The Arms Industry's Role in Building a Military Europe
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Lobbying Warfare The arms industry’s role in building a military Europe September 2011 Introduction: dodgy deals or normal business? The activities of arms lobbyists only appear understanding of how legitimate democratic in the press on rare occasions, often associated decision making should work. This close with bribery, dubious export deals and cor- alliance between policy makers and industry rupt government officials. Such as the shady has also contributed to a worrying expansion German arms broker Karlheinz Schreiber, or of the EU’s defence and security structures in the former high-ranking civil servant in the terms of decision-making powers, staff and British Ministry of Defence, Julian Scopes, organisational capabilities, and to the overall who went on to become a top lobbyist for BAE militarisation of its foreign policy. This report Systems. Schreiber was sentenced to eight investigates the crucial role of big arms- years in prison for illegal payments related to producing corporations like EADS, Thales the sales of helicopters, planes and tanks to and BAE Systems in this process and exposes Canada, Thailand and Saudi Arabia by Ger- their symbiotic relationship with EU-decision man companies. Scopes was a key figure in the makers. A relationship that serves as the recent scandal concerning BAE’s alleged bribes foundation for the emerging military/security- for arms deals with Saudi Arabia, the Czech industrial complex in Europe. Republic and other countries1. While the public image of arms lobbyists is The name of the beast generally defined by such scandals, there is a more mundane side to their activities which Both Frank Slijper from the homeland security field2. Though is no less disturbing. This is not only true at Dutch Campaign Against Arms the emphasis is different, both a national level, where arms companies have Trade and Ben Hayes from authors converge in their criticism always had close ties with governments and Statewatch have highlighted of a militarised EU, captured by defence departments, but also at the Euro- the close relationship between corporate interests and man- pean level. The arms industry has become an the arms industry and European aged by a political elite which integral player in the European Union (EU), policy makers in their work. Frank sees industry as the only decisive where military issues have become increasingly Slijper described the worrying stakeholder. This report shifts the important. All the major arms companies have developments of EU military focus again, to explore in detail offices in Brussels, acting through a vast net- power and the influence of the the concrete networks of the mili- work of think tanks, clubs and informal circles, arms industry in 2005, cautiously tary/security-industrial complex and their industry association is frequently stating that the situation “could in Brussels. These networks are consulted by EU officials. Though arms indus- evoke the ‘military-industrial labelled here the “security and de- try lobbyists have long been active in Brussels complex’ term”1. A year later, fence community”, to emphasise due to the presence of NATO, the transforma- discussing the new “homeland the intimate relationships on a tion of the EU into a powerful player in foreign, security” industry and related EU personal level among the relevant defence and security policies – in part due to activities – Ben Hayes introduced actors from both industry and successful lobbying by the arms industry – has (and later developed) the term institutions. The terms “security” increased the city’s attraction for lobbyists. “security-industrial complex” to and “defence” are used, bear- denounce the ongoing militarisa- ing in mind that they are merely The companies’ activities, as far as they are tion of police forces, the erosion names given by this community covered in this report, are not illegal. Never- of barriers between internal to encompass their politics of theless, they give rise to serious questions and external security, and the paranoia, surveillance, arms build- about the EU policy-making process, with conjunction of the arms and IT up, intervention, and war. decisions made by a small elite of policy-mak- sectors in the supposedly civilian 2 Hayes, Ben (2006): Arming Big Brother. ers and industry representatives, effectively The EU’s Security Research Programme. hidden from public scrutiny. This system, Amsterdam: TNI / Statewatch, p. 3-4; Hayes, Ben (2009): Neoconopticon. which lacks transparency and public account- 1 Slijper, Frank (2005): The emerging The EU Security-Industrial Complex. EU Military-Industrial Complex. Arms ability, sits uncomfortably with the common Amsterdam: TNI / Statewatch, p. 8. industry lobbying in Brussels. Amsterdam: TNI / Dutch Campaign Against Arms 1 http://www.spiegel.de/thema/karlheinz_schreiber/; http:// Trade, p. 34. www.guardian.co.uk/world/bae Lobbying Warfare Introduction: dodgy deals or normal business? The arms industry’s role in