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Waiting for Terror: How Realistic Is the Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Threat?

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Waiting for Terror: How Realistic Is the Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Threat? OXFORD · RESEARCH · GROUP WAITING FOR TERROR: HOW REALISTIC IS THE BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR THREAT? October 2001 BY DR. FRANK BARNABY OXFORD RESEARCH GROUP Oxford Research Group was established in 1982 to develop effective methods whereby people can bring about positive change on issues of global and local security by non-violent means. Our work involves: • researching how policy decisions are made and who makes them • promoting accountability and transparency • providing information on current decisions so that informed public debate can take place • fostering dialogue between policy-makers and their critics. Our areas of research include the building of a more secure world through the elimination of nuclear weapons, reduction and control of the arms trade, and the effective non-violent resolution of conflict. We bring policy-makers – senior government officials, the military, scientists, weapons designers and strategists – together with independent experts to develop ways past the obstacles to disarmament, control of the arms trade and greater global security. In an informal environment with skilled facilitation we help to build bridges of understanding as a means of opening up new ideas and making possible significant policy shifts. In this new millennium, human beings are faced with challenges to survival on and of our planet; these challenges can only be solved collectively and co-operatively. Oxford Research Group is committed to this approach. Oxford Research Group is a small independent team of researchers and support staff; it is a public company limited by guarantee with charitable status, governed by a Board of Directors and supported by a Council of Advisers. The Group enjoys a strong reputation for objective and effective research, and attracts the support of foundations, charities and private individuals, many of Quaker origin, in Britain, Europe and the United States. It has no political or religious affiliations and does not campaign. About the author Dr. Frank Barnaby is consultant to Oxford Research Group on technical and scientific issues, and has been on the Group’s Council of Advisers since its inception. He is a nuclear physicist by training, and a prolific author. He worked at the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston (1951-1957) and was on the senior scientific staff of the Medical Research Council. He was Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for many years (1971-81) and Guest Professor at the Free University, Amsterdam (1981-85). 2 WAITING FOR TERROR: HOW REALISTIC IS THE BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR THREAT? CONTENTS Executive Summary........................................................................................................................................... 4 1. What is terrorism?......................................................................................................................................... 8 Types of terrorist.................................................................................................................................................. 8 Terrorism by an individual .................................................................................................................................. 9 Religious terrorism .............................................................................................................................................. 9 Political-nationalist terrorism............................................................................................................................... 11 Right-wing terrorist groups.................................................................................................................................. 16 The number of international terrorist attacks....................................................................................................... 16 2. Terrorist use of chemical weapons ............................................................................................................... 18 Chemical warfare agents...................................................................................................................................... 18 Symptoms of exposure to a nerve agent .............................................................................................................. 19 The dispersal of a nerve agent ............................................................................................................................. 19 3. Terrorist use of biological weapons.............................................................................................................. 21 How terrorists could acquire biological agents.................................................................................................... 21 Biological agents ................................................................................................................................................. 22 Genetic engineering ............................................................................................................................................. 23 4. Terrorist use of nuclear weapons ................................................................................................................. 24 Design of primitive nuclear explosives................................................................................................................ 24 The dispersal of plutonium .................................................................................................................................. 25 5. Keys to counter-terrorism............................................................................................................................. 27 The physical protection of key chemical, biological and nuclear materials......................................................... 27 The urgent need for effective intelligence ........................................................................................................... 27 6. Future terrorism ............................................................................................................................................ 29 Cyberterrorism..................................................................................................................................................... 29 Attacks on nuclear power plants.......................................................................................................................... 29 Future trends in terrorism..................................................................................................................................... 30 References........................................................................................................................................................... 31 Appendix 1 Active international terrorist groups listed by the Department of State............................................................... 32 Appendix 2 Total number of deaths and injuries in various regions, 1995 to 2000 inclusive, caused by international terrorism.....................................................................................................34 3 Executive Summary There is no agreed and unambiguous definition of terrorism. There is, therefore, no agreed list of terrorist groups. It is clear, however, that terrorism is on the increase. It is estimated that only 11 terrorist groups were active in 1968. In the past 33 years, there has been a fivefold increase in the number of terrorist groups operating in the world. Five types of terrorism can be usefully identified, each of which has distinct characteristics. These are: terrorism by an individual; terrorism by religious fundamentalists; political terrorism, usually with nationalist aims; terrorism by extreme political groups, right and left wing; terrorism carried out by single issue groups, such as anti-abortionists and radical ecologists; and terrorism by millennial groups. Religious terrorism Religious terrorists are generally the most fanatical of all terrorists. They are willing, and even anxious, to die for their cause. Religious terrorists are prepared to commit almost limitless violence against almost any target. Of all the terrorists groups, the religious ones are the most likely to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. The AUM group started this process by its nerve gas attack in Tokyo. It may only be a matter of time before a religious terrorist group makes and uses a nuclear explosive. Two main groups of religious terrorists, the Islamic Fundamentalists and the Christian White Supremacists, are operating today. Both justify and legitimise terrorist violence on the basis of their religious beliefs. White supremacist groups preach a virulent anti-Semitic, white supremacist theology, vilifying Jews and non-whites as the children of Satan. Political-nationalist terrorism Most terrorist groups with political aims are nationalist, usually aiming to create an independent homeland. Typical examples are the Basque Fatherland and Liberty group (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna or ETA as it is usually called), the Tamil Tigers, groups within the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and groups in Northern Ireland. Right-wing terrorist groups Right-wing terrorists generally believe that conflict and violence are essential elements in society. Extreme right-wing groups in America are closely aligned with religious fundamentalist movements, as they are in Eastern
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