DDC: 305.8 CHINESE INDONESIANS AND CHINA- RELATIONS: A JUXTAPOSITION OF IDENTITY AND POLITICS1 ORANG INDONESIA KETURUNAN TIONGHOA DAN HUBUNGAN INDONESIA-TIONGKOK: PENJAJARAN ANTARA IDENTITAS DAN POLITIK

Thung Ju Lan Research Center for Society and Cultute, Indonesian Institute of Sciences Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT In this paper, I would like to discuss various possibilities of Chinese Indonesian positions within the socio-political and cultural framework of Indonesian nationalism and contemporary globalism. As history has shown, the position of Chinese Indonesians is often determined by the interaction between China and Indonesia in the global context, and vice versa. The impact of 1965 tragic event -which is known as the Indonesian Communist Party’s failed coup d’etat- on Chinese Indonesians is the clearest example of such a loose position. Today we face the growing power of China globally which is followed by the strengthened bilateral relations between China and Indonesia in various fields. China’s “new diplomacy” has changed the way its neighbors view Beijing and Chinese diaspora communities which are previously known as “”. As part of a diasporic community, Chinese Indonesians might have to deal with what Nira Yuval Davies calls “multiscalar citizenship of transnational, national and local”, signifying a critical juncture between homeland, citizenship and residency. Keywords: Chinese Indonesians, China-Indonesia Relations, Identity and Politics ABSTRAK Tulisan ini membahas berbagai kemungkinan posisi etnik Tionghoa dalam kerangka sosial-politik dan kultural nasionalisme Indonesia dan globalisme kontemporer. Sebagaimana ditunjukkan oleh sejarah, posisi etnik Tionghoa di Indonesia seringkali ditentukan oleh interaksi antara Tiongkok dan Indonesia dalam konteks global. Dampak dari peristiwa tragis 1965, yang dikenal sebagai kudeta yang gagal dari Partai Komunis Indonesia, terhadap etnik Tionghoa merupakan contoh yang paling jelas dari posisi mereka yang tidak pasti tersebut. Hari ini kita menghadapi meningkatnya pengaruh Tiongkok secara global yang diikuti dengan menguatnya hubungan bilateral antara Tiongkok dan Indonesia di berbagai bidang. ‘Diplomasi baru’ Tiongkok telah mengubah cara negara-negara tetangganya memandang Beijing (Peking) dan komunitas-komunitas diaspora Cina yang sebelumnya dikenal sebagai ‘orang Cina yang tinggal di luar negeri’. Sebagai bagian dari komunitas diaspora, etnik Tionghoa di Indonesia harus berurusan dengan apa yang disebut Nira Yuval Davis sebagai “kewarganegaraan berbagai skala: transnasional, nasional, dan lokal”, yang menandakan suatu titik temu yang kritis antara tanah air, kewarganegaraan, dan tempat tinggal. Kata Kunci: Etnis Tionghoa, Hubungan Tiongkok-Indonesia, Identitas dan Politik.

1 The paper had been presented at the 6th International Symposium of Journal of Anthropology Indonesia “Post- Reformasi Indonesia: The challenges of social inequalities and inclusion”, Depok, 26-28 July 2016.

197 INTRODUCTION them. Firstly, at the global level, Chinese Indonesians could be seen as part of Chinese A Chinese has become adjective for many things; diaspora like Wang & Wang suggested. And, Chinese people, Chinese language, Chinese secondly, at the national level as part of the community, Chinese newspaper, Chinese school, Indonesian community which has established Chinese restaurant/food etc. By definition, a itself as a nation-state. In accordance to the topic Chinese is also a person who comes from China proposed above, in this paper, I would like to or whose family came from China. The term combine these two perspectives. But, before we Chinese Indonesians is not as well known as talk about Chinese Indonesians, I think it would “overseas Chinese” (huaqiao), i.e. Chinese be better if we first discuss Beijing’s policy toward who travelled across the sea and lived out of Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia. the country (China) in a foreign country. But, as Wang Ling-Chi & Wang Gungwu argued BEIJING AND CHINESE DIASPORA in their book, The Chinese Diaspora, Selected IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Essays, Volume 1 &2, the huaqiao term is part of the politicization of the ‘problem’ of overseas “Over time China’s overseas Chinese policy Chinese and “the Yellow Peril” (which refers [read: Beijing’s policy toward Chinese to a series of questions about the loyalty of the diaspora communities which consist of “PRC nationals who live abroad (huaqiao) Chinese abroad), even though in reality most and ethnic Chinese who have assimilated Chinese living outside China today “no longer into their host countries (huayi)] has evolved see themselves as sojourners, orphans, or patriotic to reflect changing migration patterns and Chinese nationalists whose welfare, sole future, favorable international conditions. The and final resting place is to be in China” (Wang, overseas Chinese have been both a problem Ling-Chi, 2003, ix; underline is added), and that and an instrument of China’s domestic and “many of them consistently denied any allegiance foreign policy agenda. The one constant to the government of China” (Wang, & Wang, in Beijing’s domestic agenda has been the 2003, vi; Preface, underline added). Moreover, need to attract foreign exchange—primarily through the overseas Chinese in the form of “Among the Chinese outside China today, remittance or investment. Moreover, there