VAUBAN!S SIEGE LEGACY in the WAR of the SPANISH SUCCESSION, 170241712 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requi
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VAUBAN’S SIEGE LEGACY IN THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1702-1712 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Jamel M. Ostwald, M.A. The Ohio State University 2002 Approved by Dissertation Committee: Professor John Rule, Co-Adviser Co-Adviser Professor John Guilmartin, Jr., Co-Adviser Department of History Professor Geoffrey Parker Professor John Lynn Co-Adviser Department of History ABSTRACT Over the course of Louis XIV’s fifty-four year reign (1661-1715), Western Europe witnessed thirty-six years of conflict. Siege warfare figures significantly in this accounting, for extended sieges quickly consumed short campaign seasons and prevented decisive victory. The resulting prolongation of wars and the cost of besieging dozens of fortresses with tens of thousands of men forced “fiscal- military” states to continue to elevate short-term financial considerations above long-term political reforms; Louis’s wars consumed 75% or more of the annual royal budget. Historians of 17th century Europe credit one French engineer – Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban – with significantly reducing these costs by toppling the impregnability of 16th century artillery fortresses. Vauban perfected and promoted an efficient siege, a “scientific” method of capturing towns that minimized a besieger’s casualties, delays and expenses, while also sparing the town’s civilian populace. How thoroughly Vauban’s siege legacy was accepted by the end of Louis’s reign is the focus of this study. A quantitative survey of the 115 sieges in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) places the anecdotally-based conventional wisdom on a more sure footing by setting Vauban’s offensive revolution in a broader chronological context. Abandoning the narrow biographical accounts of national figures (Vauban and the ii English Duke of Marlborough in particular), we discover a larger picture that highlights the many challenges engineers faced when applying his theory to the reality of combat. Focusing on the Flanders theater (1702-1712), we find that the most important elements of Vauban’s siege attack were not only ignored, but actively opposed by the most successful French and Allied generals. These commanders – the most famous among them Marlborough, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and the Duke of Villars – are examples of a widespread reaction against Vauban’s humanitarian attempts to rationalize warfare. Generals consistently rejected Vauban’s goals and captured strong fortresses with brute force rather than finesse; they accepted higher casualties in order to avoid delays. In this early modern discourse over how wars were to be waged, the brute force community emerged victorious. Their acceptance of high casualties and reliance on overwhelming firepower has influenced Western military strategy ever since. iii Dedicated to my wife, Liz, and my parents iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My journey to Doctor of Philosophy would not have been possible without a team of scholars and supporters helping me along the way, each playing a pivotal role in my accomplishments. I wish to thank Professor John Rule for accepting a new graduate student who quickly realized that he was more interested in Louis XIV’s France than Peter the Great’s Russia, and who provided me with a greater appreciation of the importance played by the personalities and networks of Louisquatorzian France. My thanks also go to Professor John Guilmartin, who was also willing to take on another new charge, and whose wide-ranging interests in comparative conflict (from the ancient world to Vietnam) and the use of technology provide a broader context for my studies. I must also express my thanks to Professor Geoffrey Parker, the most recent entrant to the team, who provided the necessary focus needed to complete this work, and who has given the communities of historians of early modern Europe and military history a grand theory to argue over for years to come. v I should thank as well Professor John Lynn, who first stirred my interest in quantitative history with his article on the trace italienne, and whose mentoring in the field included graciously publicizing the findings of an early graduate student. Professor Randolph Roth also deserves credit for teaching me that even a mediocre math student could understand the concepts of statistics and sharpen my understanding with their application. Thanks too go to my colleagues John Stapleton, Derek Croxton, and Ben Trotter, who served as sounding boards, debate partners, and friends, and forced me to sharpen and revise my arguments. My mother and father deserve much of the credit for what little contribution I ever make, for they are the ones who raised me to be intellectually inquisitive, who provided moral support throughout, and who helped me navigate the shoals of academia over the years. My greatest thanks of all to Liz, who has served as loving wife, fount of encyclopedic knowledge, financial supporter, and computer specialist throughout these many years. This research was supported by grants from the Ohio State University Department of History, the OSU Graduate School, and the OSU Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies. I would also like to thank the many librarians and archivists in both the United States and Europe for their assistance and patience, vi particularly the Interlibrary Loan office of the Ohio State University and the helpful staff at the Archives municipales de Douai, the Archives de Guerre, the Algemeen Rijksarchief and Leiden Universiteit’s DOUSA zaal. All errors are, of course, my own. vii VITA March 3, 1970 Born – Edina, Minnesota 1992 B.A. cum laude, Carleton College 1995 M.A. History, The Ohio State University 1998 – 2000 Adjunct Lecturer, Columbus State Community College PUBLICATIONS 1. “The ‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites of Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare,” The Journal of Military History 64 (July 2000). Website at: www.ostwald.hispeed.com FIELD OF STUDY Major Field: History (Early Modern Europe) Minor Field: Military History Minor Field: Russia/Soviet Union viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract........................................................................................................... ii Dedication....................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgments........................................................................................... v Vita.................................................................................................................. vii List of Figures................................................................................................. xi List of Abbreviations...................................................................................... xii Chapters: 1. Introduction................................................................................................ 1 2. Contextualizing Vauban’s Legacy............................................................. 28 3. Defining Vauban’s Offensive Legacy........................................................ 61 4. Implementing Vauban’s Offensive Legacy............................................... 120 5. Reversing Vauban’s Offensive Legacy..................................................... 177 6. Succeeding Without Vauban..................................................................... 249 7. Conclusion................................................................................................. 301 Appendices: Appendix A: Allied Campaign Lengths in Flanders........................... 318 Appendix B: Siege Lengths, War of the Spanish Succession............. 319 Appendix C: Siege Database Methodology........................................ 331 Appendix D: Siege Lengths versus Non-Siege Tactics...................... 337 Appendix E: Estimates of Siege Durations, Selected Allied Sieges... 360 Appendix F: Siege Artillery................................................................ 365 ix Bibliography.................................................................................................... 370 x LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1.1 Length of Allied Campaign Season in Flanders.................................. 3 1.2 Percent of Allied Campaigns Spent Besieging, Flanders theater......... 18 2.1 Lynn’s Average Siege Lengths by War............................................... 37 2.2 Lynn’s Average Siege Lengths by War, French besiegers.................. 38 2.3 Spanish Succession Siege Lengths: A Comparison of Sources........... 44 2.4 Histogram of Spanish Succession Sieges by Length: A Comparison of Sources............................................................................................. 46 2.5 Spanish Succession Flanders Siege Lengths, by Besieger...... 48 2.6 Revised Spanish Succession Siege Lengths......................................... 51 2.7 Lynn’s Siege Lengths, 1512-1714....................................................... 60 6.1 Fortifications in the Low Countries c. 1700........................................ 252 A.1 Allied Campaign Lengths in Flanders................................................. 318 B.1 Siege Lengths, War of the Spanish Succession................................... 323 C.1 Siege Stages......................................................................................... 334 D.1 Tactics Used to Capture a Town.......................................................... 342 D.2 Theoretical