Martin Shipway. The Road to War: France and Vietnam, 1944-1947. Providence, R.I. and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996. xii + 306 pp. $59.95, cloth, ISBN 978-1-57181-894-2.
Reviewed by Irwin Wall
Published on H-France (July, 1997)
This is an important book. It is not customary origins and "causes" beg for explanation. Martin to inquire into the origins of colonial wars; we Shipway, Professor of French at Birkbeck College, seem rather to take them for granted as part of an University of London, has gone a long way toward inevitable tide of postwar decolonization, their providing one. origins thus requiring no explanation. Yet despite, Shipway casts his net widely, situating Viet‐ or perhaps because of, these conficts, much of nam in the context of the broader question of imperialism's end occurred peacefully, or amid postwar decolonization. The Dutch and British disturbances short of war. France's long and tor‐ also pursued the chimerical goal of bridging the tured Algerian confict from 1954 to 1962 followed distance between nascent colonial nationalism immediately after the French termination of their and the preservation of empire, whether in the phase of the war in Indochina but obscures the si‐ form of commonwealth, federation, or ill-defned multaneous granting of independence to Morocco "union." But was the project for a French Union and Tunisia in 1956 and the progressive acts of bound to fail? Were the French pursuing an illu‐ legislation marking the end of the colonial depen‐ sion? To take such a position is to take the easy dence of French black Africa by 1960. The In‐ way out as an excuse for failing to examine the dochinese confict was prelude to all of these specifc reasons why this particular war broke out events, yet its signifcance is far greater. In its lat‐ where and when it did. Shipway shows that once er stages, the confict was absorbed by the cold one gets into the specifcs, the broader context of war, fnanced by the United States, and fnally decolonization appears increasingly problematic taken over by the Americans, stretching out into a as explanation. God is indeed in the details. thirty-year war that ended where it started, with The plan for a renewed and modernized Vietnam under the control of the Viet Minh, but French Union was laid down at the conference of with the United States altered almost beyond Brazzaville, French Congo, in 1944 and assumed a recognition and the cold war itself transformed. hallowed place in Gaullist mythology as a liberal Like all wars, however, it had a beginning, and its H-Net Reviews and progressive call for an end to imperialism, stroy the Fourth Republic in 1958. These three appropriate to de Gaulle's movement of Free constraints were relatively inoperative in 1944-45, French seeking to liberate metropolitan France allowing the parameters of a reasonably rational from the Nazi scourge. As a number of French Indochina policy to be laid down. Salience was scholars have shown, the Brazzaville conference low, Gaullism and Republicanism appeared part was nothing of the kind. It was a closed meeting of a unitary vision, and the colonial administra‐ of a small number of colonial administrators, ad‐ tion was in hand. Unfortunately this happy situa‐ mitting no representatives of subject peoples tion was not to last: colonial issues became part of themselves (Felix Eboue, the one assimilated internal Paris politics, Gaullism and Republican‐ black, was part of the French colonial administra‐ ism were to appear antithetical to one another, tion), which left an ambiguous legacy, advocating and the colonial bureaucracy went its own way by economic and cultural reforms but rigidly exclud‐ the war's outbreak in 1946. But this gets us ahead ing any idea of independence for France's former of our story. For even when these constraints colonies. Henri Laurentie, whose papers provide were not yet operative, Laurentie found his feder‐ a good deal of Shipway's most interesting source alist ideas running up against traditional French materials, sketched the plan for the French myths of the unity and indivisibility of the Repub‐ Union--which eventually categorized France's for‐ lic and the assimilation of colonial peoples into a mer colonies as Associated States, Territories, and nation of "100 million Frenchmen." France would Overseas Departments within the French Union-- not abandon its mission civilisatrice. but his ideas were rejected at Brazzaville. De Indochina was under a Vichy administration Gaulle took them over later and attributed them covered by a virtual Japanese protectorate for to Brazzaville, however, creating its myth, much most of the war; only in March 1945 did the Japa‐ as he did the myth of Vichy as the shield and the nese fnally push the Vichy administration aside Resistance the sword, both in some sense working in a coup d'etat. In March 1945, the French gov‐ for French liberation. ernment made its frst declaration on Indochina, Laurentie, the Director of Political Afairs in which had been targeted by U.S. President the ministry of colonies, pursued his ideas for a Franklin Roosevelt as a fagrant example of his‐ French Union against a backdrop of