Defeating Firewalls : Sneaking Into Office Computers from Home (Pdf)
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Remote Cellular TCP/IP Access to Rockwell Ethernet and Serial Devices
Remote Cellular TCP/IP to Rockwell Devices Remote Cellular TCP/IP Access to Rockwell Ethernet and Serial Devices Keywords: Cellular, SLC5/05, ControlLogix, MicroLogix Abstract: This document describes how to set up the Digi Connect™ WAN products (Digi Connect WAN, Digi Connect WAN RG, and Digi Connect WAN VPN) for remote cellular TCP/IP access to Rockwell equipment, such as the PLC5E, SLC5/05, ControlLogix, and MicroLogix. The Digi Connect WAN Family functions much like a home DSL/Cable modem, except the connection is by digital cellular signals such as GSM or CDMA. This enables wireless “Ethernet” solutions on a metro, regional, or global scale. 1 Introduction 1.1 Example Application To illustrate the use of Digi Connect WAN products with your Rockwell equipment, consider the following example: Key Features: The Digi Connect WAN product used with your Rockwell equipment provides several key features: • Provides outgoing Network-Address-Translation (NAT) and incoming TCP/UDP port forwarding. Some models act as VPN end-point. • Maintains an always-up IP connection, either on either the public Internet or by customized private networks established through your cellular carrier. • Being IP-based, all common Ethernet protocols can be used concurrently, including HTTP (Web browsing), ODVA Ethernet/IP, CSPv4, and Modbus/TCP. PN: 90000772_A http://www.digi.com/support/ia Page 1 of 37 Remote Cellular TCP/IP to Rockwell Devices • Existing applications, such as RSLinx, RSLogix and OPC, can be configured to access the field equipment through existing corporate LAN connections. • Intelligent field devices can use IP-based protocols to send email, file updates, or report-by-exception notifications. -
Portproxy User's Guide
portproxy User©s Guide Author: Tomasz Mrugalski version 2009-10-22 Table of contents 1 Project overview...............................................................................................................................4 1.1 Phase 1: Portproxy.....................................................................................................................4 1.2 Phase 2: Port forwarding GUI..................................................................................................4 2 Project status.....................................................................................................................................4 2.1 Phase 1: portproxy.....................................................................................................................4 2.2 Phase 2: Port forwarding GUI...................................................................................................4 2.3 Revision history........................................................................................................................4 3 Portproxy overview...........................................................................................................................5 4 Compilation......................................................................................................................................5 4.1 OpenWRT compilation.............................................................................................................5 4.2 MiniUPNP daemon...................................................................................................................6 -
Secure Shell- Its Significance in Networking (Ssh)
International Journal of Application or Innovation in Engineering & Management (IJAIEM) Web Site: www.ijaiem.org Email: [email protected] Volume 4, Issue 3, March 2015 ISSN 2319 - 4847 SECURE SHELL- ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN NETWORKING (SSH) ANOOSHA GARIMELLA , D.RAKESH KUMAR 1. B. TECH, COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING Student, 3rd year-2nd Semester GITAM UNIVERSITY Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh India 2.Assistant Professor Computer Science and Engineering GITAM UNIVERSITY Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh India ABSTRACT This paper is focused on the evolution of SSH, the need for SSH, working of SSH, its major components and features of SSH. As the number of users over the Internet is increasing, there is a greater threat of your data being vulnerable. Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol provides a secure method for remote login and other secure network services over an insecure network. The SSH protocol has been designed to support many features along with proper security. This architecture with the help of its inbuilt layers which are independent of each other provides user authentication, integrity, and confidentiality, connection- oriented end to end delivery, multiplexes encrypted tunnel into several logical channels, provides datagram delivery across multiple networks and may optionally provide compression. Here, we have also described in detail what every layer of the architecture does along with the connection establishment. Some of the threats which Ssh can encounter, applications, advantages and disadvantages have also been mentioned in this document. Keywords: SSH, Cryptography, Port Forwarding, Secure SSH Tunnel, Key Exchange, IP spoofing, Connection- Hijacking. 1. INTRODUCTION SSH Secure Shell was first created in 1995 by Tatu Ylonen with the release of version 1.0 of SSH Secure Shell and the Internet Draft “The SSH Secure Shell Remote Login Protocol”. -
