Language Equality in Canada: a Delicate Balance
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A Rare View Into 1980S Top Court
A rare view into 1980s top court New book reveals frustrations, divisions among the judges on the Supreme Court By KIRK MAKIN JUSTICE REPORTER Thursday, December 4, 2003- Page A11 An unprecedented trove of memos by Supreme Court of Canada judges in the late 1980s reveals a highly pressured environment in which the court's first female judge threatened to quit while another judge was forced out after plunging into a state of depression. The internal memos -- quoted in a new book about former chief justice Brian Dickson -- provide a rare view into the inner workings of the country's top court, which showed itself to be badly divided at the time. The book portrays a weary bench, buried under a growing pile of complex cases and desperately worried about its eroding credibility. One faction complained bitterly about their colleagues' dithering and failure to come to grips with their responsibilities, according to memos seen for the first time by the authors of Brian Dickson: A Judge's Journey. The authors -- Mr. Justice Robert Sharpe of the Ontario Court of Appeal and University of Toronto law professor Kent Roach -- also interviewed many former judges and ex-clerks privy to the inner workings of the court at arguably the lowest point in its history. "The court was struggling with very difficult issues under very difficult circumstances at the time," Prof. Roach said yesterday. "It was a court that had an incredible amount on its plate and, in retrospect, we were well served by that court." The chief agitators were Mr. Justice Antonio Lamer and Madam Justice Bertha Wilson. -
Calgary Declaration Page 2 Freedom Flyer 33 June? 1998 Eec£6Ac We Get Fetters
THE OFFICIAL NEWSLETTER OF THE FREEDOM PARTY OF ONTARIO JUNE 1998 #33 Calgary Declaration Page 2 Freedom Flyer 33 June? 1998 eeC£6ac We get fetters ... Instead of bringing you our regular 'Openers' column this issue (which will return next issue), we thought we'd use this opportunity to let our readers do some of the talking, and to introduce you to a new regular feature of Freedom Flyer: Feedback. By no means exhaustive, the following selection of letters and e-mail represents a broad sampling of correspondence received by Freedom Pa~during the period January 1997 to May 1998. While many of these letters have already been personally responded to, others have not. Editorial responses, as they appear here, may be entirely new and/or edited versions of our original personal responses. To the greatest degree possible, original letters to Freedom Pa~ are left unedited, though there are exceptions with regard to length, structure and grammar (the latter applying particularly to e-mail and Usenet (news groups) correspondence). As always, we'd like to hear from you. Your comments, criticisms, suggestions, and occasional compliments are always welcomed. To contact Freedom Party, write: Box 2214, London, Ontario N6A 4E3, or fax us at (519) 681 -2857, or e-mail us at "feedback@freedomparty org". OJ NO DONATION up on freedom. To simply ignore the disastr· the text of Joe Armstrong's first-class ous consequences of drug prohibition and the speech to Kingston's Canadian Club. It's a Too bad you folks are still hung up on effect that such laws have on individual free· clarion call which, unfortunately, will not drugs! No donation. -
Federal Spending Power: Practices, Principles, Perspectives
Reflections on the Federal Spending Power: Practices, Principles, Perspectives Thomas J. Courchene IRPP Working Paper Series no. 2008-01 1470 Peel Suite 200 Montréal Québec H3A 1T1 514.985.2461 514.985.2559 fax www.irpp.org Reflections on the Federal Spending Power: Practices, Principles, Perspectives * Thomas J. Courchene ** I: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW1 The federal spending power (FSP) has returned to centre stage in public policy debates, in large part due to Stephen Harper’s call for “open federalism” replete with a commitment to respect the constitutional division of powers on the one hand and the subsequent Parliamentary proclamation that “the Québécois form a nation within a united Canada” on the other. Watts (1999,1) defines the spending power as “the power of Parliament to make payments to people, institutions or provincial governments for purposes on which Parliament does not necessarily have the power to legislate, for example, in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.” However, for the purposes of this paper the exercise of the federal spending power will be viewed more broadly and will encompass areas like federal regulation that can also affect the division of powers. In any event, the key issue here is that for Prime Minister Harper’s commitment to respect the constitutional division of powers to be credible it follows that the exercise of the federal spending power in selected areas must somehow be circumscribed. Not surprisingly, therefore, the October 2007 Speech from the Throne contained the following undertaking with respect to the narrower conception of the spending power: ...guided by our federalism of openness, our Government will introduce legislation to place formal limits on the use of the federal spending power for new shared-cost programs in areas of exclusive * This paper was prepared for the January 2008 symposium “Open Federalism and the Spending Power,” sponsored by Queen’s Law School and Queen’s Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. -
