrinal ethnic, religious, and political unrest; natural guidance—thus providing a lucid example of disasters; and failed states—all of which create transformation. Henceforth, we will need this an environment ripe for terrorist proliferation. type of creativity and innovation to contend Afghanistan and Somalia have shown that with strategic uncertainty and asymmetric en where anarchy and radicalism run rampant, gagement worldwide. so does terrorism. In order to counter the Africa may well serve as the proving ground spread of these maladies, the United States for transformational concepts, methods, and must establish access with select, promising capabilities. That continent provides a great African nations. challenge to the ability of the United States to This article concentrates on access as the project forces to a region often overlooked enabler of the military, economic, and diplo because of the magnitude of ongoing crises in matic elements of US power projection. It dis the Balkans, Middle East, and Korean Penin cusses the strategic importance of access as a sula. The American public has been subjected means of demonstrating soft-power projec to unrelenting media attention towards those tion;3 addresses how regional, operational areas. But Africa has been overlooked as scarce strategies for cooperation create greater ac national resources and advocacy were directed cess, albeit not without significant challenges; to areas of greater vital interest to the United and identifies emerging concepts of assuring States. Not until cataclysmic tragedy strikes, as access to show how the United States can best occurred in Rwanda during the summer of prepare for future air expeditions into Africa. AIR EXPEDITIONARY ACCESS 49

The Strategic Importance of with overwhelming power, peace and stability reign since there is little point in declaring war Global Access against such a state. Political scientist Robert In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by Gilpin has argued that “Pax Britannica and side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. Pax Americana, like Pax Romana, ensured an This threatens both a core value of the United international system of relative peace and se States—preserving human dignity—and our curity.”6 Unlike the Britain of the past, which strategic priority—combating global terror. controlled a global empire, America possesses a large, self-sustaining home economy and —National Security Strategy, 2002 has the ability to project great soft power (the art of diplomacy, transparent military coopera The NSS notes that, “together with our Euro tion, and economic reform) to all corners of pean allies, we must help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capability the globe. Thus, the United States is more apt to secure porous borders, and help build up to send food and medical supplies than a the law enforcement and intelligence infra man-of-war to Africa. structure to deny havens for terrorists.”4 We Power projection and access go hand in cannot realize these goals without significant hand. In this article, air expedition becomes power projection and sustainment to a conti the means of power projection, and access is nent of immense size and diversity. The US/ its enabler. But one has to peel back the dis African regional-security strategy must respect cussion of national power another layer or multilateral alliances while preparing bilat two to adequately portray the type of power eral engagements that build confidence and best suited to project towards Africa. Of strengthen assured access. course, the United States must always be pre- The administration of President George W. pared to exercise both military and economic Bush clearly recognizes that it must focus its hard power to induce other parties to change attention on South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and their positions. Major force deployments and Ethiopia as anchor states for regional-security economic sanctions are two examples of the cooperation. Yet, other regional players also compelling projection of hard power, which deserve recognition for maintaining good is relatively easy to use when access is pre governance and implementing responsible, dictable and overseas presence extensive. A democratic political systems—namely Ghana, large, permanent US presence and invest Gabon, Mali, and Senegal. The administra ment (military and economic) in Europe, the tion’s policy towards regional-security cooper Pacific, and the Middle East demonstrate ation recognizes these states, as it does the America’s willingness to use hard power. But entire Sahel. Indeed, the Pan-Sahel Initiative one can exercise power indirectly: that is, a is the most recent cooperative effort spun off country can obtain desired outcomes in from the global war on terrorism.5 Budding world politics because other countries admire democracies have granted US requests for ac its values, emulate its example, aspire to its cess to counter emerging crises. We will need level of prosperity and openness, and there- assured access to shore up rapid response fore want to follow it.7 once conflict flares, as it has recently in Soft power is more than persuasion or the Liberia and numerous times in Africa over ability to move people by argument.8 The the last decade. United States would be in dire straits if it lost Striving to balance global power as it de the ability to shape the international landscape velops new national-security strategies, the by credibly projecting hard and soft power. United States finds itself in a unique hege America’s hegemony comes into play less monic position. From a classic political per often when its soft power is strong and associ spective, this is not necessarily bad because if ated with the tenets of benevolence and one nation dominates the international arena human dignity. 50 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

Africa is ripe for soft-power engagement. position, and sustain these forces. Rapid global Great hard-power resources, such as those in- mobility demonstrates an improved ability to vested in the Middle East, Europe, and the support operations with a smaller force and Pacific, are not needed in Africa. Soft-power footprint while transiting distances in mini- projection will go a long way towards securing mum time. ACS, which begins well before de vital American interests. Credible projectors ployment, provides many capabilities crucial to of soft power include Canada, the Nether- successful beddown and sustainment, includ lands, Norway, and Sweden, each of which ing readying the force; assessing, planning, has political clout that vastly exceeds its mili and posturing for employment; tailoring and tary and economic weight. All four nations in- preparing for movement, deployment, and corporate attractive soft implements such as reception; employing effectively; and sustain economic aid and peacekeeping assets into ing appropriate levels of support for theater their definition of national interests, thereby operations.9 negating the necessity for costly hard power. Although these concepts and capabilities Limited objectives allow for exclusive soft- sound promising, nonstate entities preparing power foreign policies. for conflict with the United States will seek to Interestingly, governments are not the only capitalize on the great distances US forces must wielders of soft power. US industries and travel to engage them. Those evasive enemies NGOs develop their own soft power, which realize all too well the near-absolute reliance might either complement or compete with of of the United States on unimpeded access to ficial foreign policy. But there is no room for and use of airfields and bases in the potential 10 friction between players when scarce resources theater of conflict. In today’s environment are better applied by collaborative efforts that of crisis action, quickly getting in-theater is as assure widespread access—a classic, symbiotic important as what one does after forces ar soft-power relationship. In Africa, competing rive. The Bush administration’s greatest con unilateral efforts tend not to survive. From the cern for the projection of military power to onset, complementary private and public co Africa is establishing select sites that form the greatest foothold once the boots hit the operation has a greater impact and longer- 11 lasting effects. For that reason, the US military ground. plays a substantial role in transporting, dis tributing, and supporting the wares of many The Difficulties of African Access NGOs and official government programs. There are ways to assure that all US interests For the Armed Forces, troubled states and in Africa are safely supportable and, if neces transnational threats will probably occupy an sary, introduced in-theater via expeditionary, increasing amount of their time in the future, global-mobility, and rapid-response task forces. further complicating existing OPTEMPO Little difference exists in the planning, exe problems. The ethnic, tribal, and religious ex­ cuting, and sustaining of air expeditionary tremism revived by the end of the Cold War task forces for other-than-major conflicts. Al gives no indication of abating. though their scope and character are vastly —Hans Binnendijk different, the strength of air expeditionary “A Strategic Assessment task forces lies in the transformational capa of the 21st Century” bilities of each. In Africa, the potential for rapid global Globalization is the child of US foreign mobility and agile combat support (ACS), re policy. In the most rudimentary terms, glob inforced with distributed command and con alization is a worldwide network of interde- trol capabilities, is perfect for future area op pendence.12 So intertwined is globalization erations. Air expeditionary forces (most likely with world economies, societies, environments, part of a joint task force) will rapidly move, and defense that some members of the world AIR EXPEDITIONARY ACCESS 51 community have become dependent upon vulnerable due to a gap in rapid US military the more endowed nations for vital suste assistance traditionally performed by Marine nance. Africa is the norm rather than the ex expeditionary units afloat in the South Atlantic ception insofar as it receives substantial per and Indian Oceans. Although strategic- and centages of official development assistance tactical-airlift assets of the US Air Force have from developed nations: France (43 percent), flown extensively in Africa, these missions Germany (28 percent), Italy (69 percent), must contend with the danger of nonstandard United Kingdom (35 percent), and United operations, limited access, and degraded ca States (15.4 percent).13 As a percentage of pabilities. total, worldwide foreign assistance, the US Today, Enduring Freedom sets the stage contribution is deceptive; actually, it repre for future deployments of air expeditionary sents more than $2.1 billion of committed forces. Lessons learned from the expedi funds in 2003. tionary methods and processes used to bed The hub-and-spoke metaphor fits military down air assets at Bagram and Kandahar, globalism more closely than economic, envi Afghanistan, and in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, pro ronmental, or social globalism because Ameri vided the practical environment to test and can dominance is so much greater in that do- 14 standardize the laydown of air expeditionary main. So globally entrenched is American forces.15 The deliberate planning, task orga military dominance that less capable nations nization, and ACS necessary to ensure safe, lean on bilateral security agreements to fill supportable beddown should be captured as their own defense gaps. In order to ensure via the standard for future air expeditions. Com bility, the United States negotiates assured ac bining OEF lessons learned with years of fly cess via these mutual agreements, a process ing air operations in Africa provides a base- that leads to every possible forward-basing op line that should set the standard for the tion—from “fortress Europe” installations to re- beddown and basing of air expeditionary mote stations in forgotten corners of the globe. forces in any corner of the globe. Although significant US forces remain in Eu Any contingency operation will entail an rope, the Middle East, and the Western Pacific, force drawdowns over the last 15 years have left inherent amount of uncertainty. However, the significant gaps in overseas presence. fact that the future remains uncertain is no excuse for failing to make adequate prepara- This unequal distribution of military hard 16 and soft power in preindustrial and industrial tions. Any major operation begins with thor parts of the world has taken its toll in very short ough strategic-campaign planning, which rec order. What had been a modest US military- ognizes that success depends upon bedding cooperation program in strategic locations down all the implements of warfare in opti such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Somalia, mal locations. Force beddown is the responsi Sudan, and Zaire was all but ended by the late bility of the regional combatant commander, 1980s. Over the last decade, US military pres whose staff must account for the specific bed- ence was reduced to nothing more than lim down requirements of its air component once ited airlift operations supporting diplomatic the total number and type of aircraft are missions, minor exercises and exercise-related known. According to joint doctrine, each ser construction, port calls, and sparse special- vice component is responsible for its own de forces training and familiarization (focused ployment and sustainment. The combatant on the Horn of Africa). command must approve initial and subse As limited Navy and Marine assets become quent beddown, if applicable, to ensure not tied down with current and projected hot only supportability and force protection, but spots in the eastern Mediterranean, Persian also—and most importantly—the maximum Gulf, and Indian and Pacific littoral, the west, attainable power projection in the least amount central, and southern parts of Africa become of time. 52 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

Of equal importance, access is a funda African operations, deployment and employ mental facet of combat-support planning be- ment degradation, and ill-defined exit strate cause it is inextricably tied to logistics and gies. National political as well as joint military force protection. If logistics is the lifeblood of and service planning all warn of the inherent airpower, then access to air bases is the skele dangers associated with operating in proximity ton and internal organs through which the to or through adversary states and nonstate ac blood flows.17 The need for air bases to em- tors. These groups will use increasingly avail- ploy land-based airpower effectively has been able weapons and subversion to affect our will essential since the beginning of forward air and ability to conduct vital African military operations. Recently, expeditionary air opera operations, leaving twenty-first-century Africa tions have experienced growing pains, the with conditions antithetical to US interests. first notable problems inevitably resulting Political unrest, ethnic and religious fighting, from nonoptimal operations. pandemic health disasters, and corruption Aside from distance, preindustrial Africa is make strategic cooperation tenuous at best. In rife with other unique access challenges to a continent oozing with porous borders ideal the projection of air expeditionary forces. For for undetected, transnational terrorist move example, among the 286 larger African air- ment, antiaccess operations are not only plau ports or airfields currently included in Air sible, but also probable in today’s emerging Mobility Command’s Airfield Suitability and security lexicon. Restrictions Report (ASRR) of May 2000, only Add to this volatility unpredictable sup- 84 percent of major military-surveyed airports port, erratic air-traffic control and communi can support C-130 aircraft operations (the cations (both ground and airborne), and smallest US Air Force tactical transport).18 questionable security, and it is no wonder that The C-17, designed for better worldwide de US commercial air carriers deliberately stay ployment with greater payload/range and re away from Africa. Nothing disturbs an aviator quiring at least 4,000-foot improved runways, more than operating in an environment that can land in less than 65 percent of ASRR- lacks the staples taken for granted in the rest listed major African airfields.19 The bulk of of the world. Air expeditionary planning, op missions flown into Africa over the last 20 erations, logistics, support, and medical as years used C-130 and C-141 airframes—not sumptions standard on the other four major the strategically valuable C-17, 87 of which continents have been hit or miss over the past were delivered to the US Air Force for global decade or more in Africa. movement of personnel and equipment.20 In Operation Guardian Assistance—the hu addition to the shortage of suitable runways, manitarian-assistance operation conducted in limitations concerning such factors as flight 1996, two years after the atrocities in Rwanda— safety, available support and fuel on the provides a representative example of problems ground, and airfield security compound to that plagued US forces attempting to establish defeat the advantage of the C-17’s capability airhead operations. Because lack of fuel stor to provide worldwide response when that asset age and mobile refuelers limited overall fuel is already stretched to the limit supporting throughput, strategic aircraft sucked so much round-the-clock operations in the Middle East fuel that the rate of consumption seriously af and Central Asia. fected other sequential locations along the fuel Ten significant expeditionary airlift opera lines and often cascaded into adjacent coun tions have occurred in Africa over the last 10 tries. Airfield facilities, as well as navigational years, including peacekeeping and enforce aids and procedures, did not meet US stan ment operations, noncombatant evacuation dards designed to assure flight safety. The lack operations, and humanitarian-assistance opera of current and complete airfield surveys tions. All of them generated lessons learned forced last-minute surveys that risked captur that reflected the difficulties of planning for ing incomplete, critical data that put aircrews, AIR EXPEDITIONARY ACCESS 53 passengers, and cargo in peril. At times air- Availability and operability access became crews were restricted to daytime visual-flight significant challenges at Ganci Air Base (AB) conditions to conduct operations. Onboard at the Manas Airport, Kyrgyzstan.21 Here, need inertial navigation and global positioning sys superseded cost as access to air bases in Cen tems, as well as aviation-chart visual confirma tral Asia became preeminent during the first tion, became the directed methods to navigate weeks of OEF, and the physical challenge of the vast, blacked-out African distances. availability and operability outweighed other Before undertaking the next inevitable air limited options. Manas Airport required sig expedition to Africa, the United States must nificant infrastructure improvements and ad ensure that properly qualified personnel con ditional major construction to handle a mod trol the operations. When an attendant air erate strategic-airlift throughput (it had and space operations center (AOC) is task- enough ramp space to park only four C-17 or organized, depending upon the joint task force C-5 transports).22 The price of access is high mission (in Africa most air expeditions are at Manas: the US military is expected to airlift oriented), it must have people with air- pump more than $40 million annually into lift expertise. AOC resident personnel in the the weak local economy.23 air mobility division maintain the qualifications We must not overlook opportunities for needed for most African missions, but dedi potential force beddowns and adequate basing cated load planners must be added to the joint in Africa. Understandably, this investment may manning document. Stripping load planners come in many forms, often costing more than from overworked tanker airlift-control ele monetary reimbursement to a host nation. The ments is not the solution. political cost of opening contingency-base ac The US Air Force faces a critical physical cess can mark the beginning of a long-term challenge—specifically, availability and oper relationship built on the foundation of nego ability—in basing expeditionary forces. Avail- tiations. For example, in Turkey, the United ability, as applied to access, refers to using the States colocated operating-base employment best possible airfields for operating bases in at Incirlik AB, beginning in 1954. It started as the employment of airpower. Nations will grant a forward refueling and supply base in a re- the best physical access to US forces when it is mote location, very similar to places from in their best interests to do so, with economic which the United States has operated in Africa. return the predominant consideration and That’s 49 years of growing US presence from a availability a secondary concern. If the price single expeditionary base. is right, availability becomes a moot point. This is not to suggest that engagement To the airman, operability refers to using with Africa should mature to a sub-Saharan an airfield at peak efficiency in support of as- Incirlik. But the time for action has arrived. signed aircraft. The airfields necessary to sus Security cooperation in Africa comes at sub tain modern aircraft employment require stantial savings compared to the situations in tremendous infrastructure to support today’s Europe and Central Asia. The scope of technologically sophisticated weapon systems. African initiatives is a fraction of those associ The dilemma of modern airpower is that it ated with OEF. Waiting until the beginning of tends to come with a very large footprint on the hostilities or crisis response to initiate beddown ground. Oftentimes, the forward airfield re- actions will delay the full effectiveness of ex quires significant infrastructure improvements peditionary airpower. Preemptive engagement in order to accommodate long-term deploy can lead to assured access when we need rapid ments. Then again, a Desert Storm combat global-mobility beddown. beddown in Africa is unlikely. We are more apt This discussion has concentrated on air ex to see force laydowns similar to the OEF model. peditionary beddown; sustainment of those Certainly cost will be a factor in establishing as forces is crucial to prolonged operations. A sured access according to US standards. network of efficient and effective in-theater 54 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 distribution points must quickly link forward beddown and basing information in its con forces to the lifeline attached to the conti cept of operations. Having current data and nental United States.24 Generation and main preapproved expeditionary sites is the basis of tenance repair must be secured because they US Air Forces in Europe’s (USAFE) preap are key to sustained operations. proved expeditionary deployment sites (PEDS) In a crisis situation, the time spent deploy concept.27 ing forces and ACS is the mitigating factor in The United States can ill afford to waste decision making with regard to basing. De valuable deployment planning on extensive ployment to a robust base significantly im unilateral negotiations as in Central Asia and proves security options and missions spanning the Middle East. The need for preplanned, the spectrum of conflict. Beddown to an aus preapproved airfields for US aircraft was iden tere location hinders responsiveness because tified in the Government Audit Office’s report of conflicting resource requirements between on Kosovo air operations. Canceling of the making air base improvements and sustaining colocated operating-base concept in the mid- operations; such a scenario detracts from the 1990s left a strategic gap in assured US access to expeditionary nature of the emerging global- potential hot spots in USAFE’s area of respon mobility concept of operations. sibility (which includes 41 of the 54 African na tions). USAFE had to come up with a concept to rectify the reduction from 25 to eight per Recommendations manently accessible airfields in-theater—none Prepare for the location to which you are of which are on the African continent. going, take the right people and equipment, The PEDS concept is based upon require get there early to oversee the establishment of ments. Thus, US European Command must base support, build rapport with host nation use the recent NSS and follow-on foreign-policy commanders, work within the theater com­ guidance to define the soft-power projection mand structure for personnel issues and sus­ requirements of selective sub-Saharan access. tainment of forces. Ghana, Gabon, Mali, and Senegal are all credi ble PEDS candidates because they show rela —Maj Gen Roger A. Brady, USAF tive political stability and an overt willingness to “Building and Commanding support the United States in the global war on Expeditionary Units” terrorism. The strategic locations of these four nations amply fit the hub-and-spoke require Given a joint force commander’s strategic ment for joint US air expeditionary operations. appreciation of the political, economic, mili Upon concept approval by US European tary, and social forces affecting access, and as Command and the Department of Defense, suming that the strategic and operational ob PEDS preliminary-agreement negotiations jectives needed to accomplish the mission are would set the ball in motion. Specifically, they understood by the components, one of the would initiate host-nation concept approval for first considerations for concrete planning be- 25 US beddown and operations of a specific air- comes beddown and basing. Preparing force field for specific types of aircraft and expedi beddown involves conveying to the supported tionary support. After host-nation approval, combatant commander the best estimate of negotiated agreements must include the fol the air-component planning requirements and lowing: future operational assessment. Accurately as sessing support capabilities and infrastructure 1. Status-of-forces-agreement permission is critical to the US Air Force’s agility because for deployed US military and US con- it allows planners to determine support re tractors. quirements and properly tailor force pack- 2. US contracting practices. ages.26 Also, the strategy division of the air component’s AOC must incorporate force 3. Tax relief. AIR EXPEDITIONARY ACCESS 55

4.� Base facilities available for use by expe directly addresses the concept of combined- ditionary forces. arms integration to maximize the effects of an air and ground task force—the forebear of 5. Host-nation support. today’s joint task force. Marine survival de 6.� US payment for facility use, repairs and pends upon full integration of capabilities, as upgrades, and services received.28 will the joint forces that join in tomorrow’s se curity challenges. As we learned through OEF negotiations, Another point worth pondering involves standing arrangements—such as the memo taking advantage of time. Why deploy into randum of understanding (MOU) for poten tial airfield utilization—accelerate force bed- austere locations if time is available and if ro down and, more importantly, can activate a host bust major operating bases are accessible? nation’s force-protection plan well in advance Again, preemptive air expeditionary concepts, of reception. This simple consideration hastens such as PEDS, provide significant capability to the employment of expeditionary forces. sustain protracted military operations. The Minimal resource allocation to improve a decision to commit resources is difficult to re- host nation’s facility assures our access partner call once initiated. US planners and combat- of US commitment that previously was just a ant commanders must realize that power pro signature on an MOU regarding the joint use jection is not easily reversible. We must of designated air bases. Seeing the implemen implement the best options because the speed tation of MOU technical arrangements in such of decisive airpower employment will outrun areas as personnel and equipment beddown in the ability to reposition a poorly conceived forward locations, initiation of local contract concept of basing. services, and facility improvement/new construc As Sebastian Mallaby remarked in the tion bolsters good relations that pay big divi Washington Post, “The paradox of American dends when forces arrive in the host country. power at the end of this millennium is that it Enough cannot be said about paying at is too great to be challenged by any other tention to details in a noncrisis mode. Timely state, yet not great enough to solve problems supply routes and methods can be activated such as global terrorism and nuclear prolifer and tested in advance of the deployment of ation.”29 Although he made this statement expeditionary forces. In essence, this provides prior to 11 September 2001, it still rings true. an opportunity for ACS to rehearse critical Unfortunately, the war against nonstate play tasks. Most importantly, force protection can be ers will gravitate to a point where the advan assessed and deficiencies identified and cor tage goes to the terrorist. Africa promises to rected without risking loss of life or equipment. be such a haven, for it overflows with wide- spread poverty and unemployment that create idle masses attracted to anything that prom Conclusion ises financial gain and greater self-esteem. The This article has emphasized the transfor unfamiliar landscape of sub-Saharan Africa can mation of the US Air Force from deploying be bounded only by greater American pres cumbersome, large-footprint air packages ence—and that can occur only with assured (poorly synchronized with other services’ access to well-planned and capable airfields power projection) to rapidly deployable ex that enable hub-and-spoke operations to re- peditionary airpower tailored to meet over- mote areas ripe for subversion. The plan of seas rapid response. The Air Force can learn access presented here is a step in the right di much from the Marine Corps, which has long rection. America’s door to Africa will remain had a true appreciation for expeditionary- open as long as US interests remain focused force employment and, indeed, embodies the and funded. Soft-power projection is the word expeditionary. Marine combat doctrine goal—air expeditionary access is the key. 56 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

Notes

1. Henceforth, this article will refer to sub-Saharan Africa as 13. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Africa. North Africa, composed of the littoral Mediterranean na Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues (Washington, D.C.: Government tions, does not pose as great a challenge to air expeditionary op Printing Office, 3 December 2002), 9. erations because the United States has fostered long-lasting rela 14. Ibid. tions and access to colocated operating bases during contingencies; 15. “Summary—Ganci AB at Manas, Kyrgyzstan,” JULL no. these bases receive periodic attention during binational and 02403-56195 (unclassified), Air Force Center for Knowledge Sharing, multinational exercises. Lessons Learned, 4 December 2001, on-line, Internet, 9 June 2003, 2. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America available from https://afknowledge.langley.af.mil/afcks/Search/ (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 2002), JULLsrch.asp. 29, on-line, Internet, 9 June 2003, available from http://www. 16. Lt Col Karen U. Kwiatkowski, Expeditionary Air Operations whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. in Africa: Challenges and Solutions (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univer 3. Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the sity Press, December 2001), 13. World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (New York: Oxford Uni 17. Julian Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed versity Press, 2002), 8. Conflict (London: Brassey’s Ltd., 1991), 3–5. 4. National Security Strategy, 10. 18. Kwiatkowski, 13. 5. Briefing, Steve Metz, subject: Africa and Future US Policies 19. Ibid. and Strategies, USAF Air War College, 20 February 2003. 20. Boeing Corporation, C-17 Globemaster III, 19 March 2003, 6. Quoted in Nye, 15. on-line, Internet, 9 June 2003, available from http://www. 7. Ibid., 8. boeing.com/defense-space/military/c17/flash.html. 8. Ibid., 9. 21. “Summary—Ganci AB.” 9. Draft briefing, Headquarters USAF/XOXS, subject: Air 22. John Hendren, “Beddown in Bishkek,” Air Force Magazine, and Space Expeditionary CONOPS, September 2002. July 2002, 58. 10. US Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary 23. Ibid. of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Final Report of the De­ 24. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-4, Combat Sup- fense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security (Washing- port, 22 November 1999, 15. ton, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 25. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 13-1AOC, Operational Proce­ and Technology, December 1999), on-line, Internet, 9 June 2003, dures—Aerospace Operations Center, 1 July 2002, 18. available from http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/globalization.pdf. 26. Ibid., 11. 11. Briefing, Dr. Cindy Courville, deputy assistant national se 27. US Air Forces in Europe, Pre-Approved Expeditionary De­ curity advisor for African affairs, National Security Council, subject: ployment Sites (PEDS) Concept, 13 January 2003. The NSC and Foreign Policy, USAF Air War College, 23 January 28. Ibid. 2003. 29. Sebastian Mallaby, “A Mockery in the Eyes of the World,” 12. Nye, 8. Washington Post, 31 January 1999, B5. Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance Developing Training Partnerships for the Future of Africa

COL RUSSELL J. HANDY, USAF

Editorial Abstract: Shifting the emphasis from direct US involvement in African peacekeeping toward support for the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance program promises to create an “African solution for Africa.” The program builds upon the African Crisis Response Initiative by rein- forcing training packages, including peace-enforcement training.

FRICA IS A continent of immense the end of the tunnel. As fledgling govern- social diversity, rich in human and ments struggle to hold on to order and sta natural resources. Regrettably, its bility, various groups undoubtedly will continue history has been marred by images to challenge their rule. Thus, the requirement ofA governmental corruption, failed states, and for competent and capable peacekeeping and shattered economies. The collapse of appar- peace-enforcement forces remains strong. ent “bright spots” such as Côte d’Ivoire sug- How extensively should the United States gests the presence of only a very dim light at involve itself in African peacekeeping? Since

57 58 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 it has at least peripheral interest in ensuring ment in Africa undoubtedly contributed to that the continent doesn’t disintegrate, the Clinton administration’s reluctance to should America directly participate in these enter Rwanda in 1994. The absence of timely operations or find ways to help Africans help US support in the early stages of the genocide themselves? The administration of President that occurred there lingers in the memories George W. Bush clearly favors the latter op of many African leaders. tion. Funding for direct US involvement in The looming crisis in Burundi in 1996 African peacekeeping is on the decline—from acted as a catalyst for the United States to en- $31 million in fiscal year 2003 to a projected gage more actively in African operations. In $9 million in 2004.1 Conversely, forecasts for the aftermath of Rwanda, influential leaders the Africa Contingency Operations Training on the continent and the international com Assistance (ACOTA) program call for fund munity sought ways for African nations to ing to increase from $10 to $15 million over tackle their problems effectively without con the same period. stantly requiring help from the United States Is the United States getting the most for its or other Western nations.3 Initially, America money from ACOTA? Evidence indicates that offered assistance by suggesting the creation ACOTA has instituted some beneficial changes of an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF)— to its predecessor—the African Crisis Response an indigenous African military force, trained Initiative (ACRI). This article argues that the and equipped with the help of the US mili United States should continue to support tary, available for deployment to trouble spots ACOTA, redouble its follow-up efforts to mea on the continent. This concept seemed to sure effectiveness, and initiate the formation offer a perfect way for the United States to help of training partnerships with key African na prevent a repeat of a Rwanda- or Somalia-type tions, beginning with South Africa. It briefly catastrophe while minimizing the number of reviews ACRI’s history, describes the Bush ad- US boots on the ground. Given the frequency ministration’s design for ACOTA to improve of such contingencies and Africa’s interest in upon ACRI’s success, outlines the potential for more effectively handling its own problems, US-African partnerships, and offers recom ACRF seemed a logical approach to avoiding mendations for implementation. the severity of future Rwanda-style scenarios. Unfortunately, ACRF was not well received by most African nations. When Warren Background Christopher, then the US secretary of state, The United States experienced few suc went to Africa in October 1996 to present the cesses with its involvement in African peace- idea, many of the implementation details re keeping operations during the early 1990s. mained incomplete.4 Additionally, African Public perceptions of Rwanda and Somalia leaders were troubled that the United States put the administration of President Bill Clinton had not consulted them, and the unsolicited between a rock and a hard place with regard offer of a US-trained standing military force to the scope of US involvement on the conti may have created anxiety about the prospect nent. Prior to Somalia, the United States had of American “imperialism” reminiscent of re- taken a more active role in African peace- cent European colonial history. Finally, many keeping, but American attitudes toward opera African leaders felt that ACRF did not appro tions in Africa took a drastic turn for the priately recognize the burgeoning influence worse on 3 October 1993—a fateful day for of regional agencies such as the Organization US forces. President Clinton’s subsequent of African Unity. Presidential Decision Directive 25 made it very Committed to salvaging the ACRF concept clear that the United States was not interested and resolving the objections to it, the United in an expanded role in African peacekeeping.2 States formed an interagency working group America’s renewed timidity toward involve in early 1997. Led by Marshall McCallie, for- AFRICA CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRAINING ASSISTANCE 59 mer US ambassador, the group recommended tuted to resolve three key ACRI shortfalls: (1) softening the objectives of the initiative, fo lack of appropriately tailored packages, (2) cusing on the long-term capability of African perishable nature of the training, and (3) ab peacekeeping forces, and crafting a relation- sence of peace-enforcement training. ship with the United Nations (UN).5 Conse ACOTA architects intend to add substan quently, ACRF evolved into ACRI, a plan that tial specificity to their recipient nations’ pro- aimed to enhance the peacekeeping capability grams. Peacekeeping requirements vary greatly of military forces from a number of African among African nations, so any training or nations, which would retain operational con equipment provided must be carefully planned trol of their units.6 The facelift proved suc to meet the recipient’s needs. Initial ACRI cessful: by mid-1997, seven African countries training provided by US special forces was had signed up for eight battalions to be conducted using the same basic syllabus for trained under ACRI.7 each country. According to Theresa Whelan, After ACRI’s inception, US military and director of the Office of African Affairs for contractor personnel trained nearly 9,000 the US Office of the Secretary of Defense, the troops from eight African nations under the existence of a “fixed curriculum” was a glar 8 program. Their training entailed all aspects ing ACRI deficiency.12 Scott Fisher of the US of tactical- and operational-level peacekeep Department of State Interagency Group on ing tasks, including interaction with a variety ACOTA acknowledged that the same basic of nongovernmental organizations. Units program of instruction was used for all recipi with ACRI-trained soldiers participated in at ent nations, albeit “tweaked” by the on-scene least nine peacekeeping operations during 9 battalion commander to meet individual re the initiative’s five-year history. After con quirements of each military.13 ducting the initial training, US teams re- Greg Engle, director of the Office of Re turned every six months to help develop in gional and Security Affairs at the US Depart digenous sustainment capability within the 10 ment of State, contends that “tailoring of in host-nation units. From the outset, America dividualized programs is a key difference” intended the program to serve a dual pur between ACOTA and ACRI.14 ACOTA’s train pose—make a “present impact” on existing ing packages are formalized and vetted dur conflicts and build long-term capacity to en- ing detailed planning conferences conducted gage in future crises.11 prior to the first training event. Training is matched to the individual operational require ACOTA:ACRI for the ments of the recipient, and equipment deliv ered as part of the package is specifically Twenty-First Century adapted to a country’s blueprint.15 For example, The Bush administration’s plan for build ACOTA personnel spent two weeks in Ethiopia ing peacekeeping capacity in Africa closely re in February 2003 during the second meeting sembles President Clinton’s ACRI program. with that nation to lay the groundwork for a ACOTA, the new program, retains most of tailored program. Two planning conferences the components of ACRI. On the surface, were completed with Kenya in February and the changes appear cosmetic, merely “de- May 2003 to lay similar groundwork for that Clintonizing” the program for the new ad- country’s program, which began in June ministration by changing its name. A closer 2003. Clearly, ACOTA puts much more em examination, however, reveals a few key dis phasis on training packages designed ex tinctions between the two. The US Depart pressly for the customer. ment of State fine-tuned ACOTA’s objectives The second area targeted for improvement in several areas to capitalize upon lessons under ACOTA involved the challenge of creat learned from its five-year experience with ing an enduring peacekeeping capacity in the ACRI. Most notable were modifications insti recipient nations. Despite attempts to stress 60 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 continuity, ACRI-trained troops remain a per equipped and/or untrained units into this ishable asset. Although accurate statistics are environment can be deadly and, ultimately, elusive, a number of these troops were lost to counterproductive. ACOTA training now in HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. Ad cludes a provision for peace-enforcement ditionally, according to US Embassy officials tasks such as light-infantry operations and interviewed in Dakar, Senegal, unit effective small-unit tactics.19 Additionally, each ACOTA ness is diffused by a lack of unit cohesion— package contains between just under $1 mil- that is, soldiers trained under ACRI are often lion to $2 million worth of equipment, includ dispersed across a nation’s military as a mat ing combat paraphernalia, that the recipient ter of numerical necessity, without regard to retains after the completion of training. Finally, the impact on unit effectiveness.16 When the although agreements for training involve time comes to deploy peacekeepers on short ment are made bilaterally, ACOTA puts in- notice, the task becomes a pickup game that creased emphasis on the participation and fails to inspire confidence in the quality of the consultation of subregional organizations, such soldiers who arrive for the operation. as the Economic Community of West African ACOTA seeks to ensure the continuity of States and the Southern African Development 20 trained peacekeepers by strongly emphasiz Community. These organizations play a criti ing the “train-the-trainer” concept. According cal role in initiating and/or legitimizing peace- to Engle, ACOTA takes an entirely different enforcement operations on the continent in approach than ACRI, focusing on enhancing sofar as their “buy-in” to ACOTA enables the the country’s ability to train its own troops.17 multinational integration essential to the suc Ghana’s first ACOTA event concentrated al cess of those operations. most exclusively on the development of Although ACOTA clearly addresses ACRI’s Ghanaian training doctrine and strategy.18 In three key deficiencies, it remains on a pure their follow-on event, conducted from 13 donor-to-recipient basis. Additionally, ACOTA January to 11 April 2003, US personnel trained contracts largely excluded states envisioned Ghanaian instructors and then monitored the by the United States as key to its involvement on the continent. These states could prove soldiers who taught peacekeeping skills to in especially influential and could facilitate— digenous troops. The United States is also de perhaps even improve upon—peacekeeping veloping a methodology for certifying host in training in their regions. Thus, the possibility structors. Additionally, future training funding of establishing partnership arrangements will be tied to the host nation’s commitment with principal African states, beginning with to utilize the certified trainers. ACOTA plan South Africa, becomes especially important. ners are optimistic that this more aggressive train-the-trainer approach will effectively hold African nations’ feet to the fire, propa South Africa: First “Anchor” gating peacekeeper training and creating a more capable force. Peacekeeper-Training Partner? The third major ACRI area addressed by Despite the best intentions of ACOTA to ACOTA entailed a failure to provide training help Africans help themselves, the program to cope with the full range of potential action has enjoyed only minimal involvement from likely to be encountered by the recipient na America’s so-called anchor states—namely tion’s soldiers. ACRI training packages effec South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya. tively addressed operations categorized under According to Dr. Jendayi Frazer, the US Na chapter 6 of the UN Charter as peacekeeping tional Security Council’s director of African tasks but did not prepare troops for peace- Affairs, US policy on the continent under the enforcement operations—oftentimes the pre Bush administration is built around develop cise skill set needed on short notice to quell ing the capabilities and understanding the conflict on the continent. Introduction of ill- role of these four regional “pillars.”21 Despite AFRICA CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRAINING ASSISTANCE 61

