Providence and Causality in the Summa Halensis
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CoreyL.Barnes Providenceand Causality in the Summa Halensis Abstract: William of Auvergne’streatment of providenceinhis De universo (1230s) selectively employed Avicenna, Aristotle, and the category of efficient causality to mark adistinctionbetween divine foreknowledge and providence.William’sfocus on efficiency and affirmation that natural agents work in the mode of servants fol- lows Neoplatonicimpulses to instrumentalize nature and thereby risks eviscerating anymeaningful secondary causality.Considerations of providence at Paris in the 1230s and 1240s engagewith or react to William, with the Summa Halensis providing an interesting example. The Summa Halensis counters this risk by framing provi- dence within the largerscope of divine knowledge and will, using reinterpreted ver- sions of Aristotelianformal and final causality.The Summists avoid the danger of re- ducingprovidence to predictive knowledge or to atemporal awareness of temporal events by stressing the causality of the divine intellect and will. Further,the Sum- mists counter the danger of magnifyingthe causal efficacy of providenceuntil God remains the sole agent of every effect by framing the causality of the divine intellect and will in terms of formal and final causality.Bythis approach, the Summa Halensis harmonizes providential causality with the integrity of secondary causality. The Summa Halensis begins its consideration of providence with aclear recognition that the observable world is full of confusion and disorder and with aclear affirma- tion that everythingnot wellordered in itself ‘is nevertheless well-ordered with re- spect to divine providence, which always orders for the good’.¹ That this is so appears beyond doubtfor the Summists; how it is so requires careful consideration. How does providenceorder for the good what is disordered in itself?How does divine provi- dence order the disorder of secondary and contingent causes?Toanswer these and related questions, the Summa Halensis invokes Aristotle’sexplanatory categories of efficient,formal, and final causality.Without neglectingefficient causality,the Summists place special emphasis on formal and, to alesser extent,final causality.² To frame better the importance of this emphasis, abrief analysis of William of Au- vergne’sdiscussion of providence in his De universo will proveuseful. William em- Alexander of Hales, Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH), 4vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), VolI,P1, In1, Tr5, S2,Q3, Ti1, C1 (n. 195),p.282. Auseful brief discussion of the Summa Halensis on providence can be found in Hester Gelber, ‘Providence,’ in TheCambridgeHistoryofMedieval Philosophy,vol. 2, ed. Robert Pasnau(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2009), 761– 72. OpenAccess. ©2020 Lydia Schumacher,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685008-008 90 Corey L. Barnes ployed an Avicennan-inflected Aristotelianism thatrisked undermining the causal integrity of nature and lapsinginto necessitarianism through his focus on efficient causality.Evenwhen William treatsfinal causality as related to providence,he frames finality in terms of efficiency. The Summa Halensis counters with balanced at- tention to formal and final causality in asubtlypowerful correction to William of Au- vergne as well as to Avicenna and with astrident affirmation of human freedom. William of Auvergne (c.1180/1190 –1249) served as Bishop of Paris from 1228 until his death.³ This was during atime of changeinParis generallyand within the UniversityofParis specifically. Though criticized by the papacyfor his handling of university related matters (or crises), William exercized aclear influenceontheo- logical reflections in the 1230s and 1240s. During this period, he composed his sprawling Magisterium divinale et sapientiale,aseven-part opus covering atremen- dous rangeoftopics.William’s De universo,written in the 1230s and itself far from slim, is merelyone the Magisterium’sseven parts.Within the De universo William em- beds atreatment of providenceindebted to Aristotle and Avicenna as much as to Au- gustine and Boethius and intended, among other things, to counter dualistic argu- ments associated with the Cathars.⁴ The De universo begins with arguments for aunifiedfirst principle and proceeds thereafter with arguments for the universe as aunified whole. The anti-Cathar force of the arguments is obviousand shapes the remainder of the lengthywork. William stresses from the beginning that contrariety does not divide unity.⁵ God creates solely for the sake of the divinebeauty,and divine beauty causesthe unified whole of the universe as well as the diverse participations in or reflections of divine beauty that constitutethe diversity of creatures.