Monday, September 28, 1998
CANADA VOLUME 135 S NUMBER 127 S 1st SESSION S 36th PARLIAMENT OFFICIAL REPORT (HANSARD) Monday, September 28, 1998 Speaker: The Honourable Gilbert Parent CONTENTS (Table of Contents appears at back of this issue.) All parliamentary publications are available on the ``Parliamentary Internet Parlementaire'' at the following address: http://www.parl.gc.ca 8431 HOUSE OF COMMONS Monday, September 28, 1998 The House met at 11 a.m. how taxpayers feel on certain issues, for example, the credibility of political leaders in negotiating these types of deals. _______________ Even though it is taxpayer money that is used to find out what the taxpayers feel about particular situations, they are not being Prayers told. They are not being given the information. We have some _______________ serious problems with that. This is very reminiscent of what happened with Brian Mulroney in 1992 when the Tories refused to release the taxpayer-funded PRIVATE MEMBERS’ BUSINESS polls on Charlottetown. It begs the question of why this taxpayer money is being spent. Why are these polls being held back? Why D (1100 ) are we not being apprised of the situation? [English] It boils down to a few reasons. One of the things the government likes to say is that somehow this will taint federal-provincial CALGARY DECLARATION relations. That was decided in court by Judge Rothstein. I will get into the quotes in a minute. In that case there was a determination Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Ref.) moved: that the government did not have a legitimate case to deprive the That a Humble Address be presented to His Excellency praying that he will cause public of these documents. -
Constitutional Workarounds: Senate Reform and Other Examples
CONSTITUTIONAL WORKAROUNDS: SENATE REFORM AND OTHER EXAMPLES Robert E Hawkins* The process for amending Canada’s constitution is complex and difficult. As a result, “back door” routes for realizing change of a constitutional nature have been adopted. These “workarounds” include “formula shopping,” where amendment procedures requiring a lesser measure of provincial consent are adopted; ordinary legislation, where no provincial consent is sought at all; and hortatory declarations, where mere statements purport to define a government’s position with respect to particular constitutional issues. Workarounds in areas such as Senate reform, fixed date election laws, secession and clarity acts, and regional vetoes, along with declarations dealing with special status for Quebec, the federal spending power, and prorogation of Parliament, will be examined. Key to the constitutional validity of these workarounds is whether they bind the actions of relevant political actors, as opposed to being merely advisory or consultative. At stake is the interplay between two fundamental constitutional values: flexibility, which permits the constitution to adapt to changing societal realities; and federalism, which requires a meaningful degree of provincial consent for significant constitutional change. Il est difficile et complexe d’amender la constitution canadienne. C’est pourquoi, les modifications de nature constitutionnelle sont souvent effectuées par des moyens indirects. Ces “tactiques d’évitement” des difficultés constitutionnelles comprennent l’utilisation stratégique de procédures d’amendement qui requièrent un niveau d’appui provincial moindre; l’adoption de lois ordinaires, qui ne requièrent aucun appui provincial; et l’adoption par le Parlement de textes de nature déclaratoire, en vertu desquels le gouvernement tente de se positionner par rapport à un enjeu constitutionnel donné. -
The Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Role: an Historical Institutionalist Account
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE: AN HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST ACCOUNT by EMMETT MACFARLANE A thesis submitted to the Department of Political Studies in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada November, 2009 Copyright © Emmett Macfarlane, 2009 i Abstract This dissertation describes and analyzes the work of the Supreme Court of Canada, emphasizing its internal environment and processes, while situating the institution in its broader governmental and societal context. In addition, it offers an assessment of the behavioural and rational choice models of judicial decision making, which tend to portray judges as primarily motivated by their ideologically-based policy preferences. The dissertation adopts a historical institutionalist approach to demonstrate that judicial decision making is far more complex than is depicted by the dominant approaches within the political science literature. Drawing extensively on 28 research interviews with current and former justices, former law clerks and other staff members, the analysis traces the development of the Court into a full-fledged policy-making institution, particularly under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This analysis presents new empirical evidence regarding not only the various stages of the Court’s decision-making process but the justices’ views on a host of considerations ranging from questions of collegiality (how the justices should work together) to their involvement in controversial and complex social policy matters and their relationship with the other branches of government. These insights are important because they increase our understanding of how the Court operates as one of the country’s more important policy-making institutions. -