building a military Europe | September 2011 1 I. An “alliance of the willing”: the security and defence community in Brussels “The defence industry, the defence markets are fundamental instru- ments in a European policy to give us greater independence and sover- eignty in defence […] and I repeat: you cannot have a common foreign policy unless you have a common security and defence policy” Antonio Tajani, Vice-President European Commission, responsible for Enterprise and Industry, May 20112. The common mindset behind the alliance which seeks to address this need, mentions A new partnership of industry and EU policy makers is founded long-range military transport aircraft, heli- for European in the belief that a strong European security copters, and global surveillance systems as Security? 4 and defence industry is a necessary basis for major priorities . Such a build-up has been re- Security and Defence Agenda a strong security and defence policy. This inforced by the Lisbon Treaty, adopted in 2007, in turn is seen as a prerequisite for a com- which contains a unique article, decreeing mon foreign policy. This point is frequently that “Member States shall undertake progres- emphasised by both industry representatives sively to improve their military capabilities”5. and policy makers, and companies lobbying The benefi t for the arms industry is clear: if in Brussels unanimously declared a “strong member states open up national arms markets European Defence and Security Policy” (ESDP) or even pool procurement, more units of each as their goal3. The security and defence com- weapon can be sold at once, increasing the munity in Brussels, which is largely fi nanced profi tability of weapons projects considerably. by industry, nurtures and spreads this belief With this in mind, the arms industry lobby is in a number of ways. This means that the active in discussions on the future direction infl uence of arms companies in shaping EU for the European Defence and Security Policy. policy is not confi ned to industrial policy, it also aff ects the EU’s broader position on the global stage. Aggressive power projection and a military rationale are reinforced as integral elements of the EU’s foreign policy. Industry’s motive is easy to see: the transi- tion from a traditional defence force to the newly required expeditionary armies, able to intervene outside EU territories, has to be ac- companied by a massive build-up of arms. The EU’s European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), 2 Speech at the “EC High Level Conference on Defence and 4 ECAP: http://www.eda.europa.eu/Strategies/Capabilities; Security Industries and Markets”, 23 May 2011 Priorities: http://www.eda.europa.eu/Capabilitiespriorities/ 3 See for example EADS: https://webgate.ec.europa. Top10priorities eu/transparency/regrin/consultation/displaylobbyist. 5 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) do?id=2732167674-76 §42 / 3. Lobbying Warfare I. An “alliance of the willing”: the security and defence community in Brussels The arms industry’s role in building a military Europe | September 2011 2 II. Why they fi ght: European champions in search for profi ts “Our industry needs to receive an adequate level of support for its long-term development and success. This means, in particular, that we should continue to attract signifi - cant EU funding for our research and technology activities […].” Domingo Ureña-Raso, President of the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), October 20106. not least to dramatic increases in German Polish military forces Two decades of cross-European mergers and arms exports (up by 96% from 2001-2005 to taking part in EU acquisitions have given rise to a small number 2006-2010 periods), the EU has surpassed the intervention in Chad, of powerful mega-corporations in the arms US and Russia as the world’s biggest arms March 2009 11 industry, though a more diverse corporate exporter . Thirty one (Western) European © Polish Ministry of National landscape still exists in some sectors such as companies are today among the 100 biggest Defence military shipbuilding. At the very top, the “Big arms manufacturers worldwide (see table 1) Four” (BAE Systems, EADS, Finmeccanica, and the sector’s profi tability is even higher and Thales) eff ectively dominate the Euro pean than comparable industrial corporations12. Nor market. Combined, they control two thirds of are companies such as EADS or Finmeccanica the European arms industry’s turnover, which solely dependent on the traditional military amounted to €88 billion in 20097. Not only market for tanks, fi ghter planes, and the like. are company structures highly concentrated They also build civil and military satellites, in Europe, but production sites and the major other spacecraft and have diversifi ed into the customers are also found together with the bulk new market for “homeland security” which of European production in just six countries: emerged in the wake of the terrorist attacks UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden8. in New York, Madrid and London.