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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School

2005 A Comparative Study of Changing Attitudes Among Young, Educated, Professional Urban Women in Morocco and Women of Moroccan Origin in France Dorish H. Gray

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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CHANGING ATTITUDES AMONG YOUNG,

EDUCATED, PROFESSIONAL AND URBAN WOMEN IN MOROCCO AND

WOMEN OF MOROCCAN ORIGIN IN FRANCE

DORIS H. GRAY

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Modern Languages and Linguistics In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded Fall Semester, 2005

Alec G. Hargreaves Professor Directing Dissertation

Peter Garretson Outside Committee Member

William Cloonan Committee Member

Zeina Schlenoff Committee Member

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

This dissertation is dedicated to my daughters Tunuka and Khadijah and has been written in constant memory of Lancy. It is also dedicated to my husband Kenneth, my most trusted companion. I wish to offer this work to my parents Karl Heinz and Elfriede Herr and my mother- in-law Melvia Knuckles Gray. Their untiring desire to understand a world that has changed so much during their lifetimes has been an inspiration to me.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Alec G. Hargreaves, for his support in bringing this project to fruition. His piercing insights, relentless pursuit of excellence and the generous giving of his time have allowed this research to be completed within the time frame set out at the beginning. My committee members, Dr. William Cloonan, Dr. Zeina Schlenoff and Dr. Peter Garretson have also contributed to the success of this project.

A scholarship from the Winthrop-King Institute enabled me to carry out my fieldwork in Morocco and France.

In Morocco, I am grateful to Abdellah Benlahmidi who explained to me the intricacies of the Moroccan Personal Status Code. In France, Mona Hakim offered insights based on her expertise as an ethno-psychologist. Above all, I am indebted to the women who opened their hearts and minds - and often the doors to their homes - and shared with great sincerity their ideas, hopes and agonies. Without their willingness to cooperate, this project would not have been possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ...... Page vii Abstract ...... Page ix

INTRODUCTION ...... Page 1

1. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ...... Page 13

Conceptions of Islam ...... Page 14 Family Law- Personal Status Code and the Role of Women...... Page 31 The Debate over the Muslim headscarf in France ...... Page 44 Personal and Professional Goals and Challenges ...... Page 53

2. METHODLOGY ...... Page 59

Guiding Themes...... Page 59 Data Collection ...... Page 61 The Samples ...... Page 63 Interview Topics ...... Page 66 Questionnaire Development and Pilot Interviews ...... Page 69 Research design – Protocol if Interview Schedule ...... Page 72 Language ...... Page 79 Data Collection ...... Page 80 Data Analysis...... Page 82 Conclusion ...... Page 84

3. PRESENTATION OF DATA AND ANALYSIS: CORE BIOGRAPHICAL FEATURES...... Page 106

Conclusion ...... Page 132

4. PRESENTATION OF DATA AND ANALYSIS: CONCEPTIONS OF ISLAM ...... Page 106

Conclusion ...... Page 132

5. PRESENTATION OF DATA AND ANALYSIS: LEAGAL CHANGES - THE PERSONAL STATUS CODE IN MOROCCO AND THE BAND ON WEARING OVERT RELIGIOUS INSIGNIA IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

IN FRANCE ...... Page 135

Conclusion ...... Page 136

6. PRESENTATION OF DATA AND ANALYSIS: PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL GOALS AND CHALLENGES..... Page 165

Conclusion ...... Page 193

7. CONCLUSIONS...... Page 194

APPENDICES

A Questionnaire ...... Page 205 B Discours Royal sur la reforme de la moudawana ...... Page 211 C Projet de Code de la famille...... Page 217 D Loi encadrant, en application du principe du laïcité...... Page 219 E Décrets, arêtes, circulaires, Ministère de l’éducation...... Page 222 F Human Subjects Committee Approval Memorandum...... Page 229

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A Unpublished Core Data Interviews...... Page 230 B Printed Sources...... Page 232

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... Page 256

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Age of Respondents ...... Page 85

Table 3.2: Marital Status of Respondents ...... Page 86

Table 3.3: Number of Respondents with Children ...... Page 87

Table 3.4: Living Situation of Respondents ...... Page 88

Table 3.5: Self-Description of Respondents...... … Page 92

Table 3.6: Attitudes concerning Relocation of Respondents in France...... Page 95

Table 3.7: Desired Location of Permanent Residence ...... Page 97

Table 3.8: Family Ties to Morocco of Respondents in France...... Page 98

Table 3.9: Understanding of Moroccan Languages...... Page 98

Table 3.10: Desire to move abroad among Moroccan Respondents ...... Page 100

Table 3.11: Visits to France of Respondents in Morocco...... Page 102

Table 3.12: Visits to other countries of respondents in Morocco...... Page 102

Table 3.13: Family Ties to France of Respondents in Morocco...... Page 103

Table 4.1: Muslim by Birth of by Choice...... Page 108

Table 4.2: Number of Respondents of read the Qu’ran...... Page 111

Table 4.3: Number of Respondents who can recite the Qu’ran...... Page 114

Table 4.4: Number of Respondents who fast during Ramadan ...... Page 116

Table 4.5: Number of Respondents who observe Daily Prayers ...... Page 118

Table 4.6: Evolving Understanding of Islam...... Page 120

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Table 5.1: Personal Status Code reform based on the Qu’ran...... Page 138

Table 5.2: Number of Respondents with Experience of PSC...... Page 148

Table 5.3: Number of Respondents whose Mother wears the hijab...... Page 153

Table 5.4: Number of respondents who wear the hijab...... Page 155

Table 5.5: Number of Respondents in favor of Ban on “overt” religious insignia...... Page 156

Table 5.6: Number of Respondents in Favor of Standardized Family Law ...... Page 162

Table 6.1: Number of Respondents in Favor of Women in High Positions ...... Page 166

Table 6.2: Number of respondents who think their Opinions matter ...... Page 167

Table 6.3: Number of respondents in Favor of Government Intervention ...... Page 170

Table 6.4: Sufficiency of Professional Opportunities...... Page 173

Table 6.5: Sufficiency of Professional Opportunities of Men and Women...... Page 176

Table 6.6: Number of Respondents in Favor of living alone...... Page 179

Table 6.7: Number of Respondents who consider marriage essential...... Page 182

Table 6.8: Number of Respondents who consider it possible to marry a non-Muslim...... Page 182

Table 6.9: Number of Respondents with non-Muslim Friends ...... Page 190

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ABSTRACT

This is a comparative study of young, educated, professional and urban women in Morocco and women of Moroccan origin in France. It is a qualitative study examining attitudinal changes and discerning cultural trends based on in-depth interviews with samples in Morocco and in France. The purpose of the comparison is to determine the extent of similarities and differences in attitudes among the samples. The interview schedule focused on three themes: Conceptions of Islam, Legal Changes in Morocco and in France that impact in Muslim women, i.e the Personal Status Code (moudawana) reform in Morocco and the ban on wearing “overt” religious insignia in public schools in France, and Personal and Professional Goals and Challenges. The Data Analysis showed that the greatest similarities occurred among samples and the greatest differences appear within each sample. This indicates that young, educated, professional and urban women in Morocco and women of Moroccan origin in France share significant values. Their conceptions of Islam are marked by a desire for personal interpretation, individual application and a reading of the Qu’ran that emphasize equality between men and women. Religion and spirituality was described as an important aspect of their sense of self. Attitudes towards legal changes were marked by support for changes that lead to greater empowerment while being critical of laws that restrict personal freedoms. Questions about personal and professional goals and challenges revealed that both samples experienced great difficulty in striking a balance between professional ambition and personal aspirations for marriage and family. The large proportion of unmarried women in their late twenties and early thirties in both samples indicates a strong desire for self-realization and determination at the cost of early marriage or marriage altogether. The similarities in attitudes can be attributed in large parts to high levels of education in both samples and exposure to global trends.

INTRODUCTION

In this dissertation, I set out to compare young, educated, professional, urban Moroccan women and young, educated, professional women of Moroccan origin in France. The purpose of this study is to ascertain similarities and differences with regards to attitudes toward Islam, legal changes affecting women in both countries, and personal and professional goals and challenges. The dissertation is based on in-depth interviews which I conducted in Morocco and in France. It offers a new, comparative look at population groups from countries that to date have not been compared in this way. This research examines the ways in which social changes have been interpreted by my respondents and thereby straddles the boundaries of cultural studies and social sciences. France and Morocco both border the Mediterranean basin. In the course of history, cultures from both spaces have ebbed and flowed and landed on each other’s shores, moving further and further inland. Today, both countries are grappling with issues of cultural and social change. France is attempting to come to terms with the fact that Islamic religion and culture are becoming part of her national fabric, while Morocco is seeking to accommodate reforms that grant women more rights. Currently, three million Moroccan nationals, i.e. ten per cent of the population, reside abroad. 86 % of these Moroccan expatriates live in countries of the European Union, the majority in France.1 Thus, cultural and societal changes within Morocco and in France reverberate in both countries.

Often having been ignored as agents of change, women are in fact an integral part of a shift in cultural values in both Morocco and France. The 2003 Arab Human

1 According to Jeune Afrique l’intelligent, no. 2003, 27 février au 5 mars 2005, p. 49, 86 % of Moroccan expatriates live in countries of the European Union, 9% in the Arab world and 5 % in the United States and Canada.

Development Report published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) identifies the following main tasks in promoting human development: “Building, using and liberating the capabilities of the Arab people by advancing knowledge, freedom and women’s empowerment.” The Report, produced jointly with the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, offers an assessment and lays out a plan of action that emphasizes the role of women in national development. The Report states that because their rights to “self-determination have been grossly violated” in predominantly Muslim and Arab nations, women’s contribution has been underutilized and undervalued (UNDP, 2003: III). The UN Report, compiled on the basis of data collected by hundreds of scholars, offers a comprehensive assessment of the situation of the peoples in various parts of the Arab world, and Arab women in particular. The report asserts: “Knowledge is one of the key instruments of human development, be it in instituting good governance, guaranteeing health, producing the ingredients of material and moral welfare, or promoting economic growth” (ibid.: VI). Because knowledge is a key ingredient in the development of an individual as well as the nation, an advanced level of education was a key factor in selecting women for this study. Higher levels of education enable individuals to evaluate their own culture and traditions more critically and can open the door to personal and professional advancement as well as active participation in the public sphere. Globalization is another factor influencing women’s understanding of their religion, culture and their personal and professional aspirations. The field of Cultural Studies has addressed issues of globalization. Writes Simon During (1999):

Globalization has both undermined the autonomy of nation states and reduced state intervention in society and the economy – sometimes as a cause, other times as an excuse. It has also drastically transformed and punctured the old metropolitan/colony, center/periphery, north/south divisions, enabling new regions to invent themselves alongside new cosmopolitanisms, elite and popular. Because it unifies the world and divides it, the problem of how to evaluate the consequences of globalization or transnationalism has become a central cultural studies issue. (24)

Though this dissertation does not set out to study directly the impact of globalization, it is important to recognize that shifts in attitudes do not occur in a vacuum but are part of larger changes. Inasmuch as the perceptions of Muslims in France are influenced by exposure and immersion in secular, French society with a Judeo-Christian heritage, the presence of millions of Muslims2 within the hexagon will in time leave its mark on mainstream French society as well. Separated from the southern tip of Spain by only nine miles at the Straits of Gibraltar, Morocco has deep historic ties with Europe and changes in that country occur as a result of pressures from within as much as from without. The close geographical proximity of the Maghreb and Europe and their historical relationship, coupled with the fact that a significant number of families have members on both sides of the Mediterranean, allows for cross-fertilization of ideas, views and perceptions that influence and shape societies in both cultural spheres. Globalization offers easy access to French media in Morocco and Moroccan media in France; via the Internet people in both countries can connect with the same virtual communities, transcending geographical boundaries. The target populations of my research in both countries are exposed to similar trends, fashions, music, movies as well as news and public discourse. As a result, young, educated, professional and urban women in North Africa and Western Europe are breaking with traditions, are rethinking their roles, private and public, and are exploring new ground. These changes on the individual level go hand in glove with larger cultural and societal changes in both countries. In modern times, rights and freedoms for the majority population have been achieved by expanding rights and freedoms of minorities. Young, educated, professional, urban women in Morocco and women of Moroccan origin in France are minorities who are breaking with conventional roles assigned to them and are asserting their right to determine their own personal and professional roles.

Nevertheless, the life experiences of women in Morocco and those of women of Moroccan origin in France differ significantly. They are not exposed to the same national contexts and are instead confronted with country-specific sets of circumstances. There are

2 The Muslim population in France is estimated at close to 10% of a total population of 61 million.

different social norms in matters such as, for example, relative gender equality in France versus explicit gender inequality in Morocco, near absolute monarchy in one versus democracy in the other, an Islamic state in Morocco versus a secular state in France. Morocco is an Islamic state that knows no separation of the religious from the secular. This North African kingdom has a highly hierarchical, authoritarian structure. However, the traditional, patriarchal nature of the society is in a state of flux, the previously ascribed role of women is changing and women are in the process of re- negotiating their private and public roles. Recent major legal changes in Morocco allow for a new understanding of the place of women in this Islamic state. France, a democratic country that guarantees basic liberties for its citizens, offers women of immigrant origins an opportunity to forge a new sense of personal and collective identity. Most women of Moroccan origin in France who contributed to this research described themselves as “culturally French and religiously Muslims.” The microcosm of France encapsulates the newly exacerbated, worldwide tensions between the Islamic and the Western worlds. Of critical importance are the real and perceived conflicts between Islam, Judeo-Christian values and those espoused by secular society. New legislation in France has restricted certain practices of Muslim women in this Western country. Currently, Muslims constitute the single-largest immigrant minority in France and pose the greatest challenge in terms of identity, social cohesion and economic parity. Of critical importance is the extent to which the French government and dominant French society at large can bring minorities into the mainstream. Should they remain an underprivileged underclass, this carries potentially serious risks ranging from petty crime to - in the extreme - terrorism.

The purpose of this study is to ascertain the degree to which attitudes of French women of Moroccan origin in France differ from or are similar to those of their counterparts in Morocco. To the extent that significant differences in attitude are found, the dissertation attempts to identify the factors to which these can be attributed. Where no significant differences can be ascertained, the reasons for similarities are explored. Because this study draws on a comparison of Muslim women in France with those in Morocco, the extent of difference or similarity can serve as an indicator of how young,

educated, professional women view themselves, where their loyalties lie, what they perceive as their main personal and professional challenges, and the extent to which they see themselves as vital parts of their respective societies. Modifications in attitude are often less perceptible than legal reforms and economic shifts, yet attitudes are of critical importance in social change. Europe is at the threshold of a new era in which new cultural identities are emerging as a result of large Muslim minorities in several major European countries. The prospect of Turkey entering the European Union, makes it all the more important to gain a deeper understanding of young Muslims in the Western hemisphere. To my knowledge, no comparative study based on a similar set of questions has been undertaken in Morocco and in France. The results of this research are intended to contribute to a better understanding of Muslim women and the degree to which their particular circumstances are similar or different in a European country on the one hand and a North African, Islamic country on the other. Improved understanding is a vital prerequisite for policies which aim at greater inclusion and for unlocking human potential with regards to national development. Much scholarly research has been conducted on “Islam in the West.” Most studies attest to a trend toward secularization among Muslims in the Occident. Muslims residing in Europe or the United States tend to accept the separation of the public, secular sphere from the private, religious sphere. This study sets out to examine whether this trend is particular to adherents of Islam living in a Western country such as France or if a comparable trend can be observed among Muslims residing in the heartland of an Islamic state such as Morocco.

This is a qualitative study which follows the principal guidelines for qualitative research based on personal interviews. I developed a questionnaire for interviewing young, educated, professional and urban women in Morocco and in France. This category of women was chosen because these women are in a better position than, for instance, illiterate or less educated women, to comment on public policy such as legal reforms. In terms of agents of change, they are more influential. For the purposes of a valid comparison, the two population groups had to have several significant traits in common.

As a West-European, albeit not French, I am familiar with the cultural setting of women in France. Having lived and worked in Morocco (1999-2001), I also have an understanding of the social environment in this North African country. Based on my periods of residence in South Africa (1982-1984) and Kenya (1984-1993), I feel at ease in a developing world setting and have acquired some skill in cross-cultural adjustments. Still, one always comes to research with preconceived notions and biases. The single largest difference between the women interviewed and me is that I am not a Muslim. Studying a religion is unlike practicing a religion or leading a life of faith. However, partly because I am not Muslim, the women I interviewed often shared their perceptions and aspirations freely because they did not regard me as being in a position to judge their views from a dogmatic or co-religionist standpoint.

The research is structured around three major themes : Islam, legal changes and personal and professional aspirations and challenges. These three topics emerged as a result of a preliminary survey of the relevant literature. They also seemed relevant choices because a study of Muslim women would be incomplete without including a discussion of the religion of Islam. The focus of that part of the interviews was to gain a better understanding of young women’s own understanding of Islam. As both Morocco and France have seen legal changes in 2004 that directly affect women in both countries, this topic presented itself because of its timely quality. In Morocco, a major reform of the family law has set the scene for considerable societal change in that country. The reform of the Personal Status Code (moudawana), or family law as it would be known in the West, changes the concept of the family as a unit presided over by a man to a unit with two equal partners before the law. This transformation in the family unit will affect larger societal shifts as the understanding of partnership changes on a fundamental level. The proposal for each article in the new law was checked by those drafting it against the Qu’ran and if justification for the proposed changes could be found in the sacred text, it was accepted by the government appointed commission that was charged with drawing up the reform of the Personal Status Code. In Morocco, the reform of the moudawana has been interpreted as a return to Qu’ranic roots

by abandoning cultural practices written into law upon Morocco’s independence from France in 1956. Outside of Morocco, the reform has been hailed as a major step in the direction of granting women equal rights and thus bringing Morocco more into the mainstream of its neighbors on the northern shores of the Mediterranean. Like Turkey, Morocco has its designs on membership in the European Union.

In France the banning of selected religious insignia in public schools including the Muslim headscarf is the result of an ongoing debate concerning the secular nature of the French republic. The greater visibility of Muslims in the public sphere has provoked increased official discourse on the Muslim minority in France. Whereas the Personal Status Code reform in Morocco is an indication of change, the banning of selected religious insignia can be interpreted as an indication of the French government’s insistence on the status quo. According to Hargreaves (1995): “In the debate over Islam in France, no single incident has generated greater acrimony than the headscarf affair of 1989.” (125) Ever since then, the Muslim headscarf, hijab, has divided public opinion as France struggles to find a way to incorporate Islamic cultural and religious traditions into her European fabric.

The topic of personal and professional challenges and aspirations emerged largely as a result of pilot interviews conducted in Florida. Women who participated in these sessions expressed a desire to talk about their personal and professional ambitions and the particular challenges associated with achieving them. The choice of this topic was also intriguing to me because little scholarly research has been conducted on this theme and therefore provided an opportunity to cover new ground.

This comparative study offers a fresh approach to understanding Muslim women. It has as its focus ‘ordinary’ citizens, i.e. the research does not draw primarily on experts, spokespersons, policy makers or religious leaders but is intended to contribute to an understanding of the everyday lives of young, educated, professional and urban Muslim women in two Mediterranean countries. It is however by no means comprehensive. Isaacs and Michael have pointed out that the major limitation of a qualitative study lies in the

fact that the subjects cannot be a wholly representative sample, and therefore results are limited in their representativeness and do not allow for firm generalizations to the populations from which the units come until appropriate follow-up is completed. (Isaac and Michael, 1991: 280)

Definition of Terms

Issues dealt with in this dissertation revolve around a number of concepts and terms which have been used and interpreted in widely different ways. To avoid ambiguity, it is therefore important to make clear how these terms are used in this dissertation. Several particular terms are used and in this section, I will describe some of those terms. A large part of the dissertation pertains to the ‘veil.’ However, there are a variety of religiously inspired garments for Muslim women, depending in style on geographical region or culture, variously called tschador, burkha, or hijab. In the Qu’ran the term djillab appears. In North Africa, the most common type of veil is the hijab, which is a headscarf that hides all hair but leaves the face and upper body uncovered, though some women also cover their faces. As the majority of Muslims in France are of North African origin, I use the term hijab or “Muslim headscarf.”

As used here, ‘secular’ refers to a condition in which church and state are separated, i.e. there is an absence of religious interference in government affairs and vice versa. The substantive concept from which that adjective derives is secularism which does not necessarily imply hostility towards religious beliefs. In France this concept is called laïcité and therefore this term is used. This concept is not applied in Morocco, an Islamic state where the King is at the same time head of state and the nation’s highest religious authority. Because of the historic connection between France and Morocco and the continued close relationship between those two countries, my respondents in Morocco were familiar with the meaning of laïcité.

Several of my respondents considered themselves ‘Islamists.’ Islamism refers to movements, often characterized by moral conservatism, literalism, and the attempt to implement Islamic values in all aspects of life, i.e. an Islamist worldview seeks to evaluate all aspects of private and public life based on the Qu’ran and other sacred scriptures. However, there is not one single Islamist movement but several, which may differ and at times disagree with each other on matters of interpretation of sacred texts and practice. In Morocco, the largest Islamist movement is Al Adl wa Ihsane (Justice and Charity) which stands in the tradition of Sufism, the mystical branch of Islam that emphasizes personal experience and love for God over adherence to dogma. It is also a movement committed to non-violence and does not overtly participate in the political process of this country. It does not for example field candidates in elections. Moroccan respondents who said they were Islamists or subscribed to Islamist positions referred to the positions taken by the Al Adl wa Ihsane. There is in Morocco also a political Islamist group, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) which has grown to become the third largest political party in the national parliament and is expected to make substantial gains in the elections scheduled for 2007. Morocco also has what could be termed ‘radical Islamists’ within its borders as evidenced by the suicide bombings carried out by Islamic fundamentalists in five separate locations in Casablanca in 2003. The tragic events of May 16, 2003 in Casablanca marked a watershed for Morocco comparable to the impact the 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York had on public life in the United States. The international reach of Moroccan radical Islamism can be seen in the predominance of Moroccans in the group that carried out the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004 and the presence of Moroccans in international terrorist networks that have been uncovered in recent years.

In France, women who said they felt close to Islamism also emphasized their commitment to non-violence which is different from radical groups that call themselves Islamists and support or engage in violence, including in extreme cases, terrorism. Some belonged to the French branch of Al Adl wa Ihsane, which in France operates under the name Participation et Spiritualité Musulmane. Most respondents however did not

identify with a particular religious group. When the term “Islamist” is used, it is based on this definition.

As used here, ‘second-generation’ refers to children of parents who emigrated from the Maghreb which encompasses the countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania, though there are few Mauritanians in France, where the main focus is on Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians. In everyday language, ‘immigrants’ in France most often suggests low-skilled workers with little formal education, even though juridically the term pertains to anyone from a foreign country taking up residence in France. Some respondents in France emphasized that their parents were not ‘immigrants’ by which they meant their parents came to France as educated professionals.

I generally use the expression ‘women of Moroccan origin in France’ rather than ‘Moroccan women in France’ or ‘French women of Moroccan origin’ because some of the women I interviewed there had retained their Moroccan citizenship, some had dual citizenship, and some were French nationals only.

In the Western world, Family Law is part of Civil Law. In Morocco, as in most of the Arab world, a separate, religiously based law, the Personal Status Code, governs matters such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. In Morocco this Personal Status Code is called moudawana. Although parts of Moroccan civil and criminal law are also based on Islamic law, only the Personal Status Code is held to be based systematically on Islamic law. In civil law for example, there are certain stipulations pertaining to real estate or property law that are based on Islamic law and in criminal law certain sections are based on Islamic law for example, breaking of the fast during the month of Ramadan, but other parts of civil or criminal law are derived from other sources, notably France.

Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is structured around seven Chapters. Chapter 1, The Literature Review, sets my research in the context of academic texts, narratives and novels which have explored ground relevant to my investigation. This chapter is divided in three parts that pertain to three main themes of this dissertation: Conceptions of Islam, Legal Changes and Personal and Professional Goals and Challenges. Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework and methods employed in this study. Prior to the field work in North Africa and France, I conducted a series of pilot interviews in Florida with a population group that has much in common with the populations studied for this research: young, educated Muslim women of immigrant origin in the United States. These pilot interviews were crucial in refining the interview schedule used during the field research. The chapter explains how the samples were constructed, the development of the interview schedule and offers particulars about how I met the women interviewed. Chapter 3 introduces the samples by presenting key biographical features, such as age, marital status and living situation. The extent of family relations across the Mediterranean is presented in addition to information about respondents’ knowledge of Arabic and/or any of the Berber languages spoken in Morocco. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present the data analysis and discussion of the data. These chapters are structured in accordance with the main themes explored in this study. Chapter 4 describes and analyzes responses to questions pertaining to the conceptions of the religion of Islam and the level of respondents’ adherence to the required practices, such as daily prayer and fasting. It also offers examples and illustrations of respondents’ personalized understanding of their religion. Chapter 5 presents findings about perceptions and evaluations of recent legal changes in Morocco and France. The purpose of this part of my investigation was not to find out how much Moroccan women knew about legal changes in France and to what extent women of Moroccan origin in France were informed and interested in legal changes in the country of their parents’ birth. Respondents’ views concerning government involvement in personal and religious matters was also investigated. Chapter 6 presents findings which ascertain respondents’ attitudes toward these changes and how these affect their own lives. In addition, I wanted to find respondents’ views on personal

matters such as marriage, friendships, and professional opportunities. Most importantly, it illustrates women’s conflicts in having to choose between marriage and family and professional careers. Finally, Chapter 7 brings together the main findings and points to gaps that could not be filled by this research. It also offers suggestions regarding new questions for further inquiry which arise out of this comparative study of young, educated, professional and urban Moroccan women and women of Moroccan origin in France.

CHAPTER 1

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The purpose of this chapter is to situate my research in its socio-historic context with particular reference to scholarly and other sources which best illuminate it. It will also highlight areas in which my dissertation attempts to cover new ground. To my knowledge there are to date no comparative studies on contemporary women that use the Mediterranean region as the locus of inquiry, though Mediterranean Studies is emerging as a new academic field. Most research based on in-depth interviews concentrates on one particular country or a conventionally defined region, for example France in the context of Western Europe or Morocco in the context of North Africa, specifically the Maghreb (i.e. Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, sometime Mauritania is included). Within France, relevant research occasionally distinguishes people by national heritage; most often however the broader category of the Maghreb is used. Comparative studies within Europe for example explore the situation of women of Turkish origin in Germany or women of Maghrebi origins in France. There has been little research comparing women in countries of immigrant settlement in Western Europe with those in the region of the Mediterranean basin from which the main flow of Muslim immigrants emanate. However, a large body of research on the role of women in Islam in general is available, conducted by scholars of various disciplines, from religion to history, Middle Eastern Studies, sociology to political science. Most research is rooted in one academic discipline, in the case of studies on contemporary women, most often sociology or political science. Literary scholars have worked on a rich body of texts, autobiographies and fictional accounts of personal experiences by French women of North African origin in the past two decades.

Three main themes were covered in my interviews with women in Morocco and France: Islam, recent legal changes in both countries affecting Muslim women, and personal and professional goals. The selection of these three themes necessitated an interdisciplinary approach which is reflected in the following literature review. The review draws on texts, academic and literary, which pertain to the three main themes of the interviews. All of the materials reviewed here shed light on one or other aspect of my research agenda, but none of them has the particular cross-cultural and interdisciplinary framework which characterizes my own approach.

The chapter is divided in three sections, each pertaining to one of the themes of my interview schedule: conceptions of the religion of Islam, legal changes in Morocco and France, i.e. the family law reform in Morocco and the banning of selected religious insignia including the Muslim headscarf in public schools in France, and personal and professional goals and challenges.

Conceptions of Islam

As with any major world religion, it is impossible to do a comprehensive review on a body of literature that spans more than a thousand years and reaches across the entire globe. The review presented here is limited to scholarly work that has appeared roughly within the past twenty years and addresses conceptions of Islam relevant to this particular comparative study on women of Maghrebi origin. This section includes a review of literature that focuses on interpretations of the Qu’ran with regards to the role of women and it also includes research that speaks to the role of Muslim women in Western countries, such as France. Discourse on the role of women according to Islam is of importance not only to Islamic societies. In her “Believing Women,” Asma Barlas writes that in this day and age Islamic thought and practice affects communities beyond the Muslim world. “Although the practice of Islam is of concern only to Muslims, Muslim practices are of concern to

the community of nations in which we live” (Barlas, 2002: xii). Women of Moroccan origin in France come from families which have brought their culture, religion and traditions with them when they crossed the Mediterranean. Muslims now constitute the largest minority in France, consequently questions of the role of women in Islam are indeed of concern beyond the Muslim world.

The Qu’ran frequently refers to the role of women. Hence, a rich body of literature has accumulated throughout the centuries. In recent decades, a re-reading of sacred texts, i.e. the Qu’ran1, the hadith (sayings attributed to the prophet) and the sunnah (part of the hadith, pertaining to customs of the prophet), has resulted in Islamic feminist, post-colonial and other non-traditional readings of the Qu’ran. As women have become central to the discourse on development and social change, religious and secular scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the role of women in Muslim societies and Muslim women in secular societies with a marked Judeo-Christian heritage. Ever since the inception of the religion of Islam in present-day Saudi Arabia in the 7th century, the role of women in predominantly Islamic societies has been discussed. Religious scholars have interpreted the position of women as prescribed in the Qu’ran and the various hadith. Historians like Ira M. Lapidus, who have written extensively on the history of Islamic societies, have argued that with the spread of Islam throughout the Middle East and North Africa, the religion of Islam has adapted to and incorporated local traditions and customs: “An ‘Islamic’ state was also an expression of non-Islamic territorial and cultural identity” (Lapidus, 2002: 188). This view is supported by the majority of scholars who point to the fact that there is no central authority in Islam pronouncing religious dogma. To the contrary, Islamic scholars have always insisted on the importance of fiqh, jurisprudence based on Islam, which differs from one geographical region to another and the privilege of ijtihad (judgment) or “rightful interpretation.” Hence, there always has been room for interpretation of the Islamic religion. While scholars generally agree that Islam has improved the situation of women in pre-Islamic Arabic societies, regional and local customs remained a crucial factor in

1 The Qu’ran is understood as God’s word as revealed to the prophet Mohammed. The hadith (lit: something new) are sayings attributed to the prophet. The sunnah are traditions and practices attributed to the prophet.

defining the role of women. “Islam was not necessarily the decisive element in the definition of gender in the region, but rather this religion encapsulated, reworked, and finally helped diffuse many older cultural practices of the region, including those defining of gender” (Nashat and Tucker, 1999: 2). Applying a western concept to the status of women, Leila Ahmed argues that women in the Islamic world are hat the West calls “ minority.” She explains this as follows: “In establishment Islamic thought, women, like minorities, are defined as different from and, in their legal rights, lesser than Muslim men. Unlike non-Muslim men, who might join the master-class by converting, women’s differentness and inferiority within the system are immutable”(Ahmed, 1992: 7). In recent years, some scholars of Islam have advocated a new, “enlightened” reading of the Quran which not only supports equality of women but also insists on the compatibility of Western and Islamic values (Arkoun, 1994 and 2004). In his seminal work “Rethinking Islam”, Mohammed Arkoun, an Algerian-born Islamic scholar residing in France, takes issue with the way Islam is customarily studied in the West. “Islam is always considered apart from other religions and from European culture and thought. It is often excluded from departments of religion and taught instead as part of Oriental studies” (Arkoun, 1994: 8). Hence, despite the presence of millions of Muslims within its borders, Islam is not treated as a part of the European religious and cultural fabric. Arkoun challenges this Orientalist approach that insists on an inherent difference between the West and the East and is based on a vision or ideological bias ostensibly suited to the concept of Orient as critiqued by Edward Said. Arkoun rejects this image of the 'Orient', expressed as an entire system of thought and scholarship. Nevertheless, sweeping generalizations and misconceptions cloud understanding on both sides according to Arkoun (1994):

It is true that the sort of Islamic discourse common to fundamentalist movements, especially those engaged in the most decisive political battles, proposes the powerful image of a single, eternal Islam, the ideal model for historic action to liberate the world from Western, imperialist, materialist model. ….. The field of perception is open to the confrontation of two imaginaries overheated by accumulated confusions about each other. (7)

Because this study offers a comparison between women in Morocco and women of Moroccan origin in France, Arkouns’ analysis of Islam’s historical influence on Western Europe is relevant. He emphasizes the fact that Islam has for centuries been part of European history. Therefore Islam has had - albeit largely unacknowledged - an influence on European culture in general and the Mediterranean region in particular of which both Morocco and France are a part (ibid.):

Another aggravating factor in the old quarrel between Islam and the West is that Islam, as a force in the historical rise of societies, took control of the Mediterranean area from the seventh to the twelfth centuries and again, with the direction of the Ottoman Turks, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. The cultures of the Mediterranean region share a single historical destiny that the scientific study of history, independent of the ideologies that divide the northern and southern or the eastern and western coasts of the Mediterranean, is far from confronting. The Mediterranean region I refer to is more cultural than geographic and strategic, it encompasses all those cultures that have been influenced historically by Iranian religions and the great cultures of the Near East, including the Mesopotamian, the Chaldean, the Syriac, the Aramaic, the Hebraic, and the Arabic - all before the intervention of Greece, Rome, Byzantium, and “Islam.” (8)

Arkoun challenges the notion that the Christian West and the Islamic East are inherent opposites with few, if any, social and cultural commonalities. To him the cultures that developed along the Mediterranean coastline were shaped up until modern times by the same historical forces. This scholar also dispels the view that Islam is a static, backward looking religion. Unlike most of Christianity which until the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century, was guided by the authority and dogma of the Catholic Church, Islam never had any comparable hierarchical structure. In his more recent “The Unthought in Contemporary Islam,” Arkoun emphasizes that there is in fact no single, common tradition in Islam: “Tradition is informed and conditioned by changing backgrounds, teaching, guiding and conditioning these backgrounds in return. This interaction is translated into self- entitlement of each Muslim community to incarnate and monopolize the authentic expression of the ‘orthodox’ tradition” (Arkoun, 2002: 251). Therefore, it is neither uncommon nor problematic to think of new ways of interpreting the Qu’ran according to

changing social, cultural and historic circumstances. Assumptions of this kind are reflected in my interviews with young, educated and professional Muslim women in Morocco and France. Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi encourages public discourse about Islam. She in fact credits public discourse about religion as a major factor in the initial development of Islam. Mernissi explores the earliest phases of the religion as a period during which the new faith was perceived as “a religion of reasoning” (Mernissi, 1991: 35). She insists this quality of reasoning should form the basis of modern understandings of the faith particularly with regards to the role of women (ibid: 195). Like other scholars exploring the theme of women in Islam, Mernissi traces the origins of assigning women an inferior role to some misogynist sayings in the hadith such as the often cited: “Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity” (vol. 4 p 226 Bukhari hadith)2. She questions the veracity of these sayings because they contradict what the Qu’ran says about women. Mernissi studied the life of revered figures in Islamic history such as Abu Bakr, close companion to the prophet, to whom the remark quoted above is ascribed. She argues that no one close to the prophet would have publicly uttered something so obviously in contradiction with the revelations received by Mohammed. Instead, Mernissi proposes that portions of the hadith are based more on hearsay or selective memory than on actual fact. She describes parts of Islamic history as “a tradition of misogyny” which is based on questionable pronouncements and unsubstantiated sayings by the prophet rather than by referring to the Qu’ran itself. In addition, because women remained uneducated for centuries after Islam was introduced, a certain image of women could be put in place that was quite different from the revelations received by the prophet, “the imams were able to take advantage of our [women’s] ignorance of the sacred texts” (ibid, 115). Mernissi insists that more attention needs to be paid to the Qu’ran rather than the hadith because the sacred text emphasizes equality of believers, regardless of their gender.

2 According to Annemarie Schimmel, a hadith, a “saying tale,” is part of the oral tradition, so a good number of non-authentic tales may have infiltrated the text in the course of the first centuries (1992:52).

This equality of believers is a theme explored by various Islamic scholars and will be addressed later in greater detail. Mernissi probes the question of why official Islamic historical discourse is purged of female heroes like A’isha, Sukayna and Umm Salama. “The answer without doubt is to be found in the time-mirror wherein the Muslim looks at himself to foresee his future. The image of ‘his’ woman will change when he feels the pressing need to root his future in a liberating memory. Perhaps the woman should help him do this through daily pressure for equality, thereby bringing him into a fabulous present” (ibid, 195). One of the foremost contemporary scholars of Islam in the United States, Amina Wadud, explores the role of women based on the scriptures in her “Qu’ran and Women.” She too differentiates between the scriptures and the historical practice of Islam. “If the definite basis of what Islam means is determined by what Muslims do, then women and men are not equal” (Wadud, 1999: ix). Though the scripture clearly assigns a different role to women than to men, Wadud argues that these are based on functional considerations:

Femininity and masculinity are not created characteristics imprinted into the very primordial nature of female and male persons, neither are they concepts the Qu’ran discusses or alludes to. They are defined characteristics applied to female and male persons respectively on the basis of culturally determined factors of how each gender should function. (22)

According to Wadud, Qu’ranic considerations of woman center on her relationship to the group, i.e. as a member of a social system. When the Qu’ran does refer to humans as individuals, it does not differentiate between male and female: that is, whatever the Qu’ran says about the relationship between Allah and the individual is not conveyed in gender terms. “With reference to the individual, the Qu’ran most often uses the term ‘nafs’ (self, soul) a non gendered-term” (ibid, 34). Like Mernissi, Wadud points out that Qu’ranic interpretation was up until recently a male prerogative and thus influenced by a specific cultural environment. “No interpretation is definite, limitation exists when specifically addressing the social situation in Arabia at the time of the revelation. No community will ever be exactly like

another, therefore no community can be a duplicate of that original community. That most tafasir (exegetical works) are done by males indicates something about women and interpretation” (ibid, 95). Interpretation occurs within a specific historic, geographic and cultural context and even divinely inspired texts fall prey to these earthly limitations. Therefore, the Qu’ran has been interpreted to support a certain social system that benefited those doing the interpretation, in this case, men. “Sometimes the open- endedness of the Qu’ran, which does not give explicit social functions or attribute explicit values to those functions, has been interpreted to mean that the Qu’ran supports existing systems of evaluation - whether at the time of the Prophet or in subsequent Muslim communities” (ibid, 96). The Qu’ran, according to Wadud, is very much concerned with social justice in the sense that its message is intended to right the wrongs of this world. By this definition, it cannot be interpreted as supporting inequality. Wadud (1999) writes:

With regard to social justice, it becomes necessary to challenge patriarchy - not for matriarchy, but for an efficient co-operative and egalitarian system which allows and encourages the maximum participation of each member of society. This system would truly respect each gender in its contributions, and all tasks that are contributed. This would allow for the growth and expansion of the individual and consequently society at large. (103)

Acording to Wadud, the Qu’ran, like the Bible, is not a “how to manual” that offers step-by-step guidance for daily affairs but is concerned with human being’s eternal life and the meaning of earthly existence. The scriptures are concerned with human’s responsibility toward God and their responsibility toward each other. It is this absence of specific instructions however, that allows for diverging interpretations, argues Wadud.

The absence of explicit Qu’ranic prescriptions for dividing labor allows and supports a myriad of variations…Thus the Qu’ranic guidance can be logically and equitably applied to the lives of humankind in whatever era, if the Qu’ranic interpretation continues to be rendered by each generation in a manner which reflects its whole intent. (104)

Asma Barlas, a scholar of Pakistani origin, explains that change within Muslim societies can in the long run only be successful if it will be perceived by the population as being based on the Qu’ran: “... it is safe to say that no meaningful change can occur in these societies that does not derive its legitimacy from the Qu’ran’s teachings, a lesson secular Muslims everywhere are having to learn at their own detriment (ibid, 3). Barlas does not view herself as a “feminist” in the Western sense and insists that her reading of the Qu’ran is based on conventional theological exegesis. She argues that no “feminist” reading of the Qu’ran is required to come to the conclusion that the sacred text does not favor men over women. Instead, Barlas (2002) guides the reader through the sacred text by highlighting the suras (chapters in the Qu’ran) which emphasize equality between men and women:

The most radical of the Qu’ran’s teachings, which establishes the ontic nature of sexual equality in Islam and which undermines the very notions of radical difference and hierarchy, has to do with the origin and nature of human creation. ……as both men and women originated in a single Self, have been endowed with the same natures, and make up two halves of a single pair. (133)

Scholars, who do not specifically focus on gender issues, also emphasize that the message of the Qu’ran is one of equality of all humans vis-à-vis Allah. Annemarie Schimmel, a German scholar who taught at Harvard University, wrote extensively on Islamic mysticism, and insists that the Qu’ran addresses “man” as in “human being” and not with reference to gender. Because the Qu’ran is concerned with change for the better of humans in general, early Islam improved women’s position in Arabia compared to pre- Islamic times. This, according to Schimmel was based on the fact that “the ‘man of God’ was always mentioned as the idea of the true believer, but one should beware of taking ‘man’ here as gender related” (Schimmel, 1994:197). Several of my respondents in France referred to some of Schimmel’s work3. Like other scholars cited above, Schimmel separates the text of the Qu’ran from the practice of Islam: “It would be amazing if Islam were a religion that is against women as much as later developments give that

3 In my interviews, respondents in France frequently referred to Schimmel’s book Mon âme est une femme: la femme dans la pensée islamique. Paris: Jean-Paul Lattès, 1998.

impression” (198). She goes on to describe various female saints in Islamic history, which come from all parts of the Muslim world and are neither limited to one geographic region nor to a particular time period. In Morocco for example, where saint worship is a widely accepted practice, Lalla Mimuna is revered. Schimmel sheds light on the little known fact of Islamic convents for women during the Middle Ages, especially in Egypt and Iraq. Women could seek refuge in these institutions after a divorce or find solace between marriages. These convents were led by a shaykha, a female sheikh, who also preached and led the women in prayer (199). Hence, there are historic precedents for having female religious leaders in Islam. In fact, it was in Morocco where as late as 1942 women “circle-leaders” (muqqamadat) were found (Trimingham, 1971: 114). Why and how this practice of female religious leadership discontinued, has not yet fully been explored. Like their much earlier counterparts in the Middle Ages, these female religious leaders in North Africa were adherents of the mystical branch of Sufism. The attraction of Sufism among women in Morocco and elsewhere in the Islamic world can be explained by the fact, that “mysticism was the only religious sphere where women could find a place” (ibid 18). Sufism is less concerned with adherence to dogma and instead emphasizes personal experience with the divine and the importance of love between God and man and between human beings. Given the historical preponderance of Sufism in Morocco, it is understandable why women in or of that region today feel less bound by orthodox doctrine and instead feel free to develop a religious understanding that suits their particular circumstances. Schimmel also weighs in on the issue of the hijab, the headscarf. She argues that there is no theological justification for the headscarf or the veil. She notes that covering a woman’s head was initially a sign of class distinction, whereby noble women covered themselves in public whereas servants and lower-class women entered the public sphere with little more than the necessary clothing: “It was a distinction, not an onerous duty” (200). However, Schimmel (1994) observes:

The insistence upon women’s deficiencies (a term very much used also in the Christian Middle Ages) reveals the ascetic fear of women’s power, and the ascetics in early Islam saw in women something horrible but - alas! - necessary. The sunna’s insistence on

married life left them between their wish to sever completely the bonds with this world (a world that appeared to them, as it did to their Christian contemporaries, as a ghastly old hag, always ready to seduce and then to devour her unfortunate lovers) and a normal and normative family life. Marriage, to be sure, is no sacrament but a simple contract in which the bride is represented by her wali, ‘representative.’ (200)

This emphasis of the contractual nature of marriage is also at the heart of Islamic Personal Status Code, an issue addressed later in this chapter. Schimmel asserts nevertheless that a theological basis for assigning women a lower status than men can be derived from the Qu’ran: “One reason for the deteriorating image (and as a corollary, position) of women was the old ascetic equation between women and the nafs, the lower soul, nafs being a feminine term. As the nafs incites one to evil (Sura 12:53), woman, too tries to divert man from his lofty goals - or so it was thought” (ibid, 201). On this point Wadud (see above) disagrees with Schimmel because she insists that nafs refers to ‘self’ or ‘person’ and does not carry a gendered meaning.

