Bogus Parts — Detecting the Hidden Threat Flight Safety Digest Vol

F L I G H T S A F E T Y F O U N D A T I O N JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1994 FLIGHT SAFETY D I G E S T SPECIAL DOUBLE ISSUE Bogus Parts — Detecting the Hidden Threat Flight Safety Digest Vol. 13 No. 1/2 January/February 1994 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION Special Double Issue For Everyone Concerned With the Safety of Flight In This Issue Bogus Parts — Detecting the Hidden Officers/Staff 1 Threat Stuart Matthews The aviation community has been Chairman, President and CEO plagued by bogus parts for decades. But Board of Governors John H. Enders there are alarming indications that the Vice Chairman scope of the problem is growing. Board of Governors Industry officials and government Robert Reed Gray, Esq. regulators are now working together to General Counsel and Secretary Board of Governors track down and eliminate counterfeit parts and to trace thousands of Richard A. Maginnis potentially airworthy parts that lack Senior Vice President proper documentation. Administrative Fatal Convair Crash Linked to Nancy Richards 18 Executive Secretary Suspect Parts, Improper Maintenance Financial An exhaustive investigation conducted Brigette Adkins by the Aircraft Accident Investigation Accountant Board of Norway found that several Technical safety issues, including suspect parts, improper maintenance work and Robert H. Vandel documents, and aging aircraft, were part Director of Technical Projects of a chain of events that led to the Millicent J. Singh Secretary accident. Membership Aviation Statistics J. Edward Peery 31 Director of Membership and Development U.S. aviation system indicators show no decline in safety. Ahlam Wahdan Administrative Assistant Publications Received at FSF Jerry Publications 38 Lederer Aviation Safety Library Roger Rozelle Director of Publications Publications highlight human factors, Girard Steichen physiological and historical. Assistant Director of Publications Kate Achelpohl Accident/Incident Briefs Editorial Assistant 40 Bilingual exchange causes near-miss. Monique Kohly Production Consultant Flight Safety Foundation is an international membership organiza- tion dedicated to improving aviation safety. Nonprofit and indepen- dent, the Foundation was launched in 1945 in response to the aviation Jerome Lederer President Emeritus industry’s need for a neutral clearinghouse to disseminate objective safety information, and for a credible and knowledgeable body that would identify threats to safety, analyze the problems and recommend practical solutions to them. Since its beginning, the Foundation has acted in the public interest to produce a positive influence on aviation safety. Today, the Foundation provides leadership to nearly 600 member organizations in 75 countries. Bogus Parts — Detecting the Hidden Threat The aviation community has been plagued by bogus parts for decades. But there are alarming indications that the scope of the problem is growing. Industry officials and government regulators are working together to track down and eliminate counterfeit parts and to trace thousands of potentially airworthy parts that lack proper documentation. Editorial Staff Report On Sept. 8, 1989, a chartered twin-engine Convair their way into airline and general aviation fleets. 340/580 turboprop aircraft with 50 members of a Norwegian shipbuilding company and a crew of five The term “bogus parts” has a deep and ominous on board disappeared from radar as it approached the resonance in the language of the aerospace industry, northern coast of Denmark. Minutes later, search especially since the end of World War II, when sur- and rescue teams discovered wreckage floating about plus parts flooded the market. But the term, while in 10 miles offshore. There were no survivors. (See widespread use, actually refers to several distinct “Fatal Convair Crash Linked to Suspect Parts, Im- categories of aviation parts. proper Maintenance” on page 18.) Bogus parts can range from dangerous substandard In Fort Lauderdale, Florida, U.S., special agents for components and blatant counterfeits to safe (airwor- the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) In- thy) but “unapproved” parts, which can simply mean spector General’s (IG) office examined a broker’s that Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) paper- suspicious brake parts stockpiled for use on a Boe- work regulations were not followed to the letter. ing 737 jet. Subcontractors for FAA-approved manufacturers, for example, sometimes overproduce a part, then offer At nearby Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International the overruns at a discount to brokers and repair stations, Airport, two flight computers valued at more than bypassing the strict quality control systems required US$250,000 were stolen from a United Airlines jet, by the FAA. The