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Home , Carl Heinrich Becker, Franz von Papen, Fritz Grobba, Max von Oppenheim, Oskar von Niedermayer, Werner Otto von Hentig

GERMANY'S POLICY Wolfgang G. Schwanitz*

At times of peace, ’s Middle East policy has historically taken a secondary position—one subordinate to Germany’s primary policy toward Europe and America. While of secondary importance, it was a tool that could be used to manipulate the Middle Eastern Question by playing off Western powers against each other. ’s goal was a peaceful penetration of the , and it had no colonial aspirations in the region. During the world wars, however, Berlin elevated its Middle East policy to primary status by instigating in the enemy’s hinterland. Yet in recent years, Berlin has sought out policies on Middle East peace and Islam fitting the European framework.1

GERMAN MIDDLE EAST EARLY whose vast lands ranged from via YEARS and Mesopotamia to Egypt and Mauritania. The first striking feature of When the German Reich was established in Berlin‘s peacetime Middle East policy thus 1871, the neighboring countries of Great appeared: respecting the status quo and Britain, France, and Russia were already refusing to create any colonies in the region.6 expanding their overseas colonies into Furthermore, the Eastern Question—who empires. During the next four decades, while would get which part of the declining Ottoman these empires continued to grow, Berlin was Empire—had caused many conflicts. It was forced to develop a policy toward North Chancellor —until 1890 the Africa and West Asia that differed from those main foreign politician with a distaste for of the other European powers.2 colonial acquisitions—who regarded the By the time Germany was founded, there Eastern Question as a means for his policy was nothing much left in the region to be toward Germany‘s neighbors in Europe. He claimed. The territories that became known as opined that policy toward Europe and America the Middle East had already been distributed came first, and policy toward the Middle East among Germany‘s neighbors. Thus, had to serve this primary policy. Thus, and maintaining the status quo in the region was this is the second feature, Berlin‘s Middle East most likely to have served Germany‘s national policy was always subordinated to a primary interests.3 Trade, commerce, and peaceful policy toward Europe and America.7 penetration—especially in open-door areas— Third, the Middle East was not promising were the cornerstones of Berlin‘s Middle East enough to merit a grand design for German policy. This was also true during the Deutsche policy. As Otto von Bismarck said, ―The Orient-Gründerjahre, or the ―German Orient Eastern Question is not worth the bones of a founding years,‖ beginning in 1884 and lasting single Pomeranian musketeer.‖ For example, three decades.4 During this period, Germany the German policy toward Egypt at the time explored new regions in Africa and Asia. was considered a question not between Berlin Berlin established colonies in West and East and , but between Berlin and London. In Africa, becoming a small colonial power.5 the chancellor‘s eyes there was not much to However, it was also an era during which the expect from direct relations with Egypt, but intensified their economic, cultural, Egypt made an effective ―stick‖8 to be used and military relations with the Middle East— against London to disturb some alliances

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) 26 Germany's Middle East Policy between Germany‘s neighbors. He used this them Carl Heinrich Becker—for having bâton égyptien diplomatically. Since Berlin supported this ―jihad fever.‖ The Dutchman had no colonies in the region, it slipped into insisted this jihad was an intellectual weapon the role of a key mediator in European that had been ―made in Germany.‖ Supposing conflicts over the Orient. Thus, the third this were true, replied the German scholar of striking feature of Berlin‘s Middle East policy Islam, had not Berlin and every right was a diplomacy of mediation, namely during to do so? Yet this, wrote Hurgronje, hurts a series of conferences on African frontiers humanism and religious peace. ―There is no and Asian topics beginning in the 1880s.9 taboo for religion,‖ Becker answered.12 The three features of Berlin‘s policy Jihad developed as a concerted German- toward the Middle East in peacetime were: Ottoman campaign. It consisted of five stages: respecting the status quo and renouncing ‘s design to revolutionize territorial claims in the region; the the enemy‘s colonial hinterland; the subordination of this secondary policy to the instigation of jihad by the Berlin-based primary policy toward Europe and America; Oriental News Department; the Ottoman fatwa and the diplomacy of mediation in Oriental (religious edict); Shaykh Salih‘s commentary conflicts. Unlike the other great powers, on the fatwa; and the realization of jihad. Jihad Germany did not rule over any Muslims in the was used as a weapon to globalize the war. Middle East.10 Therefore, the Germans gained However, it was a slap in the face to the a critical perspective on their neighbors‘ Enlightenment. Although Hurgonje‘s criticism Middle Eastern empires and all the troubles hit the mark, Becker maintained a chauvinistic they had caused. It is no wonder that approach. To understand Germany‘s Middle mainstream German politicians and academics East policy, it is worthwhile to look into these had a sympathetic view of anti-imperial five elements of jihad according to the tendencies and their nationalistic or Islamic German design. expressions. Max von Oppenheim had served as an archaeologist and diplomat in the Middle East JIHAD MADE IN GERMANY for 20 years. Wilhelm II read Oppenheim‘s reports recommending jihad.13 After the war Soon, the long-feared ―Sarajevo effect‖ began, German General Chief of Staff dragged Europe and the world into a war Hellmuth von Moltke wanted Enver Pasha to starting in the peripheral Balkans. The unique proclaim jihad in order to weaken the enemies feature in Berlin‘s switch from a secondary from within. The kaiser asked him to enter the peacetime Middle East policy to a primary war too: He wanted the sultan to call for jihad wartime policy against Great Britain, France, in Asia, , Egypt, and Africa to enlist and Russia (and the colonial Middle Eastern Muslims to fight for the Caliphate. Berlin and hinterland) was that the jihad was ―made in Istanbul cooperated closely in planning and Germany.‖11 This had already become an issue realizing the jihad. There were even some during the first year of the war. A dispute academics in Berlin who expected to see between the two founding fathers of the study ―Islamic fanatics fighting for Germany."14 of Islam in Europe erupted. Their discussion Invoking jihad was the idea of Max von indicated that the general attitude toward the Oppenheim, the German ―Abu Jihad.‖ In late war was at first frenetically welcomed and October 1914, before the Ottomans had expected to be very short. entered the war (siding with the Central Did the Germans push the to Powers), he designed a master plan proclaim jihad after entering ―fomenting rebellion in the Islamic territories against the British, the Russians, and the of our enemies.‖15 The emperor confirmed French? Indeed they did, maintained the Oppenheim‘s suggestion to incite Muslims— leading Dutch Arabist, C. Snouck Hurgronje, potentially those in British India, French North who blamed his German colleagues—among Africa, and Russian Asia—to jihad under the

