by terrorists in Europe acquisition Firearms Firearms acquisition recommendations Project of SAFTE Research findings and policy by terrorists in Europe Research findings and Flemish Peace Institute policy recommendations Leuvenseweg 86 1000 Brussels of Project SAFTE tel. + 32 2 552 45 91 [email protected] Kevin Goris Kevin Nils Duquet www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu The Flemish Peace Institute was founded by decree of the Flemish Parliament as an independent institute for research on peace issues. The peace Institute conducts scientific research, documents relevant information sources, and informs and advises the Flemish Parliament and the public at large on questions of peace. Nils Duquet Co- funded by the Internal Security Fund of the European Union Kevin Goris Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE Nils Duquet Kevin Goris Co- funded by the Internal Security Fund of the European Union Colophon Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe. Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE ISBN 9789078864912 © Flemish Peace Institute, Brussels, 18 April 2018 Project SAFTE Project SAFTE is an international research project funded by the European Commission. SAFTE stands for ‘Studying the Acquisition of illicit Firearms by Terrorists in Europe’. The research was conducted by an international network of firearms experts. Project coordination: Flemish Peace Institute Project partners: SIPRI and Scuola Universitaria Superiore Sant’Anna. Country study teams: • Flemish Peace Institute • SIPRI • Scuola Universitaria Superiore Sant’Anna. • Arquebus Solutions • Bureau Bruinsma • Small Arms Survey Project SAFTE has received funding from DG Migration and Home Affairs of the European Commission under the call for proposals to support ‘Transnational initiatives to fight trafficking in drugs and firearms’ (HOME/2015/ISFP/AG/TDFX) of the Internal Security Fund (2014-2020). This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the author, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. Authors Nils Duquet, Kevin Goris Language review Alex Potter Layout Karakters, Ghent Print Artoos, Kampenhout Disclaimer While the Flemish Peace Institute has exercised the utmost care in the redaction of this report, it cannot be deemed or held liable for possible mistakes or oversights with regard to completeness. At the same time, the Institute shall not assume any form of liability for the use that a reader may make of this document. 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD 9 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 13 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 15 Executive summary 17 Introduction 25 1 EU policy to combat (terrorist access to) illicit firearms markets 33 1.1 EU counter-terrorism policy as driver of developing 34 European homeland security 1.1.1 Building on existing JHA agreements after 9/11 35 1.1.2 Counter-terrorism as a distinctive area of 38 EU governance after the Madrid and London attacks 1.1.3 Towards a ‘Security Union’ after the recent ISIS attacks 41 1.2 EU firearms policy development, 1991-2015 43 1.2.1 The 1991 Firearms Directive: balancing economic and 43 security interests 1.2.2 Actions to combat illegal firearms flows to and from third countries 46 1.2.3 Targeting the illegal use of and trade in firearms 48 within the EU 1.3 Recent firearms-terrorism policy nexus, 2015-2017 52 1.3.1 Increased policy focus on illicit firearms trafficking 52 after the 2015 terrorist attacks 1.3.2 Legislative initiatives 55 1.3.3 EU Action Plan against Illicit Trafficking in and Use of 57 Firearms and Explosives 1.4 Main actors in the EU fight against (terrorist access to) 59 illicit firearms markets 1.4.1 EU institutions 59 1.4.2 EU agencies 64 2 Illicit firearms markets in Europe 71 2.1 Obstacles to estimating the size of illicit firearms 73 markets in Europe 2.2 Demand for illicit firearms from criminals and gun 78 enthusiasts 6 2.2.1 Criminals 78 2.2.2 Gun enthusiasts 81 2.3 Supply mechanisms for illicit gun markets 82 2.3.1 Illicit production 82 2.3.2 Domestic procurement through diversion 85 2.3.3 Cross-border smuggling 104 2.4 Dynamics of illicit firearms markets 119 2.4.1 Traditional closed market 120 2.4.2 Increased availability of military-grade firearms 122 2.4.3 Cyclical nature of supply and demand 124 2.4.4 Prices 126 3 Terrorist access to firearms 129 3.1 Terrorists’ use of firearms in the EU 130 3.2 The acquisition of firearms: preference versus availability 132 3.3 Differences in acquisition methods between different types 135 of terrorist actors 3.3.1 Separatist groups 135 3.3.2 Religiously-inspired groups 137 3.3.3 Right-wing groups 139 3.3.4 Left-wing groups 141 3.3.5 Firearms linkages among