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Japan's Response to the Shifting Global Order Professor Sally Paine Japan’s Response to the Shifting Global Order Professor Sally Paine Strategy & Policy Department U.S. Naval War College This presentation represents the thoughts and opinions of the author, not necessarily those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy Department, or the U.S. Naval War College. Emperor Meiji (1852-1912) 1 Tōjō Hideki on the stand International Military Tribunal of the Far East, ca. 1948 2 Japan’s Response to the Shifting Global Order THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION I. Modernization vs. Westernization II. Incorrect and Missed Lessons WORLD WAR I AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION III. Implosion of the Regional and Global Order IV. Incomplete Institution Building 3 I. MODERNIZATION VS. WESTERNIZATION The Industrial Revolution Steam Power Iron Industry Textiles Insurance/Banking Railways/Telegraph Steamships Mass Markets/Trade Armaments Rapid rise in per capita income Manchester, England 1843 The Industrial Revolution The Destruction of Traditional Societies Steam power and textiles Industrial Revolution Economic growth Changed balance of power Commodore Matthew G. Perry’s Squadron, Japan, 1854 6 TO THE WAR CRIMES PROSECUTOR: “ Tokugawa Japan believed in isolation…and had its doors locked tightly. Then along came Perry…in his black ships to open those doors; he aimed his big guns at Japan and warned ‘If you don’t deal with us, look out for these; open your doors, and negotiate with other countries too.’…[Japan] for its own defense…took your own country as its teacher and set about learning how to be aggressive...Why don’t Lt Gen Ishiwara Kanji you subpoena Perry from the other (1889-1949) world and try him as a war Architect of 1931 criminal?” Manchuria invasion 7 Studying the Problem QuickTime™ and a decompressor are needed to see this picture. Iwakura Mission, 1872 8 Japanese Grand Strategy Goal: Transform Japan into a great power Environment: Preempt Russia in Korea and China. • Failing Qing dynasty (power vacuum) • Accelerating Western imperialism • Russia on the march (Trans-Siberian Railway) Two-phase grand strategy • stage 1: domestic reforms (make Japan strong) • stage 2: activist foreign policy (net an empire) Avoid war in stage 1 so as not to derail reforms. 9 PHASE 1: Domestic Reforms 1869 feudal domains disbanded 1872 compulsory elementary education 1873 universal military conscription 1878 Army General Staff 1882 Bank of Japan 1882 new criminal code 1885 Western Cabinet system under prime minister 1886 Imperial Tokyo University 1887 modern civil service examination 1889 Constitution 1890 Diet (Parliament) 1890 reorganized court system 1890 code of civil procedure 10 PHASE 2: Expansion Sino- Japanese War 1894-5 Russo- Japanese War 1904-5 Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-45) Japanese soldiers with gas masks in China, 1940 12 Russia Japan China Korea Fishing for Korea French Cartoon, ca. 1890 13 Tonghak Rebellion Outbreak of First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) Tonghak Unrest Battle Tonghak Advance Tonghak Plan Tonghak Retreat Korean Advance Qing Advance Japanese Advance 14 Japan China Battle of Yalu • Pyongyang • Port Arthur • Seoul • Weihaiwei Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) 15 Japanese Gains in the Sino-Japanese War Demise of the Chinese Regional Order DOMESTIC • Validated controversial westernization program • Increased prestige of military, especially the army REGIONAL • Japan replaced China as dominant regional power • Beginnings of Japanese Empire (Taiwan, Pescadores) INTERNATIONAL • Japan became a recognized great power (1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance) • Russo-Japanese arms race • Russian foreign policy shift from Europe to Asia Trans-Siberian Railway Manchurian Route 1. Save on construction costs 2. Contain Japan 3. Stake claim to Manchuria 17 Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901) Russo- POPULATION Japanese War Russia (1904-5) 126,367,000 (1897) Japan · Mukden 45,000,000 (1903) ARMY IN EURASIA Port Arthur · Russia 1,135,000 (Jan. 1904) Japan Tsushima 150,745 (Jan. 1904) 19 Japanese Gains in the Russo-Japanese War Confirmation of the First Sino-Japanese War IMMEDIATE WAR OBJECTIVE • Russian troop withdrawal from Manchuria • Japanese sphere of influence in Korea • Validated Westernization program EXPANSION OF EMPIRE • So. Manchuria sphere of influence (Russian railways) • Southern half of Sakhalin Island (Russian territory) • Japan the dominant regional power in East Asia Spheres of Influence ̶̶ 1907 treaty ̶̶ 1912 treaty Russian sphere of influence Japanese sphere of influence Northern Islands 21 II. FLAWED MILITARY LESSONS Combined with an Incorrect Self-Assessment Battle of Shahe (Sha-ho) 1904 False Operational Lessons: Will Power Trumps Material Superiority ASSAULTS ON PORT ARTHUR Storm Date Casualties No. 1904 Japan Russia 1st 8/19-24 16,000 3,000 2nd 9/19-23 7,500 1,500 3rd 10/26-30 6,000+ ? 