’s Response to the Shifting Global Order

Professor Sally Paine Strategy & Policy Department U.S. Naval War College

This presentation represents the thoughts and opinions of the author, not necessarily those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy Department, or the U.S. Naval War College. Emperor (1852-1912) 1 Tōjō Hideki on the stand International Military Tribunal of the Far East, ca. 1948 2 Japan’s Response to the Shifting Global Order

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

I. Modernization vs. Westernization II. Incorrect and Missed Lessons

WORLD WAR I AND THE GREAT

DEPRESSION III. Implosion of the Regional and Global Order IV. Incomplete Institution Building

3 I. MODERNIZATION VS. WESTERNIZATION The Industrial Revolution Steam Power Iron Industry Textiles Insurance/Banking Railways/Telegraph Steamships Mass Markets/Trade Armaments Rapid rise in per capita income Manchester, England 1843 The Industrial Revolution The Destruction of Traditional Societies

Steam power and textiles  Industrial Revolution  Economic growth  Changed balance of power Commodore Matthew G. Perry’s Squadron, Japan, 1854

6 TO THE WAR CRIMES PROSECUTOR: “ Tokugawa Japan believed in isolation…and had its doors locked tightly. Then along came Perry…in his black ships to open those doors; he aimed his big guns at Japan and warned ‘If you don’t deal with us, look out for these; open your doors, and negotiate with other countries too.’…[Japan] for its own defense…took your own country as its teacher and set about learning how to be aggressive...Why don’t Lt Gen Ishiwara you subpoena Perry from the other (1889-1949) world and try him as a war Architect of 1931 criminal?” Manchuria invasion 7 Studying the Problem

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Iwakura Mission, 1872 8 Japanese Grand Strategy

Goal: Transform Japan into a great power Environment: Preempt Russia in Korea and . • Failing Qing dynasty (power vacuum) • Accelerating Western imperialism • Russia on the march (Trans-Siberian Railway) Two-phase grand strategy • stage 1: domestic reforms (make Japan strong) • stage 2: activist foreign policy (net an empire) Avoid war in stage 1 so as not to derail reforms.

9 PHASE 1: Domestic Reforms 1869 feudal domains disbanded 1872 compulsory elementary education 1873 universal military conscription 1878 Army General Staff 1882 1882 new criminal code 1885 Western Cabinet system under prime minister 1886 Imperial University 1887 modern civil service examination 1889 Constitution 1890 Diet (Parliament) 1890 reorganized court system 1890 code of civil procedure 10 PHASE 2: Expansion Sino- Japanese War 1894-5

Russo- Japanese War 1904-5 Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-45)

Japanese soldiers with gas masks in China, 1940 12 Russia

Japan China

Korea Fishing for Korea French Cartoon, ca. 1890 13 Tonghak Rebellion Outbreak of First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5)

Tonghak Unrest Battle Tonghak Advance Tonghak Plan Tonghak Retreat Korean Advance Qing Advance

Japanese Advance 14 Japan China

Battle of Yalu • Pyongyang • Port Arthur

• Seoul • Weihaiwei

Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) 15 Japanese Gains in the Sino-Japanese War Demise of the Chinese Regional Order DOMESTIC • Validated controversial westernization program • Increased prestige of military, especially the army REGIONAL • Japan replaced China as dominant regional power • Beginnings of Japanese Empire (, Pescadores) INTERNATIONAL • Japan became a recognized great power (1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance) • Russo-Japanese arms race • Russian foreign policy shift from Europe to Asia Trans-Siberian Railway

Manchurian Route 1. Save on construction costs 2. Contain Japan 3. Stake claim to Manchuria 17 Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901) Russo- POPULATION Japanese War Russia (1904-5) 126,367,000 (1897) Japan · Mukden 45,000,000 (1903) ARMY IN EURASIA Port Arthur · Russia 1,135,000 (Jan. 1904) Japan Tsushima 150,745 (Jan. 1904)