27 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) Wolfgang G. Schwanitz leadership of the Ottoman sultan-caliph. The from doing so would be committing a horrible call to fight would be announced in several sin and would deserve divine wrath. It would languages. The sultan was to proclaim jihad be absolutely forbidden for Muslims of the against the British, French, and Russians, named enemy countries to fight against the while Berlin would provide money, experts, troops of Islamic lands and they would be and equipment. In addition, Berlin would deserving of hellfire for murder, even if the establish an Oriental News Department in its enemies had forced them to do so. It was also Foreign Office. Muslim rebellion in India, declared a great sin for Muslims under the rule however, was the key to victory. Expeditions of England, France, Russia, Serbia, were to be sent to to trigger an Montenegro, and their allies to fight against uprising there.16 The Germans would provide Germany and Austria, the allies of the intelligence to the Muslims, while the Turks Supreme Islamic Government. would incite them to rise up against their According to this fatwa, the sultan-caliph foreign masters. Islam, concluded Max von had sovereignty over all Muslims. They were Oppenheim, would be one of Germany‘s permitted to fight with infidels against infidels sharpest weapons against the British. He and ―their‖ Muslims. The latter not only had believed Germany should mount a joint effort no right to fight back, but had to turn against to make it a deadly strike.17 Max von their foreign overlords. Shaykh Salih al-Sharif Oppenheim (later succeeded by Karl E. al-Tunisi backed the Austro-German Central Schabinger and Eugen Mittwoch) was made Powers‘ new doctrine of jihad. Enver Pasha head of the Oriental News Department. had asked Shaykh Salih to travel to Berlin to Oppenheim employed a dozen academics promote the idea of jihad among the Germans. and native Muslims. Some called his strategy For this purpose, Shaykh Salih wrote a of jihad a ―war by revolution.‖18 Yet it was an commentary entitled Haqiqat al-Jihad (The asymmetrical war, waged by incitement to Truth of Jihad), which was published in early jihad and by anti-imperial uprisings. The aim 1915 by the German Society for the Study of was a double strategy using both the direct Islam. Martin Hartmann of the Seminary of fighting on the front lines and an effort to raise Oriental Languages in Berlin wrote a friendly revolts in the colonial hinterland to keep foreword and the dragoman Karl E. enemy troops busy putting them down. Of Schabinger added an afterword. Both course, the strategy raised some questions. Did recommended the text as a ―development of all Muslims accept the Ottoman sultan as jihad.‖ This referred to possibility of a ―partial caliph? Were Muslims permitted to fight with jihad‖: the allied infidels against certain infidels against other infidels and ―their‖ enemy infidels alone. This jihad was an Muslims? As Max von Oppenheim had individual duty for all Muslims. A peace suggested, a fatwa provided the answer. The between the world of Islam and Europe would Shaykh of Islam declared five points on be possible if foreign occupation of Islamic November 11, 1914.19 lands were to come to an end.20 In brief, after the enemy of Islam had In the end, the execution of the jihad was attacked the Islamic world, His Majesty the disappointing for Max von Oppenheim and his Padishah of Islam would order a jihad as a Oriental News Department in the Foreign general mobilization and as an individual duty Office. The majority of Muslims seemed to for Muslims worldwide, in accordance with ignore the call to jihad despite the vast sums of the Koran. With Russia, England, and France money the Germans had invested in hostile to the Islamic Caliphate, it would also expeditions (for example, the expedition to be incumbent upon all Muslims ruled by these headed by and governments to proclaim jihad against them ) and pan-Islamic and to actually attack them. The protection of propaganda printed in Berlin (such as the the Ottoman Empire would depend on Muslim weekly al-Jihad). Nevertheless, Schabinger participation in the jihad, and those refraining concluded that the seeds of an uprising had