Fellow German scholar Dorothee Sölle, a Christian theologian, shares Schimmel’s interest in mysticism. In her comparison of mystic traditions of major world religions, Sölle comes to the conclusion that mysticism in all religions transcends dogma and therefore opens the way to a universalistic understanding of the human condition. Religion in the third millennium, she argues, “will either be mystical, or it will be dead.” Sölle recounts the story of one of the most well-known female Sufi saints, Rabi’a of Basra (ca. 713 -801). Rabi’a once walked the streets of her hometown in Iraq, holding a torch in one hand and a pail of water in the other. Asked why, she replied: “I want to put fire to paradise and pour water over hell so that these two veils disappear and it becomes plain who venerates God for love and not for fear of hell or hope for paradise” (Sölle, 2001:35). In recent times, Rabi’a has become increasingly popular among young, educated Muslim women because of her image of fearlessness and her example of a woman whose faith transcended conventional dogma. During my interviews, several women both in Morocco and in France talked about Rabi’a of Basra as a historical figure they admired.

While Sufism is a venerated tradition in Morocco, several of my respondents in France said that in that country “Sufism” sometimes was used in a derogatory sense and therefore they hesitated to use that term.

In France, access to Islamic religious discourse and literature is limited. Young Muslims, who want to explore their religious heritage beyond what has been transmitted to them by their parents, have to invest substantial effort. Not only is there no societal encouragement for religious pursuits, religious instruction in the homes of second generation North Africans in France is often limited to the folkloristic and consists of little more than repeated recitation of prohibitions: no alcohol, no pork, no premarital sex (for girls, at any rate), no marriage to someone outside their community etc. As the parents of most of these young Muslims were either illiterate or had little formal schooling, their own understanding of Islam was rather narrow. This young generation, educated in the French public schools, could in principle read the scriptures for themselves and seek out information on their own. However, because of their limited knowledge of the Arabic language, their access is further reduced to French texts. Despite these restrictions, a homegrown, French-educated Muslim population emerged within the hexagon which came about largely unnoticed by the majority culture. Because of its emphasis on laïcité, France does not encourage the public recognition of Islam. According to Arkoun, France is overemphasizing its secular nature at its own peril. “This combative secularism employed in the service of a specific political project - construction in France of a Republic that is ‘one and indivisible’ - neglects one of its own founding principles, that of philosophic openness to the study of all human channels for the production of meaning” (Arkoun, 2004 : 96). By discouraging open discourse about religion and relegating it to the private sphere, this creates a situation in which extremism can flourish more easily:

By ‘privatizing’ religion, through its elimination from the teaching syllabus in state schools in the name of ‘national education’, the French Republic’s ‘compulsory, secular and free’ principles for schooling equally all citizens has generated a lack of religious culture and abandoned religious affairs to the exclusive responsibility of the various ‘churches’… Instead of this emancipating knowledge, the so-called secular schooling has enhanced among the citizens what sociologists

describe as ‘the culture of disbelief’, at a time when the question of the religious phenomenon, as I am trying to define it in this book, has become one of great political urgency, all the greater in that it was thought to have been dealt with for good by the progress of positivist scientific knowledge since the nineteenth century. (96)

Widespread ignorance and disinterest concerning Islam, changes in the conceptions of Islam among second generation Muslims in France, have occurred largely unnoticed. In his early research on Muslims in France, Gilles Kepel observed that the French state failed to recognize Islam as a force of growing influence. It was not until the mid 1970s that France began to realize that Islam had become a fact of life (Kepel, 1987:139). This recognition coincided with having to come to terms with the permanent presence of North African immigrants within its borders. As suggested by the title of Gilles Kepel’s book “Les banlieues de l’Islam”, Islam up until then was perceived as a culture and religion of the banlieues, i.e. it existed outside of the mainstream much as in the United States the Nation of Islam is often perceived as a fringe religion, whose adherents reside primarily in the poorer inner cities, the social if not geographical equivalent of the French banlieues. Kepel describes the phenomenon of “re-islamization” which occurred chiefly as a result of social circumstances in the often violent suburbs, which are marked by unemployment and deprivation. He speaks of “les jeunes Maghrébins qui ont découvert l’Islam …une mutation des valeurs dans le monde des jeunes Maghrébins de France se produit après l’essoufflement du mouvement ‘beur4’” (386). Unlike in Morocco, young French Muslims experience Islam not as an omnipresent reality but as the faith of a disenfranchised minority. It forms the basis of a culture that the second and third generation has to rediscover for itself. In attending meetings of young Muslims with imams all over France, Kepel (1987) observed that the questions asked show that these young people are thoroughly inculcated with French modes of thinking.

4 The term ‘beur’ was coined by inverting the syllables of the word ‘Arabe’ which often carries a pejorative connotation in French. ‘Marche de Beurs’ refers to a major political demonstration held in 1983 by younger members of the immigrant Maghrebi community. It’s official title was “la marche pour l’égalité et contre le racisme.”

Elles [les questions] sont conceptualisées grâce à des modes de pensées acquis en France. Les questions qu’ils posent à leur imam s’inscrivent dans cette perspective…..les jeunes Maghrébins qui se définissent comme ‘musulmans’ n’ont pas d’une univers de référence préalable vécu ou appris autre que la France : l’Islam est, pour eux, une projections vers l’avenir, une manière d’utopie. (372)

Absent in Kepel’s early writing on French Muslims is an acknowledgement of the different circumstances for men and women. However, in his most recent work “The War for Muslim Minds - Islam and the West”, Kepel does approach the issue of young Muslim women: “As Islamist movements develop, the issue of gender equality becomes increasingly a field of contention in the battle for Europe” (Kepel, 2004: 282). Kepel explores the way in which modern technologies such as the Internet have allowed young people, women in particular, to seek answers to their religious questions from sources which previously were beyond their reach. Because of their inability to read Arabic, the majority of French Muslims of immigrant origins have no direct access to most of Islamic literature. However, a new discourse on Islam is emerging among Muslims in the West. One of the most prominent proponents of this new discours on occidental Islam is Swiss-born philosopher Tariq Ramadan, grandson of Hassan al Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, who is advocating dialogue among the various Muslim communities and proposes a new “occidental Islam” (2004). Ramadan’s propositions on a variety of issues, from the Muslim headscarf to stoning of adulterous women, have been disseminated via Islamic websites and are discussed in chat rooms. In fact, new information technologies cross linguistic boundaries as websites and chat rooms are often bi- or even trilingual. Increasingly, women use these chat rooms and Internet forums to discuss issues such as birth control and abortion, the veil and pre-marital sex. The anonymity guaranteed in cyberspace allows for near-unlimited freedom of expression. The fact that women in France turn to these sites, indicates that they do seek answers to life’s questions within the context of their ancestral culture and religion. In my

interviews, respondents in France said that Internet sites were one of their main sources of information about their religion.5 At the time of Kepel’s writing, many Internet forums that provided religious counsel were operated by fundamentalist groups and consequently, the advice given was based on strictly traditional interpretations of the Qu’ran. The increasing importance of cyberspace for young Muslims has also been addressed by Olivier Roy, who dedicates and entire chapter in his “Islam mondialisé” (2004) to the virtual, online community of Muslims worldwide. Moving back and forth between different worlds is a daily routine for young Muslims in France. They are inculcated with Western values and for them Europe and what it represents is a reality. Such cultural flexibility is in contrast to the majority of Western Europeans, for whom Islam still represents a new, formidable challenge. Because of their ability to traverse cultural divides, Bruno Etienne refers to the second generation as “les jeunes sans frontières” (Etienne, 1989: 260). This new generation of French Muslims creates a culture and religion based on very diverse influences. According to Etienne, what people believe is more important than their actual circumstances. Etienne argues that French Muslims - rather than representing an alien element in France - are in keeping with the finest of French traditions by reaching beyond borders for inspiration. Etienne proposes that these young people are no less “typically” French than so-called français de souche: “la plupart des Français ne sont pas typiques: donc n’être pas typique est l’essence du Français moyen. Ce qui parait normal dans un pays où les reines ont toujours été des étrangères…exogamie oblige” (264). This political scientist points to another common misperception, namely that “North African immigrant” is often understood as synonymous with “Muslim.” Yet, the majority of today’s Jews in France are also of North African decent (265). Before it became a commonly used concept, Etienne advocated the notion of “multiple identities” which he called “citoyenneté plurielle.” This certainly applies to French Muslims of immigrant descent. As the interviews for this research revealed, young, educated women appear quite at ease with their multiple identities. They are

5 In my interviews, the most frequently cited sites were www.oumma..com, www.sezame.info, www.islamfrance.free.fr and www.saphirnet.info.

culturally French and Muslims by religion. It is the dominant culture that adjusts with difficulty to a situation in which Muslims are an integral part of French society.

New ways of interpreting Islam are explored by French sociologist Leïla Babès. This Algerian-born scholar describes the “nouvelles manières de croire” of women of North African immigrant origin.6 Given the secular character of French society, some even have argued that Islam is the most widely practiced religion in France. One of the most profound changes in conceptions of Islam is identified as “privatisation et […] intériorisation” (Babès, 1996: 7). France, and the Western world in general, places great value on individualism. Babès argues that this emphasis results in a personalization of faith with diminished adhesion to an institutionalized religion. A highly individualized interpretation of religion is particularly prevalent among women who seek to live their faith in the secular, less visible patriarchal society of France. Babès raises the fundamental question “Qui definit le religieux ? ” and answers : “Ce n’est pas au sociologue ou à un quelconque chercheur de le faire,… ce sont des acteurs soicaux qui determinent la qualité de ce qui est religieux” (15). The new religious understanding which is “en train de se faire” in France does not mean the end of religion but rather a “mutation des croyances” (177). Islam in its new Western expressions is a nascent yet rapidly growing field of academic study. In her “L’Islam Positive,” Babès observes that by conventional accounts, young, French Muslims are caught between a rock and a hard place, “ils sont trop religeux, ou pas assez” (Babès, 1997:23). For the majority of young, French-educated, Muslims, the mosque is the place where their parents go, it is associated with the “old country.” The majority of the young generation rejects the institutional aspects of Islam. Having internalized Western individualism, they feel free to discover a personalized understanding of their religion. Apart from the obvious influence of French society with its emphasis on laïcité, Babès attributes this “secularization of Islam” (94) in some measure to the presence of Christian or church-connected social service institutions in the banlieues. Young

6 A changing understanding of Islam among young, educated, urban women in Morocco has not so far been the subject of published academic research.

Muslims socialize in church-run community centers in the banlieues and benefit from secular outreach activities of Christian institutions. They experience Church-run public service without the express purpose of proselytizing. In addition, young Muslim women use the official secular nature of France to pursue their own goals when these are against the wishes of their families and communities. “La laïcité est d’ailleurs souvent leur cheval de bataille,” writes Babès (95). Another significant feature of French society is its pluralism, which according to this researcher, goes hand in glove with laïcité . As a result, “une des conséquences les plus importantes du pluralisme religieux est le phénomène de relativisation de la religion à laquelle on appartient” (102). Most North African immigrants live in communities in which the majority of their neighbors are transplants from the Maghreb as well. Young people growing up in these environments do not experience much religious diversity within their own communities. Freedom of choice and individualism are concepts to which they are exposed in the French public schools, not at home. Writes Babès : “La liberté de choix, caractéristique de la sécularisation, montre ainsi une nette préférence pour l’expérience personnelle” (106). Young Muslims in France use this freedom primarily to explore the religion they were born into. While there is a considerable number of français de souche who convert to Islam or a religion that is different from that of their parents, there are no known accounts of Muslims who have converted to Christianity.7 Aware of this fact, Babès quotes an Arab proverb: “Si les religions se mélangent, alors tu dois tout faire pour t’attacher à la tienne. Voilà, sans doute pourquoi en matière de religion, le choix est hérésie, c’est-à-dire opinion libre” (107). Michèle Triablat’s findings lead her to go a step further than Babès. In her “De l’immigration à l’assimilation. Enquête sur les populations étrangère en France” (1996), Tribalat compared religious practices and adherence to Islam between immigrant parents and their children. Her research is based on extensive questionnaires that included

7 In Morocco, religious proselytizing is against the law. Though there are publicly known cases where Muslims have converted to a Christian denomination, such cases are kept quiet, if not secret. However, recently, there has been some controversy and publicity about conversions to Christianity in Morocco. See “Perceé protestante au Maghreb” in Le Monde, Dossiers & Documents, No 343, June 2005, p 6.Given the stigma associated with conversion, Muslims of North African background may be hesitant even in France to openly profess a different faith.

questions about “religious practice” which mostly referred to attendance of a mosque, following dietary restrictions (pork, alcohol) and fasting during Ramadan. From her data she concludes that the second generation is significantly less religious and closer to the secular values of French society than their North African parents. However, Tribalat finds that people of Moroccan origin in France show a comparatively higher religious inclination than those of Algerian or Tunisian backgrounds. Whether the second generation is less religious (Tribalat) or religious in a different manner than their immigrant parents (Babès), is up for debate. Even the most obvious sign of adherence to Islam, the Muslim headscarf (hijab) does not reflect a uniform belief. This public display can be motivated by a form of radicalism or fundamentalism, a return to cultural and religious roots and may even be inspired by fashion but it does not equate with support for violence, certainly not terrorism, and therefore is not to be confused with the common use of the terms “radical” or “fundamentalist” (Nökel, 1999: 72). Regardless of where women stand on the headscarf issue, most agree that this should be a matter of personal choice. Wearing the hijab is not something a woman should be forced to do. “Il est primordial que toutes les femmes du monde - musulmanes ou pas, voilées ou pas - sachent que rien ne justifie leur enferment dans une image construite sans elles ” (Bouzar/Kada, 2003 : 12). It is this very insistence on their right to self-determination that brought liberal activist Dounia Bouzar and covered Islamist Saïda Kada together to jointly author a book about the headscarf, “L’une voilée, l’autre pas” (2003). The collaboration of these two women, who approach the headscarf from very different perspectives, shows that the headscarf need not be viewed as a divisive issue within the Muslim community. The headscarf will be discussed in greater detail in a later section of this chapter.

In Morocco, a different set of circumstances impacts on young, educated women. There, Islam is a state religion, freedom of religion as understood in the West is an absent concept. With a population of 98.78 percent Muslim, exposure to religions other

8 According to the World Fact Book (2001) there are in Morocco: 98.7 % Muslims, Christian 1.1 %, Jewish 0.2 %. In France: 83-88 % Roman Catholic, 2 % Protestant, 1 % Jewish, 5-10 % Muslim, 4% unaffiliated.

than Islam is virtually non-existent. Most of the educated population is fluent in Arabic and therefore has access to a wide variety of literature on Islam. In a country where the King is at the same time head of state as well as Commander of the Faithful (ultimate religious authority in his country), academic studies on emerging new interpretations of Islam among young people, are not encouraged. Though there is a lively public discourse on Islam within Morocco, certain themes are off-limits, such as questioning the religious authority of the King. Those who have done so in public such as the outspoken founder of the largest non-violent fundamentalist Islamic movement in Morocco, Al Adl wa Ihsane (Justice and Charity), Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine, have in the past been imprisoned or put under house arrest. In my own research, I have attempted to approach the issue of new interpretations of Islam through questions about recent social and legal changes such as the reform of the Personal Status Code in Morocco and the law banning selected religious insignia in French public schools, to which I now turn.

Family Law - Personal Status Code and the Role of Women

Religion and law are closely related in most cultures but nowhere is that connection more evident today than in Islamic family law. Personal Status Code, or family law as it would be called in the West, is based on the Qu’ran. Law, like religion, reflects categories of meaning according to anthropologist and legal scholar Lawrence Rosen: “Though couched as statements of fact, legal discussions are, quite often, really creators of fact. Like religion, law is a kind of metasystem which creates order in a universe that is often experienced in a more disorderly way” (Rosen, 1989: 17). Rosen argues that cultural beliefs and understanding are revealed most vividly in Islamic family law. A change of law, therefore, marks a cultural shift as well. Over the course of a decade, Rosen observed the courtroom proceedings of a local judge in a small town in the Atlas mountains9 of Morocco. Based on this experience, his own legal training and an anthropologist approach, Rosen (1989) writes:

9 Rosen conducted much of his research in Sefrou, a small town near Fès in the foothills of the Middle Atlas and within a few kilometers from a town (Ifrane) where I conducted several interviews.

It appears more fruitful to view law as part of the larger culture, a system which, for all its distinctive institutional history and forms, partakes of concepts that extend across many domains of social life. In law, as in politics and marriage, one has the opportunity to see ordinary assumptions put to the test of scope and implication, and though the response may be peculiar to its own domain, analyzing the realm of the law as a cultural phenomenon is no more unusual than viewing aspects of a society through the behavior of its members in the public market-place, the family dwelling, or the house of worship. (5)

The family - nuclear and extended - constitutes the cornerstone of Muslim society, therefore an entire legal code is dedicated to issues pertaining to family matters: marriage, divorce (sanctioned in Islam), custody, inheritance. The Personal Status Code, in Morocco called moudawana, lays out the role of women within the family and in society in general. Any change in the Personal Status Code therefore has larger implications with regards to the status of women. While women in Morocco obviously are under the rule of Moroccan family law, the moudawana also applies to Moroccans residing abroad. And even after adopting French citizenship, immigrant families carry with them their traditions and customs and family matters are often dealt with in accordance with the laws and traditions of their home countries rather than those of their newly adopted homes. In an effort to understand the dilemma of modern French women of Moroccan origin, it is therefore important to have some basic understanding of the Moroccan Personal Status Code and Islamic law in general. In most of the ca. 60 predominantly Moslem states in the world today, Islamic law has been replaced with modern western law in the areas of commercial, civil and much of criminal law. Despite these changes, family law has remained largely intact as a separate, religiously based form of law from pre-colonial through colonial and the present postcolonial period. This does not mean that the Personal Status Code has not been changed over the years, it simply means that family law remains religiously based law and changes have to be first and foremost justified by referring to the Qu’ran. Because the Qu’ran, the sunnah (traditions and customs of the prophet) and the hadith (sayings attributed to the prophet) are explicit with regards to family, changes in family law cannot be made without new interpretation of sacred texts and thus connote an altered

religious understanding. However, the demarcation line between pre-colonial, traditional and Western-inspired law is not always clear. The Arab Human Development Report 2004, published by the United Nations Development Programme (2004) states:

The colonial imprint can be marked. Indeed, it is often difficult to determine which legal processes are genuinely traditional and which can be seen as a hybrid by-product of colonial manipulation and control. An added complication in separating authentic from imposed practices is that colonial and its “civilizing mission” unilaterally claimed responsibility for introducing modern values, beliefs and institutions to the colonies. (58)

The UNDP report further states that such legal pluralism has been recognized in “countries from Australia to Canada to South Africa” and that in no African country, either during or after the colonial era, has customary law been entirely disregarded or proscribed. (59)

One of the foremost scholars on Islam in the United States, John L. Espositio, argues that a change in Personal Status Code is an “indicator of social change and reform, its methodology and problems” (Esposito, 1982: x). This Middle Eastern Studies scholar writes that Personal Status Code reform goes to the heart of establishing Islamic identity which includes re-examination of the question “What does it mean to be a Muslim woman?” (xi) The Qu’ran itself is not a legal text, but offers general moral guidelines and principles. In the centuries following Mohammed’s death (632 C.E.), four major legal schools, madhab, developed which have become the basis for law in various countries. The Moroccan Personal Status Code is based on the Maliki code, Egypt for example uses the Hanafi code, Tunisia the Hanbali code, others the Shafii code. These schools differ on issues such as a the proper age of marriage for a girl, whether or not a young woman has the right to reject a marriage made by her guardian wali, usually the father or grandfather, upon reaching adulthood etc. The Hanbali code for example contains several hundred stipulations on the issue of inheritance alone.

The revelation of the Qu’ran, understood as an expression of Divine Will for man, was the basis for major reform of the status of women in Arabia. This reform pertained to three areas: marriage, divorce and inheritance. According to Islam, women are a legal partner in a marriage contract and not an object for sale as had been the case prior to the advent of the new religion. Islam curtailed unlimited polygamy and men were restricted to marrying four wives with the stipulation that all wives are to be treated equally. Because it is in reality nearly impossible to treat different individuals the same way, this stipulation is interpreted by some as meaning that the prophet was in fact discouraging the practice of polygamy. In the realm of divorce, a waiting period was instituted to allow for reconciliation. A pregnant woman could not be divorced by her husband until after the birth of the child. Inheritance customs changed through Qu’ranic reform by de- emphasizing tribal allegiances and instead advocating solidarity with the community of believers (ummah). As the family constituted the smallest unit of the newly formed, faith- based community, inheritance became an issue within the family and not, as previously had been the custom, a tribal matter. Though it was often thought that Islamic law remained constant throughout the ages, “twentieth century scholarship has, in fact, demonstrated that the development of Islamic jurisprudence in general and Sunnah in particular was a much more dynamic and creative process than classical theory would suggest” (Esposito, 1982: 111). Legal scholar Mohammed Ali Syed argues that the questions of women’s rights and obligations “…appear to be the most controversial and most complex of all social problems” (Syed, 2004). This practicing barrister at the British bar challenges assumptions of conservative framers of Islamic law who accorded a lesser status to women. Syed argues that the Qu’ran and the hadith - the two primary sources of Islamic law - place Muslim women on the same level as Muslim men. Syed provides an overview of both sources and explores their respective roles in Islamic law, emphasizing the Qu’ran's role as the supreme authority and questioning the authenticity of some of the alleged sayings attributed to the Prophet. Rather than analyzing the practice of Islamic family law, Syed focuses on the theoretical position of Muslim women as sanctioned by the Qu’ran. Like scholars cited earlier in this chapter, Syed too emphasizes the fact that most denigrating commentaries on women appear in the hadith and not the Qu’ran itself.

He refers to sayings of the hadith which are used to support the inferiority of women: “I took a look at Paradise and noted that the majority of the people there were poor, I took a look at Hell, and noted that women were the majority” or “I have not seen anyone more deficient in intelligence and religion than you women” (Bukhari 1:301)10. Syed contrasts these sayings with specific examples how the revelation of the Qu’ran elevated the status of women from pre-Islamic Arabia. A case in point is the tribal custom of concubinage, whereby a man was entitled to have sexual relationships with any female slave or female prisoner of war. The Qu’ran however clearly demands that a man be married to the woman or women with whom he desires to have sexual relationships (Qu’ran 24:32, 33). The same applies to child marriage. Proponents of child marriage often refer to the story of the marriage between the prophet and Aïsha when she was only nine years old. Less known is the fact that this marriage was not consummated until Aïsha reached the age of maturity. In addition, Syed points out that this marriage was contracted before the prophet received revelations concerning marriage, though there are no explicit verses in the Qu’ran proscribing child marriage. Hence, according to Syed, “pre-Islamic Arab customs that allowed child marriage played a major role in introducing child marriage to Islam” (Syed, 2004: 40). Unlike Qu’ran, the hadith does contain sayings pertaining to the permissibility of child marriage of both boys and girls. As minors have no right to enter into a binding contract, the concept guardian, wali, was introduced, vesting an adult male relative with the authority to marry their minor offspring without their consent. All schools of Islamic law have the provision of a wali and consequently, child marriage became part of the sharia (lit: the path to be followed, Islamic law). However, Syed argues that adjustments to the sharia have been made throughout the ages; therefore modern times should be no exception. Because of the centrality of the wali (guardian) in Islamic Personal Status Code, its abolition in the moudawana reform in Morocco is of critical importance. This concept is also one of the most controversial aspects of Islamic family law, which is why it is discussed here in some detail. Every female is under the tutelage of a wali, in most cases

10 There are six collections of hadiths , the one gathered by Bukhari is considered the most comprehensive and authentic.

her father or grandfather. The wali can arrange marriage of his female child and depending on the legal school a country has adopted, the young woman may or may not reject the marriage arrangement made by her wali. Consent of the wali is required for any marriage to be considered valid. In Morocco, a wali needed to give his consent for such matters as obtaining a passport or opening even a small business. As the concept of wali stems from the Qu’ran, to abandon this type of guardianship represents a major religious re-interpretation. The - by Western standards excessively – frequently dominant role of fathers or brothers in Muslim families in France has its roots in the concept of wali. Polygamy is another critical aspect of Islamic Personal Status Code and its abolition (with very limited exceptions) in the 2004 family law reform Morocco is nothing short of revolutionary. This is because the Qu’ran explicitly allows a man to marry up to four wives under certain conditions. In practice, few men today actually live simultaneously with multiple wives, however what does happen with some frequency is that a husband leaves his first wife without divorcing her and moves in with another woman, declaring her his second wife. This leaves the first wife in a legal and financial limbo because absent a divorce, she can neither remarry nor claim alimony. The Qu’ran further stipulates that a man may marry a non-Muslim woman as long as she is Jewish or Christian, i.e. a believer in one of the religions of the book. As religion is inherited in a patri-linear fashion, a Muslim woman is not allowed to wed a non- Muslim unless the man converts. The issue of marriage with a non-Muslim is one that preoccupied several of my interview partners in France.

Legal change is only one step in a process of transformation. More profoundly are changes in attitude which take considerably more time to take root. According to Moroccan anthropologist Abdellah Hammoudi, author of “Master and Disciple - The Cultural Foundation of Moroccan Authoritarianism,” maintaining traditions is an important aspect of Moroccan society. In his analysis of the Moroccan social order, Hammoudi describes the Moroccan power structure as essentially resembling the traditional Sufi tariqa (brotherhood) model of a stern master with his obedient disciples. The king, according to Hammoudi, is viewed as an arbiter who transcends partisan struggles. To implement policies and to maintain stability and coherence, he relies on the

unique Moroccan system of the makhzen. To put it simply, the makhzen encompasses notables and others beholden to the Moroccan throne and also includes a wide net of informants, casting an invisible net over the entire population. As there is no real power outside of the palace in Morocco, any change emanates from the king. Likewise, loyalty to the king is akin to religious duty. Says Hammoudi: “This set of attitudes could not impose itself if it did not have as its source the historical roots of the ethos of humility, submission, service, and gift exchange” (Hammoudi, 1997:43). The now American based anthropologist describes the power structure as it exists in the Morocco of today as resembling the one put in place in the 19th century:

To put it briefly, the arrangement was as follows: first the charismatic community, then the bureaucratic machine. Those with functions in the royal bureaucracy were put in a secondary position, while priority was given to those who ensured the perpetuation of the family of the Prophet and to the ulema (religious scholars), the custodians of his teachings and tradition. At the mirhab (niche in the mosque showing the direction of Mecca), the focal point of worship were the descendants of the prophet, not the ulema11. The chorfa12 derived their primacy from the fact that their presence was a tangible manifestation of the Prophet’s “mystical body.” (70)

The Moroccan King is not only the head of state but also holds the title of “Commander of the Faithful” (Amir al Mouminine) which makes him the highest religious authority in his country as well. This title dates back to the 10th century when the Amir Abdul Rahman III (912-61) assumed the caliphate in Cordoba, Spain and declared himself Amir al Mouminine (Abun-Nasr, 1987: 72). Any legal change announced by the monarch is therefore not merely of social or political importance but is viewed as a religious ruling. The religious mandate is not only ex officio but has even deeper roots. The current ruler is heir to the Alawi (or Alaoui) dynasty which has ruled Morocco, except for the 40 year interruption of the French protectorate, since the 17th century. Furthermore, the monarch holds the title of sharif, i.e. claiming direct descent from the prophet which endows him with special authority and baraka, i.e. blessing and

11 Ulema, singular alim, those who are trained in the religious sciences 12 chorfa, elevated place in the mosque for the imam

grace (ibid: 228). The power and importance of the Moroccan monarch, both as spiritual and as secular leader, cannot be underestimated. It is in this context that the King’s announcement of the Moroccan Personal Status Code reform has to be viewed as a mandate to change an entire population’s religious understanding. Social change has to be presented as being consistent with tenets of the religion. This unity between the religious and the secular is often misunderstood in the West, where a pragmatic approach to remedying social ills is favored.

To better understand this social shift, a brief explanation of the Moroccan legal system is helpful. When Morocco achieved independence from France in 1956, the new nation adopted French civil law but retained a code of Islamic religious laws to govern matters within families. While the colonial legal system influenced development of Morocco’s civil and commercial law, traditional courts continued to apply Maliki fiqh to matters of family law. Following independence in 1956, a Code of Personal Status (al- Moudawana) was issued, based on dominant Maliki doctrine. Under Moroccan civil law, women were considered equal to men. However, under the moudawana, women needed permission from their wali (guardian) to get married. Men were free to marry multiple wives, issue unilateral divorces in accordance with the Islamic tradition of repudiation (talaq), and make decisions regarding their wives. Women could not normally request a divorce and had limited rights with regard to property and inheritance. In the 1990s, the Union for Feminine Action (UAF), a women’s rights group in Morocco, organized a campaign to collect one million signatures for a petition which urged a reform of the moudawana. The late King Hassan II referred the matter to a council of religious leaders and in 1993, limited reforms were announced. After his father’s death in 1999, King Muhammed VI ascended to the throne. It was not until the fall of 2003 that the young monarch announced his first, wide ranging reform. For this, he chose the Personal Status Code, moudanwana. According to the King, the aim was to draw up a modern Family Law which was consistent with the spirit of “our tolerant religion” (Discours Royal, Site Officiel du Maroc). King Mohammed VI announced the reform of the Personal Status Code in the capital city of Rabat on October 10, 2003. The major aspects of the reform pertain to enhancing

the rights and status of women. In essence, the reform changes the family from a unit presided over by a man to a unit with two equal partners before the law. As the official legal document is at the time of this writing only available in Arabic and no unauthorized translations (meaning a translation sanctioned by the palace) are considered valid, the following is based on a dalil, a guide, which is available in French and a Discours Royal,13 which can be obtained from the official website of Morocco.

- Marriage age: The legal age of marriage for girls has been raised from 15 to 18 as it has been for men. - Polygamy: a practice permissible according to the Qu’ran – has been outlawed except when a judge rules that there are significant reasons for which a husband might be granted permission to wed a second or third wife. The new law allows women to have a say in their husband’s decisions to marry a second wife: “Women have the right to impose a condition in the marriage contract preventing the husband from taking a second wife. If there were no conditions, the first wife should be summoned to secure her consent. The second wife should be informed that the husband was married to another woman and her consent should be obtained, and the first wife should be given the right to demand a divorce.” - Repudiation: The Islamic practice of talaq, the right of a man to single-handedly repudiate his wife will be outlawed. This practice did not guarantee the livelihood for the repudiated women and her children. The new law stipulates that divorce has to be granted by a court. “A new procedure for divorce has been established, requiring the court’s prior authorization. Divorce cannot be registered until all money owed to the wife and the children has been paid in full by the husband….” The new law further states, “Divorce is the husband’s prerogative but the wife may avail herself of this prerogative.” - Divorce: The wife can ask for a divorce. Before, a judge would not accept a request for divorce by a woman unless the woman could present a case of “suffering prejudice” and witnesses.

13 The full text of the Royal Discourse is in the Appendix

- Inheritance: Whereas in the past, inheritance was strictly patrilineal, the new law gives “the granddaughter and the grandson on the mother’s side the right to inherit from their grandfather, as part of the compulsatory legacy, just like the son’s children.” - Joint responsibility: The family is the joint responsibility of both spouses and not only the one of the father. The rule of “a wife’s obedience to her husband” will be abolished. - Guardianship: The wife will no longer require a guardian (wali) in order to marry, which was required by the old law. - Civil Marriages: Marriages entered into outside of Morocco will be recognized by the new moudawana, provided two of the witnesses are Muslims. - Sharing of assets: Spouses may enter into a pre-nuptial agreement before marriage in order to ensure a fair sharing of acquired assets. - Child custody: In case of divorce, guardianship of children goes first to the mother, next to the father, next to the maternal grandmother. Appropriate housing and child support must be guaranteed. - Children outside of marriage: The rights of children will be safeguarded in case the parents are not married. Before, children prior to marriage did not have to be recognized by the husband. (Collectif 95 – Maghreb Égalité and Discours Royal )

Because of the male-centered nature of Moroccan society, the new law is explicitly described as not being a law that favors women; instead it is explained as reflecting the “true nature of a family law,” namely the inclusion of all members of a family, father, mother and children. In the words of King Mohammed VI :

Je ne peux, en ma qualité d'Amir Al Mouminine, autoriser ce que Dieu a prohibé, ni interdire ce que Le Très-Haut a autorisé. Il est nécessaire de s'inspirer des desseins de l'Islam tolérant qui honore l'Homme et prône la justice, l'égalité et la cohabitation harmonieuse, et de s'appuyer sur l'homogénéité du Rite Malékite, ainsi que sur l'Ijtihad qui fait de l'Islam une religion adaptée à tous les lieux et toutes les époques, en vue d'élaborer un Code moderne de la Famille, en parfaite adéquation avec l'esprit de notre religion tolérante. (Discours Royal, Site Officiel du Maroc)

The position of the King as political and religious leader is particular to this country. In addition, Morocco has other traits that set it apart from the Islamic world. The reform of the Personal Status Code in Morocco has to be understood in the larger context of the geographical, historical and cultural context of this North African kingdom. Geographically, Morocco, as its Arabic name “Al Mamlakah al Maghribiyah” (The Kingdom of the Maghreb) indicates, is located on the farthest western end of the Islamic world. The Maghreb (literally: West) has seen itself historically in opposition to the Islamic Mashrek (literally: East). Ever since the first Arab incursions into the Maghreb under the legendary Egyptian conqueror Uqba ben Nafi in the late seventh century, Morocco has developed its own Islamic identity. The country has a long history of keeping the influences of Islamic Empires to its east at bay. Unlike its immediate neighbor Algeria, Morocco was thus not part of the Ottoman Empire. Another feature of Morocco is the sustained influence of its original Berber inhabitants. Various Berber (Amazigh) populations live in widely dispersed communities in the mountainous and desert regions of North Africa. Unlike most population groups, the Berbers have no common physical features. The black-skinned Tuareg nomads of the Sahara, often called the blue men of the desert, are Berbers just as the light-skinned, green-eyed, sedentary people of the Middle Atlas. For Berbers it is variations of the Tamazight language hat provides the common bond. The unique Islamic society that has developed in this part of the Maghreb, incorporates elements of the cultures of some of its earliest invaders. The native Berber populations have variously embraced Christianity, Judaism and Islam, all the while maintaining their own culture. It is for instance not uncommon to find Berber women in remote parts of Morocco making the sign of the Christian cross while at the same time invoking the Qu’ran14. Successive Berber dynasties have ruled Morocco from the Almoravids and Almohads in the 12th and 13th century, to the rise of the Merinids and the Saadians from the 13th to the 17th centuries. Eventually the Alawis, the lineage from which the current monarch hails, who originate from an Arab family of Sufi holy men, took over. Power has moved from the urban centers along the Mediterranean coast into the hinterlands of

14 Personal observation during treks through remote regions of the Atlas mountains.

the Atlas mountains (Sijilmasa), with the center of power being at one time located in Marrakesh in the south (under Ibn Tashfun in the 12th century), at another in the Middle Atlas cities of Fès (under Abu Hassan in the 14th century) and Meknès (under Moulay Ismael in the 17th century), to Rabat in modern times. While the mostly rural Berber communities have progressed according to their own rhythm, the urban centers have become increasingly arabized, sophisticated and prone to change. The particular Arab/Berber mix in Morocco is one of the distinguishing factors of this country. Today, the population is about 60 per cent Arab and 40 per cent various Berber ethnicities who speak a variety of Berber languages15. However, there has been so much inter-marriage throughout the ages that Moroccans are sometimes referred to as “arabized Berbers.” Thus it is not surprising that Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi is quoted as saying, “We are far away [from the Muslim heartland to the East.] Are we quite legitimate? We have been rebellious, we don’t fit into the proper pattern…. There is something faintly dissident about us. So what kind of Muslims are we?” (Warnock- Fernea, 1998: 64). Tension within Morocco today stems less from the Arab/Berber divide, than from the economic and educational disparity between rural and urban areas. Life in the fast- paced, noisy, polluted economic capital of Casablanca is not much different from that in any industrialized city in the Western hemisphere. This is in sharp contrast to the quiet life in remote rural communities, where villagers still draw water from a communal well, their houses or goatskin tents are without electricity and the main means of transportation are donkeys. Real and imagined differences between Arabs and Berbers were exploited during the four decades Morocco was a French protectorate. An important element in the development of Moroccan family law is the Berber dahir (Royal Decree) of 1930 which the sultan of Morocco issued on behalf of the French colonial powers. Mounira Charrad, a US based sociologist writes: “Exacerbating once again political and legal divisions between Berbers and Arabs, the decree reasserted the legitimacy of Berber customary law

15 In Morocco the three main Berber languages are Tarifit in the Rif mountains of the North, Tamazight in the Middle Atlas and Tachelhit in southern Morocco.

and tribal councils” (Charrad, 2001: 140). She describes the hidden purpose of the Berber decree as follows:

The decree of 1930 was a continuation of the colonial policy of setting one part of Morocco against another. The French saw Berbers in the bilad-al siba16 as potential allies. Catholic circles in Morocco believed that the distinctiveness of Berber customary law implied that Berber allegiance to Islam was shaky, even in the Islamisized areas. They entertained the notion that, with some encouragement, the Berbers could be weaned away from Islamic faith. (141)

The Arab/Berber divide in Morocco comes into play again with the immigration of Moroccans to France as it was mostly Berbers from the poor, rural areas who crossed the Mediterranean to France in search of better living conditions. It is ironic that North Africans in France are often simply referred to as “Arabs” when in fact the largest contingents of North African immigrants hail from the Berber regions of the Rif mountains, the Middle or High Atlas regions in Morocco and Kabylia in Algeria. The majority of the women interviewed for this research in France, traced their roots to a Berber region in Morocco. Charrad (2001) describes how the Moroccan monarchy after independence in 1956, established itself by drawing on regional tribal support as much as on the Arab/urban elite:

The policy of family law after independence reflected the coalition between monarchy and tribe and the continued importance of kin-based solidarities in Morocco. Once victorious, the monarchy engaged in political actions and policies that protected – or avoided disturbing – the tribal order that provided it with its base for power. The policy on family law was part of this overall strategy. ……The codification [of the personal status code] institutionalized the model of the family as an extended patrilineage based on agnatic ties, the kinship model that was the cornerstone of the tribal model. (147)

As stated in the beginning of this section, law is a reflection of culture and vice versa; in as much as law prescribes conduct, it becomes part of a people’s culture. Hence,

16 Bilad (or bled) -al siba, lit.: place (city) of youth, here meaning ‘Lands of Dissidence' (until 1930s, Berber-dominated Rif, Atlas and Sahara).

Islamic law, shari’a, in general - of which Personal Status Code is one aspect - is described by Swiss-based philosopher, Tariq Ramadan, as an expression of a way of life : “La shari’a n’a rien à voir avec la lecture réductionniste qui nous est proposée par certains musulmans, orientalistes ou journalistes qui l’associent à l’application des peines du Code pénal pour en présenter l’exact trahison. La shari’a, c’est comment être musulman et demeurer musulman, c’est la voie de la fidélité aux principes de la foi vivante, de la responsabilité, de la justice, de l’équité, du respect et de la liberté” (Ramadan, 2002 : 49). Ramdan’s views reflect an Islamist perspective, namely that Islam is not merely a religious belief system, but a complete way of life that encompasses all aspects of personal and public life.

