Scientific Expertise, Uncertainties and Politics
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SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE , UNCERTAINTIES AND POLITICS THE PROTRACTED SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS OVER HAZARDOUS INDUSTRIAL WASTE IN PORTUGAL Helena Mateus Jerónimo Selwyn College Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Cambridge, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract………………………………………………………………….……………… iv Acknowledgements…………………………………..……………………………….. v Acronyms and abbreviations.………………………………………………………… vi INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………….. 1 Structure of the dissertation………………………………………………………….. 5 1. WASTE , EXPERTISE AND THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY Introduction……………………………………………………………………………. 8 1. Waste as a political and social problem...………………………………............ 10 The Industrial Revolution and the formation of waste as a “problem”………. 10 The revolution in collective sensitivity and consumerism…………………….. 14 2. Waste as a “risk” issue……………………………………………………………. 19 The generalization of the risk language in contemporary society…………… 19 Rendering the notion of risk more complex……………………………………. 26 3. Waste and the need of specialised scientific knowledge…...………………… 32 The role of expertise between knowledge and decision………...……………. 32 The experts faced with limitations, uncertainties and citizens……………….. 36 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….. 40 2. HAZARDOUS WASTE IN PORTUGAL : A CASE STUDY 1. Aims and main working hypothesis…...………………..……………………….. 42 2. Methodological orientations.…..…………………………….…………………… 44 3. THE HAZARDOUS WASTES INVOLVED Introduction……………………………………………………………………………. 54 1. The problem of hazardous waste and the European policy response………. 55 2. Environment and waste in Portugal…...………………………………………… 60 The importance of the “push” from outside……………………………………… 60 Waste policy……………………………………………………………………….. 65 3. Controversial solutions, hazardous decisions………………………………….. 67 The failure of the dedicated waste incinerator option.………...……………… 67 The co-incineration option….…………………………………...……………….. 69 The irrelevance of the public enquiry procedures………………………………… 72 i 4. Waste not : the irruption of the popular protest.………...…………..………….. 74 Perceived health, safety and environmental risks……………………...……... 77 Lack of trust in the government, politicians and the cement plants……...….. 80 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….. 82 4. THE POLITICAL CRISIS AND EXPERTISE EX MACHINA Introduction……………………………………………………………………………. 84 1. Politicization of the conflict………………………….……………………………. 85 The nullity of the public hearings……….………...…………………………….. 88 Unawareness of waste quantities …….……………...………………………… 89 Financial and electoral interests………………………...………………………. 91 2. The government’s reaction: environmental improvement and the scientific 93 committee……………………………………………………………………………... Organization, membership and operation of the commission……...………... 98 3. The “confiscation” of a monolithic expertise………………………………….… 101 An interdisciplinary committee, ma non troppo …………………………...…… 106 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….. 112 5. ASSESSING THE SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT : RISK , UNCERTAINTIES AND CONTROVERSY Introduction……………………………………………………………………………. 114 1. The Committee’s report: the technical response to the problem………...…... 115 Expert advice as the imperative for government action………………………. 121 Risk assessment and acceptable risk: safety, certainty and control………... 126 2. The arguments between experts and scientists………...……………………... 132 The numbers controversy: risks and “technical errors”………………………. 135 Controversy beyond numbers: uncertainties and fallibility…………………… 138 The controversy over development values and models……………………… 142 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….. 147 6. HEALTH RISK , POLLUTION TRAUMA AND PUBLIC POLICY DECISIONS Introduction……………………………………………………………………………. 150 1. The controversy redefined in terms of public health: the opinion of the medical committee…….……………………………………………………………... 152 2. Epidemiological study and co-incineration tests: between the search for control and the inadequacies of science…………………………………………... 156 ii A “contaminated community” threatened by dioxins………………………….. 162 3. “Civic virtues” and political decision……………………………………………... 166 4. Politics and science in risk scenarios…...………………………………………. 173 5. “Administrative despotism” and the state of “mindless anomie” in Portugal…. 178 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….. 183 CONCLUSION 1. The impasse in the treatment of HIW in Portugal……………………………… 187 2. The research in summary and conclusions…………………………………….. 188 BIBLIOGRAPHY ……………………………………………………………………….... 198 ANNEX ………………………………………………………………………………….. 