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) 28 Germany's Middle East Policy been planted. He posited that one day there victors‘ demands. Reconstruction and reform would be an accumulation of colonial people were the order of the day. Thus Berlin ready to turn against their rulers.21 The returned to its secondary Middle Eastern peace German general staff drew a much less policy. favorable conclusion; they believed that the In accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, notion that jihad would decide the war was an Germany lost its Central African colonies. The illusion.22 new republic was even freer to concentrate on On the opposing side, as early as mid-1916, trade, commerce, and culture, reestablishing a French source concluded that the two of the prewar pillars of the German policy declarations of jihad had moved many people toward the Middle East. This included to act in the name of Islam: ―They failed, respecting the status quo and disclaiming any indeed, but they caused no end of trouble to territories. The third pillar, mediating in the Entente Powers.‖23 Indeed, this jihad was Oriental disputes, was excluded since viewed as a concerted German-Ottoman Germany was given no role in international action. Planned as an export of an Islamic relations at all, a fact that promoted thoughts uprising or revolution into the enemy‘s of vengeance in Berlin. colonial hinterland, the idea was truly made in In the early 1920s, the Foreign Office made Germany. It was rather unfortunate that reforms, thus breaking away from older renowned German Oriental experts such as traditions. Both the classical diplomat of noble Carl Heinrich Becker, Martin Hartmann, Ernst descent—trained in jurisprudence— and the Jäckh, and Max von Oppenheim unleashed the dragoman—conversant in Oriental languages old genie of pure religious hatred. Others, like as well as in judicial matters—were replaced C. Snouck Hurgronje, remained steadfast by a wider range of experts from all against this use of jihad and defended basic disciplines. Thus Berlin managed to regain values of humanism and enlightenment. most of its lost positions, and once again The most distinctive features of Berlin‘s became the third-ranking country in foreign Middle East policy during World War I were trade with the Middle East. not the 30,000 German troops fighting as part One question that was often discussed in of the Ottoman army, the two attempts to Berlin was whether or not to support capture the Suez Canal, or General Hans von industrialization in the region. Ultimately, the Seeckt‘s role as the last Ottoman chief of staff. argument that prevailed was that if Germany Of course, from a Middle Eastern viewpoint, did not do so, competition would take over the foremost element was that the Ottomans this business. The Germans were attractive sided with the Germans.24 What was unique partners, especially for Middle Eastern was that after the switch from a secondary nationalists in newly emerging countries such policy of maintaining peace to a primary war as and Iraq who sought out policy, the jihad was ―made in Germany.‖ alternative suppliers. Students from the Thus, the German discipline of Islamic study Middle East who had studied in Germany lost its innocence not long after its birth. since 1920 returned to their homelands and advanced there professionally. They favored THE REPUBLIC OF WEIMAR Germany in a climate that had become hostile RETURNS TO A SECONDARY MIDDLE to the new British and French mandatory EAST POLICY powers.25 The Republic of Weimar applied a After the Germans had lost the war and had secondary Middle East peace policy, overthrown their emperor and his ―world cautiously avoiding trouble with London and policy,‖ the German Reich no longer remained . Nevertheless, the Germans remained a monarchy but became the Republic of very critical of the declining empires in the Weimar. As such, a Germany that had lost a region35 and supported Arab nationalists in third of its size was bound to comply with the their desire to rid themselves of foreign

29 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) Wolfgang G. Schwanitz masters. the Middle East to the Soviets, Great Britain, In light of this, there was a natural basis for and ,27 maintaining the tradition cooperation between the Germans on the one established by the first chancellor, Otto von hand, and the , Turks, and Persians on Bismarck, who had regarded colonial outposts the other. It was not difficult for the old in Africa and Asia as nothing but trouble. diplomatic guard, among them Dr. Fritz Hitler‘s racial views, made public in 1920, Grobba,26 to exploit the feelings created by must have influenced his lack of interest in having fought and lost on the same side in the creating German colonies or territories in the war. As a result of the Treaty of Versailles, lands of ―colored people.‖ Berlin possessed no navy or other military An examination of German Middle East tools, and thus had a diminished interest in the policy under Hitler confirms that the region Middle East. Apart from economic and was of no concern to him. He built a Berlin- cultural relations, the region lacked Rome axis with clear functions for Italy in the importance for Berlin and returned to playing Middle East and hoped for an understanding a marginal role. with London. Arab nationalists such as Grand London had decided to support a Jewish Mufti Amin al-Husayni of were homeland in Palestine. As the waves of new more interested in him than vice versa. An Jewish immigrants, olim chadashim, arrived additional factor on the German side was the there, Palestine became a focal point. Berlin shortage of funds, as most of the money was tried not to get involved in this project and being spent on rearmament. All this could be kept its distance. Nevertheless, anti-Semitism changed by three factors. was on the rise in Germany and did influence First, if a disagreement or war were to arise the fate of the region, though initially only with London, Paris, or , the Middle indirectly. Moreover, some politicians in East could become a major battleground. For Berlin saw the emigration of to Palestine this reason, German planners were interested as the solution to problems of Central Europe. in the French and British-influenced territories However, the most dangerous development as well as Russia‘s immediate neighbors (such was that advanced Jewish assimilation in as Afghanistan and Turkey), even in Germany was in jeopardy, and with it some of peacetime. was soon made the most important results of the European Hitler‘s ambassador to , showing the Enlightenment. importance Hitler accorded Turkey. Throughout the 1920s, German racism rose Second, the Middle East could become a to the surface. What occurred in the following primary matter if the positions of Axis decade was in no way a surprise. Even partners such as Italy and Japan were in founding fathers of Islamic studies such as danger. Berlin could then be dragged into Carl Heinrich Becker had tended to divide conflicts. A common German policy was to humankind into ―higher‖ and ―lower‖ races. avoid such risks in a region of secondary importance. The Middle East was not even ’S SECONDARY AND important to Germany as a source of raw PRIMARY MIDDLE EASTERN materials. Instead, Germans relied on Europe POLICIES for raw materials, including oil from the Balkans, tungsten from Portugal, and chrome From his election in 1933 until World War ore from Turkey. There was no need for II, pursued a secondary Middle deliveries from the Middle East or for military East peace policy. He was much more bases there. interested in a of labor with London. The third possibility for increasing Berlin‘s He thus accepted the while interest in the Middle East was in case the plan believing that Eastern Europe should be a of Blitzkriege (―lightning wars‖) in Europe completely German domain for Lebensraum. failed. In that event, the region would become He readily left political ―responsibilities‖ for more important as a battlefield tying down as