Given the historic context, the reform of the Personal Status Code in Morocco represents a major societal shift and an altered religious understanding. It has the potential of enhancing social cohesion in Morocco by eroding remnants of the Arab/Berber divide and bringing the entire population under one unified law. It offers a degree of self-determination to women previously unheard of in this North African kingdom. As this reform was implemented only recently, there has so far been very little scholarly research on its impact or attitudes of Moroccan women towards the reform. By including questions on this reform in my fieldwork, I was able to throw new light on this important development.

The Debate over the Muslim Headscarf in France

As much as the reform of the family law in Morocco is a reflection of a progressively changing culture in that country, in France legislation on selected religious insignia, chiefly the Muslim headscarf, is by contrast indicative of a move towards conservative interpretations of the law. Since 198917, the appearance of the hijab (Muslim headscarf) in French public schools has opened the most impassioned debate over the role of laïcité in French society

17 For a comprehensive explanation of the ‘The headscarf affair’ see Hargreaves, 1995:125 pp.

since the separation of church and state was put into effect at the beginning of the last century. Conflicts between Muslim adolescents and school authorities have extended beyond the schools to involve intellectuals, political actors, and religious authorities. In March 2004, a new law has been passed that bans the wearing of all “ostentatious” religious symbols in public schools.18 France, historically a predominantly Roman Catholic country, has wrestled to find a balance between secular and religious powers for centuries. The French Revolution in 1789 ended the Catholic Church's domination over the state. About a decade later, in 1801, Napoleon came to an agreement with the Catholic Church under the Concordat which brought the Church under state auspices and confined it to religious matters. A landmark law was passed in 1905 that instituted the separation of church and state. This law - intended to keep the influence of the Catholic Church at bay - has in the past decade been put to the test with the increasing visibility of Muslims within the hexagon, epitomized by the appearance of young Muslim women wearing head scarves. Once politicians and courts were called upon to legislate or rule on specific issues concerning the Muslim headscarf, the “veil debate” became a widespread public concern in France. The most publicized events revolve around the question whether a public school teacher or student may wear a Muslim headscarf or whether a company may fire an employee for wearing a veil to work. In 1989, when the world was stunned by the fall of the Berlin Wall, French media were preoccupied with the case of two girls from Creil who were suspended from school because they refused to abide by their school's rule and remove their headscarves. At the time, the French Conseil d’Etat, France’s highest administrative court, ruled that religious signs are allowed in schools as long as they are not "ostentatoire." Based on the secular principle at the heart of the French state, it is not illegal to wear religious symbols in public schools. But the law did forbid those that “constitute an act of pressure, provocation, proselytism, or propaganda”. In 2003, once again two teenage girls, this time from Aubervilliers, an industrial suburb of Paris, aroused public awareness when they too refused to take off their headscarfs (The Economist, 2003).

18 The full text of the government document appears in the Appendix.

In 2004 the French government hoped to put an end to the veil debate and signed into law a ruling that would ban all ostentatious religious symbols from public schools.19 This includes the Muslim headscarf, large crosses (the exact size is not specified), and the turban worn by male members of the Sikh community and the Jewish yarmulke. The “Journal Officiel de la Republique Française,” dated March 15, 2004 (Loi no 2004-228) and signed by President Jacques Chirac states :

… Dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, le port de signes ou tenus par lesquels les élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse est interdit. Le règlement intérieur rappelle que la mise en œuvre d’une procédure disciplinaire est précédée d’un dialogue avec l’élève.

The interdiction for wearing a veil in public schools is seen by its proponents as an affirmation of France’s commitment to separation of the religious from the secular sphere. This time the law is not directed at the Catholic Church but at France’s second largest religion, Islam. Though Muslims have resided in France in large numbers for decades, they have for the most part existed outside of the mainstream. With second- and third generation of North African entering public schools, universities and public life, the presence of Muslims is now felt as a force to be reckoned with. According to Joyceline Cesari, a French political scientist, the first wave of immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s introduced an “islam provisoire” into modern French society. In recent years however, France is confronted with a “religion stabilisée dont les adeptes affichent une volonté de plus en plus marquée de reconnaissance” (Cesari, 1998: 9). Like Kepel, Cesari observes a renewed Islamization whereby young French Muslims are looking for ways to assert their cultural and religious affinity which their parents’ generation practiced in the shadows of mainstream culture. This trend can be observed - to the surprise of some observers - among upwardly socially mobile young people. Cesari (1998) based her research on in-depth interviews with young French Muslims of immigrant origins. She describes the upwardly mobile (le grimpeur social) as the ones who most openly embrace an Islamic identity:

Les étudiantes, mais aussi les commerçants et artisans, sont les catégories les plus présentes dans ce processus d’islamisation et c’est là une surprise de l’enquête. Ils sont en effet un personnel de choix pour l’encadrement des nouvelles associations islamiques. (74)

These upwardly mobile young Muslims, having been forced to feel their differentness all their lives, now re-assert the role assigned to them by the majority culture and as a result, more and more young women don the hijab. Ironiously, this self- assertion is perceived as a provocation to the French state and its notions of laïcité, the strict separation of church and state. Soheib Bencheikh, the mufti (canon lawyer who can formulate a formal legal opinion) of the mosque in Marseille, points out that the concept of laïcité does not exist in the Arabic language. He insists that this is in fact a religious term which derives from the Catholic lexicon wherein “lay” people are non-ordained members of a Catholic congregation. Hence, irony of ironies, the term laïcité itself has a distinct religious connotation and does not necessarily imply the separation of the religious from the state (Bencheikh, 1998 :29). Even though Bencheikh questions the basic premise of laïcité, he nevertheless asserts that Islam in France enjoys a freedom not found anywhere in the Arab world because “political manipulation does not enter into religious reflections, the French law applies to all citizens equally” (ibid: 273). However, as stated earlier, this emphasis on laïcité, France does not encourage the public recognition of Islam. Arkoun argues that France is overemphasizing its secular nature at its own peril. “This combative secularism employed in the service of a specific political project - construction in France of a Republic that is ‘one and indivisible’ - neglects one of its own founding principles, that of philosophic openness to the study of all human channels for the production of meaning” (Arkoun, 2004 : 96). Some sociologists argue that the ban on the headscarf contradicts basic human rights which guarantee freedom of religion (Guénif-Souilamas, personal interview, May 2004). Others like journalist and author Fawzia Zouari are warning that the headscarf issue is threatening to tear France apart. Those Muslim feminists who do not wear the headscarf themselves have “no particular sympathy for the headscarf,” however they strongly advocate their co-religionist’s right to express their faith (Zouari, 2004: 5).

According to sociologist, novelist and recently (June 2005) appointed Minister of Equal Opportunities in France, Azouz Begag, “la condition de la femme,” is at the heart of the conflict between secular French society and its large Muslim minority. He ascribes the banning of the headscarf to a “fear of Islam,” which will lead to a further isolation of Muslim youth and ultimately will result in greater solidarity of second generation members - believers and non-believers alike - of the Maghrebi immigrant community with the culture and religion of their ancestors (Begag, 2003: 100). Khosrokhavar (1997) speaks of a distinct “islam féminin français” of which the headscarf is a particular expression:

Le moyen visible de cet islam féminin français est le foulard. En France, sa signification présente des différences notables avec ce qu’elle est dans les sociétés musulmanes même si, par certains côtés, elle s’en approche. En effet, le foulard français se développe chez de jeunes filles, qui ont été scolarisées à l’école publique et vivent en France depuis leur enfance. Elles sont plus imprégnées qu’on ne le dit de la mentalité française et parlent souvent un français élaboré. (97)

Thus, the headscarf in France is a much more complex and potentially divisive issue than in Morocco where it is indeed a matter of personal preference. As Morocco is not a secular but an Islamic state, there are no official pronouncements for or against the veil or the headscarf. In “L’une voilée, l’autre pas”, two French Muslim women of immigrant origins spar with each other over the issue of the veil. Dounia Bouzar, first female member of the Conseil français du culte Musulman (CFCM) and Saïda Kada, self-described militant feminist of “Femmes françaises et musulmanes engagées” present their opposing viewpoints. The book is a collection of essays and includes testimonies of young French women who explain why they do or do not cover themselves in public. Bouzar opposes the hijab while Kada, covered herself, supports the head-scarf of her fellow-co- religionists. As divided as they are on the particular issue of the Muslim headscarf, they are united on several points of importance which they describe in their jointly authored work. One issue on which both agree is that they reject the idea that men should rule on the headscarf issue. Bouzar and Kada (2003) write:

Les Françaises de confession musulmane cherchent aujourd’hui leur place dans un univers où les normes semblent être toujours faites pas les hommes et pour les hommes. Elles ne veulent plus être définies à partir comportements de préétablis légitimées par un islam préfabriqué, modelé autour des besoins masculins. (37)

Bouzar quotes the previously cited Bencheikh to support her view. He makes the case that women are not compelled by the Qu’ran to cover their heads. The purpose of the veil or the headscarf is to offer protection to women. In this day and age, Bencheikh (1998) argues, education is the single most important shield of protection for women:

Si le Coran recommande le voile, c’est dans le seul objectif de préserver la dignité et la personnalité de la femme selon le moyen disponible de l’époque de la Révélation. Si, aujourd'hui, le même moyen ne réalise plus le même objectif, il ne faut pas s’attarder sur ce moyen, mais le chercher ailleurs. Paradoxalement, ce qui préserve aujourd’hui la personnalité et assure l’avenir de la jeune fille peut se défendre comme toute atteinte a sa féminité et sa dignité. Aujourd’hui, le voile de la musulmane en France, c’est l’école laïque, gratuite et obligatoire. (144)

On the other side, Kada draws on the writings of Tariq Ramadan (2003) who insists on the continued relevance of the headscarf, the actual piece of fabric, for Muslim women. Ramadan insists that Muslim women need to be free to uphold their own traditions in the face of secular, Western influences: “Le voile est une prescription mais fondée sur la liberté. N’obéissez qu’a votre conscience!”

In Ramadan’s view, a woman’s conscience should eventually direct her to wear the headscarf. To an uninitiated reader, his call to follow one’s own conscience may allow for multiple interpretations but given Ramadan’s standing in the Islamic community as an eminent scholar who places great value on Muslim’s rights to self- expression in the West, it is clear which way a woman’s conscience is to direct her. On another occasion, Ramadan wrote that one of the principal characteristics of Muslim identity is to “educate and bear witness” (Ramadan 2002:30). I will return to the aspect of bearing witness again later on.

In their essays, Bouzar and Kada (2003) place the hijab in a historical and cultural context. Kada stresses the notion of continuity:

Le foulard est arrivé pour les femmes et non pas contre elles. A l’époque de la Révélation, on en avait besoin, en termes de protection…Il fallait un signe pour qu’ils [les hommes de l’époque] se mettent à respecter les femmes et arrêter de les agresser. (33)

For Kada, faith in the revelation of the prophet is demonstrated outwardly by following the customs initiated by Muhammad. Bouzar on the other side believes that the veil or the headscarf have to be understood within a specific historical context. As social circumstances change over time, the need for certain practices has to be re-examined. Bouzar suggests searching for the meaning behind practices like the wearing of a headscarf, and evaluate them based on their intended meaning, which according to Bouzar is to ensure the God-given equality between men and women:

Je fais exactement le raisonnement contraire: pour moi, mettre le foulard aujourd’hui, ici, c’est admettre qu’on ne sera jamais considérée comme égale, telle que Dieu a voulu (34).

Any dispute revolving around a religious question is complicated by the fact that ‘faith’ is not a quantifiable entity. External symbols like the headscarf are nothing but an indicator and one to which its wearers attribute different meanings. As stated in the section on ‘Conceptions Islam,’ faith cannot easily be measured or evaluated. As revealed in my interviews, the public discussion about the veil is understood as missing the point of the problematic of Muslims in France, namely social exclusion, lack of opportunity and discrimination. Though Bouzar and Kada do not quote the Qu’ran in their book, it is worthwhile to take note of what the Holy Scripture says about the covering of women’s head. Part of the reason for discord concerning the veil among Muslims themselves is because in the 114 suras of the Qu’ran (A Contemporary Translation by Ahmed Ali,1988), the veil is mentioned only twice20. Following is the most commonly cited sura:

20 The other verse in which the veil is mentioned are and 24: 31

O prophet, tell your wives and daughters, And the women of the faithful, To draw their wraps a little over them. They will thus be recognized and no harm will come to them. God is forgiving and kind (sura 33, verse 59).

This sura states that the veil serves two purposes: one, as a means of recognizing a Muslim woman and secondly, to protect women from harm. Let us return briefly to Tariq Ramadan’s reading of “they will thus be recognized.” This phrase is understood as being synonymous with “bearing witness.” From an Islamist perspective such as Ramadan’s, this is the prime reason for wearing a headscarf. However, it should be pointed out here that there is a difference between bearing witness to one’s faith by means of the headscarf and for asserting an otherness already imposed by society. Ramadan’s interpretation does however shed some light on the underlying reasons why the headscarf is perceived as such a contentious issue in France. If this piece of fabric is used to distinguish an individual in terms of her religious affiliation, it may be interpreted as a tool for proselytizing. The veil is intended to impact others, who will recognize the wearer. And herein lay some of the roots for the tension surrounding the debate in France. Implicit in the scriptural exhortation is the idea that “their wrap” is concerned with the response of others to the wearer: “They will thus be recognized and no harm will come to them.” L’une voilée, l’autre pas illustrates this nervousness about what Muslim women think, what Muslim men think and what the French community at large thinks. Bouzar and Kada agree that there is a unique French dimension to the debate over the headscarf:

Le foulard est désormais un phénomène français. Les jeunes filles qui le portent sont françaises, elle revendiquent et mettent en avant leur francité. La différence de ce livre a résidé dans la nécessité d’analyser le sens que le port du voile a au sein de l’espace français. Il ne s’agit pas de renvoyer ces Françaises à des histoires qui ne sont pas les leurs - c'est-à-dire à celles de leur parents ou grands-parents. (16)

The second purpose as stated in the sura, protection, is another a frequently cited reason for wearing a headscarf by women of Maghrebi origin in France. In the testimonies included in Bouzar and Kada’s book, young women speak of the need to protect themselves from male violence. They feel that the headscarf serves this purpose. This particular French aspect - pertaining to the concept of laïcité - of the headscarf debate should, according to Kada, not be confused with a debate about Islam in general.

Autrement dit, même si l’actualité internationale nous a aussi permis de mieux comprendre la crainte de ceux qui percevaient le voile comme le signe de la soumission de la femme - crainte d’autant plus grande que toutes les injustices liées a la place insignifiante de la gent féminine dans nos sociétés d’origine sont articulées autour de la religion, ce n’est pas pour cela qu’on va accepter de réduire le foulard à cette interprétation et à cette utilisation, et qu’on va se l’interdire. (41)

The dialogue among these two authors illustrates the fact that there exists a vigorous internal debate on the headscarf among Muslims in France, and that it is not merely a matter of the French state versus its Muslim citizens.

My interviews showed that women in Morocco followed the headscarf debate in France with great interest and their responses revealed a nuanced approach, one that was not necessarily opposed to the position of the French government. While a substantial body of scholarly literature exists on the relationship between Islam and laïcité and a wide variety of popular and scholarly debate has been generated by successive waves of the headscarf affair in France, my own fieldwork is the first to compare attitudes towards the 2004 law among Moroccan women in France with those of a similar age group in Morocco.

Personal and Professional Goals and Challenges

The theme, “personal and professional goals and challenges” of young, educated, urban Muslim women in France and in Morocco, as I have explored it in my research, has not yet been a subject of extensive scholarly research. This is partly because an educated, professional class of second generation North Africans is only now emerging in France. Likewise in Morocco, a young professional class of women is a recent phenomenon. While questions about challenges refer to experiences in the present, goals pertain to aspirations for the future. In her research, sociologist Nacira Guénif-Souilamas identifies three major areas of concern for French women of immigrant origins: integration, subjectivity and individual identity. Integration pertains mostly to their professional lives, subjectivity to their desire and insistence on being in charge of their own personal destiny, and identity to their understanding of themselves (Guénif-Souilamas, 2000: 345). Her research findings are based on a series of interviews with young second- and third generation women of immigrant families from the Maghreb, primarily Algeria. These three themes come to the fore in the narratives to which I will now turn. Within the past decade, authors of Maghrebi origin in France and Moroccan women have written personal memoirs, most often in the form of first-person narratives or as fictional accounts. In Morocco this new genre is categorized as “litterature féminine maghrébine,” whereas in France, these texts are labeled “litterature beur.” (The term Beur was formed by inverting the syllables which make up the word ‘Arabe.’). Hargreaves (1997) has examined this literature in France and concluded that it consists mostly of first-person narratives of women and men who offer testimonies of their lives in France.

It focused on the key problematic which has preoccupied Beur writers: the articulation of a sense of personal identity, forged in the particular circumstances which are those of an ethnic minority in France. (1)

Therefore, these narratives lend themselves for an exploration of issues pertaining to personal and professional aspirations and challenges. According to Hargreaves, the experiences of women have become the subject of a growing number of narratives,

especially by second generation authors (2004: 6). Most of these authors describe the difficulties of growing up in immigrant Maghrebi communities in France, their family conflicts, their travails at school, discrimination and the problem of neither fitting in with the traditional structures of their extended families, nor French society in general. These texts indicate that women are preoccupied by the question of personal emancipation vis- à-vis their community of origin. In one of the early works of this genre, author Malika Mokkedem (1993) lends these words to her protagonist Sultana :

Je suis plutôt dans l’entre-deux, sur une ligne de fracture, dans toutes les ruptures. Entre la modestie et dédain qui lamine mes rébellions. Entre la tension du refus et la dispersion que procurent les libertés. Entre l’aliénation de l’angoisse et l’évasion par le rêve et l’imagination. Dans un entre-deux qui cherche ses jonctions entre le Sud et le Nord, ses repères dans deux cultures. (65)

In “Ils disent que je suis une beurette” (Nini, 1993), Soraya Nini describes the conflicts of an adolescent girl in these cross-cultural settings. She also tells of the difficulties of second generation North African women in leading a life that differs significantly from that of their mostly illiterate mothers who never pursued a career outside the home. In “Née en France. Histoire d’une jeune beur” (Benaïssa, 1990), the author recounts her ordeal of being sequestered by her parents in Algeria to curtail the young woman’s ambition for personal freedom. Another writer, Djura, tells of the story of a woman of Maghrebi immigrant origin who marries a French man (Djura, 1990). Very dramatically, the book describes the attempted murder of the author/protagonist by members of her family upon learning that she was pregnant by a French man. The issue of inter-religious marriages was also part of my interview schedule. As Islam is a patri- linear religion, dogma forbids Muslim women to marry a Non-Muslim unless he converts and thereby ensures that children of such a union are born as Muslims. Marriage, arranged, forced or to a Non Muslim, are recurring themes in the narratives of second generation North African authors. Leila - no last name given - writes

in “Mariée de force” (Leila, 2004) of the travails of a young woman, forced by her parents to marry a man she did not know prior to the marriage and did not love. Some of these testimonials are a call to action, such as the memoir “Vivre libre” by Loubna Méliane, who describes the violence in the socially disadvantaged neighborhoods, the banlieues (Méliane, 2004). This activist trend was set in motion by the publication of Fadéla Amara’s “Ni putes, ni soumises”21 (Amara, 2003). Despite the questionable literary quality of some of these works, they are remarkable for the fact that they give women a voice. Hargreaves observes that often a second name appears on the cover of books by second generation female authors, namely that of a “français de souche” co-author. Also, the principal author’s Arab name is frequently either a pseudonym or only a common first name is indicated, while the real name of the French co-author is displayed. He further notes: “The negative images of Islam highlighted in the publishers’ promotional materials seem at least likely to attract out-and-out racists as liberal sympathizers with immigrant minorities” (8). Therefore, the themes of these narratives are also indicative of the issues the majority French culture perceives as important concerns of young women of Maghrebi origin. Few of these memoirs for instance deal at any length with the question of employment opportunities, an issue of critical importance and one that was frequently raised during the interviews I conducted.

On the Moroccan side, first-person testimonies by women is a new literary genre, “litterature féminine maghrébine.” First-time, non-academic authors have limited access to the nascent publishing industry in that country. There are also cultural constraints concerning writing in the first-person. As with their counterparts in France, female authors in Morocco often use the literary device of a novel to recount their own personal stories. Notable exceptions are first-person narratives by two well-known Moroccan women, sociologist Fatima Mernissi and Leila Abouzeid. Both women hail from upper class, respected families. Mernissi is an internationally acclaimed scholar and feminist and Abouzeid had been appointed by the late King Hassan II to a commission

21 “Ni putes, ni soumises” is also the name of a highly mediatized organization fighting for the rights of minority ethnic women.

investigating the practice of family law in Morocco. Rejecting the colonial French language, Abouzeid writes in Arabic and thus far, her books have been translated only into English. In the preface to Abouzeid’s (1998) autobiography “Return to Childhood. The memoir of a Modern Moroccan Woman,” she writes:

Autobiography, until the last few years, was not respected as a literary form in Morocco. For Arabs, literature meant the lyric, the poetic, and the fantastic, whereas autobiography deals with the practice of daily life and tends to be written in common speech……perhaps even more important, a Muslim’s private life is considered an ara (an intimate part of the body), and sitr (concealing it) is imperative. (iii).

Abouzeid explains that the hijab is as much a concept as a piece of clothing, hence women’s private lives are to be veiled and not brought into public view. This inhibition to write - or speak - about one’s own life was also evident in my interviews, as respondents often needed to be reassured of the confidentiality of these conversations and were initially hesitant about disclosing their personal views about private matters. This is illustrated by Abouzeid (1998):

For me, writing an autobiography was therefore even more unusual, because I am a woman, and women in my culture do not speak in public, let alone speak about their private lives in public. When I published my first article in a Moroccan newspaper in 1962, I did not even sign it with my real name, but used the pseudonym of Aziza, and when I published my first novel, Am al Fil (Year of the Elephant), in 1983, I left the protagonist’s hometown unnamed because it was my own. (iv)

Abouzeid’s coming of age memoir is filled with historic references to her country’s struggle for independence and her family’s role in that endeavor. The great disappointment occurred when women, who bravely stood at the front line of that struggle, after independence found themselves relegated to their traditional roles in the home. Occasionally, husbands divorced their wives because they had become too independent-minded. In “Dreams of Tresspass - Tales of a Harem Childhood” (1994) Fatima Mernissi recalls her childhood in a privileged household in the medieval, royal city of Fès, and

contrasts her veiled existence in the urban harem (the separate quarters for the women of a household) with that of her summers spent in the countryside where women rode horses and freely roamed the fields. Like Abouzeid’s, Mernissi’s autobiography paints a vivid picture of a specific period in Morocco’s recent history and equates her countries struggle for independence from France with women’s quest for emancipation. More recently, personal narratives by less well-known authors have appeared in Morocco. Some of these texts came to North African book stores by way of France, where they were initially published. Rachida Yacoubi, author of “Ma vie, mon Cri” (1996) recounts her difficulty as a divorced women in Morocco. In 2002, Yacoubi published another installment of her memoirs in “Je dénonce” wherein she describes how she was put in jail for having had the audacity to divorce her husband. She recalls the despicable conditions in a women’s prison in Casablanca. To date, prison conditions are rather a taboo issue in Morocco. The issues raised in some of these narratives are remarkably similar to those of French authors of Maghrebi origin. Siham Benchekroun “Oser Vivre” (1999) tells the story of a woman who rebels against her abusive husband and oppressive tradtionalism in an effort to find her own identity : "Nadia aurait aimé pouvoir expliquer à son mari qu’elle ne cherchait aucunement à dénigrer quoique ce soit, que le plus important à ses yeux était de pouvoir choisir ses propres vérités, que celles-ci appartiennent à l'orient, à l'occident où n'importe quelles civilisations" (Benchekroun, 1999 :89). For her part, lawyer Fadéla Sebti fictionalized the story of a young French woman who marries a Moroccan man and moves to his hometown of Casablanca in “Moi, Mireille, lorsque j’étais Yasmina” (1995). The young woman becomes the victim of traditional Moroccan family law and eventually is repudiated by her husband. Because the protagonist is French and not Moroccan, the inhumane and humiliating effects of the custom of repudiation are described in detail without offending local sensibilities. One memoir stands out because it became an international bestseller: Malika Oufkir’s “Stolen Lives -Twenty years in a Desert Jail.” Her palace to prison story had all the attributes of a celebrity memoir: Her intimate connection with the opulent life at the royal palace of Hassan II and her notorious father, General Mohammed Oufkir, erstwhile head of the infamous Moroccan Security Service who had masterminded the attempted

overthrow of the monarch in Morocco in 1972 and was subsequently executed. This led to Malika’s own imprisonment in a widely publicized case of clan liability. The tragic fate of a member of a prominent Moroccan family made the horrendous situation of political prisoners in Morocco known to a wider international public. Apart from that, the early part of the book reveals details of a lavish court life in an otherwise impoverished country which illustrates some of underlying reasons for the social tensions that threaten this country to this day. On the extreme other end of the social spectrum are the testimonies collected by Aïcha Ech-Channa in “Miseria-Témoignages” (2004) which chronicle the despair and poverty of unwed mothers and their children. Ech-Channa, a social activist now in her mid sixties, has been a constant and controversial voice in advocating family law reform. I interviewed Ech-Channa at her women’s center in Casablanca where she spoke about the difficult lives of single mothers who exist on the periphery of Moroccan society. She welcomed the family law reform because it offers for the first time a legal status to children born out of wedlock. In Morocco as well as in France, a central issue for women is marriage, motherhood and all aspects connected to marriage such as arranged marriages, free choice of a spouse, domestic abuse, rape, violence within the family and creating a live in accordance with their own private and professional ambitions and dreams. While imaginative and other narrative texts provide useful insights as to the personal and professional goals and challenges of women on both sides of the Mediterranean, they do so in highly personalized forms which are less susceptible to comparative analysis than the data yielded by my interviews, which used a standardized structure among the two target groups. For this reason, my research findings provide a significant addition to existing knowledge in this field.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

Guiding themes

Changing attitudes and cultural change are not easy to measure. Both themes are explored in my research. At the heart of this study are the perceptions of individuals. My interest was to find out what individual women in Morocco and women of Moroccan origin in France believe and think about certain issues. I was most interested in their personal understanding rather than the official discourses for example on the legal reform in Morocco or the banning of selected religious insignia in French public schools. In addition, I wanted to find out what women in both places have in common and what sets them apart. At present, there is little published scholarship with a comparative focus on women in Morocco and women of Moroccan origin in France. I set out to fill this gap through a qualitative research project based on a sample of target populations in Morocco and France. Qualitative research is a type of research that produces findings not arrived by statistical procedures or other quantitative means. While some of the data may be quantified, such as demographic information, the greater part of the analysis is interpretative (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 11). The choice of this methodology was determined by the nature of the research problem. The goal of this research is to gain a better understanding of attitudes of a population, their aspirations, thoughts, and feelings. Qualitative research is based on certain assumptions and inherent biases however it does not start out with a narrowly defined hypothesis followed by field work designed to test this hypothesis.

My research was designed to allow respondents to speak their minds on issues of importance to them. An interview schedule was used to provide a framework for the sessions with participants. This interview schedule included categorical and open-ended questions. Categorical (sometime referred to as “closed”) questions refer to questions with a fixed catalogue of answers from which to select, for example “yes/no”, “agree/disagree” or a number chose from among a range of alternatives. Such questions were used when inquiring about matters such as marital status, age, fasting during Ramadan, support for recent legal changes, etc. Open-ended questions, with no pre-set range of responses, allow respondents to elaborate on their answers to the categorical questions in their own terms and/or for new themes to emerge. They provide respondents with an opportunity to raise issues which they consider relevant and which might otherwise be overlooked by the researcher. As Lofland (quoted in Patton, 1980) writes:

The commitment to get close, to be factual, descriptive and quotive, constitutes a significant commitment to represent the participants in their own terms…. A major methodological consequence of these commitments is that the qualitative study of people in situ is a process of discovery. It is of necessity a process of learning what is happening….It is the observer’s task to find out what is fundamental or central to the people or world under observation. (36)

Social science scholars have developed a variety of research methods that apply to an investigation of attitudes. In the following, I will give a brief overview of Grounded Theory, a methodology from which I draw. In the 1960s, at the University of Chicago, Glaser and Strauss developed Grounded Theory based on a perceived need to get out into the field and find out what is “really going on.” The two scholars saw a need for theory, grounded in data, for the development of a discipline and as a basis for social action (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 9). Grounded Theory is derived from data and illustrated by characteristic examples from that data. Categories are developed in ex-post facto from the data in an effort to determine patterns that may lead to theory. This type of qualitative research begins with the collection of data and then develops a theory based on this data. An integral part of

this methodology is sensitivity to the evolving and unfolding nature of events (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 5). There are three major components of this type of qualitative research. First, there are the data, which in my case come from interviews. Second, there are the procedures that are used in organizing and interpreting the data. These include coding and conceptualizing data. The literature review or prior research findings accompanies the research process but does not entirely determine the direction of the research (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:12). The Grounded Theory approach is based on the assumption that framing the investigation too narrowly in terms of existing scholarly research will bias the researcher and reduce openness for new themes to emerge during the data collection. In preparing for this dissertation, I selected three broad themes (Islam, legal changes, personal and professional goals and challenges) and then structured my literature review around these themes. I subsequently conducted a series of pilot interviews which brought my chosen themes into sharper focus. The next step was initial field work in Morocco and in France in the summer of 2004 in which a network of contacts was established and some preliminary interviews were conducted. The final part of the field work in Morocco and France consisted of conducting the formal interviews which are the basis for this dissertation in the summer of 2005. In the year between the first and the second field trips, the review of the literature was completed, the methodology refined and the categories for the data analysis were developed. Strauss and Corbin (1998) consider that everything that occurs in the process of collecting the data is as important as the data themselves. In the following, I will describe the research process in greater detail.

Data Collection

My data collection consisted of interviews conducted in Morocco and France in the summers of 2004 and 2005. After laying the groundwork and establishing a network of contacts in 2004, I collected my core data in the form of 55 interviews conducted in 2005 among a sample of young, urban, educated professional Moroccan women between the ages of 18 - 35 and a sample of comparable women of Moroccan origin in France.

Ten additional interviews were conducted with older women, in some cases mothers of the women I interviewed for this study. These interviews were not conducted in a systematic manner but often brought interesting points to light on data collected through the core interview schedule. In the main body of my analysis, I will draw on these interviews. Some of the interviews with more mature women offered a perspective on generational differences and put responses of the younger women into a broader context. Where appropriate, I draw on these additional interviews in the main body of my analysis. I also consulted experts on issues such as law, social and political science and religious scholars. In Morocco, these experts included legal scholars and lawyers, political scientists, scholars of Islam and journalists and social workers. I also interviewed prominent public figures like feminist Leila Rhiwi of the Union of Feminine Action (UAF), an organization which was instrumental in promoting the family law reform. As Islamism is a rising force in Morocco, I sought out Nadia Yassine, spokesperson of the largest non- violent, fundamentalist Islamic Movement Al Adl wa Ihsane (Justice and Charity) and daughter of its leader Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine. Nadia Yassine is one of the most influential and, due to her critical stand towards the monarchy, controversial women in Morocco today. In France, I did not have access to women of comparable public standing. However, I interviewed women who direct a variety of grassroots social service organizations, such as a center for aging workers of North African immigrant origin, a center for abused women, Voix d’elles Rebelles, an organization that caters to troubled young women (filles en difficultés) in the banlieues (socially disadvantaged neighborhoods). I consulted with scholars such as Nacira Guénif-Souilamas who has written on the subject of second-generation women of Maghrebi origin and Philippe Dewitte, editor of the long-established, monthly journal “Hommes et migrations.” Consultations with these experts provided context, background information and allowed for a better understanding of the answers provided by the women interviewed for this research. Because of my background in journalism, conducting interviews is a well- practiced skill and even seemingly casual conversations can be directed so as to provide important insights and background information.

In all, a total of 80 interviews are drawn on in the dissertation, i.e. 55 conducted using a common interview schedule with my core sample of women in Morocco and France and 25 supplementary interviews conducted in more flexible ways with a more diverse range of subjects. Because all interviews were conducted in compliance with the Human Subjects Committee requirements for confidentiality, none of my interview partners will be referred to by their real name in the Data Analysis Chapters. Throughout, real names have been replaced with pseudonyms.

The Samples

The samples were selected from the target populations, namely young, educated, professional and urban women in Morocco and comparable women of Moroccan origin in France. The responses of different interviewees are drawn on in varying ways. Because of the exploratory nature of this research, certain responses will be cited in greater detail than others to illustrate a particularly striking point or to highlight an issue raised by several respondents. Naturally, some respondents were more eloquent than others and therefore their answers are referred to more frequently especially when these reflect a viewpoint of several other women. These multiple case studies serve to explore characteristics of the population and gain deeper insights into their perceptions and attitudes about specific issues and to discern possible patterns.

The reason for focusing on this particular population lies in the comparative nature of the study. To facilitate a valid comparison, the two groups need to have criteria of significance in common. Because the study has as its focus women in Morocco and women of Moroccan origin in France, certain commonalities can be taken for granted, for example the majority, if not all, women are Muslim and have been inculcated with Moroccan culture and traditions. The reasons for choosing the additional criteria mentioned above are follows: Young: Young women are in the process of charting out their personal and professional lives and they are an integral part of cultural shifts. Inasmuch as their lives differ from those of their mothers, young women are breaking new ground. The age of the women interviewed for this research ranges between 18 and 35 years.

Educated: As agents of change, educated women play a larger role in the public sphere of their countries than, for example, illiterate, rural women. According to World Bank statistics, Morocco has a literacy rate of 50.7 per cent. Among women, the literacy rate is 38.3 per cent: that is, more than 60 per cent of Moroccan women are illiterate. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization defines the adult literary rate as follows: “The adult literacy rate is the percentage of people aged 15 and above who can, with understanding write a short, simple statement on their everyday life” (UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2002). For France, no comparative data are available. It is, however, safe to assume that the literacy rate among women brought up in France, where the educational system is far more developed, is very much higher than among women in Morocco. Granted these educational differences between Morocco and France, rather than sampling women representative of the general population of the two countries, my investigation focuses on those with similar educational attainments, thereby facilitating closer comparisons of their attitudes on the topics selected in my research.1 All the women interviewed for this study possessed at minimum a baccalaureate, the majority in both samples held the equivalent of a Bachelor’s Degree, some a the equivalent of a Master’s and some a Ph.D. The reasons why women in the French sample generally have attained a less advanced degree than those in the Moroccan sample lies in the fact that educated, professional women in Morocco often come from a higher social class and therefore have easier access to educational facilities. The issue of the importance of social class is addressed in the Data Analysis chapters and in the Conclusion. Professional: Professional women, i.e. women who possess distinctive qualifications for their jobs, are a relatively recent phenomenon in Morocco. Likewise in France, second-generation professional women of Moroccan origin are only now emerging. It was therefore of particular interest to ascertain the differences and similarities between two groups of people who are among the first in their respective countries to enter the job market in comparatively large numbers. Some of the women

1 Women immigrants often have received only minimal schooling before leaving Morocco and moving to France; however, their daughters - the target population of this study - will have attended schools in France.

were between jobs and some were unemployed at the time of my first meeting with them in 2004 but most had found professional positions when I interviewed them in 2005. Urban: For the purposes of a comparative study, urban residence was selected as a criterion for sample selection. In metropolitan France, few second-generation Moroccan women live in a rural environment. Even the socially disadvantaged banlieues or cités have basic services such as electricity, water and healthcare and children growing up in these parts of town will attend school, which is not the case in the shantytowns on the outskirts of Moroccan cities such as Casablanca. Therefore, the sample in Morocco was drawn from an urban, population, even though the families of some of the women I interviewed came from small towns across Morocco.2

Despite the commonalities of both samples with regards to the above criteria, there are significant differences as well. The single biggest difference between young, urban, educated and professional women in Morocco and a comparable group of women of Moroccan origin in France, was found to be social class. I endeavored to take this into account in constructing my samples. In Morocco, most women who fit the selected criteria hail from middle or upper middle class backgrounds. The mothers of these young women are literate, but most have not pursued a professional career, while their fathers are often in the employ of the government or are highly skilled professionals such as medical doctors, pharmacists, academics or businessmen. In France the majority of women of Moroccan origin come from working-class backgrounds and have grown up in the socially disadvantaged outskirts, banlieues, of industrial cities. Their mothers are often illiterate; if they had a job outside the home, they had menial jobs such as domestic servants. Most fathers work in low-skilled, low-wage jobs. Because of these disparities with regards to social class, in selecting interviewees particular effort was made to locate young, educated, professional women in Morocco

2 A hallmark of Moroccan society is its rural/urban dichotomy. About half of the population of 32 million lives in the rural areas and hinterlands, the other half in the urban centers. In the urban areas, there is great disparity between the poor, socially disadvantaged shantytowns where dwellings may not have running water or electricity or adequate educational facilities and the middle-and upper-middle class sections of town.

who come from modest backgrounds though these cases are rare in a society that knows little upward social mobility. Women in that category are a particularly small minority but as the data analysis will show, they are also a particularly outspoken and active minority. In a similar way, in France, efforts were made to include women of Moroccan origin whose parents come from middle-class backgrounds. These were women whose fathers had come to France to pursue university degrees and then found well-paying, high-skilled jobs and remained there or they were businessmen who traded across the Mediterranean but maintained their residence in France or who worked for international companies.

Interview Topics

The topics for the interviews revolved around three main themes: Conceptions of Islam, Legal Changes and Personal and Professional Aspirations and Challenges. Because religion is central to a believer’s identity and because Islam in particular has become an important issue in current public discourse, women’s individual perceptions and understandings of their religion were deemed an important theme. I was particularly interested to investigate the extent to which attitudes of women in Morocco, a predominantly (Sunni) Islamic country, differ from or are similar to those of Muslim women in France, a secular state with a marked Roman Catholic heritage. In France, discussions about the Muslim minority reached an almost feverish pitch culminating in the debate on the headscarf ban in public schools in the spring of 2004. Furthermore, as Turkey is poised to become the first predominantly Islamic country to enter the European Union, integration of Muslim populations into the European mainstream is a pressing issue. Selection of the interview topics was also influenced by my personal experience in Africa. Before living in Morocco, I had lived in South Africa (1982-1984), a country of diverse cultures and religions. At the time, the apartheid system was still in place and tension and conflict between peoples of different races was an all-encompassing, daily reality. From southern Africa I moved to Kenya, East Africa, (1984-1993) which, like

South Africa, has a substantial Muslim population3, particularly along the Indian Ocean coastline. The national language, Kiswahili, is closely related to Arabic (swahel meaning coast). During the decade I lived in Kenya, I did not perceive religious differences as a major dividing factor between people. Quite the contrary, it is not uncommon to find families whose individual members profess belief in different religions, from a variety of Christian denominations to traditional African religions or Islam. Differences in religious belief rarely were a main cause for tension. My experience in North Africa (1999 -2001) by contrast was marked by an absence of religious diversity and religious differences associated with external cultural spaces, were perceived as a major stumbling bloc in human relations.

Both France and Morocco have recently seen important legal changes that directly impact women’s lives; therefore this theme was deemed relevant. Again, the focus of the investigation was on how women in the two samples understood and perceived legal changes with regards to their own lives. Among other things, I wanted to find out how much women in France knew about the family law reform in Morocco and conversely how much women in Morocco had followed the debate on the banning of the veil in public schools in France.

The third thematic group of questions concerned personal and professional challenges. I developed this part of the interview schedule after conducting pilot interviews with young Muslim women of immigrant origins in the United States. (The pilot interviews will be discussed in greater detail in the next section). The initial interview schedule had contained open-ended questions concerning participants’ assessment of the status of women in the country of their residence and what they considered some to be of the most pressing social issues facing women. However, during the pilot interviews, participants were more inclined to speak about their personal situations than to discuss a topic in the abstract. This desire to stay with the personal rather than the general can be attributed in part to the fact that the sample consisted of

3 Protestant 45%, Roman Catholic 33%, indigenous beliefs 10%, Muslim 10%, other 2% note: a large majority of Kenyans are Christian, but estimates for the percentage of the population that adheres to Islam or indigenous beliefs vary widely (World Fact Book)

young women. For them, decisions about marriage, family and/or a professional career are issues of immediate concern. Weaving together family obligations and the demands of a professional life are of course challenges for women regardless of their cultural, religious or educational background. Marriage, however, presents a particular area of concern for most Muslim women. Marriage is often understood as a fact of life and not primarily a matter of choice. Questions about early marriage, arranged marriage, the requirement to marry within the culture4, weigh particularly heavy on Muslim women. The pursuit of professional ambitions is also of particular relevance for women in Morocco and women of Moroccan origin in France. In France, second generation women whose North African parents came to Europe as low-skilled immigrants, are the first of their kind to claim a place in the public sphere. Khosrokhavar describes the emergence of a professional class among women of Maghrebi origins as follows: “L’irruption des femmes sur la scène publique est un phénomène nouveau dans l’islam” (115) and he continues, “Les filles, elles, s’émancipent progressivement, mais leur marge de manoeuvre est beaucoup plus restreinte [que celles des hommes]” (121). In Morocco, a similar phenomenon occurs with increasing numbers of young, educated women seeking entrance into the workforce. The 2003 Arab Human Development Report, published by the United Nations Development Programme, identifies three main tasks for the Arab world: “Building, using and liberating the capabilities of the Arab people by advancing knowledge, freedom and women’s empowerment” (UDP, 2003:III). An increasing number of women in Morocco and France eschew early marriage to pursue higher education, a professional career and are faced with the task of accommodating personal and professional aspirations. In achieving a balance between the two, there are particular hurdles for women in the Arab world associated with the demarcation between the public and the private sphere. An understanding of this matter is important in order to appreciate the acuteness of the issue of personal and professional goals and associated challenges for the two samples.