constraints torical French misrule. The declaration promised imposed, in Shipway's terms, by considerations of Indochina freedom within the context of the yet- salience, ideology, and institutional solidarity. to-be French Union. But the declaration bore little "Salience" referred to the degree of importance relationship to events on the ground, where Ho colonial afairs assumed in the domestic political Chi Minh and the nationalist Viet Minh had seized maelstrom of Paris from 1944 to 1947; "ideology" power in the wake of Hiroshima and the Japanese was defned by the parameters of the postwar defeat. Shipway tries too hard, I think, to portray Gaullist-Republican synthesis; and "institutional Laurentie as a relatively enlightened and liberal solidarity", which turned out to be the most criti‐ ofcial. He undercuts his case by showing that cal of the three, involved the degree of control Laurentie's liberalism refected a pragmatic con‐ Paris was able to exercise over its colonial bu‐ sideration born of French weakness rather than reaucracy. The Indochina war established the dis‐ any altruistic spirit of generosity. Laurenties's pol‐ astrous pattern of unauthorized actions by colo‐ icy refected the French desire to salvage what it nial and military ofcials in the colonies later be‐ could. ing rationalized and "covered" by weak Paris The contradiction became at once apparent politicians preoccupied with domestic political when France returned to Indochina--prepared, to crises, the malady which eventually was to de‐
2 H-Net Reviews be sure, to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh even to the the issue of the unity of Vietnam, and was point of uttering the fatal word "independence," shocked to discover that France meant to monop‐ however defned. But de Gaulle chose to send an olize the diplomatic representation of the Indochi‐ uncompromising Governor General in the person nese Federation. A "free" French Vietnam in the of the redoubtable Thierry d'Argenlieu, whose im‐ French Union in fact was intended to enjoy auton‐ perialism was held with all the fervor of his omous powers neither in defense, foreign policy, Catholicism (d'Argenlieu was a former monk and fnances, or education. Ho frmly rejected these returned to the monastery when he retired). terms, counting on his ability to mobilize more D'Argenlieu was endowed with the traditional progressive support in Paris, but he arrived there powers equivalent to those of a dictator, and was in June 1946 to discover yet a further set of un‐ instructed to apply a program of "fve lands" in In‐ pleasant facts. The constitutional draft for the dochina, Cambodia, Laos, and a divided Vietnam Fourth Republic was in the process of being re‐ into three provinces or ky, Tonkin, Annam, and jected by the voters, a relatively progressive gov‐ Cochinchina. To back this up, the French came ernment of Socialist Felix Gouin gave way, after with four French divisions under the heroic Gen‐ new elections, to a government headed by colo‐ eral Philippe Leclerc, who wasted no time in es‐ nialist Georges Bidault of the Mouvement republi‐ tablishing a tenuous control in the South. Little cain populaire (MRP). And back in Vietnam, in a wonder that Ho Chi Minh proved so compliant policy of establishing new "facts" on the ground, and agreed to negotiate on the basis of indepen‐ d'Argenlieu declared an autonomous Republic of dence within the context of the French Union. A Cochinchina. Marius Moutet, Gouin's minister of consensus built of mutually pragmatic considera‐ colonies, approved d'Argenlieu's action and the tions drove the two sides into the accords of government's negotiator in Fontainebleau, Max March 6, 1946. Ho Chi Minh agreed to abide by Andre of the MRP, was the same person who had the results of free elections to determine the ques‐ refused any and all concessions at Dalat. Finally, tion of the unity of the three ky, and he accepted de Gaulle laid down his challenge to the restored the return of French troops to the North. Paris in "system" of political parties at Bayeux, calling for turn agreed that Vietnam would enjoy indepen‐ a strong executive, indicting it, among other def‐ dence within the Indochinese federation and the ciencies, for its failure to afrm the integrity of French Union, and French troops would withdraw the empire, with none other than D'Argenlieu, within fve years. But both sides chafed under back in France for a strategic visit, at his side. these terms, and meanwhile de Gaulle resigned In this situation Ho discovered no more dis‐ and France entered a cycle of constitution mak‐ position to make concessions in Paris than had ex‐ ing, referenda, and elections. A three-way argu‐ isted on the French side in Vietnam. In frustration ment over the locus of power developed between he worked out yet another "modus vivendi" and d'Argenlieu on the ground in Vietnam, the colo‐ returned home to an increasingly restive constel‐ nial bureaucracy in Paris, and the special inter- lation of political forces in the Viet Minh. Here ministerial committee charged with Indochinese Shipway begins, alas, to fail us, for he can tell us policy under the prime minister, known by the nothing certain of the pressures and conficts unlikely appellation of "Cominindo." within the Viet Minh, and he spends precious lit‐ The March accords provided for negotiations, tle time on French perceptions of the Viet Minh ei‐ frst at Dalat, to settle the terms of Vietnam's place ther. It takes, after all, two to tango and two to go in the Indochinese Federation, and then in Paris, to war. to determine Vietnam's role in the French Union. Dalat turned quickly to stalemate: Ho returned to