Wing How to Guide
Configuration Guide for RFMS 3.0 Initial Configuration XXX-XXXXXX-XX WiNG5 How-To Guide Network Address Translation July 2011 Revision 1.0 MOTOROLA and the Stylized M Logo are registered in the US Patent & Trademark Office. Symbol is a registered trademark of Symbol Technologies, Inc. All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. © 2011 Motorola, Inc. All rights reserved. WiNG5 – Network Address Translation How-To Guide Table of Contents 1. Introduction: ...............................................................................................................................................4 1.1 Overview:............................................................................................................................................4 1.2 Applications: .......................................................................................................................................5 1.3 Restrictions: ........................................................................................................................................5 2. Pre‐Requisites: ............................................................................................................................................6 2.1 Requirements: ....................................................................................................................................6 2.2 Components Used:..............................................................................................................................6 -
Nokia HA-140W-B
Port forwarding for Nokia HA-140W-B Port forwarding can be used to establish a home-based FTP server, web server or similar kind of a server. The server is located on the LAN client (e.g. desktop computer or laptop). To set up Port forwarding, log into your router and go to Application > Port Forwarding. See image 1. Image 1. Port forwarding configured with port mapping (WAN port maps to LAN port) To set a specific port forwarding rule, select Custom settings for Application Name line. In the WAN Port field, set an arbitrary port on WAN interface of a router (e.g. TCP port 12001). All requests coming to the server from the internet side will have a destination IP address of the router itself, and a destination port as listed in WAN Port fields. For LAN port fields, list the port on which the LAN client server app is running (in this case TCP port 8008). Select the appropriate LAN client (server machine) from the dropdown menu on Internal Client. Protocol is determined by the type of server application (in this case TCP). Tick Enable Mapping and click Add to save the rule. Once the rule is saved, you’ll see the confirmation (see image 2). 1 Image 2. Port forwarding rule confirmation Similarly, ports on WAN and LAN side can be kept the same (see image 3). Image 3 shows the second way things can be configured. It’s up to you whether you prefer to use the methods in image 1 or image 3. Image 3. -
ECE 435 – Network Engineering Lecture 4
ECE 435 { Network Engineering Lecture 4 Vince Weaver http://web.eece.maine.edu/~vweaver [email protected] 13 September 2018 Announcements • HW#1 was due. • HW#2 will be posted. Write a mini webserver. • Cybersecurity club Linux Security Lab on Saturday 1 WWW wrapup 2 What if Server Overloaded? • Slashdot effect (modern: HackerNews?) • caching/proxy { squid • Content Delivery Network { akami • Server farms 3 Security • SSL { Secure Socket Layer • Replaced by TLS (Transport Layer Security) • Port 443 for https • Public key encryption. 4 Setting Up a Web-server • Apache • Easy to do, more difficult to secure 5 Web Seach • Web-bots index the web. robots.txt file • Altavista, Hotbot, Excite, Inktomi, etc. • Curated search like Yahoo (people organize links rather than automatically search) • Google (1996 some machine in Stanford, 1997-1998) • MSN search 1999, rebranded Microsoft Bing 2009 6 Remote Connections 7 telnet/rlogin/rsh/ssh • telnet { login to remote system (tcp port 23) everything (including passwords) sent in plain text • rsh/rlogin { remote shell, remote login. (tcp port 514) Didn't even need password, could configure to let you run commands on remote machine. Security based if you had same username on both machines, assumption was getting root on a UNIX machine and connected to Ethernet was expensive/difficult 8 SSH secure shell • tcp port 22 • can login, run commands, tunnel tcp/ip, tunnel X11, file transfer (scp, sftp) • Large number of RFCs • Version 1: 1995, originally freeware but became private • Version 2: 2005, openBSD based on last free version • For security reasons there's a push to drop Version 1 • uses public-key cryptography • transport layer: arranges initial key exchange, server 9 authentication, key re-exchange • user authentication layer: can have password, or can set up keys to allow passwordless, DSA or RSA key pairs • connection layer: set up channels • lots of encryption types supported, old ones being obsoleted as found wanting • Various ssh servers/clients. -