4 Islam is a patrilineal religion, i.e. a Muslim father is required for a child to be born a Muslim.

In Moroccan culture, as in most of the Arab world, the public and the private are two distinct spheres. They are two separate worlds for which the rules of behavior are different. The public refers to: the street, men’s place, where everything is up for grabs, and where it is every man for himself. This is contrasted with the private that refers to the home, where all relationships are clearly defined and rules of behavior are unambiguous and all actions are accounted for (Gray, 2005). Anyone who has traveled to North Africa or the Arab world will have experienced the rude behavior in the street which is in sharp contrast to the generous and kind hospitality in the home, widespread neglect of public spaces versus the immaculate cleanliness inside the house. There also is a marked absence of personal space and boundaries in public places which particularly for women can create uncomfortable situations (Hall, 1966: 159 p). Families who moved from Morocco to France have a deep seated sense of this distinction. Concern - even fear - among fathers, brothers, husbands of releasing their female relative into the unruly world outside, is not merely a control issue as it is often presented, but it is also based on an understanding of the different rules governing social interaction in the private and the public spheres.

Questionnaire Development and Pilot Interviews

Pilot interviews preceded the main fieldwork. The purpose of this phase was to explore responses to the provisional interview schedule in order to identify unexpected problems or shortcomings and possible ways of eliminating these. The development of the interview schedule was significantly influenced by the pilot interviews conducted with young Muslim women of immigrant origins in the United States. These women came from families who had immigrated to the United States from Iraq, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. All women were second-generation, that is their parents were born abroad and came to the United States as adults. The daughters were born in the U.S. or came to the U.S. as infants but families had maintained ties with their relatives in the country of their origin. In most cases, these young women were the first females in their families to obtain a university education and embark on professional careers. Some of them wore the Muslim headscarf, hijab, others did not. Socio-cultural

similarity between these women and the target population was a relevant factor in selecting women for participation in the pilot phase. Because easy access was also a factor at that stage of my research, all women who participated in the pilot interviews lived in Tallahassee, Florida. For the pilot phase, I used a provisional interview schedule but otherwise employed the same procedures I was later to follow in Morocco and France. I informed respondents that the interviews were confidential and that none of the information would be made public by using their real names; instead pseudonyms would be used in any write-up of the interviews. I asked respondents if I could record our sessions on tape, if they declined, I took extensive notes. During these interviews, I paid particular attention to non-verbal responses as well as they way in which women responded verbally to a question. For example, I looked to see if participants asked for clarification and/or hesitated before answering a certain question. As a result of these pilot interviews, the interview schedule went though several stages of refinement to ensure that the questions were clear and allowed plenty of scope for respondents to speak their minds. Still, as will be seen in the data analysis chapters, there were questions that were unambiguous in an American context but were not as readily understood in France or Morocco. An example of changes made as a result of the pilot interviews was a question that asked women to identity themselves on a continuum between “progressive” or “conservative”. The pilot interviews quickly showed that these categories did not capture the particular characteristics of the target populations. Consequently, the question was modified to include categories such as “practicing Muslims” and “laïque.” As already mentioned above, the general or abstract questions about the status of women were changed to more personal questions about hopes and goals for the future and obstacles that stand in the way of achieving them. Extensive notes taken during and after these sessions highlighted recurring themes, such as the role of religion for all aspects of marriage - choosing a spouse to parental involvement in that choice, the importance of children, to physical traits such as circumcision - and thus helped to refine questions pertaining to marriage.

The questions were not grouped thematically in the interview schedule. Instead, they were mixed so that a particular topic was addressed at different times during the interview. This procedure was used to cross-check internal validity of the responses. For example, if someone answered “yes” to the categorical question: “Do you think men and women have equal chances of getting a job?” but then later in the interview in response to the open-ended question “What do you think are the main challenges for you to get ahead in your profession?” offered the following answer: “Being a woman makes it harder to compete in the job market,” it was obvious that either a misunderstanding had occurred or there was a deeper issue concerning that question. Participants were then asked to elaborate further on the topic in question. If respondents gave prompt, concise answers and elaborated on their replies without being encouraged to do so, a question resonated and made sense to participants regardless of differences in opinion or point of view. Another issue of importance during the pilot phase was to ascertain how easily a relationship of trust could be established. In most Arab cultures, formal discussions need to be preceded with - by American standards - lengthy personal exchanges. I let respondents determine the extent of these conversations before moving to the actual interview. Because of the personal nature of some of the questions, most respondents did not wish to part ways immediately after the interview was concluded but wanted to continue the conversation in a more relaxed setting. Often it was then that respondents elaborated on important themes raised during the interview. Thus, the interview process generally had three parts: the pre-interview personal exchange, the formal interview, the post-interview conversation. The interview schedule for the pilot interviews helped to model the actual interviews to be conducted in France and Morocco. The choice of venue was decided by the participants, as was the duration of the interview. The protocol of informed consent was followed before commencing the interviews and recording them on tape. Some women requested not to be tape recorded. In those instances I took copious notes and met or spoke on the telephone with the women a second time to verify the accuracy of my notes.

A major difference between the pilot phase and the actual interviews, on which this dissertation is based, was that I asked participants in the pilot phase to offer feedback on the questions themselves. Also, I asked respondents to evaluate my own performance during the pilot interview. Did they feel at ease or did they feel intimidated? Did they get the impression I was looking for certain answers or did they feel free to say what they believed? This type of feed-back enabled me to make adjustments in the actual interview sessions. The pilot interviews also prepared me for a range of reactions to the interview process. Several times, at the end of an interview, participants requested that I share with them my own responses to the interview schedule, particularly on questions concerning Islam. Later, in Morocco and in France, I encountered the same requests. Most respondents were interested in a sincere dialogue with someone from a different religious background. Veiled women defied widespread Western stereotypes. Once a basis of respect and trust was established, I was often met with a virtual avalanche of questions about perceived differences and similarities between Muslims and Christians or Islamic and Western culture. Most often, respondents inquired about life in the United States, religious freedom and opportunities for minorities. Because the questions addressed to me were remarkably similar among all the women I interviewed, they served to bring into focus issues of concern and interest of the target populations groups.

The research design – protocol of the interview schedule

For this research I followed an interview schedule that included 64 questions. Fifty of the questions were identical in Morocco and France and 17 were different in order to accommodate differences between the two locations.

The interview schedule also contained questions that differed in Morocco and in France. Examples of these types of questions include: In Morocco: “How many times have you visited France? Can you envision settling in France? Do you have relatives in France? In what circumstances do you use the French language?” And in France: “How

many times have you visited Morocco? Do you have relatives in Morocco? Do you speak Arabic? Can you imagining permanently moving to Morocco?” During the interview, non-verbal indicators were also observed, that is behavior that reflects attitudes not conveyed in the spoken answers. For example, a respondent wiped tears from her eyes when answering a seemingly straightforward question such as: “Do you live alone or with family or friends?” Such non-verbal indicators led to probing deeper even if the categorical question appeared to be adequately answered. In personal interviews, taking note of these types of behaviors is crucial in uncovering deeper themes underlying a question of the interview schedule. Routinely, I discussed responses with experienced academics of Moroccan origin to search for hidden clues as well as a larger context. These scholars understood the nature of my research, including the guarantees of confidentiality given to respondents, and were at home in the culture of the women interviewed. They could shed insights on responses obtained during the interviews. This applied to categorical as well as open- ended questions. On occasion, a deeper meaning to a seemingly uncomplicated “yes” or “no” response was thus revealed. An example of this was the question: “Do you fast during Ramadan?” Almost all women in Morocco answered “yes” to this question while they were being recorded. At the end of the official interview when we were chatting informally, some women said that they did not fast but did not want this answer recorded on tape. Despite assurances of confidentiality, they were hesitant to admit in a formal setting that they did not fast during Ramadan. In Morocco, the Ramadan fast is a national event in which all citizens are called to participate and eating in public is a criminal offense. According to the scholars I consulted, an admission of not fasting, even to an outsider and non-Muslim, was to be interpreted as a sign of trust and that I was held in confidence.

In all cases, I asked respondents to suggest a meeting place. There were several reasons for this. It is important that respondents have some measure of control over a process that requires them to speak frankly about personal issues. The choice of locale was also indicative of a variety of factors, for instance how comfortable they felt being interviewed in view of colleagues or friends or if they chose a place where they were not

likely to be seen by acquaintances. If they chose a public venue for our interview, this also indicated that these young women were claiming their place in the public sphere, especially when this occurred in Morocco. In Morocco, I interviewed participants either in their home, their place of work or, in the case of university students or professors, on campus. If they asked me to come to their office, I was seen by their co-workers. There, they introduced me to their colleagues which meant telling them that they were being interviewed for a research project. In this type of situation it sometimes happened that a colleague showed interest and asked to participate as well. Whenever I was invited to a woman’s home, I was welcomed by other family members who showed an interest in my research. Some particularly self-confident women suggested we meet in a café, while carefully choosing one that had both male and female customers. Most outdoor cafés in Morocco still are a predominantly male domain. In France, no interview was conducted at a place of work. Most women suggested meeting in a café, neighborhood restaurant or on campus. The only women who invited me to their home were women who lived alone. Because I have no established ties in France, it was particularly important there to conduct field work in two consecutive years, allowing for relationships to develop and to deepen these (by maintaining contact via electronic mail) between the first contact in 2004 and the second meeting in 2005. For example at our first meeting in 2004, several respondents would simply state their profession without much further elaboration. In our second and third meeting in 2005, they would confide that they actually felt rather insecure in their present position, were overqualified but could not find another position or felt that they could not move up within the company as they had expected. In Morocco, there was no difference between veiled and unveiled women in terms of the ease with which they approached the interviews. In France, veiled women hesitated to be tape recorded and they were cautious in their choice of venue; one requested written assurance from my advisor as to the legitimacy of my research which was duly provided. The precarious situation of veiled women in France was made apparent when I conducted a series of interviews at the university campus in Nanterre where a guard approached me to inquire about my meetings with “these women”.

In Morocco without exception, everyone who agreed to participate in the interviews did so. In France, on several occasions, women did not show up for an appointment, cancelled at the last minute or when we did meet, said they were actually not prepared to be interviewed. This difference can be attributed to the fact that I started out with a good network of contacts in Morocco. Even when I met someone for the first time, I had been referred by a common acquaintance or because of my affiliation with a Moroccan university, my research was considered legitimate. In France, I could rely on no such network, and met all the women for the first time as part of this research. In Morocco, I met a young American researcher in the medieval city of Fès who was in the process of conducting interviews with women as well. Her situation in Morocco was comparable to mine in France. She had no network of established contacts in Morocco and met the women solely for purposes of her research. She experienced similar frustrations in Morocco as I did in France, namely that women were hesitant to talk to her, or simply did not show up for appointments. This illustrated the fact that doing research with private citizens on matters of personal attitudes and opinions requires time to develop a certain level of trust. By private citizens, I refer to people who are not usually consulted as experts or are not accustomed to expressing their views to strangers. Indeed, trust was a major issue of concern. In doing research on attitudes, a researcher has to minimize the risk that respondents do not reveal their own views but respond in ways they believe are expected and/or that have the effect of retaining their privacy despite their having agreed to be interviewed. Particularly in authoritarian societies such as Morocco, conformity is highly valued, therefore respondents may say what they believe the researcher wants to hear or repeat official viewpoints. This was liable to be the case, for example, in answer to the question “Do you believe the Personal Status Code reform is based in the Qu’ran?” The reform was introduced by the King himself who presented it as being in conformity with the religion of Islam. With official discourse in Morocco thus based on the premise that the legal reform is grounded in the Scripture, few people would dispute this assertion in public. Another seemingly simple question was: “Do you have friends who are not Muslim?” Like most participants, one particular woman responded “yes.” I knew this student had not traveled much beyond her hometown and had lived all her life in the

heartland of Morocco. Furthermore she came from a strict Islamist family that monitored her relationships and she was still living with her parents. Therefore I was curious as to where she could have met someone with a background different from hers. At the end of the interview, I casually asked her who her non-Muslim friends were, to which she exclaimed: “Why, you!” In the course of our evening together, this shy woman said that nobody had ever shown an interest in her opinions. The encounter with my fieldwork was her first opportunity to express her own views on religion, family, marriage, her dreams and hopes for her personal and professional life. And so she concluded that we must be friends.

Respondents were found in various ways. In Morocco, I started by contacting former university students whom I knew from my residence there. These women now had professional jobs in Rabat and Casablanca. As I knew some of these women quite well, I asked them to refer me to others who fitted the sample characteristics. I also contacted acquaintances and asked for recommendations. I interviewed sisters or daughters of friends. I moved from city to city to meet women from different parts of the country. One interview led to another and so the sample included women in locations ranging from the small, mostly Berber middle Atlas towns of Ifrane and Azrou, to the large economic center of Casablanca, the capital city of Rabat, the industrial city of Safi, the ancient royal cities of Fès and Meknes and lastly the northern coastal city of Tangier. France proved a more difficult terrain to navigate as I had few established contacts there. I was based in Paris and all the interviews were conducted either in Paris, the department of Seine-Saint-Denis, in the banlieues of Montreuil and smaller towns in the vicinity of Paris from Nanterre to Orry-la-Ville in the north to Créteil in the south-east and Trappes, an industrial town west of Paris. Prior to my arrival in France, I had contacted several Muslim groups, Maghrebi women’s organizations, and support groups for Moroccans in France by e-mail. I had also asked my contacts in Morocco if they had family or friends in the Paris region. In addition, I followed leads provided by my advisor. Many of these contacts did not in the end come to fruition in terms of securing an interview but they pointed the way to other potential participants. One major difficulty in France was the intense level of mistrust of a U.S.-based researcher. The French

government had opposed 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, a stance widely supported by the population, and public discourse in France often has an anti-American bent. Occasionally, women backed out of an interview already agreed upon. Some simply did not show up or called to cancel or asked a friend to call and cancel on their behalf. Some interviewees could only be found with great difficulty. Because veiled women in France were exceedingly apprehensive about being interviewed by an U.S.-based researcher whom they knew nothing about, some unconventional techniques had to be employed to secure interviews. Patience and persistence were crucial in securing interviews with this particularly reticent group of women. Once I located an Islamic study center in a Parisian suburb and placed myself in the hallway at the entrance area for more than five hours. I knew of a self-proclaimed fundamentalist woman who attended classes there but had stood me up several times. I introduced myself to each woman who walked through the door and told them who I was waiting for. I rightly assumed that women who frequented this center knew each other by name. While sitting in the waiting area, I could observe through the slightly ajar door a study session in progress. A bearded man held forth on the role of women according to the Qu’ran to an all female, all veiled audience. The lecturer apparently spoke Arabic whereas the audience members did not because he repeatedly invoked sayings in Arabic which he then translated into heavily accented French. Eventually, the woman I had been waiting for agreed to talk with me under the condition that the door of the room to which she guided me remained open, and that she could end the interview at any moment. She furthermore insisted on writing short answers to my questions down herself and requested to read over the notes I had taken during the interview. This young woman insisted that in her understanding of Islam, there was no differentiation among people along national or ethnic lines because all believers were brothers and sisters and national or ethnic background was of no import. Though her parents were Moroccan, she considered herself first and foremost as part of the umma, the community of believers. In fact, the circle of friends of most respondents in France included people originating from all of the countries of the Maghreb. This was evident when I asked participants to introduce me to some of their friends for further interviews. The most common response to this request was that they were willing to introduce me to their

friends but often they were not of Moroccan origin. Their circles of friends included people from North African immigrant families, mostly from Algeria, occasionally from Tunisia. Interestingly, in Morocco one does not find too many people positively inclined towards Algerians. Because of Algeria’s support for the Polisario movement that is fighting for the independence of the Western Sahara, a territory claimed by Morocco, the two countries have had a long, acrimonious relationship. In France, these national hostilities have all but disappeared among the second generation. Also, I met several women in France, though none in Morocco, who came from mixed parentage, i.e. one parent was Moroccan, one from a sub-Saharan African or a Middle Eastern country.

Appointments in France were generally made by phone, occasionally via e-mail. During the initial phone conversation, the nature of the research was explained and the contacted persons were asked if they were interested in contributing to the project. We exchanged particulars about our appearance so that we could recognize each other. This was mostly the case in France, because as a foreigner in Morocco, I was easily recognized. Still, the way women in Morocco described themselves made it easy to spot them even in busy places such as in front of the main railway station in Rabat or at the edge of the medina of Fès, the walled-in part of town that has remained largely unchanged since the 14th century. Their self-descriptions matched their actual appearance. By contrast in France, most women described themselves on the phone as looking “typically Moroccan.” Routinely, potential interview partners would spot me before I saw them. What they viewed to be “typically Moroccan” could be lost on an outsider. Most participants were clad in fashionable western attire, had brown or black hair, coiffed in a variety of styles - all very usual for women in France. Yet these women of Moroccan origin had a deep-seated sense of differentness from other French women. Upon meeting, I again explained that this was a comparative study of young, educated professional women in Morocco and women of Moroccan origin in France. Occasionally, women brought one or two female friends along. I insisted on the confidential nature of the interviews and therefore they had to be conducted with one person at a time. Respondents insisted on the closeness of their friendship and

consequently had nothing to hide from each other. Still, I remained firm on the protocol of one-on-one interviews. There was one exception where a non-veiled women introduced me to her veiled friend. This veiled woman was adamant about the presence of her friend during the interview. During the course of certain interviews women occasionally revealed secrets they had not shared with their friends or family. Some respondents admitted to having had sexual relationships despite keeping up the appearance of being a virgin in the eyes of her family and most of their friends. One woman spoke of an abortion - arranged by her mother - after she had become pregnant from a relationship with a non-Muslim boyfriend. Because of the shame and disgrace she felt afterwards, she agreed to a marriage arranged by her parents to a man she did not know prior to their engagement. Her friends knew nothing of the events that preceded this arranged marriage. Due to the sensitive nature of certain topics, some respondents requested that I turn off the recorder during portions of the interview. Others elaborated on their answers after the formal session ended and the recorder had been turned off. Here again, my journalistic experience in rapid note-taking came in handy. In these instances, I wrote down everything I remembered of the conversation as soon as we parted ways. Often, what was said during these informal conversations was particularly relevant and revealing. Where appropriate, I would meet respondents a second time to go over the notes again, or ask for clarification via e-mail or over the phone, to make sure I had recorded their responses accurately.

Language

The interviews were conducted primarily in French. In Morocco, some women preferred to use English for parts of the interview because they felt they could express their personal views in that language more freely - especially when their opinions differed from mainstream discourse. Because neither French nor English is my native language, I can understand some of the internal processes and the freedom that comes with expressing oneself in a foreign language.

In Morocco, most participants responded in a mixture of French and dereja, the Moroccan dialect of Arabic. Especially when discussing matters of religion, they used common Arabic phrases or quotations from the Qu’ran. To ensure confidentiality, no translator was employed. When Arabic was spoken, the women used common expressions or sayings with which I am familiar. If I did not understand an Arabic word or sentence, I wrote down what I heard and later asked for a translation but I did not interrupt the flow of speech. Transcribing lengthy responses to open-ended questions in a tri-lingual mix, posed a particular challenge and occasionally required follow-up sessions to clarify certain points. In France, the women spoke to me only in French, and in fact often apologized for not knowing even verses from the Qu’ran in the original Arabic. Occasionally, they would insert common expressions in Arabic such as “Inch’Allah” (God willing), “Mektub” (it is written, meaning destiny). To the question “Do you speak Arabic?” some women in France responded by invoking the fatiha, the opening sentence of most suras: “besmellah errahman errahim” (In the name of Allah, most benevolent, ever merciful) or recite parts of the shahada, the profession of faith “La ilaha il Allah" (there is no God but God) and say that this was the extent of their knowledge of classical Arabic. In France, the majority of participants described French as their primary language even though they spoke dereja or a Berber language, or a mixture of languages with their parents and other senior family members, but used French with their siblings. In the Data Analysis Chapter, I have used an English translation when quoting respondents. This is to facilitate the reading especially in cases where respondents switched back and forth between French, English or Arabic but also to further protect the identity of my respondents. English is not a language commonly spoken in Morocco and as my sample represented a select minority, it would not be difficult to uncover the identity of some of the women if only they were quoted in English.

Data Collection

“Collecting data” can be viewed as a cut-and-dried academic process of amassing information. Conducting interviews on qualitative constructs such as “attitudes” in a

cross-cultural setting and with a comparative focus, is a much more fluid process fraught with nuances and indiscernible hints. Researchers who have based their studies on personal interviews describe a frequently occurring experience, summarized by Joyceline Cesari who quotes a young man in her Musulmanes et Republicains: “Nous voulons bien contribuer à votre enquête, mais est-ce que vous allez faire comme les autres ou dire la vérité? Pourquoi faut-il toujours se justifier ? La religion musulmane ce n’est ni l’intégrisme ni le terrorisme” (Cesari, 1998 : 13). This outburst reflects the assumption that a Western researcher who asks questions about Islam - particularly post 9/11 - must be concerned with terrorism and fundamentalism. In my interviews in France and Morocco, this sentiment was expressed frequently.

As some of the examples in previous sections of this chapter illustrate, considerable effort was expended to bridge the culture gap and to ensure that I understood responses in the meaning intended by the participants. Communication across cultures always presents a high risk of misunderstanding and misinterpretation. In examining differences both in perception and communication, anthropologist Edward T. Hall categorized cultures as being either “high” or “low” context cultures, depending on how much meaning their members attach to settings. Hall describes the role of culture in communication: “One of the functions of culture is to provide a highly selective screen between man and the outside world. In its many forms, culture therefore designates what we pay attention to and what we ignore” (Hall, 1976: 74). Hall defines context as “the information that surrounds an event; it is inextricably bound up with the meaning of the events” (ibid., 30). To provide a contextual reference and to create an environment familiar to participants, I decided to enlist the support of my teenage daughters. Though it is not common academic practice for a researcher to be accompanied by his or her children, in this particular project, their presence proved to be an important asset. Islamic culture emphasizes the role and position of the mother. A commonly cited quote from the hadith says: “Heaven lies at the feet of mothers.” Motherhood is perceived as a revered state. Because this research depended on women to be open and honest about private matters,

much thought went into finding ways to create an atmosphere of trust. It was therefore important that participants did not see me primarily as a foreign researcher especially when meeting participants for the first time. Given the cultural gap between Muslims and Westerners, majority and minority cultures, developing and industrialized world, an effort on my part to conform to conventions of my respondents was deemed necessary to facilitate the process of data collection. There was a noticeable difference in atmosphere when I was accompanied by one of my daughters or when I went alone to an interview. By myself, the tone between participants and me was professional, if cordial, but conversations rarely strayed beyond the themes raised in the interview schedule. When accompanied by one of my daughters, the environment immediately was more relaxed and familial. Often participants felt more comfortable asking my daughters questions they did not pose to me, such as: “Is your father a Muslim?” or: “Are you thinking of converting to Islam?” indicating that this research was perceived in part as a quest on my part to gain a deeper appreciation of Islam. Participants frequently engaged my daughter in exchanges about the American school system, popular music, films, occasionally fashion and brand names - a virtual obsession among Moroccan women - in all, topics that never came up when I was by myself. Still, so as to meet confidentiality requirements, I asked my daughter to step aside prior to the formal part of the interview.

Overall, the process of data collection followed the guidelines for Grounded Theory research. There was extensive writing of memos after each interview, constant reviewing of responses in search for recurring themes and nightly, partial transcription of interviews.

Data Analysis

An important aspect of the grounded theory approach is the coding of data, i.e. the process whereby categories are identified, labeled and interpreted. Analytical tools differ depending on the particularities of each research project, yet their purpose remains the same, making sense of the collected data. The purpose of data analysis is to extrapolate

from the specific to the general by letting the data determine the direction of the research and “steer the researchers’ thinking away from the confines of both the technical literature and personal experience” (Strauss and Corbin, 1996). In my research, I focused on content analysis to find common themes. Data Analysis, according to Strauss and Corbin is like working on a puzzle. Coding is the part of the analysis concerned with identifying, naming, categorizing and describing phenomena. It is the analytical process through which concepts are identified and their properties and dimensions are discovered in data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 101). Essentially, each response to a question is being read in search of an answer to the question “What is this all about? What is being referenced here?” Strauss and Corbin suggest employing fairly abstract categories for “open coding” as the abstract will help to identify a trend. In my study, these categories are the three main issues addressed in the interview schedule, namely Conceptions of Islam, Responses to Legal Changes in Morocco and in France and Personal and Professional Aspirations and Challenges. The analysis and interpretation of the data from each category are ordered conceptually and summarized in Chapters 3 to 6. Questions relating to a theme are grouped together and tabulated answers to categorical questions aspects of these longer answers are presented. Often, respondents elaborated even on categorical questions and these lengthy answers are presented as well. The Data Analysis of open-ended questions is presented as a narrative, based on themes that emerged during the interviews. The interviews schedule is used as a guide for these narratives but there has been no systematic process of presenting each question and corresponding answers as they appear in the interview schedule. Because this research is concerned with attitudes and personal viewpoints, it was imperative to bring the issues raised by respondents to the fore rather than following a mechanical procedure of data analysis. The first step in the Data Analysis process was to transcribe relevant parts from the interviews as they relate to a specific question and categorize them by country. Then, answers obtained in Morocco were compared with those in France. Often, responses were similar but some respondents were more eloquent than others in which case I used lengthy quotations from those who best communicated a particular point to illustrate an

issue raised by several women in the sample. In the narrative, I sometimes juxtapose responses obtained in France with those from Morocco and sometimes dwell on responses from one country more extensively. Most research about Muslims in the West, in this case France, is conducted from the vantage point of the Western world and examines its influence on changing attitudes among Muslims. My research takes an Islamic country, Morocco, as a starting point and then looks at women of Moroccan origin in France with particular reference to the extent to which their views are different from and similar to those of their counterparts in the Maghreb. Therefore, the views of the sample in Morocco are often presented in greater detail because they allow for depth of understanding of the responses by the sample in France. It is also better suited for the purposes of this comparative analysis so as to arrive at a better understanding how to interpret attitudinal changes among a certain segment of people from an Islamic background and culture.

Conclusion

This research is cross-cultural and inter-disciplinary. It is a qualitative study that draws on Grounded Theory for its methodology. This approach is well-suited for exploratory research because it provides a structure that allows respondents to raise themes and issues that are important to them. It is also a useful tool in assessing cultural change at the time it occurs. The research is based on a series of structured interviews of two samples of a young, educated, professional and urban women in Morocco and in France. Field work in both countries was preceded by pilot interviews conducted with a comparable sample in the United States. The findings based on the interview schedule are presented and analyzed in four chapters. Chapter 3: Core Biographical Features which introduce the samples, Chapter 4: Conceptions of Islam, Chapter 5: Legal Changes in Morocco and in France and Chapter 6: Personal and Professional Aspirations and Challenges.

CHAPTER 3

CORE BIOGRAPHICAL FEATURES

This chapter introduces the two samples from France and in Morocco. This includes demographic details such as ranges of age, marital status, living situation, and proficiency in dereja (Moroccan Arabic) and/or one of the Berber languages spoken in Morocco. In addition, the interview schedule contained a section wherein respondents were asked to describe themselves by using specific categories or by offering different descriptors. Also presented here is an analysis of responses to questions that differed in Morocco and in France. The section of the interview schedule that contained country- specific questions aimed at gaining an understanding of the extent of family relations across the Mediterranean. Naming a preferred country of residence provides an indication of the degree of satisfaction with or loyalty to the country in which respondents reside. All answers have been tabulated and, combined with content analysis of responses and descriptive narratives, they provide preliminary insights into similarities and differences between the two samples which are then explored in greater depth in the Data Analysis chapters.

Table 3.1. Age of Respondents

Age 18-22 22-26 26-30 30 and over Total France 5 8 6 6 25 Morocco 3 7 9 11 30

Table 3.1. shows that the majority of women in both samples are in the age ranges of 22-26 and 26-30. Five women in France and three in Morocco were younger than 22 and six women in France and 11 in Morocco were over thirty years of age. These particular age ranges were chosen because younger women, still in the process of forming

their viewpoints and understanding of important issues, are less set in their ways and are exposed to a great variety of influences which point towards future developments. Younger women are also more directly affected by recent changes in the law of their respective country of residence. Their views on personal and professional issues are of immediate concern as they are in the process of making decisions with regards to marriage and family and are developing their careers. These types of options are more limited in older women. Nevertheless, I conducted some interviews with women over forty or fifty years because their reflections provide context and depth and illustrate some of the differences in perceptions and aspiration between the generations. These interviews are not included in the core sample but will be referred to in the overall analysis.

Table 3.2. Marital Status of Respondents

Civil Status Single Married Divorced Total France 18 3 4 25 Morocco 24 6 0 30

Table 3.2. shows the marital status of women as single, married or divorced. The majority of women were single, three in Morocco and six in France were married and four in France but none in Morocco were divorced. In Morocco, all women in the sample were either single or married. In France, the situation was more complicated. For example, two women were single mothers as a result of a divorce. One lived with her child while the other woman’s child was raised by relatives in Morocco. This woman felt that though she was divorced, her status as a “single mother” was a great burden. She also cited practical reasons for sending her son to live with relatives across the Mediterranean, namely the cost of living in Paris and the difficulty of establishing herself in a professional career while raising a child. Another “married” woman did not live with her husband because the marriage existed on paper only, that is, she had married a French citizen with the goal of obtaining French citizenship for herself. The status of this woman is recorded in the category “single” even though her official status is “married.” Yet another divorced woman had been divorced from such a “marriage blanc” but had never

actually lived with her “husband.” These demographic complications tell of the precarious personal status of descendants of the immigrant population in France. The relatively large proportion of unmarried women in their late twenties and early thirties is unusually high given that Moroccan culture historically encourages early marriage for women. The recent family law reform in Morocco raised the legal marriage age for girls from 15 to 18 years. Islamist groups in Morocco opposed the raising of the legal age for marriage because they considered early marriage an acceptable practice as long as there were large numbers of girls in the rural areas without any or only limited formal education. Raising the marriage age was perceived as being of advantage primarily for educated, urban women. Interestingly, most of the women over the age of 26 followed the response “single” with a sigh or an exclamation such as: “Unfortunately, I am still single.” Or turning to me: “You are lucky, Western men don’t mind marrying older women but ‘our’ men don’t do that.” As shall be seen later in the data analysis in Chapter 6, not being able to find a husband is the price women in both countries have to pay for pursuing higher education and embarking on professional careers.

Table 3.3. Number of Respondents with Children

Children Yes No Total France 4 21 25 Morocco 3 27 30

Table 3.3. shows the number of women in the samples who had children. All women with children were either married or divorced, i.e. there were no single mothers in the samples. In France, there were some divorced women with a child or children, whereas all women in the Morocco sample who had children were married. Certainly, there are unmarried women (mères celibataires) with children in both countries, but the social stigma associated with single motherhood is formidable. In Morocco, these women are widely regarded as prostitutes. Until the recent reform of the family law, single mothers and their children had few legal rights and existed on the fringes of society, often

at the mercy of social service institutions because they were no longer welcomed in their parents’ home. The stigma associated with single motherhood carries over into the community of women of Moroccan origin in France. For example, there was one woman in the French sample who said she had been in a hastily arranged marriage, followed by an equally rapid divorce so that her child would not be born out of wedlock. These personal circumstances were revealed in the interviews in great confidence and it caused women visible pain to speak about these issues. It is reasonable to assume that these admissions could be made in part because I am a foreigner who is considered sufficiently distant not to pass judgment on their personal circumstances.

Table 3.4. Living Situation of Respondents

Living Alone w/Friends w/Family w/Husband w/Hus+Ch. Total France 7 1 14 1 2 25 Morocco 9 4 10 5 2 30

Table 3.4. shows the living situation of respondents. Living alone is a relatively recent phenomenon among Moroccan women and women of Moroccan origin in France. I asked respondents if their mothers had ever lived by themselves. Without exception, the answer was “no.” Given this context, the number of women living alone is relative large (seven in France and nine in Morocco). This seemingly straightforward categorical question about living situation unleashed a torrent of emotion. Women in both countries were at pains to explain why they lived alone. Apparently, they had not come to terms with this situation. None of the women simply affirmed “living alone” and moved on to the next question. Instead, they felt compelled to offer lengthy explanations as to the circumstances that led them to live alone. In France, living alone most often was the result of a painful break with the family caused by one or both parents’ disapproval of the personal or professional choices of their daughters. Another reason for living alone was that these young women had escaped from an impending arranged marriage. An illustration of just how complex and conflictual it is for women to live alone can be found in interviews conducted with two

sisters. One lived by herself without the parents’ knowledge of her place of residence while the other, married, remained in close contact with her family. The sisters talked to each other often but the married one agreed to keep her sisters’ whereabouts a secret. Though it may be a coincidence, in France divorced women with children wanted me to visit their home for the interviews where they made sure that I was given a tour of their small but immaculately clean apartments. As in most Moroccan homes I had visited, there were no visible signs that children were present in the household, such as toys, children’s books, crayons, little shoes, or some such items that would normally be found in a Western household with small children. The majority of the women in the French sample lived with their families and said they planned to stay there until they got married. Most said they could not imagine living by themselves. In Morocco, respondents who lived alone considered this an “unnatural” but necessary situation because their place of employment was far away from where their family or relatives lived. This was most often the case among women who came from small towns, had received higher education and subsequently found rewarding jobs in the capital city of Rabat or the commercial center of Casablanca. Living alone was also often a class issue. Women of more affluent backgrounds did in most instances have relatives in the large urban areas with whom they could live whereas women from modest homes had no such relations. While none of the veiled women in France lived alone, in Morocco there was no difference between veiled and unveiled women with regards to their living situation. This is significant because it reflects a different understanding of how life can properly be led in accordance with the scripture. Veiled women in France considered it “impossible” or “improper” to live alone, whereas veiled women in Morocco made no such connection between personal religious commitment and living situation. The category living with friends refers to living with friends of the same gender. In France and in Morocco, the number of women who share an apartment is small compared with the number of women who live alone or with family. To a Western reader it may be striking that no woman said she was living with a partner to whom she was not married. Though it is conceivable that some respondents may in fact live with a male partner, none admitted as much.

The majority of respondents in France and in Morocco said they were living with family. This was the case regardless of age. Family mostly means parents or siblings but can also refer to extended family such as an aunt or a female cousin. For most women this was seen as the most natural arrangement. They expected to leave their family’s home only upon marriage. Some of the women over the age of thirty did, however, say they had briefly tried living alone, only to move back in with their families as they found this too lonely. Married women said they lived with their husband when this was a consummated relationship. In the cases where the marriage existed on paper only for the purposes of gaining citizenship, the women lived alone. Married women with children lived with their husband and children. Regardless of age, all “really” married women were in their first marriage relationship even though some had husbands who had been married previously. None of the women in the samples was in a polygamous marriage, though some said their fathers had been married to multiple wives. Almost all had some degree of familiarity with a polygamous marriage among relatives or friends of their parents. For all respondents, a polygamous marriage was unequivocally out of the question. The issue of polygamy is addressed in the chapter on legal changes.

These core biographical features reveal significant similarities between the two samples. This is evident from the tables but even more so in other aspects of the ways in which women responded or reacted to questions. For instance, it is safe to assume that a question about “living situation” would not likely have resulted in such outpouring of emotion among Western women who live alone. Also, from a comparable sample of Western women, one would expect to hear some say that they are living with a boyfriend. Likewise, one would have to consider the possibility that living with someone of the same gender refers to a sexual partnership. However, none of the women in either sample as much as hinted that “living with friends” indicated anything more than sharing an apartment. While male homosexuality is mentioned in the Qu’ran, same-sex relationship among women is not and therefore lesbian relationships do not exist officially.

The two most significant elements gathered from the demographic information are the large proportions of single women and of women living alone. Similar research conducted only a decade earlier would not have been likely to yield the same results. Then it would have been exceedingly uncommon for women over the age of 25 not to be married. It would have been equally unheard of for young women to live by themselves. These data indicate a significant shift in societal norms, attitudes and values. Several women talked about their mothers who had married in their teens to a man chosen for them by their families. Some respondents spoke about their sisters, younger and older, who were already married, to underline their own unusual status even within their own families. In Morocco, I interviewed a 28-year-old school teacher, Khadija, who lived with her 45-year-old mother Aicha in a medium-size town. The young woman also had an older brother. Laughingly, mother and daughter remarked about the differences between their lives. The illiterate Aicha, who only spoke Tamazight, had been married at age 14 to a man she had met for the first time on her wedding day. Through her daughter’s translation, she said she had grown to love her husband because she had been a child when they got married and thus she had not had time to develop her own ideas about love and marriage. Her husband now lived with one of her sons in another part of the country after a car accident had left the son handicapped and unable to work and provide for his family. The father worked to support his son’s family while the daughter took care of her mother. Aicha was proud that her daughter had studied at a university and was thus well-educated and she gesticulated vividly to make me understand that she thought it was quite alright for a 28-year-old not to be married in this day and age. Fatima for her part said she would like to get married but did not have much opportunity to meet a man as she worked full-time and did not go out much. Fatima felt that the transition from arranged marriage to choosing one’s own spouse was not an easy one and that several of her girlfriends were in a similar situation. In some ways she envied her mother’s situation because the absence of choice had made her life simpler. At the time she embarked on her university studies Fatima had not envisioned that this would lead to her being what she laughingly called an “old maid.” This encounter illustrates a shift in values and attitudes because like Fatima, women in both samples postponed marriage sometimes with the dire consequence of

remaining single longer than anticipated. Some were willing to explore new territory by living alone. Despite the different cultural and social environments in North Africa and Western Europe, young, educated women on both sides of the Mediterranean share common traits as they are charting a course that differs in important ways from that of previous generations.

Table 3.5. Self-Description of Respondents

Describe yourself by checking one or more of the following categories:

Categories Progress. Laïque Conservat. Practicing None Other Total France 19 7 4 14 0 4 48 Morocco 19 2 8 16 2 5 52

Table 3.5. shows how respondents described themselves when asked to choose between specific categories. Respondents were not limited to one category but were free to choose as many - or none - that applied to them. The total number of responses reflects the sum of categories chosen by the 25 women in the French sample and the 30 in the Moroccan sample. Several women in both samples asked for the definition of certain categories. Most often they requested definitions for “progressive” and “conservative.” I explained the terms the way I understood them, namely that “progressive” is most commonly associated with forward-looking, supportive of change with regard to individual liberty and freedom of choices. “Conservative” referred to an inclination of wanting to preserve the status quo and upholding conventions and traditions. Categories are necessary tools when collecting data, however their usefulness is limited when respondents consider these categories irrelevant or insufficient descriptors or if their meaning is unclear or differs from person to person. As the above listed categories are commonly used in the West, they are useful in the context of this dissertation. Lacitïé is an important aspect of French society and most respondents affirmed that it is in large part due to this concept that the rights of individual Muslims are better protected in France than in Morocco or for that matter in most of the Arab world. Nevertheless, recent legislation banning selected religious insignia in public schools is

often understood by Muslims as aiming directly against them, and proponents of this law often present it as a necessary feature of lacitïé. Perhaps because of this, as can be seen from the above table, respondents in France generally preferred to categorize themselves in other ways, rather than as laïques. Lacitïé is not part not of the social fabric in Morocco, where the unity of the religious and the secular sphere is firmly anchored in the constitution. Still, two women (one veiled, one not) said they supported the idea of separation of the religious from the secular. This is noteworthy because at the heart of this assertion is a rejection of the monarchy in its present form, a position that is criminally liable. Even allowing for my repeated assurances of confidentiality, these two women demonstrated quite some courage in stating their position so clearly. In fact, around the time I conducted my interviews in Morocco in May/June 2005, Nadia Yassine, spokesperson of the Islamist movement Al Adl wa Ihsane faced court proceedings due to a remark she made at an academic conference at the University of California at Berkeley earlier that year in April which was subsequently reported widely in the Moroccan media in which she posed a hypothetical question about a the possibility of a future Moroccan republic1. Among the women who chose two categories to describe themselves the majority opted for telling combinations, such as “practicing” and “laïque,” or “progressive” and “conservative.” The most frequent combination was “progressive” and “practicing.” This allows for the conclusion that women in both samples did not perceive a conflict between being a practicing Muslim and having progressive views on societal issues, such as personal freedoms, choice and professional careers. I routinely double-checked to make sure I had correctly understood their insistence on being considered “practicing and progressive” or “conservative and progressive.” In the cases where women responded by describing themselves as “conservative and progressive,” I asked them to elaborate on their answers. Respondents in both samples said they were proud of certain traditions and religious customs and therefore thought they were worth preserving while they considered themselves supportive of change on social issues. Among the traditions worth

1 For complete coverage of the court proceedings, the remarks made by Yassine and the response of the U.S. State Department in defense of the Islamists’ right to free speech, see Le Journal, June 24, 2005, or at: www.lejournal-hebdo.com. Also see “Le climat politique se dégrade au Maroc” in Le Monde, June 29, 2005.

preserving, most said “strong family ties,” “Islam,” including the Ramadan fast and the holiday Eid al Kbir, or a preference for Moroccan over Western cuisine. Veiled women in both countries most often chose the combination “practicing” and “conservative.” Those who chose the category “other” described themselves in similar ways in Morocco and in France, namely as “open-minded,” “ecumenical,” or “non-dogmatic.” In France, some used the term “feminist,” in Morocco one described herself as an “Islamic feminist.” Two women in Morocco felt the categories provided did not reflect the way they saw themselves. They did not, however, offer any other categories and instead chose to skip this part of the interview schedule. These self-descriptions are revealing in several ways. For one they show that the majority of individuals in the French sample chose similar categories to describe themselves as the women in the Moroccan sample despite their significantly different county-specific circumstances. The comparatively large number who described themselves as “progressive,” i.e. in support of social change indicates that young, educated, professional women are faced with similar challenges and therefore want to see certain aspects of their respective societies changed.