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Shipway is very good on the Paris side, how‐ their own on a preemptive military strike to de‐ ever, where he now discerns a three-way division stroy Ho Chi Minh and his government. One has over what to do next. Moutet and the government here a foretaste of Algeria in May 1958, and if Cominindo wanted to continue negotiations with Shipway is right, an eerie parallel. The Third Re‐ Ho Chi Minh, putting pressure on him by pursu‐ public was established and fell as the conse‐ ing the creation of a genuinely democratic repub‐ quence of two defeats at the hands of Germany. lic in Cochinchina which could become the basis The Fourth Republic was born and died to the of a unifed Vietnam under an alternative govern‐ tune of military-bureaucratic insurrections in ment to the Viet Minh. Laurentie and the colonial Vietnam and Algeria. Unfortunately, it is impossi‐ bureaucracy favored a stronger policy and negoti‐ ble to say whether Shipway is right, or is ofering ating position relying on a possible show of force, us a rather ingenious speculation. within the context of negotiations, but meant to The incidents in Haiphong appear rather bring Ho Chi Minh to his knees. Finally, straightforward, and do appear to buttress Ship‐ d'Argenlieu, backed by General Jean Valluy, in way's point. The French tried to seize control of charge of the expeditionary force, favored a pre‐ customs in the port and impounded an oil emptive strike designed to eliminate the Ho Chi freighter. The Vietnamese resisted, shots were Minh government from power. There were ratio‐ fred, and in reaction French troops asserted their nal voices warning against the consequences of control of the city, killing 243 persons in the this policy. Admiral Pierre Barjot of the chiefs of process (and losing seven of their own). They then staf thought it would require 250,000 men to sub‐ bombarded the city from the sea for good mea‐ due Vietnam. In the event a far too conservative sure, killing anywhere from six hundred to six estimate even for the Americans later, and thousand people, depending upon whom one be‐ Leclerc, who knew the situation intimately, lieves. On December 16, there occurred in Hanoi a thought France too weak to endure a protracted secret meeting chaired by d'Argenlieu with Valluy war that was sure to ensue. and others present. We have no minutes, but As the two sides waited for the "modus viven‐ Shipway assures us it had all the signs of a "war di" and new negotiations to begin on October 30, council." On December 19, French troops set violence erupted in the South where French con‐ about demolishing barricades which the Viet‐ trol was slipping. The Cochinchinese "govern‐ namese were constructing in various areas of the ment" unravelled in the absence of popular sup‐ city, apparently in an efort to forestall another port and its head, Dr Nguyen Van Thinh, commit‐ French attempt like the one which had just oc‐ ted suicide. France again went to the polls and curred in Haiphong. The Vietnamese again resist‐ this time approved the second constitutional draft ed; there was a period of standof, French troops albeit by a bare plurality. The Communist party appearing to stand down, but in the evening a se‐ emerged the largest in still new elections, and a ries of brutal Viet Minh attacks occurred on fve week governmental crisis ensued until the French forces throughout the city. Was it the re‐ designation of a Socialist prime minister, Leon sult of provocateurs? The French Surete generale? Blum, took place on December 12. Blum was frm‐ Dissidents in the Viet Minh challenging Ho Chi ly committed to the policy of pursuing negotia‐ Minh? General Vo Nguyen Giap, Vietnamese min‐ tions with Ho Chi Minh on the basis of Vietnamese ister of defense? Or were the attacks ordered by independence within the French Union. With Ho himself? Shipway ofers all of these as possibil‐ events spinning out of control, Shipway suggests, ities, curiously reducing the likelihood of a d'Argenlieu and Valluy, fearing the consequences planned Vietnamese attack on the French far be‐ of negotiations conducted by Blum, decided on