Authenticated Encryption in SSH
Authenticated Encryption in SSH Kenny Paterson Information Security Group @kennyog; www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp Overview (both lectures) • Secure channels and their properties • AEAD (revision) • AEAD ≠ secure channel – the [APW09] attack on SSH • The state of AEAD in SSH today • A new attack on CBC-mode in OpenSSH • Security analysis of other SSH and OpenSSH modes – CTR, ChaChaPoly, gEtM, AES-GCM. 2 Secure channels and their properties Why do we need secure channels? • Secure communications is the most common real- world application of cryptography today. • Secure communications systems are extremely widely-deployed in practice: • SSL/TLS, DTLS, IPsec, SSH, OpenVPN,… • WEP/WPA/WPA2 • GSM/UMTS/4g/LTE • Cryptocat, OTR, SilentCircle • OpenPGP, iMessage, Telegram, Signal, and a thousand other messaging apps • QUIC, MinimalT, TCPcrypt 4 Security properties • Confidentiality – privacy for data • Integrity – detection of data modification • Authenticity – assurance concerning the source of data 5 Some less obvious security properties • Anti-replay • Detection that messages have been repeated. • Detection of deletion • Detection that messages have been deleted by the adversary or dropped by the network. • Detection of re-0rdering • Ensuring that the relative order of messages in each direction on the secure channel is preserved. • Possibly re-ordering the event of violation. • Prevention of traffic-analysis. • Using traffic padding and length-hiding techniques. 6 Possible functionality requirements • Speedy • Low-memory • On-line/parallelisable crypto-operations • Performance is heavily hardware-dependent. • May have different algorithms for different platforms. • IPR-friendly • This issue has slowed down adoption of many otherwise good algorithms, e.g. OCB. • Easy to implement • Without introducing any side-channels. -
Wind River® Vxworks® 7 Third Party License Notices
Wind River® VxWorks® 7 Third Party License Notices This document contains third party intellectual property (IP) notices for the BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY Wind River® VxWorks® 7 distribution. Certain licenses and license notices THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, may appear in other parts of the product distribution in accordance with the OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN license requirements. ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. Trademarks All company, product and service names used in this software are for ACPICA identification purposes only. Version: 20170303 Component(s): Runtime Wind River and VxWorks are registered trademarks of Wind River Systems. Description: Provides code to implement ACPI specification in VxWorks. UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group. IBM and Bluemix are registered trademarks of the IBM Corporation. NOTICES: All other third-party trademarks are the property of their respective owners. 1. Copyright Notice Some or all of this work - Copyright (c) 1999 - 2016, Intel Corp. All rights reserved. Third Party Notices 2. License 2.1. This is your license from Intel Corp. under its intellectual property rights. You may have additional license terms from the party that provided you this software, covering your right to use that party's intellectual property rights. 64-Bit Dynamic Linker Version: 2.2. Intel grants, free of charge, to any person ("Licensee") obtaining a copy Component(s): Runtime of the source code appearing in this file ("Covered Code") an irrevocable, Description: The dynamic linker is used to load shared libraries. -
PF: the Openbsd Packet Filter
PF: The OpenBSD Packet Filter Languages: [en] [de] [es] [fr] [id] [ja] [pl] [up to FAQ] [Next: Getting Started] PF: The OpenBSD Packet Filter Table of Contents ● Basic Configuration ❍ Getting Started ❍ Lists and Macros ❍ Tables ❍ Packet Filtering ❍ Network Address Translation ❍ Traffic Redirection (Port Forwarding) ❍ Shortcuts For Creating Rulesets ● Advanced Configuration ❍ Runtime Options ❍ Scrub (Packet Normalization) ❍ Anchors and Named (Sub) Rulesets ❍ Packet Queueing and Prioritization ❍ Address Pools and Load Balancing ❍ Packet Tagging ● Additional Topics ❍ Logging ❍ Performance ❍ Issues with FTP ❍ Authpf: User Shell for Authenticating Gateways ● Example Rulesets ❍ Example #1: Firewall for Home or Small Office Packet Filter (from here on referred to as PF) is OpenBSD's system for filtering TCP/IP traffic and doing Network Address Translation. PF is also capable of normalizing and conditioning TCP/IP traffic and providing bandwidth control and packet prioritization. PF has been a part of the GENERIC OpenBSD kernel since OpenBSD 3.0. Previous OpenBSD releases used a different firewall/NAT package which is no longer supported. PF was originally developed by Daniel Hartmeier and is now maintained and developed by Daniel and the rest of the OpenBSD team. This set of documents is intended as a general introduction to the PF system as run on OpenBSD. It is intended to be used as a supplement to the man pages, not as a replacement for them. This document covers all of PF's major features. For a complete and http://www.openbsd.org/faq/pf/index.html (1 of 2) [14/04/2004 20:53:58] PF: The OpenBSD Packet Filter in-depth view of what PF can do, please start by reading the pf(4) man page. -