Many African countries, such as Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, and Zambia, still use 50-year-old aircraft like this DC-3.

this intent, Kenya is the only anchor state to prosperity on a third world continent, South participate in ACRI to date, and ACOTA plan Africa is gravely affected by any instability in ners are currently completing their first meet its region. The 1999 war in Angola had ing to solidify Ethiopia’s involvement. Addi spillover effects on Namibia, showing how tionally, all of the ACOTA proposals dealing conflict in one state can influence its neigh- with anchor states—including the proposed bors.22 Indeed, southern Africa is fraught with conference with South Africa—stress US weak and unstable regimes. Any conflict on training to the recipient nation, an approach South Africa’s borders could have a devastat that ignores involving anchor states in train ing effect at a critical juncture in the devel ing other African nations’ forces. opment and transformation of such govern Perhaps the most intriguing potential ments. Similarly, migration can have ACOTA participant is South Africa, whose in potentially catastrophic social and economic terest in effective regional peacekeeping is effects. For example, approximately eight straightforward. An “island” of first world million illegal immigrants reportedly crossed 62 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

South Africa’s borders in 1990 alone,23 and of February 2003, no uniformed US military the five million illegal entries to that country personnel are involved in ACOTA. The total in 1994 cost it an estimated $2 billion. Clearly, instructor cadre consists of contractors.27 instability on South Africa’s borders is not in SANDF’s official military position toward its best interest. ACOTA is more positive, however. Mosioua Since South Africa alone cannot success- Lekota, South Africa’s defense minister, re fully accomplish the daunting peacekeeping cently acknowledged his military’s need for tasks required in southern Africa, it should better trained troops and staff members.28 He help ensure that other African nations can contends that other African countries rou successfully employ their military forces in a tinely expect South Africa to play a leading peacekeeping role. Regrettably, according to role—diplomatically and militarily—when Gen Siphwe Nyanda, chief of the South peacekeeping needs arise on the continent. African National Defense Force (SANDF), Lekota asserts that this burden of regional other African states expect more force pro leadership demands the ability to provide tech jection on the continent from the SANDF,24 nical expertise to others, and he welcomes US which has deployed nearly 1,000 soldiers to assistance in this regard. Maj Gen Jan Lusse, four locations in Africa. General Nyanda con- chief of Joint Operations at Headquarters tends that greater regional involvement from South African Joint Forces, agrees that cur- South Africa would become problematic, es rent demand far exceeds capacity. He feels pecially regarding sea lift, airlift, and air de that ACOTA training would prove useful in fense. Virtually all military officials inter- South Africa’s quest to build a more robust viewed in March 2003 during a visit to Africa peacekeeping force.29 by students from the US Air War College Persuading South Africa to step up to the agreed that getting the troops to the fight and table as a full ACOTA participant with the sustaining them—by means of tactical lift— United States will not be easy. Formidable ob were among the most significant limiting fac stacles stand in the way of effective interac tors in the SANDF’s peacekeeping ability.25 tion. Because of US support to the former Given these limiting factors and South apartheid regime, relations with South Africa Africa’s vested interest in better regional- since 1994 have been strained. In September peacekeeping capabilities, would that country 2000 William Cohen, then the US secretary of benefit from involvement with the United defense, acknowledged that the process of States in ACOTA training? Opinions on the building “a level of trust and mutual respect” utility of this type of assistance within the would be a long-term endeavor.30 Relations country appear mixed. Henri Boshoff—a re- since then have remained cool and are cur tired South African officer, veteran of several rently extremely tense. During the Air War African peacekeeping operations, and senior College visit mentioned above, members of analyst for the Institute for Security Studies in the South African Parliament commented on Pretoria—has participated in initial discus a very clear rift that exists between US and sions regarding South African involvement in South African positions on many issues, most ACOTA. He argues that little need exists for notably the ongoing tensions with Iraq.31 Se direct US training of soldiers and staff in the nior South African officials strongly disagree country due to the SANDF’s extensive, practi with US policies on global engagement, pre cal peacekeeping experience.26 At the tactical ferring that individual nations—or, at most, level, Boshoff maintains that South African regions—sort out their own difficulties. troops are perhaps better qualified than US Cooperating with South Africa to enhance personnel who would conduct the ACOTA peacekeeping training on the continent may training. The current manning of US ACOTA well provide a “best of both worlds” answer to training teams may underscore this assertion: this issue. The United States wants to see an due to current operations-tempo realities, as expanded, sustainable peacekeeping capacity AFRICA CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRAINING ASSISTANCE 63 on the African continent. South Africa has them or their neighbors—even though the similar interests but clings to a deep-seated United States stands ready to help. Like its philosophy of internal, grassroots solutions to predecessor, ACOTA is an effective bilateral one’s own problems, devoid of external influ tool to assist smaller African nations in devel ence. The compromise may lie in a US train oping this capability, but substantive partici ing partnership with anchor states, using South pation from African anchor states has not Africa as the template for developing com been forthcoming. Several recommenda bined peacekeeping-training teams that work tions, however, could enhance the effective together to train other nations’ forces. In ness of ACOTA. fact, the door may already be open for this First, the United States should continue to initiative. South Africa is the first nation on craft customized training packages for indi the continent invited to participate in Opera vidual nations and strengthen the follow-up tion Phoenix, a newly proposed US program mechanism to ensure that these programs are designed to establish a direct liaison between appropriate and that the train-the-trainer the SANDF and a US reserve-component concept is working. To accomplish this effec 32 organization. This is a tremendous engage tively, we must be willing to remain engaged ment opportunity for the United States and with these states after training is completed. A South Africa, having the potential to better train-and-forget mentality will perpetuate develop a mutual comprehension of each diffusion of qualified personnel throughout other’s interests and spearhead a better long- the recipient nation. To the maximum extent term relationship. practical, the United States must include its uniformed military forces in these ACOTA Recommendations training activities to uphold the program’s legitimacy and avoid a perception of waning and Conclusion US interests. The United States has an ardent interest in Second, America must intensify its efforts stability on the African continent. The focus to involve major regional powers (anchor on counterterrorism following the events of states) in the program. The next planning con 11 September 2001 underscores just one ference with South Africa should initiate ef long-term consequence of weak and failed forts to transform the present donor-recipient states in the region. President Bush’s recently association to a full partnership. Creating a announced budget demonstrates his commit training partnership—beginning with bilat ment to helping African nations tackle long- eral skills development and later expanding term issues such as HIV/AIDS. Projected to a US/South African training team that de- spending for peacekeeping, however, implies livers training to other African nations—has that the administration is serious about tremendous potential. The United States Africans being prepared to conduct these op must also ensure that the unit chosen to par erations themselves. Peacekeeping and peace ticipate in Operation Phoenix is qualified to enforcement may be analogous to “putting be a peacekeeping partner. If the United States out fires,” but they are bona fide require and South Africa can traverse the diplomatic ments that will continue to emerge in Africa hurdles to make this happen, the continent on extremely short notice. Neglecting this re will have better indigenous peacekeeping sponsibility can have catastrophic human forces and enhanced regional commonality consequences. in doctrine and tactics; perhaps most impor US fiscal policies are sending a clear mes tantly, relations between the United States sage to African governments to focus on and South Africa will improve. building indigenous peacekeeping and Like its predecessor, ACOTA faces signifi peace-enforcement capability so they can cant obstacles before it can become Africa’s help themselves when scenarios arise involving saving grace in terms of peacekeeping. Practi- 64 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 cally speaking, the primary hurdle may have logistical infrastructure for peacekeeping and less to do with training than with the physical peace enforcement, the SANDF instead is capacity to execute. African states lack the tac buying guided-missile frigates, submarines, tical mobility and logistics infrastructure to and third-generation tactical fighters. Hope- independently conduct peace-enforcement fully, a partnership with the United States and peacekeeping operations. Some blame may serve to highlight some of this apparent may be cast upon the more developed na force-structure mismatch. Regardless, the tions, such as South Africa, which arguably is United States must face the continued reality undergoing a period of strategic confusion that, for the foreseeable future, Africans will regarding its optimal force structure. Despite continue to need US assistance when crises a desperate need for more tactical airlift and emerge on their troubled continent.

Notes

1. Col Mike Bittrick, USA, retired, US Department of State, 18. Fisher interview. lecture to the West Africa Regional Studies Seminar, Air War Col 19. Bittrick lecture. lege, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 13 February 2003. 20. Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons, “Conclusion: 2. Jeffrey Herbst, “Western and African Peacekeepers: Mo African Foreign Policy Making at the Millennium,” in African For­ tives and Opportunities,” in Africa in World Politics: The African eign Policies, Power and Process, ed. Gilbert M. Khadiagala and State System in Flux, ed. John W. Harbeson and Donald S. Terrence Lyons (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Rothchild, 3d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000), 308–23. 2001), 212–13. 3. Lt Comdr Andrea Pollard, “An Analysis of the Measures of Effectiveness for the African Crisis Response Initiative” (master’s 21. Greg Mills, “A ‘Less Is More’ Policy for Africa,” Daily Mail thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2000), and Guardian, 23 April 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 25 March 10–12. 2003, available from http://www.aegis.com/news/dmg/2001/ 4. Werner Biermann, ed., African Crisis Response Initiative: The MG01406.html. New U.S. Africa Policy (Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 22. Senzo Ngubane and Hussein Solomon, “Southern 1999), 130–31. Africa’s New Security Agenda,” Africa Insight 32, no. 1 (March 5. Ibid., 132–33. 2002): 60. 6. Maj Timothy E. Lolatte, “How Should the United States 23. Ibid., 62. Shape Training for Those Countries That Are in Support of the 24. Helmoed Römer-Heitmean, “Interview: Gen Siphwe African Crisis Response Initiative?” research report (Maxwell Nyanda, Chief of the South African National Defence Force,” AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1999), 8. Jane’s Defence Weekly 37, no. 26 (26 June 2002): 32. 7. Biermann, 93. 25. Notes compiled from presentations during visit to Sene- 8. Association of Concerned African Scholars, US Military Pro- grams in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001–2003, 11 February 2003, 5, on- gal and South Africa, 3–13 March 2003. line, Internet, 16 February 2003, available from http://www. 26. Henri Boshoff, military analyst, South African Institute of prairinet.org/acas/military/miloverview.html. Security Studies, lecture to the Air War College’s West Africa Re 9. Scott Fisher, US Department of State Interagency Group gional Studies Seminar, Pretoria, South Africa, 7 March 2003. on ACOTA, interviewed by author via telecon, 4 February 2003. 27. Fisher interview. 10. Lolatte, 9. 28. “South African Forces to Get US Training?” 11. Biermann, 3. 29. Maj Gen Jan Lusse, chief of Joint Operations, South 12. “South African Forces to Get US Training?” Africa Online, African National Defense Force, lecture to the Air War College’s 26 July 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 16 February 2003, available West Africa Regional Studies Seminar, Johannesburg, South from http://www.africaonline.com/site/Articles/1,3,48752.jsp. Africa, 10 March 2003. 13. Fisher interview. 30. Jason Sherman, “Arm’s Length: The Pentagon Hopes to 14. Alex Belida, “US Readies to Launch Military Training Pro- Foster Good Changes in Difficult Places by Teaming Up with Two gram for Sub-Saharan Africa,” VOA News.com, 25 July 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 31 January 2003, available from http://www. Nations It Once Ignored,” Armed Forces Journal International 138, voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=692BCA14-086D-4159.htm. no. 2 (September 2000): 33. 15. Bittrick lecture. 31. Remarks delivered under conditions of nonattribution, 16. Remarks delivered under conditions of nonattribution, South African Parliament, Cape Town, South Africa, March 2003. US Embassy, Dakar, Senegal, March 2003. 32. Col C. D. Smith, US defense attaché to South Africa, in 17. Belida. terviewed by author, 10 March 2003. Editorial Abstract: Even though China China and India have a 20-year track record of cooperation, both countries have ample justification for proceeding with caution. and India On the one hand, US hegemony and Friends or Foes? greater US involvement in Asia may push the two neighbors toward even more LT COL MONA LISA D. TUCKER, USAF cooperation. On the other hand, the de­ gree to which one nation perceives the other as a threat could encourage closer ties with the United States.

INCE ITS INCEPTION as an inde ship as well as possibilities for the future, both pendent nation in 1947, India has fol through the prism of US interests. Although lowed its own drumbeat in developing both countries have developed a more coop foreign policy. Such an independent erative relationship in the last 20 years, be- Sworldview and the desire to become a re cause India still sees China as a threat, it gional hegemon in South Asia has often put continues to pursue both additional nuclear India at odds with the United States. Even capability and a stronger relationship with the though the two nations share democratic val United States. Some observers might argue ues, their values and interests have rarely con- that India and China are on a path of coop verged in the world of international politics. eration so as to effectively counterbalance US India and China, who claim to be the world’s hegemony in Asia. This article, however, argues two oldest and largest civilizations, also have that, although India is cautiously proceeding had a seesaw-like relationship.1 This article with cooperative efforts with the Chinese, it examines India’s and China’s history of foreign sees China as a major threat, and that the policy and discusses their current relation- United States welcomes this view as a means

65 66 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 of counterbalancing China as its only near- tion against it in 1962.4 India has always felt it- term strategic competitor. self superior to Pakistan, an attitude reinforced by its sound defeat of that country in 1971. But following India’s testing of a nuclear weapon India’s Major Foreign-Policy in 1974, Pakistan began its own covert journey Themes to achieve nuclear-power status. Indeed, when India conducted its next nuclear demonstra Upon achieving its independence, India tion in 1998, Pakistan responded in kind with set about becoming a world power with global its own test. It was now apparent to the world influence, even though it fixed most of its at that both India and Pakistan intended to di tention on Pakistan. India also extended its rect their nuclear capabilities at each other. hand to the African National Congress of Other disputes between Pakistan and India South Africa—which had adopted the passive stem from the seemingly irresolvable dispute resistance advocated by Mohandas Gandhi— over Kashmir. Further, degradation in their by providing training and assistance as Africans relationship occurred with the so-called state- struggled to rid themselves of colonial oppres sponsored terrorist tactics used by the Paki sors. Unwilling to become a pawn of the United stanis, especially in the Kashmir region. De- States and USSR, the world’s two superpowers, spite the US reliance on Pakistan as an ally in during the Cold War, India cofounded the the global war on terrorism, India continues Non-Aligned Movement, remaining neutral to insist that its neighbor is an enemy and a until it became more expedient to side with source of much of the world’s terrorism.5 the USSR.2 Additionally, India promoted total nuclear disarmament of all nuclear powers, US-India Relations all the while seeking nuclear-power status it- self. It continued to condemn nuclear powers India’s position of nonalignment put it at odds but saw nuclear weapons as its ticket to be- with the United States. The United States ini coming a global force.3 tially saw India, the world’s largest democracy, as a prize to be kept away from the Commu nists. When India failed to side with the United Cold War and Post–Cold War States during the Korean War, Secretary of Relationships State John Foster Dulles called the Indians “immoral.” Over time, the United States came India and Pakistan have been fixated on to accept India’s nonalignment policy as a each other’s demise since the partition of India nuisance but not a threat. As a result, India by the British. The legitimacy of each govern enjoyed handouts from both the United ment seems to hinge on the illegitimacy of States and USSR, thus benefiting from the the other. On the one hand, the very existence Cold War for a while. However, as the United of the Muslim state of Pakistan threatens States tired of the zero-sum relationship be- India’s idea of itself as a pluralistic society tween India and Pakistan, as well as their in- with a secular government that also represents ability to resolve their differences, it sought to the world’s second-largest Muslim population. extricate itself from the countries’ ongoing bat On the other hand, Pakistan was founded on tles. When the India-Pakistan war of 1971 re the belief that the world needed a Muslim sulted in Pakistan’s sound defeat, India emerged state that would provide Muslims equal status as the regional power of South Asia,6 but the and rule them under Muslim law. Conse United States lost patience with both countries quently, India’s foreign policy remains focused because of their practice of using US weapons on the Pakistani threat—seemingly, everything and aid to fight each other. With the detona else is secondary even though India developed tion of India’s nuclear warhead in 1974, the a two-front scenario in its national-security United States again opposed India on the strategy after China’s successful military ac grounds of nonproliferation, seeking an end CHINA AND INDIA 67 to that country’s nuclear testing and arming.7 Cold War. Nehru envisioned a close relation- Meanwhile, Pakistan also gained nuclear ca ship between his country and China, seeing pability, presumably with China’s help, and them both becoming strong regional allies conducted a nuclear test of its own. Once with important seats at the world table. But again, India believed that the United States this was not to be. Since the two countries had was trying to thwart its regional hegemonic great potential and no additional territorial status by levying more sanctions and beating ambitions, Nehru believed that they shared a the nonproliferation drum in the international common path. Both were on the sidelines, arena. Becoming more embroiled in Vietnam, watching the Cold War between the United the United States pulled its aid from both India States and USSR. Both had large populations and Pakistan. India began to see a pattern of and needed to build their respective economies. US support followed by sanctions when India Both aspired to become great powers and had displeased America. Or the United States to- the requisite potential to do so.13 Therefore, tally ignored India, opting to court Pakistan, India—the second country formally to recog China, and—later—even the USSR. Unsurpris nize the People’s Republic of China as the ingly, India became increasingly distrustful of single voice of China—was understandably the United States and, though initially bent surprised in 1962, when the border disputes on nonalignment, grew closer to the USSR.8 between the two countries escalated and China invaded parts of India, taking some of its ter USSR-India Relations ritory. As a result of China’s aggression, India continues to dispute the border between the India didn’t see the Soviet Union as a threat two countries to this day. at all. Although the two countries were ideo Furthering the ill will between China and logically far apart, India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, India, Pakistan ceded about 5,800 square kilo- its first prime minister, admired the Soviets’ meters of Indian Kashmir to China in 1963. ability to become a world power by building Additionally, in 1965 during the India-Pakistan their economy, military, and political might conflict, China provided Pakistan with mili on their own terms. In fact, the Soviet Union tary weaponry and accused India of “criminal became India’s economic model for building aggression.”14 Because India was adamant an infrastructure of roads, dams, and power about remaining militarily superior to Pakistan, plants and its main benefactor in terms of however, it adopted a policy of accommodation arms sales.9 Obviously, this relationship with with China—a move undoubtedly motivated Russia further strained the one with the by India’s realization that it could never win United States.10 But the USSR did not help any further conflict with China. But as China India with nuclear issues, and its invasion of became more of a benefactor of Pakistan, Afghanistan in December 1979 caught India India strengthened its ties with the USSR. off guard, putting their relationship to the The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in test. Further, the collapse of the USSR severely 1979 caused the United States and China to degraded India’s military readiness because, become more active in the region, both of without Soviet help, it could no longer logis them once again providing aid and military tically support its equipment.11 Dismayed at hardware to Pakistan.15 how the Israelis had used US and Western technology to easily defeat the Arabs and their Current and Future China-India Relations Soviet-supplied weapons, India once again sought out the West.12 Still concerned about the above-mentioned border dispute, India remains cautious in its dealings with China, which is in no hurry to China-India Relations resolve the problem even though India con Sino-Indian relationships also experienced tinues to press the issue during each exchange many ups and downs during and after the visit.16 India also views China warily because 68 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 of the latter’s history with Pakistan. Specifi cerns.”20 It appears to India, however, that cally, China provided Pakistan with much of China hasn’t been responsive enough in solv its weaponry and technology, most likely in ing long-time border disputes and that it cluding its nuclear capability. China still re- doesn’t consider India an equal. fuses to recognize Sikkim as a legitimate part In the last few decades, India has pursued of India, having called it an “illegal annexation” resolution of the border issue. Since resuming in 1975, and persists in thwarting India’s quest ambassadorial relations in 1976 after a 25-year for a permanent seat on the United Nations hiatus, India and China have taken steps to (UN) Security Council.17 strengthen cooperative measures. In 1988 Rajiv Another roadblock in China-India relations Gandhi, the Indian prime minister, visited is India’s position on Tibetan autonomy and China, and as the two countries resumed high- human rights. India provided refuge for several level diplomatic dialogue, they decided to set exiled Tibetan spiritual leaders, and China up a joint working group to discuss their bor scathingly referred to the meeting between ders. As a result of Prime Minister Narasimha Indian prime minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee Rao’s visit in 1993, China and India signed an and the Dalai Lama in 1998 as an interfer agreement on Border Peace and Tranquility ence in its internal affairs. India further irri and set up the India-China Expert Group of tates China by allowing these and other exiled Diplomatic and Military Officers to assist the Tibetans to express their views and influence work of the joint working group. On the Chi world opinion concerning the treatment of 18 nese side, Premier Li Peng visited India in their people. In spite of these hindrances, 1991, and President Jiang Zemin did so in Indian political leaders claim to want good re 1996. During the latter’s visit, the two sides es lations with China. They deny seeing China as tablished the Agreement on Confidence Build a threat, yet the Indian military clearly seems ing Measures in the Military Field along the to think otherwise. Moreover, the Ministry of Line of Actual Control in the India-China External Affairs talks about cooperation with Border Areas. Both countries agreed to work China and opportunities for trade, yet high- towards a constructive and cooperative rela ranking officials have verbally identified China tionship for the twenty-first century. Never and Pakistan as India’s two principal threats. theless, even though the joint working group Further corroboration occurred in early March has met 13 times since its inception, the bor 2003, when Indian newspapers described newly der problem remains unresolved.21 Other co purchased Su-30 MKI aircraft as the means of delivering nuclear weapons to any part of operative efforts include six memorandums China. These overt references to China as a of understanding and agreements signed in threat seem to fly in the face of the rhetoric of New Delhi on 14 January 2002 that address cooperation heard in some circles.19 cooperation in the areas of science and tech nology, outer space, tourism, phytosanitary measures, and China’s providing India with Cooperative Efforts between hydrological data regarding the Brahmaputra River during flood season.22 China and India After India’s nuclear test in 1998 and its The annual report for 2001–2 published by disclosure that the threat of China made the the Indian Ministry of External Affairs states test necessary, both countries agreed on the that India “seeks friendly, cooperative, good need for bilateral security dialogue. After re neighbourly and mutually beneficial relations suming relations about a year later, India and with China on the basis of the Five Principles China stated that they did not consider the of Peaceful Coexistence, jointly enunciated other a threat. The first meeting of the secu by India and China. India seeks a long term, rity dialogue occurred in Beijing in March 2000 stable relationship based on equality in which and the second in New Delhi in February both sides are responsive to each other’s con 2001. After the terrorist strikes of 11 September CHINA AND INDIA 69

2001, India and China agreed that they should Exports, Torrent Group, Lupin Laboratories, maintain close cooperation and establish a bi and Kanoria Chemicals and Industries.26 lateral dialogue against terrorism. Chinese Despite these moves, much remains to be leaders have also remarked that, since both done. Significant bilateral cooperation will countries feel threatened by the United States, require changes in both China’s and India’s they should cooperate to counterbalance threat perceptions, avoidance of open rivalry America.23 According to Zhou Gang, China’s over regional issues, better management of ambassador to New Delhi, “the threat is not each country’s relationship with Pakistan, and 27 from China to India and not from India to eventual resolution of their border dispute. China. It comes from other places. . . . There is only one force dominating the world and The Future of Relations between asserting its domination to create a unipolar world. It is quite realistic for [India and China] China and India to improve [their] relations to a cooperative The rhetoric of government officials from 24 partnership.” either India or China suggests that the two When Li Changchun, member of the polit consider each other friends and seek coopera buro of the Chinese Communist party and tion and harmony. Although India and China party secretary of Guangdong Province, visited have agreed to better and more cooperation India in May 2001, he stated that India and on border resolution, security, the fight against China were the world’s largest developing terrorism, and trade, India still seems suspi countries and that they had a responsibility cious of China. As recently as March 2003, to promote economic development, the well discussions and briefings by senior military being of the two peoples, and the strengthen and government officials demonstrated that ing of bilateral ties. He also noted that the India sees China as one of its two main two countries shared more commonalities than threats.28 India now bases its security strategy differences and that both sides agreed on the on a two-front scenario, using the China threat existence of concrete opportunities for the as a rationale for procuring new weapons sys development of bilateral trade.25 tems. Indeed, China can reach all parts of Such trade has grown rapidly over the last India with its nuclear arsenal, and India’s re- decade. In 1991 the trade volume between cent purchase of the Russian-made Su-30 MKI the two countries was $265 million (US dol aircraft, mentioned above, is a response to lars), and in 2001 it reached $3.6 billion. The that threat and part of its effort to close the increase from the year 2000 to 2001 was about military gap between the two. It seems India believes that China will deal with it as an 23.4 percent. India imports more than it ex- equal only if it can reciprocate China’s nuclear ports to China, imports having increased by threat. Additionally, Indians are frustrated with 21.5 percent from 2000 to 2001. Its main ex- the “glacial” pace of the border-resolution ef ports include ore, slag, ash, cotton yarn/fabric, forts. China has been slow to move on the issue plastics, organic chemicals, mineral fuel, oil, since the two countries began their dialogue silk yarn/fabric, and machinery. For both in 1988. In short, India thinks that China does countries, however, their bilateral trade is sig not consider it a legitimate Asian or regional nificantly smaller than the rest of their foreign power. To overcome this perception, many In trade. India and China continue to exchange dians feel a need to build a stronger, better trade delegations and product exhibitions; ad military arsenal; others argue that India can ditionally, each has established joint-venture never win an arms race with China.29 and wholly owned companies in the other’s Additionally, China and India are rivals in country. Indian companies in China include the marketplace, competing for business in Cadilla and Wockhardt pharmaceutical com Asia, Europe, and the United States. Although panies, Orissa Industries Ltd., Infosys, Tata they seek cooperation on some level and have 70 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 certainly improved bilateral trade, the two an idealist looking at the great potential for produce many of the same goods, both have shared values and market globalization or a billion-person populations to employ, and their realist seeing an opportunity to counterbalance large populations’ impoverishment gives them China with a billion-person weight, the United little buying power. Once again, China has an States would benefit if the level of coopera edge on India in terms of goods, services, and tion between India and China remained low. access to other markets. For instance, the Both countries provide huge markets for US United States has shown much more interest commerce although each needs a larger mid in trade with China than with India.30 dle class if the United States is to benefit sub Other stumbling blocks to closer bilateral stantially. Militarily, the United States remains cooperation include China’s stance on Sikkim wary of China and could use Indian military and India’s stance on Tibet. Also, China’s re power and intelligence to help keep China in fusal to back India’s efforts to gain a perma check. Clearly, China’s military outclasses nent seat on the UN Security Council inhibits India’s at this time, but a more robust India full-scale cooperation between the two.31 with nuclear capability can at least provide an- Even though India and China have agreed other concern for Chinese security. As Secre to cooperate on the war against terrorism, tary of State Colin Powell observed in his con India remains wary of China’s relationship firmation hearing, “We must deal more wisely with Pakistan. In the past, China has provided with the world’s largest democracy. . . . India Pakistan with many of its weapons and, his has the potential to keep the peace in the vast torically, their relationship has sought to Indian Ocean area and its periphery.” This counterbalance India-Soviet power. With the statement may well indicate that the United disintegration of the Soviet Union, it will be States no longer perceives China as just a major interesting to see how these relationships evolve. market but a strategic competitor that needs Today Pakistan is an active partner with the to be contained in Asia.33 United States and the West in the global war on terrorism, but India has always contended that Pakistan is the main perpetrator of much Conclusion 32 terrorist activity, as mentioned earlier. This Many ups and downs have marked the his- issue must be addressed if further coopera tory of Sino-Indian relations. Today a number tion is to occur. of observers believe that China and India can become cooperative partners to counter- balance US hegemony, but in reality India Sino-Indian Cooperation or still sees China as one of its two principal Competition:What Is Best threats. Thus, the United States would do well for US Interests? to strengthen its ties with a more robust and nuclear-capable India so as to offset China’s If India and China were to cooperate on growing strategic importance and influence. security and economics, what would that India continues to pursue regional hege mean for the United States? Could they effec mony and global influence, so stronger ties tively push the United States out of regional with the United States would contribute to its issues and counterbalance US power both re stature as a world player. On the other hand, gionally and globally? The United States sees India deals cautiously with China and will deal China as its only potential near-peer in the similarly with the United States because of the next couple of decades. On the other hand, latter’s history of imposing sanctions on India although the United States and India have and isolating it. The United States may yet de been at odds for most of their history, the cur- velop a partnership with the world’s largest rent administration seeks to solidify a coopera democracy that will benefit both parties—a tive relationship. Regardless of whether one is goal implicit in the previous and current US CHINA AND INDIA 71 administrations’ reaching out to India in an relationship with India.”34 If our country re- effort to make amends. As outlined in current mains true to course, India and the United US national security strategy, “the United States can take advantage of greater trade op States has undertaken a transformation in its portunities as well as strategic security against bilateral relationship with India based on a China. conviction that U.S. interests require a strong

Notes

1. Shri George Fernandes, “Concluding Address at the Fifth 20. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Annual Asian Security Conference Organised by the Institute for De- Report, 2001–2002, 25, on-line, Internet, 15 July 2003, available fence Studies and Analyses,” Strategic Digest, February 2003, 95. from http://meadev.nic.in/AReport2002.pdf. 2. Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, 21. “India’s Foreign Relations: China.” D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001), 72. 22. Ibid. 3. Ibid., 168. 23. Ibid. 4. Ibid., 203. 24. Frazier. 5. Briefing, Indian Integrated Defense Staff (IDS) to US Air 25. “India’s Foreign Relations: China.” War College students and faculty, subject: Organizational Overview 26. Ibid. and Security Issues, March 2003. 27. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-Dong Yuan, “Resolving 6. Cohen, 137. the Sino-Indian Border Dispute: Building Confidence through 7. Amit Gupta, CRS Report to Congress: US-India Security Rela­ Cooperative Monitoring,” Asian Survey 41, no. 2 (March–April tions (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Novem 2001): 351–76, reprinted in South Asia Regional Studies Reader ber 2002), CRS-3. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Air War College, 2003), 156. 8. Cohen, 270–71. 28. IDS briefing. 9. Ibid., 38. 29. Cohen, 163–64. 10. Ibid., 142. 30. Gupta, CRS-21. 11. Ibid., 249–50. 31. “India’s Foreign Relations: China.” 12. Ibid., 139. 32. Briefings, Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the In 13. Ibid., 25. tegrated Defense Staff to US Air War College students and faculty, 14. “India’s Foreign Relations: China,” Ministry of External Af­ subject: India’s Strategic Outlook—Pakistan, China, Threats, and fairs, Government of India, March 2003, on-line, Internet, 16 June Cooperative Efforts, March 2003. 2003, available from http://www.meadev.nic.in/foreign/china.htm. 33. Gupta, CRS-4; and “Prepared Statement of Colin L. Powell, 15. Gupta, CRS-3. Confirmation Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Com 16. Mark W. Frazier, “China-India Relations since Pokhran II: mittee, January 17, 2001,” Bush Team Confirmation Hearings, on-line, Assessing Sources of Conflict and Cooperation,” Access Asia Review Internet, 16 June 2003, available from http://www.acronym.org. 3, no. 2 (2000): n.p., on-line, Internet, 16 June 2003, available from uk/53bush.htm. http://www.nbr.org/publications/review/vol3no2/essay.html. 34. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United 17. “India’s Foreign Relations: China.” States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 18. Frazier. 2002), 27, on-line, Internet, 16 June 2003, available from http:// 19. IDS briefing. www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.