there are clear differences between those has been significant continuity in its foreign who have grown up in different countries policy and corresponding overseas Chinese or territories. For example, American-born policy. One of Beijing’s primary foreign Chinese see the world differently from new policy objectives has been to restore relations Chinese immigrants or Southeast Asian with its neighbors. Therefore, China sought remigrants of Chinese descent. Similarly, diplomatic relations with its Southeast Asian with the sizeable communities of settled neighbors and made efforts to solve the Chinese in Western Europe, in India, Korea overseas Chinese dual nationality problem. or Japan, in Fiji, Australia, New Zealand, Finally, China’s third and fourth generation Tahiti or Mauritius. The Chinese in these leaders have undertaken a more pragmatic, communities are different again from those sophisticated, and subtler foreign policy who have emigrated recently and directly approach to achieving Beijing’s ambitions. from Hong Kong, Taiwan or the People’s China’s “new diplomacy” is changing the Republic of China”. way its neighbors view the emerging power Clearly, the differences between Chinese and their overseas Chinese communities. communities in various places indicate a different Thus, the estimated 35 million overseas level of identification with the country where Chinese have become assets in connecting they are residing, i.e. their sense of belonging China to the outside world” (Zerba, 2008, or emotional attachment about feeling at home Abstract). outside their home country, which according to As indicated by Zerba, the PRC’s overseas Nira Yuval-Davis (2011, 3) should be differentiate Chinese policy is “a function of the overseas with the politics of belonging. In speaking about Chinese themselves—where they [live] and Chinese Indonesians, we should see them as a what they [are] capable of doing. Conversely, the different unity and identity from Chinese living capabilities and means of the overseas Chinese somewhere else, and that there are several themselves [are] a function of China’s prestige” perspectives that could be used to understand (Zebra, 2008, 61). It means that, for China,

198 │ Masyarakat Indonesia, Vol. 43 No.2, Desember 2017 China – overseas Chinese connection is an asset a pendulum-like, at a certain period they were that should be exploited for China’s benefits. pulled to China’s side, while at another period In the past Chinese government, as Zerba of time they should take side with the country pointed out, was “careful not to exploit or employ where they reside. In that position they are the overseas Chinese in the area of politics” always subjected to local governments’ suspicion (Zebra, 2008, 62), but since “China’s pragmatism and Chinese government’s strategic (political) is creating an environment amenable to overseas manipulation. Chinese political involvement”, overseas Chinese CHINESE INDONESIANS AND GLOBAL are now welcomed for their economic links to PERSPECTIVE China (Zebra). In her study, Amy Chang too indicated Beijing’s attempts, in last several The idea of Chinese everywhere as one community decades since 1989, “to highlight the economic is quite problematic, since this perspective ignores benefits of a relationship with China”, as well “the uniqueness, diversity, interests and welfare as “to exert strategic influence on the Chinese of Chinese [living outside China] experience in diaspora through soft-power inducements” (2013, each country and the different roles they play Executive Summary). She believed this policy in it” (Wang, Ling-chi, 2003, ix). According to adaptation of China was taken due to several Wang Gungwu, the thought that “once a Chinese, considerations; firstly, “historical animosity and always a Chinese” was shaped by “great fears distrust in Southeast Asia toward China” has among the leaders of nascent indigenous states in caused Beijing to create a favorable portray of Southeast Asia about the power of a nationalistic China in the region; and secondly, “most ethnic China appealing to the patriotism of the Chinese Chinese in Southeast Asia do not possess a bond [living outside China]” (Wang Gungwu, 2003, with China beyond purely economic interests 5), particularly since “Sun Yat Sen and his and thus do not want to risk losing political and Guomindang party had their origins among the economic privileges to serve China’s broader Chinese abroad and identified the huaqiao as interests” (Zebra). This is perhaps, as Zerba has one of the mainstays of the party” (WangWang observed, due to the fact that “in many cases Gungwu, 2003). Even though, the Communist they are still viewed with reserve and suspicion” Party were less dependent of the huaqiao, but (Zerba, 2008, 62). In his opinion, “It’s a catch-22 “their victory in 1949 aroused even greater fears for the overseas Chinese: while assisting China of Chinese expansion through the huaqiao in in its development and diplomatic relations the region and this became the backdrop against could improve their status at home, it may also which [‘overseas Chinese’] studies were written add to the perception that their loyalties lie in for several decades” (Wang Gungwu, 2003). China” (Zebra). Amy Chang’s own observation On March 1998, Wang Ling-Chi and his suggests that, “diaspora populations have become colleagues at the Asian American Studies important political actors that ‘influence both the Programme of the Department of Ethnic Studies, political processes of the country in which they University of California, Berkeley, initiated the reside and the relationship between their country first International Conference onLuodi-shenggen of residence and their country of origin’” (Chang, (growing roots where they land) in San Francisco. 