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) 30 Germany's Middle East Policy many enemy troops as possible, as a source of concentrated on continental Europe. In the allies in the form of local revolts, and as a base most critical period of World War II, from for attacking Russia or blocking British access June 1940 until November 1942 (see Map 1), to the Suez Canal. Thus, the concept of a Hitler regarded the Middle East as a potential ―jihad made in Germany‖ again became battleground, but never as a field of a greater important. Yet Hitler, of course, did not expect engagement—a position that only a victory it to be needed. The region was to be reserved against Russia could have changed. In primarily for the Italians. The Germans and preparation, his Order Number 32 called for Japanese had only economic interests. Germany‘s plans in the Middle East to pave Accordingly, the Tripartite Treaty of Berlin the way for subsequent battles against the codified the areas of influence a year after British. There too he would inflict an World War II had begun. ―uncompromising war against the Jews.‖ After Germany started World War II in Furthermore, as he explained to the Grand September 1939, all three of the above Mufti of Jerusalem at the end of November scenarios played out. Hitler did not achieve an 1941, this relentless war would naturally agreement with London, and instead, a war include an active opposition to the Jewish against Great Britain commenced. Most national homeland in Palestine. Germany British-influenced countries, such as Egypt, would be ―willing to solve the Jewish problem broke off their relations with Berlin at the step by step and it would appeal at the proper beginning of World War II. Taking matters a time to non-European nations as well.‖29 The step further, they declared war on Germany current battle against the ―Judeo-Communist shortly before its end. Berlin then switched Empire in Europe‖ would decide the fate of from a secondary policy of Middle East peace the Arab world as well. He hoped that the to a primary policy of Middle East war. coming year would make it possible for Although this new policy was directed against Germany to thrust open the Caucasian gate to London, Berlin played no major role in the the Middle East, but his Blitzkrieg failed at the Middle East, as it had to take the Italian policy Stalingrad front in November 1942.30 That in the region into account. same month, General Erwin Rommel lost the In mid-1940, after the fall of France, the Battle of al-Alamayn, an attempt to reach the Middle East became more accessible for the Suez Canal. The Allied forces landed in Germans. However, Hitler showed no interest Morocco and Algeria, and Hitler‘s plan had in the French colonies.28 Again, he failed.

31 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) Wolfgang G. Schwanitz

Map 1. Mid-1940 and 1942, the most critical time for the Allied forces in the Middle East. (Source: New York Times, March 17, 1940. Copyright © 1940 by the New York Times. Reprinted with permission.)

Moreover, the Germans at first had had no German supporters. After Paris‘ fall, Max von foothold in the Middle Eastern door, except Oppenheim forwarded an adapted version of briefly after an anti-British development in his old jihad plan. The time had come, he Iraq (see Map 2). Rashid Ali al-Kailani wrote, to oppose England in the Middle East. launched a military coup in April 1941 in There entailed getting reliable news from the , and the Germans intervened by air region and inciting rebellion in Syria and in its at the beginning of May. However, by late neighboring countries. The main objectives May, the British forces prevailed, forcing the were to keep British troops there, to cut off the Iraqi premier and his followers to flee— British navy‘s oil supply, and to block Suez though Hitler had ordered limited support for Canal traffic. It was suggested that Dr. them. Rashid Ali al-Kailani—like Grand Grobba—in cooperation with influential Mufti Amin al-Husayni—ended up in exile in natives such as Shakib Arslan of Greater Berlin, and both spent the wartime there as Syria—was best suited to organize the guests of the German government. Both uprisings intended to weaken British positions conspired from there against the Allies (see in Egypt and India. It was also proposed that a Document 1 for the American evaluation). government under the leadership of Amin al- Through broadcasts to the Middle East, the Husayni be established in Palestine, and only Grand Mufti aided the Germans by declaring the Jews who had lived there before the First jihad against the Allies for which he found World War should be allowed to stay.31