Science has been awaiting the great physicist, who, like Galileo or Newton, should bring order out of chaos in aerodynamics, and re­ duce its many anomalies to the rule of harmonious law. It is not im­ possible that when that law is formulated all the discrepancies and apparent anomalies which now appear, will be found easily ex­ plained and accounted for by one simple general cause, which has been hitherto overlooked. —Octave Chanute Progress in Flying Machines Operation Linebacker II CHARLES TUSTIN KAMPS

By October of 1972, peace B-52s were traversing North Vietnam at will, the enemy talks between the United having expended the last of his surface-to-air missiles. States and North Vietnam Causing little appreciable collateral damage, Line- had come to a standstill as backer II devastated the intended targets and inflicted se America tried to extricate vere psychological damage on the North Vietnamese itself from the nightmare leadership and population. American prisoners of war war in Southeast Asia. Presi (POW) noticed a marked change in the demeanor of dent Richard M. Nixon, their captors, who were visibly shaken by the aerial on frustrated by communist slaught. North Vietnam returned to the peace talks on intransigence, decided that 8 January 1973, and an accord was in hand by the 27th of it was time for the “Buffs” that month. The battle lines were temporarily frozen, re (B-52s) to go “downtown” maining US forces departed Vietnam, and 591 American and take out any targets of military value in the formerly POWs were released to come home. restricted Hanoi and Haiphong metropolitan areas. In Some historians have tried to belittle the effective just 11 flying days between 18 and 29 December, the Air Force and Navy achieved an objective that had eluded US ness of Linebacker II by asserting that the North Viet politicians since 1964—forcing the North Vietnamese to namese simply wanted to bide their time and let the the peace table on America’s terms. Americans leave before they “finished off” the South. In Linebacker II saw the greatest operational concentra fact, however, the Northerners lived in fear of a repeat tion of B-52s in history, with some 206 employed from performance of Linebacker II up until President Nixon’s Andersen AFB, Guam, and U-Tapao Royal Thai Air Base. resignation of the presidency. In any event, the South In addition to 729 effective B-52 sorties, the campaign in Vietnamese were able to defend their sovereignty for an cluded over 700 sorties by Air Force tactical aircraft and additional two years—until US congressional appropria 500 by Navy planes. Initial flaws in tactical planning were tions for munitions and spare parts virtually dried up. overcome but not before 15 of the giant bombers were The overwhelming majority of general officers who ac lost to North Vietnamese SA-2 missiles. In effect, just tually fought the war assert that Linebacker II was the under 2 percent of the committed heavy-bomber force model of what the air campaign should have been— had been lost. By the end of the operation, however, the right from the start in 1965.

To Learn More . . . Eschmann, Karl J. Linebacker: The Untold Story of the Air Raids over North Vietnam. New York: Ivy Books, 1989. McCarthy, James R., and George B. Allison. Linebacker II: A View from the Rock. USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, vol. 6, no. 8. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Airpower Research Institute, Air War College, 1979. Thompson, Wayne. To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966–1973. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000. The Chinese Editorial Abstract: Analysts who predict that China will become the next peer competitor of the United States often cite as evidence China’s Air Force large population and latent industrial poten­ tial. If they are correct, a critical component of and Air and US-Chinese relations will involve understand­ ing the strategic perspective, composition, and Space Power doctrine of China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force, because the unique characteristics of Chinese society and culture discourage using LT COL THOMAS R. MCCABE, USAFR historical war-fighting models as foundations for strategy.

N AN INFORMAL interview with James or otherwise, can support such policy aims. If Reston of the New York Times in 1971, the Chinese Communist Party continues its Zhou Enlai, premier of the People’s Re- gradual drift from Marxism to Chinese na public of China (PRC), laid out in broad tionalism as its justification for ruling, these Iterms the PRC’s foreign-policy objectives: (1) objectives are not likely to change. Although unification of the mainland and Taiwan, (2) diplomacy can finesse and conveniently obscure removal of US military power from Asia, (3) the issue, to a degree, and although the events withdrawal of the massive Soviet military force of 11 September 2001 may have changed its deployed along the Sino-Soviet border, and tone, the overall circumstances of US-PRC re (4) prevention of the rise of Japan as a mili lations make very possible a future of funda tary power.1 Meeting these objectives would mental hostility. have established the PRC as the dominant Even though China’s primary focus today military power in Asia. Even more important, remains on its internal development and even meeting them today would produce the same though it is probably satisfied with its land effect. Equally notable is their ideological borders, such is not the case with its maritime neutrality: any Chinese nationalist, Communist borders—especially with Taiwan and, second-

73 74 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 arily, the South China Sea.2 The status of Tai Doctrine wan, in particular, could lead to war sometime in the future. Even more important, China is a Drew and Snow define three levels of doc- trine: (1) fundamental, which deals with basic profoundly dissatisfied power in psychological characteristics such as the nature of war, pur terms. It craves respect, but the United States pose of military power, and relationship of is not likely to give it such respect as long as military force to other instruments of power; the PRC remains a dictatorship. To the degree (2) environmental, “a compilation of beliefs that the PRC ultimately aspires to the leader- about the employment of military forces ship of Asia, it is likely to clash with the United within a particular operating medium” (func States, Japan, and probably with Russia. A tionally speaking, this is air and space power policy of containing China as a strategic com doctrine—a statement of how today’s air and petitor will be regarded by its government as space power capabilities should be used to hostile, while a policy of “engagement” has have a decisive effect on military operations been and will likely continue to be regarded in and wars); and (3) organizational, which in the same light—as one of smiling containment cludes basic beliefs about the operation of a and subversion. Some sources have indicated particular military organization and its roles, 6 that the PRC government already regards the missions, and current objectives. In the US Air United States as a rival and has done so for Force, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) several years; indeed, anti-Americanism is evi 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, covers environmen dently widespread among the population.3 tal doctrine, defining it as “most fundamental and enduring beliefs that describe and guide The overall circumstances of US-PRC relations the proper use of air and space forces in mili provide at least considerable potential for a tary action”; AFDD 2, Organization and Em­ fundamentally hostile Sino-US relationship. ployment of Aerospace Power, covers organiza For these reasons, it is prudent to study tional doctrine.7 China in general and its military in particular. The PLA and its component services do If the Chinese are not an enemy, it is worth- not use the term military doctrine. The closest while to understand them so as to minimize analog they have to Western doctrine is what the chances of inadvertently identifying them they call military science, which links theory as such.4 If they are, we need to understand and practice.8 Chinese military science con why and to judge accurately whether they rep sists of (1) basic military science, the funda resent a threat, since a powerless enemy is mental concepts that govern PLA military op more a nuisance than a danger.5 If they are in- erations at the various levels of war (basic deed a present or emerging threat, we must military science would include whatever envi understand them in order to deter or, if nec ronmental doctrine—air and space power 9 essary, defeat them. doctrine—the PRC might have); and (2) ap In studying the Chinese military as a po plied military theory, the specifics of how to tential enemy, one must pay attention to apply military force at each level of warfare (similar to US organizational doctrine).10 more than just the capabilities of the People’s PLA military concepts, including those of Liberation Army (PLA) and its component the PLAAF, are not couched in terms of roles services. Specifically, one would do well to and missions, as is the case with the US mili begin with the PRC’s military doctrine, since tary. Instead, they use the alternative concept it shapes objectives, strategy, force structure, of campaigns, defined as a series of battles procurement, and training. This article ad- fought under a unified command to achieve dresses the air and space power doctrine of a local or overall objective.11 Campaigns pri the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force marily take place at what the US military (PLAAF) and analyzes its ability to carry out would call the operational level of war, using that doctrine. a wartime operational structure called a War THE CHINESE AIR FORCE 75

Zone. Depending on the size of the operation, will integrate with that in the other di a War Zone can encompass either a portion mensions. Forces will fight throughout of or more than one Military Region.12 the depth of the theater (a “full-depth A critical point of the PLA’s campaign strike”), and the battlefield will be ex planning lies in its expectations of the mili tremely fluid and dynamic. Airpower tary environment in the type of war it expects and precision strike are now the pri to face. These expectations will obviously mary means of conducting warfare, with have a dramatic effect on strategy, force struc ground operations secondary.16 ture, and procurement. At present, the PLA This type of war, of course, represents a views the primary threat as a local (i.e., re revolutionary change from the traditional gional) war under high-technology condi- PLA concept of People’s War, which assumed tions.13 It expects such a war to have the fol a total war fought primarily by ground forces lowing general characteristics: and a comprehensively mobilized population •� It will be a limited war, fought in a re against an invading enemy seeking to destroy stricted geographic area for limited ob and occupy the PRC. At first glance, it would jectives with limited means and a con appear that this new war is tailor-made for air scious effort to curtail destruction. It and space power, which can have a major im will not be a comprehensive or total war, pact by waging an independent air campaign fought to destroy the Chinese state and against vital targets and supporting other to invade and occupy the homeland. It arms of the military.17 Thus, one would rea will not threaten the survival of the sonably expect the PLAAF to have a concept states involved. In many ways, such a of air and space power that calls for such an conflict is the modern equivalent of a air force and to restructure itself along the border war.14 Overall, the threat of lines of the US Air Force (i.e., emphasizing world war is minimal for the indefinite all-weather offensive aircraft; precision- future, due to the revolutionary changes guided munitions; and sophisticated com in external circumstances faced by the mand and control, intelligence, surveillance, PRC over the last 15 years (i.e., the col and reconnaissance capability). However, little lapse of the Soviet Union and the end of evidence suggests that PLAAF military science the Cold War).15 thinks in these terms or that the PLAAF is building this kind of an organization. If any- •� Such a war will be fought with compara thing, a massive disconnect seems to exist be- tively small, highly trained joint forces tween what we might expect the PLAAF to do using mostly long-range, precision-strike and what it is actually doing. Several likely ex- weapons made available by the ongoing planations account for this situation. revolution in military technology. For one, by assuming that the PLAAF •� The objective in such warfare is to defeat would choose a course parallel to our own, we the enemy rapidly by inflicting strategic are mirror-imaging—that is, projecting our and operational paralysis through attacks assumptions and thinking onto the PLAAF’s. on his weaknesses. In fact, it may be pos This practice proved dismally common and sible to defeat the enemy with one strike. nearly disastrous during both the Cold War and, in fact, at times during our past dealings This kind of war will not require annihi 18 lation of the enemy or physical occupa with the PRC. It is essential to remember tion of his territory. that we are not dealing with Americans or, for that matter, Westerners. The PLAAF’s aims •� This multidimensional war will unfold are not necessarily the ones we would choose in all dimensions (air, sea, ground, space, under similar circumstances (even if the and the electromagnetic spectrum) si PLAAF’s aims were identical to ours, it might multaneously. Warfare in one dimension choose drastically different ways of pursuing 76 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 them); its assumptions are not necessarily our tary theory—one that will be difficult to over- assumptions; and its tactics and strategies are come. not necessarily the ones we might choose. We must remember that the PLAAF’s history is Geopolitical and Historical Circumstances not ours and, above all, that the circum Historically for the Chinese, war has been a stances it faces are profoundly different than those we face. home game, fought on and over their terri tory; until recently, their military science has Beyond this explanation for the apparent 22 disconnect, I suggest two others. The first is reflected this fact. In recent centuries, that local war under high-tech conditions is China has endured humiliation and partial what some authors call aspirational doctrine.19 dismemberment from invasion, and in recent The second is that, at present, PLA military decades it has largely been surrounded by science, strategy, and procurement do not states perceived as hostile or powerful or seek to wage a high-tech local war but to defeat both. The PRC’s strategic concepts and mili an enemy who wages high-tech local war tary strategy have reflected this situation by against them. These two explanations are not focusing on a People’s War, mentioned mutually exclusive. above—a strategic, defensive war to defend the mainland from attack and invasion. China expected to wage a war of attrition de- Aspirational Doctrine signed to wear down and ultimately expel in vading enemies. In this strategy, the PRC’s In aspirational doctrine, military theory is ground army would be the preeminent ser much more advanced than actual military vice, supplemented by a comprehensively mo technology and capability, and the concepts of a local war under high-technology condi bilized population. Power projection beyond tions detail the kind of offensive war the PRC China’s borders was only a secondary con wants to be able to wage. Such doctrine does cern, and any power projection would be by not necessarily suggest that the PRC can in ground forces into adjacent territory. The air fact fight such a war today. In this respect, force played an even lesser role. In the con China’s military science bears a marked re- flict envisioned by People’s War, the PLAAF’s semblance to Soviet doctrinal writings such as function was primarily defensive, with very Marshal Sokolovskiy’s classic Soviet Military limited offensive capability. China did not ex­ Strategy, which originally laid out an extremely pect to use air and space power but did expect an ambitious strategy for fighting a nuclear war enemy to do so. Indeed, the very name of the at a time when the USSR was only starting to Chinese air force—the People’s Liberation deploy the capabilities necessary to fight such Army Air Force—speaks volumes in this re a war.20 One should note that the highest levels gard. Clearly, China considered its air arm an of the Chinese leadership have evidently rec extension of the army. Under such conditions, ognized that at present the PRC cannot fight the PRC had no need for air and space power doc- a high-tech local war.21 trine. Only recently has China, facing the chal Preventing it from doing so are the PRC’s lenge of local wars under high-technology geopolitical and historical circumstances, conditions, reportedly granted the PLAAF an economic limitations, and technological limi enhanced role. However, having a new role tations, as well as the legacy of its past military on paper does not equate to the ability to policies. Obviously, these factors have had— carry out that role. In many ways, the PLAAF and continue to have—a profound impact on now faces the worst of all worlds: it has a huge shaping the PLAAF and its military science. legacy force of obsolescent or obsolete equip They constitute an enormously unfavorable ment that was inadequate for the old strategy legacy for the PLA and PLAAF and their mili and that is utterly unsuited for the new one. THE CHINESE AIR FORCE 77

Economic Limitations based on the MiG-19 and MiG-21, respectively, and the B-5 and B-6 bombers, based on the China’s lack of wealth has severely restricted Il-28 light bomber and Tu-16 medium bomber, the resources available for military-related matters.23 Until fairly recently, the country respectively. At best, these aircraft have only spent much of its available military funds on limited ability to operate at night, in bad infrastructure such as tunnel systems and the weather, and in an electronic-countermeasures construction and dispersal of military indus environment. Few are capable of using precision- try to remote areas. Although economic re- guided munitions. China’s attempts to design forms of the last 20 years have led to impres and build more sophisticated aircraft, such as sive (although often overstated) economic the F-8, have met with limited success, as have its attempts to import, integrate, and main growth, the PRC still has neither a wealthy 25 nor modern economy. Even partial replace tain foreign technology. The PLAAF and ment of the PLA’s and PLAAF’s antiquated PLA evidently have major programs aimed at equipment with modern assets suitable for developing high-technology weapons, but major power projection would be enormously generally they are still in the technology- development phase—years (or decades) away costly at best and ruinous at worst—undoubt 26 edly one of the major reasons that the from actual deployment. PLAAF’s acquisition program for new equip ment is proceeding so slowly. Campaign Theory of the Technological Limitations PLA and PLAAF Because of its poor and developing economy/ Clearly, the PLA and PLAAF have only an society, China has had only a very limited extremely limited ability to wage a high-tech technology base to draw upon to support its local war at present, even against an enemy military. Although the PRC has established an such as Taiwan, and any gains in capability are increasingly significant industrial base, its proceeding slowly.27 This situation suggests ability to support a technologically sophisti the second, probably more important, reason cated military, let alone build one by itself, re- for Chinese military science’s adoption of this mains very much open to question. The coun concept of war: It is the kind of war the PRC ex­ try’s aviation-related military industry is pects to have imposed upon it in any future conflict, limited, technologically backward, and ineffi- especially one with the United States or a US-led al- cient.24 Most of the PLAAF’s equipment, es liance.28 Within the limits of the circum pecially its aircraft and surface-to-air missiles stances discussed earlier, China is preparing (SAM), is based on Soviet designs of the 1950s to try to survive and defeat this kind of war. and 1960s, such as F-6 and F-7 fighter aircraft, Thus, it might be more accurate to say that

“The F-6 (Jianjiji-6 Fighter aircraft 6) is the Chinese version of the MiG-19, which as of the mid-1990s was still in pro­ duction in China. The J-6, which began flight tests in 1958, was China's first supersonic jet fighter.” (From “MiG-19 Farmer, J-6/F-6,” Federation of American Scientists, 26 June 2000, on-line, Internet, 2 June 2003, available from http:// www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/mig-19.htm.) 78 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

“In 1995 it was projected that J-7 production would continue for at least another decade, resulting in a total inventory of nearly 1000 aircraft by 2005, but in fact the PLAAF inventory has remained static since then at about 500 aircraft, suggesting that production has either been suspended or terminated.” (From “MiG-21 Fishbed, J-7 [Jianjiji-7]/F-7, YF-110,” Federation of American Scientists, 26 June 2000, on-line, Internet, 2 June 2003, available from http://www. fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/mig-21.htm.) the PLAAF does not have an air and space mobilize, reduce the PLA to a position power doctrine so much as it has an anti–air of inferiority, and eventually defeat it.30 and space power doctrine. At present, the national military strategy of War-Zone Campaign the PRC calls for “active defense,” which in volves a nominal strategic defensive that uses The PRC will likely structure the War-Zone or offensive tactics, including preemptive war. In overall campaign as a joint effort aimed to in such a war, the PRC aims not necessarily to tegrate ground, naval, air, and special opera conquer enemy territory but to win decisively tions forces, as well as surface-to-surface missile and coerce the enemy to change the particular forces of the II Artillery Corps, with service- policy that prompted the PRC to go to war in based subsidiary campaigns functioning with the first place.29 More than likely, the PRC will relative autonomy within the campaign plan. base its campaign strategy on three principles: Any PLAAF campaign would probably be sub sidiary, but some writers theorize that it might 1.� Using elite forces and sharp arms. The serve as the primary campaign.31 cutting edge will consist of “fist forces”— comparatively small, well-equipped, and PLAAF Air Campaign highly trained elite joint forces. The Military Region Air Force (MRAF) com 2.� Gaining the initiative by striking first. mander will direct aviation units assigned to Evidently, the PRC is prepared to launch the air campaign and have responsibility for a war if diplomacy fails in a crisis. PLA coordinating with any other service units preparations for such an attack empha (e.g., II Artillery Corps, special operations size a campaign of deception and disin forces, etc.) operating in support of the air formation to maximize the chances of campaign. The commander’s purview will in surprising the enemy. Furthermore, clude the air defense campaign, the offensive the PLA seems prepared to launch a air campaign, any air transport, and, presum preemptive strike, preferably before ably, any air support provided to other ser enemy deployments are complete. vices, such as the ground forces and navy.32 3.� Fighting a quick, offensive battle to force Air Defense Campaign. Historically, the a rapid, successful end to the war. A long PLAAF’s primary campaign entailed strategic war would likely prove both economi air defense of the PRC mainland, especially cally and militarily costly. Even more the Beijing and Shanghai areas, with the air important, because any PLA superiority force’s major arms (aviation, SAMs, and anti- would probably be temporary, a long aircraft artillery) operating in parallel, not as war would enable an enemy to recover, parts of an integrated air defense system. It THE CHINESE AIR FORCE 79

“In January 1959 China received two TU-16 BADGER medium jet bombers from the USSR. China began producing the BADGER at the Hsian Airframe Plant in 1968 and had 32 BADGERs in the operational inventory by 1972.” (From “H-6 [Tu-16 Badger],” Federation of American Scientists, 18 August 1999, on-line, Internet, 2 June 2003, available from http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/aircraft/h-6.htm.) would provide defense in depth, with light warning and control system (AWACS) and screening forces located in a forward area jamming aircraft, with either long-range fight and most forces concentrated close to key po ers or, preferably, long-range SAMs (resisting tential targets (“light front, heavy rear”). attack remains PLAAF’s priority and will be- Strategic air defense remains the PLAAF’s come an increasingly multidimensional activity principal campaign; indeed, some authors with the integration of advanced surveillance suggest that, under some circumstances, it systems); and (3) launching timely counter- 33 may be the war’s only campaign. In fact, its attacks against enemy air bases (PLAAF writers importance is increasing, for three reasons: stress that a purely defensive air effort surren 1.� In a local war under high-tech condi ders the initiative to the enemy and would tions, air and space power represents likely guarantee defeat).35 the major threat faced by the PRC. Air Currently, the PLAAF is working to upgrade and space power has been central to all its extremely limited strategic air defense ca such wars fought since 1990. pabilities by deploying better equipment and developing an integrated (though probably 2.� The threat from air and space power is rudimentary) air defense system, something growing, a fact acknowledged by the it has lacked until very recently.36 However, PLAAF in its “three offenses and three modernization is proceeding slowly due to the defenses” training program.34 relatively small number of Su-27s acquired thus 3.� The PLAAF’s legacy interceptor aircraft far, either purchased from Russia or manu are suited only for short-range air de factured under license in China, and prob fense missions, and most of its newer lems with other systems.37 The PLAAF is in the aircraft (F-7s and F-8s) face similar limi early stages of building an AWACS component tations. This situation is likely to through indigenous development and the change only very slowly as new aircraft leasing of aircraft from Russia after the United enter the inventory. States vetoed a sale from Israel.38 Further- The PRC’s air defense campaign seeks to more, it has just a few advanced SAMs (SA-10s establish and maintain strategic air superiority purchased from Russia) although this situation over the War Zone by (1) achieving complete may change if and when it initiates major de deterrence through denial (psychologically, ployments of FT-2000s.39 Overall, the PLAAF’s the enemy becomes reluctant to attack because limited means of projecting airpower, whether he expects any such attack to fail); (2) resist for timely counterattacks or any other reason, ing attack by targeting hostile intelligence and renders its ability to conduct an air defense surveillance platforms, as well as airborne campaign largely aspirational. 80 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

“The [FT-2000] is a program to develop a new long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM). The [FT-2000] development effort may be based on a Chinese-designed missile motor, search and guidance hardware based on the Russian S-300PMU, and guidance technology from the American Patriot.” (From “HQ-9/FT-2000,” Federation of American Scientists, 23 June 2000, on-line, Internet, 2 June 2003, available from http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/hq-9.htm.)

Offensive Air Campaign. This campaign means for either a strategic- or campaign- seeks to maximize enemy weaknesses by “mov level offensive in a local war—a situation sub ing the battlefield as far as possible toward the ject to gradual change at best.42 Most of the enemy’s side” and forcing the enemy to fight PLAAF’s current aircraft might prove useful on the defensive at China’s initiative.40 It in- only as a sacrificial first wave to soak up the tends to exploit air and space power’s advan defensive armaments of targets attacked in an tages of initiative, versatility, and suddenness. offensive campaign; as mentioned earlier, its The campaign can either stand alone as an in- aircraft have little or no capability to operate dependent air force effort or, far more likely, at night, in bad weather, and in an electronic- become part of an integrated joint campaign countermeasures environment — and the of surface-to-surface missiles, special opera greater part of the B-5/B-6 bomber force is tions forces, electronic and information obsolete.43 Furthermore, few, if any, of its air- strikes, and attacks by aircraft. The PRC could craft can use precision-guided munitions aim such a campaign at either strategic-level against land targets; it has only a modest force or campaign-level enemy target systems. The of fighter aircraft (Su-27s) with the capability former includes political and economic sys (not to mention the range) to conduct air-to- tems, transportation and lines of communica air offensive counterair; and, aside from the tion, and supply and mobilization targets that Su-30s coming from Russia, the PLAAF lacks will have strategic-level effects. The latter en- the aircraft and specialized munitions neces compasses air defenses, air bases, and aircraft sary for airfield attack and suppression/ carriers (damage to or destruction of such tar- destruction of enemy air defenses.44 Thus, the gets can influence events in the War Zone).41 Chinese air force will likely find itself rele Historically, the PLAAF has not considered gated to nothing more than a supporting role offensive attack a major mission since it has in any offensive campaign, with the major no capability for conducting strategic inter- burden carried by missiles of II Artillery continental air attack and extremely limited Corps and by information warfare, for which THE CHINESE AIR FORCE 81 the Chinese have vast enthusiasm.45 If the fensive elements and (2) to initiate a qualitative conflict should expand to intercontinental transformation that reflects the ongoing revo ranges, the PLAAF would probably have no lution in military technology. In theory these role at all. wishes make reasonable sense. At present, how- Direct Support of Ground Units. The ever, they remain an aspirational concept that PLAAF has a record of scant participation in exists largely on paper. The PLAAF has moved close air support, battlefield air interdiction, very slowly to build the force it requires: out and interdiction, and shows no signs of im of a force of approximately 2,500 combat air- provement in the foreseeable future. Interest craft, fewer than 150 can be considered mod- ingly, it evidently does not consider this mis ern, and that number is increasing by fewer sion a separate campaign. Although the than 50 a year—with no sign of accelerating PLAAF has a substantial force of attack air- the acquisition process. The air force has not craft, they are not equipped—nor are their taken the obvious interim step of upgrading crews trained—for direct support of ground the capabilities of existing aircraft (e.g., by units; nor is the PLAAF organized and adding modern missiles, especially standoff equipped to function in support of a highly weapons, and improved electronics). Nor has dynamic surface war of maneuver.46 Evidently, it taken more than preliminary steps toward the air force has never successfully carried out making the qualitative improvements in orga direct support, preferring to provide indirect nization, training, and tactics that have proved support by attacking targets in the enemy’s so central to the success of American air and rear area, such as air defenses, campaign re- space power. Finally, the PLAAF has not under- serve forces, logistics support, communica taken a major effort to build the intelligence, tions, and helicopters.47 The PLAAF shows no surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities sign of initiating major efforts to improve its it will need if only to partially duplicate Ameri capabilities in this area. can capabilities. The PLAAF’s military science, force struc ture, and acquisition make considerable sense Conclusions and Implications if it is not expecting a conflict with the United PLA military science’s concept of high- States within the next 20 years. But the unset technology local wars gives the army an accu tled status of Taiwan makes that assumption rate assessment of the military environment it uncertain at best. Against a major American faces in the early twenty-first century in the effort, the PLAAF fundamentally would remain form of challenges from either a local enemy in the same position it found itself after Opera or a “powerful country” such as the United tion Desert Storm: incapable of either effective States. The PLA’s strategy of relying on surface- offense or defense—and its current efforts to-surface missiles, fist forces, and asymmetric will not change that status in the foreseeable warfare, while gradually modernizing its mas future. In fact, in all likelihood the United sive and obsolete military, is reasonably sound States is widening its lead and will do so even so long as it deals with an isolated Taiwan; more rapidly as it deploys new capabilities, over time the strategy may provide plausible such as the F/A-22. capability to coerce or overwhelm Taiwan, so Chinese military science and strategy for a long as the United States does not intervene. war with the United States over Taiwan call But it does not provide plausible capability to for defeating the island rapidly and present defeat or even deter the United States at any ing America with a fait accompli before it can time in the foreseeable future. intervene. China’s published writings are ex The situation is even worse for the PLAAF, tremely vague as to what it intends to do if its which wishes (1) to move from the primarily first effort does not succeed and a million defensive strategy and force structure of the tons of US diplomacy come roaring across the past to one that combines offensive and de Pacific at flank speed and/or the speed of 82 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 sound before Chinese forces have won. It felt that they could rapidly overrun the western seems that China hopes the United States will Pacific and that the soft, materialistic United not be willing to endure the casualties and States would not have the stomach for a long costs of a major war, but in that hope may lie and bloody war. Three and a half years later, an immense potential for danger. Such a their country in ruins, they surrendered un mind-set has ominous parallels to the wishful conditionally. However, it is difficult to con thinking of the leadership of the Hirohito ceive of a nuclear-armed China surrendering Shogunate before Pearl Harbor. The Japanese on the aft deck of the USS Ronald Reagan.