2003, 1), and as such they now become a major The theme of that conference, luodi-shenggen factor in China’s foreign policy, at least “influence or “the planting of permanent roots in the its security calculus”. It should be noted that, soils of different countries”, is considered as by some estimates, the diaspora population has representing “a significant departure from two grown to more than 50 million, and about 32 existing paradigms or approaches to the treatment million out of the 50 million reside in Southeast and studies of the [‘overseas Chinese’]. These Asia (Chang, 2003). two paradigms, namely luo-ye-guigen (the In the political context of China-Chinese inevitability of return to China) and zancao-cugen Diaspora relations, we could see a precarious (the total elimination of racial identity and cultural position of Chinese overseas (Chinese Indonesians heritage) are now characterized as “chauvinistic, included), which in Jamie Mackie’s opinion2, is regressive and approaching the anachronistic”

2 He suggested the term when I met him in 1990s in Jamie Mackie died in 2011 (http://oa.anu.edu.au/obituary/ Australia to discuss the topic of Chinese Indonesians. mackie-james-austin-jamie-13754).

Orang Indonesia Keturunan Tionghoa...... (Thung Ju Lan) │ 199 (Wang, Ling-Chi, 2003, x). Luodi-shenggen is paternalistic protectors of the passive natives”, then associated with the word “diaspora”, which particularly around 1900 when the Dutch policy according to J.L. Heilbron, from the Greek took an ‘ethical direction’, that is “turned much word “dispersion”. At the beginning this word of its reforming zeal against these Chinese roles “diaspora” was used to refer to the Jews, because as tax farmers and distributors” (Reid, 2001, as explained by Heilbron, the word “exile” in 70). The expulsion of the Dutch from Indonesian Hebrew could be closely translated as diaspora, economic life in the 1950s and the takeover of the and it was associated with the history of many state by a new Indonesian intelligentsia, is seen by Jews were being forcibly removed to Babylon Reid as a starting point for competition between (Heilbron, 2003, xii). Nevertheless, the word the Chinese and a newly emerged indigenous diaspora carries the meaning of peoples “who entrepreneurial group. However, in the Sukarno after some generations in a new land, may become years, capitalism remained a dirty word which not only dispersed, but also assimilated in the was “associated with alien evil”, creating moral host country” (Heilbron, 2003). Heilbron sees constraints for the indigenous people to get serious the analogue between the overseas Chinese and into it. “[I]ts harsh and greedy edges sheeted the Jews, since the Chinese have “journeyed far home to Chinese” as much as they were blamed as traders, setting up communities and preserving on Jews (Reid, 2001, 73). Perhaps this image, as their customs abroad” (Heilbron, 2003). well as the situation of the global politics which Chinese Indonesians have long been part of was divided between Capitalist/Anti-Communist the life of the Indonesian society, starting from Blocs and Communist Blocs, had led to the two major migrations of Chinese people into 1965 tragic event that placed the Chinese in South-East Asia [including Indonesia] in the Indonesia as “a fifth column” (Coppel, 2008, late 13th and early 15th centuries (Llyod, 2001, 125) for the Communist China. In contrast, the 1), following the Admiral Cheng Ho’s seven opening to foreign investment and rapid economic ‘legendary’ journeys. Difficulties in maintaining growth under Soeharto gave unprecedented contact with faraway China has stimulated opportunities to Chinese Indonesians business, assimilation at the local level, but it was only in particularly those crony capitalists who had the mid-16th century, with the arrival of the Dutch already “involved in smuggling and other shady and the establishment of VOC, that the Chinese business” with Soeharto-related military units communities developed as “a stable feature of the before 1965 (Coppel, 2008, 75). Of course, the South-East Asian [and Indonesian] political and resentment of the Chinese on the part of the economic community” (Llyod, 2001). Although pribumi rose as a consequence, and it accumulated the first Chinese came as traders, but gradually till it exploded in the tragic event of May 1998; they have become “a dynamic and multifarious even though it was not so much outbreaks of community”. They helped to “maintain links anti-Chinese popular violence as “an outlet for between the harbour kingdoms of North Java diversionary scapegoating” as another way of and West and South-East Sumatera”, and by the attacking Soeharto regime. As Reid indicated, beginning of the 18th century, they had become the rise of a majority [indigenous] middle class, the “predominant commercial minority” in marks “the greatest danger for pariah or outsider South-East Asia [and in Indonesia] (Llyod, 2001, entrepreneurs”, particularly since the two still- 1-2). Since the Chinese played intermediary distinct middle classes are