19 Japanese Gains in the Russo-Japanese War Confirmation of the First Sino-Japanese War IMMEDIATE WAR OBJECTIVE • Russian troop withdrawal from Manchuria • Japanese sphere of influence in Korea • Validated Westernization program EXPANSION OF EMPIRE • So. Manchuria sphere of influence (Russian railways) • Southern half of Sakhalin Island (Russian territory) • Japan the dominant regional power in East Asia Spheres of Influence ̶̶ 1907 treaty ̶̶ 1912 treaty Russian sphere of influence

Japanese sphere of influence

Northern Islands 21 II. FLAWED MILITARY LESSONS Combined with an Incorrect Self-Assessment

Battle of Shahe (Sha-ho) 1904 False Operational Lessons: Will Power Trumps Material Superiority ASSAULTS ON PORT ARTHUR Storm Date Casualties No. 1904 Japan Russia 1st 8/19-24 16,000 3,000 2nd 9/19-23 7,500 1,500 3rd 10/26-30 6,000+ ? 4th 11/26-12/4 14,500 6,900 1/2/05 Fall of Port Arthur

POST-WAR JAPAN • Overlooks weapons systems • Exaggerates own personnel • Minimizes logistical problems • Discounts enemy will Russian troops posing

with Japanese dead 23 First Sino-Japanese War 1894-5 False Strategic Lessons: Liaodong The Army Won the Peninsula Wars While the Diplomats Lost the Peace

MISSED • Diplomacy • Alliances • Mediation • War loans • Intelligence • Public diplomacy • International law 24 Missed Strategic Lessons Cooperative Adversaries and Sins of Omission

Neither Adversary Leveraged Its Strengths • Strategic depth • Overwhelming manpower superiority • Resource superiority Neither Adversary Targeted Japanese Weaknesses • Essential sea lines of communication • Manpower shortage • Logistical difficulties fighting inland • Failed to contest river crossings or transit through passes • Failed to draw the Japanese deep inland to fight

25 Army-Navy Debate over Self-Assessment Navy Argument: Japan the Maritime Power ADM Yamamoto Gombei (1852-1933) POSITIONS Admiral 1904 Navy Minister 1898-1906 Prime Minister, 1913-14, 1923-4 FAILED PLANS •Navy dominant service •Empire not essential for defense •Jettison empire in time of war ARMY-NAVY SOLUTION •Separate chiefs of staff •Decline of joint operations OUTCOME: Navy becomes interested in maritime empire 26 The Moat Japan the Sea Power POSITIONS Key naval theorist Vice Admiral 1915 President Naval War College

“Among the Powers in the world, there are only three countries that can defend themselves primarily with navies. They are the UK and the Vice Admiral Satō Tetsutarō US and Japan.” (1866-1942) History of Imperial Defense, 1908 27 Army-Navy Debate over Self-Assessment Army Counter-Argument: Japan the Continental Power

POSITIONS Chief of General Staff 1878-82, 1884-5, 1904-5 Field Marshal 1898 Prime Minister 1889-91, 1898-1900 President of Privy Council 1893-4, 1905-22

BELIEFS •Empire essential for defense •Manchuria = Japan’s “life line” Marshal (1838-1922) 28 Japan the Continental Power Asian Monroe Doctrine

POSITIONS Minister of War 1902-11 Governor-General Korea 1910-16 Prime Minister 1916-18 Marshal 1916

BELIEFS “Eventually all of Asia should be under the control of our Emperor.”