Notes

1. Tillman Durdin, James Reston, and Seymour Topping, The acteristics and Laws of High-Technology Local Wars and Raise New York Times Report from Red China (New York: Quadrangle the Standard of Guidance for Winning the High-Technology Books, 1971). See p. 107 for the summary and pp. 81–106 for the Local War of the Future,” Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 20 Feb actual interview. ruary 1999, on-line, Internet, 25 May 2002, Foreign Broadcast In- 2. China is probably satisfied with its land borders, but one formation Service (FBIS) Online [hereafter FBIS Online], serial cannot necessarily say the same of its neighbors—especially FTS19990701001913, available from http://199.221.15.211. India. Over time, that satisfaction may change with circum 14. One should note that, for the United States and the PRC, stances, as the demographic balance of the Russian Far East the Korean War was the equivalent of a border war. Nevertheless, changes with the loss of ethnic Europeans to western Russia and it was a major war. the illegal entry of Chinese. If, at some point, a significant ma 15. One should note that some events, especially the bomb jority of the population there becomes ethnic Chinese, they may ing of the PRC embassy in Yugoslavia, reportedly prompted some start to demand annexation by the PRC. Chinese leaders to warn that US hegemony was increasing regional 3. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict wars, which could lead to a world war. See Yueh Shan, “Beijing with China (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1997), 22. For a more opti Sets Forth New World War Theory,” Hong Kong Cheng Ming, 1 May mistic view, see John Pomfret, “China Sees Interests Tied to U.S.,” 1999, on-line, Internet, 25 May 2002, FBIS Online, serial Washington Post, 2 February 2002, 1. FTS19990516000908, available from http://199.221.15.211. See 4. Although I am extremely skeptical of the claim that wars also Li Tzu-Ching, “The Chinese Military Clamors for War: Vow are caused by misunderstandings, they may very well be caused by ing to Have a Fight with the United States,” Hong Kong Cheng miscalculations that grow from misunderstandings. A particularly Ming, 1 June 1999, on-line, Internet, 25 May 2002, FBIS Online, se relevant example is the misunderstanding of the United States that rial FTS19990626000913, available from http://199.221.15.211. led to Japan’s miscalculation in going to war with America in 1941. 16. In December 1995, the Central Military Commission— 5. Fidel Castro is an obvious example. With the collapse of the Communist Party organization that oversees the military— the Soviet empire and the bankruptcy of Communism, he has concluded that the ground battle was now secondary to the air shrunk to irritant status. battle. See Mark Stokes, “China’s Missile, Space, and Conven 6. Col Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow, Making tional Theater Missile Development: Implications for Security in Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems the Taiwan Strait,” in People’s Liberation Army after Next, ed. Susan (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), 167–70. M. Puska (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, US 7. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1 September 1997, 2; and Army War College, 2000), 109. AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, 17 Febru 17. Wang Houquing and Zhang Xingye, chap. 3, p. 9. ary 2000. 18. Dr. Jeffrey Record, “Thinking about China and War,” Aero­ 8. Dr. David Finkelstein, “Thinking about the PLA’s Revolu space Power Journal 15, no. 4 (winter 2001): 69–80. tion in Doctrinal Affairs,” draft paper, November 2002. Cited with 19. The concept is from Paul Godwin, quoted in Kenneth W. permission of the author. Allen, “Focus on China’s Air Force Modernization,” unpublished 9. Adm Shi Yunsheng, “PLA Navy Military Science,” in Chinese paper, n.d., 3. Navy Encyclopedia, vol. 1 (Beijing: Haichao Publishing House, 20. Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, 3d ed., 1998), 16–31. Many thanks to Dr. David Finkelstein of the Center trans. and ed. Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak, and for Naval Analysis for bringing to my attention the PLA’s naval en- Company, 1975). The original Soviet edition was printed in 1962. cyclopedia (and the book The Science of Campaigns). 21. In 1999 Jiang Zemin recognized that the PRC could not 10. Shi Yunsheng, 16–31. fight and win this kind of war. See “Review of Jiang Zemin’s Views 11. Wang Houquing and Zhang Xingye, eds., The Science of on High-Tech Warfare,” Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, 13 February 2001, Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000), es on-line, Internet, 25 May 2002, FBIS Online, serial pecially chap. 1. CPP20010213000086, 4, available from http://199.221.15.211. 12. A Military Region is a peacetime administrative entity, 22. This, of course, differs most profoundly from the situa whereas a War Zone is a wartime operational entity for the com tion of the United States, which, surrounded by friendly coun mand and control of campaign-level operations. Military Regions tries and far away from the main battlegrounds of the world, has provide forces and assets to a War Zone. Dr. David Finkelstein, implicitly or explicitly assumed for nearly the last century that any Center for Naval Analysis, correspondence with author. wars it fought would be expeditionary and conducted somewhere 13. An excellent basic source is Chinese Views of Future Warfare, else. China has not enjoyed that luxury. ed. Michael Pillsbury (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Uni 23. Mao Zedong’s ideologically driven policies of the 1950s versity Press, 1997). For a more recent and representative Chi and 1960s, particularly the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s and nese view, see Gen Fu Quanyou, “Deepen the Study of the Char- the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the mid-to-late THE CHINESE AIR FORCE 83

1960s, were disastrous, even by the standards of Communist eco 35. Strategic air superiority results from establishing air supe nomics; they led directly to repeated economic and political up riority for the entire war over the entire War Zone, or for specific heavals that set PRC economic growth back decades. periods of time over a specific location or locations. The Chinese 24. For information on the technological limits of Chinese aim to establish such superiority not only over the PRC mainland, military industry, see Bernard D. Cole and Paul H. B. Godwin, but also over the area into which they are trying to project power. “Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Ca See Kenneth W. Allen, “PLAAF Strategic Thought,” unpublished pabilities for the 21st Century,” in The Chinese Armed Forces in the paper, n.d., 1–3; and idem, “PLA Air Force Operations and Mod 21st Century, ed. Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strate ernization,” in Puska, 224. gic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1999), 159–215. See 36. In 1999 a US Department of Defense report estimated also John Wilson and Xue Litai, “China’s Search for a Modern Air that it would take up to 20 years for China to fully establish a na Force,” International Security 24, no. 1 (summer 1999): 64–94. tional integrated air defense system. Cited in Allen, “Focus on 25. For information on China’s past difficulties with integrat China’s Air Force Modernization,” 13. ing foreign technology into its aircraft, see Wilson and Xue Litai. 37. China has purchased 76 Su-27s from Russia, and licensed In “China Hikes Defense Budget Again,” Washington Post, 5 March production of an additional 200 is under way. See “World Defense 2002, 5, John Pomfret reported that 60 percent of China’s Su-27s Almanac,” 301. However, this is hardly a crash program: the pro were grounded. The Chinese consider the Su-27s inadequate. duction agreement between Russia and China set the maximum See Chi Mo, “ ‘J-10’ Fighters Set to Become Air Force’s Main production rate at 10–15 per year. See Allen, “Focus on China’s Arms—50 ‘J-10’ Fighters Set to Be Built; General Secretary Jiang Air Force Modernization,” 7–8 n. 16. In addition, the F-10 fight Zemin Watches Test Flight,” Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao, 29 May ers entering production will replace the comparatively new F-8IIIs, 2002, on-line, Internet, 25 May 2002, FBIS Online, serial not the elderly F-6s—a situation that presumably indicates serious CPP20020529000059, available from http://199.221.15.211. problems with the F-8IIIs. See Chi Mo. 26. Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications 38. Four Russian-built A-50M/U airborne early warning and for the United States (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Insti control (AEW&C) aircraft are reportedly on order. See “World tute, US Army War College, 1999). Defense Almanac,” 302. China seems to need 15–20 such aircraft. 27. Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Tai See Allen, “Focus on China’s Air Force Modernization,” 10–11. wan,” International Security 25, no. 2 (fall 2000): 51–86. The indigenous aircraft is the Y8AEW. See Department of De 28. PRC writings often assume a US-Japanese alliance, and fense, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY 2000 National Defense some of them imply that the PRC expects to confront NATO. See Authorization Act, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Gen Liao Xilong, “PRC General Discusses Civilian Air Defense,” Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Secretary of Defense, 2000), Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 1 April 2001, on-line, Internet, 25 17, on-line, Internet, 15 April 2003, available from http://www. May 2002, FBIS Online, serial CPP20010416000146, available from defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm. http://199.221.15.211. 39. Jim O’Halloran, “New Missile for Chinese FT-2000 SAM 29. Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use System,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 15 August 2001, 15. of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings (Santa Monica, 40. Zhou Shijun, “Try as far as Possible to Move the Battlefields Calif.: RAND, 2000), vii. toward the Enemy Side,” Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, 14 September 1999. 30. This description draws extensively from Nan Li, “The 41. Allen, “China and the Use of Force,” 12. PLA’s Evolving Campaign Doctrine and Strategy,” in The People’s 42. In 1999 PLAAF commander Liu Shunyao said that the Liberation Army in the Information Age, ed. James C. Mulvenon and PLAAF would change as fast as possible from territorial air defense Richard H. Yang (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), 146–74. to gain both defensive and offensive capabilities, indicating that See also Huang Jialun, “Attach Importance to Operation at Outer offensive capability was an aspiration, not a present capability. See Strategic Line,” Beijing Jiefanjun Bao, 30 November 1999, on-line, Sun Maoqing, “Air Force Commander Liu Shunyao Says That He Internet, 25 May 2002, FBIS Online, serial FTS19991231001520, Is Endeavoring to Build a Powerful Modern People’s Air Force available from http://199.221. 15.211; and Nan Li, 154. with Both Offensive and Defensive Capabilities,” Beijing Xinhua 31. Maj Gen Zheng Shenxia and Senior Col Zhang Chazhi, Domestic Service, 8 November 1999, on-line, Internet, 25 May 2002, “The Military Revolution in Air Power,” in Pillsbury, 301. FBIS Online, serial FTS19991130000440, available from http:// 32. The main transport capability of the PLAAF consists of 25 199.221.15.211. See also Huang Jialun. Y-8s (Chinese-built AN-12s) and 25 Il-76s. See “World Defense Al 43. Allen, “China and the Use of Force,” 40. Although the manac,” Military Technology 26, no. 1 (January 2002): 301. The de specific reference is to F-6s and F-7s, this could just as readily mands on PLAAF’s transport force are likely to be extreme. In ad apply to the B-5s and B-6s of the PLAAF bomber force. The dition to providing force-projection capability, they will have to PLAAF evidently has about 150 B-5s (being retired) and 120 B-6s. redeploy troops from other parts of the PRC to reinforce the War See “World Defense Almanac,” 301. Zone. The PLAAF’s very small force of transports is likely to be to- 44. The PLAAF has taken delivery of 38 Su-30s, signed a sec tally inadequate for either mission, let alone both. Although Chi ond contract for a second batch of 38 more in 2001, and is re nese civilian transports can deliver troops, they cannot move much portedly expected to buy at least a third batch. See “China Ex equipment. In addition to these wartime campaigns, PLAAF writ pected to Buy Third Batch of Su-30MKKs,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 ings discuss an air-blockade campaign, intended to isolate a tar- August 2002, 14. The PLAAF, which is reportedly procuring them get country. See Wang Houquing and Zhang Xingye, chap. 13. as replacements for older B-5s, may be considering producing 33. Zong Fangsheng, “PLA Merges Artillery and Air Defense them under license. See Allen, “PLA Air Force Operations and Forces,” S&T Daily, 25 July 2000. He is evidently thinking in Modernization,” 215. terms of NATO’s war against Yugoslavia in 1999. 45. The Chinese are enthusiastic about the potential of in- 34. Kenneth W. Allen, “China and the Use of Force: The Role formation warfare, which they seem to regard as something of a of the PLA Air Force,” unpublished paper, 2000, 26. The three new magic bullet. However, their actual capabilities may be quite lim offenses include those against stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and ited. See James Mulvenon, “The PLA and Information Warfare,” armed helicopters. The three new defenses include those against in Mulvenon and Yang, 175–86. precision bombing, electronic interference, and reconnaissance 46. The PLAAF has about 500 Q-5 attack aircraft, which are and surveillance. See Guo Jia, “Building Stronger Armed Forces redesigned F-6s. See “World Defense Almanac,” 301. through Science and Technology: Train Crack Troops for Winning 47. See Allen, “PLA Air Force Operations and Moderniza Future Wars,” Beijing Renmin Rebao, 17 December 2001. tion,” 201; and idem, “China and the Use of Force,” 6. Iraq, Preemption, and the Views of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary

COL GORDON R. HAMMOCK, USAF

Editorial Abstract: Colonel Hammock exam­ ines the generally favorable actions and views of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in response to the announced US strategy of preemption and the recent implementation of that policy in Iraq.

We’ll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of Amer­ ica will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons. —President George W. Bush

OLAND, THE CZECH REPUBLIC, Hungary, though, seems to be losing steam in and Hungary see merit in many of the the longer term. This article reviews the US arguments supporting the announced policy of preemption, and the sequence of in US strategy of preemption and, par ternational political events relating to the ap Pticularly, the recent implementation of that plication of that policy in Iraq; it then examines strategy in Iraq. They would, nevertheless, have the views and actions of Poland, the Czech preferred to avoid “choosing sides” between Republic, and Hungary. the important countries and bodies involved in that discussion (i.e., the United States, in dividual European nations, the European The US National Security Strategy Union [EU], the North Atlantic Treaty Orga and Preemption nization [NATO], and the United Nations [UN] and its Security Council). However, when The words of President Bush, quoted in the compelled to do so, Polish leaders emerge as opening epigraph and spoken during his State the most supportive of US actions with the of the Union Address on 29 January 2002,1 Czech and Hungarian leaders not far behind. were eventually integrated into the new Na-

84 IRAQ, PREEMPTION 85 tional Security Strategy, which he signed on 17 preemptive action in self-defense, supported September 2002. That strategy asserted that presidential efforts to work with and through “we must be prepared to stop rogue states the Security Council, and authorized the use and their terrorist clients before they are able to of force in self-defense or to enforce Security threaten or use weapons of mass destruction Council resolutions.8 Finally, the resolution against the United States and our allies and entrusted solely to the president any future 2 friends” (emphasis added). It also outlined decision to use force—requiring at that future three criteria—the inability to deter, the imme time the president to determine that diacy of the threat, and the magnitude of the potential harm—that when combined cause a •� reliance on diplomatic or other peace situation to warrant “preemptive” action.3 ful means will not protect US national Importantly, the new US policy can be trig security or will not lead to the enforce gered by either a capability or simply an effort ment of relevant Security Council reso to obtain a capability, when it is combined lutions, and that with a presumed hostile intent. This new stan dard is a significant relaxation of the long- •� such action is consistent with the over- standing, apparent requirement for such a use arching actions of the United States and of force.4 More to the point, it injects a fair other countries in pursuing interna amount of subjective judgment into an equa tional terrorist organizations, including tion that had historically been more objective those nations, organizations, or persons in nature. involved in perpetrating the events of 11 September 2001.9 Throwing Down the Gauntlet In short, Congress provided the president sufficient flexibility to act in the nation’s de to the UN fense with the caveat that force was the option On 12 September 2002, President Bush ad- of last resort, should be consistent with the dressed the UN General Assembly and de- larger strategic war on terrorism, and would be tailed Iraq’s history of noncompliance and best accomplished by and through the Security deception regarding previous Security Council Council. resolutions; more importantly, he challenged the UN to become the full-bodied institution its founders intended and pledged the United UN Security Council States to work with the UN to that end. That Resolution 1441— said, President Bush made clear his resolve, that should the Security Council fail to mea Implementation and Aftermath sure up to the task, the United States would 5 The Security Council unanimously adopted fill the resultant breach. Resolution (UNSCR) 1441 on 8 November 2002, which, inter alia, held Iraq in “material Congressional Approval of Use of breach” of its obligations under previous reso lutions, afforded Iraq a “final opportunity to Force against Iraq comply with its disarmament obligations,” re On 16 October 2002, President Bush signed quired Iraq to declare all aspects of its weapons into law House Joint Resolution 114, which al of mass destruction (WMD) programs and ac lowed force against Iraq.6 Although debate companying delivery systems, and provided for on the measure was fairly abbreviated, the re an enhanced inspection regimen.10 The Se sulting measure was comprehensive in both curity Council warned Iraq of “serious conse its scope and design.7 The resolution articu quences” in the event of continued violations lated a rationale for the United States to take and decided to remain “seized” of the matter.11 86 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

During January–February 2003, public and provoked an intemperate rebuke from Pre often visceral posturing by Germany (one of sident Chirac.14 the six nonpermanent members of the Security NATO became divided on 11 February 2003 Council and whose representative served as its over Turkey’s request for defensive assistance president during the month of February 2003) in anticipation of retaliatory acts by Iraq for and the five permanent members of the Secu Turkey’s (expected) support of the coalition. rity Council caused deep divisions: first in the France, Germany, and Belgium vetoed the Security Council, then in the EU, and finally in measure, calling it “premature.” Although this NATO. Germany set the divisive process in mo issue was later resolved, these countries did tion on 22 September 2002 when Chancellor not relish the prospect of being pulled into Gerhard Schröder “snatched victory from the conflict by their collective self-defense re jaws of defeat” for his Green Party through a sponsibilities (contained in Article 5 of the rash, last-minute promise to not support or par NATO treaty) to indirectly support US-initiated ticipate in any later action against Iraq. Chan offensive operations that some felt were not 15 cellor Schröder compounded the divide fur sanctioned by the Security Council. ther by convincing President Jacques Chirac of In the midst of this posturing and in vari France to back out of his gentleman’s agree ous public statements, President George Bush, ment with the United States—an agreement to Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary not force a second UN resolution—in exchange of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made clear the for a power-play move that would permit France United States’s intention to press forward in and Germany to dominate the European Coun- the face of continued Iraqi intransigence— 12 with or without specific authority from the cil. The issue that had initially separated the 16 United States from three of the Council’s per UN. At about the same time, UN secretary- manent members (France, Russia, and China) general Kofi Anan stated his view that a sec ond UN resolution was a prerequisite for the was their desire to allow the UN inspectors ad 17 ditional time. Britain also supported giving the legitimate use of force. Following the onset inspectors “the time they need,” but with Prime of hostilities, the United States publicly dis agreed with this view.18 Within the context of Minister Tony Blair’s caveat that he could fore- this international backdrop, we turn our ex see military action without a second resolution amination to the views and actions of Poland, if such a resolution were vetoed “unreasonably” the Czech Republic, and Hungary. (i.e., in the face of a clear report from inspec tors that Iraq was not cooperating).13 An EU rift erupted on 30 January 2003 as Commonalty and Differences the leaders of eight of its member countries (Spain, Britain, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, amongst the Three Countries Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) Although there is much to make each of publicly endorsed the US position on Iraq in the three countries and their actions unique, a written declaration published in newspapers there are also three historic events that they in both Europe and the United States. Their have in common. The significance of those action caught leaders of the EU, France, and events warrants their specific mention: the Germany by surprise. In addition, the synergy conflict in Kosovo, the Prague Summit, and of that action and Secretary of State Colin the 30 January 2003 “Statement of Eight.” Powell’s address to the UN Security Council Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic on 5 February 2003 helped prompt the “Vilnius entered NATO together on 12 March 1999, 10” (the NATO-candidate and near-candidate and within days, all three cast their first vote in countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, the alliance to back the use of armed force in Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slo Kosovo. In Hungary and especially the Czech vakia, and Slovenia) to publicly endorse the Republic, this vote came against a difficult do US position on that same day. Their action mestic backdrop—given the long-standing ties IRAQ, PREEMPTION 87 with the neighboring region and the genuine the same time it supports philosophically and risk of spreading the conflict. Nevertheless, substantively the US response to the changed their support was unequivocal, as NATO was world condition after the events of 11 Sep viewed as the essential guarantor of each coun tember 2001.22 Additionally, Poland’s leaders try’s future security.19 This was not only the offer constructive insight and “ways ahead” first vote these countries cast, it was also the first for progress. Mr. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, “out of scope” action authorized by NATO— Poland’s minister for foreign affairs, has been an interesting introduction to NATO. at the forefront of urging a structural reex Following the Security Council’s unanimous amination of the concept of preventive action approval of UNSCR 1441, these three countries in response to emerging, and not just imminent, joined with the other 16 NATO countries at threats—the latter having long served as justi the Prague Summit on 21 November 2002 and fication for preemptive action. On 6 March unanimously endorsed that UN resolution. 2003, in an address in New Zealand, he inti- Their joint statement concluded with the fol mated that change was necessary and that the lowing words: “NATO Allies stand united in Iraq crisis could serve as the catalyst for pro their commitment to take effective action to ducing that change. In that forum, he invited assist and support the efforts of the UN to en- UN members to create a new basis for a global sure full and immediate compliance by Iraq, security system and to squarely address one of without conditions or restrictions, with UNSCR the most important security issues of the day: 1441. We recall that the Security Council in this resolution has warned Iraq that it will Since September 11, 2001 several important pub lic statements have emphasized the fact that the face serious consequences as a result of its 20 use of force as an instrument of addressing inter- continued violation of its obligations.” national problems has been put in a new light. Finally, these three countries joined the Some argued that the scope of the right to self- Statement of Eight in supporting the US pos defense was a legitimate topic for re-examination. ture on Iraq. Of importance, however, is their Others sought to prove the legitimacy of pre collective view that the UN Security Council ventive military intervention should international occupy the central and formative role in law be seriously violated. The case of Iraq raises the maintaining peace and security, as reflected question of the culture of prevention. Would it be ap­ in the statement’s concluding paragraph: propriate now to include this notion into the code of political norms espoused by the United Nations? How The U.N. Charter charges the Security Council can the reaction of the international community with the task of preserving international peace be speeded-up in the face of crisis situations? and security. To do so, the Security Council must There are no ready answers on hand in the mat maintain its credibility by ensuring full compli ter. The case of Saddam Hussein may offer an ance with its resolutions. We cannot allow a dic instructive lesson to the international commu tator to systematically violate those resolutions. nity if it seriously looks for relevant solutions to If they are not complied with, the Security Coun global security threats. The international envi cil will lose its credibility and world peace will ronment changes and the way it is perceived suffer as a result. We are confident that the Se changes likewise. This concerns among others curity Council will face up to its responsibilities.21 international security. The old international set ting fades away and the structures originating In short, the eight countries clearly share the from it are not always able to live up to the new US view on the apparent need for the use of situation. They urgently need reform. . . . Today’s force in Iraq, though they may not wholly discussions on global governance are definitely share the US view on the legality of the use of eclipsed by the Iraqi crisis. We still do not know such force absent specific UN authorization. all implications that it may have for the interna tional system. It has already caused visible rifts. Poland However, we must look beyond the short-term agenda. Polish initiative of the New Political Act Poland is a nation committed to NATO, the for the United Nations is intended to help us in UN, and a multilateralist approach, while at this process (emphasis added).23 88 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

On 19 March 2003—the eve of hostilities During my in-country conversations with as Mr. Bush’s ultimatum to Iraq was running Polish officials as well as Christopher R. Hill, out—the Polish Council of Ministers issued a the US ambassador to Poland, several of the statement endorsing the president of Poland’s above points were expanded. In short, the request to commit military support to the coali Polish position not only supported the tion forming against Iraq. That statement em United States, but also intellectually sup- phasized several important points: force as an ported its rationale. option of last resort in international relations, Ambassador Hill noted that the Statement and the failure to take action to disarm Iraq in of Eight was a genuine reaction of those na this situation would be a serious political and tions—not a US brainchild—to what they military mistake. The Council approved the viewed as the French and Germans speaking president’s request, while capping participa out of turn on Iraq during the celebration of tion at 200 soldiers, noting that the Elysee Treaty’s 40th anniversary. As Ambas sador Hill noted, this prompted Chancellor the anticipated participation of Poland in the Schröder to place a nasty call to Prime Minister international coalition is limited, and the size of Leszek Miller of Poland to complain bitterly the contingent will not exceed 200 soldiers. about not being consulted. President Miller The Polish contingent will receive limited spe cialist tasks. They will be mostly of a logistic na aptly noted in response that Poland had not ture, supporting the activities of the coalition been consulted prior to the French and Ger 27 forces—such as neutralizing the consequences man statement. of the possible use of weapons of mass destruc Mr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the former minis tion by Iraq, decontaminating the area, etc. ter of national defense for Poland, made clear They are well suited to the capacity of our his view that preventive war was a necessary armed forces.24 option for the United States to retain. In sup- port for his position, he noted that in 1934, Poland had already made a significant con Poland had urged France to pursue preven tribution to the larger international war against tive military action against Germany. His con terrorism. That included the deployment of cern was that it was important that the United combat engineers and logistics forces to Bagram, States flesh out the criteria for its use—what Afghanistan, where they cleared over 4,000 would be the exception, and what would be square meters of land, and the deployment of the norm. He noted that countries develop a special operations unit, as well as a logistics ing WMDs served as a good tripwire. Mr. support ship to US Central Command (CENT Onyszkiewic also expressed concern that the COM) for its use in maritime and leadership United States had not thoroughly thought 25 interdiction operations. It was one of only through its preemption policy and as a conse 11 countries whose contribution to the coali quence, could not accurately anticipate the tion was singled out by President Bush in a 27 potential and probable consequences ema March 2003 speech to the CENTCOM troops nating from it.28 at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: All the nations in our coalition are contributing The Czech Republic to our steady progress. British ground forces The Czech Republic, although understanding have seized strategic towns and ports . . . Polish the necessity of preventive action in certain military forces have secured an Iraqi oil platform situations—particularly involving WMDs—is a in the Persian Gulf. . . . Czech, Slovak, Polish, and Romanian forces, soon to be joined by nation committed to seeing that when force is Ukrainian and Bulgarian forces, are forward used in international relations, it is done so deployed in the region, prepared to respond in under the rubric of the UN. If Poland’s cardi the event of an attack of weapons of mass de nal rule is “First do no harm to NATO,” then struction anywhere in the region (emphasis the Czech Republic’s corollary is “Please don’t added).26 make us choose between being pro-Atlantic IRAQ, PREEMPTION 89 and pro-Europe.”29 The republic’s “straddle” During the in-country conversations with position was exacerbated by the gap between Czech officials, our team did not develop any the end of the term of President Vaclav Havel— real insights into how the Czech Republic a staunchly pro-US figure—and the 7 March views the US policy of preemption. However, 2003 inauguration of Vaclav Klaus—a brilliant, in an extended informal exchange with the top if less enthusiastic, ally.30 lawyer in the republic’s Ministry of Defense, In official statements, the Czech Republic he commented that he had been asked to issue consistently advocated that the UN adopt the an opinion on the legality of the Coalition of US view on Iraq. On 5 February 2003, the the Willing in light of the provisions in the UN Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that charter. His elicited opinion was that no such authority existed; that opinion was returned from the viewpoint of the Czech Republic . . . with the request that he study the issue fur- the UN Security Council must seek a consensus ther.36 In sum, the Czech Republic sees the UN on how to ensure the implementation of its re spective resolutions. The Czech Republic there- as the only vehicle for collective action, but it fore welcomes the continued multilateral ap also seeks to fully support US actions, as long proach favored by the US. . . . Provided the UN as that does not compromise its basic world- Security Council proves in any form the viola view. Successfully maintaining a political pos tion of the Iraqi obligations, the Czech Republic ture such as this requires careful parsing, will be prepared to assume its share of respon which was much in evidence in the words and sibility for the maintenance of global peace and actions of the Czech Republic. security.31 Officially listed as a member of the “Coali Hungary tion of the Willing,” the Czech MFA’s statement The US deputy chief of mission at the US Em on the eve of war was a tepid endorsement of bassy in Budapest noted that the Hungarian the coalition’s effort. It also delimited its mili government signed the Statement of Eight, tary contributions to a nuclear, biological, and then immediately backtracked.37 Perhaps, this is chemical protection battalion in the event of due to Hungary’s own discordant public opinion WMD use or reasonable suspicion of its use and the conflict inherent in her foreign-policy against civilians or coalition forces. At the goal to improve relationships with the United same time, the MFA signaled its willingness to States, Russia, and her neighbors. It’s note- provide humanitarian assistance during the worthy that the issues surrounding the Iraqi war and to aid in the postwar reconstruction crisis received scant attention on the Web site effort.32 The Czech Republic made significant of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or contributions to both the effort in Afghanistan that of the Embassy of the United States in as well as to the then looming conflict in Iraq.33 Budapest.38 That support included stationing country Hungary’s apparently quixotic support is representatives at CENTCOM, providing bas prompted by the realization that its support ing and overflight permission, deploying 251 for the coalition might produce an undesired personnel to Kuwait for combating the effects security risk. More to the point, Hungary of possible WMD employment, donating mili agreed to allow the United States to use tary uniforms to the Afghan national army, Taszar Air Base to train some 3,000 Iraqi exiles deploying a 150-man hospital unit to Bagram, for possible postwar administrative roles.39 and providing air transport support to NATO Hungarians—who were opposed to a war with for early warning missions—support that Iraq and were opposed to the training at earned President Bush’s public recognition.34 Taszar by figures of 80 and 60 percent, re Finally, the Czech Republic promptly expelled spectively—fear that these actions risk sparking the Iraqi chargés d’affaires just days after the terrorist action against Hungary.40 In some United States asked all countries to take such sense, Hungary’s after-the-fact hand-wringing action.35 mirrors problems encountered in integrating 90 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 its military with NATO. A dominant theme diplomatic bone” to France by refusing to that emerged during our meetings with Hun expel the Iraqi chargés d’affaires as requested garian counterparts was that Hungary was by the United States.45 In short, Hungary ap asked to commit resources to NATO without pears to be actively engaged in working both first fully understanding what that commit sides of the street, with the hope of reducing ment actually entailed.41 the differences between NATO members, and Hungary does understand—even with its the expectation of having friendly relations reservations—that 11 September 2001 changed and being welcomed by both sides. the world’s political equation. If the Czech Republic’s concern is “Please don’t make us choose between being pro-Atlantic and pro- Conclusion Europe,” then the Hungarian offshoot is more Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and fatalistic—it is that “No matter what we do, we the United States share common values and a will be seen as disloyal to France and Germany, common understanding that the use of force or to the US.”42 Hungary is supportive of US is a necessary—if undesirable—tool in preserv preventive action in striking against terror ing peace and security, as well as earning and ism—particularly against nonstate actors, which maintaining one’s freedom. When they were are not easily influenced by UN Security Coun reluctantly compelled to take sides in the case cil action. Notwithstanding, Hungary believes of Iraq, each sided with the United States—each that there must be international consensus on with varying amounts of reservation as to the the desired end state of a military campaign road ahead, but with the hope that the nor and the political goals to be realized.43 Given mal order of international relations will once the lack of such consensus, Hungary has again turn to multilateralism through the aus stepped forward and taken on the role of pices of the UN, NATO, and, in the future, the fence-mender between the members of NATO. EU. These countries share multiple borders This is partially explained by Hungary’s histori and view robust collective security organiza cal orientation towards Germany and France, tions as the guarantor of a more certain future and its friendship with Britain and the United for themselves individually and for Europe at States. In this regard, Prime Minister Peter large. In many ways their stance mirrors that Medgyessy of Hungary was the first European of our Congress—they support the military leader to be received in France’s Elysee Palace action but state a preference for action under following President Chirac’s intemperate re- the mantle of UN authority. All of these three marks; this is consistent with his fence- countries emerged from the Iraq matter with— mender’s role in smoothing over differences to some degree—a foot in each camp and can of opinion in the transatlantic alliance.44 Re now serve as effective “bridge builders” in maining consistent with this policy, Hungary smoothing over bitter feelings between some permitted the United States and Britain to members of the UN and NATO and help use Hungarian airspace and designated air- both institutions achieve greater importance ports for its war in Iraq, while it threw “a and attain a more robust character.