So as to illustrate some of those country-specific circumstances, the interview schedule contained a series of questions that differed in Morocco and in France. In the following, I will present data obtained from questions that differed in Morocco and France. These questions were designed to ascertain the level of familiarity and the bond respondents felt with the country on the other side of the Mediterranean. In France, questions pertained to respondent’s desire to move to Morocco, their fluency in dereja (Moroccan Arabic), how often they had visited Morocco and which country they would like to settle in permanently. In Morocco, respondents were asked if they had ever visited France or any other country, if they had relatives in France and also if they had ever thought of moving to a foreign country.

Respondents in France

Table 3.6. Attitudes concerning Relocation to Morocco among Respondents in France

Have you thought about the possibility of permanently moving to Morocco?

Moving to Yes No Other Morocco 11 14 0

Table 3.6. shows that in France most respondents had not thought about the possibility of permanently moving to Morocco while slightly less than half of the respondents said they had in fact at least entertained the idea of moving to the country of their parents’ - and in some cases their own - birth. In itself these response are not surprising. Viewed through a comparative lens however, another dimension appears. When I shared responses obtained in France with the Moroccan sample, most said they doubted the veracity of statements made by women of Moroccan origin in France. Said Bouchra in Rabat: “They did not tell you the truth; of course they want to come back to Morocco. They are Moroccans. They just said that because you are a Westerner yourself and so they wanted you to believe that they too consider a western country their home.” Occasionally I had a slip of the tongue and asked respondents in France: “Have you ever thought about the possibility of permanently ‘returning’ to Morocco?” which was immediately followed by a correction such as: “It is not ‘returning,’ I am French,” or “I was born in France and lived all my life here, so if I go to Morocco I am not returning, I am visiting,” or: “Even though I still have a Moroccan passport, I have never lived in Morocco and therefore am not really Moroccan.” Among those born in Morocco, now living in France, most said they had not considered ever moving back. When I discussed how some women in Morocco had reacted to responses of women of Moroccan origin in France, a middle-age lawyer in Rabat who had studied and lived abroad for several years, explained: “Our women have to say that. They feel a sense of pride in being Moroccan and don’t want to think that people who leave to settle

elsewhere cut their ties with their home country.” Another person offered this comment: “Every summer, we see Morocco invaded by immigrants and their families who are coming back for the summer. It seems there are more cars with French, Belgian, Dutch or German number plates in Morocco during the summer months than cars with local number plates. So we have a sense here that those working overseas still consider Morocco their home. It makes us feel good to see them coming home.” However, another observed: “My brother comes back every year from France, his suitcase loaded with goods, many of which we can get here. But if something is from Europe, people believe it is special, of superior quality. I told him to stop bringing us stuff. It is humiliating. We have what we need here. Last year, he came with just his backpack and other than me; everyone in the family was disappointed. This longing for all things Western is schizophrenic because on the other side, people say they are so proud of living in an Islamic country.” There were some women in France who actually had come to work in Morocco for a short period of time, only to return to France because they did not feel at home in Morocco. A social worker in Paris had moved to Casablanca to work for a year for a social service organization a distant relative was heading. She said: “I could not stand it. I could not handle the Moroccan mentality. Even though I lived in a large, modern city, the way women were treated was terrible.” Those respondents who said they did consider moving to Morocco often were in their early twenties and felt unsure about their professional future in France. They hoped a French university degree might make it easier for them to find a satisfying job in Morocco. As there is a difference between hopes, wishful thinking and reality, the question about moving to Morocco was addressed in a different manner through a second question.

Table 3.7. Desired Location of Permanent Residence of Respondents in France

Do you expect to move to Morocco permanently?

Moving Yes No Other permanently 3 20 2

Table 3.7. shows less ambiguous responses. Asked if they actually expected to relocate to Morocco, the number who said “yes” dwindled to three while 20 out of 25 respondents said “no.” Those classified as “other” explained that such a decision depended on the circumstances, particularly professional opportunities. They felt a French education gave them an advantage over Moroccan applicants for certain positions, so if their careers in France did not take off the way they envisioned, they would look into finding a position in Morocco yet not necessarily with the intention of settling there permanently. Professional opportunity was thus the prime reason for a possible move. When asked if marriage might be a factor, for instance if their future husbands wanted to relocate to Morocco or were offered a position there, respondents were less sure that this was a good enough reason to turn their back on their lives in France. The response to the first question indicates that second generation women in the sample still feel an emotional bond with the country of their heritage but ultimately pragmatic reasons are the prime factor in deciding where to settle. Under any circumstances, a move from one country to another is a major undertaking and therefore such decisions are not taken lightly and require a lot of advance planning and an above average sense of mobility.

Table 3.8. Family Ties to Morocco of Respondents in France

Do you have family in Morocco?

Family in Morocco Yes No Other France 25 0 0

Table 3.8. shows that all women in the French sample did indeed have close family in Morocco but the extent of their contact with those family members varied. Most said that as children, they had visited Morocco on a regular basis during the summer months. Upon becoming adults, these visits had become less frequent. Respondents admitted that their first-hand understanding of life in Morocco was based on these holiday family visits and not on an experience of everyday life. The majority of the women in the French sample hailed from typical immigrant backgrounds, i.e. their parents came from small, rural or impoverished places situated on one side of the rural/urban divide that characterizes Moroccan society. They had left Morocco as low- skilled workers in search of better opportunities to provide for their families. Thus, their daughters’ emphasis on going - to put it bluntly - where the money is, is in keeping with the family tradition.

Table 3.9. Understanding of Moroccan languages of Respondents in France

Do you speak Arabic and/or Berber?

Language Dereja/Berber Classical Read/write French Total only France 22 3 3 3 31

Table 3.9. shows that the majority of respondents in the French sample said they could communicate in derjea (Moroccan Arabic) or one of the Berber languages but acknowledged they were not entirely fluent. Classical Arabic is different from the local

Moroccan dialect and only three women said they also had some competency in classical Arabic. Among those who said they spoke either classical Arabic and/or derjea, only three said they were able to read and write Arabic. Of those who spoke one of the Berber languages (Tamazight, Tachelhit, Tarifit), most spoke Tarifit, indicating their families came from the Rif mountain region in the north of Morocco2, a part of the country known for its rebellions against the central political authority and in the past often neglected by the national government and therefore particularly poor. In the table, derjea (Moroccan Arabic) and Berber are grouped together because the purpose of the question was to ascertain proficiency in a language spoken in Morocco. To distinguish further between dereja and Berber would have required a differentiation of the three Berber languages spoken in Morocco which exceeds the scope of this study. The three women who said they were proficient in classical Arabic or could read and write Arabic fluently had learned this either in Qu’ran school as children or learned it on their own initiative as adults. This was the case among veiled, more religiously inclined respondents. The prevalent lack of knowledge of classical Arabic also meant that respondents could not read the Qu’ran in its original version. As the Qu’ran is believed to be the directly revealed word of God to the prophet Mohammed, any translation is considered an interpretation and therefore inferior. In the part of the interview schedule that pertains to conceptions of Islam, this lack of proficiency was cited by several respondents as one of the main reasons why they had never read the Qu’ran. There was some inhibition towards reading the Qu’ran in French translation. Respondents also said that their parents, even though they had immigrated from an Arabic-speaking, Islamic country, had not been educated enough to read the Qu’ran. Those who spoke Tarifit with their parents said their only option was reading the Qu’ran in French as Arabic was not one of the languages they understood anyway. Most said they wanted to keep up their Arabic/Berber language skills. Aicha, a teacher near Paris, said: “It is fun to have sort of a secret language, when I am in the subway with my friends, and we don’t want people around us to understand what we are saying, we can switch to dereja.” With very few exceptions, respondents said that French was the language they were most comfortable

2 The Rif mountains is the largest hashish growing region in the world and whatever wealth there is in this region was created through the drug trade. Cannabis is cultivated openly and the fields grow right by the roadside in plain view of every traveler through this region.

with because their schooling was in French. All respondents considered French their native language.

Respondents in Morocco

Table 3.10. Desire to Move Abroad of Moroccan Respondents

Have you thought of the possibility of moving elsewhere?

Moving elsewhere Yes No Other 20 9 1

Table 3.10. shows that the majority of respondents in Morocco had thought about the possibility of moving elsewhere3 . The category “elsewhere” meant respondents were given the option to name any place in the world. I wanted to see which country would be cited most frequently. Given that the majority of respondents had family in France or another country of the European Union, coupled with the geographical proximity of North Africa and Europe, one might have expected that Europe would be the destination of choice. However, Canada was the most frequently cited country. This response is interesting for a variety of reasons. First, it indicates that the Moroccan sample was not singularly focused on France, its former colonial master - or Europe for that matter - as its external reference point. Secondly, Canada shares many social, cultural and economic traits with the United States, its immediate neighbor. Third, despite the similarities with the United States, Canada offers the advantage of having a substantial francophone region. Considering the geographical distance between Morocco and Canada and the expense involved in trans-Atlantic travel, it is unlikely that respondents who said they had thought of moving, would actually ever get there. However, the choice of Canada shows a remarkable skill in negotiating a balance between public Moroccan discourse -

3 Ten per cent of the Moroccan population of ca. 30 million resides abroad, thus immigration is a concept present in the minds of many.

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which in the wake of the invasion of Iraq is decidedly anti-American, and personal preferences. As expected, France, Great Britain, Belgium, the United States were also mentioned. Mostly these choices were connected to the fact that respondents had either close or distant relatives in one of those places and had received favorable reports from them. None mentioned another Arab country, though one said she had lived in Saudi Arabia for a year and another said she once had received a job offer from Kuwait but had decided against moving there. As with the French sample, the most often cited reason for thinking of relocating abroad was “professional opportunity,” followed by “financial security,” and some said “the possibility of being myself.” Asked to clarify this statement, respondents said they felt that in their home country they were bound to abide by traditions and customs, even those they did not agree with. Especially women who had briefly lived abroad to pursue university degrees said they felt more at ease in a foreign society where they could express themselves more freely and evaluate their own habits and beliefs by comparing them to others. Some said they thought it might be easier to find a husband overseas because in their understanding, Western men were not as prejudiced against marrying women over a certain age as are their Moroccan counterparts. Some respondents said they had already lived abroad, either in France, the United States, Brazil, or Saudi Arabia but had come back to Morocco because, “this is my home and where my family lives.” The women who had thought about moving abroad were decidedly oriented toward the West. None mentioned another developing world country, for example an African country, none another Arab or Islamic country. The citing of European countries might be in part explained by the geographical proximity of Morocco and Europe and in part by the historical relationship between Spain, France and Morocco; the most important factors, however, were economic affluence and real or perceived abundance of opportunities relative to respondents’ home country. About a third of the Moroccan sample stated they had not seriously thought about moving elsewhere, regardless of imagined enhanced opportunities. They wanted to stay where they were. Their thinking reflected a Moroccan proverb that states: “The tar of my country is better than the honey of others.”

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Table 3.11. Visits to France of Respondents in Morocco

Have you ever visited France?

Visited France Yes No 14 16

Table 3.11 shows that slightly more than half of the women interviewed in Morocco had never visited France whereas slightly fewer than half had been to France, either for a visit or an extended stay to obtain an advanced university degree. Again, this finding is of interest primarily due to the comparative nature of this study. All women in the French sample had been to Morocco at least once, the majority more than once. Therefore, women of Moroccan origin in France did have some personal, first-hand experience of life in Morocco, even if these visits occurred chiefly during a holiday season. Respondents in Morocco did not have the same degree of experience with France. Those who had lived in France for an extended period had pursued higher education there and those who had gone for a visit, rarely spent more than a fortnight - if that much - in France.

Table 3.12. Visits to other Countries of Respondents in Morocco

Have you visited countries other than France?

Visited other countries Yes No 23 7

Table 3.12 shows that the majority of the women in the Moroccan sample had visited a foreign country other than France. This comparatively large number reflects the fact that the sample selected for this study is not representative of the entire national population. It is a sample drawn from a small minority of women, to whom the criteria for selection apply: young, educated, professional and urban, criteria that rule out that vast majority of the female population. Their travels had taken them anywhere from

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neighboring Algeria to Norway and Malaysia, from Spain to South America and the United States. Those who had been to Saudi Arabia had been there for the haj, the pilgrimage to the Muslim holy sites in Mecca and Medina. Women in the Moroccan sample were more cosmopolitan than women in the French sample. This is partly attributable to social class, i.e. young, educated professional women in Morocco generally hail from middle- to upper-class families and so have been provided with the means for international travel. Another factor lies academic scholarships that offer eligible candidates an opportunity to study abroad. Women of Moroccan origin in France had for the most part had only been to Morocco; only a few had been to other countries. Some had gone on school field trips to Great Britain or Germany and some had visited different countries as part of their jobs.

Table 3.13. Family in France of Moroccan Respondents

Do you have family in France?

Family in France Yes No Morocco 22 8

The majority of the women in the Moroccan sample did have close or distant family in France. From the comparative data, it is evident that women of Moroccan origin in France had visited their family in Morocco more frequently than their Moroccan counterparts had gone to France.

A table absent in this study is one that shows educational level. As one of the sample criteria was educational level, such a table might be expected. However, tabulating educational level was complicated by the differences between educational systems in Morocco and in France. Though the two countries have similar educational systems, they are not identical. Several of the women in this study had received their university education in the United States, Great Britain or at a Moroccan university that uses the American system. All respondents in both samples had completed at minimum the BAC. Most had pursued a Bachelor’s Degree, DEUG or licence. Some had obtained

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Master’s Degree maîtrise or DEA. Several women in Morocco and one in France had earned a Ph.D. When relevant, individual respondents’ highest educational degree is mentioned in the following chapters. As this research focuses on educated women, respondents do have a higher than average level of education in both countries. This is particularly the case in Morocco, where no more than 36 per cent of women are literate.4

Conclusion

The core biographical features show that women in the Moroccan sample and women of Moroccan origin in the French sample have important attitudinal traits in common. These commonalities pertain primarily to issues concerning family matters. Living with family is preferred over living alone, living alone is considered a necessity but not the preferred situation. No one in either sample said she was living with partner to whom she was not married, none had children out of wedlock. Women in both samples regard professional opportunities as an essential aspect of their lives and therefore they were willing to consider relocating to another country should such opportunities present themselves elsewhere. In their self-description, women in both samples said they considered it possible to be “practicing” and “progressive” or “conservative” and “progressive” at the same time. Most differences could be observed within each sample and not between samples. For example, women with strong religious inclination in both countries described themselves as “practicing” and “progressive,” i.e. they perceived a link between leading a religious life with supporting social change. This reflects the position of Islamist groups according to which contemporary societies in the West as in Islamic countries are morally bankrupt because they do not address basic social inequities

4 UNICEF statistics for 2000 for Morocco: Adult literacy rate for females: 36 percent, for males 62 percent

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and uphold power structures that betray - in France - the ideal of fraternité, égalité liberté for all citizens and - in Morocco - the ideal of the brotherhood of the umma, the community of believers as envisioned by the prophet. Overall, despite the very different social and cultural environment in France and in Morocco, young, educated, professional and urban women share remarkable attitudinal similarities. Certainly one never does justice to the uniqueness of each individual when generalizing, thus these similarities are based on certain, limited factors. Data obtained from the interviews allow for several conclusions, most notably that as far as young, educated, professional women are concerned, the differences between those living in a North African, Islamic, Arab country such as Morocco and those living in a European, secular, Western country such as France are commonly exaggerated or that the force of globalization touch the lives of women in both countries in a comparable fashion. The single largest aspect women of Moroccan origin in France and women in Morocco have in common, is the religion of Islam. In the following chapter, I will turn to conceptions of Islam among the two samples.

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CHAPTER 4

CONCEPTIONS OF ISLAM

In my interviews, the majority of respondents described themselves first and foremost as “Muslim.” At the beginning of each interview, I asked respondents if they saw themselves primarily as French - or Moroccan - as women, as children of immigrants, as professionals or as something else altogether. I did not suggest a religious category. However, women in both samples spontaneously gave similar responses: “I am a Muslim.” Even young, educated, professional, urban women who said they were not particularly religious or did not practice Islam in accordance with the five pillars,1 believed that Islam was a major aspect of who they were. Individual identity can never be comprehensively or exactly enveloped in general categories. The precise meaning of being a Muslim no doubt varied among respondents. It is nevertheless remarkable that the majority of respondents in both countries chose the same broad category to describe themselves despite their different circumstances. In France, women of Moroccan origin are a religious and ethnic minority, whereas respondents in Morocco are not. In this chapter, I will explore the conceptions of Islam of two samples of young, educated, professional, urban women and how they are incorporating religious and cultural values based on Islam into their lives. This chapter first compares answers to categorical questions about the religion of Islam among both samples in France and Morocco and then explores responses to open-ended questions. The interview schedule included a series of open-ended questions that allowed respondents to expand on issues of importance to them and bring to the fore themes and issues I might not otherwise have considered.

1 The five pillars of Islam: 1. Shahada: profession of faith (There is no God but God and Mohammed is His prophet) 2. Salat : daily prayers 3. Zakat: giving of alms or charity. 4. Swam : fast during the month of Ramadan in commemoration of the revelation of the Qu’ran completed with the feast of Id-al-Fitr 5. Hajj: pilgrimage of every physically and economically able Muslim to Mecca

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In developing my interview schedule, I tried to devise questions that were equally relevant to the samples in Morocco and in France. The purpose of the questions was to ascertain the extent of similarities and differences between young, educated, professional, urban women of Moroccan origin in the two countries with regard to their personal understanding and practice of Islam. My interview schedule contained categorical questions about religious practices such as reading of the Qu’ran, being able to recite parts of the Qu’ran by heart, fasting during Ramadan and observance of daily prayers. Not included were questions concerning attendance of a mosque because the emphasis of this study is on individual practice independent of external infrastructure. In Morocco, there is a mosque in every neighborhood or within walking distance for most citizens. Many places of work have a designated room or place for daily prayers. This is not the case in France where it takes considerably more effort to get to a mosque or find an appropriate place for worship. Furthermore, public French routine makes few, if any, provisions for Friday prayers. Attendance of a mosque would therefore not be a very useful measure for a study with a comparative focus. This study draws for its context on research about Islam in its Western expression as explored, measured and described by French scholars such as Kepel (1984, 2004), Babès (1996, 1997), Etienne (1989, 2003) Wieviorka (2003) and Tribalat (1995, 1996), and on texts that deal with the new Globalized Islam (Roy, 2004) as described in Chapter 1. Islam in Arab cultures and countries is a long established field of study whereas Islam in its Western expression is a relatively new area of research. The comparative nature of this study aims at bringing together these two areas of research by adding to the understanding of two particular Muslim samples of the Mediterranean region that are an integral part of the movement of peoples, cultures and ideas in our increasingly interrelated and interconnected world.

In Morocco, practicing Islam is part of everyday normality whereas leading a life in accordance with this religion in France requires considerably more commitment. Fasting during the month of Ramadan is one of the pillars of Islam and therefore an important part in the life of a Muslim. Adhering to this religious command is much more difficult for Muslims in France than for those in Morocco. In Morocco fasting is a

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national event (eating in public during Ramdan is a criminal offense) and the time schedule of all institutions and places of work is altered so as to accommodate a different daily routine during the holy month. There are no lunch breaks; instead work ends so as to allow everyone to gather for ftour (or iftar), the festive meal after sunset that breaks the daily fast. The same applies to reading the Qu’ran. In Morocco, almost all respondents were fluent in Arabic and had read sections of the Qu’ran as part of their regular schooling, with the exception of those who attended private French schools. In France, most respondents were not literate in Arabic and therefore could only read the Qu’ran in translation. Also, few had any formal exposure to the scripture during their adolescence. Because the Qu’ran is believed to be the literal spoken word of God, translations are considered interpretations and thus inferior to the original version in classical Arabic.

My first question about conceptions of Islam intended to ascertain the degree to which respondents identified themselves as Muslims. In Islam, everyone born to a Muslim father is considered a lifelong Muslim, regardless of their actual practice or faith. Therefore, I asked young, educated, professional women if they saw themselves as Muslims primarily by birth, by choice, or both.

Table 4.1. Muslim by birth/choice

Do you consider yourself a Muslim by birth or by choice?

Muslim by Birth Choice Both Other Total France 4 0 20 1 25 Morocco 7 0 21 2 30

Table 4.1.shows that the majority of respondents in both samples saw themselves as Muslims not merely by birth but also by choice. This means that these educated, professional women did not discard their sense of self as Muslims upon becoming adults but affirmed their faith and culture voluntarily. Being a Muslim was understood as a

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religious and a cultural reference. Respondents in France for example said they held Eid al-Ftir and Eid al-Adha2 to be their most festive days. This was the case even among women who described themselves as laïques or not practicing. In France, respondents also said that they did not see a contradiction between being a Muslim and celebrating Christmas in some form. Four respondents in France said they were Muslim by birth only, meaning they had ceased to practice the religion they were born into. And yet they did not rule out the possibility of developing an interest in Islam again at some point in their life. In Morocco, most women who said they were born Muslim insisted that being born a Muslim means being a Muslim for life so there was no need for further affirmation. One woman in Morocco said that although she was born a Muslim she was currently in the process of studying other religions in an effort to find a belief system that made most sense to her. This young woman said that in Morocco this was a difficult task as access to literature about religions other than Islam was limited and furthermore only the religions of the book (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) were considered religions, other faiths such as Buddhism or Hinduism being considered philosophies. Another offered this pragmatic assessment: “I am Muslim by birth and I am Muslim by culture, because of where I was born and where I live. But it was not my choice. There are many other ways to lead a righteous life.” Women in both samples said that in Islam, culture and religion are so closely intertwined that it was sometimes difficult for them to differentiate between culture and religion even though they felt that some of the traditions and customs passed on to them were clearly not in accordance with their interpretation of the religion of Islam. It is often assumed that for Muslims in France the distinction between culture and religion is more evident as they live in a secular surrounding with a marked Judeo-Catholic heritage. My research however showed that educated Moroccans who live in an Islamic country are equally capable of making that distinction. Indeed, women in my sample frequently said

2 Eid al-Fitr is the day of celebration that marks the end of Ramadan. Children receive gifts or money from their relatives. Eid al-Adha or the Feast of Sacrifice takes place during the traditional time of pilgrimage to Mecca. It is celebrated by pilgrims in Mecca and by those who remain at home. Eid al-Adha commemorates Abraham's obedience to God by being willing to sacrifice his son. Each family is supposed to kill a sheep and prepares a feast using the meat.

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their conception of Islam was at odds with the prevailing culture, particularly with regards to the status of women. A distinction between religion and culture can be facilitated by knowledge and understanding of the scripture. I therefore included questions about familiarity with the Qu’ran and frequency of reading the sacred text. Also, as reading the Qu’ran is a voluntary practice and not part of the five pillars and it can serve as a particularly significant indicator of the level of religiosity. One of the most extensive surveys concerning religious practice among Muslims in France was conducted by sociologist Michèle Tribalat who published her findings in De l’immigration à l’assimilation. Enquête sur les populations étrangère en France(1996). Tribalat measured “religious practice” by using criteria such attendance of a mosque, following dietary restrictions (abstaining from pork and alcohol) and fasting during Ramadan. Based on her data, she concluded that second generation Algerians and Moroccans in France are less religious and closer to the values of laïcité dominant in French society than to the values of their parents. My approach differs from that of Tribalat in that I also included questions about practices not required by the religion of Islam such as reading the Qu’ran. By whatever means, a life of faith cannot easily be measured but I would contend that studying the scriptures is a stronger indicator than following rituals that have become part of a culture and tradition. Significantly, in the course of my interviews, questions concerning reading or reciting the Qu’ran often led to discussions of more complex issues.

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Table 4.2. Number of Respondents who Read the Qu’ran

How often do you read the Qu’ran?3

Read Qu’ran4 Weekly Monthly Yearly Never Total France 6 2 4 13 25 Morocco 19 5 4 2 30

Table 4.2. shows that comparatively more women in Morocco than in France read the Qu’ran on a weekly basis. The table further shows that the number of women who read the Qu’ran once a year is the same for France as for Morocco while the number of respondents in France who said they never read the Qu’ran is significantly higher than the one for Morocco. The explanations that followed the question were most revealing. When asked if or how often they read the Qu’ran, respondents in Morocco gave quick, straightforward answers. Most respondents said they had established a habit of reading the Qu’ran on a regular basis, weekly, monthly or in the case of yearly reading, this was done during the month of Ramadan. Of the two women who said they never read the Qu’ran, one had attended a private French school in Rabat and her parents were part of the old Moroccan elite that preferred to speak French rather than Arabic even in the home. The other, the daughter of a diplomat, had lived abroad in Europe during her formative years and had not been exposed to reading the Qu’ran as part of her schooling. While some women read the Qu’ran as a type of religious observance, more women said they had studied the holy book in recent years because they wanted to gain a better understanding of their religion based on their own study and independent of their instruction at school or of pronouncements of religious authorities. This individual study confirms what Roy describes as follows: “Le religieux s’est « sécularisé » non pas au

3 Answers of respondents in France categorized as “never” in the table included: • It is hard to say because I don’t read Arabic and to read the Qu’ran in French is not the same thing. • I am in the process of studying Arabic now so that I can read the Qu’ran. • I never read the Qu’ran, but I always carry a copy in my purse. • I recently bought a Qu’ran but have not started to read it yet. • I read the Qu’ran out of necessity for example when wanting to find out what the Qu’ran says about the veil or if it says anything about arranged marriage.

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sens de « laïcité », mais au sens où le divin est l‘affaire de chacun et n’est plus aux mains d’un corps de professionnels qui l’externalise en se l’appropriant. L’articulation du religieux et du social est ainsi modifié” (Roy, 2004 : 100). In France, the question about reading the Qu’ran generated more lengthy responses. Rather than simply saying “never,” as many did, respondents who answered in that way felt compelled to explain the reasons why they did not read the Qu’ran. The first reason given was their lack of mastery of the Arabic language and an apprehension of reading a translation. Others who responded “never” said they did in fact read the Qu’ran in French but felt that this did not qualify as “reading the Qu’ran” because they only read an interpretation of the scripture. Some women in France said they had not acquired the habit of reading the holy book because their parents were barely literate and therefore had not read it themselves. The only copy of the Qu’ran in their parents’ homes was an Arabic version that no one in the house could read properly. Several said that they did want to read the Qu’ran at least once in their lifetime. All respondents said they had a copy of the Qu’ran in their house and that they took it off the shelf from time to time to hold or look at. Some even said that although they did not read the Qu’ran, they always carried a miniature copy with them in their purse, which they proceeded to show me. I asked: “How can you call yourself a Muslim by choice, if you have never read the Qu’ran and don’t know what it says?” Respondents in France seemed surprised at this question as they felt there was no co-relation between “reading the book and being a believer.” Apparently, religiosity is understood as some internal disposition with a great variety of external expressions such as proclaiming the intention of wanting to read the Qu’ran one day or carrying an (unread) copy of the Qu’ran in the purse. This confirms Babès’ assertion à propos of her question, “Qui définit le religieux ? Ce n’est pas au sociologue ou à un quelconque chercheur de le faire,… ce sont des acteurs sociaux qui déterminent la qualité de ce qui est religieux” (Babès, 1996:15). Thus, the new religious understanding which is “en train de se faire” in France does not mean the end of religion but rather a “mutation des croyances” (ibid, 177). More respondents in France than in Morocco said they consulted websites and went to chat rooms5 aimed at Muslims for

5 The most frequently cited sites were www.oumma.com, www.sezame.info, www.islamfrance.free.fr and www.saphirnet.info.

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guidance on religious questions as they found it difficult at times to understand the Qu’ran. However, some in France said they had started to systematically study the Qu’ran. For some this was done in an effort to understand their own religion, while others were prompted by external events to pick up the book and read it to gain some sense as to why there seems such increased hostility towards Muslims in France and Islam in general. Said Nadia in Paris: “Growing up, I never read the Qu’ran. I had no idea what it said about anything. Based on what I heard at home and at school, I thought Jesus is the man for Christians and Mohammed is for Muslims. So I grew up believing that we have nothing in common. I did not even know that the Qu’ran speaks of Jesus or that Mary was a revered figure also for Muslims. I really did not know anything about Islam. I thought Christianity and Islam were two totally different religions and just accepted that. Now that I have studied Arabic for several years and have read the Qu’ran, I wonder why there is such acrimony between us [Muslims and Christians]. I don’t know, but maybe the same is true of many Christians. They have no idea that we actually have more in common than they think, or else we would get along better.” But, she added: “I have also studied the Bible a little bit and we Muslims certainly do not agree that Jesus is the son of God. God cannot have a son, He sends prophets. Also I don’t accept that God is three, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. We believe that God is only one. So there is a genuine difference but I am not sure that this could be the cause for such antagonism.”

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Table 4.3. Number of Respondents who can Recite the Qu’ran

Can you recite passages of the Qu’ran by heart?

Country Yes No Other Total France 12 8 5 25 Morocco 30 0 0 30

Table 4.3. shows that more respondents in Morocco than in France could recite passages of the Qu’ran by heart. In fact, all women in the Moroccan sample said they were able to do so. Even those who never read the Qu’ran on their own nor had done so as part of their French private schooling were able to recite certain passages because of the omnipresence of Islam in Moroccan daily life. It was simply an element of their culture. However, respondents were quick to add that being able to recite a verse was not synonymous with understanding its full meaning. Recitation of the Qu’ran is a required component of the Moroccan school curriculum but questions about meaning are discouraged. Thus, actual comprehension of the text is often limited. This is also due to the fact that the Arabic used in the Qu’ran is of such a sophisticated quality that it requires more than common knowledge of the language to understand the connotation of certain words or expressions. The Arabic of the Qu’ran differs significantly from dereja6, the spoken Arabic of Morocco. In addition, critical thinking and individual inquisitiveness are not characteristics of the Moroccan educational system which stresses rote memorization and acquisition of established knowledge. Voluntary recitation of the Qu’ran by adults can be compared with reciting the rosary in the Catholic Church. It is a religious practice observed in the spirit of worship and humility and not intended as an exercise in the exploration of meaning. Respondents in Morocco said they invoked the Qu’ran because it offered them some serenity in their otherwise busy lives and because they could do so whenever they felt like it outside of any prescribed prayer ritual.

6 Each Arab-speaking country has its own dialect. The Moroccan variety is probably most distant from Classical Arabic as it has incorporated Berber phrases and expressions as well as French words. The phrasing of the Qu’ran can therefore not easily be understood by someone with limited comprehension of classical Arabic.

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In France, the situation was again more complex. Those who were able to recite verses or suras had learned this on their own as adults. Among those who responded “other”, the most common response was that they could recite nothing but the fatiha7 but were not sure if this qualified because they took the ability to invoke this most frequently recited verse for granted. This uncertainty about religious practices was a distinguishing feature of my respondents in France. To the question if she was able to recite verses from the Qu’ran, one young woman summed up what several others had expressed: “I often pray with my own words and in French. I know this is not what is commonly done by Muslims, but I have to offer what comes from my heart. Sometimes I include verses in Arabic from the Qu’ran but I am not sure if I recite them properly.” Externally observable acts are a means to ascertain a degree of religious observance but as respondents emphasized, this is not necessarily an indication of their faith. Women in both samples approached religion from a perspective of personal meaning and belief and did not consider adherence to prescribed rituals as a measure of their faith. Leïla Babès has identified “privatisation et […] intérorisation” as one of the most profound changes of Islam in its French expression due to the great emphasis on individualism in the Western world (Babès, 1996: 7). Babès argues that this emphasis results in a personalization of faith with diminished adhesion to an institutionalized religion. My research revealed that this approach seems to become increasingly prevalent among young, educated, professional women in Morocco as well, pointing to a trend that has to date rarely been studied in a systematic fashion. My interviews show that young, educated, professional women in my sample did not see a conflict between public secular values and personal belief. Loyalty to French republican ideas did not diminish their individual faith, but it manifested itself in less conventionally measurable expressions such as fasting or observance of the required five daily prayers.

7 Fatiha, the opening “Bismi Allahi alrrahmani alrraheemi” In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. Praise be to Allah, the Cherisher and Sustainer of the worlds; Most Gracious, Most Merciful; Master of the Day of Judgment. Thee do we worship, and Thine aid we seek. Show us the straight way, The way of those on whom Thou hast bestowed Thy Grace, those whose (portion) is not wrath, and who go not astray.

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No study about Islam is complete without considering Ramadan. Most Muslims take great pride in the fact that they are capable of enduring an entire month without ingesting any food or drink from sunrise to sunset, at the same time abstaining from sex and smoking. It is indeed remarkable to see heavy smokers bring their habit to an abrupt halt in observance of the holy month, yet light up again as soon as the required period of abstinence is over. Whenever I asked a smoker why he (it is mostly men who smoke in Morocco) started smoking again after giving it up during Ramadan, I routinely received a similar response like this one from Ahmed, an accomplished scholar: “I like smoking. By abstaining during Ramadan, I demonstrate that I am not addicted and that the mind is stronger than the body. This sort of self-discipline is the essence of Ramadan and is required of a good Muslim.”

Table 4.4. Number of Respondents who fast during Ramadan

Do you fast during Ramadan?

Fast Yes No Other Total France 20 4 1 25 Morocco 26 3 1 30

Table 4.4. shows that the majority of women in both samples fast during the month of Ramadan. Often the questions I thought were the easiest to answer brought forth unexpected responses that allowed for a deeper appreciation of respondents’ understanding of issues relating to religion, culture and society. Their responses shed light on aspects of their respective societies that exceeded the anticipated scope of the interview schedule. The question about fasting during Ramadan was one such question. One might think that people either fast or they do not and say just that. The responses of women in both samples led to an understanding of more complex issues underlying this question.

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In Morocco the annual fast is a national affair in which all levels of society participate. The King is said to observe Ramadan as rigorously as a pauper in the streets. The difficulty of not eating and especially not drinking when Ramadan occurs during the summer, when the days are long and hot, is believed to engender national cohesion and unity. Daily work schedules change to accommodate the routine associated with the fast. As mentioned above, there are no lunch breaks. Instead the work or school day ends in time for people to join friends or family for ftour, the meal at after sunset that breaks the fast. Restaurants and cafés are closed throughout the country, and mass media routinely show scenes of public intimidation of persons caught eating, drinking or smoking. Female television personalities wear no noticeable make-up during Ramadan, shedding their image of glamorous beauty and instead appearing modest and bland. I asked a prominent TV anchor if she found it difficult to go on the air without her usual heavy make-up, jewelry and fancy clothing. She said, no pun intended: “That is the beauty of being a Muslim. Once each year, we all are equal.” The different rhythm imposed during Ramadan and the sense of national and religious obligation, makes it near impossible for Moroccans to admit that they are not participating in the fast. In my interviews only three women admitted to not fasting and two said they could not fast because they were exempt due to health issues. However, after the official part of the interview was concluded, several women said that they adhered to the fast only “in public.” Women who had lived abroad (in countries that were not predominantly Muslim) said they did not fast while they lived abroad. Those who did not observe the physical aspect of the fast said that Ramadan was not merely about refraining from food, drink, sex and smoking but was intended for the cleansing of the mind by abstaining from bad thoughts and feelings. This, they felt, required great internal discipline and aided them in being true to the spirit of Islam. In France, the majority of respondents also claimed they fasted during Ramadan. Several said they had fasted while they still lived with their parents, then stopped upon moving out but had taken up the practice again recently because they felt some personal desire to do so. Some said they fasted some years and not others, while others said they fasted on certain days but not the entire month. Though the fast is one of the five pillars of Islam and therefore not optional, respondents’ perception was that fasting should be a

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personal choice and not mandated. As with other questions about their religious practice, young, educated, professional women in this sample saw no conflict between making individual choices on a matter that is a required tenet of the faith and still considering themselves Muslims. Similar responses were given to questions about another practice required by Islamic dogma, the daily prayers (five for Sunnis, three for Shiites).

Table 4.5. Number of Respondents who observe Daily Prayers

Do you pray daily?

Pray Daily Yes No Other Total France 12 10 3 25 Morocco 21 5 4 30

Table 4.5. shows that daily prayers were more rigorously observed in Morocco than in France. In a country where one can see men rolling out little carpets on the side of the road and bowing for prayers in the direction of Mecca, where calls for prayer from the minarets are louder than most church bells in France and - with the help of modern technology - resonate through every corner of every household, it is obvious that praying is an encouraged and accepted practice. In contemporary France, there is no comparable overt encouragement for prayer. Still, several respondents in France said they found a way to pray five times a day, most often unnoticed by their colleagues at work or school. Respondents in France who said they did not pray, or said “other,” clarified this by adding that they did not pray in the prescribed manner but did pray often or occasionally on their own, using their own words. “Prayer has to come from the heart, it is not a matter of following a ritual,” was an explanation frequently offered. Respondents described prayer as a personal expression that did not at all times have to follow a particular pattern. “In Islam there is too much focus on following the rules, I pray when I need to pray, but sometimes I use my own words,” was how one respondent in France put it. “Praying should not be an obligation, it has to come from the

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heart,” said a woman in Morocco. Whenever respondents elaborated on their understanding of prayer, the views of the Moroccan and the French sample were strikingly similar. One woman in Saint Denis, on the outskirts of Paris, who described herself as devout, said: “There are what I call the ‘five-pillar-Moslems,’ that are those who follow the prescribed rituals of Islam, but that is a rather low level of practice. A higher level is imane, faith, which requires more effort on the part of the individual because faith is an internal focus on a higher ideal. And the highest level is ihsane, perfection, bienfaisance or what I think Buddhists call compassion.” She offered this explanation in part as a critique of my question concerning observance of the daily prayers. Assia, who had a graduate degree in bio-chemistry, felt strongly that Western researchers, as some Islamic scholars, were overly preoccupied with dogma and ritual and ignored the essence of a life of faith that should be evident in a person’s behavior towards others and could not easily be captured by conventional research. Assia’s comments did indeed put the finger on a limitation of some recent findings, namely that Muslims in the Western world are less religious as a result of living in a secular environment with a heavy emphasis on individualism. This individualized approach goes hand in glove with a heightened sense of personal freedom and also responsibility. By taking charge of their lives, pursuing higher education and embarking on professional careers, these women move out of the realm of obedience to conventions and traditions and take charge of their lives and assume responsibility for their decisions, but this does not necessarily mean abandoning Islam. Most studies do not take into consideration that comparable changes occur also in Morocco, a collective society that knows no separation of the religious from the secular. My research points to a trend of an increasingly individualized approach towards Islam among educated, professional young women regardless of their place of residence.

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Table 4.6. Evolving Understanding of Islam

Has your understanding of Islam evolved over time?

Evolved Yes No Other Total France 22 2 1 25 Morocco 30 0 0 30

Table 4.6 shows that the majority of respondents in both samples affirmed having an evolving understanding of Islam. In France, one woman said her understanding had not changed because she had never thought much about religion. Another said she did not care enough about Islam to deepen or improve her understanding. The woman who responded “other” said she had not invested time to learn about Islam but expected to do so at some point in her future. However, the majority of the women in the French sample stated that their understanding of Islam had indeed evolved over time while all women in the Moroccan sample claimed to have deepened understanding of their religion. Among Moroccan respondents, the most remarkable difference could be observed between women who had never traveled outside of Morocco or had not otherwise experienced intense interaction with people from a different cultural and religious background and those who had been exposed such contacts. In a developing country, travel or study abroad is generally reserved for the affluent elite. Research that focuses on educated, professional women in Morocco tends to focus on this privileged minority. However, because of the comparative nature of the study and an awareness of the fact that most women in the French sample came from families of modest means, I made conscious effort to seek out young, educated, professional women who came from a range of socio-economic backgrounds in Morocco and thus did include women from families of lower social status.

