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Russian Foreign Policy: an Overview*

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Russian Foreign Policy: an Overview* STEFANI HOFFMAN (Jerusalem, Israel) RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: AN OVERVIEW* At a roundtable discussion evaluating Russian foreign policy, Sergei Karaganov, chairman of the presidium of the advisory Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, made a wryly optimistic appraisal of Russia's recent diplomatic success, noting, "In Soviet times, we achieved results commensurate to our might. Here, however, we achieved much better results than [is in keeping with] ' our own strength."' This comment serves as a useful starting point for an assessment of recent Russian foreign policy. This overview will look at some of the difficulties faced by Russian foreign policy makers and the tactics adopted to accommodate to them. In trying to develop its new statehood after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia faced a seemingly insuperable set of obstacles associated with the simultaneous collapse of former political, economic and social systems and also the loss of empire. Together, these factors strongly affected attempts to forge a new Russian foreign policy course. The breakdown of the Soviet political system set adrift the entire process of foreign policy decision making. In the early 1990s, neither the president nor Foreign Ministry nor any other body succeeded in setting up a new, coordinated procedure. As Russia began a process of restructuring and reform, foreign policy decision making became less centralized and more susceptible to the influence of such factors as domestic political conflicts, business interests, pressure from the legislature, voter attitudes, and the media.3After replacing Andrei Kozyrev as foreign minister in January 1996, Evgenii Primakov succeeded, with the support * Dr. Stefani Hoffmanis director of the MayrockCenter for Russian,Eurasian, and East EuropeanResearch at the HebrewUniversity of Jerusalem. 1. "Vneshniaiapolitika. Vstupaia v posledniigod tychiacheletiia,"Mezhdunaroclnaia zhizn', nos. 11- 12(1998), p. 5. 2. Remarks by Shlomo Avineri at a conferenceat Hebrew University in April 1995, "Extremismand Nationalismin EuropeFifty Yearsafter WorldWar IL" 3. On structural changes in foreign policy making under Yeltsin, see: Nodari Simonia, "Prioritiesof Russia'sForeign Policyand the Way it Works,"in The Makingof Foreign Policy in Russiaand the NewStates of Eurasia(Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1995),pp. 17-41;N. Petro and A. Rubinstein, Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State (New York: Longman, 1996), pp. 98-107; and Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge,1996), pp. 281-84. 82 of many of the conflicting factions, in diminishing these effects as he brought _ greater authority to the ministry. In addition, in May 1998, President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree which stressed the leading role of the Foreign Ministry in all international foreign policy matters, thus indicating the obligation of other departments engaged in the foreign policy sphere to coordinate actions with the Foreign Ministry.4 . However, as Primakov's successor, Igor Ivanov, emphasized in interviews after his first (in Primakov's cabinet) and second (under Sergei Stepashin) ap- ointment as foreign minister, "All questions of principle are decided by the president."5 The larger question - whether the president - or someone else either in the president's personal coterie, in the power ministries or the mili-tary- industrial complex - was deciding or strongly influencing the president's policy - remained a lively topic of debate. The issue returned to the foreground in the course of Russia's participation in the Kosovo settlement process, particularly regarding the entry of Russian troops to Pristina in advance of NATO forces. The lack of clarity on the subject makes it hard to evaluate the situation systematically and also highlights the importance of taking domestic factors into consideration in discussing Russian foreign policy. Although the decision-making process often appears erratic in specific cases, it is possible, nevertheless, to speak of a gradual, consistent development in the formulation of Russian foreign policy priorities which appears to have guided much of Russia's activity in the foreign policy sphere in recent years. When Evgenii Primakov became foreign minister in January 1996, his appointment was seen as an attempt by Yeltsin both to correct the overly pro- Western line of his predecessor, Andrei Kozyrev, and to restore consistency and authority that had been lacking in foreign affairs. There was general agreement that Kozyrev had wrongly neglected "the defense of Russian national interests" by his pro-Atlanticist position, although, in fact, his own position had been evolving in a more national direction. Although a consensus (with some deviations) has evolved among Russian statesmen and analysts on many issues, it has been more difficult to define these national interests. These interests are not merely - as some in the West assert - a continuation of the empire building interests of the tsarist and Soviet times but have changed quite basically in connection with both the new, still evolving post-Cold War international system and the situation of Russia today. The consensus emphasizes five foreign policy priorities, which Primakov outlined in a speech to the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in ' 4. G. Karasin,"U vostochnykhvorot," Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, no. 8 (1998),p. 11. 5. Moskovskienovo.rti, May 8-14, 1999,p. 4; also Nezavisimaiagazeta, Sept. 30, 1998,pp.l, 6. .
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