⁶ William fills out this initial framing with a long series of chapters aiming to specify and refute errors of the philosophers, in- cludingAristotle, followed by an accounting of creation following Genesis. This basic disposition in the secundaprimae’streatment of governance, which discusses time and eternity,argues against an eternal world, supports the perdurance of souls, and concludes with arguments supporting the resurrection and,whereappropriate, glorification of bodies. Next comes providence, and it is worth pausing,evenifjust for amoment,toreflectonthe stakes for providence in light of William’ssketch of creation and redemption. Formoreinformation on William, see Noël Valois, Guillame d’Auvergne, évêque de Paris,1228– 1249: sa vie et ses ouvrages (Paris:Libraire d’AlphonsePicard, 1880) and Amato Masnovo, Da Gugliel- mo d’Auvergne aSan Tomaso d’Aquino,vol. 1, Guglielmod’Auvergne el’Asecesa verso Dio (Milan: So- cietà editrice ‘vita epensiero’,1930). See Roland Teske, ‘William of Auvergne and the Manichees,’ Traditio 48 (1993): 63 – 75. William of Auvergne, De universo I-I, c. 11, in Guilielmi AlverniOperaomnia,vol.1(Paris:Apud An- dream Pralard, 1674;repr.Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963), 605. William of Auvergne, De universo I-I, cc.16and 18, 611– 2. See also Henri Pouillon, ‘La beauté,pro- priététranscendentale,chez les scolastiques (1220 –1270),’ Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 21 (1942):263 – 328. Pouillon also provides ahelpful, brief discussion of John of La Ro- chelle and the Summa Halensis. Providenceand Causality in the Summa Halensis 91 Medieval theologians knew the contours of classicaldebates regarding provi- dence from Augustine and Boethius, but the context changed significantlyand re- flected different concerns in the decades prior to William’s De universo. Peter Lom- bard offered arather terse presentation of providence in the midst of defining and distinguishing aseries of related terms. Foreknowledge (praescientia)concerns fu- ture things, whether good or evil. Predestination (praedestinatio)concerns human salvation. Providence(providentia)pertains to the governance of thingsand thus re- lates to arrangement (dispositio)—aterm for making or doing—though Peter notes providenceissometimesaccepted for foreknowledge.⁷ By the time William of Aux- erre wrotehis Summa aurea,the topic of providence remained amediating point be- tween divine knowledge and power.The Summa aurea raises the central concern of whether divine foreknowledge imposes necessity upon thingsand proposes astrat- egy later adopted by Thomas Aquinas in his own treatment of providence.⁸ William distinguishesthree basic qualifications: infallibly, necessarily, and contingently. God foreknows everything infallibly, and, crucially, foreknows everythingaseither com- ing to pass necessarilyorcontingently. Infalliblydesignates God’sforeknowledge while necessity and contingency pertain to secondary causes and effects. Before moving on to divine power,William examines the relationship of providence to good and evil. Considered in their universality,all thingsare ‘whollygood and are in themselvesdelectable’.⁹ Within that universal order,some individuals fall short due to human weakness or mingling with devilish works.¹⁰ The main point to stress here is thatWilliam of Auxerre follows and develops Peter Lombardbyrecognizing providenceasapoint of contact between divine knowledge and divine power,yet William moves beyond Peter in recognizing the pull and danger of adivinelyim- posed necessity conditioning every created reality. Despite William of Auxerre’sknowledge of Aristotle, his considerations of fore- knowledge,necessity, providence,and power do not utilize the Stagirite’sscheme of four causesorexplanatory modes. William of Auvergne, by contrast,regularlyem- ploys Aristotelian causal categories to elucidate providence.¹¹ Within that framework of Aristotle’sfour causes,William concentrates on efficient causality and, though to a Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae I, d. 35,cc. 1–6, vol. 1, ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Spic- ilegium Bonaventurianum, 4(Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971), 254–5. See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 22, in Thomae Aquinatis Operaomnia iussu im- pensaque Leonis XIIP.M.edita,vol. 4(Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta,1888), 263–9. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea I, tr.10, vol. 1, ed. Jean Ribaillier,Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 16 (Paris:Editions du CentreNational de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1980), 199. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea I, tr.10(Ribaillier,199). Bertolacciclarifies