There is a particular place in Morocco, where one can find bright, young people who have not had an opportunity to travel abroad but who have had extensive interaction with people from various nationalities and cultures. The late King Hassan II founded a university in Morocco that uses the American system of education and uses English as

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the language of instruction. His vision for this institution was the strengthening of a home-grown middle-class and also to stem the brain drain of academics and of gifted young people. Al Akhawayn University of Ifrane (AUI) was established in 1995 in the remote, picturesque Middle Atlas town of Ifrane, home of the late King’s favorite palace resort. The faculty is a blend of international and local academics and there are extensive student exchange programs with American universities. In the dormitories, local students are intentionally paired with foreign students. The motto of the institution is “tolerance” and “inter-religious and intercultural dialogue.” Conferences and extra-curricular programs routinely revolve around aspects of these themes. My interview schedule at AUI included Moroccan faculty, staff and students. As English is the language used on campus, administrative staff have to have a comparatively high degree of education (at minimum equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree) as they must be fluent in English, a language not commonly used in this Arab- francophone country. They also must be capable of adapting to an international environment and an American system of education and management, though all positions from Dean and upwards are held by Moroccans. A reasonable number of staff positions are filled by people who posses the prerequisite qualifications rather than coming to their appointment by “coup de piston” (personal connections) as is often case in Morocco. The student body hails largely from middle to upper-middle class families, and 50 % of students are female. AUI is the first private university in Morocco and tuition fees are - by Moroccan standards - high. Scholarships and a system of work-study, common in the U.S. but previously unheard of in Morocco, allow for recruitment of bright students from modest backgrounds. For my interviews, I purposely sought out students who benefited from these programs because their background is more similar to those of the women I interviewed in France and therefore permits a more valid comparison. For my interviews with staff members, I also looked for those who managed to secure employment because of their qualifications rather than their family connections. The campus of AUI is a close-knit international island built on the slopes of a Berber mountain village. Because I had lived and taught at AUI for two years (1999- 2001) and had been invited back for summer teaching assignments in subsequent years,

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faculty, staff and students knew me and my family well and easily opened up during the interviews. The international environment at AUI allowed Moroccans close, everyday interaction with a wide variety of foreigners: Americans, Chinese, Pakistanis, South Africans, British, French, German, South American, etc. This experience had a remarkable effect, as became evident in the interviews. Amal, a young woman from a small town near the Rif Mountains had been the recipient of a scholarship and upon graduation had been employed by AUI. From a devout, religious family, she was the first in her family of four brothers and sisters to attend college. “Before I came to AUI, Islam was all I knew. I had never met a person who was not Muslim. When I came here, I met people from all over the world and I roomed with several American girls. My parents are very proud of me for being able to get this education but they were also a bit worried that I would lose my way.” Amal explained that though she did not wear the hijab, she planned to do so after getting married. “Right now, it is just not practical for me to wear a headscarf. I play soccer and here men and women socialize together. With a headscarf, I feel I could not do that.” The way she explained her evolving understanding of Islam was typical of the responses of women in the Moroccan sample who had been exposed to people from different cultures and religions. “Islam is one of the religions in the world. There are other religions too but this happens to be mine. For me Islam is my liberation, my freedom to express myself,” she said. “It is the promise of peace and equality. Islam for me is a way of life, that means it is not just a faith but it informs everything I do and as a woman Islam is the way to pursue women’s rights because that is what the Qu’ran states. We in Morocco have got to get away from the cultural practices which have nothing to do with Islam but are presented as such. I constantly argue with my mother about that. I want to travel abroad and see what people in other countries do and if they are not Muslims, how are they are different? I really liked my American roommates. In the U.S., all kinds of people live side by side. I think you can really be yourself there.” I asked Amal to elaborate on what she meant by being herself. She said she often felt restricted by Moroccan customs and social conventions and said that questioning her own religion was not encouraged. “By exploring Islam and looking critically at it, I feel I have become a better Muslim, but of

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course many in my family back home don’t agree with that. They feel that I have changed, I have become too ‘free’, too critical of our customs.” Amal emphasized her belief in tolerance. “I think we need to tolerate differences, it is actually not so difficult. But the key is education, we don’t know enough about each other.” As with most conversations in Morocco, the issue of the Middle East conflict was never far away and Amal too, inserted the Palestinian question into her understanding of Islam. “What about Jews? I am not sure they want to understand or tolerate us. Look at how Israelis treat Palestinians. That is a real problem. But universities are the perfect environment where people of different backgrounds can interact. But apart from one professor, I have never spoken to a Jew.” Amal felt that through her studies she came to understand different aspects of Islam. “Education really is the key. The first word the Archangel8 told the prophet was ‘ikra’ (read or recite). And he did not say that this message was intended for men only. The first order of Islam is the duty to educate but we have not followed this in our country. Otherwise we could not have such high illiteracy rates.” Youssra, who had received a scholarship to pursue graduate studies in the United States and had lived two years in Minnesota, had this to say about her evolving understanding of Islam: “Islam is one of the religions in the world. When I lived in the U.S., I began to question the environment in which I grew up in here in Morocco. Life in the U.S. was so different from what I had been used to at home. While there, I studied other religions and now I am trying to find out which is the best religion for me. I never knew for instance that Buddhism was a real religion. Here, we only consider the religions of the Book9 proper religions; the others are considered philosophies because they are not based on direct revelation by God. But I found Buddhism very appealing. I have a hard time fitting back into Moroccan society; there are not many people with whom I can discuss my spiritual search. But now that I am back, I also want to study more about Islam, especially Sufism.” Jamila came to her interest in Islam by way of studying finance. “Because I live in an Islamic society, I have not spent much time thinking about Islam. I have studied finance and sometimes we have to study some particularities of Islamic banking because

8 The Qu’ran is believed to have been revealed to Mohammed by the Archangel Gabriel. 9 The three Abrahamic religions of the Book are Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

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Islam does not allow charging interest. But here we studied different international systems of finance and the underlying philosophies that shaped those systems. That made me interested to study Islam more deeply with a view of understanding the social system based on this religion. And without realizing it at first, I became more and more fascinated with Islam and also realized that I actually have a deep belief in God.” Jamila grew increasingly animated as she tried to find the proper words to express her thoughts. “I know that faith can exist independently of a particular religious doctrine, but in my case, Islam made me realize that there is a larger purpose to our existence. I don’t consider myself different from a Christian or a Jew, the spirit behind these religions is the same. It is just that for me, the door to a spiritual life was opened by Islam,” and she added smiling, “by way of studying international finance, not necessarily because I grew up in an Islamic society.” The views of Amal, Youssra and Jamila on the AUI campus were echoed by women in other parts of the country who had lived abroad. Said Ikram, a medical doctor in Rabat, who had earned her degree in France: “Islam is the religion of the people of Morocco. It is what holds our country together. It keeps people united. Of course, we are in a time of great social upheaval and we have an economic and social crisis in our country. Even though Islam is my personal religion, it is important to recognize that in Morocco it is also an important social force. It is the official religion, it is also the basis of our educational system. It does not matter if one agrees or disagrees.” Ikram paused for a minute before she continued: “In Morocco, Islam is based on instilling a sense of guilt. Here everyone proclaims to be a ‘good Muslim,’ people don’t say what they really think or believe. It is just a part of our social fabric. People tell me that my personal problems stem from the fact that I am not a ‘good Muslim.’ At age 32, I am still not married, and yes, I have had a couple of boyfriends and occasionally I drink alcohol. Does that make me a bad person or a bad Muslim? I don’t think so. I really have been rethinking my understanding of Islam, because I need to be able to live my life the way I think is best. Anyway, it is not for others to judge if I am a good Muslim or not. There is too much of that going on here.” Women in the Moroccan sample who had been exposed to people of different cultures and religions, perceived their religion as one faith among others. They also had a

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more critical view of the way Islam was practiced in their home country. Though none of the women in the sample had changed her religion or declared herself an atheist, affirmation of their faith was based on aspects of Islam that supported their aspirations of being professional, educated women in a changing world. They also teased out the religion of Islam the way they understood it, from the blend of religion, culture and social circumstances that make up the Moroccan social fabric. Respondents who had only minimally been exposed to people of a different culture or religion by contrast, focused primarily on aspects that set Islam apart as a superior faith. Karima, a librarian said: “Islam is one of the three monotheistic religions. I don’t know much about the differences between the three but the essence of all three is the promotion of peace. In Morocco, Islam is the basis for our culture, for our political and social life and it is the basis of our values. On a personal level, what I like about Islam is that there is no intermediary between man and God. Each believer can come to God directly. I don’t like the concept of an intermediary when it comes to my relationship with God. We don’t believe in a ‘Son of God’ as Christians do. The Qu’ran says Jesus was a prophet and we revere him as that. But Mohammed was the last prophet. Also, we believe in only one God whereas Christians believe in a trinity that does not make much sense to me. Islam means everything to me.” Loubna, a university student in Rabat, wearing the hijab, and by her own account close to an Islamist10 position: “Islam is more than a religion, it is a complete way of life. It is not what is taught in the mosques here. The mosques just support the current [political, social and economic] system which is corrupt. I am very proud to be a Muslim, I believe in Islam. We have to show the world that true Muslims are the bearers of peace and social justice.”

The theme of “peace” was frequently raised by respondents. They voiced concern that Islam was perceived in the West as synonymous with terrorism. Morocco has had its own encounter with terrorism in the attacks of May 16, 2003 in Casablanca that killed 43 people. The bombings were carried out by self-proclaimed radical Islamists. Shortly after the attacks, tens of thousands of people demonstrated in the streets of Casablanca in a

10 The Islamist point of view is explored in grater detail in Chapter 5.

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“March against Terror.”11 My interview schedule purposely did not include questions about terrorism as I had not intended to make this part of my research. However, terrorist attacks had so shocked a nation that felt itself immune to such atrocities that respondents could not resist commenting on this during our interviews. It was common knowledge in this North African country, that Moroccans had been implicated in the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York and also in the bombings on a commuter train that killed 191 people in Madrid on 11 March 2004. At the time of this writing, suspects of Moroccan origin were on trial for the killing of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands on November 2, 2004. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that respondents felt compelled to address the issue of terrorisms when asked about their understanding of Islam. Without exception, all respondents in the Moroccan sample, no matter where they stood on any other issue that was indeed part of my research, said that Islam, the way they understood it, does not condone violence. “I can’t even describe how terrible it is what the terrorist are doing to our religion,” said Khalida, a school teacher in Azrou, home town of Zacharais Moussaoui’s12 mother. Several respondents expressed fear that by linking Islam with terrorism, the West might use this connection to destroy Islam. Terrorism carried out by self-proclaimed Islamic fundamentalists certainly was an important factor for emphasizing “peace” as a main aspect of the religion of Islam. “Islam means peace, love and goodness. It guides you through the dark hours which precede the daylight,” said Amina, another school teacher. By dark hours, she referred to the darkness terrorism had thrown over the light of Islam.

By contrast, respondents in France rarely raised the theme of peace - or terrorism for that matter - when speaking about Islam. Only some of the respondents who wore a headscarf made sure to emphasize that their “fundamentalism” was not to be equated with violence perpetuated in the name of Islam by terrorists. For the most part, women in the French sample insisted that Islam, or religion in general, was an intensely personal matter. Karima, an internet web designer in Paris, said: “Islam is something very personal

11 For more information on the bombings and the subsequent “march against terror” see the BBC world news website http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2936918.stm (last accessed April, 2005) 12 Zacharias Moussaoui is the only person who to date stood trial in the United States for the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001.

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for me. It guides me through this life and prepares me for the next. But I must not speak too much about this in a laïc state and I respect that. It is also a bit delicate to discuss religion in my family. I don’t want to upset my parents with the questions I have about my religion.” “Parents” was the key word for most respondents in France when discussing Islam. They emphasized that their understanding of Islam was different than that of their parents. “Islam is the religion of my parents,” said Aicha, a woman who works for a social service organization in Paris. “But my parents don’t know the Qu’ran very well. They did not have any choice with regards to religion. They were born Muslims in an Islamic society and then they moved to France. Their friends are Muslims and they live in a part of town where they are surrounded by other immigrants from North Africa. Even after all their years here in France, they have not learned much about other religions, other than that Christmas is a big event here.” Aicha contrasted the experience of her parents with her own: “I grew up here, went to a French school where most of my class mates were not Muslim. My colleagues at work are not Muslim. So, for me to be a true Muslim, not in name only, I would have to study the Qu’ran and understand what it says. I hope to do that one day. Still, I am no less of a Muslim now.” Lila, a legal assistant, offered this perception of Islam: “For me, Islam offers simplicity in a very complicated life. It offers purity of spirit, tolerance and a sense of belonging. That’s very important for me here in France.” She spoke of the closeness she enjoyed with her friends who were of a similar background to herself. Though they did not discuss religion explicitly, she said simply the fact that they were Muslims too, made the relationship easier. With her Muslim friends, she could discuss the difficulties she had with her parents which were similar to the conflicts they experienced. These conflicts were caused by such mundane issues as clothing - their parents did not approve of their taste in French fashion - but also more serious issues such as dating and marriage (themes explored in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6) Respondents in France saw religious affiliation as a primarily as a matter of individual choice. Because of the selection criteria of Muslim women, I did not encounter anyone who had changed their religion by converting to another. Thus, choice was limited to affirming - or rejecting - their adherence to the religion of Islam.

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Rabha, a graduate student in Paris who had recently decided to wear the hijab, said: “Islam means everything to me. It is my way of life, the basis for my everyday behavior and for all the decisions I make. I am actively studying the Qu’ran now and attend Qu’ranic classes on the weekend. I did not learn much about Islam from my parents but now I am beginning to understand what a great religion it is.” I had tried to interview Rabha for several weeks. We had first established contact months before my first research excursion to France. I had found her name on a website of a French Muslim Student organization and we had exchanged e-mails at irregular intervals. Initially, she seemed excited about the prospect of making her views known to a U.S.-based researcher. When I finally tried to meet her in person in Paris, getting together became like a game of cat and mouse. We had agreed to meet no less than four times, yet each time Rabha stood me up. When I called her to arrange for yet another meeting, she apologized profusely and promised to show up the next time around. I pursued this particular woman so vigorously because, as a spokesperson for a Muslim student organization, she could represent and articulate the views of a select group of young, educated women who wore the headscarf. Eventually, I became more intrigued by the reasons for which she kept failing to show up for our rendez-vous. Surely she did not want to convey the message that French Muslims with fundamentalist leanings were undependable or irresponsible. I knew she attended a Qu’ranic schools in the suburbs on the weekends so one Saturday I set out early in the morning to find this center in Seine- Saint Denis to which I had only vague directions. Though this neighborhood is filled with residents of North African origins, few were able or inclined to help me find the way to this Qu’ranic school. Eventually, I approached a bearded young man (les barbus are most often Islamists) who agreed to show me the back alley in which this center was located. When I attempted to enter, I was held back by a young man who inquired about my intentions before letting me in. Then the waiting game started anew. During the course of my several hours observing the goings-on at the center, Rabha’s no-show for our appointments became clearer to me. Repeatedly, she came out of a session to assure me that she would talk to me “soon” but did not want to miss out on her lessons. I came to understand that this intense religious instruction made students aware of the lack of their understanding of Islam. Through slightly ajar doors, I could listen in as the teacher, who

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spoke French with a heavy Arabic accent, pounded students with dogma, rules and regulations and other expressions of God’s will for mankind. When Rabha finally did agree to speak with me, she asked if her (male) teacher could be present. I told her that the focus of my interviews was on women and that I had to ensure confidentiality. Like a new convert, Rabha was exceedingly concerned that her responses did not stray from the official line of her particular group. Though she had been a Muslim all her life, the discovery of Islamism had offered her a new understanding of Islam as a universal religion that, according to her “seeks to eradicate social, national, class and other boundaries in an attempt to establish a truly equitable society under Islamic law.” Of the country where her parents were born but with which she felt no particular bond, she said: “One has to recognize first of all that Morocco is in a neo-colonial situation. Though it is an Islamic country, it needs to return to the source of Islam and not look to the West for guidance.” Like some respondents in Morocco, she was concerned that an U.S.-based researcher would find an easy link between Islam and terrorism and therefore she kept having second thoughts about meeting with me. Rhaba also felt uncertain about her ability to convey properly the essence of her new-found faith. She considered her parents’ knowledge and understanding of Islam as insufficient and therefore felt she had to “unlearn” some of what she had been taught at home and replace it with the new understanding she obtained at the Islamist center. When I asked Rabha what had attracted her to this particular brand of Islam, she replied: “I rediscovered Islam when I was at the university in St. Denis13. There I met people who lived to please God. I felt attracted to these people and I began asking myself questions like ‘Is Islam really only just another faith as Christians make us want to believe?’ I discovered that Islam was a real treasure that one has to discover daily. It is a system for living one’s life. It is not just a religion. It needs to govern all aspects of life and the laws of a country should reflect that.” Rabha’s views were not those of the majority of respondents in the French sample but they represented a worldview that is often misunderstood or vilified in the West. The sharpness with which Rhaba expressed her views differed from that of other veiled women who displayed a more quiet, yet more self-assured understanding of Islam. “The

13 a department with a large population of Maghrebi origin

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more I study Islam,” said Nacira, also university student, “the more open I become towards others. There is no longer a “us” and “them,” there only is a “we together” and how to be kind to one another.” I asked Nacira if she belonged to any particular group of if she attended some kind of Qu’ranic instruction. She said so far she had been studying the Qu’ran and other religious texts on her own, but mostly she consulted websites and logged into chat rooms on the Internet. Her parents had opposed her putting on the hijab: “They pushed me to go to university. Many of the young people in our neighborhood don’t have a proper profession or are unemployed. My parents wanted to make sure that I get out of that quagmire and so they felt I should not be so demonstrative about my religion.” In the course of her university studies and her friendship with other young women who were in a similar situation and who had already put on the headscarf, she became interested in exploring Islam. “It is really after I learned more about Islam that I became more serious about my studies. The Qu’ran does not condone the way women are treated chez nous.” In Morocco and in France, women found support for their personal ambitions through the study of Islam. For them, the realization that strict patriarchic structures were not a God-given system but that divine providence actually endowed them with rights and freedoms of their own, offered them a deep sense of conviction that they were on the right path. Sadia, an aspiring academic who had just completed her PhD in Rabat when we first met in the summer of 2004 and had started her career as a professor by the time we conducted the formal interview in 2005, summarized her evolving understanding of Islam: “When I was younger, I thought I had to make choice between being ‘modern’ and being a ‘true Muslim.’ Now I understand I can be whatever I want and be a good Muslim at the same time. No one can tell me how to be a ‘good Muslim.’ I do not have to make a radical choice instead I have to achieve a balance within myself.” Clad in fashionable Western clothes and long brown hair, Sadia felt that her studies of Western feminism had led her to better refine her own positions and she now describes herself as an “Islamic feminist.”

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Based on my study of the relevant literature, I had not expected to find such similarity in the responses of women in the French and the Moroccan sample. When coding the answers to the open-ended questions, I initially transcribed all responses to the question, “Can you describe a personal experience in which Islam has been important to you?” without identifying the respondent or where the interviews were conducted. I then put these notes aside and moved on to other tasks. Weeks later I picked up the notes again and tried to match responses to the countries in which they were given. The purpose of this exercise was to see if it was immediately apparent if a response came from a woman in Morocco or from a woman in France. I could not distinguish responses by nation of origin.

Following are select examples of some of those responses: 1. “Islam informs my relationship with other people. I know I need to be patient for example and virtuous and need to educate my future children in the in the religion of Islam.” 2. “Every day I have an experience with Islam. I am very shy and solitary, so I don’t talk much with others. But I do pray all the time and ask for guidance. Really, Islam is my source of strength especially in the work place where I have to deal with different people all the time.” 3. “I once had a wonderful boyfriend who was not Muslim. In fact, I don’t even know if he believed in any religion at all. We really liked each other a lot. But then I got very disturbed thinking about our future together and that we may raise children who are completely secular and without religious beliefs. And so I broke off the relationship. Even though I am not at all a devout Muslim, I feel I must not bring up my children without any faith.” 4. “I really don’t want to speak so much about Islam as about faith. I pray during times of difficulty and in trying times and because I grew up in the religion of Islam, I pray the way I know how. If I was brought up in a different religion, I would probably pray differently.” 5. “Islam is part of my daily life. It is how I accept bad things that happen to me

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or to my family. Also when you start judging your deeds by yourself, I always feel there is an eye on me - some people say this is moral consciousness. But for me it is this reference that you are never alone at any moment. It also makes me accept my destiny, death, sickness and it gives me hope when all doors seem closed.” 6. “As an individual, God is a refuge for me. Faith is like therapy for me. God controls the universe. I know that from a spiritual perspective on life. And you know that from being a Muslim. And when I am happy, I can be grateful to God. Islam puts everything into a larger perspective for me.”14

Conclusion

Religion or faith plays an important role in the lives of the young, educated, professional women sampled in Morocco and in France. Being Muslim was a large aspect of their sense of self. Their study of Islam was a liberalizing force and one that allowed them to move forward with their personal and professional ambitions in the deep conviction that God was, so to speak, on their side. Even those women who described themselves as “not practicing” said Islam was part of who they were or the trajectory from where they launched their lives. In Morocco, the majority of respondents had received religious education in their regular schooling and were conversant with the Qu’ran. However, on becoming adults, many had taken it upon themselves to explore Islam with a critical eye. Respondents in France, by contrast, had not received comparable religious instruction and had to expend considerably more effort in learning about Islam. Apart from what some have called a “sentimental attachment” to Islam, most women in the French sample actively sought to gain a better understanding of their religious roots and even those who had turned their back on the religion as practiced by their parents said they had an interest in finding out what Islam was all about. Their explorations led them to similar conclusions as their Moroccan counterparts. Recent

14 Responses 1,2,3 came from women in Morocco, responses 4,5,6,came from women in France

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perceived or real tensions between the West and the Islamic world have contributed greatly to this newly invigorated quest to understand this religion. My respondents in France and in Morocco differentiated between religion or their personal faith and the cultural practices and traditions of their country or families. They emphasized that some practices, like the unequal treatment of women, were part of the cultural fabric but were not in keeping with the spirit of the scriptures they way they understood it. Women in both samples had developed a personal understanding of their religion which was in most instances different from established, traditional interpretations. A major aspect of their personal interpretation was their changed perception of the role of women. For both samples this meant gaining confidence in exploring a new role for their personal and public lives. In France respondents situated themselves in contrast to their parents and in Morocco in contrast to prevailing social norms. As outlined in Chapter 1, an individualized approach to religion is a phenomenon associated with Islam in its Western expression. My research indicates that young, educated and professional women in Morocco, particularly those who have had exposure to peoples from other cultures and countries, approach matters of faith in a similarly individualized manner.

The major differences occurred not between the two samples but within each sample. Women who wore the headscarf and had Islamist leanings in Morocco held views similar to those of covered women or those with comparable leanings in France. To varying degrees, they felt that Islam was not only a religion but an all-encompassing way of life, sometimes perceived as superior to other religions. Their analysis of the society in which they lived was that it was corrupt and rife with discrimination and the unequal distribution of wealth, in contradiction to the teachings of the Qu’ran. Some advocated a strict implementation of Islamic law and a return to the true faith which would restore peace and eradicate social differences. Wearing a hijab was not synonymous with a conservative outlook on life. Both in Morocco and in France, there was a range of views among covered women and some held decidedly progressive views on certain social matters.

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The greatest difference within the Moroccan sample was found between women who had either lived or traveled abroad or who had intense exposure to people from different cultural and religious backgrounds and those whose interactions were limited almost exclusively to fellow Moroccans. Women with extensive international exposure, even when wearing the headscarf, saw Islam as one religion among others and felt that religion was a personal choice and the practice of religion a matter of individual preference. They saw religion primarily as a spiritual path and as one that allowed them to realize their potential as women. A life of faith required societal encouragement but not coercion. The differences within the French sample were more closely associated to women’s personal experiences within their families. They viewed Islam as practiced by their parents as being limited by their lack of exposure to a variety of possible interpretations. They too felt that the practice of Islam could not be determined by adherence to prescribed rituals and that their sense of being Muslims was determined by their own decision to uphold the cultural practices inspired by Islam.

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CHAPTER 5

LEGAL CHANGES – THE PERSONAL STATUS CODE IN MOROCCO AND THE BAN ON WEARING “OVERT” RELIGIOUS INSIGNIA IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN FRANCE

Young, educated, professional women in Morocco and women of Moroccan origin in France expressed a variety of viewpoints on the legal changes in both countries. While respondents on both sides of the Mediterranean generally welcomed the reform of the Personal Status Code (moudawana) in Morocco, they had considerably more difficulty in assessing the ban on wearing “overt1” religious insignia, which includes the Muslim headscarf (hijab), in public schools in France. None of the respondents opposed the moudawana reform outright; but the degree of support varied. Some women for example expressed concern that the new law was not entirely based on the Qu’ran and therefore threatened the integrity of Morocco’s national Islamic identity. No comparable degree of unanimity of support or disapproval could be observed with regard to the banning of wearing “overt” religious insignia in French public schools. Respondents in France and in Morocco were troubled by the perceived, underlying message implicit in this law as it was taken as an affront against Muslims in general and Muslim women in particular. Even those inclined to support the ban felt that the French government should have employed a less confrontational approach. The main concern of women in both samples was how new laws in Morocco and in France freed - or restricted - them to assert control over their private and public lives.

1 The full text of the law appears in the appendix. “Overt” is the closest rendering I can offer for the French “ostensiblement.” The reason for putting in quotation marks is because there is no precise description in the law as to what is considered “overt.” The wearing of Christian crosses, for example, is not disallowed and therefore the law can be interpreted to be directed at the wearing of the Muslim headscarf.

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Though most did not care much about politics in their respective country, they followed with great interest legislation aimed at shaping the role of modern Muslim women in a changing world. This interest extended beyond the borders of their country of residence as respondents in France followed the family law reform in Morocco just as much as their counterparts in Morocco kept informed about the ban on wearing “overt” religious insignia in French public schools. Routinely respondents inquired about the legal situation in the United States with regards to Muslim women. The following findings are organized in four sections: 1. Responses in Morocco to to the Personal Status Code reform, 2. Responses in France to the legal changes in Morocco, 3. Responses in France to the banning of wearing “overt” religious insignia in public schools and 4. Responses in Morocco to the new French law.

The reform of the Personal Status Code, moudawana, in Morocco

In Moroccan public discourse, the reform of the moudawana is framed within the context of Islam. My research aimed to find out if educated women, who have access to multiple sources of information, subscribe to this discourse or place the reform in a different context. In France, my goal was to assess the degree of familiarity with the debate on the Personal Status Code reform and how these changes were viewed from the vantage point of women in France. Almost all women in Morocco and France welcomed the reform of the Personal Status Code. They felt that this reform presented “a step in the right direction” or was part of “an evolution.” However, most cautioned that a change of law was only one measure of Morocco’s move toward gender quality. Respondents saw a change of mentality and of culture as equally important. Modifying the law was an act of government that demonstrated a willingness of the ruling elite to set in motion a deeper societal change. A change of mentality among the population at large was seen as a slow process and one that required more of men than of women. This is because the reform has widely been viewed as curtailing men’s rights and restricting their liberties, for example with regards to abolishing unilateral divorce (repudiation) and abolishing the clause that

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requires a woman’s obedience to her husband. As one respondent in Morocco said: “The question for men is: what is in it for them? And quite frankly, from a man’s point of view, not much.” Respondents viewed as a formidable task the garnering of widespread support for a reform that was perceived as offering few advantages for men. The reform draws into question centuries-old customs concerning the roles of men and women. Marriage in Morocco has traditionally been understood as an entity presided over by a man, not as a partnership among equals. For a woman, marriage meant exchanging the tutelage of a father or a brother for submission to a husband. The Personal Status Code reform mandates a new understanding of family and the role of women therein, because men and women are now legally considered equal partners. Furthermore, an altered concept of the family forms the basis for a changing understanding of women’s private and public roles. With more and more women entering the formal, documented workforce and playing a substantial role as wage earners in the family, a fundamental shift in the division of labor is already taking place. Previously, the public role was the domain of men. Currently, a transformation of women’s role is underway, written into law by the Personal Status Code reform. The most meaningful change, according to my respondents, was however not a matter of law, but of mentality and a realization of the difference between culture, customs and religion. King Mohammed VI presented the reform as in keeping “with our tolerant religion of Islam” and emphasized that reform was based on ijtihad, rightful interpretation of the Qu’ran. As discussed in Chapter 1, the commission charged with drawing up the reform included Islamic scholars whose seal of approval was required for every passage of the new law. Critics of the reform, most notably certain Islamist groups, have argued that no one called to participate in a royal commission would dare to oppose the wishes of the monarch as he is the also highest religious authority in the country. Because such great emphasis was given to the Qu’ranic basis for the reform, I asked if women in the sample agreed that the Personal Status Code reform was based on the scriptures. In the following I will describe the responses of women in Morocco and compare them with responses by women of Moroccan origin in France.

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Table 5.1. Personal Status Code reform based on the Qu’ran In your opinion, is this reform based on the Qu’ran?

Based on Yes No Other Total Qu’ran France 7 8 10 25 Morocco 14 7 9 30

Table 5.1. shows that only about half of the women in the Moroccan sample agreed that the Personal Status Code reform was based on the Qu’ran. This question often led to lengthy explanations of how religion can and has been used to justify a social system that disadvantages women. A fresh look at religious interpretation was a matter of social necessity. Said Farida, a young woman with a Master’s Degree in Business: “The question is not only if the new moudawana is based on the Qu’ran, but we should ask ourselves if the old moudawana was based on the Qu’ran. The old moudawana had also been presented as if it was the word of God.” In her reading of the sacred text, women should not have been placed in a position inferior to that of men in the fist place. For Farida, discussion about the religious validity of the reform was a spurious one. The patriarchal structure and with it gender inequality arose from the Moroccan cultural context, not from a genuine religious one, she said. Latifa, a woman wearing the hijab and on a fast track in a government department, echoed the opinion of the majority of respondents: “It is important that we stay true to our own cultural roots and the religion which forms the basis of our identity and of our family law.” Morocco’s roots should be traced to the changes introduced by the prophet and not to customs that had existed in North Africa before the arrival of Islam. She felt that Morocco need not look to the West to come to the conclusion that men and women were created equal. “People should read the Qu’ran more carefully and not just take what suits them,” she said. Latifa emphasized that she wore the hijab out of religious conviction and to demonstrate her belief in the veracity of the revelation of the prophet. Like most of her peers in the Moroccan sample, she did not view the

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moudawana reform through the lens of religion, but as a change born out of necessity. It marked a milestone for moving into a modern era by discarding rigid patriarchal traditions and customs. Still, most respondents commended the King for having recognized that the Qu’ran did not condone treating women as second-class citizens by pronouncing that living in harmony required equality.2 Yet most women I spoke to were not sure just how quickly this reform would lead to a change in attitude, mentality and behavior. With very few exceptions, young, educated professional women expressed the view that the Personal Status Code was at the heart of Moroccan society. Granting women substantial rights meant that that the vision for Morocco’s future had changed. This view confirms the assessment of one of the foremost Islamic scholars in the United States, John L. Esposito, who argues that a change in family law is an “indicator of social change and reform, its methodology and problems” (Esposito, 1982: x).

To some respondents it was however of paramount importance that legal change was framed within the context of Islam because the identity of their country as an Islamic state was at stake. This position was voiced especially by women who felt close to Islamist organizations. They feared that Morocco would “loose its soul” if it implemented changes based on what they perceived as “Western models.” Those respondents feared that though Mohammed VI had emphasized that the reform was based on ijtihad, rightful interpretation of sacred texts, his real objective was to narrow the gap between Europe and this North African country. Most vocal in their initial opposition to the reform of the moudawana was the largest Islamist3 movement with a mass following in Morocco, and committed to non-violence, Al Adl wa Ihsahane (Justice and Charity), founded by Sufi Sheikh Abdesslama Yassine4. While this Islamist group in Morocco initially opposed the reform as not being based on the Qu’ran, Al Adl wa Ihsahane later expressed concern that

2 Discours Royal, my translation, see complete quotation in Literature Review Chapter 1. 3 Willis, Michael. Moroccan Islamism – Expansion or Decline. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 4 Abdessalam Yassine has advocated the need to “islamiser la modernité et non moderniser l’islam.” He was imprisoned and later put under house arrest by the previous King Hassan II.

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the reform did not go far enough in changing all aspects of law, civil and criminal, that discriminate against women. Because Islamist ideas echoed in some respondents’ assessments of the family law reform, I decided to seek out a leading member of the movement, whom I shall call Zineb. In a lengthy interview she explained that religion is meant to uphold an ideal whereas politics deals with physical circumstances. Zineb is in her mid-forties, university-educated, highly articulate and married with four children and two grandchildren. She described herself as a “militant neo-Sufi5” as opposed to a feminist. Occasionally, I mentioned to respondents that I was scheduled to visit Zineb in her home in Salé, the old twin city of Rabat. Each time there was an intense response. Some encouraged this visit because they believed she could lay bare the complexities of the new law and explain its advantages and its shortcomings better than anyone else. Others saw it as a waste of my time to talk to an Islamist because they believed Islamists had nothing of substance to offer with regards to Morocco’s progress. Some women insisted that I meet with them again after my rendez-vous with Zineb because they thought Moroccan mass media were given to misrepresenting the views of this movement so as to discredit it and they were keen to receive an account from an outsider as to what a leading member had to say. I had come to know Zineb during the time I lived in Morocco (1999 - 2001) and had been a guest at her house in subsequent annual visits to North Africa. Because of her precarious status as a leading member of an organization that has a history of openly criticizing the King, a crime punishable by imprisonment, Al Adl wa Ihsane has officially been shunned. Consequently, contact with Zineb has to be handled discreetly. Her modest apartment is located near the prison of Salé where the founder Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine spent many years. Zineb usually advised me to wait next to the prison gate where she would send someone to meet and guide me to her place through the maze of unnamed streets. The effect of having to ask a taxi driver to take me to the prison was not lost on me. Generally, taxi drivers pretended not to understand my request and more than once, I had to change vehicles because a driver felt uncomfortable taking a foreign woman to such a notorious site.

5 Sufism is the mystical branch of Islam which is popular in Morocco.

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In her home, when no men are present, Zineb lets down her long, black hair and wears jewelry and make-up, which is in sharp contrast to her stark appearance in public where she covers each strand of black hair under a simple, dark veil, wears no jewelry and, other than the customary black henna around her eyes, no make-up. During the decade that Sheikh Yassine had been in jail and under house arrest, she had risen to a leading position in his movement. Fluent in French, Zineb is well- equipped to explain the founder’s message to a wider world. She resents Western- inspired reforms on the grounds that they impose a foreign agenda on the Moroccan people. She explained to me that the change of the moudawana was based on a realistic assessment of a changing reality in Morocco but had “precious little” to do with new insights into the Qu’ran. Her critique of the reform was based on an assessment that it addresses the needs of an elite minority and not of the majority of Moroccans. As an example she cited a new legal provision that makes it easier for women to obtain a passport. “Is this an issue of national concern, given that more than 60 per cent of our women are illiterate and live in the rural areas where they travel on foot or on donkeys from one village to the next?” she asked. “There is no new law that mandates building schools in the rural areas, there are no jobs for our university graduates who do not have powerful connections. There is no proper health care in the rural areas and there are no realistic plans to rectify the glaring social inequalities. We are a poor country, a third world country as you say, yet our king is one of the richest men in the world. How can that be called an Islamic society?” she asked provocatively, raising a recurring theme of the Moroccan Islamists, namely questioning the legitimacy of the monarchy. For the Islamist opposition, the elimination of the rigid class system is a more pressing issue than revision of the Personal Status Code. In terms almost reminiscent of Marxist rhetoric, Zineb decried the immense wealth of the King and that of a miniscule, privileged upper- class which contrasts sharply with an average annual per capita income of 530 US dollars for the majority of the population (United Nations Country Report, 2003). Zineb also took issue with some more fundamental changes such as the raising of the marriage age and the abolition of polygamy. Again, referring to the majority of Moroccan women, she argued that raising the marriage age from 15 to 18 did not present advantages for the large number of rural, poor, under-educated women. For rural girls,

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early marriage offered protection and a safe way to grow into adulthood. Zineb cited the problem of child labor that has widely been recognized as a major social ill, particularly the large numbers of petites bonnes, girls as young as seven years, working as domestic servants and prone to exploitation and sexual abuse at the hands of their employers. Early marriage, even as a second wife, offered a better prospect for a young girl in those circumstances. The abolition of polygamy reduced the chances of poor, rural girls to get married and, Zineb feared, as a result some might end up as prostitutes6 and even more as petites bonnes. On the issue of the wali, guardian, Zineb explained the Islamist position as follows: Without a profound change of mentality, Moroccan women who are not under the protection of a wali, are susceptible to abuse. Men could easily prey on women if they did not have to fear retribution from a male guardian. The system of a wali was needed as long as the majority of Moroccan women remained illiterate, poor and without adequate access to the legal system. For Zineb, the moudawna reform was not only pandering to a minority urban elite, but also “putting sand in the eyes of the West” by appearing to “modernize” the country in accordance with Western standards while ignoring the most pressing issues affecting the country. More urgent than a reform of the family law was an improvement of education and employment opportunities. Her movement maintains that Islamic countries such as Morocco can reform from within and need not follow the lead of the Western world to address social ills within their borders. The West, Zineb said, was not responsible for the large-scale corruption that hindered genuine development in Morocco. This was not idle rhetoric given that this Islamist movement maintains grassroots programs which provide health care in the rural areas and offers literacy classes. As we chatted in Zineb’s living room, sipping strong mint tea and eating home- made Moroccan marzipan cookies, women “of the movement” came in, sat with us for a while and offered their own comments. All were veiled, articulate, well-educated, professional women who dedicated their spare time - and part of their income - to some of the Islamists social causes. Some were involved in campus outreach programs, where

6 In Morocco, the term prostitute is also used to describe women who have sexual relations outside of marriage.

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the activist stance of the Islamists has attracted a large following among students. Of the women I interviewed on different university campus throughout Morocco, those who wore the hijab were in some way connected or at least sympathetic to Al Adl wa Ihsane. Even among uncovered women, the Islamist movement enjoyed clandestine support because it put its finger on one of the main problems facing Morocco, namely widespread, high-level corruption. With regard to the moudawna reform, Zineb eloquently pointed to the difficulties with the implementation caused by poorly trained judges, ill-equipped administrators and an illiterate populace who was un- or misinformed about the reform. She had been to court herself to observe some of the proceedings required by petitioners for obtaining a special dispensation to marry under the new legal age of 18. “The girls have to appear in front of a male judge and his assistants. They are asked in the presence of their parents if they are still virgins and if they were willing to have their private parts checked by a medical examiner to confirm the veracity of their statements.” To Zineb these were tactics designed to discourage applications for early marriage. Training of female judges and grassroots campaigns were needed to explain the new laws instead of relying on the “typical Moroccan system of intimidation and fear.” Our conversation turned from the moudawana reform to other issues of interest. Zineb had only recently been granted a passport and for the first time in her life had the opportunity to travel abroad. She recalled how surprised she was to find that most Americans she met, were people of faith and that her Muslim headscarf had been of no obvious concern or interest to anyone she had come across in the United States. As I was accompanied by one of my teenage daughters, Zineb inquired about her preferences in music, movies, books and fashion. She asked my daughter if she dated boys and if she had been exposed to drugs. Again, she was surprised that a taste for rap music, R-rated movies and - by Islamist standards - immodest clothing7, did not correlate with loose morals or a lack of values. She admitted that her perception of the Western world had been profoundly changed as a result of her recent travels to the United States. As much as the West is misunderstood by Islamists, so are Islamists by the West, she concluded.

7 In this case immodest clothing refers to a sleeveless t-shirt and the absence of a headscarf.

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Throughout the interview Zineb emphasized that her movement was committed to non-violence and had nothing in common with terrorists who claim to act in the name of Islam. Zineb articulated the position of respondents in the sample who expressed reservations about the moudawana reform but also spoke about important issues raised by those who supported the legal changes, most importantly corruption, unequal application of the law and an entrenched rigid patriarchal system. The majority of respondents agreed that law depended on implementation by the courts and judges. “If the mentality of the judges does not change, the new law is meaningless,” said Lamiae, a manager in an international firm in Casablanca. “Anyone can buy a verdict here and consequently, well-connected, wealthy men can obtain a ruling no matter what the new law says. Less fortunate men and women are at the mercy of old-fashioned judges, whose decisions they would not know how to appeal.”

In my interviews with women in Morocco, it was striking how often “the Moroccan woman” was invoked. In the West, with its emphasis on individualism, differentiation and recent adversity to stereotyping, one would not speak of “the French woman”, “the American woman,” etc. But in this North African country, most of my respondents frequently spoke of the advantages of the reform for “the Moroccan woman”. The reform, so respondents insisted, will allow “the Moroccan woman” to find her place in the modern world. When probing deeper into who “the Moroccan woman” was, it became evident that respondents were keenly aware of ethnic and especially class differences in their country and of the gulf that separates urban from rural women. There was some disagreement over who would benefit most from the new laws. Some argued that urban women were the primary beneficiaries because they had access to information and could claim their new rights, whereas rural, illiterate women remained at the mercy of those interpreting the changes for them. Others said that lower class women stood to gain most because they did not enjoy the freedom and opportunities that come with being a member of the upper class, regardless of what the law says. Women in my sample eventually agreed that the term “the Moroccan woman” did not capture the diversity of women in

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this country and that it presumed a sense of solidarity and shared experience which did in fact not exist.

Some respondents saw the moudawana reform as a means of bringing Morocco more in line with its European neighbors to the north, while others pointed out that the model of reform of the Personal Status Code was to be found two countries over to the east, in Tunisia. “For us, the status of Tunisian women is the role model,” said Nadia, an official in one of Morocco’s Ministries. “It has taken us more than 40 years to catch up to our neighbor in the Maghreb,” she said. Indeed, with regards to the status of women, Tunisia has long been far ahead of most Arab or Islamic countries. Shortly after independence from France, Tunisia’s Personal Status Code was single-handedly changed by its first president Habib Bourguiba, a French-educated lawyer, in 1958. Not only was polygamy abolished but Bourguiba also advocated discarding of the veil for Tunisian women and promoted mandatory education for girls. Pointing toward Tunisia as a model for the reform was not uncommon among educated, professional women though they added that in this day and age it was important that laws were internationally compatible, that is in relation to regions beyond the Maghreb and the Arab world. The fact that it took Morocco close to sixty years after independence from France to craft a new Personal Status Code is in line with anthropologist Hammoudi’s assertion that the Moroccan elite is inherently averse to fast and dramatic change, especially changes that threaten its own, immensely privileged status (Hammoudi, 1997). Another aspect that came to the fore in discussions about the Personal Status Code reform was the distinctions between religion and culture or traditions. Most said that though Morocco was an Islamic country, some of the traditions had their roots in the Berber and Arab culture and not in the religion of Islam. Some had come by this assessment through their individual study of the Qu’ran; others had done so through international travel where they had encountered Muslims from other regions of the world. A particular case in point was a young science professor who upon completion of her doctoral degree had accepted a teaching position in Saudi Arabia. Though she described herself as a devout Muslim and wore a headscarf, she was shocked to see how the

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country of the birth of Mohammed “had perverted what the prophet stood for.” Breaking her contract, she left Saudi Arabia after only one year, chiefly because she considered the way women were treated in that country in contradiction to what she believed to be an acceptable interpretation of the Qu’ran. Her experience in Saudi Arabia also led her to take a closer look at the customs and traditions in her own country which previously she had taken as being based on the Qu’ran. After returning to Morocco she became active in social causes in the hope of contributing to the development of an Islamic society the way she now understood it. Women who had not left Morocco but had immersed themselves in the study of the Qu’ran and the history of Islam insisted that Islam is a religion that does permit new interpretation according to changing social circumstances. They argued that it was reasonable to present the reform as being based on ijtihad, rightful interpretation of the Qu’ran. Said Sadia who works for an international organization in Rabat: “Slavery for example is a practice condoned by the Qu’ran. The Qu’ran contains several passages that admonish believers to treat slaves properly and justly, however without stating that the practice itself is an abomination. Still, slavery has long been outlawed in Morocco - as it should be.” Abolishing slavery, according to Sadia, should not be interpreted as a sign of abandoning the tenets of Islam, but of the need for constant re-examination of the sacred text. Another example was child marriage (i.e. under the age of 15), again a practice mentioned in the Qu’ran but long outlawed in Morocco. Women in the sample argued that the moudawana reform should not be taken to mean that the country was adopting a more relaxed attitude toward religion or as a move towards a more secular position. This point was important to respondents in Morocco as they understood that the reform was commonly hailed in the West as an effort to modernize the country based on European models.