4 H-Net Reviews low what most other scholars have believed and dependent" Soviet republics, shared in what histo‐ asserted. rians have aptly called the colonial "myth" or con‐ Shipway here leaves us to our own devices, sensus. The choice of d'Argenlieu was de Gaulle's, but conspiracy theorists are buttressed by the in‐ and Gaullism, contrary to the myth which the explicable delay of Ho Chi Minh's congratulations, General's contemporary admirers are today busi‐ sent to Blum on December 15, but which did not ly constructing, was no advocate of the emancipa‐ arrive in Paris until December 20, the day after tion of colonial peoples. De Gaulle did not indict the incidents. Blum, in ignorance of the full di‐ the system because it lacked "a" policy but be‐ mensions of what had occurred, sent a courteous cause it was too weak for his taste in applying reply to Ho combined with an ofer of a cease-fre "his" policy of repression. The same was true of de and resumption of negotiations. On December 23, Gaulle and the regime again in the crisis over Al‐ he sent Moutet, accompanied by Leclerc, to In‐ geria. The Fourth Republic did not lack a policy, dochina, ostensibly to see Ho. But in the mean‐ despite ministerial instability and the same bla‐ time, learning of the events in Hanoi, Blum fell tant bureaucratic insubordination which existed back on a familiar refrain: order must be restored during the crisis in Indochina. If politicians in prior to any negotiations. Moutet, once in Hanoi Paris accepted and "covered" for actions carried and shown the evidence of the carnage and "bru‐ out independently by military and colonial of‐ tality" of the Viet Minh, renounced seeing Ho, ob‐ cials in the colonies, it was because a consensus in serving that "before any negotiations it is neces‐ the government existed in support of those poli‐ sary that there be a military outcome." The conse‐ cies, and was backed in turn by French public quence of this policy was seven years of war, Dien opinion which concurred in associating the loss of Bien Phu, and the Geneva agreements of 1954, France's colonies with national decline. Moreover, which ended the French role in Vietnam--none of during the Algerian crisis, many of these acts of which prevented the French from replaying the so-called insubordination were actually covered whole chanson again in Algeria. beforehand by one or another minister acting without authorization of the cabinet as a whole. I This leads me to my fnal point. Shipway has suspect the same may have been true in the case done a brilliant job of dissecting the currents of of Indochina. Premier Paul Ramadier, who suc‐ thought in Paris and Saigon and tracing their con‐ ceeded Blum, blandly accepted d'Argenlieu's res‐ sequences in terms of policy. One cannot talk of ignation in March 1947, ofered because the longue duree of the Annales school in the twenti‐ prime minister would not abandon the hope of eth century, but he does put his story in the con‐ dealing eventually with Ho Chi Minh. How easy it text of the conjuncture, decolonization, and then was! Why then did no one cashier d'Argenlieu does a masterful job of resurrecting the impor‐ earlier? However fearful his reputed Gaullism, tance of narrative and histoire evenementielle. there is no documented evidence of any capability But in portraying a struggle for power between of d'Argenlieu or the army carrying out a coup the colonial bureaucracy and Saigon against the d'etat in Paris, as was later to be the case during backdrop of a Gaullist-like analysis of paralysis of the war in Algeria. the political system in Paris, it seems to me he ex‐ aggerates the existing diferences and over-em‐ If I have gone on so long, it is out of enthusi‐ phasizes the possible policy outcomes. All French asm for the story Shipway has to tell and the skill‐ politicians of the era, including the Communists, ful way he tells it. This book is extremely well whose vision of the recast French empire was a written, and I found reading it almost efortless, version of the Soviet Union with its fourteen "in‐ something I can say about all too few monographs that come across my desk. The manner in which
5 H-Net Reviews the author weaves together the diverse strands of policy-making, combining domestic politics, bu‐ reaucratic considerations, and the situation on the ground in Saigon and Hanoi must stand as a model of the way war origins should and must be presented. It is many years since historian Arno Mayer told us to pay attention to the internal ori‐ gins of war. Shipway has done so with fne re‐ sults. I believe, however, that the author has exag‐ gerated the diferent policy options possible in Paris. And lurking in the background, marring somewhat an otherwise fne story, is our histori‐ cal ignorance of the internal politics of the Viet Minh. Did Ho Chi Minh face similar problems of bureaucratic insubordination? Was he feuding with General Giap? Was he the moderate he is so often portrayed to be? Shipway does not make sufcient use of the existing works on Vietnamese communism. A study of these questions is needed to complement and complete the French side of the story which Shipway has so fnely told. But I recommend this book to anyone interested in the origins of what may one day be considered the second thirty-years war of our "short" century. Copyright (c) 1997 by H-Net, all rights re‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ tact [email protected].
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Citation: Irwin Wall. Review of Shipway, Martin. The Road to War: France and Vietnam, 1944-1947. H- France, H-Net Reviews. July, 1997.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=1171
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