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) 32 Germany's Middle East Policy

Map 2. Iraq, for a brief period—May 1941—a German foothold in the Middle Eastern door. German planes, presumably flying from the Nazis‘ newly acquired island bases in the Aegean Sea (1), were said to be arriving in Syria for action in Iraq. Many of Syria‘s military airdromes, the main ones shown on the map by airplane devices, were reported to already be under German control and thus subject to British attack. Nazi planes were declared to have landed around (2), where there were extensive oil fields, and north of Baghdad (3), the Iraqi capital. British bombers raided the railway near Baghdad, a small arms factory at Musayib in the same area, and barracks at Amarah in the neighborhood of the port of Basra (4). (Source: New York Times, May 16, 1941. Copyright © 1941 by the New York Times. Reprinted with permission.)

A more challenging and for the most part Germany. Yet some leading thinkers, among undesired development for Berlin in the them the Egyptian poet Tawfiq al-Hakim, Middle East began after the Italian dictator grasped it better. On the other hand, young asked his German counterpart to support his Egyptian officers, among them Gamal Abdel troops against the British in Libya. Thirty days Nasser and Anwar Sadat, placed their hopes of after ‘s32 request for help, ridding their country of the British on the German troops landed in Libya. A month later, Germans.33 It was not German racism or anti- General Rommel arrived, leading the newly Semitism that attracted them, but the thorough founded German Africa Corps into battles and fast modernization of Germany under the leading them close to Alexandria. Since the Nazi dictatorship. Arab nationalists originally Germans also occupied Crete, it appeared that admired the of Mussolini, and the Middle East would be the next major consequently also of Hitler, as an alternative battleground. However, Hitler had already to Anglo-Saxon democracy and as a ordered the attack against the USSR for late modernistic movement. Berlin used this June 1941. Its outcome spared the Jews in the tendency in a selfish and ultimately antihuman Middle East from the Holocaust and the region manner to create trouble for the Allied powers. from a terrible experience. Thus, Germany‘s Middle East policy Many Middle Easterners, like many resonated from radical Arab nationalists as Germans, did not recognize the nature of Nazi well. The Middle East again became simply a

33 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) Wolfgang G. Schwanitz means for German ―out-of-area‖ aims toward their disappointment accumulated, as did their Europe and America. As Middle Easterners potential for anti-Westernism. became aware of this nationalistic approach,

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) 34 Germany's Middle East Policy

35 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) Wolfgang G. Schwanitz

Document 1. An American evaluation of the Axis propaganda in the Muslim world in 1941.

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) 36 Germany's Middle East Policy

BERLIN'S PATTERNS AND Following its collapse, Berlin was willing to PROSPECTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST respect the national independence of former provinces of the empire. During World War II, Otto von Bismarck based Berlin‘s Germans favored the idea of a Greater Arabian secondary Middle East peace policy on three Empire or a federation associated with the free pillars: respecting the status quo, renouncing countries of the region, such as Saudi Arabia territorial claims, and mediating conflicts. The and Egypt. Of course they were to be allied most striking paradigm was the subordination with the . Clearly, Berlin would of this policy to the always primary policy not follow Rome‘s lead for long. On the toward Europe and America. contrary, it would end up dictating its junior Although the German policy toward the partner‘s policy toward the Middle East. Middle East was direct and active, especially After World War II, some politicians and in trade, commerce, and cultural exchange, it academics claimed that Berlin had lost its contained the same ranking of regional greatest chance for victory after the fall of priorities as did the primary policy. First came Paris, and had Hitler chosen the Middle East the Turkish heartland; then the countries under rather than Soviet Russia as the next big British or French influence, most notably battleground, he might well have succeeded in Greater Syria (bilad al-sham, including the fight against London. Although Winston Palestine and Lebanon); then the other French- Churchill supported this speculation in his influenced territories, especially Algeria and memoirs, Hitler‘s nature and the racism that Morocco; and finally the Russian Muslim characterized the Nazi system made such a lands in Central Asia. choice unlikely. The dictator was completely This order of priorities did not change oriented toward Eastern Europe and had during either world war. What changed was excluded the idea of German expansion in the Berlin‘s switch to a primary Middle East war Middle East from the beginning. policy directed against Great Britain, France, On the other hand, some officers in the and Russia. Even then the warfare was Foreign Office worked against Hitler. asymmetrical, weakening the enemies‘ According to the foremost German envoy to colonial hinterlands from within by incitement Arab countries, , they prevented to jihad. During World War I, the Ottoman Hitler from discovering the ―Middle Eastern sultan-caliph, the Shaykh of Islam, and a opportunity‖—if it at all existed—in the short Tunisian mufti promoted the concept, whereas period of the anti-British revolt in Iraq. It is no during the World War II, it was the exiled wonder that during his final days in his Iraqi prime minister and the Grand Mufti of bunker, Hitler talked about the failed Jerusalem who advanced this idea. In both agreement with London. If the senseless war cases, the result was a new mixture of critical against the British could have been avoided approaches to Europe‘s Middle Eastern even until early 1941, he said, America would empires and of nationalistic aspirations in the not have entered the war. The ―false great declining or former Ottoman Empire. powers,‖ France and Italy, he claimed, could During neither war did Berlin have an have dropped their untimely ―policy of explicit design for the Middle East nor any greatness.‖ That would have allowed the direct goals other than two unsuccessful Germans a ―bold policy of friendship with attempts to conquer the Suez Canal—once Islam.‖ Thus, without the war against the with the Ottomans from the East, the other British, Hitler reasoned further, London could time with the Italians from the West. Yet this have turned to the Empire, whereas Germany direct military involvement resulted from the could have concentrated on its real mission— goals of its coalition partners. the eradication of Bolshevism.34 Berlin‘s original aim in World War I was to This reasoning leads to another conclusion fight the European great powers and to about Berlin‘s Middle East policy. In wartime, maintain the Ottoman Empire‘s status quo. it became as ideologically oriented as it had