Notes

1. President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” 3. Ibid., 15. United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 28 January 2002, on-line, 4. On 7 October 2002, Sen. Arlen Specter restated, in the well Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.whitehouse. of the Senate, the long-standing international norm with respect gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html. to preemptive action. He noted: “In evaluating the time when 2. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United preemptive action may be used, Secretary of State Daniel Web States (Washington, D.C., 17 September 2002), 14, on-line, Internet, ster, in dealing with the so-called Caroline incident, in 1837, 16 June 2003, available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ when British troops attacked and sank an American ship . . . nss.pdf. Pay special attention to the word threaten—the policy now made a point that an intrusion into the territory of another State targets nascent capabilities. can be justified as an act of self defense only in those: [C]ases in IRAQ, PREEMPTION 91 which the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming and leaves gon, Washington, D.C., 22 January 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June no choice of means and no moment of deliberation” (emphasis added). 2003, available from www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm; Senate, Delegation of Congressional Authority, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 7 and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, remarks to the United Na October 2002, S10004, on-line, Internet, 17 June 2003, available tions Security Council, United Nations Headquarters, New York from http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate.cgi? City, 5 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available WAIS docID=85668724316+1+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve. from http://dod.mil/news/Jan2003/t01232003_t0122sdfpc.html. 5. President George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President in 17. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, comments delivered by an Address to the United Nations General Assembly,” United Na Lakhdar Brahimi to the Thirteenth Summit of the Non-Aligned tions Headquarters, New York, N.Y., 12 September 2002, on-line, Movement, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 24 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 17 June 2003, available from http://www.whitehouse. Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.un.org/News/ gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html. Press/docs/2003/sgsm8616.doc.htm. 6. President George W. Bush, remarks made when signing 18. The State Department’s top lawyer, William Howard Taft House Joint Resolution (H.J.R.) 114, White House, Washington, IV, stated that clear UN authority for the use of force was derived D.C., 16 October 2002, on-line, Internet, 17 June 2003, available from UN Security Council Resolutions 678, 687, and 1441. Also, Mr. from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/2002 Taft noted that the United States could proceed under the theory 1016-1.html. of self-defense. Peter Slevin, “U.S. Says War Has Legal Basis—Re 7. Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of liance on Gulf War Resolutions Is Questioned by Others,” Washing- 2002, H.J.R. 114, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 16 October 2002, was en- ton Post, Friday, 21 March 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, acted as Public Law 107-243, 116 Stat 1498-1502, on-line, Internet, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ 17 June 2003, available from http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ A1332-2003Mar20.html. cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f: 19. Fred Coleman, “NATO Newcomers Plunged into Conflict,” publ243.107.pdf. USA TODAY, Wednesday, 23 April 1999, on-line, Internet, 19 June 8. Ibid. The resolution noted, inter alia, that in his address to 2003, available from http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/ the UN, President Bush committed the United States to “work kosovo//koso396.htm. with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common 20. Prague Summit Statement on Iraq, Prague, Czech Republic, challenge” posed by Iraq. 21 November 2002, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available 9. Ibid. from http://www.czechembassy.org/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id= 10. UN Security Council Resolution 1441, “The Situation be- 15683&ido=10094&idj=36. tween Iraq and Kuwait,” 8 November 2002, especially paragraphs 21. Editorial, “United We Stand,” Wall Street Journal, Thursday, 1–3 and 5–7. Note that 1441 referenced 11 of the 25 prior reso 30 January 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from lutions regarding Iraq. On-line, Internet, 18 June 2003, available http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110002994. from http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/ 22. Mr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Poland’s minister of national de iraqres.pdf. fense, said that their adaptation of the “Hippocratic Oath” is “first 11. Ibid. See paragraphs 13 and 14. “Seized” is a diplomatic do no harm to NATO” in comments to US AWC contingent at the term denoting intense interest in and continued oversight and di Polish Armed Defense Forces Headquarters, Warsaw, Poland, 3 rection of a particular issue or problem. Conversation with Mr. March 2003. Earle St. A. Scarlett, Department of State advisor to Air War Col 23. Mr. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Poland’s former prime lege (AWC). minister and current minister for foreign affairs, “Poland in the 12. William Safire, “Bad Herr Dye,” New York Times, Thursday, Changing International Environment at the Dawn of the 21st 23 January 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from Century,” lecture, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/23/opinion/23SAFI.html. Wellington, New Zealand, 6 March 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 13. Glenn Kessler, “Verdict Unclear; UN Divide Is Not: Diplo June 2003, available from http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php. mats Find Justifications for and against Iraq Invasion,” Washing- 24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, ton Post, Tuesday, 28 January 2003, A13, on-line, Internet, 19 June “Statement of the Council of Ministers,” Warsaw, Poland, 19 2003, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ March 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from articles/A52076-2003Jan27.html. http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php. 14. Editorial, “United We Stand,” Wall Street Journal, Thursday, 25. US State Department Fact Sheet, “International Contri 30 January 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from butions to the War against Terrorism,” 14 June 2002, on-line, Inter- http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110002994; Glenn net, 20 June 2003, available from http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/ Frankel and Keith B. Richburg, “8 Leaders in Europe Back Bush pol/terror/020815contribute.htm. on Iraq,” Washington Post, Friday, 31 January 2003, A16, on-line, 26. President George W. Bush, remarks made at Headquar Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.washington ters CENTCOM, MacDill AFB, Fla., 27 March 2003, on-line, Inter- post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3685-2003Jan30.html; the text of the net, 24 June 2003, available from http://www.usinfo.pl/docs/cc_ Vilnius Group Statement is on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, avail- transcript.htm. able from http://www.bulgaria-embassy.org/!/02052003-01.htm; 27. US Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, remarks to AWC con and David R. Sands, “Continental Divide,” Washington Times, Sun- tingent, US Embassy, Warsaw, Poland, 3 March 2003. day, 9 February 2003. 28. Onyszkiewicz. 15. Steven R. Weisman, “US Demands Iraq Show Cooperation 29. Mr. Ivan Pocuch, deputy director of security policy for the by This Weekend,” New York Times, Monday, 10 February 2003, Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), remarks to on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.ny AWC contingent at the MFA, Prague, Czech Republic, 6 March times.com/2003/02/10/international/middleeast/10DIPL.html; 2003. and Richard Bernstein with Steven R. Weisman, “NATO Settles 30. US Country Team, remarks to AWC contingent, US Em Rift over Aid to Turks in Case of a War,” New York Times, Monday, bassy, Prague, Czech Republic, 6 March 2003. 17 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from 31. Czech Republic MFA, Statement on the UN Security http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/17/international/europe/ Council Meeting of 5 February 2003, MFA, Prague, Czech Re- 17IRAQ.html. public, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from http:// 16. President Bush, State of the Union; Secretary of Defense www.czechembassy.org/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id=16585&ido= Donald H. Rumsfeld, briefing at the Foreign Press Center, Penta 6569&idj=2. 92 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

32. Czech Republic MFA, Statement on the Situation Con 39. Adam LeBor, “Government Decision on Taszar Sends a cerning Iraq, MFA, Prague, Czech Republic, 19 March 2003, on- Message to the World,” Budapest Sun, 23 January 2003, on-line, In line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from http://www.czech ternet, 24 June 2003, available from http://www.budapestsun. embassy.org/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id=17669&ido=6569&idj= com/full_story.asp?ArticleId={CCC2D4052AF142018C8895CC0E 2&amb=1. 768440}&From=News%20-%20Editorial. 33. US State Department Fact Sheet, “International Contri 40. Eszter Balazs, “Taszar Fears Run High,” Budapest Sun, 23 butions to the War against Terrorism,” Department of Defense, January 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from Washington, D.C., 14 June 2002, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, http://www.budapestsun.com/full_story.asp?ArticleId={378EA18 available from http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/020815 D58D74050B166DF9A47482AC9}&From=News; and Tamas Kiss, contribute.htm. “First Iraqi Volunteers Touch Down in Taszar,” Budapest Sun, 6 34. President Bush, Headquarters CENTCOM. 35. Czech Republic MFA, Statement of the Expulsion of the February 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from Iraqi Chargé d´affaires,” MFA, Prague, Czech Republic, 24 March http://www.budapestsun.com/full_story.asp?ArticleId={996D24 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from http://www. ABE94D45BD8708E598AB6D2A96}&From=News. czechembassy.org/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id=17724&ido=6569& 41. Hungary’s complaint was that once it had committed to idj=2&amb=1. providing certain types of forces to the alliance, NATO then ex 36. Czech Republic Ministry of Defence attorney, conversation plained what the requirements for such forces were. with AWC contingent, informal social gathering, Prague, Czech 42. Eszter Balazs, “PM Dismisses Chirac Outburst as ‘Mistake,’” Republic, 6 March 2003. Budapest Sun, 27 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, 37. Ms. Janet E. Garvey, remarks to AWC contingent, US Em available from http://www.budapestsun.com/full_story.asp?Article bassy, Budapest, Hungary, 11 March 2003. Id={AE10B03F701D46BD8BDC09700CA26E3E}&From=News. 38. There was only one mention of Iraq on each Web page. 43. Gyorgy Rabai, administrative assistant, Hungarian minis The first reads as follows: “Prime Minister of Hungary and lead ter of defence, to AWC contingent at the Ministry of Defence in ers of Britain, Spain, Portugal, Italy, the Czech Republic, Poland Budapest, 11 March 2003. and Denmark call for Europe and [the] United States to stand 44. Eszter Balazs, “Chirac Assures PM of Continued EU Sup- united.” Hungarian MFA Web site, on-line, Internet, 19 June port,” Budapest Sun, 13 March 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, 2003, available from http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/Templates/ available from http://www.budapestsun.com/full_story.asp?Article CikkSablonAlt.aspx?NRMODE=Published&NRORIGINAL Id={7A773B3DC78B45348BF262B7B0CB655A}&From=News. URL=%2fKulugyminiszterium%2fEN%2fissues%2firaq%2ehtm &NRNODEGUID=%7b95D0625D-E625-45BF-B57E-6 45. Eszter Balazs, “Iraq Airspace Decision,” Budapest Sun, 20 D061716F536%7d&NRCACHEHINT=NoModifyGuest; the other March 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http:// statement—informative, vice positional—was issued following Sec www.budapestsun.com/full_story.asp?ArticleId={8D0E14F3FF1B retary Powell’s address to the UN on 5 February 2003. Laszló 43CD9E096B40FCB315BB}&From=News; and idem, “Hungary Kovács, Hungarian minister for foreign affairs, statement on Iraq, Rejects US Iraq Embassy Request,” Budapest Sun, 27 March 2003, Budapest, Hungary, 5 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 June on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www. 2003, available from http://www.kum.hu/Szovivoi/2003/02/ budapestsun.com/full_story.asp?ArticleId={87DF900F0DEF4C1B spok0205.htm. AAF9658F8D8CDED4}&From=News.

As an institution, the American people trust the military more than any profession in the United States. They are confident in our ability to defend our nation at home. They trust our competence in conflict. They are keenly aware of the professionalism and skill of airmen and their contributions to our nation’s victories in the first Gulf War, in the Balkans, and most recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq. And they deeply appreciate the airmen who secure the skies over this wonder­ ful country. —James G. Roche Secretary of the Air Force The Benelux Deployable Air Task Force A Model for EU/NATO Defense Force Integration

LT COL DAVE L. ORR, USAF

Editorial Abstract: Colonel Orr observes the success of Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg in combining aspects of their individual military strengths to create the Benelux Deployable Air Task Force, a rapid-response expeditionary capability. The success of this initiative offers one model for improving EU/NATO rapid- response efforts while simultaneously al­ lowing member states to optimize their own limited defense resources.

ELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG member nations seek to organize their indi formed the Benelux Deployable Air vidual capabilities through bilateral and multi- Task Force (DATF) in September lateral arrangements to form specialized task 1996 in an effort to optimize the ef forces. The Benelux DATF has been a model Bfect of their limited defense resources. Com that illustrates the positive effects that achiev ponents of the Belgium and Netherlands air ing interoperability within multilateral coali forces were combined with a tailored Luxem tion resources has on increased capability for bourg security force to form the Benelux military roles and missions. This article de- DATF—viable, highly specialized packages to scribes the DATF’s organization and its possible support the gamut of military operations. future role in NATO and an EU Rapid Reaction Current security themes in the European Force (EU RRF). It also compares the NATO Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty goal of formally integrating member-nation Organization (NATO) focus on the formation assets with those of the DATF example, which of corps-sized task forces that emphasize merely pools capabilities for greater effect. “long-range application of force, deployability, Despite the 2002 Prague Summit’s repeated sustainability, and effective engagement” in commitment to leverage military technologies peacekeeping and peacemaking missions and field an EU RRF in 2003, NATO and EU- throughout and beyond the US European member defense budgets have continued to Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility decline. That decline pressures these nations to (AOR).1 In achieving this vision, European pool their combat and support assets within

93 94 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 multinational task forces to be able to field a distinct military organization—separate from military capability that can successfully serve NATO—the CFSP sought a greater commit in future contingencies. ment from EU member nations and expected them to relegate some sovereignty over their military resources.6 The Benelux DATF and Benelux DATF Origins— other bilateral and multilateral arrangements Developing an EU Military Identity were forged during the effort in the mid-1990s to build multinational cooperation between Since the inception of NATO, and most NATO and EU members. notably with the growth of a military structure within the EU, European nations have sought multinational cooperation in building defense Benelux DATF: forces. NATO’s struggle with interoperability Organization and Execution and burden sharing has continued in recent years due to the divergence in defense budgets Cooperation between the Netherlands and and the resulting differences in military capa Belgium air forces was already strong before bilities between the United States and the formally joining the DATF. They had devel other members of NATO. The United States oped comparable military capabilities, and has been called on, during most post–Cold War their common NATO history and culture had missions, to provide all strategic airlift, intelli allowed them to effectively participate together gence gathering, and the preponderance of in military exercises. The precedent of their logistics and airpower; the other NATO mem long-standing naval-command relationship, bers carried out “manpower-intensive tasks which placed the Netherland naval command such as long-term peacekeeping.”2 In the over both navies during crisis situations, was 1990s, the EU expanded its focus from eco not followed by the DATF. The air forces sim nomic interoperability to aggressively explore ply agreed to pool all types of military equip the development of European military capa ment and weapons systems for DATF use.7 A bilities. Initially, initiatives such as Combined planning cell was activated in February 1996 Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and the European as a precursor to the actual DATF enactment Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) were the following September. The cell developed collaborative ventures with NATO. The CJTF the deployable force concept, which led to the organization enabled the EU to use NATO re- inclusion of the Luxembourg army to provide sources for peacekeeping operations without deployed security. At this time, the DATF was US involvement. During the approval of this unique because it extended military coopera concept in June 1996, President Jacques Chirac tion beyond the NATO model of matching of France termed this multinational pooling systems. While NATO was the springboard for of European assets as “separable but not sepa international cooperation, it focused on system rate forces.”3 The Eurocorps was a formal ex- interoperability and commonality to best inte ample of this effort to integrate NATO assets grate its multinational assets. The DATF took into a multinational force. The Eurocorps in advantage of the Belgian and Dutch cultural cludes forces from Germany, Belgium, Spain, similarities and extended its capabilities to in France, and Luxembourg and maintains a clude command and control, logistics, trans permanent headquarters to execute NATO- or portation, and operational planning.8 The EU-directed missions.4 The Eurocorps par DATF’s success in Operations Joint Forge and ticipated in NATO operations in Bosnia and Allied Force showcased its capabilities in ac Kosovo, and its headquarters commanded the tual combat operations. Kosovo Force from March to October 2000.5 The DATF assumed both combat opera EU’s drive to develop military capabilities tions and combat support responsibilities in continued with its Common Foreign and Se Operation Joint Forge. The Dutch and Bel curity Policy (CFSP). With a vision to build a gians staffed intelligence and operational plan- THE BENELUX DEPLOYABLE AIR TASK FORCE 95 ning cells, security patrols, maintenance shops, the capability of the DATF for peacekeeping and all flight-line specialties. Although Dutch or peacemaking operations. and Belgian pilots flew their own air force’s In addition to the original DATF, the F-16s, close cooperation existed between the Netherlands and Belgian armed forces are in operations and maintenance units. Both air volved in other bilateral and multinational forces had accomplished aircraft and weapons agreements to pool scarce defense assets. The upgrades on identical schedules, so the air- Belgian-Portuguese DATF was formed in 2000 craft were completely interoperable. This al and combines the elements of each country’s lowed DATF pilots to plan their missions to C-130 fleet for intratheater lift and airdrop gether and enabled maintenance specialists to missions. The force has served NATO in pool their expertise for solving system anoma Macedonia and conducts routine exercises to 12 lies. This enhanced flight-line operations and increase interoperability. Belgium also generated higher mission-capable rates for served as the lead NATO trainer for C-130H both forces. Based on its success in Joint crews in the mid-1990s and trains a significant Forge, the DATF was tasked for a greater role number of allied airmen in the F-16. Finally, in Operation Allied Force. The DATF de the Belgian military has taken the lead to in- corporate air transportation and air-to-air re- ployed a total of 32 F-16 aircraft and 520 per fueling in these multinational cooperation sonnel to Amendola AB, Italy, in support of ventures. The Netherlands and Belgium pro the NATO operation against Slobodan Milo- grammed 50 million euros to strengthen Ger sevic.9 The Luxembourg army, as planned, many’s strategic-lift and air-to-air refueling ca- provided over 100 security personnel to pro pability.13 In return, the DATF will have access tect the DATF. During the 78-day air cam to Germany’s air-transport fleet during crisis paign from 24 March to 10 June 1999, the and peacekeeping operations. DATF flew 11.6 percent of all allied fighter missions and maintained a 95 percent mission- capable rate for the duration of the war.10 The Building an EU RRF DATF flew every type of mission called for by Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR This DATF discussion leads to the strategic level of the EU’s long-range force-structure [NATO]) , including defensive counterair, night planning. Will the EU have access to its mem attack, and reconnaissance. Because the DATF bers’ task forces and be able to integrate them F-16s were equipped with targeting pods, they into the proposed EU RRF? In 1999, leaders of were the only aircraft other than those of the the EU committed their nations to the Helsinki United States and Great Britain to expend Headline Goal, which called for a 60,000- laser-guided munitions during the conflict. person force to be deployed within 60 days and Their low-altitude navigation and targeting be sustainable for at least one year.14 Under infrared for night (LANTIRN) system pro this goal and within the overarching European vided NATO planners additional night-attack security and defense policy, the EU RRF would 11 precision-weapon capabilities. Since Allied be equipped to accomplish all the command Force, the DATF has continued to rotate forces and control, airlift, logistics, intelligence- in Bosnia and has conducted seven multi- gathering, and combat support functions nec lateral exercises with NATO and EU partners essary to sustain a long-term deployment.15 to enhance their interoperability in future in Such an EU RRF will use smaller rapid- tegrated rapid-response forces. Denmark is response elements, such as the DATF, to ac negotiating to join the DATF, and its fleets of complish the tasks agreed upon in the Peters- F-16s and C-130s are already compatible with burg Tasks, which include duties associated the DATF platforms. Their cultural similari with peacekeeping contingencies and the ties would permit an easy and logical integra ability to generate combat missions for crisis tion of shared resources to further increase management and peacemaking.16 96 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

A Royal Netherlands air force KDC-10 refuels a Dutch F-16.

Benelux DATF, the Belgian-Portuguese the day will impact how much a nation sup- DATF, the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force, ports a particular EU operation. NATO was the Franco-British Air Group, and other such able to successfully integrate member nations’ organizations, as well as the many multilateral personnel and equipment using a common memorandums of understanding between motivation based on a common threat—the ex member nations, are critical to the creation of pansion of Communism into Western Europe a credible EU peacemaking force. Defense and throughout the world. Operation Iraqi budgets for a majority of EU member nations Freedom vividly illustrates the difficulty that are currently at less than 2 percent, and European leaders had in developing a com “present-day military capabilities do not mon consensus on the use of force; that recent match the common foreign policy ambitions difficulty portends a future in which develop of the European Union.”17 Therefore, inte ing that necessary European consensus may grating these mission-specific, pooled re- continue to be difficult or even unattainable. sources becomes the only viable means for National defense postures change, and de the EU to produce an effective and capable, fense budgets get slashed when political con stand-alone combat force. Beyond building, cerns shift at the same time European integrating, and training the 60,000-person economies are struggling; then internal social force, the more difficult challenge will be de programs are prioritized ahead of a common veloping the consensus on when to use such a EU military defense force. Shrinking budgets force. The political and economic climates of make it even more difficult for individual na- THE BENELUX DEPLOYABLE AIR TASK FORCE 97 tions to bridge the technological gaps in their fense. Providing an anchor system or mission systems to improve—or even maintain—their capability to an international force not only military capabilities. Adding to this challenge serves as a source of national pride, but it also is an increasing number of deployments for protects the military budget from internal their downsized air forces. Formal agreements cuts. The budgets of the Netherlands and regarding future common-defense programs Belgian air forces are less likely to come under are also suspect, as evidenced by the large cut domestic political scrutiny as long as the in Germany’s Airbus 400 strategic airlift pro- DATF is designated as the lead composite gram, demonstrating that German domestic in force for an EU peacekeeping operation in terests supersede EU-defense initiatives. that budget year.

Pooling Capabilities for The Benelux DATF: Coalition Warfare Roles Today and in The EU RRF could initially function at the Future EU Task Forces tactical level by using established task-force agreements, such as the DATF, to separate The employment of the EU RRF, to support categories of responsibility. This would en- a peacemaking operation, would likely cause courage smaller countries to pool their limited the Benelux DATF to be deployed and tasked assets and allow them to participate in a joint to conduct night attack missions and execute international force. The ability to combine the precision attacks on lucrative command and various weapons platforms and system opera- control targets. Likewise, the Spanish-Italian tors creates the synergistic effect whereby the amphibious force would be tasked as the first-in sum is greater than the constituent parts.18 In infiltrating unit to conduct special operations war-fighter terms, an operational commander missions, and the combined Dutch-German would then be able to build sufficient combat airlift operation would provide logistical sup- mass from this pool of limited assets. For now port and personnel movement. The British, this approach to pooling resources eliminates French, and German forces will form the com the problem of national control over national posite task units essential to the success of a assets and alleviates the differences in doc- given EU RRF deployment and crisis-action trine and culture inherent in a formally inte response. Finally, forces representing the grated tactical force under an EU-designated smaller EU member states would be integrated commander.19 In any pooling arrangement, a into specific combat, support, and sustainment problem will occur if one member nation re functions. frains from participating in a coalition opera The Benelux DATF is a model military orga tion. Within the EU RRF-DATF framework, nization in present-day Europe. It’s a force however, that effect is minimized; the impact that optimized its nations’ limited national will simply be a reduction in numbers versus defense dollars, combined a diversity of sys the loss of an entire capability, which could be tems, and built a composite force, which has a critical element in an integrated force pack- now been proven in combat. The air forces of age. National pride also becomes a source of the Netherlands and Belgium and the security stability in such an organization as the smaller forces of Luxembourg can operate as single NATO or EU countries with modest capabili entities and retain sovereignty for action based ties make positive contributions to a specific on national interests. However, through years military operation. A small member nation of cooperation in training, procurement of may have the technological lead in a given like systems, combined deployments, and the weapon system or be structured to best sup- sharing of tactics, techniques, and procedures, port a special mission capability such as com the DATF in execution is a fully integrated bat search and rescue or integrated air de combat force. The development and pooling 98 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 of multinational task-force structures is the economic, and military environment in Eu best starting point to meet the Helsinki Head- rope will dictate if—and if so, when—the EU line Goal of a deployable 60,000 EU RRF this RRF will become a military organization on year. Eventually, a formal integration of mem par with NATO. Nevertheless, the Benelux ber resources will be required to sustain such DATF is capable of serving either organiza a force for recurring peacekeeping or crisis- tion and will remain a mainstay in European action contingencies. The future political, fighter capabilities.

Notes

1. Lord [George Islay MacNeill] Robertson, secretary-general June 2003, available from http://home.wanadoo.nl/tcc/balkan/ of NATO and chairman of the North Atlantic Council, “Investing allfor_forces.html. in Security,” NATO Review, no. 3 (2002), on-line, Internet, 25 June 10. Ibid. 2003, available from http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/ 11. F. H. G. DeGrave, “Opening Statement to the Air Power issue3/english/art3.html. Colloquium in Rijswijk,” 5 July 2001, on-line, Internet, 27 June 2. James Appathurai, “Closing the Capabilities Gap,” NATO 2003, available from http://www.mindef.nl/nieuws/toespraken/ Review, no. 3 (2002), on-line, Internet, 25 June 2003, available content/070501_airpower.html. from http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/ 12. Belgian Ministry of Defense, “Belgian-Portuguese Deploy- art1.html. able Air Task Force to Be Formed,” 7 July 1999, on-line, Internet, 3. Erik Derycke, “Belgium’s Contribution to Security in the 27 June 2003, available from http://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Euro-Atlantic Area,” NATO Review, no. 6 (1996): 4, on-line, Internet, data/communiques/archives/1999Jul/data/1999Jul496/. 25 June 2003, available from http://www.nato.int/docu/review/ 13. DeGrave. 1996/9606-1.htm. 14. Gen Rainer Schuwirth, “Hitting the Helsinki Headline 4. Eurocorps Web site, “Eurocorps: A Force for Europe and Goal,” NATO Review, no. 3 (2002), on-line, Internet, 27 June the Atlantic Alliance,” 1, on-line, Internet, 25 June 2003, available 2003, available from http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/ from http://www.eurocorps.org/downloads/infobrochure/info issue3/english/art4.html. brochure_en.pdf. 15. Colin Robinson, “The European Union’s Nascent Military 5. Ibid., 12. Capability: The Right Move for European Security?” 23 May 2002, 6. Guy Verhofstadt, Belgium prime minister, “Europe Has to on-line, Internet, 25 June 2003, available from http://www.cdi.org/ Become a Force in NATO,” Financial Times, 20 February 2003, on- mrp/eu-security.cfm. line, Internet, 25 June 2003, available from http://victory 16. Ibid. village.com/GM/archives/00000087.htm. 17. DeGrave. 7. S. T. Planken, “Royal Netherlands Air Force Deployable 18. Lt Gen B. A. C. Droste, commander in chief, Royal Air Task Force,” Canada Connection, 28 August [2001], on-line, In Netherlands air force, “Combined Joint Task Force Development ternet, 27 June 2003, available from http://home.wanadoo.nl/ and Allied Air Power: Pooling Assets for Cooperative Missions” tcc/rnlaf/datf.html. (paper presented at the Global Air Chiefs Conference, Las Vegas, 8. Ibid. Nev., April 1997), on-line, Internet, 25 June 2003, available from 9. S. T. Planken, “Operation Allied Force: Air Strikes against http://www.af.mil/lib/gacc/pt2.html. Yugoslavia,” Canada Connection [Web site], on-line, Internet, 27 19. Ibid.

We can view, and we can access any battle space. When air and space combine in the right ways, we can target, we can be redun­ dant, and we can persist. We can find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess anything of significance on the face of the Earth. We can bring this to the joint fight in ways that no one else can. It is our job, and it is our duty. It is what air and space warriors are all about. —Gen John P. Jumper Chief of Staff of the Air Force Words and Weapons The Power of Discourse

LT COL EDITH A. DISLER, USAF

Editorial Abstract: Air Force culture favors technological and quantifiable solutions to most problems. However, the methods by which information gets disseminated are as impor­ tant as the technology used, and the accurate flow of information and data is critical to air and space power. As the service moves further toward an expeditionary philosophy, accu­ rately packaging and delivering information will remain a vital leadership capability that can help preserve unit and service effectiveness.

Thus new thinking, or the complexity paradigm, can create a model and an un­ derstanding of major regional conflicts that could not be developed by our tra­ ditional scientific paradigm and its simple, linear, universal models. Driven by the aesthetics of complexity and specificity, new thinking develops models that strengthen our understanding with increased numbers of variables; that build depth and sophistication with interdependent variables; that describe open sys­ tems subject to global conditions; and that capture political and economic phe­ nomena as products of the era in which they occur. Operating in the white spaces, new thinking challenges us to defend our 300-year-old thinking pat- terns: Are simplicity, linearity, and universality the only way to think about the world? —Dr. Gerry Gingrich National Defense University

N THE SPIRIT of the “traditional scien work. We value real-time data with which to tific paradigm and its simple, linear” make decisions and plan responses and be- models Gingrich cites above, we in the moan the bureaucracy we must navigate to Air Force approach modern warfare buy the equipment that gets us the data in Iwith a penchant for extolling the virtues of real time. Air Force members interact daily in technology in attack aircraft, reconnaissance person, via E-mail, and on the phone. Yet we platforms, and even computer-facilitated staff neglect the study of the one thing that driving

99 100 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 intelligence satellites, flying attack aircraft, words, images, and other cues, come together performing computer-aided staff work, and and cause us to take action. even working in the bureaucracy all have in In the 1996 RAND study The Virtual Combat common—discourse. Whether interpreting a Air Staff: The Promise of Information Technologies, satellite photo, assimilating the information the authors foresee an era in which dispersed on a head-up display, or communicating as a members of a combat air staff can come to Pentagon action officer, military members are gether as a virtual combat air staff, using net- but human beings, taking action within a spe worked communications and information cific social setting through the use of dis technologies.3 Among other advantages, the course. Analysis of the discourse involved in authors note, is the ability to keep people fur our day-to-day interactions is, this article pro- ther from harm’s way and slim the size of the poses, operating in the “ ‘white spaces’—areas staff needed. They continue, “The military unit of thought and discovery not covered by old must understand its environment, have some thinking and the traditional academic disci knowledge of the enemy’s position and inten plines.”1 This article will explore the complex tions, be able to assess its own strengths and web of discourses which come together to re weaknesses, and know what other friendly sult in human action, with particular attention forces are doing. In this regard, communica to both the theoretical underpinnings of such tion is key.”4 But, what is communication? analysis and the framework for analysis pro- To the military mind, “communication” may posed by mediated discourse analysis. imply the proper network of secure and non- secure satellite links, fiber-optic cables, or radio frequencies; to the linguist, sociologist, Communications versus or cognitive psychologist, communication is a Communication much more human concern. Some military theorists manage to keep sight of this human Military strategists and theorists have de- dimension. Institute for National Strategic voted volumes to the role of information Studies (INSS) author David Alberts says, technology in today’s defense structure, but “The appropriate command concepts for an many fewer volumes to the impact of those information-rich battlefield have, as yet, not technologies upon the individuals using been determined even at the most basic level. them. As INSS Senior Fellow Martin Libicki Concerns have been raised regarding the po has pointed out, tential adverse effects of increased visibility into Information has always been part of conflict, operations at all levels, including potential but in times past it has been almost entirely at for information overload, second-guessing, the human level: who is my enemy, what are his micro-management, stifling of initiatives, and intentions, what can I see and hear of him, and distraction.”5 The latter complications em how can I best confound him. Today, human- phasize the fact that communications may be level analog information is being supplemented working fine, but communication may not. Of by a wealth (perhaps a flood) of machine gen interest here is finding a framework whereby erated information that can be further processed we can examine the confluence of technology and distributed through electronic means.2 and discourses to determine exactly what But, until the technological platforms can causes “information overload, second-guessing, wage war amongst themselves without a human micro-management, stifling of initiatives, and in the loop, we must face the fact that war is distraction.” The solution may be partly tech still waged by “human-level analog” minds, nological, and, obviously, it is also a matter of helped along by increasingly advanced cul human perception. tural tools. For that reason, we should stop One problem with a focus on technology is and consider the ways in which various dis its underlying assumption of the “conduit” courses, including written words, spoken metaphor. That is the notion that communica- WORDS AND WEAPONS 101 tion travels from sender to receiver, as though complete “sense and tone” of what is in the through a pipe, with language (or digital ones commander’s mind, that having been dialogi and zeros) as the conduit of transmission. cally created from the commander’s knowl Philosophers and theorists have long ex edge and background. This difference may or plored the intricacies of communication and may not affect the specific actions taken in re interaction far beyond the sender-receiver sponse to the command. A command is nor model of communication. Communication is mally considered objective in nature, but not just as simple as sender-receiver; therefore, Bakhtin would argue that the dialogic inher our sender-receiver technology is not entirely ent in its issuance makes it relative, “subjec the panacea we desire for the contemporary tive, psychological and (frequently) random” and future military engagement. Users and in character.8 This subjectivity will never be inventors of information technology pri completely eliminated, just as technology will marily want to know how to get more infor never be perfect. mation through the pipe. In contrast, students One source of the subjectivity of interpre of linguistics and sociology are interested in tation is the human mind and each individ how humans make meaning of the informa ual’s particular psychological processes. L. S. tion when it is generated, heard, or read; how Vygotsky, a contemporary of Bakhtin, placed the discourse may be impacted at various particular emphasis on the social dimension points along the way; and how that discourse of consciousness.9 One of Vygotsky’s themes results in specific human actions. is “his claim that human social and psycho- Consider the work of philosopher Mikhail logical processes are fundamentally shaped by Bakhtin, who explores in great depth the reality the ‘mediational means,’ especially language, that all interactions are dialogic. That is, every they employ.”10 In the realm of military tech utterance is influenced by previous utterances nology, then, the computers of virtual air and a variety of cultural and personal assump staffs or “sensor to shooter” platforms, the tions. He says, “The living utterance having satellite communications (SATCOM) system, taken meaning and shape at a particular his and the fiber-optic cables are but mediational torical moment in a socially specific environ means, cultural tools, or sign systems that ment, cannot fail to brush up against thou- help shape human mental processes. Exami sands of living dialogic threads, woven by nation of such mediational means is key to in socio-ideological consciousness around the terpretation of human action. As Vygotsky given object of an utterance.”6 In other words, claimed, “By being included in the process of an utterance is not static. Words communi behavior, the psychological tool [sign] alters cated by operators in one location to a virtual the entire flow and structure of mental func air staff in another location may have very dif tions. It does this by determining the struc ferent relevance in different times and loca ture of a new instrumental act, just as a tech tions to operators with different training, dif nical tool alters the process of a natural ferent experiences, different missions, and adaptation by determining the form of labor different tasking orders. operations.”11 In other words, the setting and As those transmitted words (or images) are technology of an interaction affect the process interpreted, acted upon, and relayed to other of interpretation and, hence, action. operators, the meaning can’t help changing The notion of intertextuality—a term coined along the way. In dialogue, says Bakhtin, words by J. Kristeva in response to Western audi live a “double life.” That is because, in a com ences’ interpretations of Bakhtin, refers to bined context, one cannot adopt or interpret the shaping of texts and utterances by prior the words of another, “without losing [their] texts and utterances.12 This notion is critical sense and tone.”7 While a written or verbal to military theorists and strategists. As Norman command can be issued, the one who carries Fairclough notes, “The concept of intertextu out the command cannot possibly have the ality points to the productivity of texts, to how 102 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 texts can transform prior texts and restruc relationships between knowledge and ac ture existing conventions to generate new tion.”15 It is exactly those complex interrela ones.”13 Far from esoteric, intertextuality is a tionships that the field of mediated discourse key condition of all military training and op analysis examines, which, says linguist Ron erations. Military members are trained, for Scollon, “takes the position that social action example, through classroom discourse, hands- and discourse are inextricably linked on the on instruction, and by written texts such as one hand16 but that on the other hand these technical orders, operating instructions, and links are sometimes not at all direct or obvi checklists. Strategies and tactics, when com ous, and therefore in need of more careful mitted to warning orders and tasking orders, theorization.”17 Generally speaking, mediated are but retextualizations, for a specific time discourse analysis examines the interrelation- and place, of written doctrine and political ship between individuals, social practices or policy. When operators in the field engage in actions, and various forms of text—that is, the actions assigned to them, it is as a result of discourse. years of dialogic and intertextual formation of We see just such an analysis by Hutchins their own understanding of their duties, obli and Klausen in their “Distributed Cognition gations, and interactions. in an Airline Cockpit.”18 In this study of air- We can use the insights of Bakhtin, Vygotsky, crew interaction in a NASA Boeing 727 flight Kristeva, Fairclough, and others as we exam simulator, the authors explore the ways in ine the layers of discourse which impact the which training and interaction (verbal and actions we take. This analysis is necessary as the nonverbal) work together in “the construc Air Force moves forward with key information tion of a shared understanding of the situation technologies. As David Alberts points out, in which the interactants find themselves.”19 Specifically, given the sometime random Since we cannot stop, slow down, or control the information explosion or totally prevent unin order of tasks in cockpit operations and the tended consequences, we must design a strategy various methods of communication between for introducing information technologies that crew members, a mere glance at the captain a) identifies and anticipates negative repercus by the first officer cued the captain to respond sions and enables us to avoid those repercus to an air-traffic-control (ATC) transmission sions or minimize their impacts, b) recognizes when the first officer thought the response and takes advantage of unexpected opportuni time was excessive. However, the first officer ties, and c) balances the risks associated with could also tell, simply by the look on the cap 14 the failure to achieve these two objectives. tain’s face, that the captain wasn’t sure of the A close analysis of the discourse networks altitude that ATC had cleared them to main used in information technologies will help tain. So, responding based upon the social avoid problems and may very well lead to un practice intertextually and interdiscursively expected opportunities. created by training and operations, the first officer simply says, “Three two zero,” thus pro viding the information that the captain is to Mediated Discourse Analysis— echo back to ATC. This shared understand One Framework for Study ing between interactants is called intersubjec­ tivity. Such shared understanding should Consider the following assertion: “It is now sound familiar to Air Force members, as it is widely accepted within the U.S. Department the basis of the crew concept. of Defense that its military capabilities will be Hutchins and Klausen’s analysis is, of course, decisive to the extent that the United States much deeper and much more detailed than can enjoy information dominance over its presented here. The point is that, in their foes extant and potential. Behind this simple study of the interaction of a 727 crew, they formulation, however, is a set of complex inter- showed the importance of interactional cues WORDS AND WEAPONS 103 that couldn’t possibly be replicated by ma action—the glance by the first officer in the chinery. They also discuss, however, ways in simulator scenario above, for example, which which the machinery cues the interactants in resulted in a response from the captain. In what they call distributed cognition. For in- fact, the most difficult aspect of applying this stance, mechanically linked control yokes framework may very well be narrowing a se allow members of the crew to visually monitor ries of actions down to a specific action taken. inputs in ways side-stick controllers do not. The action of launching a missile, for example, Or, dual sets of identical instrumentation en- is much too nebulous and complex. The process sure that the captain and the first officer are must be broken down into the smaller actions working with the same information and the that comprise it; each of those actions can be same relative display of that information while further analyzed according to the mediated- performing their tasks. Newer aircrew work- discourse-analysis framework. The remainder stations have independent flight-management of this article will delineate some key consid computer systems for each crew member and erations within the framework of mediated do not necessarily display the same informa discourse analysis and apply that framework tion, thereby interrupting distributed cogni to the specific action of opening an E-mail tion. As the authors point out, “The issue is and tracing the web of discourse and social whether or not the system could interact with practices which resulted in that action. the pilots in the way that they interact with Scollon delineated the key concepts of me each other. With human interactants, we have diated discourse analysis: seen that intersubjectively shared representa tions permit a silent look in a particular con- 1.� Mediated action is the basic unit of analy text to have the meaning of a request for spe sis. It is the moment when an individual, cific information. This sort of phenomenon is as a social being, engages in an action in a reminder of the complexity and subtlety of a “dialectic between [the] action and human interaction. It is difficult to imagine the material means” which mediate it. what sort of machine could engage in this 2.� The mediated action occurs in a site of kind of interaction.”20 engagement. This is the point at which We largely take for granted an understand the action becomes “the focal point of ing of such subtleties. But, it is just such sub attention of the relevant participants” at tleties that are easily overlooked when we seek a “unique moment in history.” a purely technological solution to the transfer of information. In designing a virtual air staff, 3.� The mediational means are the material for example, one must closely study the kinds objects used to carry out the mediated of interactive cues operators use to communi action and include the material factors cate so that when dislocated in time and associated with the social actors in space, compensation can be made for the volved. Intertextuality and interdiscur lack of interactive cues. sivity/dialogicality are inherent in the mediational means. 4.� In mediated discourse analysis a medi Mediated Discourse Analysis ated action must be seen as “a necessary Applied: One View of Staff Work interaction of social practices and media tional means which in themselves re- This article has only broadly addressed produce social groups, histories, and mediated discourse analysis as a method of identities.” analyzing humans in social interaction. Now it is time to examine the framework for analy 5.� One action involves the intersection of sis more closely. Key to this framework is re several discursive and nondiscursive membering that in mediated discourse analy practices. This intersection is called the sis, the unit of analysis is the mediated nexus of practice.21 104 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