General (1852-1919) 29 Japan the Continental Power Japan First Policy POSITIONS War Minister 1918-21, 1923-4 Prime Minister 1927-9 Foreign Minister 1927-9 Colonization Minister 1927-9 Japan should “free itself from previous conditions of being an island and develop its national future as a continental power.” MISSES • Moat provides sanctuary • Survival depends on trade, not resources per se General (1864-1929) 30 Naval Arms Limitations Conferences Debate within the Navy

DEATH OF NAVAL ARMS CONTROL 1922 Washington Naval Treaty UK, US, Japan navies 5:5:3 tonnage ratio Right of “supreme command” = military veto 1930 London Naval Conference UK, US, Japan navies 10:10:7 tonnage ratio 1935 London Naval Conference Japan walked out 1936 Arms limitations expired

31 Grand Strategy The Nexus between Economic and Military Power “National defense is not a monopoly that belongs to military men.…Simply put, no war can be fought without money.” “Even if we would match the US in terms of military power…where would we get the money? The US is the only country from which Japan can borrow money. If the US is the enemy, this is impossible and we would have to make money for our- Admiral Katō Tomosaburō selves. Unless we are prepared to do (1861-1923) so, we can never fight…Thus, war Navy Minister 1915-23 with the US is simply impossible.” Prime Minister 1922-3 32 Grand Strategy The Constraints Memo: The New Defense Plan, fall 1941 Japan Could Not: • Invade the • Occupy the U.S. capital • Blockade the U.S. coastline But the U.S.: • Could do all of the above to Japan Therefore: • War vs. the U.S. = Unwinnable Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi

(1889-1975) 33 Strategic Assassinations Misunderstanding Japan’s Geography and Economy

Assassinations of Prime Ministers 1931 Hamaguchi Osachi 1932 Replaced by ADM Saitō Makoto End of Party governments 1936 ADM Saitō Makoto

Assassinations of Finance Ministers 1932 Inoue Junnosuke 1936

34 Continental vs. Maritime Powers Continental Powers • Border on main enemies • Focus on territorial control • Preemption by garrisoning surrounding buffer zones • Therefore large standing army is key • BUT Army has great political influence at home • Economic policies favor army, state planning Maritime Powers • Moat provides comparative security • No need for large, expensive standing army • Focus on trade, wealth accumulation, economic growth • Navy key for homeland defense and trade protection • Reliance on trade, wealth, and navy  grand strategy 35 Positive-Sum vs. Negative-Sum World Orders Maritime vs. Continental World Orders Maritime Global Order = Positive Sum (Win-Win) •Focus on wealth creation 1. Freedom of navigation 2. Free trade 3. International laws and institutions facilitating trade •Together produce economic growth (a win for all) Continental Global Order = Negative Sum (Win-Lose Big) •Focus on territorial confiscation 1. Spheres of influence 2. Negative-sum territorial disputes 3. Security through the destabilization of neighbors •Together impede growth (a win for one, a lose for the rest) 36 Follow on Effects of Mis-self-identification Death of Grand Strategy Foreign policy reduced to a single instrument: the military False belief that operational success = strategic success

Marshal Yamagata Aritomo General Tanaka Giichi (1838-1922) (1864-1929) 37 III. Implosion of the Regional and Global Order: World War I and the

38 Collapsing Regional Order China the Failed State China’s Revolutions • 1911-12 Fall of the Qing Dynasty • 1913 Failed revolt of South China • 1916 Failed imposition of new dynasty Main Warlord Wars of 1920s (North China) • Anhui-Zhili War (1920) • First Zhili-Fengtian War (1922) • Second Zhili-Fengtian War (1924) • Fentian-Zhejiang War (1925) • Fengtian-Feng Yuxiang War (1925-6) Nominal Reunification of China • Northern Expedition under Nationalists (1926-8) 39 Collapsing Regional Order China the Failed State, continued Coup Attempts within the Nationalist Coalition • 1929 Four North/South China coup attempts • 1930 War of Central Plains • 1931 South China coup attempt • 1933 North China coup attempt • 1936 South China coup attempt Nationalist Encirclement Campaigns vs. Communists • 1930 1st Encirclement Campaign • 1931 2nd Encirclement Campaign • 1931 3rd Encirclement Campaign • 1932-3 4th Encirclement Campaign • 1933-4 5th Encirclement Campaign 40 The Treacherous Regional Environment Post-World War I Economic Depression in Japan