Chapter Sixteen
Ch a p t e r Si x t e e n National Unity Figure 16-1 Québec cartoonist Terry Mosher, also known as Aislin, drew this Figure 7-1cartoon In 1970, in 1990 Manitoba to show celebrated his opinion its 100th anniversary of enteringof the into way Confederation. constitutional As debates part of hadthat celebration, in 1971 a statueaffected (below) Canadian of Métis unity. leader Louis Riel was unveiled on the grounds of the Manitoba Legislature in Winnipeg. In the following years, controversies erupted over the statue; over Riel’s naked and contorted figure, and over the role Riel played in the time leading up to Manitoba’s entrance into Confederation and beyond. In 1995, the statue was removed from the grounds of the legislature to Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface and was replaced on the grounds of the legislature by another statue (left). The removal and replacement of the original statue caused a controversy of its own. Figure 16-2 In 1995, just days before Québec held a referendum on whether to separate from Canada, thousands of Canadians from across the country descended on Montréal to tell Québec that they wanted the province to stay united with Canada. image P7-39 460 CLUSTER 5 • Defining Contemporary Canada (1982 to present) • MHR How has the question of national unity influenced federalism, constitutional debate, and political change? To explore this essentialEssential question,Question, you you will will KEY TERMS • examine the issues,attempts events, to have and Québec people signthat theshaped Canadian the history ofConstitution -
Article De La Revue Juridique Thémis
ARTICLE DE LA REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS On peut se procurer ce numéro de la Revue juridique Thémis à l’adresse suivante : Les Éditions Thémis Faculté de droit, Université de Montréal C.P. 6128, Succ. Centre-Ville Montréal, Québec H3C 3J7 Téléphone : (514)343-6627 Télécopieur : (514)343-6779 Courriel : [email protected] © Éditions Thémis inc. Toute reproduction ou distribution interdite disponible à : www.themis.umontreal.ca Untitled 5/17/05 2:27 PM La Revue juridique Thémis / volume 28 - numéros 2 et 3 Jean Beetz as Judge and Colleague Hon. Gerald Le Dain, C.C., Q.C., LL.D.[1] I attempted to sum up my general impressions of Jean Beetz as a judge and a person in the necessarily brief tribute I was invited to prepare for the memorial ceremony in the Supreme Court of Canada on October 16, 1991. I take the liberty of quoting that tribute here because it serves as a convenient point of departure for the further things I propose to say about Jean Beetz as a judge and a colleague, with reference to his participation in some important constitutional cases. Its quotation here has perhaps the further merit of disclosing at the outset that, in addition to having great respect and admiration for Jean Beetz as a jurist, I was very fond of him as a person, although I do not think that has coloured my appreciation of his qualities as a judge and a colleague. On that occasion I said: As a judge Jean Beetz displayed not only an exceptionally powerful and penetrating intellect but also wisdom and intellectual integrity, qualities of judgment and character which do not invariably accompany superior intelligence. -
Schools, Signs, and Separation: Quebec Anglophones, Canadian Constitutional Politics, and International Language Rights
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy Volume 27 Number 3 Summer Article 4 May 2020 Schools, Signs, and Separation: Quebec Anglophones, Canadian Constitutional Politics, and International Language Rights William Green Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp Recommended Citation William Green, Schools, Signs, and Separation: Quebec Anglophones, Canadian Constitutional Politics, and International Language Rights, 27 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 449 (1999). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. SCHOOLS, SIGNS, AND SEPARATION: QUEBEC ANGLOPHONES, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE RIGHTS WILLIAM GREEN* I. INTRODUCTION Contemporary Canadian politics has been defined by Quebec's vi- sion of the province as a linguistically distinct society and by its 1980 and 1995 sovereignty referendums.' Quebec's rejection of Canada as a bilingual nation, embodied in the 1982 Charter of Rights and Free- doms, 2 and Canada's obsession with keeping Quebec in Canada have, however, left unexamined the impact of the province's language policies on its anglophone minority. In Quebec, the enactment of the Charter of the French Language 3 and the government's promotion of a French cul- ture have intruded upon the Canadian Charter freedom of its anglo- phones to conduct their business in English and their Canadian Char- ter right to have their children educated in English.4 In response, the * William Green, Professor of Government, Morehead State University; J.D., University of Kentucky, 1984; Ph.D., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1977; and M.A. -