now competing directly roles between the Dutch colonials & Javanese over a shrinking pie (Coppel, 2008, 77). aristocrats and the masses, according to Anthony The combination between the Chinese’s Reid, many European colonials identified the global connection and Indonesia’s political and Chinese in South-East Asia [and in Indonesia] economic dynamics had continuosly placed with the category that had been developed for Chinese Indonesians in a vulnerable position Jews in Europa, namely ’outsider’ entrepreneurs as “racial, national or class enemies” that are (Llyod, 2001, 70), which according to Reid, was suspected to manipulate the global financial used to “shift the negative, disturbing features system that caused then 1997 economic crisis and of capitalism onto these minorities, making it depression in Indonesia (Reid, 2001,78). possible for Dutch colonials to see themselves (despite the evidence) rather in the role of

200 │ Masyarakat Indonesia, Vol. 43 No.2, Desember 2017 THE RISE OF CHINA AND INDONESIA & Irfa Puspita Sari (2010, 7), “the ethnic Chinese – CHINA’S STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP minority has been crucial in keeping [Indonesia and China] apart”, because “the apprehension The rising economic, political and military about the ethnic Chinese still exists”. power of China is commonly considered as “the most geopolitically significant events of Cooperation between Indonesia and China this century” (Chang, 2013, 1). In 2007 CSS after the resumption of diplomatic ties in 1990 (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich) in “remained limited to trade and investment” (pp. their CSS Analyses in Security Policy Vol 2 No 143), therefore, as observed by Rahul Mishra 8 acknowledged China as “the world’s second- & Irfa Puspita Sari, it becomes an astonishment largest national economy and third-largest trading when, power”, with the average growth rates of about “In a matter of just thirteen years, Indonesia- ten per cent for more than two decades (p. 1). China relations have improved beyond In military sector, China has underwent a rapid recognition. The Indonesian minister for modernization which transformed the People’s foreign affairs Marty Natalegawa opines Liberation Army into “a multifunctional, mobile, that China has become an important strategic smaller army with a personnel strength of about partner of Indonesia and developing a healthy relationship with China should be 2.3 million soldiers”, and this transformation one of the priorities for Indonesia. From the will enhance China’s capability for – initially then President Abdurrahman Wahid’s visit regional – power projection” (Chang, 2013). to China on 24 July 2000 until incumbent China too “is making increasing inroads into President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s, the center of Asia” by intensifying its bilateral there have been thirteen important high relations with Southeast Asian states (‘ASEAN+1’ official visits from both sides. Indonesian free trade zone was planned for the year 2010) presidents have visited China six times in and concluding partnerships with Russia, India these years, which demonstrates that China and Pakistan (China initiated the Shanghai figures prominently in Indonesia’s foreign Cooperation Organization, which includes Russia policy calculus” (2010, 3). as well as four Central Asian republics, as a The Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership forum for discussing security and trade issues) between Republic of Indonesia and the People’s (Chang, 2013, 2). At the global level, China is also Republic of China was signed on 25 April 2005 “striving to demonstrate its sense of great-power under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s responsibility” by providing “generous financial administration, while the 2010 – 2015 Plan of and technical support” towards the African Action for the Strategic Partnership between continent (Chang, 2013). the Government of the Republic of Indonesia For Indonesia, which had experienced the and the Government of the People’s Republic most troubled relationship with China until the of China was signed on 22 January 2010. The early 1990s, the rise of China, as suggested by partnership covers a bilateral cooperation in Rizal Sukma, “constitutes an issue that has various fields, namely Political, Defence, and captured the attention of foreign policy circles, Security; Economic and Development Coperation; the business community, defense planners, and Maritime, Aerospace, Science and Technology; as academia [of Indonesia]” (p. 139). Even though well as Social and Cultural Cooperation. Indonesia-China relations had begun to enter a new The improvement in Indonesia – China period of active re-engagement and cooperation bilateral cooperations is seen by Rizal Sukma since 1998, Indonesia’s policy towards China as a result of the changing attitudes in both “continues to reflect a degree of ambiguity”. countries, particularly in related to the 1998 On the one hand, “Indonesia genuinely sees the anti-Chinese riots. Both sides managed the issue benefits of having good relations with China well; the Chinese government, even though and begins to demonstrate increasing comfort “express[ed] its concern overn anti-Chinese in managing the bilateral relations with the riots in Indonesia”, seemed to “[recognize] the country”. On the other hand, however, “Indonesia sensitivity of the problem, and so “repeatedly remains uncertain and anxious regarding China’s maintained that the problem was Indonesia’s long-term role and intentions in the region” (pp. internal problem”, keeping a non-intervening 139-140). Moreover, as indicated by Rahul Mirsha policy. In this case, it was obvious that “both