Among respondents in France the question of the Personal Status Code reform was based on the Qu’ran was not one they had thought about deeply. Having grown up in a laïc state, women in the French sample said though they had followed the debate concerning the reform in Morocco, they were not familiar with the details. Whether or not they felt the reform was based on the Qu’ran made little difference in their overall

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assessment, namely that this was a long overdue step in the right direction. They understood that the reform all but abolished polygamy, made it possible for women to obtain a divorce and no longer required women to submit to their husbands. They said they were happy and relieved about the reform because they believed in time it would make life easier for women in Morocco. Like their counterparts in Morocco, women in the French sample cited a change in mentality and everyday behavior as even more important than the legal reform. Some recounted how the separation of their parents had left their mother in dire financial straits. Even though this separation had occurred in France, the mother was not familiar with French law and therefore accepted repudiation by her husband because she knew this to be in accordance with Moroccan customs. Said one woman: “When you are left in such a desperate situation, you don’t much care if this is justified by the scripture.” A more detailed assessment of the reform was offered by respondents who professed to be Islamists. They said the new law had to be examined “point by point.” One, a graduate student in Paris said: “Polygamy is permitted by Islam, so I am against abolishing it. On the other side, divorce is also allowed by the Qu’ran, so to make it easier for women to obtain a divorce is an acceptable change. It is also a good thing to raise the marriage age from 15 to 18 because the Qu’ran does not give a specific age at which girls should get married.” When I asked her if she could envision herself in a polygamous marriage, she hesitated and eventually would say no more than “it depends.” For this sociology student, the most important question was: “What is the vision behind this law? What vision does the King have for his country? Is this an occidental vision? One should ask these questions. In Islam, we are taught to be open, to ask questions, to be critical.” Other women wearing the headscarf also said they did not trust the King’s motives, believing he would do anything to enhance his standing in the West. Nevertheless they welcomed the Personal Status Code reform: “This is just politics. But if the outcome is good for the people, I am content. Islam is an easy religion. It does not want to make life difficult for people.” Several respondents knew of family members who had been at the mercy of the old moudawana and in their recollection, this had never been a good experience for the

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women affected. A more structured examination of experience with the moudawana was explored in the following question.

Table 5.2. Number of Respondents with Experience of Personal Status Code

To your knowledge, has any woman in your family had an experience with the moudawana in the past?

Country Yes No Other Total France 11 11 3 25 Morocco 10 18 2 30

Table 5.2. shows that comparatively more women in the French sample spoke of someone with personal experience with the old moudawana than those in Morocco. This can be explained in part by the fact that the majority of immigrants come from the poorer, rural regions of Morocco where customs and traditions are rooted deeply. As described in Chapter 1, Charrad (2001) writes that the policy of post-independence family law relied on the support of kinship-based tribal societies by institutionalizing a Personal Status Code that incorporated ancient customs and traditions. Openness about bad experiences with the Personal Status Code may also be an indication that people who have been physically removed from their country of origin for an extended period of time, talk more readily about things they see as being wrong with their country. Despite their difficulties in France, immigrant parents had to assure themselves that they had made the right move by coming to a European country. Telling their children of some of the problems they had left behind could be interpreted as a text-book example of cognitive consonance. Without exception, when respondents said they knew of a case in their family where someone had an experience with the moudawana, it was a bad one. By contrast, more than half of the respondents in Morocco claimed they knew of no one who had had an experience with the moudawana. Only a third of respondents recounted incidents where a family member or a friend of the family’s had had an experience with the Personal Status Code. They told remarkably similar stories: A relative had been repudiated by her husband who proceeded to marry another woman

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without paying alimony or child support; a relative had wished to divorce her husband because of his repeated infidelity but could not obtain a divorce; a divorce left a woman impoverished because assets which had accrued during the marriage were not shared after the separation; and there were stories about women who had been coerced by their guardians or families to marry someone they did not want to share their lives with.

The interview schedule also contained open-ended questions that allowed respondents to speculate on possible long-term outcomes of the Personal Status Code reform. Most women in the French and in the Moroccan samples said they expected only good things to come of the reform. However, they offered only cautious optimism. “Things move so slowly here,” said one young woman in Morocco, “it will take time before everyone in the country understands that things have changed.” As an example of slow or half-hearted implementation, some referred to urban women’s groups who had contributed to the drawing up of the reform and who had heralded it, but were now widely accused of not doing enough to propagate the reform in small towns and rural areas, confirming the Islamists’ assertion that the reform catered to an urban elite. In the summer of 2005, a year and half after the reform had been officially announced, most respondents agreed that implementation of the reform had been rocky. A young professor in Rabat offered this assessment: “There has been some disappointment. The reform did not yet lead to wide-spread empowerment for women as some might have hoped.” In fact, a conference had been organized to address some of the problems with the new law. The title of the government-sponsored conference indicated a willingness on the part of the authorities to critically assess the reform: “One year after: What went wrong?”

In Morocco, respondents between the ages of 18 and 22 feared some very personal repercussions of the reform: the difficulty of finding a husband. “If a man is not allowed to discipline his wife, he may not want to marry at all,” said Amal, a university student in her second year. “Of course, I don’t want to be beaten, but I’d rather have that than not getting married at all.” Though questions about domestic violence, or fear of one’s spouse, were not part of the interview schedule, fear was a theme that recurred frequently. Some said one of the reasons why they wanted their parents to take a leading

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role in finding a husband for them was that they believed this would offer them a certain sense of protection in case difficulties arose in the marriage. “Difficulties,” they specified, meant infidelity and physical violence. In conversations with mature, married women it often appeared that fear had given way to a sense of fatalism. The new law stipulates that assets accrued during the marriage will have to be divided evenly upon divorce. This too, some of younger respondents worried, would lead men to be apprehensive about getting married. Divorce henceforth will result in substantial pecuniary disadvantages for men that previously did not exist. “Morocco is in a state of uncertainty after the reform,” said Aziza, another university student, reiterating that a change in mentality would have to follow the legal changes. “Young men are afraid of getting married now. They don’t know what to expect any more now that the law is no longer on their side.”

When I asked women in the French sample what long-term changes they expected as a result of the Personal Status Code reform, the issue of fear resurfaced again. Fear was understood as an integral element of marriage and family life and one which carried over into other areas. Respondents in France felt that the new law eventually would lead to a situation where women no longer needed to live in fear. An altered concept of family was expected to endow women with more confidence and also result in more freedom to pursue a professional career. However, most respondents said they only had a cursory understanding of specifics of the new moudawana and that their assessment was based on a comparison with what they observed from having grown up in France. “I have lived in France all my life, so I know women have more rights here than in Morocco. The reform there was long overdue, but I am doubtful it will bring about real, substantial change - at least not right away” said one interviewee. The issue of fear had not been anticipated based on the interview schedule. However, repeatedly I was told that the life of Moroccan women was marked by fear; fear of their fathers, fear of their husbands, fear of what their neighbors might say, fear to express themselves openly. As with stories about experiences with the old moudawana, it is possible that because respondents in France could evaluate goings-on in Morocco from a distance, they cast a more critical eye on their parent’s home country. A different

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perspective will be offered later in this section. When asked how they had come by this assessment of fear, they said that on their visits to Morocco they had witnessed it among their Moroccan relations and experienced some of if first-hand. They recalled how they had been constantly admonished to dress or behave a certain way, told what and what not say in public, they had felt their every move was under observation and scrutiny. “Women are just not free, they think that living in fear is some kind of religious duty - or maybe just a fact of life,” observed Fatma, director of a social service center in Seine Saint-Denis. “This new law will free them from this pervasive sense of fear and guilt. So often women in Morocco think that it is their fault when things don’t work out, that it is mektoub (destiny) if bad things happen to them. In time the changes that will come as a result of the moudawana reform will allow women to shake off that sense of fatalism and step out and take charge of their lives.” The old family law obligated the husband to provide food, clothing and shelter for his wife, while she was expected to defer to him and obey (moudawana articles 1-31). Women in the French sample also insisted on a change of mentality. Yet unlike their counterparts in Morocco, they said that men and women needed to change their attitudes. “Women have lived with this system for so long, that is what they know, what they are used to. They may not know how to deal with their new rights and freedom and this can cause some confusion and conflict,” said Maria, an airport security manager. Others said that an organizational structure needed to be put into place to allow women to understand the new laws and their implications. “Women will need a lot of help, I think that is why so many new women’s organizations sprout up all over Morocco,” said Mouna, a lawyer in Paris. “This is a good time for women of Moroccan origin who have grown up abroad or studied in Europe to go to Morocco and help so that these reforms can take root in the society at large.” Women in the French sample also pointed to the example of Tunisia, where the family law had been changed in 1958. “Tunisian women have almost the same, in some instances even more rights than women in France,” said Fatima, a high school teacher in Paris. “And they are an Islamic country as well, so we should not make such a strong connection between Islam and what is going on in a given country” she added. Because their families had experienced some of the worst aspects of Moroccan society, the

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relation between religion and social reality had not been felt as strongly as among the better situated upper class. Their parents had experienced inequality before the law, inequality of educational and professional opportunities, absence of social mobility and a sense of being ignored by the government. Thus, they could not speak with pride of an “Islamic state” as some of my respondents in Morocco had done. The women I spoke to identified themselves as Muslim - to varying degrees - but considered Morocco a country held back by ancient customs and traditions, not by religion per se. To most women in the French sample, it was of little consequence if the new law was in keeping with the Qu’ran. Nevertheless, they understood that the King had to present it that way to garner the support of the population. “The new King is young and progressive, he has a lot of good ideas and he wants to position Morocco to join the European Union. He is watching closely what is happening in Turkey and the changes Turkey is required to make to be admitted to the European Union. This reform shows that he is serious about modernizing his country and moving it closer to Europe while at the same time keeping its Islamic identity intact,” said Fouzia, who works for a government-supported legal aid organization in the heart of Paris. Respondents expressed relief that the new law raised the marriage age, abolished polygamy and adjusted divorce proceedings. Many said that their mothers had been married before the age of 16 to their fathers through arranged marriage. “I don’t know if my mother was ever in love. She serves my father, she obeys him, she followed him to France, she had five children and she raised us. The new law will free women in Morocco to make their own decisions about marriage. This will allow them a whole new understanding of marriage, and that is an incredible change in Morocco,” said Kheira, a woman in her late twenties, who left home and had not been in contact with her family because they disapproved of her choosing a career over early marriage and her insistence on finding her own spouse. As respondents in France speculated on the changes that might come as a result of the family law reform, some contrasts between the French and the Moroccan samples became evident. A young Moroccan diplomat charged with advising embassy and consulate personnel on how to apply the Personal Status Code reform in their dealings with Moroccan expatriates illustrates this difference: “These people are really funny.

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They live in a time warp. Their understanding of society is based on the Morocco of 30- 40 years ago. Their mentality does not really exist anymore, at least not among young, educated people in the cities.” She grew more and more animated as she compared herself and her peers with the second generation in France: “In many respects we are more modern than them. For example, we believe women’s rights come out of Islam, we believe we need more female judges, ambassadors, business executives. Young people of Moroccan origin in France don’t have such high ambition; they are so concerned with adjusting to French society. They feel they have to become more ‘French’ before they can rise in society. They think the Personal Status Code reform takes us out of the Stone Age, but they don’t see all the other changes taking place in Morocco.” Indeed, adjusting to French society was a serious concern of the second generation as is illustrated by the issue of the “veil ban,” to which I shall now turn.

The Ban on wearing “overt” religious insignia in public schools in France

Ambivalence best describes the assessment of respondents in France and in Morocco concerning the ban on wearing “overt” religious insignia in French public schools. Though respondent in France said they understood and, more importantly, supported the concept of laïcité and most in Morocco also claimed to be familiar with this principle of governance, they did not see how the new law was to advance the cause of national cohesion. Overall, the reasons for this legislation were not entirely clear to women in my samples. Their skepticism about the government’s insistence on upholding the principle of laïcité was based on the observation that important public holidays in France were religiously based, such as Christmas, Easter, Pentecost, etc. They also referred to the lowering of the French flag throughout the country upon the death of Pope John Paul II in April, 2005. To my respondents this was a clear sign of state-sanctioned bias towards Catholicism. Respondents in France emphasized their loyalty to France, but insisted that one could be French and Muslim at the same time just as much as one could be Catholic and French without any inherent contraction. The ban on “overt” religious insignia in public schools was perceived to be directed first and foremost against

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Muslims though officially the ban includes for example the Jewish yarmulke, the turban of Sikhs and “large” Christian crosses. Even though several respondents had expressed reservations about the King’s motives in introducing the Personal Status Code reform in Morocco, the positive results were felt to outweigh such doubts. By contrast, respondents tended to doubt that there would be a positive outcome to the ban on religious insignia in French public schools. Because the Muslim headscarf is such a visible expression of religious and/or cultural affiliation, I first wanted to establish the extent of this practice among my respondents and compare it to their mothers. It is important to note here that the reasons for wearing the hijab vary not only from generation to generation but also among women in the samples. For most women over the age of approximately 40, wearing the headscarf is as much a regional custom as it is an expression of religious observance. It may also be useful to remind ourselves that in most of Europe, wearing a headscarf for women over a certain age was a common practice only two generations ago. This was the case as much in Nordic, protestant Finland as in southern, catholic Spain and Italy and all the way over to the east in Russia. It is therefore a comparatively recent phenomenon to associate the headscarf with Islam.

Table 5.3. Number of Respondents whose Mother wears hijab

Does your mother wear the hijab?

Veil/Mother Yes No Other Total France 14 11 0 25 Morocco 19 11 0 30

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Table 5.4. Number of Respondents who wear hijab

Do you wear the hijab?

Veil/self Yes No Other Total France 7 17 18 25 Morocco 9 21 0 30

If yes, since when do you wear the hijab?

In Morocco: average answer: since age of 19 to 24 years In France: average answer: since age of 17 to 24 years

Table 5.3. shows that the percentage of mothers who wear the headscarf was the same in Morocco as in France. Also more mothers than daughters put on the headscarf. The number of mothers who did not wear the headscarf was the same for Morocco and for France, suggesting the conclusion that this is a voluntary custom that some women adhere to, others do not. Because traditions can be observed more accurately among older than younger people, we can see that the headscarf is by no means a rigidly adhered to practice in Morocco. Table 5.4. shows that the percentage of women who wore the headscarf is about the same in both samples. In Morocco, wearing the headscarf was not a criterion for selection for this research. Often I did not know in advance if a woman I was to meet for an interview would wear one or not. As most of my interviews in France were conducted after the ones in Morocco, I intentionally sought out a significant number of women who wore the headscarf so as to provide for a more valid comparison. However, in France veiled women were often more reticent about participating in this research. In France women started slightly earlier (at age 17) to put on the hijab whereas women in Morocco did not start it putting on until they were at least 19. This slim age difference is nonetheless of interest because respondents in Morocco often expressed the

8 This woman said she had put on the veil when she was 21 years old, but discarded it after about a year.

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view that putting on the veil was a decision to be made by mature women and not by school girls who were subjected to intense peer pressure.

Because the headscarf is such a contentious issue in France (see Hargreaves in Chapter 1), I phrased questions concerning this new law very cautiously.

Table 5.5. Number of Respondents in Favor of Ban on “Overt” Religious Insignia

Do you think the law banning the wearing of “overt” religious insignia from public schools in France could have advantages?

Advantages Yes No Other Total France 7 15 3 25 Morocco 7 20 3 30

Table 5.5. shows that the majority of women in France and in Morocco felt that the banning of religious insignia did not have advantages. Most respondents in France followed their expression of skepticism vis-à-vis the new law with a statement such as this one by Aicha, an aspiring journalist in Paris: “When Moroccans move here, they know they are not coming to a Muslim country. They were not forced to immigrate to this place. Actually, many left because they felt France was a better place for them than their own country. Once they are here, they know they have to obey the laws of this country. The French government is within its rights to pass any law it deems necessary. We know that we do not have a dictatorship here.” Though Aicha disagreed with the ban, she had not participated in demonstrations or other public expressions of opposition because she did not want to put her professional opportunities in jeopardy. Aicha said she had thought about wearing the headscarf herself, but had decided against it because she felt this would make it even more difficult to enter the mainstream job market. “It is not a big issue for me, but I can understand that school girls and university students are willing to go all out to protest against this law.”

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Many of the women in the French sample felt “the media hype” focused on an inconsequential issue while ignoring the main problems affecting Muslims of immigrant backgrounds in France, namely unemployment and discrimination. Also largely absent in the public discussion on the “foulard” was a look at the reasons why girls wear the headscarf. French researchers have identified three main reasons: 1. pressure from family or friends 2. Conscious personal choice 3. to escape violence in the banlieues. Though my research confirmed these findings, I also found additional reasons why women put on the headscarf. In Morocco, the hijab had become a fashion item with colorful scarves matching the overall outfit. Some of my respondents in Morocco made it a sport to point out the women passing by in the streets who they believed wore the hijab for religious reasons and those for whom this piece of fabric was a fashion statement. With some practice, I could detect the difference too. Due to the controversial nature of the Muslim headscarf in France, considerably more thought went into putting on the scarf for women there. Nevertheless, in France too, wearing the scarf was in some cases a fashion comparable to the way some young people in the West put on a T-shirt displaying an image of Che Guevara. The wearer signals a kind of rebellion against the establishment and asserts an identity without in the least supporting a communist uprising. Most of the women I interviewed in France said they had put on the headscarf against their parents’ wishes, even in cases where their own mother wore the hijab. There are aspects of the headscarf that are unique to France. Kepel, for example, describes the return to religious roots as the phenomenon of “re-islamization” which occurred chiefly as a result of social circumstances in the often violent suburbs, marked by unemployment and deprivation (Kepel, 1987). Being left out of the French mainstream, a renewed identification with the religion of Islam is seen as one way of asserting difference from the dominant culture. Respondents expressed concern that the banning of the Muslim headscarf would lead to further self-segregation of Muslim communities, possibly leading to the creation of Islamic schools. As the Muslim community in France is not an affluent one, funding for those schools would have to come from outside of France as is currently the case with mosques. However, at the time I conducted my interviews, about a year after the headscarf ban came into effect, most reported that as far as they knew, schools had found

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some sort of compromise to accommodate girls who wore a headscarf. In some instances, girls had been asked to wear a bandana instead of the scarf, in others they were asked to sit in the back of the class room and others had come to an arrangement where the girl would take off her scarf on school premises but put it back on as soon as she left there. In the majority of the cases though, girls did indeed take off the headscarf. Fatima explained: “For most of our families, public education is greatly valued and they would not want to diminish their daughter’s chances of getting a decent education.” Among young women who had just passed the baccalaureat exams at the time of our interview, the ruling evoked a visceral reaction. Hayat who had completed high school near Etampes, a small town south of Paris, said she never wore the headscarf but she had classmates who did. She always felt awkward being pitted against her co- religionists by her French peers who felt closer to her because of her unveiled appearance. “But I am a Muslim just like the covered girls. Sometimes they chided me for not wearing the hijab, telling me I was not a proper Muslim. The French girls on the other hand thought I was more like them than the veiled girls. I wish there had not been this conflict and tension all the time. If none of us had been allowed to wear the headscarf, we would have looked alike and there would not have been all that bickering over who is a proper Muslim and who could be friends with whom. I think, Muslims should be allowed to wear the headscarf if they feel it is their religious duty, but quite frankly I think we would have had a lot less conflict at school if no one wore the headscarf.” On the north side of Paris is the département of Seine-Saint Denis which includes many quartiers sensibles, areas containing dense concentrations of immigrant minorities where grey, identical towers of the HLM public housing projects stand side by side with little space in between the buildings. Here a bi-weekly souk (outdoor market where all sorts of goods are for sale and prices are negotiable) brings this dreary-looking, artificial neighborhood to life. Languages other than French dominate the market scene and on every stall lively bargaining prolongs the purchasing process. Shopping here is a cross- cultural, personal experience contrasting sharply with a quick trip to the anonymous supermarket in adjacent neighborhoods. Moving between the stalls, brushing against

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women in colorful robes with babies strapped to their backs can make visitors forget that they are only a short subway ride away from the Eiffel Tower or the Champs Elysées. Hidden in one of those drab public housing towers is a center for “filles en difficultés.” I spent several afternoons at the center, observing the goings on and talking to staff and visitors. Guests are offered mint tea in small, gold-rimmed glasses. Fatma, who runs the center, is a master of multi-tasking, talking on the phone while comforting a sobbing young woman in a chair across from her worn desk and telling an old woman in a djellaba9, also in obvious distress, to sit down and be patient. She switched back and forth between French and Arabic and in between all this flurry of activity; she leaned over to answer my questions. By all accounts, Fatma is a liberal woman. Twice divorced, childless, living alone, fully supportive of French republican values, she once moved to Casablanca, the place her parents had left decades earlier, to work in a center for abused women. She returned to France within months, saying even a modern city like Casablanca was “too backward in mentality” for her to tolerate. But she adamantly disagreed with her liberal peers, intellectuals and feminists, who oppose the banning of the veil because they see this ruling as a violation of basic human rights. “I am sorry that I have to disagree with the people I would normally feel closest to. I know they are angry at me for supporting the ban on the headscarf. But I work here in the projects, I see every day what goes on at the schools, how the girls are getting increasingly pressured to put on the hijab, and mind you, not by their fathers or mothers, it is now their brothers and their peers who insist that they cover their heads. We see girls here at the center all the time who say they have been threatened if they don’t wear the hijab. The state has an obligation to protect these girls, they should not be bullied into putting on a headscarf. The hijab should be an expression of faith, but out here it is not.” Though not a practicing Muslim herself, Fatma decided to read the Qu’ran to see what it says on the issue of the headscarf or veil10 and came away believing that the Qu’ran did not require women to put on this particular piece of clothing. However, she felt that the French state handled the issue the wrong way. She

9 a djellaba is the traditional North African floor-length hooded gown which is the same for men and women. 10 Hijab or headscarf covers all hair and the top of the head, veil generally refers to the covering of the entire upper body and sometimes includes covering of the face.

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explained that most families who came to France from North Africa a few decades ago had no idea how the French public schools system worked. Coming from a country where there is no separation of the religious from the secular, immigrants did not understand how the concept of laïcité functions in everyday life. Also, they came from highly authoritarian places and were used to doing as they were told. But in France no one told them what to do with regards to their children’s public school education. Fatma felt rather than coming down with a heavy-handed law, the government could have used its resources to have social workers visit immigrant families and explain the French public school system to them. She went on: “Most parents are grateful that their daughters receive decent education in France and they could have been convinced without much difficulty that the headscarf is not appropriate in public schools here. Instead, it had to come to all these conflicts and now it seems the French state is on a collision course with its Muslim population.” For Fatma and those who think like her but were not equally as eloquent in expressing their position, unemployment is the real problem among the second generation. “Unemployed young men hang around in the neighborhoods and cause trouble. They need to gain some respect somewhere so they dominate or terrorize their sisters forcing them to wear the headscarf and behave in certain ways,” the experienced social worker explained. “It is not the religion of Islam or the headscarf that are the main problems - it is unemployment and social exclusion.” Even though Fatma’s liberal outlook appeared in sharp contrast to the Islamist positions as explained by Zineb in Morocco, their analysis of the root problems of social tension is remarkably similar and their quest for social justice is fueled by a similar understanding of a state’s responsibility to protect and provide equal opportunity for all its citizens.

Comments of women in the Moroccan sample on the French ban on the wearing of “overt” religious insignia focused on the complexity underlying the new law. Most opposed the law on the grounds that the headscarf as a religious expression was a matter of personal choice and the state had no business interfering with a person’s religious observance. However they added that France had its laws just like Morocco has hers and therefore people needed to abide by the laws of the country they reside in, regardless of

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whether they agree with them or not. There was some misunderstanding about the ban as most respondents believed that the French state was asserting her power to ban the expression of a religion that they disagreed with. When hearing that the ban affected only girls in public schools, several women responded with surprise, asking “why would young girls put on a headscarf?” Latifa, herself covered, explained that in her understanding of the Qu’ran, covering one’s head was a conscious decision made by an adult woman. “Because once you put it on, you should not take it off again. It is not a decision made lightly by a teenage girl. Here, school girls don’t wear the hijab.” She continued: “If you have children in an environment that you are not at home in, you need to understand this new environment without being made to feel that you are victims. In France, you do not find religion in the streets, they do not teach religion in schools as they do here. Religious education is left to the families and maybe there they encourage their children more vigorously to put on the hijab as a means of being true to their religious identity. Here, we know everyone is a Muslim, there is no need for overt profession of your faith. Of course France has the right to ban the headscarf but they should remember that they initially welcomed all these immigrants to do the jobs the French did not want to do. The government should have considered the fact that immigrants from North Africa are Muslims and should have thought earlier how they wanted to integrate them. To punish the second generation now is a sign that France never really thought about the religion and culture of this new population when it first arrived.” Respondents in Morocco were concerned that the French government and the majority population evidently found it difficult to live harmoniously with its Muslim population. They saw the headscarf ban as a form of discrimination which would eventually lead to more severe problems. In the present climate of “war against terrorism” which often was perceived as a war of the West against Islam, this new law confirmed that the West was not prepared to tolerate Islam as a viable religion. Respondents saw a fundamental contradiction between the West’s posture of upholding human rights while banning the religious expression of a minority. “This confirms our suspicion that the West is the enemy of Islam and that ultimately they want to convert everyone to Christianity,” said Touria, a civil servant in Rabat. “This ruling will lend

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more and more credibility to the Islamists, they are going to grow now in France and they will become more powerful, I have no doubt,” she added. Samira, a French-trained psychologist in the capital city of Rabat, said: “Muslims in France are already marginalized, this law is too brutal. Young people are given to revolt against the established system anyway, this will fuel their anger and bring them together in a way that is detrimental. This law is a trap.” She pointed to Great Britain where there has been no comparable ban. Instead, Muslim police women for instance were offered a choice of uniforms that conformed to their religious requirements and issued matching headscarves.

Questions about legal changes required respondents to comment on actual events in both countries. To gain insights to deeper held beliefs and ideas about the role of law, I also asked a hypothetical question.

Table 5.6. Number of Respondents in Favor of Standardized Family Law

Do you think France and Morocco should have the same type of family law?

Same Law Yes No Other Total France 12 10 3 25 Morocco 3 21 6 30

Table 5.6. shows that in France half of the respondents favored a more standardized international family law while in Morocco more respondents said laws in the two countries should not be similar or even the same. However, in the Moroccan sample the question about “same family law” was unanimously understood as meaning “French” law as no one considered it possible that France would adopt aspects of Moroccan law. This demonstrated that questions, even hypothetical ones, cannot be understood outside a historic context which in this case meant that standardization is understood as re-imposing French or European dominance.

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Respondents in France as in Morocco saw a strong connection between culture, identity and the law. Those in Morocco who opposed having the same law across the Mediterranean insisted that Morocco was an Islamic country with its distinct culture and tradition which needed to be reflected in the law. They emphasized that their cultural identity would be threatened if laws were the same in Europe as in North Africa. The idea of adopting similar laws in both countries brought out deep-seated fears that this would represent a new form of colonialism. The West, respondents in the sample feared, would not ever recognize contributions coming from a former colony and an Islamic one at that. Therefore any attempt for international standardization of family law was seen as a euphemism for Westernizing. Fouzia, a French-educated accountant for an international organization in Rabat, said: “We have two societies, two ways of being. We need to begin by acknowledging differences. The laws need to take cultural factors into consideration, but we should not think that Islamic law cannot adequately protect women and give them more rights. As we move forward and adjust our laws, there will be more compatibility - but it has to come from us, from within our culture.” French respondents had a more nuanced approach to this question. The majority of women in the sample expressed the view that French laws had served them well and therefore Morocco stood to gain by adopting the type of laws that had served women in Europe to exert control over their lives. They felt the secular nature of laws did not infringe on their religious identity as Muslims. Approaching this issue from a practical perspective, Khadija, a legal assistant in Paris whose firm works with immigrants and refugees, argued that uniformity of law was ultimately a necessity. She said there was an inherent problematic caused by difference in laws. “Especially with regards to family matters, it would be much better to have a uniform law. This would help stem the tide of refugees. Our firm assists women who have fled their country because of some unbearable family situation and the failure of the laws in their home countries to adequately protect them.”

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Conclusion

This comparative study showed that educated, professional women in Morocco and women of Moroccan origin in France are reasonably well-informed about important events in both countries. Women in both samples took an interest in developments that affect women on both sides of the Mediterranean. They approach interpretation and assessments of legal changes within contexts that make sense to them rather than subscribing to official discourse. Certainly, their views are shaped and influenced by their environment. They are critical of the motives for legal changes in their own place of residence as well as of the government across the shore. In Morocco, law and culture was seen as closely linked which confirms Rosen’s assessment that like religion, “law is a kind of metasystem which creates order in a universe that is often experienced in a more disorderly way.” Rosen argues that cultural beliefs and understanding are revealed most vividly in Islamic family law. A change of law, therefore, marks a cultural shift as well (Rosen, 1989: 17). In France, respondents perceived a clear difference between the public and the private. Public French culture with its emphasis on laïcité and shaped by its Catholic heritage, is not understood as a threat to private Islamic identities but clashes may occur in the public sphere. The Personal Status Code reform in Morocco was welcomed by the majority of respondents in both France and Morocco whereas the ban on wearing “overt” religious insignia in public schools in France was viewed as a controversial, complex issue on which opinions varied significantly. Beyond legal changes, respondents in both countries emphasized the need for a change of mentality and behavior.

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CHAPTER 6

PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ASPIRATIONS AND CHALLENGES

The theme “personal and professional aspirations and challenges” encompasses a wide range of issues. I included this broad theme in my interview schedule because it allowed young, educated, professional women in both samples to speak about their hopes and aspirations and the obstacles they perceive in accomplishing their goals. As with the previous three chapters, responses to categorical and open-ended questions are presented in tables which are then analyzed and described. Open-ended questions allow respondents to be proactive and put forth issues that the researcher may not have thought about. This study draws on Grounded Theory methodology which encourages the researcher to uncover new trends or issues previously not considered or not fully understood. It is therefore important to offer a setting in which respondents can raise problems or concerns that are important to them. In a study with a cross-national, comparative focus, questions about ideas, hopes or visions lead to a better understanding of themes which transcend nationality and are not necessarily country-specific. They can bring out similarities or differences on a deeper level. The three previous chapters have addressed core biographical features, the role of Islam, religion and faith in the lives of young, educated, professional Moroccan women and woman of Moroccan origin in France and responses to changes in the law in Morocco and in France. In this chapter, views on issues such as marriage, friendship, professional opportunities and obstacles are described and analyzed. This chapter offers a glimpse into very personal, intimate matters as well as views on broad issues of public policy. It was not always easy for women to discuss some of these matters freely with a stranger. There were questions respondents had previously not considered. Sometimes women in the samples were apprehensive about offering definite answers. In the process of talking through an issue, respondents occasionally refined,

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revised or changed their responses. It also happened that women asked me to share my own views before they were willing to offer theirs. I insisted that I could only share my thoughts after the interview and occasionally that sufficed for respondents to feel reassured that I was not trying to get something that I myself was not willing to give. This chapter will first look at responses to categorical and open-ended questions that pertain to public issues and will then discuss personal and private matters.

The first question in this section asked about nomination of women to high positions in government or to serve as judges. Islamic Jurisprudence (fiqh) is linked to the study of the religion of Islam and is traditionally, a male prerogative.

Table 6.1. Number of Women in Favor of Women in High Positions

Do you think women should be nominated to high positions in government and/or serve as judges?

Government/Judges Yes No Other Total France 21 1 3 25 Morocco 28 1 1 30

Table 6.1.shows that the overwhelming majority of women in both samples thought women should be nominated to high positions of government or serve as judges1. In fact most responded emphatically, exclaiming “of course”, “absolutely,” or “most definitely.” There was broad agreement on this point in both samples. One respondent in Morocco and one in France said women should not hold high positions in government or serve as judges because women were “by nature ill disposed” for positions of public responsibility. Though these two respondents were professionals themselves, they felt they did not occupy positions in which they had to make decisions that affected a great many people. Some said women were too “emotional” and due to their menstrual cycles prone to mood swings which would not allow them to be

1 There are several female judges and one female Supreme Court judge currently serving in Morocco.

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consistently impartial as judges. The respondent in Morocco who used the category “other” explained women could hold any office, except that of a judge because like the position of imam2, a judge was a position reserved for men. In France, those who responded “other” said they were unsure if women currently had the prerequisite professional qualifications to hold such offices and they did not want to see women appointed based on a notion of mandated gender equality.

The next question asked if respondents thought their opinions or views mattered to people who made public policy decisions.

Table 6.2. Number of Respondents who think their Opinions matter

Do you believe your opinions or views matter to people who make public policy decisions?

Opin.matters Yes No It Depends Total France 4 16 5 25 Morocco 7 13 10 30

Table 6.2.shows a variation of responses within and across the two samples. Two thirds of the French sample believed their opinions did not matter to people who make public policy decisions compared to slightly less than half in the Moroccan sample. Those who believed their opinions mattered qualified their response by saying during times of election public officials conveyed a sense that they were interested in the views of potential voters. How much these influenced actual public policy was unclear to respondents. In Morocco, respondents cited the example of the changes to the family law as having come about in part as a result of women pressing for reform. In France by contrast, respondents felt that the law banning the headscarf in public schools would not have come about had Muslim women’s views been taken into consideration.

2 “leader” or “exemplar”, in Sunni Islam, leader of Friday prayers in a mosque.

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A third of the Moroccan respondents said “it depends.” Morocco is an absolute monarchy and democratic processes are only now emerging. Respondents felt they were part of the changes in their country and so they had some sense of empowerment in this otherwise authoritarian, patriarchal society. By contrast in France, an established democracy, the majority in the sample felt left out of the decision-making processes. As this study is concerned with individual perception, the factual basis of statements was not under examination. What is relevant here is how educated, professional young women with no particular access to power, view the weight of their opinions. As Moroccans have limited experience with democracy, the above question prompted some respondents to ask for clarification. Some wanted to know if the question meant they were free to express their views, or that they would not have to fear repercussions if they spoke their mind. In a nascent democracy where freedom of speech, the way it is understood in the West, is not a guaranteed right, voicing one’s views in public is not a routine occurrence. In an authoritarian political system, public policy is rarely determined or influenced by majority opinions. Thus, some respondents took it for granted that people who make public policy are not interested in the views of the population at large. And so they were baffled by a question about the relevance of their views. Some referred to the massive demonstrations3 in Rabat and Casablanca for or against the family law reform that had been carefully organized and orchestrated by political parties or established Islamist movements and thus had not come about spontaneously or based on grassroots effort. However, several women said their country was in a phase of great change and for the first time, the King and the government were amenable to different ideas. They were quick to point out the reasons for this new receptiveness were based on the government’s fear of the rising popularity of Islamist movements and recent political gains by the Islamist party PJD (Party of Justice and Development). As things stood in the summer of 2005, the PJD was in a strong position to improve its standing in the 2007 elections. Support for political Islam poses a threat to the monarchy. Another reason why people in power had become more attuned to the population at large was the attack by homegrown Moroccan terrorists in May 2003 in

3 In the spring of 2000, tens of thousands took to the streets in Casablanca and Rabat demonstrating both for and against a government proposal to improve women’s rights within the personal status code, moudawana.

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Casablanca that killed 43 people. This terrorist attack had become a defining moment for Moroccan public policy comparable to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in American political life. Some respondents said the terrorist attacks had pushed the Moroccan political elite out of its complacency and forced them to acknowledge the existence of a potentially lethal, disenfranchised segment of the population. Having an ear on the ground had thus become a matter of survival for the political elite. The responses of women in the Moroccan sample have to be understood in this larger context.

In France, the majority of respondents felt their views were of little consequence to those in decision-making positions. They attributed this lack of interest in their opinions to their demographics as a socially disadvantaged cultural and religious minority. This marginalization could only be overcome with more second and third generation women climbing the social ladder. However, some said that with the creation of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman4 (CFCM) and similar, less prominent organizations, the French government “demonstrates that it recognizes the voice of Muslims in France,” even though several said they personally did not feel represented by the CFCM. Zoubida who had just attained a graduate degree in political science in Paris and was looking to become active in political life in France, said: “There are now strong advocates of Islam here in France who make their positions known to a wider public, so we are no longer a large, but voiceless minority in France. But we need more diversity of Muslim organizations because there is not one, homogenous ‘Muslim community’ in France.” Zoubida’s mother is Moroccan, her father is from Niger and she had spent time in both of her parents’ countries of origin. Born and raised in France, Zoubida felt she had a good understanding of cultural diversity and, degree in hand, she considered herself well-equipped to take her place in public life in France. Yet her opinion was not representative of the majority of the women I spoke with. Zoubida attributed some of her zest to her mixed parentage, which had made her a minority within a minority. “If I don’t speak up, no one will speak for me.” She also credited her mother’s insistence on higher

4 The CFCM was initiated in 1999 as the first publicly recognized organization to represent the views of Muslims in France

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education for providing her with a solid base from where to launch her career. However, the majority of the sample in France conveyed a pervasive sense of being left out of the decision-making process and felt relegated to the margins.

Table 6.3. Number of Respondents in Favor of Government Intervention

Do you think the French government should intervene in the religious domain for example on the issue of the Muslim headscarf?

Govt.intervention Yes No Other Total France 6 14 5 25 Morocco 7 21 2 30

Table 6.3.shows that that the majority of respondents in both samples thought the French government should not intervene in the religious domain, for example on the issue of the headscarf. There were proportionally more women in the French sample who supported such government intervention than in Morocco. Less than one in four Moroccan respondents said they supported such interventions in France. This result indicates that people evaluate government acts not on principle but based on whether such actions personally affect them or people they identify with. In Morocco the government routinely intervenes in religious matters, for example the ringing of Christian church bells is not allowed, proselytizing and conversion from Islam to any other religion are criminally liable. Around the time of my interviews, several Christians were deported after having been accused of bearing witness to their faith5. Though not part of my interview schedule, in casual conversations women expressed no qualms about the fact that religious freedom for non-Muslims on their territory was considerably more restricted than in France. Some did not hesitate to defend their government’s intervention on religious matters by arguing that Morocco was an Islamic state. Why Muslims should

5 See “Percée protestante au Maghreb” in Le Monde, Dossiers & Documents, No 343, June 2005, p 6.

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be granted religious freedoms in the laïc French state when Christians and Jews were given no comparable rights in Morocco, was a question left unexplored. Yasmina, a veiled woman in Morocco, offered an interesting perspective on French legal intervention: “We have an Islamic state, so it should be taken for granted that citizens should be allowed to wear the hijab. But even here we have seen efforts to keep the headscarf out of the workplace. When I interviewed for a job at a bank6, I was asked if I would take off my hijab if I was given a position where I had to deal with customers. This is outrageous in an Islamic state but I could find no specific law that protected my right to wear the hijab at my place of work. So it is better to have rules on these matters. At least in France things are clear and everyone knows what the law is.” Respondents in Morocco who supported French government intervention on such matters as the headscarf said that school girls were too young to put on the hijab in the first place. Others expressed suspicion based on the fact that France was Morocco’s former colonial ruler and did not have a history of respect for the religion of Islam or Islamic culture. In Morocco discussions about government intervention have to be understood within the context of the monarchy. The role of government was understood as synonymous with the authority of the monarch. In the past people were at the mercy of the King’s whims, especially during Hassan’s II iron rule (1961- 1999), a period now called les années de plomb. But in the current climate of political and social change, respondents felt a budding sense of empowerment. One woman referred to a recent cartoon in a weekly magazine that depicted someone bowing to kiss the king’s hand, asking: “How long will we be subjects? I want to be a citizen!7”

Women in both samples agreed that a sovereign government is within its rights to pass laws that uphold the values of a country while at the same time protecting the rights of individuals. Though respondents in both countries said they understood the French concept of laïcité, they were unsure how this separation between church and state was implemented practically. Said Mouna in Paris: “Christmas is a public holiday, Easter,

6 The “headscarf affair” at the BMCE Bank became public in 2004. In an effort to appear ‘modern’, employees who dealt with customers were discouraged from wearing a hijab. Bank executives eventually offered an apology to their veiled staff. 7 TelQuel, April 18, 2005.

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Pentecost etc. are a public holidays, there are so many holidays that are actually Catholic holidays. Schools are closed on these days whether you are Christian, Muslim, Jew or whatever. Of course, there is no public holiday for Aid al Kbir even though ten per cent of the French population is Muslim. And now Muslim girls are not allowed to wear the headscarf to school.” In her view, the concept of laïcité was selectively invoked to discriminate against Muslims. Others said overall their rights were better protected in France than in Morocco because they could practice their religion according to their personal choice and free from government interference. For example it was their personal decision to fast during Ramadan or to openly question any aspect of their religion. They also cited their freedom to publicly oppose the government’s ruling on the headscarf as a right they would not have to the same extent in Morocco. In France some respondents saw a need for government intervention to curtail an increasingly explosive and divisive situation in public schools, especially in the socially disadvantaged banlieues. Samia, one of the youngest women I interviewed and who had just passed her baccalaureate at the time of our meeting, said she was grateful for the French public school system because her parents could not have afforded a private school. From her yearly visits during the summer to Morocco she understood that her cousins there did not have the same educational opportunities. Samia said once students enter public schools, they are not considered Catholic, Jewish or Muslim, they are just students. “We are all citizens of the French Republic where religion is a private matter. And that is a very good thing. I am glad the government insists that religion is kept out of the schools because it causes friction and conflict.” One woman who works for a publicly funded agency investigating claims of discrimination said she could not imagine the existence of a comparable organization in Morocco. “I don’t fully understand why the government chose the headscarf but from my work I know that there are serious attempts at addressing discrimination. And the headscarf certainly leads to discrimination. I remember that from the time I was at school. Teachers often treated the veiled girls differently or made comments about them. My sister had briefly put on the headscarf while still at school but then took it off because she could not handle the consequences. Now that she is married, she wears it again.” So as to underline the problems in eradicating discrimination, she added: “I and my female

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colleagues get paid less than our male colleagues, even in our anti-discrimination agency. So it is not a simple matter.” Despite the differences in point of view concerning the headscarf ban, most respondents in France said they understood that the French government protected them on other matters of importance to them. If it had not been for French laws, one respondent said, they would have been married off by their families to someone they did not know or did not like or they could not have pursued their professional ambitions against the will or without the support of their parents. As Babès writes: “La laïcité est souvent leur [the second generation] cheval de bataille” (Babès 1997 : 95). Based on their personal experience, assessing the degree to which they supported or disagreed with government intervention was fraught with complexities and nuances.