37 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) Wolfgang G. Schwanitz been secondary and commercially oriented security matters on relations with the United during peacetime. Its central goal became States and other third parties; and third, the supporting the war through the export of influence of this bilateral and regional policy certain ideologies. During World War I, this toward growing problems of changing meant the export of an Islamic revolution. multiple identities in Europe and the Middle Germans incited jihad in a subtler fashion East. during World War II. The Nazis added the Berlin‘s new primary Middle East policy deadly racism leading to the Holocaust in indicates a paradigmatic change from the Europe and the instigation of anti-Jewish traditional threefold secondary style sentiments in the Middle East. This aggravated (respecting the status quo, renouncing the Arab-Jewish dispute over Palestine. The territorial claims, and mediating conflicts) to a project of Jewish assimilation failed in Europe primary position. because of the mass extermination of Jews by This is an opportunity that also implies Germans. Thus, the question of Palestine took risk. Regionally, Berlin‘s Middle East peace on different implications in the region. policy will come under the influence of the The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Iraqi cultural patchwork that Europe is becoming. premier sent their envoys to visit a In the past, it was the East-West divide that concentration camp near Berlin, as a recently determined Germany‘s alignment. Now, discovered report by Dr. Fritz Grobba regional and even local factors related to indicates. On the other hand, there were also North-South conflicts play a larger role. Arabs among the prisoners in the Nazi Moreover, Berlin has taken into account its concentration camps. Thus, both leaders and growing minorities of Jews and Muslims in their entourages knew of the existence of such shaping its Middle East policy, leading to a camps and were able to anticipate their use in delicate balance of foreign and domestic the coming genocide. policy factors in this new period of After World War II, Middle East policy globalization.35 was not a high priority for the governments of Until recently, the trans-Atlantic the divided Germany. relationship was a fundamental pillar of essentially went along with the Berlin‘s foreign policy, yet it was dealt a blow and the Warsaw Pact, while during the Iraq crisis of 2003, when German followed the and NATO, politicians opposed the attack by a U.S. and subordinating German interests to those of British coalition. Whether Germany will their allies. For example, when Bonn follow NATO or the EU in the future and what recognized the State of Israel in the mid- role a common European defense and possible 1960s, ten Arab states severed diplomatic ties European military intervention force will play with West Germany, and most of them remain to be seen. Although Berlin seeks to recognized East Germany by the end of that reduce trans-Atlantic disturbances under the decade. Germany also had and continues to leadership of Chancellor , the cope with the burden of the Third Reich; its Middle East bears a great potential for policies regarding Israel have often been based conflicts among democracies. Beyond the on moral rather than political criteria. United States and Europe, Islamists look for a In reunified Germany, the country finally policy of playing countries such as Japan, has the opportunity to pursue a genuine Afghanistan, and India against China, , primary Middle East peace policy of its own. and Pakistan. The new hierarchy in Berlin‘s policymaking toward the Middle East seems first to be a *Wolfgang G. Schwanitz holds a Ph.D. in focus on truly bilateral or multilateral Middle Eastern studies and economics from questions that are framed regionally between Leipzig University, Germany. He has authored Central Europe and the Middle East; second, four and edited ten books on the comparitive the influence of bilateral or multilateral history and politics of relations between