This framework is best explored through an feedback and changes from the deputy example of a specific action. for air and space operations (XO) and In late August of 2002, an Air force officer the deputy for personnel (DP), and a logged on to her E-mail server. Listed among draft of “An Expeditionary Language” is incoming E-mail messages was one from a delivered to the CSAF Staff Group. chief master sergeant at the Air Force Insti •� The package, along with a new edit of tute of Technology (AFIT) at Wright-Patterson the draft document, is forwarded to the AFB, Ohio. His E-mail was addressed to all CSAF through his administrative assistant civilian-institution liaison officers (LO) and and executive officer. had a one-page document signed by the chief of staff of the Air Force as an attachment. The •� The CSAF provides input, more edits are document came as one in a series of docu made, and the corrected document is re- ments called the CSAF Sight Picture. The sub- turned to the CSAF for signature. title of the document the officer saved to her hard drive and brought up on her screen by •� Once signed, public affairs and informa striking the required keys was “An Expedi tion personnel distribute the document, tionary Language.” What series of practices using the established electronic network, had to come together to allow that officer to to major commands (MAJCOM) and strike a key on the computer and read that various other recipients. document? According to Pentagon staff offi •� Air Education and Training Command cers interviewed, the following is an abbrevi (AETC), as a MAJCOM, receives the ated list of the linked social practices that re chief’s E-mail and then uses its normal sulted in this mediated action: distribution network that includes AFIT •� An officer assigned to the Office of the as an addressee. Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force •� Since the Air Force officer at the begin for International Affairs (SAF/IA), in an ning of this example is attached to AFIT, effort to give increased exposure to the the E-mail addressed to all civilian- need for language-trained officers, institution LOs now reaches her, and the drafts a version of the “An Expeditionary mediated action takes place. Language” document to be disseminated as a CSAF NOTAM. That is the acronym Despite this long series of actions, recall title of the periodic Air Force chief of that the finite mediated action being ana staff’s notice to airmen, which later be- lyzed is the last tap on the laptop computer comes known as the Chief’s Sight Picture. that had the effect of opening the document “An Expeditionary Language.” Anyone familiar •� This effort is terminated while being with the series of practices which results in staffed—CSAF staff members cite other creating an E-mail, attaching a document to NOTAM messages that have higher rela it, and sending it, knows that a long series of tive priority. actions is required of a social actor. One could, of course, regress the series of actions •� Roughly one year later, after the 11 Sep all the way back to the physical construction tember 2001 terrorist attacks, an in- or electronic workings of the computer that creased senior-staff interest in the officer originated the E-mail. The very fact that the corps’s language capabilities resurrects E-mail reached the officer shows that she was the “An Expeditionary Language” docu participating in a number of discourses which ment and the notion of disseminating it facilitated that action, computer discourse as a topic in the Chief’s Sight Picture series. and Air Force institutional discourse among •� A staff package containing a staff sum them. Note that the officer could have mary sheet, point paper, summary of elected to delete the message without open- WORDS AND WEAPONS 105 ing and reading either the E-mail message or and discern many additional mediational the attachment. means that were used in this process. The real-time, irreversible action that re It is obvious that for the officer to open the sulted in the officer’s reading “An Expedi chief’s message there was, as Scollon states, “a tionary Language” included placing the necessary intersection of social practices and computer-screen cursor on a box with the mediational means which in themselves re- words “open” and tapping the mouse pad on produce social groups, histories, and identi the laptop computer at a specific site of engage­ ties.”23 While it may be less obvious to those ment. As Scollon points out, this is but a mo immersed in the process, the fact that the E- ment whose “interpretation is located within mail was opened by the AFIT-assigned officer the social practices which are linked in that is a testament to the extent to which the mili unique moment.”22 In other words, this dis tary’s system of hierarchy is internalized in Air crete action is not the end result, but a result Force members. The repeated use of the Air of the long series of events, which led to the Force hierarchy within the process above—in document’s creation and publication. The so the document’s creation, initial rejection, res cial practices that were linked in the moment urrection, submission, revision, and dissemi the document “An Expeditionary Language” nation—was certainly an interdiscursive and was opened included (1) the practice of con intertextual reinforcement of the Air Force as necting military members through E-mail con- a social group with a history and an identity. tact lists structured according to the chain of Both the words in the document and the sys command, (2) the practice of drafting and tem of processes with which it was created and staffing a document through the hierarchy at disseminated reflect the ideology and struc Headquarters Air Force, and (3) the practice ture of the institution. of operating a computer in a way so as to be The institution’s culture is similarly appar able to read an E-mail and its electronic at ent in the nexus of practices which influence tachments. the action of the officer opening the chief’s E- The material objects or mediational means mail attachment. Those acceptable and rele involved in the act of opening an E-mail may vant social practices include the use of a com seem relatively discrete—the social actor, sit puter; staff summary sheets and point papers; ting in a chair in front of a computer, tapped a disciplined chain-of-command information some keys on the keyboard which produced flow, coordination, and approval process; an image with words in a language the reader chain-of-command electronic dissemination; could interpret. But, the dialectical interaction and so on. of the structures which resulted in an inter pretable computer message involved an inde terminable parade of mediational means. The Concluding Discussion material objects involved in the process in The process of creating “An Expeditionary cluded multiple personal computers, staff Language” and the more finite action of strik summary sheets and point papers, a procedur ing the computer keys which caused the docu ally correct document folder, a pen for the ment to be seen were impacted at many points chief to sign the final version of “An Expedi in the process. While Air Force–wide dissemi tionary Language,” a scanner to digitize the nation of the Chief’s Sight Picture is assumed document, cables through which the digital by virtue of the gravity of a document signed image was passed to the computer that began by the chief of staff of the Air Force, one will the dissemination, and many other computers never know if it will be read by every airman. used to distribute the electronic message, and, Although some recipients may hit the delete finally, sufficiently equipped computers for key without reading it, most recipients will recipients to read the E-mail and the chief’s feel obliged to read any E-mail signed out by attachment. One could certainly look closer the chief—having internalized the expecta- 106 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 tions of Air Force membership and the chain work of computer systems, and a potentially un of command. Commanders, officers, enlisted reliable electrical generator. members, and other social actors may each Also remember that even the simplest read the document and subscribe to it various computer-mediated actions in which a human levels of import and validity based upon their engages—opening an E-mail—are complex own knowledge, habits, and the social prac and highly involved, even in a controlled and tices of their own unit. Readers bring their own reliable environment. In the much more com interpretations to the document—a reality, plex environment of the expeditionary battle- field, the communicator must take into con according to interviews, intended by the docu sideration a much larger system of mediated ment’s originators, but perhaps not intended actions, sites of engagement, mediational by the chief’s staff. In the end, we can appre means, social practice and structure, and ciate the breadth of the effect that “An Expedi nexus of practice. By giving advance consid tionary Language” and its production will have eration to the minutest details, the “second- on its various readers: transfer of knowledge, guessing, micro-management, stifling of ini change of attitudes, and actions that could be tiatives, and distraction” that Alberts taken. This, remember, is not a wartime docu acknowledged as potential problems in the ment, produced in less than ideal conditions “information-rich battlefield” may be ad- and with time sensitivity, a quickly wired net- dressed and their effects minimized.24

Notes

1. Gerry Gingrich, “Simplified Complexity: Thinking in the 11. Ibid., Vygotsky as cited by Wertsch, 136. White Spaces,” Strategic Forum, no. 139 (May 1998), on-line, In 12. Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cam- ternet, 17 April 2003, available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ bridge, England: Polity Press, 1992), 101. strforum/forum139.html. 13. Ibid., 103. 2. Martin C. Libicki, “Information Dominance,” Strategic 14. Alberts. Forum, no. 132 (November 1997), on-line, Internet, 17 April 15. Libicki. 2003, available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/ 16. Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, Discourse in forum132.html. Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis (Edinburgh: 3. Arthur Huber et al., The Virtual Combat Air Staff: The Promise Edinburgh University Press, 2000). of Information Technologies, RAND Report MR-759-AF (Santa Monica, 17. Ron Scollon, Mediated Discourse: The Nexus of Practice (New Calif.: RAND, 1996), on-line, Internet, 17 April 2003, available York: Routledge, 2001), 1. from http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR759/. 18. Edwin Hutchins and Tove Klausen, “Distributed Cogni 4. Ibid. tion in an Airline Cockpit,” in Cognition and Communication at 5. David S. Alberts, The Unintended Consequences of Information Work, ed. Yrjö Engeström and David Middleton (Cambridge: Age Technologies (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1996), on-line, In ternet, 17 April 2003, available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ Cambridge University Press, 1996), 23; see also on-line, Internet, books/books/uchome.html. 17 April 2003, available from http://www.cc.gatech. 6. M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael edu/classes/AY2003/cs6795_spring/cockpit-cog.pdf. Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, trans. Kenneth Brostrom (Austin: 19. Ibid. University of Texas Press, 1981), 276. 20. Ibid., 24–25. 7. Ibid., 284. 21. Ronald Scollon, Mediated Discourse as Social Interaction: A 8. Ibid., 282. Study of News Discourse (New York: Longman Group, 1998), 10; 9. James V. Wertsch, “Mediated Action and the Study of Com and idem, Mediated Discourse: The Nexus of Practice. munication: The Lessons of L. S. Vygotsky and M. M. Bakhtin,” 22. Scollon, Mediated Discourse: The Nexus of Practice, 4. Communication Review 1, no. 2 (1995): 134. 23. Ibid. 10. Ibid., 136. 24. Alberts. APJ

John Huston, USAF, retired, served as a B-17 navi gator with the 379th Bombardment Group in En- gland during World War II. During his academic career, General Huston, who earned his PhD from the University of Pittsburgh, held such posts as chair of the Naval Academy’s History Department, chief of the Office of Air Force History, and distinguished visiting professor at the Air Force Academy. Clearly, General Huston is a true soldier-scholar. His long-awaited edition of Arnold’s World War II diaries is monumental in scope and detailed in content. In fact, the work is really three different projects tied together. The diaries make up just under 300 pages of the entire project, certainly a smaller number than one might expect. Huston provides a biographical text that, by itself, could stand as a completely separate book. Finally, he has created a masterful set of chapter notes—just over 200 pages in a much smaller font than the one used for the text. These notes are so extensive that they are almost worth reading independently of the text. Overall, this collection is clearly a labor of love—a magnum opus for any writer/editor. This reviewer stands in awe of the final product, which absolutely must be read by military—espe cially airpower—historians and anyone interested in the functions of the Army’s high command (and it was indeed the Army) during wartime. Any pub lication of important sections of the personal pa pers of this five-star general is valuable because, until now, none of Arnold’s papers have seen pub lication in any form. These diaries provide insight into the general’s day-to-day activities and the na ture of his major concerns during these crucial American Airpower Comes of Age: General Henry trips abroad. As described by the editor, “In all H. “Hap” Arnold’s World War II Diaries, 2 vols., cases, the aim has been to let Arnold’s notes speak edited by Maj Gen John W. Huston, USAF, re- for themselves as he recorded them in his diaries” tired. Air University Press (http://www.maxwell. (vol. 1, p. xi). That said—and as most reviewers are af.mil/au/aul/aupress), 131 West Shumacher wont to do—I will now relate what the editor (per- Avenue, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-6615, haps more directly, the publisher) should have done 2002, 592 pages (vol. 1), 458 pages (vol. 2), with these diaries. $47.00 (vol. 1, softcover), $39.00 (vol. 2, soft- This collection could have been much easier to cover). digest had one separate book included the bio graphical and operational-history segments. The The two volumes that cover Gen Henry H. diaries and Huston’s postscript to each would have “Hap” Arnold’s World War II experiences contain made another excellent single volume, and assem more than 1,000 pages! But don’t be afraid. Read bling them in that fashion might have made more ing them is worth the effort. The editor, Maj Gen sense. Quite frankly, without the editor’s commen-

107­ 108 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 tary, the diaries are not very helpful—actually Despite the shortcomings of the physical pre mundane for the most part. Because these three sentation, the content of these volumes remains sections were woven together, however, I found priceless—well worth the finger stretching needed myself reading them like a Latin translator—one to meld the significance of the diaries, text, and finger in the notes and another on my spot in the notes into a comprehensible experience. So what text or in the diaries, jumping back and forth be- are you waiting for? Crack your knuckles and dive tween lengthy pieces of text. After several hundred in. You’ll be better for the effort. pages, this exercise became a tiresome and dis tracting annoyance. Thus, I think that Air Univer Dik Alan Daso sity Press and the editor might have found a better Washington, D.C. solution. The first volume should have been limited to the edited diaries, smoothly linked together by Huston’s analysis of their content. The lengthy biographical text should have constituted a second On War and Leadership: The Words of Combat volume by itself—and it would have been a Commanders from Frederick the Great to Nor- tremendous one. No doubt, the structural com man Schwarzkopf by Owen Connelly. Princeton plexity of this set contributed to the lengthy pub University Press (http://www.pupress.princeton. lishing process. edu), 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey I would be remiss if I failed to mention a tragic 08540-5237, 2002, 368 pages, $29.95 (hard- typographical error in one of the notes of the sec cover). ond volume (p. 58, note 93). Col Frederick W. Cas tle, the son of one of General Arnold’s West Point Given the numerous published works on lead ership in general and leadership in combat in par classmates, was killed in combat on Christmas eve ticular, I initially thought that Dr. Connelly’s book of 1944 and posthumously awarded the Medal of would provide little additional advice on combat Honor, not the Medal of Humor—an inexcusable leadership. Reading the book confirmed some of copyediting mistake. my initial thoughts; that is, it does not really pro- Huston’s text includes several high points. Of vide any great new revelations about leadership in these, his examination of Arnold’s career-long re combat. However, the book still has significant lationship with Ira Eaker and of the controversy value because it confirms the most important as over Eaker’s removal as commander of Eighth Air pects of leadership in combat from 20 of the Force during the war is enlightening. Throughout world’s most accomplished commanders—men the volumes, Huston’s account of Arnold’s partici who actually led troops at the operational and tac pation at the strategic level of command and the tical levels of combat. impact he had on the operational level of planning Dr. Connelly is well qualified to produce this and execution of the war effort is, perhaps, his book. He is the McKissick Dial Professor of History greatest achievement in the work. As for the few at the University of South Carolina, an ex-US Army gems hidden in the text of the diaries, Huston ad Ranger captain, and the author of numerous mirably extracts their significance and describes it books on the French Revolution and Napoléon. in his postscript. During his visit to England in Sep Clearly, he brings a great deal of authority and ex tember 1943, Arnold’s realization that Eighth Air perience to his task. Force desperately needed long-range fighter escorts The author draws most of the book’s content is one of the best examples of Huston’s ability to from the actual writings of past commanders or separate the cream from the milk. Huston’s in- from interviews with the ones who are still alive. sight, particularly into Arnold’s command years Most importantly, these men were not “armchair” (1938–45) fills a serious historical gap in previous commanders, observing their soldiers in combat works on the Army Air Forces commander. “from afar,” but were there themselves in the heat The set includes two photo galleries, one in of battle. As a result, their comments on combat each volume. Unfortunately, the quality is uneven, leadership are more meaningful and authoritative— and the photos are printed on regular paper these commanders literally speak from their expe rather than glossy stock (a choice probably driven riences. by cost). The set might have been better balanced Despite the diversity of background (European, had the publisher consolidated all images into the American, and Asian), time span (1760s to 1990s), second volume as one large photo essay. and specific wars in which these commanders NET ASSESSMENT 109 fought (those of the 1700s, American Civil War, when the first operational American units arrived World Wars I and II, Vietnam War, Gulf War, and in North Africa in September 1942, the pilots of Falklands War), these individuals developed rela Ninth Air Force and Twelfth Air Force entered tively similar thoughts on combat leadership. They combat against German and Italian units with the all emphasize the following as characteristics of only aircraft available at the time—the venerable good combat leadership: unity of command (one P-40. In their battles with Axis forces, American leader in charge), leadership by example, taking P-40 pilots claimed 592 aerial victories, including care of the troops (providing proper and adequate the “Palm Sunday Massacre,” in which no fewer food and medical care, as well as visiting troops in than 76 Luftwaffe aircraft were shot down in a 20- the field), using initiative and improvisation, hav minute period over the Gulf of Tunis. American pi- ing personal knowledge of prospective battlefields, lots, new to combat, held their own against enemy and making bold decisions. forces. I found it especially interesting to read ac The maxims about combat leadership presented counts of American pilots shooting down Stukas, in On War and Leadership are as current today as an honor usually reserved for pilots of the DAF or when they were first made. They apply not only to the Royal Air Force during the Battle of Britain. combat leaders, but also to corporate leaders. Dr. Like the other books in this series, P-40 Connelly’s book is a welcome addition to the exist Warhawk Aces is laden with superb pictures and ing literature on leadership. color aircraft profiles. Jim Laurier’s 40 color plates of P-40s used in the MTO add a detailed dimen Lt Col Robert B. Kane, USAF sion to the book, as do the excellent scale drawings Maxwell AFB, Alabama by Mark Styling. However, maps of the area and landing grounds emphasized by Molesworth would have been helpful. More important than the visual aesthetics, I found Molesworth’s writing to be clear, P-40 Warhawk Aces of the MTO, Osprey Aircraft of informative, and easy to read. the Aces Series no. 43, by Carl Molesworth. Os Given the quality of the research, pictures, prey Publishing (http://www.ospreypublishing. color plates, scale drawings, and pilot accounts, com/index.shtml), Elms Court, Chapel Way, readers cannot go wrong by including P-40 Botley, Oxford OX2 9LP, United Kingdom, Warhawk Aces of the MTO in their collection. I look 2002, 96 pages, $18.95. forward to the author’s next volume and hope he is planning to write about P-40 aces of the DAF Osprey Publishing has done it again. Adding to from 1941 to 1942. perhaps the best series of military aviation books to hit the streets in recent years, Osprey has pro Lt Col Robert Tate, USAFR duced yet another excellent study that details aces Maxwell AFB, Alabama and aircraft from a specific area. Carl Molesworth, an expert on the P-40 and its pilots, has written sev eral books on this subject and is currently at work on his third book for Osprey—it will cover P-40 pi- Billy Mitchell by James J. Cooke. Lynne Rienner lots in the Pacific; his first Osprey book dealt with Publishers, Inc. (http://www.rienner.com), P-40 aces of the China-Burma-India theater. P-40 1800 30th Street, Suite 314, Boulder, Colorado Warhawk Aces is an excellent volume although a 80301, 2002, 305 pages, $49.95. more appropriate title may have been American P-40 Warhawk Aces. Several Desert Air Force (DAF) Billy Mitchell has always been a controversial fighter squadrons (South African, Australian, figure in American military history. On the one Canadian, and British) had success using the P-40 hand, soldiers and sailors usually see him as an ar in the Mediterranean theater of operations (MTO) rogant, disloyal, and self-promoting blowhard who before the Americans arrived, but this book focuses played loose with the facts in order to push his own on the American pilots of the 33d, 57th, 79th, agenda. Airmen, on the other hand, generally 324th, and 325th Fighter Groups, the earliest of tend to see him as a courageous, farsighted, and which did not arrive in-theater until late 1942. dedicated patriot persistently thwarted by conser The successes of the P-47s and P-51s that came vative soldiers and sailors who protected their turf. into service later in the war tend to overshadow the These conflicting images, common in the 1920s, story of the P-40. Most people do not realize that remain popular today. James J. Cooke, a professor 110 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 emeritus at the University of Mississippi who has guilty, but also—and far worse—the news media written extensively on US participation in World found him boring. A “show trial” gains one little War I, both from a ground and air point of view, at- support or sympathy if journalists don’t bother to tempts to present a more balanced portrait of cover it. Mitchell. He is only partially successful. Cooke’s account, however, fails to achieve the We have a number of Mitchell biographies, but balance he promises. Although acknowledging that Cooke found material that the others had missed— Mitchell did good work in World War I (although specifically, family papers and diaries located in even that effort was stained by his petulance and Milwaukee, Mitchell’s birthplace. These documents bravado), the author suggests that he did little else illuminate a dark side of the airman usually not of value during the rest of his career. This inter seen. Mitchell’s father, a powerful Democratic sena pretation is too stark. Mitchell thought long and tor, had gone through a particularly messy divorce deeply about the employment of aircraft in war, in his mid 30s. He subsequently remarried but had but one finds no discussion of those ideas in the almost nothing to do with his son from that first book. Instead, Cooke lumps Mitchell’s views into marriage. The senator also had little time for the children of his second marriage, including Billy, two groups—the obsolescence of battleships and who, says Cooke, was permanently scarred because the need for a separate air force. Mitchell’s views of his father’s neglect. Ominously, Mitchell went were more nuanced than that, but Cooke either ig through a similar midlife crisis, divorced his wife, nores or gives short shrift to the vast majority of his and essentially abandoned his three children from writings. For example, one finds no reference to that marriage—they didn’t even bother to show up Mitchell’s important and lengthy “Notes on the for his funeral in 1936. Multi-Motored Bombardment Group,” written in Cooke reveals that Mitchell had a drinking 1922. problem upon returning from France in 1919. For Nonetheless, Cooke admits that much of what the next two years, when his marriage was falling Mitchell advocated and predicted was accurate apart, his behavior became increasingly erratic, and valid: the obsolescence of the battleship, the and his military performance suffered noticeably. vulnerability of the Hawaiian Islands to air attack, In 1921 the Army apparently ordered Mitchell to the growing importance of strategic bombing, and Walter Reed Hospital for a psychological examina the need for a separate air force. However, the au tion. (However, Cooke’s endnote states that this thor argues that Mitchell’s methods hindered the order was written in January 1928, long after achievement of his goals, which were unobtainable Mitchell had retired; obviously, something is wrong in the mid-1920s, when Mitchell pushed them. Few with this account.) Instead, the Air Service shuffled people would argue with the former portion of that him off to Europe on an inspection trip, giving statement—as even his supporter Hugh Trenchard him an opportunity to rest and get his life back in put it, “Mitchell tried to convert his opponents by order. killing them first.” The second point, however, raises Apparently, Mitchell frequently found himself the question of what could have been attained had in debt and periodically wrote his mother, asking the air arm enjoyed proper funding. From 1921 to for money to buy uniforms, guns, and horses. For 1926, when Mitchell attacked his superiors for ig tunately for him, his second wife was extremely noring airpower, the Air Service received barely 5 wealthy; she bought their large country home out- side Washington, D.C., and her father paid Billy’s percent of the Army’s budget—small wonder the considerable legal bills during his court-martial. Air Service had so little capability at the time of Cooke looks closely at the court-martial, por Mitchell’s court-martial (precisely his point). traying Mitchell’s performance as dismal. He de Overall, Billy Mitchell is a very well written book liberately provoked the trial, apparently seeing it with some sobering insights into this controversial as a forum from which to lambaste his old foes in man’s personality and character. Readers who want the Army and Navy hierarchy. According to Cooke, an insightful view of his ideas on airpower employ he was lackadaisical throughout the trial, either as ment, however, should turn to Alfred Hurley’s Billy suming he would not be convicted or uncon Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power, the standard work cerned if he were. The prosecutor uncovered on that subject. Mitchell’s surprising lack of detailed knowledge re garding naval operations—and even the Air Ser Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired vice. As a consequence, Mitchell not only was found McLean, Virginia NET ASSESSMENT 111

