Freeman Report
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
FREEMANFREEMAN RREPOREPORTT FROM THE FREEMAN CHAIR IN CHINA STUDIES | OCTOBER 2004 More In This Issue FEATURE ESSAY: The People’s Liberation Army Under Hu Jintao * PUBLICATIONS BY TAI MING CHEUNG “Wen’s Reforms: Following in the When Hu Jintao finally took over as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Central Footsteps of Zhu Rongji” by Military Commission (CMC) in September, one of his first activities as commander-in-chief was to Zhenzhen Chen watch a presentation on the military’s information command capabilities. The event symbolized “New National Strategy Provides In- one of Hu’s top priorities as he seeks to establish his authority among the military top brass: turning sight into China’s Rise” by Drew Th- the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into an information era high-technology war-fighting outfit ompson and Zhu Feng while ensuring it retains its Maoist political credentials. Complete list of Freeman Chair publi- Successfully achieving this goal will require Hu to allow military commanders wide-rang- cations in 2004 (cont pg 4) ing autonomy over professional military issues while keeping a close check on their political loyal- * FREEMAN FACTS ties and activities. Hu’s predecessor Jiang Zemin did an excellent job by giving the top brass gen- erous annual increases in defense budgets, and eagerly backing their efforts to restructure and China’s Foreign Oil Statistics downsize the armed forces, which shrunk by a quarter during his reign to 2.5 million troops. (cont. pg 5) Hu’s Military Credentials As a veteran party cadre dealing with organization and party youth affairs, Hu’s involve- ment in military affairs has been limited. His main experience has come from his tenure as a CMC Quotes Of The Month vice-chairman since 1999. He was given this post to prepare for his eventual succession over Jiang, but he appears to have spent little time or effort to acquaint himself with military affairs or to cul- "It is not enough to leave Taiwan tivate ties with military officers, to avoid being seen as encroaching on Jiang’s power base. Hu’s alone to face China's growing military activities were largely ceremonial, such as meeting foreign military dignitaries or accompanying threat. We hope countries in the Jiang on visits to military installations. Asian-Pacific region, the U.S., Japan, Korea, Philippines, Australia and New However, after becoming state president and party general secretary in 2003, Hu sought Zealand and Taiwan to set up a coop- to increase his military profile. In May 2003, he presided over a widely publicized Politburo meet- eration system to protect regional sta- ing that discussed the war in Iraq, and the current trends leading to revolutionary changes in the bility. It is also to keep the balance of nature of armed forces and war-fighting in the information era. Hu also assumed a prominent role power with China's People Liberation in overseeing the leadership’s response to the sinking of a Chinese navy Ming-class submarine in Army," ~ Taiwan's Deputy Minister of the same month. National Defence Michael Tsai speak- Hu’s first priority as commander-in-chief is to gain the confidence and loyalty of senior ing at a joint news conference of the generals in Beijing and around the country’s seven military regions. (cont. page 2) Defence and Foreign ministries and Mainland Affairs Council. Source: In The News Channel News Asia, Oct. 19, 2004 BEIJING On his third visit to China, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with President Hu (cont. pg 3) Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and parliament chair Wu Banguo to discuss matters relating to bi-lateral cooperation in trade and security as well as Russia’s bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, talks on energy supplies, in particular oil and gas, dominated the agenda with no conclusive agreements reached. Putin also visited Xi’an where he and Vice Premier Wu Yi co-chaired a symposium Trivia on regional cooperation between Chinese officials in five northwestern provinces and their Russian counterparts. What is the average wealth of China's richest 100 entrepreneurs in 2004? BEIJING French President Jacques Chirac's five-day state visit to China netted almost $5 billion (cont. pg 3) in business. A delegation of French companies inked more than 20 new deals with local Chinese partners, including a $1.5 billion rolling stock order for Alstom SA, a French engineering giant. French companies are trying to close the gap with European rivals Britain and Germany in exploiting China's vast markets. Chirac also pushed for stronger economic and political ties with China, saying the countries had an ob- ligation to balance U.S. global influence. Freeman Chair in China Studies ● Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW ● Washington, DC 20006 ● Phone: (202) 457-8719 ● Fax: (202) 457-8713 ● [email protected] Page 2 CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies When Jiang became CMC chairman in 1989, he spent much of his time in the first two to three years concentrating on military affairs and spending time with his top generals. After he became personally acquainted with the senior ranks of the top brass, Jiang moved to put in place a new generation of commanders whom he could trust. During his 15 years as CMC chairman, Jiang promoted nearly 80 officers to the top rank of 3-star general. Hu will need to follow in Jiang’s footsteps and speedily build up his nascent power base by choosing military officers that are loyal to him and placing them in key command slots. His first move was to promote Gen. Xu Caihou, the director of the PLA General Political Department, to CMC vice-chairman. Although Xu was originally loyal to Jiang, he has also spent a considerable amount of time accompanying Hu on his military activities and official travels around China in the past few years and as played a key role in ensuring the army’s political loyalties to the party. In his new position, Xu is likely to play a pivotal role in developing Hu’s power base among the top brass. Another general whom Hu is likely to rely upon is Gen. Liao Xilong, the director of the General Logistics Department. Liao was a deputy commander of the Chengdu Military Region in southwest China in the late 1980s when Hu served as the party secretary of Tibet. Hu had to depend on assistance from the Chengdu Military Region, whose responsibilities include Tibet, when he declared martial law in the autonomous region in 1988. Removing Jiang’s Military Power Base Hu will need to carefully but steadily dismantle Jiang Zemin’s extensive power base in the high command. The surprise decision not to elect Zeng Qinghong, Jiang’s right-hand political protégé, onto the CMC represents a major triumph for Hu, but Jiang still has a number of close aides in important military posts. They include Jia Tingan, the long-time head of Jiang’s private office, who is the director of the CMC General Office that controls the agenda for the commission’s meetings, and You Xigui, Jiang’s former bodyguard and the head of the Central Guard Bureau that provides security protection of the country’s political leadership. Although the rest of the senior military leadership has loyally served Jiang, they are primarily professional officers and can be expected to swiftly switch their allegiances to Hu. This includes CMC Vice-Chairman and Defence Minister Gen. Cao Gangchuan, who heads the military’s modernisation programs, and CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong. Consequently, no major reshuffle of the senior military leadership is expected until at least the next Party Congress in 2007, although there may be occasional changes in personnel. Balancing Economic Growth with Military Modernisation One of Hu’s most tricky challenges will be to find an appropriate balance between maintaining robust economic growth while devoting growing resources to supporting the accelerating pace of military modernization. Over the past few years, the importance of building a strong army has risen up the leadership’s priorities and the PLA is no longer at the bottom of the pecking order in the country’s Four Modernizations. This is because of mounting long-term challenges to China’s national security, such as over Taiwan and volatile Sino-U.S. relations, and the increasingly outdated state of much of the PLA’s military capabilities. Under Jiang, defense budgets grew by more than 10 percent annually and the PLA was able to import billions of dollars of advanced weapons systems from countries such as Russia. Hu will be expected to maintain this generous pace of funding to the top brass, especially as the PLA is in the midst of a major long-term re-equipment of its front-line arsenal. One early test of Hu’s willingness to politically back the financial demands of the top brass will be with the drafting of the 11th Five Year Plan, which is already well underway. The plan will set general targets for government financial and resource allocations for the rest of the decade and the PLA will expect to continue to receive double-digit increases to its defense budgets. As long as overall economic growth remains robust, Hu will be able to adequately satisfy the military’s budgetary demands. But if persisting economic overheating triggers a hard landing, the authorities might have to rein in defense spending and this could create headaches for Hu. Hu’s Views on China’s Strategic Posture and Military Modernisation Hu, like Jiang before him, will likely pay most of his attention as CMC chairman overseeing political issues centered on party- army relations and ensuring the continued political loyalty of the military rank and file.