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America, the Middle East, and Europe. He teaches world history at Rider University, New Außenpolitik von 1875/76 bis zur ―Entente Jersey. Professor Schwanitz is a visting Senior Cordiale‖ (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1991). Fellow at the GLORIA Center, Herzliya, 9 Imre Josef Demhardt, Deutsche Israel. His forthcoming book deals with the Kolonialgrenzen in Afrika (Hildesheim: German Islam policy, from empire to present. Georg Olms, 1997). 10 Carl Heinrich Becker, ―Ist der Islam eine NOTES Gefahr für unsere Kolonien?‖ in Carl- Heinrich Becker, Islamstudien, Vom 1 Updated and adapted from the author‘s Werden und Wesen der islamischen Welt introduction in Wolfgang G. Schwanitz (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967), pp. 156– (ed.), Germany and the Middle East, 1871- 86. 1945 (Princeton: Markus Wiener 11 Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, ―Djihad ‗Made in Publishers, 2004), p. 1-21. Germany‘: Der Streit um den Heiligen 2 Friedrich Scherer, Adler und Halbmond. Krieg (1914–1915),‖ Sozial.Geschichte, Bismarck und der Orient 1878-1890 Vol. 18, No. 2 (2003), pp. 7–34, (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2001); http://www.trafoberlin.de/pdf- Gregor Schöllgen, Das Zeitalter des dateien/Djihad%20Heiliger%20Krieg%201 Imperialismus (Munich: R. Oldenbourg , 914%20WGS.pdf. 2002); Gregor Schöllgen, Imperialismus 12 C. Snouck Hurgronje, ―The Holy War: und Gleichgewicht. Deutschland, England Made in Germany, 1915,‖ in Verspreide und die orientalische Frage (Munich: R. Geschriften (Bonn, Leipzig: Schroeder, Oldenbourg , 2000). 1923), Vol. 3, pp. 257–58; Carl Heinrich 3 On Prussians maintaining the status quo Becker, ―Die Kriegsdiskussion über den overseas, see Ulrich van der Heyden, Rote Heiligen Krieg,‖ in Islamstudien, pp. 281– Adler an Afrikas Küste, Die 304. brandenburgisch-preußische Kolonie 13 Martin Kröger, ―Max von Oppenheim—mit Großfriedrichsburg in Westafrika (Berlin: Eifer ein Fremder im Auswärtigen Dienst,‖ Selignow, 2001), pp. 14–15. in Gabriele Teichmann and Gisela Völger 4 See the author‘s overview of 1884–1914 in (eds.), Faszination Orient. Max von August Bebel, Die Muhammedanisch- Oppenheim, Forscher, Sammler, Diplomat Arabische Kulturperiode (Berlin: Edition (Köln: Dumont, 2001), pp. 106–39. Ost , 1999), pp. 173–83. 14 Ernst Jäckh, Der aufsteigende Halbmond 5 Horst Gründer, Geschichte der deutschen (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Kolonien (Paderborn: Ferdinand 1915); Ernst Wiesener, Adler, Doppelaar Schöningh, 1995). und Halbmond (: Hansa-Verlag, 6 Axel Fichtner, Die völker- und 1917); and Wilhelm van Kampen, Studien staatsrechtliche Stellung der deutschen zur deutschen Türkeipolitik in der Zeit Kolonialgesellschaften des 19. Wilhelms II (Kiel, 1968), Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, http://www.trafoberlin.de/pdf- 2002). dateien/KaiserbeitragSchwanitzWord.pdf. 7 Diktat Bismarcks, Bad Kissingen, June 15, 15 Archiv Sal. Oppenheim Jr. & Co., 1877, in Heinz Wolter, Otto von Bismarck, Oppenheim 25/10, Max Freiherr von Dokumente seines Lebens (Leipzig: Oppenheim, Denkschrift betreffend die Reclam, 1986), pp. 320–21. See also Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete Konrad Canis, Bismarcks Außenpolitik unserer Feinde (Berlin, 1914), (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2004). http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/ausl 8 Martin Kröger, ―Le bâton égyptien‖—Der andsinformationen/7_dokument_dok_pdf_5 ägyptische Knüppel, Die Rolle der 678_1.pdf. ―ägyptischen Frage‖ in der deutschen 16 Thomas L. Hughes, ―The German Mission