Orang Indonesia Keturunan Tionghoa...... (Thung Ju Lan) │ 201 Jakarta and Beijing managed to prevent the of their loyalty to the nation” (2002, 15), but now issue of ethnic Chinese from complicating and it is the government which is the problem for undermining bilateral relations between the two Indonesian people “for its unpatriotric attitudes” countries”. Furthermore, Indonesian authorities (Ibid). Through the case of Falun Gong Incident too have realized the importance of this issue, in in 2011, he argues that “the ties therefore, they had “taken steps to bring ethnic between the two governments seem to be closer Chinese into the mainstream”. This, according to than the ties between the ethnic Chinese in Mirsha and Puspita Sari, has “created a positive Indonesia and China”. During the Falun Gong atmosphere between the two countries as both the march on March 7th, “police in plain clothes common man and the government of Indonesia attacked the crowd with helmets, including the could witness, for the first time in 50 years, a journalists”, so after the incident, journalists dehyphenation between the ethnic Chinese and in Surabaya reacted in protest, requesting the China!” (2010, 7). But, of course it would require Chief of the East Java Police to review the case. a further study to investigate how much this has Interestingly, the Police spokesperson said that changed the pendulum-like position of Chinese “the restrictions on the [Falun Gong] movement in Indonesians discussed above. Indonesia were.... upon the request of the Chinese 3 Greta Nabbs-Keller (2011, 32), on the other government through its envoy in Indonesia ; while hand, assigned this change to the Indonesia’s the Chinese vice consulate in Surabaya denied democratisation process at the domestic political it (p.5). The police comments that one of the context that “has engendered a strong degree reason of aggression came from the concern over of policy consensus on China and increasing bilateral relationship, whether or not the Chinese integration of Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese into the Embassy has requested, have raised a question mainstream”. She argued that “[a]s more and more of Indonesia’s political freedom as a sovereign indigenous Indonesians enter the middle classes nation state in the era of the Rise of China; or the issue of economic inequality is evolving from more specifically, how important is it to meet the one that carries a stigma for Chinese Indonesians political demands of China, especially with the to one that all Indonesian must face”. Also, use of force against the Indonesian citizens, or as she observed, now “there is little political how much influence does China have in changing benefit in inciting anti-Chinese sentiment”, in Indonesia’s internal governance rules? contrast to the New Order period. She provides Obviously, the changing situation at the an example of two issues that “failed to cause a global level with the rise of China has compelled stir in Indonesia”, namely the recinicization of Indonesia to adjust her foreign policy toward Indonesia’s Chinese through Indonesia’s official China. However, how much the shifting policy promotion of Indonesian Chinese culture in China of Indonesia toward China has influenced the in May 2011, where “more than 300 Indonesian position of Chinese Indonesians is difficult to Chinese participated in an Indonesian cultural determine, because at the global and Indonesia’s event in Fujian province, the ancestral homeland national context, the so-called Sinophobia remains of many of Indonesia’s Chinese, in an event an issue. As Johannes Nugroho in Today, June 11, aimed at “deepening old familial ties”, as well 2015 reported, as the Wikileaks cable lease concerning “senior “Following Chinese Vice-Premier Liu Chinese officials ‘sought to promote secular Islam Yandong’s official visit to Jakarta late last in Indonesia by encouraging interaction with China’s 20 million Muslims’”. This statement 3 Police’s explanation about “the request of the Chinese might not be totally valid if we consider the recent government” might have a realistic base if we consider developments known as 411 and 212. We will the Cambodia experience. In 2009, Cambodia repatriated to China 20 ethnic Uighur activists who were on China’s discuss it further below. wanted list for sedition. Before that, the Cambodian police Aizawa Nobuhiro also observed a significant had arrested two Falun Gong members, living there under change in what he called “the triangular the protection of the United Nations, and airlifted them to relationship between Indonesia, China and the China. According to Johannes Nugroho, those were a real example of “China’s habit of flexing its financial muscle Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia”. According to him, to bring about political compliance”(Nugroho, 2015). It during the Soeharto period, the ethnic Chinese should be noted that Cambodia is “a recipient of generous were positioned as “a suspicious group unknown financial aid from China”; it received “up to $700M yearly from China” (Reaksmey, 2014).