FAA shuns the term “bogus parts,” destined to be hawked for a fraction of their worth preferring instead to classify aviation parts into two on a thriving black market that specializes in stolen broad categories of “approved” and “unapproved” parts. and counterfeit aircraft parts. Bogus or unapproved parts amount to only a fraction In increasing numbers, unapproved, counterfeit, de- of the millions of legitimate and approved parts used fective and even stolen aircraft parts are finding in aircraft maintenance. Bogus parts are often FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1994 1 Bogus Parts: The term “bogus parts” has come to produced under FAA approval are often found to refer to a number of aircraft parts categories, ranging be of inferior quality although they are marketed from properly manufactured parts that lack re- as genuine. quired documentation to defective and deliber- ately counterfeited components. Approved Parts: These parts conform to FAA- approved production standards (FAR 21.305). They Unapproved Parts: The U.S. Federal Aviation can be approved under a parts manufacturer ap- Administration (FAA) considers all aircraft parts proval (PMA), under technical standard orders not made under proper FAA approval and accord- (TSOs), in conjunction with type-certification pro- ing to designated standards to be unapproved parts cedures, through FAA-administrator approval or by (not produced in accordance with U.S. Federal conforming with recognized industry specifications. Aviation Regulations [FAR] Part 21.305 or re- paired in accordance with FARs Part 43). This is a Life-limited and Time-expired Parts: Aircraft broad classification that includes counterfeit parts, parts that have predetermined service lives be- stolen parts, production overruns, parts that have come “timed-out” and no longer serviceable after exceeded their time limits, approved parts improperly they exceed these prescribed limits, which vary returned to service and fraudulently marked parts. depending on the part and its function on the aircraft. Scrapped time-expired critical parts have Counterfeit Parts: Aircraft parts that are not been linked to several fatal aircraft accidents. difficult to detect once they are installed on aircraft. pins cost US$148 each, the sleeves $135 and the Testing to determine the authenticity of suspect parts washers $20. often destroys them in the process. In the Fort Lauderdale brake-parts case, extensive But once installed, such parts can lead to catastro- testing determined that a shiny-new copper- phe. After a painstaking investigation, the Aircraft colored brake lining cup was a fraud of such poor Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) of Norway quality that it would cause excessive wear on an determined that the chartered Convair crash was aircraft’s brake assembly. At best, such a part would caused by substandard parts and poor maintenance increase airline maintenance costs. At worst, exces- that led to a complete disintegration of the aircraft’s sive wear could cause brakes to pull to one side empennage [the complete tail section].1 when applied in an emergency, sending the aircraft careening out of control. “This is the first commercial aircraft accident with this great loss of life that has been linked directly More than 100,000 of the brake parts, illegally stamped to a suspect part,” said Thomas Haueter, an acci- with the same serial numbers as those made by an dent investigator with the U.S. National Transpor- approved U.S. supplier, were shipped to the Florida tation Safety Board (NTSB) who participated in parts broker by a German manufacturer. the Convair accident investigation.2 U.S. agents from the Department of Transportation The Norwegian AAIB report said that locking pins (DOT), the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation [bolts] and sleeves of inferior quality “that did not (FBI) and the U.S. military have been involved in comply with the specified values for hardness and more than 200 bogus parts investigations in the United tensile strength” had been installed in the empen- States. Investigations are also being conducted in nage. Vibration, excessive wear and metal fatigue Europe, Canada and the United Kingdom, where caused them to fail. Then, parts of the tail failed unapproved parts (tail rotor shaft nuts) have been and sent the plane plunging out of control from its linked to a recent fatal helicopter crash, DOT offi- cruising altitude of 22,000 feet (6,710 meters). cials said. The origin of the suspect pins could not be traced DOT officials said that they have obtained more than because the repair station that installed them in 60 indictments and 40 convictions thus far and ex- 1986 did not have a parts and supplier registration pect that number to double after pending investiga- system at the time, the Norwegian

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