4th 11/26-12/4 14,500 6,900 1/2/05 Fall of Port Arthur POST-WAR JAPAN • Overlooks weapons systems • Exaggerates own personnel • Minimizes logistical problems • Discounts enemy will Russian troops posing with Japanese dead 23 First Sino-Japanese War 1894-5 False Strategic Lessons: Liaodong The Army Won the Peninsula Wars While the Diplomats Lost the Peace MISSED • Diplomacy • Alliances • Mediation • War loans • Intelligence • Public diplomacy • International law 24 Missed Strategic Lessons Cooperative Adversaries and Sins of Omission Neither Adversary Leveraged Its Strengths • Strategic depth • Overwhelming manpower superiority • Resource superiority Neither Adversary Targeted Japanese Weaknesses • Essential sea lines of communication • Manpower shortage • Logistical difficulties fighting inland • Failed to contest river crossings or transit through passes • Failed to draw the Japanese deep inland to fight 25 Army-Navy Debate over Self-Assessment Navy Argument: Japan the Maritime Power ADM Yamamoto Gombei (1852-1933) POSITIONS Admiral 1904 Navy Minister 1898-1906 Prime Minister, 1913-14, 1923-4 FAILED PLANS •Navy dominant service •Empire not essential for defense •Jettison empire in time of war ARMY-NAVY SOLUTION •Separate chiefs of staff •Decline of joint operations OUTCOME: Navy becomes interested in maritime empire 26 The Moat Japan the Sea Power POSITIONS Key naval theorist Vice Admiral 1915 President Naval War College “Among the Powers in the world, there are only three countries that can defend themselves primarily with navies. They are the UK and the Vice Admiral Satō Tetsutarō US and Japan.” (1866-1942) History of Imperial Defense, 1908 27 Army-Navy Debate over Self-Assessment Army Counter-Argument: Japan the Continental Power POSITIONS Chief of General Staff 1878-82, 1884-5, 1904-5 Field Marshal 1898 Prime Minister 1889-91, 1898-1900 President of Privy Council 1893-4, 1905-22 BELIEFS •Empire essential for defense •Manchuria = Japan’s “life line” Marshal Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922) 28 Japan the Continental Power Asian Monroe Doctrine POSITIONS Minister of War 1902-11 Governor-General Korea 1910-16 Prime Minister 1916-18 Marshal 1916 BELIEFS “Eventually all of Asia should be under the control of our Emperor.” General Terauchi Masatake (1852-1919) 29 Japan the Continental Power Japan First Policy POSITIONS War Minister 1918-21, 1923-4 Prime Minister 1927-9 Foreign Minister 1927-9 Colonization Minister 1927-9 Japan should “free itself from previous conditions of being an island and develop its national future as a continental power.” MISSES • Moat provides sanctuary • Survival depends on trade, not resources per se General Tanaka Giichi (1864-1929) 30 Naval Arms Limitations Conferences Debate within the Navy DEATH OF NAVAL ARMS CONTROL 1922 Washington Naval Treaty UK, US, Japan navies 5:5:3 tonnage ratio Right of “supreme command” = military veto 1930 London Naval Conference UK, US, Japan navies 10:10:7 tonnage ratio 1935 London Naval Conference Japan walked out 1936 Arms limitations expired 31 Grand Strategy The Nexus between Economic and Military Power “National defense is not a monopoly that belongs to military men.…Simply put, no war can be fought without money.” “Even if we would match the US in terms of military power…where would we get the money? The US is the only country from which Japan can borrow money. If the US is the enemy, this is impossible and we would have to make money for our- Admiral Katō Tomosaburō selves. Unless we are prepared to do (1861-1923) so, we can never fight…Thus, war Navy Minister 1915-23 with the US is simply impossible.” Prime Minister 1922-3 32 Grand Strategy The Constraints Memo: The New Defense Plan, fall 1941 Japan Could Not: • Invade the United States • Occupy the U.S. capital • Blockade the U.S. coastline But the U.S.: • Could do all of the above to Japan Therefore: • War vs. the U.S. = Unwinnable Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi (1889-1975) 33 Strategic Assassinations Misunderstanding Japan’s Geography and Economy Assassinations of Prime Ministers 1931 Hamaguchi Osachi 1932 Inukai Tsuyoshi Replaced by ADM Saitō Makoto End of Party governments 1936 ADM Saitō Makoto Assassinations of Finance Ministers 1932 Inoue Junnosuke 1936 Takahashi Korekiyo 34 Continental vs. Maritime Powers Continental Powers • Border on main enemies • Focus on territorial control • Preemption by garrisoning surrounding buffer zones • Therefore large standing army is key • BUT Army has great political influence at home • Economic policies favor army, state planning Maritime Powers • Moat provides comparative security • No need for large, expensive standing army • Focus on trade, wealth accumulation, economic growth • Navy key for homeland defense and trade protection • Reliance on trade, wealth,
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