202 │ Masyarakat Indonesia, Vol. 43 No.2, Desember 2017 month, a number of ultra-nationalist and value of rupiah, or that the majority of Chinese hard-line Muslim news websites began migrant workers sent to Indonesia have military circulating ‘reports’ claiming that either postures, PRC citizens who come to Indonesia 10 or 30 million Chinese nationals would was provided with property rights over house and be admitted into Indonesia by 2020 under plantation (Redaksi eramuslim, 2016). a new agreement between Jakarta and Beijing. In what was clearly the start of A SIGNIFYING CULTURAL LINKAGE a scaremongering campaign, they also BETWEEN CHINESE INDONESIANS, predicted the end of economic sovereignty INDONESIA AND CHINA: “DIASPORIC, for ‘native’ Indonesians. These articles were widely shared by Indonesian netizens on TRANSNATIONAL AND (TRANS) social media, generating mostly Sinophobic LOCAL BELONGING” and anti-government responses. However, The precarious position of Chinese overseas the claim proved to be a hoax since the joint explained above, which is always ‘in-between’ communique by the Indonesian and Chinese governments stated that the ‘Indonesian China and their ‘host country’, indicates a struggle side expressed the hope that the number of they have in (re)constructing their diasporic tourists between the two countries in 2020 identity. On one hand, China and Chineseness would reach 10 million people’.Judging from as the signifying cultural linkage is subjectively the intensity of the comments on the social interpretative at the individual level. On the other media, it is difficult to avoid concluding that hand, the so-called ‘local’ have fixed and rigid anti-Chinese sentiments in the country are meanings because of its constructed political still widespread” (Nugroho, 2015, 1). boundaries. As a diasporic identity, Chinese As mentioned above, the recent development Indonesian reveals the juxtaposition of identity known as 411 and 212 might contradict both and politics of ‘transnational and (trans) local Nabbs-Keller and Nobuhiro’s observation of the belonging’. changing situation toward Chinese Indonesians; at In the post-modern context of globalization, least at the society level, anti-Chinese sentiments as Monika Swasti Winarnita had argued, an remain an issue. On 4 November 2016, hence 411, expression of political aspiration is “negotiated which was followed by 12 December 2016 or 212, by the community, host nation-state, and home more than a month after non-active Governor nation-state as transnational and translocal of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama known as engagement”, indicating “’intersectionality’”, Ahok delivered his speech at Kepulauan Seribu or what Nira Yuval Davies calls “’multiscalar (Seribu Isles)4 which mentioned Al Maidah citizenship’ of transnational, national and local” verse 515, a large mass of people had gathered (Winarnita, 2014, 85). In her article, Monika around Masjid Istiqlal and then Tugu Monas to talked about Chinese Indonesians living in Perth condemn Ahok as someone who have conducted who migrated to that country after the 1998 May a religious contempt. During the two episodes, the riots. Through observing the performance of FPI leader, Habib Rizieq Shihab, rose as its most an Ondel-Ondel doll dance by Perth-dwelling prominent star. Eventhough the protest episodes (predominantly Chinese) Indonesian-speaking run peacefully, especially on 2 December 2016, Catholic youth group and the [Indonesian] but in both episodes anti-Chinese sentiments were consulate’s xylophone ochestra, Monika proposed strongly provoked by the Habib, which to some that this group of Chinese Indonesians had extent almost created a riot on the first episode of successfully changed “the meaning of their 4 November 2016. One of the allegation the Habib ‘ethnic’ identity from an ‘alien non-indigenous voiced is that the People Republic of China (PRC) minority’ to a hybrid syncretic mix: a ‘Chinese will make Indonesia part of PRC in the near future Jakartan’” (p. 91). In that example, Chinese by indicating various unverified issues such as Indonesians might carry a “‘sense of place’”, or Chinese yuan will become the basis of currency what Deirde Mckay termed “a localized place- based subjectivity”, within themselves while they 4 Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok delivered his speech at are moving through space within the country or Kepulauan Seribu on 27 September 2016. outside the country (Winarnita, 2014, 91). This, 5 Ahok said that Al Maidah verse 51 was used to deceive in Monika’s opinion, refers to ‘translocal’; in Muslims so they will not choose non-Moslem as a (politi- which the ethnic body is, as argued by Anne Marie cal) leader.