American Military Aviation: The Indispensable his five theses. Gross does a good job of summariz Arm by Charles J. Gross. Texas A&M University ing key airpower trends yet assumes that readers Press (http://www.tamu.edu/upress), John H. are already acquainted with the history he de- Lindsey Building, Lewis Street, 4354 TAMU, scribes. The book has an encyclopedic tone be- College Station, Texas 77843-4354, 2002, 382 cause it covers diverse airpower topics and con pages, $35.00 (hardcover). tains extensive endnotes and bibliographic references. However, the lack of an index hinders Dr. Charles Gross, a retired Air Force officer its utility as a reference source. Overall, American with active, Reserve, and Guard experience, has Military Aviation will prove most useful to readers surveyed a century of the history of American mili who, though already familiar with the history of tary airpower. His chronological narrative ad American military airpower, seek a balanced, vances five broad theses. First, he makes the un sweeping overview of the topic. controversial assertion that airpower “has become an indispensable element” of American power. His Lt Col Paul D. Berg, PhD, USAF next two theses present the contrasting ideas that Maxwell AFB, Alabama leaders have consistently overestimated airpower’s effectiveness yet have disparaged airlift and air re- fueling as “the neglected stepchildren of airpower” A Dance with Death: Soviet Airwomen in World (p. 8). His final two simply contend that “air power War II by Anne Noggle. Texas A&M University has transformed warfare by extending the range Press (http://www.tamu.edu/upress), John H. and destructiveness of combat operations” and Lindsey Building, Lewis Street, 4354 TAMU, that airpower “has had a significant impact on College Station, Texas 77843, 2002, 336 pages, American culture and economy” (pp. 8–9). Con $24.95 (softcover). sistent with his wide-ranging theses, the author takes a broad perspective of airpower. He discusses This oral history, complemented by a series of aviation’s growing importance in each US military photographic portraits the author made of her in service and addresses nearly all airpower roles. Em- terviewees, was extremely well received when it bedding airpower’s economic and cultural aspects first appeared in 1994. The fact that Texas A&M deeply into his narrative, he even addresses space University Press has reissued the book in paper- power briefly. Gross does not explicitly emphasize back suggests how valuable it remains. Anne Noggle, a joint-airpower perspective but does highlight a former member of the Women Airforce Service contributions of the Reserve and Guard compo Pilots and adjunct professor of art, journeyed in nents—especially since the Vietnam War. Since Dr. the early 1990s to Russia to interview over 70 women Gross currently serves as chief of the Air National who served in the Soviet air force. The accounts Guard’s history program, his generous attention to she gathered and edited constitute excellent pri airpower’s total-force aspects is understandable. mary sources and, with more recent scholarship No airpower zealot, the author presents gener (such as that of Reina Pennington), not only shed ally evenhanded historical interpretations, cri light on gender relations in Soviet society, but also tiquing Air Force icons such as Billy Mitchell and dispel many myths propagated in earlier publica remaining skeptical of the Combined Bomber Of tions about female pilots in World War II. fensive: “Tactical air power . . . not strategic Although each woman’s account is unique, all bombers, made the most significant contribution of them raise similar themes, from duty to chal to Allied victory” (p. 119). For the most part, he lenge, loneliness, courage, and pride. Most stress praises recent, dramatic advances in military avia the role of Marina Raskova, the woman who tion technology and in leaders’ attention to airlift formed the first female regiment and inspired and air refueling, yet offers cautious appraisals of them to join the service. Raskova played an essen airpower’s performance during Operation Desert tial role in convincing Soviet military authorities to Storm and the recent Balkans campaigns. allow women into combat. Nevertheless, the ac Neither a new historical interpretation nor a counts do not make clear whether the fading re reference work, American Military Aviation resists sistance of men resulted from war conditions or an categorization. Because it relies almost entirely on acceptance of Soviet ideologies of equality. In any secondary sources, readers will find few original in case, the women who joined faced conditions worse sights—but the author adds value by assembling than male trainees did in any of the combat forces information into a fast-paced narrative based on of World War II. Living conditions in the women’s 112 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 units—often formed in under three months in- land, Oregon 97213-3644, 2002, 362 pages, stead of the standard two years—were extremely $64.50 (hardcover), $26.50 (softcover). difficult (flight clothing was often male-sized, and hygiene and building heat were nonexistent). The By all reports, the conference sponsored by the women also had to contend with substandard fly Royal Air Force (RAF) Air Historical Branch/RAF ing equipment and were sent out several times a director of defense studies in July 2001 was a night without escort on missions (in the case of smashing success. Some of the most prominent one regiment, without parachutes until 1944). The scholars in airpower history gathered at the RAF’s somewhat repetitive comments of the interviewees marvelous museum at Hendon, a most appropri make clear that they did not resent these condi ate setting, to deliver some stimulating essays on tions but in fact discovered a new identity as patri their discipline. Afterwards, they participated in a otic defenders against the Nazi threat (they also Battle of Britain staff ride, an event reported to hated the German-given nickname of “night have been splendid in every regard. It is fitting, witches”). As ordinary women thrown into the fire, then, that the proceedings of the conference should they developed a strong sorority amongst them- appear in such fine shape and so soon. The work selves, and those who survived learned to devise reflects the judgment and efficiency of the editors, and share tactics as they gained experience, some Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray—the former the graduating from navigator to pilot. Several of them head of the Air Historical Branch and the latter note that they were never so respected and ad- the director of defense studies. Both editors are mired as they were during the conflict. widely published in airpower topics, chiefly Euro These testimonies, however, do not provide an pean, and are clearly authorities on the subject. analysis of their narrators’ experience. Although The editing is clean—hardly an error occurs supported by an excellent introduction by Christine anywhere in the text, a considerable achievement White, who clearly frames the role of the women’s in such an anthology. Some of the chapters are squadrons (organized into three regiments) in the well written and informative, although a few are Soviet war effort, the collection leaves the reader unsurprising and fewer still engage in some air- wishing for more information to better understand men’s chest thumping. As always, the parts of the this unique female experience in combat. The work vary in quality, and the overall theme is diffi book occasionally mentions fraternization with cult to maintain. Most of the essays focus on air- male soldiers, but whether women sought or ac power in Europe, but some address air wars in cepted these friendships as a matter of fact re- other arenas. Ian MacFarling, of the Australian air mains unclear. Similarly, 30 of the women inter- viewed received their nation’s highest award, that force, has a chapter on World War II in the Pacific, of Hero(ine) of the Soviet Union. They were all and the USAF historian deals with that topic in highly deserving, but Noggle does not specify the passing in his essay of a more general character. criteria for the award. Furthermore, one finds a The collection also includes two very fine chapters few mistakes in the transcriptions of some nouns on airpower and maritime wars, one dealing with (e.g., Focke Wolf instead of Focke Wulf and Oerlekon World War I by Christina Goulter of the Royal instead of Oerlikon). However, these are minor Naval Air Service and the other with World War II quibbles. A Dance with Death is sure to remain an by John Buckley. American experts on naval avia excellent starting point for historians, an enter tion are conspicuous by their absence. John Ferris’s taining volume for general readers, and (especially wonderful chapter on the development of the air in paperback) a good source for instructors who defense of Great Britain makes clear that the vic wish to assign reading on World War II, Soviet Rus tory was due to much more than the fortunate in sia, or women in combat. vention of radar in 1935 and the ascendancy of Air Marshal Hugh Dowding. To be sure, those events Guillaume de Syon were important, but the whole system had been Reading, Pennsylvania building ever since World War I, and other parts of it were vital too. Ferris concludes that “the Battle of Britain was a walkover, one of the most one-sided Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty victories in military history” (p. 46). At the confer Hawk to Kosovo edited by Sebastian Cox and ence, the USAF historian spoke of the same battle Peter Gray. Frank Cass Publishers (http://www. thusly: “The Battle of Britain was, like Waterloo, a frankcass.com), 5824 NE Hassalo Street, Port- ‘close-run thing’; indeed, it was perhaps even NET ASSESSMENT 113 closer than might first be apparent” (p. 97). Take and history books. Enter retired colonel Bob Ross. your pick. In a book he waited his whole career to write, Ross Part of the problem for the generalist reader of masterfully describes the emotional highs and Air and Space Power Journal is that the essays are in lows, likes and dislikes, and triumphs and defeats terpretations which sometimes contradict each of his Air Force career. other. That is fine and even stimulating for the In this account of life as a test pilot, fighter specialist in airpower history, but it can impede pilot, and combat commander, Ross tells his Air progress for the generalist. Too, the essays focus Force story with wit, candor, and refreshing irrev very much on the lethal dimensions of airpower. erence. He brings a no-nonsense perspective to a Furthermore, the book includes only one chapter culture he describes as beset with needless paper- on the logistics of the RAF in the early years, and work, career bureaucrats, and hangers-on at all lev that is disappointing; very little material addresses els of the chain of command. Both the bomber research and development, although some con community, champions of “stan-evals,” and a class tributors touch upon technology here and there; of pilots he describes with the phonetic spellings of command and control issues receive only indirect the letters W and D draw Ross’s ire. attention; despite its importance to airpower, intel The author begins by describing his inadvertent ligence gets just a peripheral look; and readers entry into the flying community after studying en enjoy a splendid chapter by John Olson on the gineering at the University of California at Berke Gulf War but nothing on the Korean War. The ley. After joining the Air Force with the expecta point is that, as fine as Air Power History is, it mainly tion of using his education and experience as a civil interests the specialist, who already has a firm engineer, Ross was startled by his assignment to a grasp of the details of the discipline. The general position in communications and electronics. Hop ist USAF officer would be better served by broader ing to correct the oversight, he was swiftly informed works such as Lee Kennett’s The First Air War, by a well-schooled personnel officer that “the Air 1914–1918; R. J. Overy’s The Air War, 1939–1945; Force doesn’t make mistakes.” If he did not like it, and Benjamin S. Lambeth’s The Transformation of he could sign up for pilot training. So began the American Air Power. Together, these three would distinguished flying career of Robert Ross. yield a good summary of the history of air war. Air Ross proceeds to detail his early flying days, se Power History is valuable to teachers of the subject, lection and tenure as a test pilot, and first tour in but perhaps a better title would have been Reflec­ Vietnam, seamlessly weaving personal stories with tions on the History of Air Power. descriptions of missions flown and experiences with leadership styles, both good and bad. Recall Dr. David R. Mets ing his first tour, he reveals the interplay of fear of Maxwell AFB, Alabama the unknown with a fighter-pilot-sized dose of hubris. Interspersing the recollections of tense missions flown are amusing vignettes of the down- time diversions of his fellow pilots. Ross also de- The Warriors: Reflections of a Fighter Pilot, Test scribes returning from Vietnam to study at an Pilot, and Veteran of the Air Wars over Vietnam American college campus (the University of Illi by Robert E. Ross. Yucca Tree Press (http:// nois in Champagne-Urbana) during the uproar of yuccatree.com), Barbed Wire Publishing, 270 the antiwar movement. Memories of this experi Avenida de Mesilla, Las Cruces, New Mexico ence are insightful and characteristically frank 88005, 2002, 304 pages, $25.00 (hardcover). (“Did I waste a year dropping napalm on the wrong folks?”). As new generations of airmen filter into the Ross concludes by describing his second tour in ranks, the American experience in Southeast Asia Vietnam in a self-deprecating manner that vastly slowly dwindles from the consciousness of the ac understates his heroism and valor. (Indeed, he is tive duty force. Veterans who saw combat duty dur the kind of man whom readers would want to meet ing the conflict in Vietnam are fewer in number, one day to hear these same stories in person.) and as they retire, their ability to pass on lessons After 438 combat missions and a total of two more learned to younger troops diminishes correspond takeoffs in his F-4 than he amassed landings, he ingly. The fear is that the passion and emotion that came home. I enthusiastically recommend The come from stories of their firsthand experiences Warriors to students of Vietnam, enthusiasts of Air will lose something when translated into memoirs Force history and culture, and any active duty 114 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 member looking for a good book about actual air- flight, and a second Canadian, Lt C. E. Rogers, was men in combat. a wingman in the flight. No book on Canadian fighter pilots would be Capt Jay Hemphill, USAF complete without a detailed history of Billy Bishop, Edwards AFB, California a Canadian and British Empire hero of World War I. Bashow masterfully relates Bishop’s colorful his- tory, which includes some of his not-so-well-known behavior. He also documents the last moments of Knights of the Air: Canadian Fighter Pilots in the Baron Manfred von Richthofen, whose last en First World War by David L. Bashow. McArthur gagement involved an attack on a Canadian (Lt & Company Publishing, Limited (http://www. Wilfred May) while von Richthofen, in turn, was mcarthur-co.com/books.html), 322 King Street under attack by Lt Roy Brown, May’s former West, Suite 402, Toronto, Ontario M5J 1J2, schoolmate and current squadron mate. Evidently, 2001, 210 pages, $50.00 (hardcover). von Richthofen was shot down by Sgt C. B. Popkin of the Australian army; however, Bashow puts a Dave Bashow, assistant professor of military his- fighter pilot’s perspective on his death by saying tory at the Royal Military College of Canada, fills a that the German ace violated his own rules by chas void with his book Knights of the Air by telling a ing Lieutenant May. story that few American pilots are aware of: the sig Knights of the Air is about more than the exploits nificant contribution of Canadian fighter pilots to of individual Canadian airmen. Bashow uniquely the history of airpower. He documents the fact that covers the Somme offensive from the perspective at least 171 of the 863 known British Empire aces of the aviator and relates air fighting to the impor of World War I were Canadian, and of the 26 with tant ground battles. His research is thorough and 30 or more kills, 10 were Canadian—including complete, even to the point of documenting the Billy Bishop, Canada’s leading ace, with 72 kills incomplete record keeping of German flying and Raymond Collishaw, who tied with Edward squadrons. He also discusses how this deficiency Mannock at 61. created some permanent holes in the history of air Of interest to the American military historian, warfare in World War I. Canadian fighter pilots made a substantial con most of these kills were made long before the tribution during the war. Bashow’s record of the United States deployed any military aircraft to Eu exploits of these daring, adventurous young men rope. British Commonwealth aviators, along with complements All the Fine Young Eagles (Toronto: the French, fought the Germans in the skies over Stoddart Publishing, 1996), his book on the his- France for two full years before American heroes tory of Canadian fighter pilots in World War II. like Eddie Rickenbacker took to the air in combat. Both books are good reads for any airman. Clearly, The author carefully records how young Canadi the legacy of Canada’s first fighter pilots is still ans paid for their own training (the substantial alive in the writings of Dave Bashow. sum of $400), mostly in the United States, so they could enter British flying squadrons. Lt Col Martin A. Noel Jr., USAF, Retired Early on, Canadian fighter pilots logged a num Las Vegas, Nevada ber of (mostly) firsts in air combat. Redford Mulock was the first to intercept a German airship over En- gland; the first to spot for artillery at night, using flares; and the second to bomb a submarine. Mu- Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution lock, flying with the Royal Naval Air Service, was of British and American Ideas about Strategic the first Canadian ace of World War I. Capt Andrew Bombing, 1914–1945 by Tami Davis Biddle. McKeever scored all of his 31 confirmed kills flying Princeton University Press (http://www.pupress. the two-seat F2a, when pilots made most of their princeton.edu), 41 William Street, Princeton, kills in single-seat aircraft. British Empire fighter New Jersey 08540-5237, 2002, 408 pages, $45.00 pilots moved from single aircraft to formation tac (hardcover). tics; specifically, they invented the “finger four” formation, known to US airmen down through the Tami Biddle has written an important and in next 60 years or so as “fluid four.” On 30 April novative intellectual history of American and 1916, Capt William Milne led the first finger-four British strategic bombing in the age of total war NET ASSESSMENT 115 that should appeal to both academic historians college’s curriculum and teaching were lackluster and military professionals. The author discusses and highly conventional. Faculty and staff seemed how strategies of airpower originate, develop, and to consider it more important that students feel are later executed, as well as why gaps occur be- good about themselves and be air-offensive- tween the genesis of an idea/strategy and the ac minded rather than think out of the box or per- tual reality of implementing it. She also wrestles form well in class. Thus, the school emphasized with the problem of why militaries fail to adapt to riding and sports to the detriment of analytical new and differing realities. study. Consequently, the RAF rearmed itself in the The book’s central idea entails comparing the 1930s without understanding the strategic vision of development of ideas in the United States and the Luftwaffe; it also ignored the lessons of the Great Britain regarding long-range bombing, rais wars that took place during this period in China ing such key questions as why the British and and Spain. Indeed, the RAF’s disinclination to Americans were interested in strategic bombing in alter its policies in light of a changing interna the first place. Biddle also considers why American tional environment could prove to be a cautionary and British expectations were at odds with reality tale for current American PME. and how perceptions and interpretations shaped In the third chapter, Biddle demonstrates that plans, policies, and campaigns. In many ways, her the dependent status of the Army Air Forces (AAF) book is about the assumptions of airpower. In illu did not hamper its intellectual development. How- minating these various questions, she casts a wide ever, she fails to discuss either the popular cultural intellectual net, using unique and original ap context of the development of US airpower or the proaches such as cognitive psychology and the role relationship between the development of theory of popular culture. and technology. Biddle does illustrate here that Early on, Biddle emphasizes the importance of the American debate over strategic bombing was World War I and its long-lasting influence upon not a high-profile political issue and shows that both the interwar period (1919–39) and World some American analysis done at the end of the War II. In many ways, her discussion of the Great Great War was either lost or forgotten during the War highlights the role of personalities—Sir Hugh interwar years. She also addresses some problems, “Boom” Trenchard, for example, was one figure such as an overemphasis on strategic bombing and who dominated the scene. She takes a more criti horseback riding, that existed at the Air Corps Tac cal view of Trenchard than have previous authors, tical School (ACTS) at Maxwell Field, Alabama, in thus providing an important corrective to early ha the 1930s. Nevertheless, she portrays ACTS as a giographical works on him. Trenchard was investi much more intellectually vibrant staff college than gated by the Army for his overtaxing pilot training its British counterpart. Like the British, however, and very high casualty rate. In fact, one could argue the Americans failed to draw any lessons from in that Trenchard fought a war of attrition in the air. terwar conflicts, and, like the previous chapter, this According to Biddle, he commanded more by in one tries to explain why the Americans and British stinct than by systematic analysis and ignored rec continued to believe for so long that bombers did ommendations regarding targeting. By analyzing not need escorts. British bomb damage assessment (BDA) at the end Biddle’s discussion of World War II reveals the of the war, she demonstrates that Trenchard heavily timidity of RAF Bomber Command and its lack of influenced BDA to justify his conduct of the war. technological ability to engage in strategic bomb This report and Trenchard himself, both of which ing—a situation quite contrary to Trenchard’s ear provoked discussion about the moral effects of lier vision of airpower. Emerging here is another heavy bombing, shaped the development and force key personality—Arthur “Bomber” Harris, a prod structure of the Royal Air Force (RAF), which or uct of Trenchard’s RAF who believed that Bomber ganized itself around strategic bombing during the Command could win the war entirely on its own. interwar years. Furthermore, Trenchard’s overem Not very “joint” and narrower in his approach than phasis on the moral effects of strategic bombing Arthur Tedder (another RAF leader), Harris had a leads Biddle to blame him for Britain’s appease difficult time working with the Americans and his ment of Nazi Germany in the late 1930s. own navy. According to Biddle, Harris said Bomber In an interesting discussion of professional mili Command’s job was to destroy cities and kill work tary education (PME) in the RAF, Biddle argues ers and that it should not hide behind the excuse that the service developed dogmatic doctrine in of collateral damage, a statement that made Winston the interwar years partially because the RAF staff Churchill very nervous about bad publicity. Al- 116 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 though the British public supported the destruc ical improvements. Whether or not one agrees tion of German cities, Harris stands as a villain in with the author, her book clearly and coherently il Biddle’s work. lustrates that the study of the history of strategic Dr. Biddle has some interesting and controver bombing remains crucial to the development of sial things to say about the AAF in World War II. airpower in this age of the transformation of mili For example, she shows that in the winter of tary power. 1943–44, the Combined Bomber Offensive almost failed. The use of long-range fighter escorts saved Dr. William Dean not only the AAF, but also the RAF. Before the out- Air Command and Staff College break of the war, ACTS had developed high-altitude Maxwell AFB, Alabama daylight precision bombing (HADPB), which Harris rejected in favor of area bombing. The United States continued to follow this strategy despite the absence of a viable precision technology because it Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing believed in this theory of air war. Biddle argues Environment edited by Jeffrey A. Larsen. Lynne that concerns about a just war or morality did not Rienner Publishers, Inc. (http://www.rienner. motivate HAPDB. In fact, one of her most contro com), 1800 30th Street, Suite 314, Boulder, Col versial arguments is that the United States was in orado 80301, 2002, 413 pages, $65.00 (hard- terested in area bombing long before the air cam cover), $24.50 (softcover). paign over Japan commenced in the winter of 1945 and that the firebombing of that country was In the years since the dissolution of the former premeditated, having its origins in 1943. Further, Soviet Union, a diverse literature has emerged to Biddle declares that the adoption of area bombing explore the manifold implications of this momen in Europe and, later, Japan upended ACTS theory. tous event. This collection of essays compiled by Domestic US popular culture emotionally pre- Jeffrey Larsen addresses the arms-control dimen pared the American public for the firebombing of sion of the post–Cold War era, specifically the Japan, after which the postwar US Strategic Bomb search for cooperative security in a global environ ing Survey continued to argue for precision over ment that bears marked differences from the pe area bombing. riod before the Soviet hammer and sickle was low Only a few quibbles come to mind regarding ered for the last time. This anthology, an update of this otherwise excellent, thought-provoking book. an earlier book—Arms Control toward the Twenty- For instance, Biddle is uneven in her discussion of First Century (1996)—draws upon the insights of technology, and key visual aids such as maps would several authors who contributed to the original vol have been helpful. Also, the discussion of the his ume, in addition to those of other scholars who toriography of strategic bombing should have oc bring considerable expertise to bear on this topic. curred in the introduction rather than at the end The new book is divided topically into four sec of the work, where the author briefly examines the tions: arms-control concepts and history, weapons- conflicts in Korea and Vietnam—both of which related issues, regional perspectives, and new items sections are relatively weak and underdeveloped. on the arms-control agenda. Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare—which will The contextual setting of arms control is the stimulate thinking about airpower and would be theme of the book’s first section. Michael Wheeler’s appropriate for inclusion in courses in PME—is a historical review of arms control is a useful survey cautionary tale for the Air Force because it demon for readers new to the literature, as well as a re strates that ideas and history really do matter. Bid minder that post–Cold War arms control will con dle shows that understanding the history of strate tinue to be a pervasive part of international rela gic bombing is an intellectual process. Many of the tions, although it may take different forms from its key problems studied by theorists and practitioners antecedents. Schuyler Foerster’s essay points out that of strategic bombing in the age of total war, such as these new forms will be a function, at least in part, the relationship between bombing and enemy ca of trends such as the global spread of technology, pitulation, still haunt airpower theorists in the emergence of new states, and proliferation of state twenty-first century. In fact, in her sweeping and and nonstate actors. Departing from this structural controversial conclusion, Biddle argues that ideas view, Jennifer Sims provides insights into the influ about strategic bombing have changed little since ence of domestic-level variables on arms control. the age of technology despite dramatic technolog Using the United States as a case study, she illus- NET ASSESSMENT 117 trates how strategic culture; political and legal in other authors present a mixed picture of achieve stitutions; economic and technological factors; ments against a background of regional factors and elites, interest groups, and public opinion will that could militate against future prospects. Glen continue to shape US arms-control policy, but in Segell’s discussion of the Middle East’s historical new ways. Clearly, a more complex, dynamic inter- record suggests meager gains unless a constructive national setting may render traditional verification dialogue and general agreement occur on norms of treaty-limited activities and items more difficult. and forms of behavior conducive to stability. Al Accordingly, Joseph Pilat suggests a greater use of though the disarmament of Iraq might resolve openness, transparency, and confidence-building some barriers to progress, Iran’s nuclear program, measures to make arms control more cooperative coupled with long-standing regional political and and less competitive. religious disputes, may lead to less—not more—co Preventing the spread of arms is the focus of operation. Christopher Carr’s essay on Africa reveals the second section of the book. Forrest Waller ar that traditional and nontraditional approaches have gues persuasively that a transformation of strategic had some success controlling the spread of small nuclear arms control will enable this enterprise to arms, but until African societies tire of internecine play a continuing role in US-Russian relations and conflict, efforts to curb these weapons will continue elsewhere to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. to resemble more a patchwork of measures than Guy Roberts makes a strong case to sustain the Co formal arms control. Similarly, Peter Lavoy observes operative Threat Reduction (CTR) program with that until India and Pakistan embrace restraint Russia to dispose of excess fissile materials and pro- and reciprocity, South Asia will remain a crisis- vide alternative employment for nuclear scientists prone region where nuclear war remains a possi and engineers. Despite its slow pace and shortfalls, bility. Brad Roberts notes that East Asia has CTR serves US interests by keeping nuclear mate- reached a fork in the road. Although arms-control rials away from terrorists and rogue states. The agreements have played an important role in that broader proliferation problem is addressed in region, future events could unravel past success. three essays by Leonard Spector, Marie Isabelle Future challenges for arms control are the Chevrier, and Jo Husbands. Spector’s examination focus of the fourth section of the book. Kerry of diplomatic initiatives to curb nuclear prolifera Kartchner concludes from his examination of the tion reveals that these measures have generally been offense-defense relationship that, although the successful and, when balanced with military pre United States will not abandon deterrence, it will paredness, could improve opportunities to deter jettison its Cold War definition of deterrence in or defeat nuclear threats. Although the objectives order to answer questions about who should be de of nuclear arms control overlap in some ways with terred, what the United States seeks to deter, and those of chemical and biological arms control, in how US forces and diplomacy should be developed other ways they are different due to the nature of for new forms of deterrence. Patricia McFate’s essay the weapons. These differences make chemical and explores the tension between reconciling the uni biological arms control more difficult and, in the lateral pursuit of US goals in space and adhering case of biological weapons, more urgent. Yet, as to the international pacts the United States has Chevrier points out, there have been problems im signed. Current space arms-control accords are the plementing the Chemical Weapons Convention and product of a different era, yet the United States has strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons interests that may conflict with these agreements. Convention—problems that may have less to do The United States has reached a juncture where its with technical and legal issues than with political choices could affect the international community differences among decision makers who perceive for many years. Not only has a new age presented divergent paths to national security. Despite the new arms-control challenges in traditional environ numerous obstacles that hamper the achievement ments, such as outer space, this new age poses chal of nuclear, chemical, and biological arms control, lenges in new realms, such as cyberspace. Gregory Husbands’s discussion of attempts to constrain the Rattray assesses growing US dependence on com global proliferation of conventional arms illuminates puter networks, particularly for military operations, an oft neglected yet equally important challenge. and the rise in cyber attacks. Undertaking “cyber The third section of the book addresses re arms control” will confront the United States with gional perspectives on past, present, and future legal, political, technical, and economic factors arms control. Aside from Jeffrey McCausland’s never before encountered in traditional arms con essay on progress in European arms control, the trol. Changes in the structure of the international 118 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 system will also influence future forms of arms con Stafford nicely peppers the book with comical trol. John Nagl offers that the emergence of a two- asides and unique stories that even trivia-savvy tiered world, a concept drawn from Donald Snow, space hobbyists will find remarkable. composed of democratic, liberal economies and His juxtaposition of American and Soviet space nondemocratic, nonmarket economies, as well as a stories is pointed and insightful—and makes the diverse range of nonstate and substate actors, will book unique. Several of the longer stories work on take arms control into uncharted areas. Clearly, as many levels: technical, historical, political, and James Wirtz observes in the concluding essay, we personal. For example, on 29 June 1971, Soyuz 11’s stand at a crossroads in the history of arms control crew left Salyut, the world’s first manned space sta and cooperation, poised to enter a new century tion. Supposed to land just before dawn in Central whose problems will be no less challenging and Asia, the crew members completed their reentry whose opportunities no less intriguing than they maneuver and then fired the retro-rockets. The de- were at the beginning of the last century. scent module parachuted to a landing in Kazakh If this anthology has gaps or omissions, none stan. But when members of the recovery team ar were evident to this reviewer. Without exception, rived, they found all three cosmonauts mysteriously the essays are timely, informative, and well written. dead. The book also includes a chronology of arms con General Stafford then concisely explains how trol from 1945 through mid-2002 and an appendix the men died and what the ramifications on the with synopses of 42 arms-control treaties, agree ground entailed, both politically and for him per ments, and organizations. Arms Control is recom sonally. I like the way he segues from expositor of mended reading for scholars, arms-control neo technical detail to storyteller here. Soyuz 11’s mis phytes, seasoned practitioners, and anyone whose fortune becomes another story—one about profession could be touched by the subject. Stafford’s introduction to dealing with the Soviets and meeting a lifelong friend who reappears Lt Col Charles E. Costanzo, USAF throughout the book. Maxwell AFB, Alabama On a family vacation to Europe at the time of the Soyuz 11 accident, Stafford was unexpectedly called to duty as a diplomat—appointed stand-in for President Richard Nixon at the cosmonauts’ We Have Capture: Tom Stafford and the Space state funeral. As a fellow space explorer, Stafford Race by Thomas P. Stafford with Michael Cassutt. was invited to serve as a pallbearer. The funeral was Smithsonian Institution Press (http://www. a solemn event, made even less bearable by tedious sipress.si.edu), 750 Ninth Street NW, Suite Communist political speeches. Stafford noted the 4300, Washington, D.C. 20560-0950, 2002, 224 Soviet guards “fainting and falling to the pavement.” pages, $29.95 (hardcover). The morning after the service, Stafford’s host, a Russian cosmonaut general named Beregovoi, From schoolboy in Oklahoma to plebe at An held Stafford’s commercial plane on the flight napolis, from Air Force test pilot to NASA astro line. As Stafford was about to board to return to his naut, Lt Gen Tom Stafford, USAF, retired, has re- family, his host announced, “We need some counted one man’s success in an easily read book. vodka.” When Stafford protested, the general But it is also much more. We Have Capture is an ex replied that “the plane doesn’t leave until I say it amination of an intriguing period of history from does” and then asked, “Do you like caviar? . . . the point of view of one of the few insiders. Come here! You need a snack.” As they drank, the Using the maturation of the US Manned Space passengers waited. The scene provides a quick, Program as a backdrop, General Stafford gives the comical example of Soviet power and attitude. reader a lively tour of his personal recollections of Another layer to this story involves Stafford’s NASA, the Cold War, détente with the Soviets, and meeting in Moscow during the memorial cere the maturation of human interaction in space. Al monies with Aleksie Leonov, the cosmonaut who though his scope ranges from his childhood and was supposed to have led the fatal Soyuz 11 mission. the World War II era, the meat of the book covers Stafford maintained a relationship with Leonov, the space race to the end of the century, particu and they were partners on the Apollo-Soyuz proj larly from the Gemini program to the interna ect. They remain friends to this day. Thus, Stafford tional space station. Famous names and familiar vi and his collaborator Michael Cassutt make the suals of space missions leap off each page. Also, book more than a typical memoir by recounting NET ASSESSMENT 119 key Soviet space events and the career progression into Air Force stealth testing; the complexities of of certain cosmonauts in parallel with Stafford’s serving as a staff officer; and some of Stafford’s en own rapid pace through the ranks of the Air Force trepreneurial, corporate, and philanthropic proj and NASA. ects—including health imaging, student scholar- I found the chapter “Handshake in Space,” de- ships, and the Stafford Commission. His personal voted to the Apollo-Soyuz mission of June 1975, achievements and lessons in dealing with internal particularly interesting. When I was a young astro NASA politics and the Soviets (and then the Rus naut wanna-be back then, this mission became a sians on the international space station), as well as significant milestone in my decision to be an Air his personal asides, lead me to strongly recom Force officer. I had the good fortune to be es mend We Have Capture. corted behind the scenes in Houston by a family member who worked in mission control. I remem Lt Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF ber the real-time video of astronauts and cosmo Washington, D.C. nauts in space. The experience was a genuine thrill, now enhanced by reading about the hidden, inside story. Stafford’s parallel recounting of Soviet and US Vietnam Air Losses: United States Air Force, Navy space achievements from the 1960s seems to lead and Marine Corps Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses to the Apollo-Soyuz mission, which included three in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973 by Chris Hobson. years of political wrangling, long sessions of train Midland Publishing, available from Specialty ing, and getting to know and trust one another. I Press (http://www.specialtypress.com), 39966 appreciate Stafford’s detailed description of the Grand Avenue, North Branch, Minnesota training and behind-the-scenes intrigue that at- 55056, 2001, 192 pages, $29.95 (softcover). tempted to pry open the Iron Curtain—if only just a little. The challenges and successes of the mis The headline of a front-page story in the New sion also add great color. The story of the Apollo York Times on 21 March 1961 read, “U.S. Ready to capsule’s rough return to Earth contains enough Face All Risks to Bar Red Rule of Laos/Decision technical stick-and-rudder details to satisfy my Made as Kennedy Meets with Top Military Advisors/ tastes, with plenty of realism that allowed me to Growing Crisis Seen.” Two days later, Pathet Lao picture what was happening. ground fire downed a C-47B out of Vientiane, thus General Stafford’s humor also adds a nice marking the loss of the first US fixed-wing aircraft touch to the book. After the rendezvous between operating in the fledgling conflict in Southeast the Soyuz and Apollo craft and the historic dock ing, Stafford knocked on the hatch leading to the Asia. Seven crew members died. Maj Lawrence Soyuz module. Leonov, his friend and Soviet cos Robert Bailey, “who always wore a parachute when monaut commander, responded, “Kto Budet tam?” he flew,” survived to spend nearly 17 months as a [Who’s there?]. Nice. I also found the Soviets’ prisoner of war (p. 5). hide-and-seek antics, pretending that their space In Vietnam Air Losses, Chris Hobson offers a program was civilian rather than military, comical running calendar that chronicles the air war and but insightful. In one instance, US cooperation provides capsule accounts of aircraft lost and the with the Soviets was almost scrubbed until Stafford fate of their crews, addressing the when, where, used his personal connections to convince them to how, and why of these incidents. The book’s stories come clean on Soyuz incidents and failures before of aviators connected by a common thread de- Congress found out. scribe accounts of bravery, misfortune, and occa All in all, We Have Capture is a great book for sional misadventure. On another level, they pro- space and history buffs. It is especially appropriate vide a clinical record, both historical and reading during our celebration of the centennial statistical, of air warfare in Southeast Asia. of flight this year. However, I also think it is just a The author, a British librarian with over 20 good book for airmen. General Stafford was famous years’ service with the Ministry of Defence, ties to not only for being a legendary Gemini and Apollo gether 3,322 aircraft losses with insightful back- astronaut, but also for being instrumental in the ground information about participating units, air- development of the B-2 and the international craft types, and the operational history of the war. space station, and for bettering Russo-American Such continuity makes his work much more than a relations. His book goes beyond NASA and delves mere directory or listing of random events. 120 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

In addition to a judicious use of photographs during the interwar years in response to potential with captions on aircraft types, the book contains a adversaries and developed a SIGINT organization bibliography and glossary of operation and project that would serve it well during World War II. code names. Appendices and indexes include Air The outbreak of World War II and the German Force, Navy, and Marine Corps orders of battle occupation of Denmark and Norway made the (wings, groups, and other units, including squadron Swedish position of neutrality more precarious. So makeup; and—where applicable—activation, inac viet codes were difficult at first but were eventually tivation, redesignation, reassignment, and deploy mastered; the German Enigma keys were even ment dates), as well as a statistical summary of air harder to break. German landline communications losses by service, year, and aircraft type, with sepa ran through Swedish territory and could be moni rate listings by date for losses to surface-to-air mis tored and exploited. That opportunity allowed the siles and MiGs. Finally, a 10-page index of 4,400 Swedes to eventually break the encryption codes personnel provides a reference point for each in used by the German Geheimschreiber teleprinter. cident that mentions an aviator’s or crew mem That successful work on its simultaneous machine ber’s name. Mr. Hobson has dedicated his book to encryption required both an understanding of these people and has told their story well. For re- codes and electro-mechanics. With a staff of fewer searchers looking for a description or confirmation than 400 people, the Swedes achieved impressive of details about aircraft losses, Vietnam Air Losses is results: Soviet, German, and American codes were a practical place to start. broken, and Swedish code security was monitored and corrected when necessary. Interestingly, while Ron Fuller the Germans realized that the integrity of their Maxwell AFB, Alabama communications crossing Sweden had been com promised, their own bureaucratic bungling pre- vented any improvement in their signal security. After demonstrating its value, SIGINT was re- Swedish Signal Intelligence, 1900–1945 by C. G. moved from the Swedish general staff’s signal sec McKay and Bengt Beckman. Frank Cass Pub tion in 1942 and established as an independent au lishers (http://www.frankcass.com), 5824 NE thority. It not only broke codes but also monitored Hassalo Street, Portland, Oregon 97213-3644, illegal radio transmissions inside Sweden, leading 2002, 310 pages, $49.50 (hardcover). to the apprehension of spies. This became an early vision of a unified SIGINT establishment. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is seldom cov In 1944 when the Finns were required to remove ered in historical texts, which makes McKay and German forces to comply with Soviet armistice de Beckman’s first authoritative account of Sweden’s mands, the Swedes proposed that a network of SIGINT both valuable and unique. It is published agents stay behind to keep Sweden informed of So in English and charts the path of a neutral Sweden viet operations inside Finland. While this network as it sought to keep a fine balance between the was never emplaced, Finnish SIGINT equipment, Russians and Germans in World War I and the Al codes, and intelligence documents were brought lies and Germans in World War II. The authors are to Sweden that year. That material was exploited to be commended for their detailed, up-front ex- and retained until it was destroyed in the 1980s to planation of SIGINT: how radio and telegraph maintain the secrecy of those activities. coding was used between various countries and The neutral capital of Stockholm offered nu their diplomatic missions, what kinds of transmis merous SIGINT interception opportunities as ex sions third parties could intercept, and the nu emplified by the Oslo-Berlin communications. merous tasks involved in decoding that data. Those interceptions provided the Swedes with in- As an integral part of the book, the authors sight into German operations and diplomatic traf documented Sweden’s ties to Finnish indepen fic. Other interesting tidbits in the book cover the dence groups in 1917 and its associations with the possible compromise of Operation Overlord, independent Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and British counterintelligence operations inside the Lithuania prior to their conquest by the Soviet Swedish Embassy in London, and the role played Union in 1939. Those conquests and the 1939 Win by the Hagelin Crypto Machine Company. Among ter War in Finland brought home to the Swedes the the smaller neutral nations of World War II, Swe threat they faced from an expanding Soviet Union. den was the most ready to tackle SIGINT chal The Swedes reorganized their military repeatedly lenges at the beginning of the Cold War, and may NET ASSESSMENT 121 have come closest to matching the British suc tred of others” (p. 6), a statement that is too sim cesses of Bletchley Park. plistic and minimizes efforts to really identify what While a more complete book could have in is currently wrong with Islam. For example, one cluded the Cold War history of Swedish SIGINT glaring problem is the inability of Sunni Islam to (which would be interesting and possibly answer reinvent itself through an Islamic concept called many Baltic mysteries), SIGINT books are rare, Ijithaad (analytical reasoning), which senior reli and this one is a must-read for intelligence profes gious officials foolishly banned in the ninth century. sionals. The detailed explanation of cryptology, “When Devils Walk the Earth,” the chapter on coding, and the way SIGINT is produced puts this terrorism, offers an excellent analysis of two differ book ahead of other, more technical, texts. Histo ent types of terrorists: the practical and the apoca rians interested in World War II may even have to lyptic. The former have a political agenda and want reconsider some events of that war after reading to ascend to power, so utterly destroying the infra this book. structure they intend to govern makes no sense. The latter are the more dangerous type because Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired they believe they are the hand of God. Unlike prac Alexandria, Virginia tical terrorists, the apocalyptic terrorists do not lis ten to reason—after all, they have God on their side. Peters candidly states that the apocalyptic faction must simply be destroyed. Clearly, Beyond Terror is a Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World by controversial book but an important one for read Ralph Peters. Stackpole Books (http://www. ers interested in forecasting strategy and policy. stackpolebooks.com/cgi-bin/StackpoleBooks. storefront), 5067 Ritter Road, Mechanicsburg, Lt Comdr Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN Pennsylvania 17055-6921, 2002, 368 pages, Washington, D.C. $22.95 (hardcover).

