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What China's Leadership Turmoil Means for the United States

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What China's Leadership Turmoil Means for the United States ISSUE BRIEF No. 3540 | MARCH 19, 2012 What China’s Leadership Turmoil Means for the United States Dean Cheng hile most sessions of China’s with access to high-level sources of ideological campaigns. Bo reput- WNational People’s Congress intelligence. edly sought to foster “red culture” (NPC) have been little-noticed by promoting Maoist quotes and affairs, the same will not be said The Ousted Leader. television programs that invoked of the 2012 session. As this year’s Bo was a “princeling,” refer- Mao-era programming. At the same session came to a close, outgoing ring to the privileged children of time, exploiting advances in social Premier Wen Jiabao warned of the senior civilian and military lead- media, Bo’s administration also sent potential for chaos and cited the ers. His father was Bo Yibo, one of “red text messages” to Chongqing’s Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976. A the core group of leaders that, with cell phone users.2 Public service day later, Chongqing Party Secretary Mao Zedong, created the People’s announcements on Chongqing tele- Bo Xilai, who had missed at least one Republic of China. After an extended vision reflect a similar tone, combin- session of the NPC, was ousted from period in Liaoning province, he even- ing exhortations for the Party and his position. tually became Party Secretary of populace to identify with each other The turmoil in China’s political suc- Chongqing, one of the five centrally with a slick format and impressive cession should temper expectations administered cities of China (the production values. for the U.S.–China relationship and equivalent of a province).1 During his Whether Bo was actually ideo- lessen the leverage the Administration five years in that position, Bo soon logically driven, however, is uncer- has allowed the Chinese by virtue became one of the most prominent tain. He was clearly ambitious, and of its extensive schedule of bilateral provincial-level leaders. there are reports that he was actively consultations. The story surrounding Bo’s rise was in large part because campaigning for a position on the Bo’s downfall is also an opportunity he seemed to pay attention to pub- CCP Politburo Standing Committee for the Administration to examine lic concerns. Bo gained significant (PSC). The nine members of the PSC, its policy on Chinese defectors so as notoriety for his anti-corruption led by the Party General Secretary to be prepared when it is presented campaigns, which not only broke up (currently Hu Jintao), are the core various gangs, but also addressed leadership of China, much more an issue that has steadily degraded so than the government offices of This paper, in its entirety, can be found at popular confidence in the Chinese Premier and State Councilor. Such http://report.heritage.org/ib3540 Communist Party (CCP). Similarly, reports, if accurate, would be unprec- Produced by the Asian Studies Center he pushed public housing in response edented in recent memory, as the The Heritage Foundation to growing public unhappiness with selection of PSC members is gener- 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002–4999 real estate speculation and skyrock- ally done behind closed doors. It is (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org eting housing prices. possible that Bo sought to leverage Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily One aspect of Bo’s populism that his populism to gain access to the reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill gained significant Western attention PSC, implying a popular backlash if before Congress. was his apparent interest in reviving he were denied one. ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3540 MARCH 19, 2012 Bo’s position suffered a crippling Great Leap Forward (1957–1960), should not refrain from decisions in blow in February, however, when his which led to one of the worst famines the U.S. national interest in favor of former police chief and lead anti-cor- of the 20th century, and the Cultural sustaining those meetings. ruption enforcer, Wang Lijun, appar- Revolution, China’s political system Develop additional China ently sought to defect at the U.S. has since pushed group leadership expertise. Lost in the debates about consulate in Chengdu. Precisely what and tended to shun the worst aspects defense spending cuts is the impor- happened remains unknown, but of cults of personality. tance of intelligence gathering and Wang left and was promptly seized by This is not to suggest, however, analysis. The U.S.–China relation- security agents. If Wang, a longtime that China is on the verge of demo- ship is far more complex than the associate of Bo’s dating back to his cratic reforms. Instead, there may U.S.–Soviet relationship of the Cold Liaoning days, was trying to defect, be no prospects for any significant War, encompassing not only mili- it would have seriously undermined reforms, political or economic. Given tary, but also economic interactions. Bo’s credibility and was a likely fac- the apparent uncertainties in the Consequently, there is a greater need tor in his subsequent downfall. political succession process, pro- for China expertise. Balancing the posing change before the August budget cannot come at the expense of Implications. Beidaihe conference (when the new intelligence capabilities and analysis; Such major developments—occur- leadership is expected to be final- indeed, there is a clear need for more ring in the midst of one of China’s ized) or even the fall Party Congress language-capable analysts. Rather most public political events—suggest (when the power transition formally than relying on the Chinese-funded that Chinese politics are in major occurs) would be politically danger- Confucius Institutes cropping up at turmoil. China is in the middle of a ous for key Chinese stakeholders. various U.S. universities, it should be major political transition as Party the U.S. government that is sponsor- General Secretary and President U.S. Policies ing Chinese studies. Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, and Need a Careful Eye. Reexamine U.S. policies other senior Chinese leaders step In light of this evolving situation, regarding defectors. When Wang aside, yet who will comprise the next American policymakers should: Lijun sought to defect to the United PSC remains unclear. As this is the Expect no major policy initia- States, he reportedly was not granted first transition without the guiding tives in the coming months. The asylum because it would have made hand of a revolutionary-era leader political instability that seems to Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit awk- (i.e., Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping), be roiling China suggests there is ward.3 If this is in fact the case, it was such uncertainty may reflect infight- neither interest in undertaking a terrible, shortsighted decision, for ing and issues of credibility and legit- major policy initiatives nor capac- Wang offered an enormous poten- imacy within the Chinese leadership ity to do so. In the past, what former tial wealth of information. Wang system. State Department Deputy Assistant would have had a thorough under- With so much uncertainty, Bo Secretary Randy Schriver has called standing of how the various security may well have calculated that he had “the tyranny of the calendar” has agencies, including the Ministry of an opportunity to insert himself effectively restrained the U.S. in Public Security, the Ministry of State into the top leadership circles, but areas such as arms sales to Taiwan, Security, and parts of the Chinese his efforts at populism, especially by with impending meetings trumping armed forces, interact—informa- invoking Mao, almost certainly ran certain policy decisions. At a time tion which is notoriously hard to afoul of China’s consensus-based when bilateral meetings will simply obtain. And Wang could have pro- leadership system. Traumatized by be a matter of marking time in the vided significant insights into not such ill-conceived schemes as the relationship, the Administration only Bo, but also other potential 1. The other centrally administered cities are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. 2. Malcolm Moore, “China Launches ‘Red Twitter,’” Daily Telegraph, December 15, 2010, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8203593/China-launches- Red-Twitter.html (March 16, 2012). 3. Ian Johnson and Jonathan Ansfield, “Scandal May Topple Party Official in China,” The New York Times, February 16, 2012, at http://www.nytimes. com/2012/02/17/world/asia/scandal-may-end-rise-of-bo-xilai-party-official-in-china.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2 (March 16, 2012). 2 ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3540 MARCH 19, 2012 members of the incoming PSC. There should be an investigation of exactly what happened after Wang entered the U.S. consulate, and steps should be taken to ensure that the admis- sion or rejection of such people is based on a broad concept of national interest and not narrow political considerations. —Dean Cheng is Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. 3.
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