View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by CiteSeerX Logic and the condemnations of 1277 Sara L. Uckelman† †Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation Plantage Muidergracht 24 1018TV Amsterdam, The Netherlands +31 20 525 5361 (phone) +31 20 525 5206 (fax)
[email protected] November 13, 2008 Abstract The struggle to delineate the relationship between theology and logic flourished in the thirteenth century and culminated in two condemnations in early 1277, one in Paris and the other in Oxford. To see how much and what kind of affect ecclessiastical actions such as condemnations and prohibitions to teach had on the development of logic in the Middle Ages, we investigate the events leading up to the 1277 actions, the condemned propositions, and the parts of these condemnations connected to modal and temporal logic specifically. We show that because of the specific mo- tivations late 13th-century and 14th-century logicians had when working in modal and temporal logic, the effect of the 1277 condemnations on the development of those branches was much smaller than might have been supposed. Keywords: modal logic, temporal logic, Oxford condemnation, Paris condemnation, Robert Kilwardby, Stephen Tempier 1 Preliminary remarks A 21st-century logician who is interested in the societal factors which affect the development of various branches of logic cannot help but notice that one of the biggest differences between logic as it is currently practiced and logic as it was practiced in the Middle Ages is the role of the Church. Problems in theology have very little influence on modern logic, whereas medieval logicians were often trained theologians and those who were not were still connected to the Church via the Church’s role in everyday life and its connections to the university and academic life.