Ralph Peters had an interesting military career that included service in the Executive Office of the War of the Aeronauts: The History of Ballooning President. He retired as a lieutenant colonel in in the Civil War by Charles M. Evans. Stackpole order to speak freely about what he considered Books (http://www.stackpolebooks.com/ problems in the US military and political policies. cgi-bin/StackpoleBooks.storefront), 5067 Ritter Although one can disagree with his points of view, Road, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055-6921, they do force readers to think about the future of 2002, 368 pages, $27.95 (hardcover). our armed forces. Beyond Terror includes 16 essays that Peters published in such journals as the US First-time author Charles M. Evans has written Naval Institute’s Proceedings and the Army War Col an excellent history of the birth of American air- lege’s Parameters, as well as a few chapters written power in War of the Aeronauts, which he began re- specifically for it. The book deals with problems as searching in graduate school. Evans provides an varied as the root causes of intelligence failures, admirable overview of early ballooning and of the the need for linguists, and the problem of retired first US and Confederate air forces. Woven around flag officers assuming positions in private defense- the universal themes of personalities and resistance contracting firms. to change, the book devotes most of its text to bal Peters—who seems to embrace Samuel Hun loonist Thaddeus Lowe and his exploits with the tington’s theory of the clash of civilizations, which Union army of the Potomac. many academics reject—begins by discussing Lowe was a ballooning pioneer, an innovator, America’s place in history, arguing that the United and an excellent organizer, as well as a supreme States should not be ashamed of its military and in egotist and self-promoter. On 17 June 1861, he dustrial might. He feels that we often support dic brought a balloon to Pennsylvania Avenue, directly tatorships and corrupt regimes in the name of po across from the White House, where he made an litical expediency when we should be throwing our ascent and sent a telegram to President Lincoln instruments of national power behind people who from the balloon. Lincoln was impressed enough want self-determination. About the world of Islam to invite Lowe to spend the night at the White he writes, “[Muslims] must decide whether to wal House and personally took him to see Winfield low in a comforting that warms the heart with ha Scott, general in chief of the Union army. Lincoln 122 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 told a skeptical Scott, “This is my friend Professor Lowe’s pay and reduce his prestige. After the Battle Lowe, who is organizing an Aeronautics Corps for of Chancellorsville in May 1863, a demoralized Lowe the Army, and is to be its Chief. I wish you would resigned, and the army never employed the balloon facilitate his work in every way” (pp. 86–87). corps again. The high command had lost interest Lowe became a civilian “contractor” attached to in aerial reconnaissance. the Bureau of Topographical Engineers (mapmak Most probably Lowe failed because of his ego ers). Insisting on being paid a colonel’s salary, he tistical personality. Officers became disgusted with proved very adept at organizing teams to inflate, his self-centered attempts to build a reputation at transport, and operate his balloons. He also de- the expense of his rivals. Many of them also dis vised portable hydrogen-gas generators that com trusted the balloonists and felt that Lowe exagger bined sulfuric acid and iron shavings to produce ated his observations for self-serving purposes. Still combustible gas. Among other innovations, Lowe others saw the balloonists as a carnival act and re- built an “aircraft carrier” from a 122-foot barge, a fused to take them seriously. Even more impor telegraph train to transmit messages from balloons tantly, Evans concludes that the horrible slaughter to army field headquarters, and colored flares for of the Civil War shocked the nation into feeling signaling troop movements. His development and that it had “no more time to waste on novel ideas employment of an “oxyhydrogen” arc lamp made concerning the war effort. The time for experi him the first person to use artificial light in combat menting with fanciful contraptions of war was over. operations, and he hired other “aeronauts” to ex Proven concepts of technology . . . would remain, pand his reconnaissance capability. Finally, Lowe because their effectiveness was categorically tested understood the need to build sturdy balloons and on the field of battle” (p. 293). equipment that could withstand the rigors of the Evans’s book is excellent—well written, re- field. His strengths and expertise won him the sup- searched, documented, and illustrated. Aside from port of Maj Gen George B. McClellan, commander the fact that the author seems to accept Lowe’s of the army of the Potomac. Unfortunately, Lowe’s writings and accounts too uncritically, the book of personality eventually became his undoing. Ex fers a well-balanced account of its subject. It will be tremely jealous of other balloonists who offered of great interest to the Civil War community be- their services to the Union army, he refused to co cause little else exists on the subject. War of the operate with any of them. Although McClellan con Aeronauts is also relevant to modern military offi tinued to support him, most other senior officers cers and airpower historians since it provides ex grew weary of Lowe’s ego. cellent case studies on the impact of personalities in Lowe and his balloonists provided effective aerial a military bureaucracy, radical technological reconnaissance during several major campaigns in change, and the innate conservatism of military 1862 and 1863. In March 1862, Lowe became the professionals. Billy Mitchell, anyone? first to discover that the Confederates had aban doned their long-held position near Centreville, Col Allan W. Howey, USAF, Retired Virginia, and in April he moved his balloons to Centerville, Ohio Fortress Monroe, Virginia, in support of the Penin sula campaign. In May 1862, he discovered the Confederate evacuation of Yorktown and observed the Battle of Williamsburg. He also reported on The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, Confederate troop movements during the Battles of and War Powers by Ryan C. Hendrickson. Van Seven Pines/Fair Oaks, Mechanicsville, and Gaines derbilt University Press (http://www.vanderbilt. Mill, where he was nearly overrun by Confederates. edu/vupress/index.html), VU Station B 351813, When McClellan retreated, Lowe had to ground Nashville, Tennessee 37235-1813, 2002, 240 his balloons due to the loss of iron shavings, essen pages, $49.95 (hardcover), $24.95 (softcover). tial to the production of hydrogen. After Lincoln dismissed General McClellan in Ryan Hendrickson’s The Clinton Wars provides the fall of 1862, Lowe never again enjoyed the full outstanding information about presidential versus confidence of the army commanders. Both Gen congressional war powers. Every president from Ambrose Burnside and Gen Joseph Hooker em Truman on has claimed constitutional authority as ployed Lowe’s balloons during the Battles of Fred commander in chief to unilaterally deploy (and ericksburg and Chancellorsville, respectively, but employ) America’s armed forces. To stem the Hooker allowed the Topographical Corps to cut growing threat of an imperial president, the House NET ASSESSMENT 123 and Senate passed the War Powers Act of 1973: tensity conflict. It is a must-read for those who wish Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of to closely examine the execution of war powers Congress and the President—also known as the during the Clinton years. War Powers Resolution (WPR). By means of the WPR, Congress intended to re- Maj Paul Niesen, USAF claim the constitutionally provided war-making au Maxwell AFB, Alabama thority. The resolution spelled out specific require ments the president needed to meet in order to deploy American armed forces. Included were limi tations on the length of deployment (subject to Airwar: Essays on Its Theory and Practice by congressional approval) and mandatory consulta Phillip S. Meilinger. Frank Cass Publishers tion with Congress prior to deployment. Despite (http://www.frankcass.com), 5824 NE Hassalo the passage of the WPR, presidents have continued Street, Portland, Oregon 97213-3644, 2003, 288 to unilaterally deploy American armed forces, fre pages, $67.50 (hardcover), $26.00 (softcover). quently with minimal (or no) consultation with Congress. Phillip Meilinger, a prolific and well-respected By examining six case studies, Hendrickson ad- historian of military aviation, has published a col dresses the president’s unilateral exercise of war lection of 14 essays taken from his master’s thesis, powers during the two terms of the Clinton presi articles, papers, and lectures. Varying in length dency. The studies range from American involve from three to 29 pages, they were either published ment in Somalia to Operation Noble Anvil over or presented between 1991 and 2001. Meilinger’s Kosovo. They cover not only President Clinton’s wide breadth of coverage, in terms of both perspective as commander in chief, but also the chronology and subject, gives readers a sweeping views of Congress and the framers of the Constitu survey of aviation history. From the outset, he em tion. Hendrickson skillfully incorporates relevant phasizes that his book is not history of airpower readings that bear on whether or not WPR re (the title is somewhat misleading) but “a collection quirements were met. of my thoughts on various important aspects of air The author’s research reveals several threads power history and theory, strategy and tactics, and common to presidential administrations. First, operations and organization, from both an Ameri public opinion about the impending conflict plays can and an international perspective” (p. 3). Three a major role—Congress just can’t seem to say no to chapters on Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and a president who wants to deploy forces for a loom John Slessor cover the theory of military aviation. ing conflict that the public supports. Second, a He also includes pieces on joint operations in World president’s willingness to consult with Congress War II, the B-29 campaign against Japan, the first seems to depend upon the circumstances at hand. Gulf War, and Kosovo. A pair of essays deals with As was true of presidents during the 50 years pre- aviation technology (the development of US fighter ceding his administration, Clinton frequently paid aircraft between the world wars and of precision- little more than lip service to Congress regarding guided munitions). Other chapters deal with seldom- consultation. Only when the political chips were discussed topics, such as the British navy’s fleet air down did he earnestly build his case with congres arm and the issue of interservice rivalry, and the fu- sional leaders well prior to a strike. Hendrickson tile international attempt in the early 1930s to dis effectively illustrates their willingness to cooperate arm the world’s militaries. with Clinton when he included them in advance Meilinger reveals his enthusiasm for and advo discussions versus their attitude when either the cacy of airpower early on (literally on page one): “I president or his representatives “consulted” them believe that air power has brought about a revolu mere hours before or after a strike. tion in war, because it has altered virtually all as The author proposes some measures to help pects of how it is fought, by whom, against whom, put teeth back into the WPR but readily concedes and with what weapons. . . . War has been funda that a Congress unwilling to put constitutional law mentally transformed by the advent of the airplane.” before politics will defer to a president in the ques He acknowledges airpower’s technological limits tion of the execution of war powers. That said, The but envisions an improvement in its capabilities over Clinton Wars is a great read for people who desire a time, further noting that concerns about “casualty better understanding of the political process be- aversion” have made airpower America’s weapon hind presidential commitment of forces in low in- of choice. In a number of the essays, Meilinger ad- 124 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003 dresses targeting—especially the issue of bombing airpower, both for its historical coverage and its as cities and civilians. Readers will find some of the sessment of airpower’s current status. One hopes author’s observations easy to accept (e.g., the im that the author one day will deal with other aspects portance of intelligence in the application of air- of airpower not covered here, such as naval aviation, power) but will need more persuading for others individuals and organizations (e.g., Billy Mitchell (e.g., the idea that, in this era of terrorism, Clause and the Air Corps Tactical School), airlift, and pilot- witz needs revising). less aircraft. In the meantime, this important collec Meilinger deserves high praise, both for his bold tion certainly deserves more than a glance by read ness in tackling these critical subjects and for his ers interested in the history and the practice of considerable skill in dealing with them. He writes airpower. Even if they read but a few of Airwar’s es clearly, cuts to the essence, and makes good sense. says, they will be amply rewarded. In addition, he provides notes and especially valu able bibliographic commentary. In short, the book Kenneth P. Werrell stands as a substantial addition to the literature on Christiansburg, Virginia

APJ

In this section of “Net Assessment,” you will find additional reviews of aviation-related books and CD- ROMs but in a considerably briefer format than our usual offerings. We certainly don’t mean to imply that these items are less worthy of your attention. On the contrary, our intention is to give you as many reviews of notable books and electronic publications as possible in a limited amount of space.

Flying Fury: Five Years in the Royal Flying Corps by photographs and a list of victories compiled by James McCudden. V.C. Greenhill Books/Stack- Norman Franks, now makes McCudden’s story eas pole Books (http://www.stackpolebooks.com), ily and affordably available. 5067 Ritter Road, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055-6921, 2000, 288 pages, $19.95 (soft- Col Eric A. Ash, USAF cover). Maxwell AFB, Alabama

This paperback reprint of the classic Royal Fly ing Corps memoir by James McCudden, recipient Storm from the Sea by Peter Young. Greenhill of the Victoria Cross, is still a great read. First pub Books/Stackpole Books (http://www.stackpole lished in 1918 under the title Five Years in the Royal books.com), 5067 Ritter Road, Mechanicsburg, Flying Corps, the book brings to life McCudden’s Pennsylvania 17055-6921, 2002, 240 pages, perspective of the first air war. Famous not only for $18.95 (softcover). his 57 aerial victories, but also for the fact that he started as an enlisted engine mechanic and fighter Storm from the Sea, a reprint of British brigadier pilot, McCudden records fascinating tales about Peter Young’s World War II memoir, will interest the challenges of flying and fighting, as well as the readers who like the “ant’s-eye view” of warfare. many personalities he encountered—both friends Young, a highly decorated soldier, literally fought a and foes. Full of period English wit, the memoir global war. Seeing conflict on the horizon, he en presents charming comic relief to the dangers and tered the British army early in 1939, deployed to tragedies of World War I. The reader is only too France as part of the British Expeditionary Force, aware of this, knowing that McCudden was killed and escaped disaster at Dunkirk. Transferring to in 1918, a few days after his final entry in the the commandos, Young quickly made a name for memoir. This paperback version, which includes himself in such far-flung and varied terrain and as- NET ASSESSMENT 125 sociated climates as Norway; Sicily; Italy; Dieppe MiG Alley: Sabres vs. MiGs over Korea by Warren E. and Normandy, France; and finally Burma, where Thompson and David R. McLaren. Specialty he finished the war as a brigadier commanding the Press (http://www.specialtypress.com), 39966 1st Commando Brigade at the ripe old age of 30. Grand Avenue, North Branch, Minnesota Although these accounts are interesting, this 55056, 2002, 192 pages, $39.95 (hardcover). reader hungered for more details. Young’s de scription of the fighting in France in 1940 is This is a fine book on a great airplane. MiG summed up in only one paragraph. The early op Alley is built around vignettes provided by over 60 erations of the commandos are almost comical in American veterans of the Korean War, woven to their naïveté, yet he makes no mention of lessons gether with a brief commentary by the authors. It learned or training for operations. Assigned to is a personal view of the subject—primarily reflec Lord Lovet’s brigade on D day, Young does not tions by F-86 pilots 50 years after the conflict. The mention the training and rehearsals for the inva book relates not only the excitement of dogfights, sion although his unit spent months in England but also incidents of bailouts and accidents during prior to 6 June 1944. Despite these shortcomings, the flying and fighting that took place over Korea. Produced on sleek paper in an unusual format readers interested strictly in a combat narrative will 1 1 find that Storm from the Sea makes a welcome addi (10 ⁄4 by 10 ⁄4 inches), it features numerous color tion to their libraries. pictures and two full-page paintings of the F-86s and the men who flew them. Few, if any, of these Maj James Gates, USAF photos have appeared before in print. The volume also includes three appendices that will gladden Washington, D.C. the hearts of students of the war. One appendix identifies each F-86 that served in the war by serial number, indicating its unit and, if the aircraft were B-25 Mitchell Units of the MTO, Combat Aircraft lost, the official explanation of the circumstances. Series 32 by Steve Pace. Osprey Publishing A second, which shows F-86 losses by date, includ (http://www.ospreypublishing.com), Elms ing the serial number, pilot’s name, unit, cause of Court, Chapel Way, Botley, Oxford OX2 9LP, loss, and fate of the pilot, is very important because United Kingdom, 2002, 96 pages, $19.95 (soft- it marks the first time such information has been cover). published. A third appendix lists confirmed Ameri can kills by date, noting both pilot and unit. A brief In B-25 Mitchell Units of the MTO, Steve Pace bibliography lists 20 books and eight articles. presents the B-25 as the backbone of the US Army MiG Alley embodies popular history at its best by Air Forces’ medium-bomber force. In addition to providing a useful narrative that ties together in tracing the aircraft’s operations across North Africa teresting anecdotes, along with numerous first-rate after Operation Torch, the book gives an account pictures. The authors demonstrate their research ing of the B-25’s employment by Ninth and Twelfth into Air Force records and validate their good repu Air Forces from Torch to the invasion of Italy. In tation as aviation writers. Exceptionally noteworthy doing so, the author covers the operations of the five is a chapter written by a retired technical repre bomb groups (12th, 310th, 319th, 321st, and 340th) sentative of North American Aircraft Corporation, as well as the 57th Bomb Wing, which was equipped which gives an excellent account of Operation with Mitchells. The firsthand accounts make for a GunVal—the Air Force’s test-mounting of 20 mm pleasant and informative read. This exceptionally cannons on F-86s. well illustrated volume includes over 30 great color MiG Alley, which vividly presents the fight for air plates and over 100 black-and-white photographs, as superiority in Korea in both prose and pictures, is well as both color and black-and-white nose art— an excellent read (and look) for any aviation en absolutely crucial to any volume on the B-25. B-25 thusiast; indeed, it is probably the best of this Mitchell Units of the MTO is a must-read for people genre. In short, the book is a sheer delight to be- interested in this aircraft and its role in the hold and should be added to the short list of books Mediterranean theater of operations. on this aspect of the air war in Korea.

Col Frank L. Goldstein, PhD, USAF, Retired Kenneth P. Werrell Fort Walton Beach, Florida Christiansburg, Virginia APJ

ir and Space Power Journal is always look • Enclose a check for $32.00 ($44.80 for A ing for good articles written by our read international mail). ers. If you have something to say, send it to us. • Spend a year enjoying four quarterly is- The Journal focuses on the operational sues mailed to your home or office. and strategic levels of war. We are interested in articles that will stimulate thought on how warfare is conducted and the impact of leader- ship, training, and support functions on op Basis of Issue erations. We encourage you to supply graphics and FRP 10-1, Air and Space Power Journal, is photos to support your article, but don’t let Athe professional journal of the Air Force. the lack of those keep you from writing! We Requirements for distribution will be based are looking for articles from 2,500 to 5,000 on the following: words in length––about 15 to 25 pages. Please submit your manuscript via electronic file One copy for each general officer on ac in either MS Word or Word Perfect format. tive duty with the US Air Force and Air Re- Otherwise, we need two typed, double-spaced serve Forces. draft copies. One copy for every five (or fraction As the professional journal of the Air Force, thereof) active duty US Air Force officers in ASPJ strives to expand the horizons and pro the ranks second lieutenant through colonel. fessional knowledge of Air Force personnel. One copy for each US Air Force or Air Re- To do this, we seek and encourage thought- serve Forces office of public affairs. provoking articles. Please submit yours to the Three copies for each Air Reserve Forces Editor, Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chen nault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428, or unit down to squadron level. electronically to [email protected]. Three copies for each air attaché or advi sory group function. One copy for each non–US Air Force, US . . . But How Do I Subscribe? government organization. EASY . . . One copy for each US Air Force or US gov ernment library. • Just write New Orders, Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh If your organization is not presently receiv­ PA 15250-7954; call (202) 512-1800 (voice) or (202) 512-2250 (fax); or visit http://book ing its authorized copies of the Air and Space store.gpo.gov/subscriptions/alphabet.html Power Journal, please contact our staff to verify on the Internet. your address. To obtain the latest information • Say that you want to subscribe to AFRP or to contact us, visit our Web site at http:// 10-1, Air and Space Power Journal, stock num www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil. ber 708-007-00000-5. The Editor

126 OUR CONTRIBUTORS

of Plans and Programs, Headquarters Air Mo bility Command, Scott AFB, Illinois. A com mand pilot with more than 3,300 hours of flight time, primarily in the C-130 Hercules aircraft, he has served flying tours at Pope AFB, North Carolina, and Little Rock AFB, Arkansas, as well as an exchange tour flying C-130s with the Canadian Forces at CFB Ed monton, Alberta, Canada. His staff assign ments have included tours as an action officer at Headquarters Military Airlift Command, Scott AFB; chief of plans, Joint Contact Team Program, US European Command, Stuttgart, Germany; deputy chief of the Strategy, Con cepts, and Doctrine Division, Air Staff, Penta gon, Washington, D.C.; and military advisor to the European Bureau, Department of State, Washington, D.C. A resident graduate of Squadron Officer School and Armed Forces Staff College and a distinguished graduate of the Naval Command and Staff Course at the Gen Richard B. Myers (BS[ME], Kansas State US Naval War College, he also studied as a Lt Col Michael R. Weeks (BEE, MBA, Auburn University; MBA, Auburn University) is the National Defense Fellow at the Olin Institute University; MSc, Oxford University) is cur 15th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Strategic Studies, Harvard University. rently assigned to an Air Force Institute of (JCS) and the principal military advisor to Colonel Krisinger is the author of numerous Technology–sponsored doctoral program in the president, secretary of defense, and Na articles on air-mobility topics. management studies at Oxford University, tional Security Council. As vice chairman of United Kingdom. He has completed tours as a the JCS during the 19 months prior to be- C-141 flight examiner, T-38 instructor, staff offi coming chairman, he served as chairman of cer with Twenty-First Air Force, and instructor the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, of management at the US Air Force Academy. vice chairman of the Defense Acquisition Colonel Weeks is a senior pilot with over 3,700 Board, and member of the National Security hours in the C-141, T-38, and T-3 aircraft. Council Deputies Committee and the Nu- clear Weapons Council. General Myers has commanded North American Aerospace De fense Command, US Space Command, Air Force Space Command, and Pacific Air Forces. At the tactical level, he commanded the 335th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 1st Tactical Fighter Wing, and 325th Tactical Training Wing in addition to serving as commandant of the USAF Fighter Weapons School. A command pilot, he has more than 4,000 flying hours in the T-33, C-21, F-4, F-16, and F-15, including 600 combat hours in the F-4. General Myers is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and Army War College.

Lt Col Robert D. Newberry (USAFA; MSEE, University of Southern California) is deputy Lt Col Mona Lisa D. Tucker (BS, Georgia In commander of Detachment 12, Space and stitute of Technology; MS, Saint Mary’s Uni Missile Systems Center, Kirtland AFB, New versity; MSS, USAF Air War College) is deputy Mexico. His assignments have included the commander of the 89th Communications Air Force Research Laboratory, Defense Nu- Group, Andrews AFB, Maryland. She has clear Agency, Milstar Joint Program Office, served as commander of the 50th Communi Titan System Program Office, Headquarters cations Squadron, Schriever AFB, Colorado; Air Force Space Command, Headquarters staff officer at United States Space Command, USAF Plans and Programs, Joint Staff, Head- Peterson AFB, Colorado; and commander of quarters USAF Air and Space Operations, the 71st Communications Squadron, Vance and United States Space Command. Colonel Col Chris J. Krisinger (USAFA; MA, Webster AFB, Oklahoma. Colonel Tucker is a gradu Newberry is a graduate of Squadron Officer University; MA, Naval War College) is chief of ate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command School, Air Command and Staff College, and the Doctrine and Policy Division, Directorate and Staff College, and Air War College. Air War College.

127­ 128 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2003

Lt Col Thomas R. McCabe, USAFR (BA, West Chester State College; MA, Georgetown Uni versity; MS, Defense Intelligence College), is Col Brian K. Hall (BS, Rutgers University; MS, Col Russell J. Handy (BS, Embry-Riddle Aero an Air Force reservist mobilized since 11 Sep Marine Corps Command and Staff College; nautical University; MS, Central Michigan Uni tember 2001 and assigned to the Military In DC, New York Chiropractic College) is deputy versity) is commander of the 3d Operations frastructure Office, Directorate of Analysis, director of Joint Requirements and Integration Group, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. He previously Defense Intelligence Agency, Bolling AFB, (J-8), US Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Vir served as commander of the 58th Fighter Washington, D.C. His active duty assignments ginia. He has served as executive officer to the Squadron, chief of 33d Fighter Wing Safety, include serving as a targeting intelligence of vice commander, Air Combat Command, and operations officer of the 60th Fighter ficer with the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, Virginia; chief of Joint Force Re Squadron, all at Eglin AFB, Florida, and as Mountain Home AFB, Idaho; as an operational quirements, US Atlantic Command, Norfolk, chief of Advanced Programs and of Missile intelligence officer with the 51st Tactical Virginia; director of staff for the 317th Airlift Defense Operations at Headquarters NORAD, Fighter Wing, Osan AB, Republic of Korea; Group, Dyess AFB, Texas; and chief of the Air Peterson AFB, Colorado. He also was an in and as a briefing officer on the Air Force Intel Force Directorate, Office of Defense Coopera structor at the USAF Weapons School, Nellis ligence Service Soviet Awareness Briefing tion, Ankara, Turkey. A command pilot with AFB, Nevada; chief of Weapons and Tactics for Team. In civilian life, he is a career intelligence over 2,400 flying hours in three major the 71st Tactical Fighter Squadron, Langley analyst. A previous contributor to Air and Space weapon systems, Colonel Hall is a graduate of AFB, Virginia; and F-15 instructor pilot and as Power Journal, he won the Ira C. Eaker Award Squadron Officer School, Armed Forces Staff sistant chief of Weapons and Tactics for the for his article “The Limits of Deep Attack,” College, and Air War College. 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron, both at which appeared in the fall 1993 issue. Colonel Kadena AB, Japan. Colonel Handy is a gradu McCabe is a graduate of Squadron Officer ate of Squadron Officer School, USAF Fighter School and Air Command and Staff College. Weapons School, Army Command and Gen eral Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, and Air War College.

Lt Col Edith A. Disler (BA, University of Michi gan; MA, University of Arkansas at Little Rock; MA, Naval War College) is completing her doc toral studies in linguistics at Georgetown Uni versity. She will then return to the US Air Force Academy to serve as an associate professor of English. Colonel Disler has served as a Titan II missile combat crew member at Little Rock Lt Col David L. Orr (BS, University of Miami AFB, as assistant professor of English at the US [Florida]; MPA, Valdosta State University; Col Gordon R. Hammock (BA, Virginia Mili Air Force Academy, as executive assistant to the MSS, Air War College) is a war-fighting capa tary Institute; JD, Washington and Lee Uni secretary and deputy secretary of defense, as a bilities analyst in the Force Structure, Re- versity, School of Law; MSS, Air War College) speechwriter to the secretary of the Air Force, sources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) of is the staff judge advocate at the 18th Wing, speechwriter to the chief of staff of the Air the Joint Staff. He has served in numerous Kadena AB, Japan. He has previously served Force, and as a conventional arms control in operational and staff positions, including the in that capacity at the 39th Wing, Incirlik AB, spector with the Defense Threat Reduction commander’s special action group, Air Com Turkey; 437th Airlift Wing, Charleston AFB, Agency, Rhein-Main AFB, Germany. She has bat Command; executive officer for the vice South Carolina; and Electronic Systems Cen regularly presented papers at professional con commander, Air Combat Command; director ter, Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. He has also ferences and has had numerous book reviews of staff, 56th Fighter Wing; operations officer, served in numerous other legal positions, in published. She recently contributed “The Mili 35th Fighter Squadron; and commander, 56th cluding that of deputy staff judge advocate; tary” chapter to Unpeaceful Metaphors, edited by Operations Support Squadron. He is a com chief, military justice; area defense counsel; Abdul Karim Bangura. Colonel Disler is a dis mand pilot with 4,500 flying hours, including chief, adverse actions and civil law; and legal tinguished graduate of Air Force Reserve Of 2,300 hours in the F-16. Colonel Orr is a dis intern. Colonel Hammock is a graduate of ficers Training Corps and a graduate of tinguished graduate of Squadron Officer Squadron Officer School and Air Command Squadron Officer School, Air Command and School and a graduate of the Army’s Com and Staff College. He is also an Air War Col Staff College, the College of Naval Command mand and General Staff College, and Air War lege graduate with academic distinction. and Staff, and Air War College. College. EDITORIAL BOARD

Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University Dr. J. Douglas Beason, Colonel, USAF, Retired, Los Alamos National Laboratory Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, National War College, National Defense University Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, Naval War College Lt Col Dave Mets, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Col Bobby J. Wilkes, USAF, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education

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