Orang Indonesia Keturunan Tionghoa...... (Thung Ju Lan) │ 203 Fortier, “’inscribed by and becomes a signifier different countries, is a subjective journey of of place’” (p. 87). Interestingly, Indonesia, or each individual, Chinese Indonesians still have Jakarta, not China becomes ‘the place’. to deal with the question of political loyalty; they As we have discussed above, Chinese outside will always be seen as having luo-ye-guigen (the China, including Chinese Indonesians, is known inevitability of return to China) if they could not as Chinese diaspora; and they have been defined do zancao-cugen (the total elimination of racial as having several shared characteristics such identity and cultural heritage). How the Chinese as “dispersal, collective memory, alienation, Indonesians should deal with the enduring China idealisation and restoration of homeland, (PRC)-related anti-Chinese sentiments is another and ethno-communal consciousness” (p. 88). aspect of identity issue they must resolve; but it Collective memory of the homeland, in Lynn is not an easy thing to do, when their position Meskell’s term, is “the residues of the past” and is always a pendulum-like between China and “inescapable in daily life” (2002, 293). But she Indonesia. also believes that, “[i]ndividually, the past is CLOSING REMARKS memory - collectively, it is history”, and “[b] oth are constructs entangled with identity issues” Nationalism and globalism are always in a dynamic (Winarnita, 2014). It follows that, the concept relationship, and Chinese Indonesians’s subjective of transnational belonging, which is embedded narration is at the core of that relationship. Their within the Chinese diasporic identity, might stories does not only reflect a movement of provide Chinese living outside China with what people between places, but also their struggle Monika suggested as “a form of ‘ambiguous’ for becoming’locals’ under the compelling belonging” to ease the feeling of being dispersed forces of nationalism and the pulling influences and alienated, as well as to restore the collective of globalism. Identity politics is part of their memory of the homeland. Perhaps it is for that continuous struggle to belong. Indonesia-China reason that today we witness a paradigm shift relationship provides a stable context for identity among Chinese overseas (Chinese Indonesians (re)construction because of indistinctness included) from luo-ye-guigen (the inevitability between place of origin and place of residence as of return to China) and zancao-cugen (the a ‘preferred home’ for resettled immigrants like total elimination of racial identity and cultural the Chinese Indonesians. heritage) into luodi-shenggen or “the planting of permanent roots in the soils of different REFERENCE countries. Furthermore, since their expression Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. (2007),), of political aspiration is the outcomes of what “The Rise of China: Regional and Global Monika Swasti Winarnita (2014, 87) suggested Power Shifts”, CCS Analyses in Security as “an intercultural process signifying multiple Policy Vol.2 No.8, February, http://www.css. cultural identities” of Chinese, local, and ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/ Indonesian components, thus the multifaceted gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/ and fragmented nature of diasporic identities CSS-Analyses-8.pdf, accessed on February undoubtedly enables the related individuals 23, 2016). to emphasize both their ‘cultural traditions’ [Chinese values] and the ‘permanency of their Chang, Amy (2013).). “Beijing and the Chinese settlement in a host country’ [Indonesia]. The Diaspora in Southeast Asia: To Serve the suggestion seems to follow Helen Lee’s cautions People”, Executive Summary, The National that “transnational engagement is not only about Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special movement of people and intense engagement but Report 3 43. http://nbr.org/publications/ should also describe the ties that are highly valued specialreport/pdf/Preview/SR43_preview. by different diasporic communities” (Winarnita, pdf, accessed on February 15, 2016. 900, which signify a critical juncture between Coppel, Charles A. (2008).). “Anti-Chinese legal and cultural identities, or between homeland, Violence in Indonesia After Soeharto”, In citizenship and residency. Leo Suryadinata (editor), Ethnic Chinese Since diasporic identity, luodi-shenggen or in Contemporary Indonesia, : “the planting of permanent roots in the soils of