218 iii ABSTRACT Over the last few decades, the interplay between scientific expertise and political decision-making in contexts of risk and uncertainty has been a key theme of social theory and the analysis of contemporary societies. The management of hazardous industrial waste is a good illustration of this issue. The aim of the research is to study the conflict over the choice of a method for treating such waste in Portugal. This particular case turned out to be one of the most significant, most debated, most participated and most long drawn out political and environmental conflicts of the last two decades. The most critical phase of this conflict so far occurred between 1997 and 2002, when the government decided to implement co-incineration (a method of burning waste in cement plants), without seeking scientific advice beforehand and without having engaged in a considered dialogue with potentially affected local residents. The result was strong protests from residents, scientists and civic and environmental associations. It was only as a result of this response that it resorted to scientific expertise, with two committees being established (one biochemical and the other medical) with the task of assessing the method’s risks to public health and to the environment. These scientific committees concluded that there were no significant risks, but their favourable attitude to co- incineration and the explanations they gave were not enough to meet the crisis of legitimacy which arose in the wake of the challenge to the government. In actual fact they aggravated the crisis, and protests continued until the process was suspended. Both the government and subsequently the scientific experts acted on the assumption that scientific rationality, the probabilistic calculation of environmental and health risks, and technical solutions would be enough to solve the problem of hazardous waste. Even though the problem is of an extensive, lasting and global nature, involving uncertainties and non-reversible choices, government and experts failed to consider alternative models of economic development, ignored the possibility of using technology differently, did not assess alternative modes of resource utilization and disregarded the values, experiences and participation of citizens. This case study offers an instructive example of how a decision on a matter of this nature, which is widely perceived as bearing on the common good, within a framework of a democratic and plural politeia , in order to have a realistic chance to be accepted as legitimate in such a polity may have both to draw on scientific knowledge which will demonstrate, within its field, what the alternatives are, and observe procedures which ensure full accountability and transparency, while remaining open to the mechanisms of democratic participation. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation would not have been possible without the assistance of a number of friends, colleagues and institutions. I have benefited enormously over the years from their suggestions and financial support and owe to all a very deep debt of gratitude. I am very grateful to my supervisor, Dr Patrick Baert, who has been a source of advice and constructive criticisms, and to John D. Thompson and Brendan Burchell, who offered invaluable comments on my 2nd year assessment. I am also deeply indebted to Professores Hermínio Martins, Manuel Villaverde Cabral and José Luís Garcia, whose suggestions, valuable guidance and incisive critique have been gratefully received. A special thanks to Richard Wall. I also owe a very special debt of thanks to all of those people who agreed to be interviewed for this study. In Cambridge, I have benefited from an interdisciplinary group in CRASSH, a space of vivid discussion and debate on science and society; in Lisbon, I have benefited from the conversations with my faculty colleagues at ISEG. That said, the usual disclaimers apply: any weaknesses, inaccuracies and misconceptions of the argument remain mine alone. This thesis was made possible by the generous financial support of two institutions: the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), from which I received a four-year scholarship and which paid College and University fees; and the Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão da Universidade Técnica de Lisboa (ISEG). On a more personal note I would like to thank Jing Wang, David Finnegan, Philippe Raymond, Margarida Abreu, Marco Chaves, João Cunha and Miguel Goulão. Finally, but not least, I am indebted to my family, especially my mother, Lourdes Jerónimo, for offering unconditional love and encouragement which sustained me throughout, as has my sister, Soraia. This thesis is dedicated to my grandmother Rosa Cabrita Jerónimo. v ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS A Cegonha The Stork – Estarreja Association for the Defence of the Environment ADAS Associação de Defesa