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to Afghanistan, 1915-16,‖ in Schwanitz 24 Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of (ed.), Germany and the Middle East, pp. the Sand: The Struggle for the Mastery in 25-63. the Middle East 1789–1923 (Cambridge: 17 Archiv Sal. Oppenheim, ibid., p. 136. See Harvard University Press, 1999). also Gottfried Hagen, Die Türkei im Ersten 25 Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, "Deutsche in Weltkrieg (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, Kairo über die Ägypter, Amerikaner, 1990); Tilman Lüdke, Jihad made in Briten, Franzosen, Russen, Japaner und Germany: Ottoman and German Juden (1919-1939)," in Wolfgang G. Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in Schwanitz (ed.), Araber, Juden, Deutsche the First World War, (Münster: Lit Verlag, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1994), pp. 63-85, 2001); Laurent Murawiec, Pandora's http://www.trafoberlin.de/pdf- Boxes: The Mind of Jihad, Vol. II dateien/Deutsche%20in%20Kairo%20Alex (Washington DC: Hudson Institute, 2007); andrien%201919%201939%20Berlin%201 Salvador Obernhaus, "Zum wilden 994%20WGS.pdf. Aufstande entflammen": Die deutsche 26 Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, "'The Jinnee and Ägyptenpolitik 1914 bis 1918 (Düsseldorf: the Magic Bottle': Fritz Grobba and the Dissertation, 2006, self published online). German Middle Eastern Policy 1900- 18 Donald McKale, War by Revolution, 1945," in Schwanitz (ed.), Araber, Juden, Germany and Great Britain in the Middle Deutsche see pp. 87-117, endnote 1, East in World War I (Kent: The Kent State http://www.trafoberlin.de/pdf- University Press, 1998). dateien/Fritz%20Grobba%20Germany%20 19 ―The Ottoman Jihad Fatwa of November Middle%20%20East.pdf. 11th, 1914,‖ in Rudolph Peters, Jihad in 27 Heinz Tillmann, Deutschlands Classical and Modern Islam (Princeton: Araberpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Berlin: Markus Wiener, 1996), pp. 55–57. See also Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, the author‘s article on Herbert M. Gutmann 1965); and Lukasz Hirscowicz, The Third and the fate of non-Muslims like Reich and the Arab East (Toronto: Armenians: Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, University of Toronto Press, 1966). http://www.trafoberlin.de/pdf- 28 Chantal Metzger, L’Empire colonial dateien/Gutmann%20Armenier%20Deutsc français dans la stratégie du Trosième he%20%20Orientbank.pdf. Reich (1936–1945) (Brussels: Peter Lang, 20 Shaykh Salih ash-Sharif al-Tunisi, Haqiqat 2002), Vols. 1, 2. al-Jihad, translated from by Karl E. 29 Political Archive of the Foreign Office, Schabinger, foreword by Martin Hartmann Film Role Nr. 61123, pp. 135-141, (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1915). See also Empfang des Großmufti durch den Führer Hugo Grothe, Deutschland, die Türkei und (Record of the Conversation between the der Islam (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1914). Führer and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem 21 Karl Emil Schabinger Freiherr von on November 28, 1941), Berlin 12/01/41, Schowingen, Weltgeschichtliche signed Grobba. Mosaiksplitter, Erlebnisse und 30 Ibid. Erinnerungen eines kaiserlichen 31 Political Archive of the Foreign Office, Dragomans (Baden-Baden, 1967). Nachlass Werner Otto von Hentig, Vol. 84, 22 Reichsarchiv (ed.), ―Jildirim,‖ Deutsche Memorandum Max von Oppenheims, July Streiter auf heiligem Boden (Berlin: 25, 1940, p. 7, Oldenburg I.O., 1925), p. 65. http://www.trafoberlin.de/pdf- 23 ―Secret French Report, 01.06.1916,‖ in dateien/Oppenheims%20Jihad%20Dokume Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan- nte%20WGS%20%20120207.pdf. Islam. Ideology and Organization (Oxford: 32 See also Manuela A. Williams, Mussolini's Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 102. Propaganda Abroad: Subversion in the

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Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935- G. Schwanitz, Deutsche in Nahost 1945– 1940 (London: Routledge 2006); Daniel 1965 (Frankfurt: Hänsel-Hohenhausen, Carpi, Between Mussolini and Hitler. The 1998), Vols. 1, 2; Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, Jews and the Italian Authorities in France ―Salami Tactics,‖ in Orient, Vol. 40, No. 4 and Tunesia (Hanover: Brandeis University (1999), pp. 597–630, Press, 1994). http://www.trafoberlin.de/pdf- 33 Anwar Sadat, ―Rommel at El-Alamain: An dateien/Deutsche%20Nahost%20Gesandte Egyptian View (1942),‖ in Bernard Lewis, %20und%20%20Quellenkritik%201999.pd (ed.), A Middle East Mosaic (New York: f; Wolfgang G. Schwanitz (ed.), Random House, 2000), pp. 314–16; see Deutschland und der Mittlere Osten im also for this period recently: René Kalten Krieg (Leipzig: Leipziger Wildangel, Zwischen Achse und Universitätsverlag, 2006), http://www.uni- Mandatsmacht: Palästina und der leipzig.de/comparativ/index.php?option=co Nationalsozialismus (Berlin: Klaus m_content&task=view&id=80&Itemid=29. Schwarz, 2007); Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Martin Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz: Das Dritte Reich, die Araber und Palästina (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006); Peter Wien, Iraqi : Authoritarian, Totalitarian, and Pro- Inclinations, 1932-1941 (London: Routledge, 2006); Jirhard Hub, Al-Arab fi al-Muhraqa an-Naziyya - Dhahaya Mansiyun? [Gerhard Höpp, The Arabs in Nazi Holocaust - Forgotton Victims?)(: Qadmus, 2006); Najda Fathi Safwa, Al-Alam al-Arabi fi Watha'iq Sirriyya Almaniyya [The Arab World in Secret Documents] (London: Al- Warraq 2006); Gerhard Höpp, Peter Wien, René Wildangel (eds.), Blind für die Geschichte? Arabische Begegnungen mit dem Nationalsozialismus (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2004). 34 Joachim C. Fest, Hitler, Eine Biographie (Berlin: Propyläen, 1997), p. 1011; see also Brigitte Hamann, Hitlers Wien (München: Piper, 2004). 35 Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, "'Gharbi, Sharqi, Ittihadi': Zur Geschichte der deutsch- ägyptischen Beziehungen 1945–1995,‖ in Ghazi Shanneik and Konrad Schliephake (eds.), Die Beziehungen zwischen der BRD und der AR Ägypten (Würzburg: Geographisches Institut , 2002), pp. 43–54, http://www.trafoberlin.de/pdf- dateien/Deutschland%20und%20Eagypten %20im%20Kalten%20Krieg.pdf; Wolfgang

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