Rice Riots 1918 Tokyo Earthquake 1923

500,000 homeless 100,000 dead Collapsing European Order Empires Overthrown or Weakened

1914 1919

43 Great Depression The Rise of Communism and Fascism

Vladimir I. Lenin (1870-1924) 44 Collapsing World Order Communism in Russia

“Comrade Lenin cleans the world of scum.” Communist Expansion Founding of Communist Parties 1920 Iran, India, Turkey 1921 China, Outer Mongolia 1922 Japan 1925 Korea 1930 Vietnam, Siam, Laos, Malaya, Philippines Soviet Funding of Chinese Factions Nationalist Party Chiang Kai-shek Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin Inner Mongolian warlord Feng Yuxiang Xinjiang warlord Sheng Shicai

46 Collapsing Regional Order Hostile Neighborhood Anti-Japanese Neighbors • Nationalism in China • Nationalism in Korea • Communism in Russia Focus of Japanese Overseas Investments • Korea • China (Manchuria) Western Protectionist Response to the Great Depression • Smoot-Hawley Tariff 1930 • Other Western powers follow suit

47 Japan’s Rejection of the Global Order The Manchurian Incident

Close up of the damage

= Manchurian Incident, 18 Sept. 1931 48 Manchurian Incident Regional War

Japanese troops enter Mukden, 18 September 1931 49 Chinese Boycotts

Opening Campaigns of Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-45) • 1931 Invasion of Manchuria • 1932 Assault on Shanghai • 1933 Invasion of Rehe (Jehol), Hebei • 1933 Great Wall Campaign • 1937 Invasion of coastal + central China 50 Japan Alone Withdrawal from League of Nations

Japan’s Defense • Chinese had blown up the railway track (False) • Manchuria was not an integral part of China (False) • Only Japan could stop Bolshevik spread to China (½ true)

51 Manchukuo Japanese Puppet State Building

Hsinking, Manchukuo The Road Not Taken Japan’s Keynes Finance Minister (1931-6) •off •devaluation of yen (↑ exports) •↑ money supply (↑ consumption) •↑govt spending (↑ deficit) •↑ public works investments •civil control over military spending •cooperation with West •anti dismemberment of China •pro Chinese economic development Takahashi Korekiyo (1854-1936) Dangers of a Political Army

The army does not stop at planning to send troops abroad for military reasons, but interferes in diplomatic and economic decision making as well, so that our country does not have a unified policy…. Because the army’s general staff interferes with other state organs we should abolish it and unify the army’s administration [under the war ministry]. The navy’s general staff happily does not have the same invidious effects as the army’s, but it is an unnecessary Takahashi Korekiyo organ. We should abolish both (1854-1936) general staffs at the same time. 54 Dangers of Autarky

Our country is poor in natural re- sources and I doubt that we can compete in an autarkic economic environment. We must think about our position in the world and form a budget in keeping with our people’s wealth. Financial trust is an intangible. Maintaining that trust is our most urgent duty. If we focus only on defense, we will cause bad inflation and that trust will collapse. Thus, our national defense will not be secure. The military should think about this. Takahashi Korekiyo 1935 (1854-1936) Heavenly Punishment Young Officer’s Revolt

On Ethiopian Invasion by Italy: If a country increases its empire and puts money into it, how big a profit is it going to have? Until the profits come in, the home country has to carry [the colony]. 1936

Military % of GNP 1933-5 7% Military % of Budget Takahashi Korekiyo 1931 27% 1936 46% (1854-1936) Young Officers’ Revolt Incident (1936) Dead Inspector General of Military Education Lord Keeper of Privy Seal Finance Minister Severely Wounded Grand Chamberlain Mutineers: 1,027 recruits Consequences • Army in control • No more truth to power • Inflexible foreign policy • Unlimited objective in China Russia Dangerous Neighbors