Detection and Analysis of Tor Onion Services
Detection and Analysis of Tor Onion Services Martin Steinebach1;∗, Marcel Schäfer2, Alexander Karakuz and Katharina Brandl1 1Fraunhofer SIT, Germany 2Fraunhofer USA CESE E-mail: [email protected] ∗Corresponding Author Received 28 November 2019; Accepted 28 November 2019; Publication 23 January 2020 Abstract Tor onion services can be accessed and hosted anonymously on the Tor network. We analyze the protocols, software types, popularity and uptime of these services by collecting a large amount of .onion addresses. Websites are crawled and clustered based on their respective language. In order to also determine the amount of unique websites a de-duplication approach is implemented. To achieve this, we introduce a modular system for the real-time detection and analysis of onion services. Address resolution of onion services is realized via descriptors that are published to and requested from servers on the Tor network that volunteer for this task. We place a set of 20 volunteer servers on the Tor network in order to collect .onion addresses. The analysis of the collected data and its comparison to previous research provides new insights into the current state of Tor onion services and their development. The service scans show a vast variety of protocols with a significant increase in the popularity of anonymous mail servers and Bitcoin clients since 2013. The popularity analysis shows that the majority of Tor client requests is performed only for a small subset of addresses. The overall data reveals further that a large amount of permanent services provide no actual content for Tor users. A significant part consists instead of bots, services offered via multiple domains, or duplicated websites for phishing Journal of Cyber Security and Mobility, Vol. -
Doodle Labs Smart Radio Advanced MIMO Mesh Router in a Tiny Form Factor
Configuration Guide Doodle Labs Smart Radio Advanced MIMO Mesh Router in a tiny Form Factor Introduction The Smart Radio runs a customized version of Openwrt with enhancements related to the Doodle Labs Mesh Rider® technology. These enhancements are useful for applications requiring low-latency command-and- control transmission and high-throughput video - e.g. UAV and robotics. The purpose of this guide is to aide a programmer in re-configuring common Smart Radio settings once it is deployed in the field. A full technical discussion of all of the different configuration parameters of the Openwrt system is beyond the scope of this guide, and the user is encouraged to explore the OpenWrt website. Smart Radio Configuration Overview Factory Configuration By default, the Smart Radio is configured to connect to a mesh network as shown in the diagram in the next section. There are two networks configured in each Smart Radio. The first is the mesh network, and the second is the configuration network. • The mesh network consists of all Smart Radios and host platforms which join the mesh. ETH0 is bridged to the mesh network. The firewall is set up to allow input access using SSH or the web GUI. The mesh network has two IP addresses. o The first is a DHCP client. o The second is a static IP address equal to 10.223.x.y where x.y is the last four hexadecimal digits of the wireless MAC address. For example, a unit shipped with MAC address 00301A4E7AB0 has the last four HEX digits 7AB0 and x.y is equal to 122.176. -
Tunneling with Secure Shell (SSH) Secure Shell Tunneling with Secure Shell
White Paper Tunneling with Secure Shell (SSH) 4848 tramway ridge dr. ne suite 101 albuquerque, nm 87111 505 - 332 -5700 www.vandyke.com Tunneling with Secure Shell Remote access to network resources is increasingly a business requirement, but external network threats must be neutralized. A Secure Shell (SSH) capability called port forwarding allows nonsecure TCP/IP data to be tunneled across public and private networks through a secure, encrypted connection. The benefits of port forwarding are illustrated by a series of concrete examples. VanDyke Software's clients and servers provide an end-to-end tunneling solution to secure client/server applications, which may serve as a lightweight alternative to a Virtual Private Network (VPN). With today’s increasingly mobile and distributed workforce, providing remote access to travelers and teleworkers is no longer a “nice to have” option. In many corporations, remote access to business applications has become mission critical. At the same time, Internet access is now cheap, fast, and readily available. Leveraging the Internet to extend the local area network (LAN), provide real-time communications, and immediate file transfer and sharing is a scalable, cost-effective soluti on for corporate network remote access. However, Internet-based remote access also adds significant risk. Sensitive data can be intercepted, modified, or replayed anywhere between remote workers and the corporate firewall. Broadcast access technologies like cable and wireless are especially vulnerable. Whenever a computer is connected to the Internet, it becomes a potential target for intruders. "Always on" broadband greatly increases this exposure by giving intruders a fixed target to attack repeatedly over time.