different types of terrorist 142 networks 3.4 Access to criminal markets 143 3.4.1 Use of pre-existing criminal connections 145 3.4.2 Low-level criminality versus high-level organised crime 149 3.5 Firearms supply chains for criminal markets 151 3.6 Direct diversion from legal ownership 154 3.7 International linkages for firearms acquisition and training 156 4 Policy conclusions and recommendations 159 4.1 The need for a structural, comprehensive and proactive 160 approach 4.2 Improve the intelligence picture of illicit firearms trafficking 162 and gun crime 4.2.1 Data collection 162 4.2.2 Data sharing 165 4.2.3 National focal points 168 4.2.4 Strategic data analysis and research 169 7 4.3 Upgrade the regulatory and policy framework 171 4.3.1 Close the loopholes in EU and national firearms 172 legislation 4.3.2 Monitor the implementation of EU firearms legislation 174 4.3.3 Adopt firearms surrender programmes 175 4.3.4 Effectively penalise illicit firearms possession and 176 trafficking 4.3.5 Increase security cooperation with third countries 178 4.4 Optimise operational measures, capacities and cooperation 179 4.4.1 Increase operational capacities 181 4.4.2 Enhance national coordination 181 4.4.3 Enhance international cooperation 183 4.4.4 Closely monitor specific risks 184 9 FOREWORD Illicit firearms are a phenomenon that mostly elicit attention in times of crisis. Mass shootings or terrorist attacks involving firearms trigger a plethora of ques- tions, including questions regarding the provenance of the firearms that were used. Oftentimes, the firearms used by criminals and terrorists have been procured ille- gally. This implies that there is a market in illicit firearms where such goods circu- late under the radar. The existence of such a market triggers concern but it also speaks to our imagina- tion precisely because we know so little about it. Whether citizen, policy-maker or practitioner, we are all aware that there must be something like ‘an illicit firearms market’ out there. Yet few people, even specialists, can say in a decisive manner what such a market looks like in Europe, which dynamics characterise it or how it has evolved over time. Can we even speak of ‘a market’ or are we dealing with mul- tiple fragmented circuits each characterised by entirely different logics? This uncertainty is driven by the very nature of the phenomena, a covert market is by design hidden from the oversight of state authority. Yet it also has to do with the fact that attention to it tends to be event-driven, and thus misses a sound and struc- tural embedding in broader policy, intelligence or legal frameworks. A further con- sequence of this is that attempts to study and address illicit firearms markets, and terrorist access to them, have been mostly piecemeal and ad hoc. An overarching understanding of what we talk about when we talk about illicit firearms markets is missing. Our knowledge of the illicit market for firearms very much resembles the Udana parable of the blind men and the elephant: a group of blind men who have never encountered an elephant are asked to describe it based on their palpating of only one part of the creature. Based on this partial impression, they each describe an entirely different phenomenon (a thick snake, a tree trunk, a bumped wall, a fan). None can grasp the entire and true nature of the thing they are confronted with. Moreover, each one of them assumes his (partial) interpretation of reality to be the whole truth. 10 Similarly, with regards to illicit firearms markets in Europe, policy-makers, regula- tors and others, all have access to, and information about, at best, one part of the phenomenon. But they usually lack any kind of intelligible overview that would facilitate a better understanding of the entirety of the phenomenon they are con- fronted with. Only by piercing these bits of information together in a systematic way, can we arrive at a more comprehensive and reliable image. One example suffices to illustrate the extent to which we have to rely on partial and imprecise information when we seek to understand illicit firearms circulation in Europe: a recent study estimated that there are between 81.000 and 67.000.000 unregistered firearms circulating in the EU, between eighty one thousand and sixty seven million. This is the kind of margin that makes any kind of reliable analysis as well as fact-based policy-making entirely impossible. It illustrates the importance of generating comprehensive and precise data and of developing a common approach and framework of analysis. Today there is neither a reliable scientific estimate of the overall size of the illicit trade in firearms in Europe, who is involved in this trade, nor how they are involved in the trade.