Adolf Hitler Joseph Stalin Hirota Kōki (1889-1945) (1878-1953) (1878-1948) Enemies on Two Fronts Anti-Comintern Pact, 24 Nov. 1936

Ambassador Foreign Minister Kintomo Mushakoji Joachim von Ribbentrop (1882-1962) (1893-1946) 59 Marco Polo Bridge Incident 7 July 1937

Marco Polo Bridge 60 Russian Script for China Chinese, Not Russians to Die Fighting Japan

AREAS OCCUPIED BY JAPAN

UP TO 1937 AFTER 1937

61 IV. INCOMPLETE INSTITUTION BUILDING The Founding Fathers (Genrō)

Diet

Difficult International Environment ▪ Uncooperative adversaries ▪ Economic depression ▪ Angry neighbors ▪ Brilliant leaders dead ▪ Preoccupied fascist friends 62 Incomplete Institution Building The Constitution

Direct Control Emperor ----- Implied Controls Genrō

Privy Council Electorate Inner Minister Imperial Household Ministry Diet Reps. Peers Cabinet Genl Staffs

Home Min. Justice M. Other Min. Army/Navy M.

Local

Assemblies Prefectures Cops Judiciary Army/Navy63 Imperial Prerogatives

Emperor Meiji (b. 1852, r. 1867-1912) 64 Incomplete Institution Building Change in the Civil-Military Balance

Prince Itō Hirobumi Marshal Yamagata Aritomo (1841-1909) (1838-1922) Civilian control over military Military rule through Emperor Party prime ministers Non-party cabinets Cooperation with UK + USA Cooperation with Axis Constitutional monarchy National mobilization Rule thru House of Representatives Rule through War Ministry 65 Yamagata’s War Ministry

Military ministers and chiefs of staff had direct access to emperor 1900 active-duty army + navy ministers = veto over Cabinet 1907 military issuance of Imperial Orders = bypass prime minister66 Incomplete Institution Building The Confusion of Ends and Means

Japanese advance, Henan, China, 1941

67 Inner Cabinet Missing Institutional Mechanisms

Prime Minister reading imperial rescript at Diet opening, 1936 68 Incomplete Institution Building End of Joint Operations

Joint Operations at Weihaiwei, 1895 69 Incomplete Institution Building Process Stovepipe

General Tōjō Hideki (1884-1948) Prime Minister 1941-44 Foreign Minister 1942 Army Minister 1940-44 Education Minister 1943 Home Minister 1941-42 Industry Minister 1943 70 Province/City Refugees % Population Anhui 2,688,242 12.23 (Hebei) 400,000 15.45 Refugees and Chahar 225,673 11.08 Homeless during Fujian 1,065,469 9.25 Guangdong 4,280,266 13.76 the Second Guangxi 2,562,400 20.37 Hubei 7,690,000 30.13 Sino-Japanese War Hebei 6,774,000 23.99 Henan 14,533,200 43.49 Hunan 13,073,209 42.73 Jiangsu 12,502,633 34.83 Jiangxi 1,360,045 9.55 Manchuria 4,297,100 12.12 Nanjing (Jiangsu) 335,634 32.90 Shandong 11,760,644 30.71 Shanghai (Jiangsu) 531,431 13.80 Shanxi 4,753,842 41.06 Suiyuan 695,715 38.20 Tianjin (Hebei) 200,000 10.00 Wuhan (Hubei) 534,040 43.56 Zhejiang 5,185,210 23.90 Shanghai 1937 TOTAL 95,448,753 26.17 Lary & MacKinnon, Scars of War, 12271 Japan’s Response to the Shifting Global Order

Professor Sally Paine Strategy & Policy Department U.S. Naval War College

This presentation represents the thoughts and opinions of the author, not necessarily those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy Department, or the U.S. Naval War College. Emperor Meiji (1852-1912) 72