204 │ Masyarakat Indonesia, Vol. 43 No.2, Desember 2017 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. Reaksmey, Hul. (2014).). “Cambodia to Receive 117-136. up to $700M Yearly from China”, The Heilbron, J.L. (2003).). “in Diaspora”, in Wang, Cambodia Daily, November 10, 2014, Ling-Chi & Wang Gungwu (eds), 2003, https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/ Chinese Diaspora, Selected Essays, Volume cambodia-to-receive-up-to-700m-yearly- 1, Singapore: Eastern University Press, pp. from-china-71925/, accessed on March 8, xii-xv. 2016. Lloyd, Grayson J. (2001).). “Chinese Indonesians, Redaksi Eramuslim. (2016).). “Analisa Habib Unsettled Past, Uncertain Future”, in Rizieq Soal Bahaya Cina-Komunis”, Michael R. Godley & Grayson J. Lloyd (eds), eramuslim 23 December, https://www. Perspectives on the Chinese Indonesians, eramuslim.com/berita/analisa/analisa-habib- Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, pp. rizieq-soal-bahaya-cina-komunis.htm#. 1-19. WHYBZ9J961s, accessed on 11 January Meskell, Lynn (2002).). “The Intersections of 2017. Identity and Politics in Archaeology”, Reid, Anthony. (2001).). “’Outsider’ Status and in Annual Review of Antropology, 2002, Economic Success”, in Michael R. Godley 31:279-301, doi:10.1146/annurev. & Grayson J. Lloyd (eds.), Perspectives anthro.31.040402.085457. on the Chinese Indonesians, Adelaide: Mirsha, Rahul & Irfa Puspita Sari. (2010).). Crawford House Publishing, pp. 67-82. “Indonesia – China Relations: Challenges Sukma, Rizal, n.d., “Indonesia’s Response to and Opportunities”, IDSA issue Brief, http:// the Rise of China: Growing Comfort and mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ Uncertainties”, http://www.nids.go.jp/ ISN/136917/ipublicationdocument_ english/publication/joint_research/series4/ singledocument/ceee86ee-9465-4595-a07e- pdf/4-5.pdf, accessed on February 16, 2016. 4d26eb88f18d/en/IB_China-Indonesia.pdf. Wang, Ling-Chi. (2003).). “On Luodi-shenggen”, Nabbs-Keller, Greta. (2011).). “Growing in Wang, Ling-Chi & Wang Gungwu (eds), Convergence, Greater Consequence: The 2003, Chinese Diaspora, Selected Essays, Strategic Implications of Closer Indonesia Volume 1, Singapore: Eastern University - China Relations”, in Security Challenges, Press, pp. ix-xi. Vol. 7, No. 3 (Spring 2011), pp. 23-41, http:// Wang, Ling-Chi & Wang Gungwu ( 2003).). www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/ “Preface”, in Wang, Ling-Chi & Wang Documents/vol7no3Nabbs-Keller.pdf, Gungwu (eds), 2003, Chinese Diaspora, accessed on 16 February 2016. Selected Essays, Volume 1, Singapore: Nobuhiro, Aizawa. (2012).). “The Inverted Eastern University Press, pp.vi-viii. Chinese/China Problem in Indonesia: A Winarnita, Monika Swasti. (2014).). “’Performing’ Preliminary analysis on the 2011 Surabaya Chinese-Indonesian belonging: diasporic, Incident”, IDE Discussion Paper No. transnational, and (trans)local”, New 348, Institute of Developing Economies, Scholar: An International Journal of the JETRO, Japan, http://www.ide.go.jp/ Humanities, Creative Arts and Social English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/348. Sciences Volume 3 Number 1, 2014 | ISSN pdf, accessed on March 1, 2016. 1839-5333, www.newscholar.org.au, http:// Nugroho, Johannes. (2015).). “Sinophobia lurks www.academia.edu/6994357/Performing_ beneath the surface in Indonesia”, Today, Chinese-Indonesian_belonging_diasporic_ June 11, 2015, http://www.todayonline.com/ transnational_and_trans_local, accessed on chinaindia/china/sinophobia-lurks-beneath- February 28, 2016. surface-indonesia, accessed on March 8, Yuval-Davis, Nira, 2011, “Power, Intersectionality 2016. and the Politics of Belonging”, FREIA Working Paper Series No. 74, ISSN:0907-

Orang Indonesia Keturunan Tionghoa...... (Thung Ju Lan) │ 205 2179, http://vbn.aau.dk/files/58024503/ FREIA_wp_75.pdf, accessed on 22 July 2016 Zerba, Shaio H., 2008, “The PRC’s Overseas Chinese Policy”, thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, http://dtic.mil/ dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a483586.pdf, accessed on February 15, 2016.

206 │ Masyarakat Indonesia, Vol. 43 No.2, Desember 2017