The Politics of Asymmetrical Federalism: Reconsidering the Role and Responsibilities of Ottawa Author(S): Kathy L
Canadian Public Policy The Politics of Asymmetrical Federalism: Reconsidering the Role and Responsibilities of Ottawa Author(s): Kathy L. Brock Reviewed work(s): Source: Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Jun., 2008), pp. 143-161 Published by: University of Toronto Press on behalf of Canadian Public Policy Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25463605 . Accessed: 02/10/2012 16:46 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of Toronto Press and Canadian Public Policy are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques. http://www.jstor.org The Politics of Asymmetrical Federalism: Reconsidering the Role and Responsibilities of Ottawa Kathy L. Brock School of Policy Studies and Department of Political Studies Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario Dans cet article, je soutiens que, s'il est souhaitable et meme n6cessaire que les diverses composantes de toute federation concluent des arrangements asymetriques, au Canada, depuis plusieurs ann6es, les empifctements du gouvernement federal sur les competences des provinces ont graduellement suscite un r6flexe protecteur dans les provinces, et que cela a entrain^ une multiplication des ententes reconnaissant les differences provinciales. -
The Constitutional Legacy of Chief Justice Brian Dickson
Osgoode Hall Law Journal Volume 38 Issue 1 Volume 38, Number 1 (Spring 2000) Article 5 1-1-2000 The Constitutional Legacy of Chief Justice Brian Dickson Robert J. Sharpe Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Courts Commons Article This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Citation Information Sharpe, Robert J.. "The Constitutional Legacy of Chief Justice Brian Dickson." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 38.1 (2000) : 189-219. https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol38/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. The Constitutional Legacy of Chief Justice Brian Dickson Abstract Chief Justice Brian Dickson played a central role in the elaboration of the fundamental values of the Canadian Constitution. He took a balanced approach to federalism, favouring neither federal nor provincial claims and inviting cooperation through overlapping jurisdiction. Dickson transformed the rule of law from a background value to an operative constitutional principle. His judgments on the rights of minorities reflect a emarkabler empathy for the plight of the disadvantaged. Democracy informed all aspects of his constitutional thinking. Dickson rejected the contention that judicial review is anti- democratic, and his constitutional legacy reflects a sustained effort to harmonize all four fundament constitutional values. Keywords Dickson, R. G. Brian; Canada. Supreme Court; Constitutional law; Canada Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. -
Document on Québec's Positions on Constitutional And
TIMETABLE QUÉBEC'S POSITIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ISSUES FROM 1936 TO MARCH 2001 1864 Charlottetown and Québec 1948 The Fleur-de-lys flag officially Conferences for a project to becomes the flag of Québec. unite the British colonies of North America. 1949 Entry of Newfoundland into the Canadian federation. 1867 Birth of the Canadian federa- tion. The federation then had Abolition of appeals to the four provinces: Québec, Ontario, Judicial Committee of the Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Privy Council in London. 1870 The federal Parliament creates 1951 Constitutional amendment the Northwest Territories. regarding old-age pensions. Manitoba becomes the fifth 1954 Québec income tax. Canadian province. 1956 Report of the Royal Commis- 1871 British Columbia enters the sion of Inquiry on Constitu- Canadian federation. tional Problems (Tremblay 1873 Prince Edward Island enters Commission, Québec). the Canadian federation. 1964 Constitutional amendment 1875 Creation of the Supreme Court regarding old-age pensions of Canada by the federal and additional benefits. Parliament. 1965 Preliminary report of the Royal 1898 Creation of the Yukon Territory Commission on Bilingualism by the federal Parliament. and Biculturalism (Laurendeau- 1905 Alberta and Saskatchewan Dunton Commission, federal). becomes the eighth and the ninth Canadian provinces. 1966 Québec refuses to accept the procedure for constitutional 1914-1918 The First World War. amendment, thereafter re- 1926 The Balfour Declaration on ferred to as the “Fulton-Favreau the status of the Dominions of Formula.” the British Empire. 1967 Interprovincial “Confederation of 1931 Statute of Westminster: confir- Tomorrow” Conference, Toronto, mation of Canada’s accession November 27 to 30, 1967. to independence.