Moving from general questions about of the role of government, the interview schedule also contained questions of a more personal nature. In this part of the interview, I wanted to find out what young, educated women had to say about their professional opportunities.

Table 6.4. Sufficiency of Professional Opportunities

Do you feel that your professional opportunities are sufficient for the moment?

Opportunities Yes No Other Total France 8 16 1 25 Morocco 13 16 1 30

Table 6.4.shows that about two thirds of respondents in France felt they did not have sufficient professional opportunities, whereas half of the Moroccan sample felt they did. This difference can be attributed in large part to one significant difference between the Moroccan and the French sample: social class. Among the Moroccan women who felt their professional opportunities were sufficient, most came from middle or upper class

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families. Women from that type of background were confident they could obtain professional positions in line with their qualifications. Those from modest backgrounds in Morocco overwhelmingly said they did not have sufficient professional opportunities. In France, there was less of a correlation between a respondents’ social class and her sense of opportunity; there women most often citied discrimination as the reason for limited opportunities.

In Morocco coup de piston was named as a major factor for securing a professional position. Women with university education who hailed from a rural background or came from less affluent families felt their professional opportunities8 were not commensurate with their education. An elementary school teacher in Azrou explained: “I was the first and am the only one in my family to get a university education. Even my two older brothers did not go to university. My mother married when she was fourteen, of course she never went to school at all. She wanted a different life for me so she was really supporting me to get a good education. And my father agreed. But now I am 28 years old, unmarried and work as a substitute kindergarten teacher. Most of the money I earn comes from giving private lessons in the evenings and on the weekends. My family does not have any connections, we don’t know anyone in high places. I am here with my mother and I am supporting her on my small salary. I wish I could get a better job.” About her personal life, she had this to say: “There have been a few men who asked my mother if they could marry me, but most of them were older men who were either divorced or widowers with children. Though they could offer financial security, my mother did not encourage me to marry any of them. She thinks I should marry someone closer in age to me and someone I like.” I asked if she felt her mother was unhappy as a result of having been in an arranged marriage. Rachida disagreed: “My mother was still a child when she got married. Of course it was very flattering to her when the parents of this handsome man came to ask for her hand. Over the years, she learned to love my father. But times have changed and she wants me to make my own decisions.” We sat in Rachida’s living room in an unfinished house without heating and only cold water. Like

8 According to the World Fact Book (2002), the official unemployment rate of Morocco is estimated at 12.3 per cent. In reality, it is likely that the figure is much higher.

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so many houses in Morocco, theirs gets build as the family has money to pay for construction. It is a common sight throughout Morocco, especially outside the major urban areas, to see already inhabited houses that are still under construction. Because of restrictive lending procedures by local banks, many of these private houses are paid for by repatriated money from Moroccans working abroad. Remissions in recent years have steadily decreased as immigrants retire in Europe instead of returning to their home country and second generation ties to Morocco become more and more feeble. It is instructive to take a small detour here and note that decreasing loyalty of children of immigrants to Morocco is an issue of concern for the Moroccan government because it stands to lose significant foreign income. Though there are no accurate figures available, immigrants contribute substantially to the foreign income and development, especially in the rural areas. Expatriate Moroccans also retain their right to vote in Morocco. It is commonly held that Moroccans residing in a Western country do not favor Islamist parties but support government efforts at “modernizing” their country of origin. In an effort to maintain and nourish ties between immigrant families and their home country, the Moroccan government in 2003 initiated a “Ministère Délégué Chargé de la Communauté Marocaine Résidant à l’Etranger,” which is an upgrade of previously much smaller bureau. The mission of this Department is based on a recognition of “l’importance numérique, la diversité et les rôles stratégiques de la communauté marocaine résident à l’Etranger.”9 Part of the Department’s mission is to create a database of Moroccan professionals abroad and to “les inciter à s’intégrer davantage dans le tissu économique national.” However, at the time of my interviews none of the respondents in the French sample was aware of the existence of this Ministry and therefore it could not be ascertained whether these renewed efforts to encourage co-operation between Moroccans abroad and those at home lead to the creation of new professional opportunities on either side of the Mediterranean.

9 Broschure of Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération outlining the Stratégie du Ministère Délégué Chargé de la Coomunaute Marocaine Résident à l’Etranger.

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Table 6.5. Sufficiency of Professional Opportunities of Men and Women

Do you think women have the same professional opportunities as all other members of society, male or female?

Same opport. Yes No Other Total France 8 16 1 25 Morocco 16 9 5 30

Table 6.5. shows a division between the two samples similar to that observed in relation to the previous question. Most French respondents thought that men and women did not have the same professional opportunities. On the other side, slightly more that half of the Moroccan respondents felt that men and women did have the same professional opportunities. This might at first glance seem surprising given that gender inequality is much more prevalent in Morocco than in France and up until the recent reform of the Personal Status Code, much of this inequality had been written into the law. But as with the previous question, responses of women in the Moroccan sample can be attributed again in part to social class. Particularly in developing world countries, social class often outweighs other factors in determining women’s opportunity and social standing. A glance at some other developing world countries illustrates this point. Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan was the first woman to head the government of an Islamic state from 1988-1990. The country with the largest Muslim population worldwide, Indonesia, has had a female president since 2001, Megawati Sukarnoputri. In Bangladesh Khaleda Zia, also a Muslim, has been acting president since 1981 and later became Prime Minister. India, likewise a non-Western developing world country, was headed for decades by Indira Gandhi (1966 - 1977 and again from, 1980 - 1984). In Sri Lanka Chandrika Kumaratunga has been president since 1994. All these women were or are part of the ruling elite and had come by their powerful positions owing to their family relations. Because several of the women in the Moroccan sample hailed from upper class families, it is not surprising that they should assert that gender is not a determining factor in professional opportunities.

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In her dissertation, Souad Eddouada10 describes her experience working with various prominent women’s organizations in Morocco: “My experience within the administration of these organizations demonstrated to me that patriarchy not only concerns the domination of men by women since we find hierarchy among women themselves. The absence of the young generation, the survival of hierarchical relationships of power within these supposedly feminist and alternative to male structures, in addition to the gap between the grassroots and their representations by the egalitarian discourses of these feminists’ activism are due to the absence of free and open reflection within these organizations.” Eddouada observed that Moroccan feminists, “by seemingly arguing for the rights of women, treat Moroccan women as a homogeneous entity, neglecting the disparities among women from rural and urban areas as well as different classes.” Eddouada’s research confirms that professional opportunities for educated women from the urban middle class are superior to those of rural men or women from a low socio-economic background. Eddouada’s observations are pertinent because they shed light on the significance of social class with regards to professional opportunities for women. According to this young scholar, gender is not one of the most important determinant for professional opportunities, instead it is social class. Educated women from well-connected families were indeed quick to admit that they came by their job not only based on merit but because family ties had opened doors that otherwise would have been closed to them. Women from less well-connected families bemoaned the fact that qualification was often not enough to secure a decent job. Adding those who cited social class and connections, not gender, as a primary factor of employment opportunities for Moroccans, the responses were almost evenly divided among respondents11 who felt that women had the same professional opportunities as all other members of society, male and female.

In France, respondents attributed their lack of access to professional opportunities commensurate with their education to a variety of factors, of which discrimination was

10 Souad Eddouada, Women, Gender and the State in Morocco: Contradictions, Constraints and Prospects, PhD Dissertation Mohammed V University, Rabat, 2003. 11 Those who responded with “other” chose this category to explain about the importance of class over gender.

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the most important. Respondents in France also raised the issue of connections, albeit in a larger context. Said Mouna, a lawyer in Paris: “In France, it is not merely personal connections, even though that helps of course in getting a good job, but it is more a matter of being part of the system. As children of immigrants, we are of course not part of that system and we have no network in established circles. Other than our education, we have nothing going for us and often that is not enough when competing with candidates who have equal qualifications but have the advantage of being part of the established system.” By ‘established system’ Mouna referred to the majority culture of Français de souche. This eloquent young woman also raised the issue of sexism. “It is not true that in the Western world women are treated equally in the workplace. When I was growing up, I always had that vision that things in French society worked differently than chez nous, but now that I am part of the French professional work force, I am quite appalled by what I see going on in the office. Women most definitely are treated differently and do not have the same opportunities as men.” As will be described later in this chapter, respondents also felt that their own families were a major obstacle in moving forward with their professional careers.

Moving from the public and professional realm to the personal sphere, the following section pertains to respondents’ views on private matters. The first question of this kind asked respondents if they considered it possible to live alone. This question may not be particularly relevant in a Western context where young women routinely live by themselves. However even in the Western world, this is a recent phenomenon and one directly linked to increasing affluence. In times past, economic conditions often dictated that young women - and men for that matter - lived with their families until they got married and started a family of their own. In Moroccan culture, it is still common for young people to live with their parents until they start their own families. Under the old family law, a woman was under the tutelage of a wali (guardian), first her father or an older male member of the family and later her husband. Thus, for women in Morocco and women of Moroccan origin in France, living alone or even considering living alone clearly meant breaking new ground.

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Table 6.6. Number of Respondents in Favor of Living Alone

Do you consider it possible to live alone?

Living alone Yes No Other Total France 19 3 3 25 Morocco 17 13 0 30

Table 6.6.shows that the majority of the women in the French sample considered it possible to live alone. In Morocco, a little more than half of the women in the sample said they could envision living by themselves, whereas slightly less than half did not. In France as in Morocco, respondents went into lengthy explanations about the circumstances that led them to live by themselves. The story of Halima in Paris is a case in point. Halima, 27 years old, did well in school and was encouraged by her teachers to continue her education at a university. Her brothers were less successful at school and are currently unemployed. Her father had wanted his only daughter to get married and raise children, while her mother supported her plans for a career. Eventually, conflict within the family grew so intense that Halima moved out. “In my understanding, it is not French society that causes us problems. It is our immediate environment in the family that is the problem. They exert such pressure on us [girls] by insisting on culture and traditions. These traditions are not Moroccan or Muslim, they are the customs of the poor, uneducated Moroccan countryside. I know, because I went to the village where my parents came from every summer while I was growing up.” Almost in tears as she recounted her story, she went on: “Because of where they come from, my parents can’t change. So I have to separate from them for a while until I have established myself and then they can see what I have accomplished and things will be easier, I hope.” Since moving to Paris nine months earlier, she had not been in touch with her family. She said she was wary of making friends with other second generation women for fear that someone might know her family and get word to them revealing her whereabouts. She felt equally ill at ease at befriending French women because of her complicated family situation. When arranging our interview, Halima suggested meeting next to a pricey café near the Eiffel Tower. After we got better

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acquainted, I asked why she had wanted to meet in one of the most expensive, touristy parts of town, far away from where she lived. She said she had wanted to make me feel comfortable. Learning that I was not French she thought the Eiffel Tower would be a venue a foreigner such as I would appreciate. It is also possible that she chose this tourist location because there she was less likely to be seen by anyone she knew. Halima consistently rejected my invitation to lunch, dinner, even a snack. Despite her urban existence, she had never eaten in a restaurant and said she did not trust food in such places. And so each time we met, we walked the streets and parks of Paris for hours, never consuming anything but bottled water. Halima, of Berber origins with light brown hair and green eyes, was obviously lonely, missing her family and close friends and had not yet adjusted to life in the big city. Despite her shyness and social awkwardness, she tackled her professional ambition with tenacity, determined to carve out a way for herself, develop her potential and break out of the socially disadvantaged milieu of her family. She felt there was no turning back for her. “My family comes from a village in the Rif mountains in northern Morocco. They were not into the drug business12.” Halima knew that climbing the social ladder was going to be a formidable challenge, but one she was prepared to tackle: “There is nothing for me in Morocco and there is nothing for me in the banlieues. I have to make it on my own, no matter how difficult it is.” Halima worked for an online news service and had started hosting a weekly radio show. She also had applied for a position at a large French publishing house. Towards the end of our conversation, she said: “I hope one day my parents will be proud of me.” In Morocco, women who lived alone also said they did not consider this a “natural lifestyle” but one borne out of necessity because they had a job in the city but no relatives in the urban centers with whom they could live. For them, living alone did not come at the cost of breaking up with their families. Their families had accepted that living by themselves was the cost of pursuing a professional career in one of the major cities. However, nearly half of the respondents said they could not imagine ever living by themselves. They either lived at home with their parents or with their husbands. A few said it was against their religious conviction to live alone as a woman.

12 The Rif Mountains in Morocco is the largest cannabis producing region in the world and a major drug supplier for the European market.

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Fatima-Zohra, 33, was an independent, professional woman in Rabat, who owned her own car, was successful in her professional career and dressed in fashionable Western clothes. She had lived abroad with her parents for several years. She said she could not envision living by herself. “I need to know someone is in the house when I come home and since I am not married that someone is my mother.” When I asked Fatima-Zohra if she had considered sharing a house with a friend her age, she said she could not trust even the best of her friends so this would be out of the question. As the issue of fear had been raised before, it was interesting to see what she had to say on trust. I subsequently asked other women about their thoughts on trust. Respondents said trust existed only within the family, nuclear and extended. Some asserted that the absence of trust was a major obstacle to economic development. People were apprehensive about going into business with someone who was not a member of the family. Therefore, positions were often not filled by the best qualified people but by trusted ones, i.e. people who belonged to the family. The issue of trust also entered into discussions of marriage. Respondents in both samples described marriage as an agreement between two families and not just an affair involving two people. Thus, trust between the families joined through marriage was of major concern. One veiled woman in Rabat tried to cut loose from such family obligations. “I am in love!” she announced when I met her one year after our initial conversation. I asked if her family knew her beloved, to which she replied emphatically: “No, not yet. I want to make sure that we have a solid relationship. If we appear unsure in front of our parents, they will take over the process and start making decisions for us. This is something between me and him,” avoiding the term ‘boyfriend’ all throughout our conversation. “We need to trust each other. That is what matters. And we can best develop this trust if there is no interference from our families. You know that here marriage is not just between two people; entire families get ‘married’ so to speak.” She said nowhere in the Qu’ran was it written that parents had to chose a spouse for their children, “I am going to do what is my right and ‘he’ sees it the same way.” Marriage was a topic explored more directly in the following questions.

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Table 6.7. Number of Respondents who consider Marriage essential

Do you consider marriage an essential part of life?

Marriage Yes No Other Total France 20 3 2 25 Morocco 25 4 1 30

Table 6.8. Number of Respondents who consider it possible to marry a non- Muslim

Can you imagine the possibility of getting married to a Non-Muslim?

Non-Muslim Yes No Other Total France 11 13 1 25 Morocco 7 18 5 30

Table 6.7.shows that the majority of women in both samples considered marriage an essential part of life despite the fact that most of my interviewees were not married. They had invested years pursuing higher education and/or professional training and were busy establishing themselves in their professional careers. In France, the average marriage age for women is 28.5 years (for men 30.6) in Morocco the average marriage age for women is 20.5 (for men 22.6) 13. The rural/urban dichotomy in Morocco skews this figure as girls in the rural areas tend to get married in their teens whereas urban women often do not marry until their twenties. Those few who said they did not consider marriage an essential part of life, emphasized marriage was a choice and not an obligation, even though it had been presented to them as such during their upbringing. Table 6.8 shows that more women in France than in Morocco considered it possible to marry a non-Muslim. Close to half of the women in the French sample but

13 UNICEF country statistics, 2004.

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less than a quarter in the Moroccan sample said they could imagine the possibility of getting married to a non-Muslim. Marriage was an issue of considerable personal agony for women in both samples. Because respondents placed such high value on marriage, they were troubled by the fact that they themselves were still unmarried because of the choices they had made with regard to education and professional life. In looking for a potential spouse, most - but not all - maintained that having the same religion was an important factor, mostly in regard to raising children. Another criterion mentioned frequently was approval of a spouse by parents. Again and again I was told that marriage was understood as an affair that involved more than two people, as an arrangement that merged two families. Several women in Morocco and in France also spoke of the need for financial security. This was especially the case among those who had grown up in difficult economic circumstances and where the father had barely been able to provide for the family. Open-mindedness and intellectual compatibility were cherished qualities too. Said Lamiae in Casablanca: “We need to understand each other. We need to have the same intellectual level. I also think it is more difficult to be married to someone who does not come from the same culture as you. It is not that I insist on marrying a Muslim, but I think it easier if both spouses come from a similar cultural and religious background. To me this is not a religious mandate but I believe we will have similar ideas about raising children.” Though Lamiae said that her preference for a Muslim husband was her personal choice, her sentiments concord with Islamic dogma, according to which a Muslim woman is not allowed to marry a non-Muslim. Touria, a 29-year-old woman in Rabat, described her situation as follows: “Of course, I would like to have a family and children. But now that I have a graduate degree and started a new job, I feel I need to establish myself professionally first. My mother who cannot even read or write is so proud of me. Even if I wanted to, I could not just marry and do pretty much the same things my illiterate mother did. Raising children is not considered a job in Morocco. The life of a married woman is still very traditional, you have to put your husband first, serve your mother-in-law and raise the children. For many married women, life revolves around the home and the hammam.”14 Touria comes from

14 Hammam is the traditional public steam bath where women congregate once a week.

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what in the West would be described as a blue-collar family, and is keenly aware of the pronounced class differences that divide Moroccan society. “Though I am a very educated woman now, I don’t want to lead the life of a typical middle-class woman. Here, middle-class families have maids and servants and nannies. My mother worked as a maid most of her life. It is such a hard job. If possible, I don’t want to have a maid but we don’t yet have the amenities that are common in Europe and so it is almost impossible to have a family where both parents work without domestic help. Though I would like to get married and have children, at this point this is not a realistic option.” As other women before and after her, Touria only half-jokingly asked if I knew of a young man who might be compatible with her. Latifa, another professional woman in her late twenties in Morocco, who also comes from a family of limited means, echoed Touria’s sentiments: “First and foremost, I have high expectations with regards to responsibility. A husband must be a responsible person and we must communicate well with each other. Often, it is the stupid things that make a marriage fail. I think I would like to have a practicing Muslim as a husband, one who observes the daily prayers, who does not drink or smoke. He must be honest too. But I am not sure what I would do if I were presented with the choice of a non-Muslim who has these character qualities and a Muslim who falls short of my expectation. I hope I won’t ever be faced with that dilemma.” Like Touria, Latifa put her education and profession first and now finds herself fantasizing about the ideal husband without envisioning she will get married any time soon. And yet another one said: “I get very upset when certain customs are justified by religion. For example when a husband beats his wife or when a brother makes decisions for his sister. I have a much better education and job than my brother, but he feels he can tell me what to do because that is what the Qu’ran allows him to do. I know that the Qu’ran says some of those things and I am really struggling with that because I am a devout Muslim. Also, here you don’t just marry a man, you marry a family. That applies especially to women, they are supposed to become part of the husband’s family and serve their mother-in-law. As a woman, you are not the master of your own time. Let me tell you: I live here in Rabat by myself and when someone wants to visit me, I want them to call ahead of time and not just show up for dinner. When I am at home at my mother’s

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house, there are all these relatives who stop by any time they want and my mother has to put everything she was doing aside to prepare a meal for them. I always fight with my uncles and tell them, ‘you should call before you come; my mother has things to do other than to feed you.’ But then my mother scolds me and says I can live this modern city life when I am in Rabat. She says here I can insist on these new ways of going about things, but when I am at home, I have to abide by traditions and customs which include welcoming visitors any time and serving them. Of course, my brother has no such obligations. My mother says even if you don’t like it, this is the way it is in Morocco. She does not want me to come in and upset our relatives just because I am an educated woman who has a good job in the capital city. So as for marriage, I don’t know. It will not be easy for me to find a husband.” The conflict between the traditional way of life and the new life of educated, professional women was a recurring theme. Zhour, an accountant, said: “For me it is important that my husband has studied or lived abroad. I am a practicing Muslim and I want my husband to understand the difference between religion and some of the cultural practices and traditions in Morocco.” Naima, a journalist in her thirties has had plenty of time to think about marriage: “I really have a hard time putting up with the Moroccan mentality. I cannot even imagine marrying a Moroccan man. Mixed marriages are the way to go but I know there will be difficulties. In my profession, I have the opportunity to meet foreign men and I have dated a few. I think my family would be OK with this but unfortunately, the relationships never worked out. Most foreign men are here on limited assignments. I am not sure if I can find a job in my area in another country. At the moment, my work is very important to me. But at least I am free to pursue my professional goals. How to find a man, I don’t know. I am 33 and still single.” There are some voices in Morocco that caution against such strong emphasis on marriage. Aïcha Ech-Channa is the founder of the Association Solidarité Féminine in Casablanca, an organization that helps women who have children out of wedlock. Her book Miseria-Témoignages (2004) was referred to in Chapter 1. Single mothers, she said, “are pariahs in Moroccan society, they cannot find jobs, no self-respecting man will marry them, and often they are cast out by their families.” I met the prominent yet controversial Ech-Channa at a center for mères celibataires which she had established in

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Casablanca. This feisty women in her mid-sixties said that marriage is upheld as such an ideal that it justifies the neglect, rejection and abuse of unwed mothers. She emphasized that she herself never was a single mother and now had grandchildren but felt called to assist women who are cast out by Moroccan society. As evidence for her assertion about the public contempt of single mothers, she cited the fact that financial support for the center came exclusively from foreign sources. She feared that the rise of Islamism in her country would further aggravate the situation of unwed mothers by dismissing them as “prostitutes.” Widespread prejudices against single motherhood also limit the options of educated professional women. Having children without getting married was entirely out of the question for the women in my samples.

In France, young, educated, professional women were also faced with the choice between career and marriage, even though all aspired toward eventual marriage. As in Morocco, a number of respondents were in their late twenties or early thirties and unmarried. In contrast to Morocco, there were some divorced women with children in the sample. One striking difference in the responses of women in Morocco compared with those in France was how frequently women in France invoked l’amour when speaking about marriage. In the interviews in Morocco, ‘love’ was a word rarely invoked. However, it would not be correct to infer from this that ‘love’ was unimportant for respondents in Morocco. The responses rather suggest that the concept of ‘love’ can be associated with different criteria. In Morocco, ‘love’ is not understood as a stand-alone value but contains specific aspects such as compatibility of ideas and character, same religious or spiritual values and honesty. Respondents in Morocco were also more inclined to perceive provision of financial security as a sign of love which is not surprising in a developing world country where everyday survival can be a struggle. The fact that a man was capable and willing to provide for his family was therefore an important criterion. Respondents in France on the other hand explained that “love” referred to some kind of romantic feeling, a feeling that was important to them. Though the average marriage age for women in France is higher than in Morocco (20 in Morocco versus 28

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years in France), women of Moroccan origin understood that they had passed the conventional age of marriage for women from their culture.

Kheira, in her early thirties, divorced and with a son, said: “I am looking for someone with an open mind. Of course loyalty and trust are very important but unfortunately that does not exist. My father had several wives, that is he did not divorce my mother before he moved in with another woman and after that with another one. So my mother never could remarry and my father did not have to pay child support, not for the children from his marriage nor any subsequent relationship. It was a really difficult situation for us. When my sister and I were old enough to live alone, my mother moved back to Morocco. Life in France had become just too difficult for her; she needed the support of her family back there. By the time I got divorced myself, I had a child. Now my mother raises my son in Morocco and I only get to see him once a year. As a single mother, I could not pursue my education and have a career here in Paris where everything is so expensive.” I was amazed how easily the term “single mother” had crossed Kheira’s lips, given how controversial and problematic single motherhood is in the country where her son is being raised. Kheira continued: “Actually, I am dating a Portuguese man right now. He is Catholic. I don’t know what to do. How shall we raise our children? I am really afraid. If he converts to Islam, he may become like most Muslim men and think he can have more than one wife, or do all sorts of things common for Muslim men. He may think it is OK for him to beat his wife. But if he does not convert, it is not right for me to marry him and it will be difficult for my family to accept. I don’t want to live in fear again. Fear is so much part of our life as Muslims and Moroccans. I am studying the Qu’ran right now to see what exactly it says about a Muslim woman marrying a non- Muslim.” Hassiba’s story was in some respects similar to that of Kheira. She too was divorced, lived with her daughter and dreamed of finding another husband. “Most important is that my husband is Muslim.” Hassiba had said earlier in the interview that she was not a practicing Muslim, she smoked and on her kitchen counter was a rack with wine bottles, so I asked why it was so important to her that her husband should be

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Muslim. After some hesitation, she finally said it was because she could not get married to a man who was not circumcised. She had been told, and apparently believed, that sex with an uncircumcised was not “hygienic.” She was under the impression that only Muslim and Jewish men were circumcised. Jewish partners were out of the question for other reasons. Hassiba also believed that Muslims were by definition “cleaner” than men of other religious persuasions as there are numerous prescriptions concerning personal hygiene in the Qu’ran, for example the insistence on ritual cleansing before entering a mosque or prayers. As our conversation continued, it became clear that Hassiba did not question the stereotypes she used. In the Moroccan countryside, I had encountered similar assertions about perceived superior cleanliness of Muslims versus the lax hygienic standards of Nazrines (Christians) but I had not expected to hear such a statement in the heart of Paris. Hassiba lived near Montmartre, in an apartment with distinct Moroccan décor, i.e. banquettes with red and gold tasseled cushions which lined the walls instead of a sofa or chairs, and the customary round table was graced with a shiny brass teapot. Hassiba went on to explain that the law banning the Muslim headscarf was nothing less than a Jewish-French conspiracy against Muslims. Though she had lived all her life in France, in Paris, and had French colleagues at the bank where she worked, she had never befriended anyone outside of the North African immigrant community. A car accident had left her limping and capable of walking only with the help of a cane, so this beautiful young woman must have been exceptionally aware of discrimination and the many facets of social exclusion, yet she was quite willing to label people in ways that were based on prejudice. Hassiba was an example of a woman who in effect lived in a parallel society to the French mainstream. Khadija was a young woman I met at a fancy American ice cream parlor on the Champs-Elysées. Like Halima, she chose a meeting place which she thought would make me feel comfortable. This heightened awareness of cultural difference was a noticeable trait among women in the French sample. In Morocco, women had generally chosen a meeting place based on convenience, their home, their place of work or a coffee shop within easy reach for both of us. Khadija spoke almost inaudibly: “This [impending marriage] is difficult to talk about. I lived in England for two years and I met a wonderful guy whom I hoped to

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marry. Then I got pregnant. It was terrible; my mother arranged for an abortion, it was such a shame. Because I brought such shame to my family, they insisted that I marry this man they had chosen. I could not refuse, after all the shame I had brought to my family already. Even my best friends don’t know about the abortion. I did not tell them that this is an arranged marriage. It looks so old fashioned. We Moroccans in France think we are different from the people in the bled15. I mean my friends know that my parents introduced me to this man but I told them that I was in love with him. I just cannot cause my parents any more trouble. I am determined to learn to love this man. He is a practicing Muslim. He is from a good family, of Moroccan origin like me.” Khadija was unsure what her marriage, which was scheduled to take place within a few weeks of our interview, might mean for her professional career but as life in Paris was expensive she trusted that she would continue to work even after she got married or had children.

The majority of women in both samples had at one time or another thought about marrying a non-Muslim. For the most part, they had ambivalent feelings toward that. On the one side, they felt such a union might be better suited to accommodate their professional ambition with family life and also allow them to leave some of the customs and traditions they had come to reject, behind. But the prospect also frightened them especially as they reflected about raising children. Willingness to consider of a non- Muslim husband was also the result of their advancing age and with this the diminished prospects of finding a Moroccan husband. In the samples, there was a direct correlation of age with the consideration of a non-Muslim husband. Most respondents under the age of 26 said they did not consider it possible to marry someone from a different culture or religion. Aside from marriage, the interview schedule also contained a question about friendships with non-Muslims.

15 Bled, Arabic for land, place, often used in a somewhat derogatory sense to refer to underdeveloped regions of North Africa.

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Table 6.9. Number of Respondents with Non-Muslim Friends

Do you have friends who are not Muslims?

Non-Muslim Yes No Other friends France 23 2 0 Morocco 18 12 0

Table 6.9.shows that the overwhelming majority of women in the French sample said they had friends who were not Muslim. In Morocco, where exposure to people from different religions is much less prevalent, a considerable number of women still said they either currently have or had had such friends in the past when they lived abroad. It is certainly not easy to determine what constitutes “friendship.” One criterion used in my research was if women met with their non-Muslim friends outside of school or work and spent part of their leisure time with them. In the workplace, relationships with people from a variety of backgrounds are not freely chosen whereas in one’s free time, contacts are voluntary. The large number of women in both samples who said they did spent off- work time with people who were not Muslim, is surprising. Self-segregation in one’s private life is a common phenomenon; thus the fact that the majority of the women in the French sample and more than half in the Moroccan sample said they had friends from a different cultural and religious background suggests a strong appreciation for these contacts. However, there is a possibility that these figures are inflated because a non- Muslim researcher posed the question, a factor that may have influenced respondents’ answers. Whereas responses to most other questions had nothing directly to do with me, saying they did not have any friends who were not Muslim could be interpreted as meaning that apart from this interview, respondents avoided or refused private contacts with non-Muslims.

After inviting them to speak about their hopes and visions, I asked women what they viewed as the biggest obstacles in achieving their personal and professional goals. Like Halima, quoted above, Malika in France blurted out a similar response: “The biggest obstacle are our families. They have their ways and want to impose those on us. They

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brought the customs of long ago Morocco with them to France. Even in Morocco things have changed but our parents don’t know that.” In Morocco, the responses were similar but less harshly formulated. Said Rachida: “Our lives are so very different from that of our mothers, even if they support us they can’t understand all the things we do and want for ourselves. There are many things I don’t do because I don’t want to hurt my mother. For example, I rarely go out on the weekends. Every day after work, I come straight home. How am I supposed to meet a man under those circumstances?” Another woman in Morocco put it this way: “After I finish my studies, I need to find a good job and help my parents financially. They have sacrificed much so that I could get a university education, so I need to take care of their needs as soon as I have a job. Of course, I would like to marry but I don’t see that happening. A husband may not want me to send money to my family but I feel very strongly that this is something I need to do.” Hanane struck a slightly more optimistic tone: “In an Arab country, especially in a Muslim society, it is very hard to succeed both professionally and in your personal life. This is because succeeding in your private life is measured by the time and effort you give to your husband and children. But I believe that where there is a will, there is a way. Within the next ten years, I wish I will find a husband who believes that as a husband and wife, we can have common goals and also accomplish our own individual goals. For example, I want to pursue a Ph.D. and so I need a husband who can be supportive of this ambition. For the moment, my education and profession comes first, even if that means that I may not ever marry.” Lila, a young woman in France, felt rather unsure about her personal and professional future. Unlike most other women I interviewed, Lila’s parents did not conform to the typical image of North African immigrants. Her father came as professional, working for an international company with headquarters in Paris to which he had been assigned. She had attended private schools in Morocco and in France and had moved back and forth between both countries. She knew both societies from her vantage point of an upper middle-class family. When I told her that I interviewed women of Moroccan origin in France, she told me right away that most immigrants from the Maghreb were “uneducated folks from the countryside. They import their ignorant ways

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to France, it is their tradition, not really their religion.” Lila felt she had little in common with the people who live in cités, or banlieues, France’s socially disadvantaged neighborhoods. In fact, she did not hesitate to use rather severe words to describe her compatriots: “I do not socialize with these people just because they are fellow Moroccans. We do not come from the same background. I don’t have much in common with them.” As we sat on the banks of the Seine, Lila talked about her upbringing moving back and forth between France and Morocco. She was unsure about her professional goals and had moved between different jobs. Due to her father’s connections, she could easily get a good position in Morocco. In France, her father’s clout was limited. She said if ever she moved to Morocco, she could only live in Rabat or Casablanca which was difficult because most of her relatives came from a small town in the interior of the country of which she said: “I don’t belong there. I can’t deal with the attitude of the people, there are too many rules and everyone is in everyone else’s business.” So she chose life in France even though she was uncertain how to pursue her professional goals. “Basically, I want to lead a normal life, have a house, marry, have children and be financially secure.” “Normal” for Lila meant marrying a fellow Muslim and securing her middle-class lifestyle.

Women in both countries felt under pressure to pave a way that had not been trodden before. They were proud of their education and capabilities and eager to apply their skills - even against the will of their parents. None of the women took lightly the conflict their ambitions presented to their families. Nevertheless, I did not hear a single woman speak ill of her parents even in cases where there was severe disagreement, to the point of physical abuse. This may perhaps have to do with the fact that I was a foreigner and an outsider. It is possible that respondents may have been more candid about their conflicted feelings for their parents in a different setting.

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Conclusion

Women in the two samples had several overriding traits in common with regards to their personal and professional ambitions and challenges: they pursued their professional goals at the cost of postponing marriage and were aware of the risk of not being able to find a husband. The difficulty in attracting a potential spouse was a particularly sensitive and difficult area for women to discuss especially since the majority considered marriage an essential part of life. Family ties were important to most women in both samples, even if considerable difficulties arose within the family as a result of their decision to pursue higher education and professional careers. Despite the conflicts within their families generated by their decisions to carve out their own personal and professional lives, there was a remarkable absence of hostility towards their parents. Instead, most understood that their parent’s generation was bound by customs and traditions they felt not at ease to critically evaluate. Adding to their personal dilemma was the difficulty in finding the kind of jobs they had gone to great length preparing for. In Morocco, these professional limitations were often imposed by social class and lack of connections while women with higher social standing were satisfied with their professional opportunities. In France discrimination and a sense of not being part of the established system were cited most frequently as obstacles in the professional path. Women in both samples displayed great tenacity in claiming their place in the public sphere, a sphere in Moroccan culture previously reserved for men. As with data analyzed in the previous chapters, the major differences occurred within each sample rather than between samples, indicating that despite the differences in circumstances in both countries, the challenges of young, educated, professional Muslim women are similar regardless of the political or social system. In both countries, respondents saw a need to overcome traditions and customs that impede women’s choices in their private and public lives.

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CHAPTER 7

CONLCLUSIONS

In this dissertation, I set out to compare young, educated, professional and urban Moroccan women and young, educated, professional women of Moroccan origin in France. The purpose of the study was to ascertain similarities and differences with regards to attitudes toward Islam, legal changes affecting women in both countries and personal and professional goals and challenges. In-depth interviews conducted in Morocco and in France allowed for a comparative look at population groups that to date have not been compared in this way. The reason for choosing these two particular populations groups lies in the fact that large numbers of Moroccans have immigrated to France. Now their sons and daughters are of an age where they are entering public life in France in large numbers. Because I previously lived in Morocco, I have some familiarity with the culture and the people of that country and could rely on a network of established contacts. The dissertation used qualitative research methods and drew on Grounded Theory, which emphasizes openness for new themes and issues raised by respondents that were not foreseen by the researcher. An interview schedule, which included categorical and open-ended questions, provided the framework for this investigation. I met with most respondents several times over a period of two years, in the summer of 2004 and again in the summer of 2005, which made it possible to ascertain recurring themes. These themes included insistence on individual choice with regards to their personal and professional lives and a right to their own, personal interpretations of the Qu’ran. Individual choice is commonly regarded an Occidental characteristic, therefore it is not surprising that women in the French sample demonstrated such an approach. The

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fact that women in the Moroccan sample also emphasized individual freedom and responsibility over conformity to the collective, stands out. Another major theme was respondents’ insistence on the differences between culture, customs, traditions and religion. The reasons for selecting young, educated, professional and urban women were that these women were in a good position to articulate issues that are of concern to the populations from which they were drawn. These women embark on personal and professional paths that are significantly different from those of their mothers, therefore their attitudes are indicators of larger cultural and societal changes. Women in the selected samples also serve as agents of change in the societies in which they reside. Currently, Muslims constitute the single largest ethnic minority in France and pose the greatest challenge in terms of identity, social cohesion and economic parity. My research shows that young, educated, professional women who have grown up in immigrant families of low-skilled workers and often illiterate mothers, demonstrate remarkable determination to climb the social ladder. They desire to become part of the French mainstream while retaining their religious identity as Muslims. Their counterparts in Morocco felt equally loyal to their country in spite of piercing criticism of social injustices, corruption, and lack of professional opportunities. They displayed a sense of empowerment as a result of the family law reform and were equally determined to take part in public life. The major lessons learned from this study are that Muslim women in Morocco and women of Moroccan origin in France share many similarities in their perceptions of major life issues. Similarities were found in attitudes toward Islam, legal changes, and views on personal and professional challenges. Differences occurred mainly within each sample and not between the two-county-based samples. Though the two groups of women are exposed to greatly differing influences on a daily basis and their resources for approaching issues vary greatly, their attitudes reveal noteworthy similarities. These similarities certainly reflect the particularities of the two samples, which included only young, educated, professional and urban women. That said, these small samples represent two groups of women who are moving out of the patriarchic, authoritarian structures of

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their society (in Morocco) or families (in France) and therefore contribute to cultural change of societies in which they live. The comparative nature of this study allowed for an examination of samples from two population groups that are not commonly looked at in this fashion. Conventionally, a hard and fast demarcation line between the West and the Arabic or Islamic world is an accepted fact. Therefore, most studies focus either on the Islamic world or the West. An exception to this is recent research by Olivier Roy (2004) who in his Globalized Islam has investigated trends among and within Muslim communities regardless of geographical boundaries. His conclusion of a changing conception of Islam that is no longer bound to a particular geographical region, a local authority, or particular dogma confirms my findings, most notably that differences and similarities were more prevalent within country-based samples than between them. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Roy observes that re-islamization is a global phenomenon that occurs within Muslim communities in the Arab world as much as in Muslim populations in the Western world. This newly emerging globalized Islam is shaped by two major trends: individualization and deterritoralization, i.e. the fact of not being bound by cultural practices and norms of a specific country or region. Thus, Roy argues against the perceptions of a dichotomy between the Islam of the Arab world and that of the West. Instead, the fault-lines occur among Muslims populations regardless of their places of residence. According to my research, what Roy writes about conceptions of Islam also applies to other areas such as interpretation of legal changes and personal and professional aspirations. Regardless of their place of residence, women in Morocco and in France distinguished between the religion of Islam and common cultural practices in their country or their families. They commonly filtered out as aspects of the latter with which they disagreed, emphasizing instead aspects of their religion that supported their personal and professional aspirations. Insistence on the right to interpret the Qu’ran according to their own understanding was coupled with rejection of the right of others to stand in judgment of their choices. This personalized interpretation led respondents in both countries to basically two different conceptions of Islam. One was a more liberal understanding of religion, the other more in line with Islamist readings. The more liberal understanding resulted in an emphasis on ethical behavior freed from obvious adherence to religious

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dogma and treating faith or religious belief as a private affair. This group of women emphasized their support for those who opted for more rigorous religious observance, however they felt that a professional career sometimes required less overt devotion. The approach more in line with Islamist views emphasized explicit observance of certain practices, such as wearing the headscarf, and viewing Islam as the basis for all aspects of life, personal and public, which includes an understanding that, ideally, laws should be scripturally based. Those with Islamist leanings in my samples all supported women’s right to assume public responsibilities which is in contrast to some other Islamist groupings. Though they insisted on their right to freely choose their path, they were sometimes skeptical of co-religionists who professed to be Muslims but did not in any obvious way show their adherence. And yet even practicing Muslims said that their practice was based on personal choice. “Submission” as the term Islam indicates, was understood as a voluntary act and not one that could simply be passed on from one generation to the next nor could it be mandated. Because certain practices are required and not optional from a dogmatic point of view, insistence on the right to personal choice with regards to religious interpretation marks a significant shift in attitudes. One possible reason for these diverging conceptions of Islam is suggested by prominent Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan (2004), who writes:

It can never be said enough that intracommunal dialogue between Muslims is virtually non-existent. Groups know one another, know how to identify one another, and work out where they are in relation to one another, but then they immediately ignore one another, exclude one another, or insult one another, without any attempt at discussion….. The culture of dialogue has practically abandoned Muslim communities and the respect for diversity, which always has been and should have continued to be their source of richness, has been replaced by dueling disagreements that contribute to the division, which causes their weakness. (210)

Another reason for differences in religious understanding has been suggested by one of the leading experts on Islam in the West, Joyceline Cesari, who states: “Etre musulman en Europe ou aux Etas-Unis revient à faire sortir le lien à l’islam de son évidence, de son statut de donné communautaire, culturel ou social, pour le faire entrer

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dans la sphère des choix individuels et donc du questionnement” (Cesari 2004 : 72). Cesari’s research, however, does not take into account the fact that similar changes in attitude occur among Muslims who continue to live in Islamic societies. In addition, Western influence that results in a critical evaluation of Islam does not necessarily lead to a distancing from it but rather to a new, invigorated understanding that is freed from cultural norms and practices. To cite Ramadan once more: “The West is therefore permeated by a new religiously based citizenship dynamic based on the fact that there are individuals who consider themselves both Muslims and completely European or American” (2004:68).

Continued insistence on a simplistic dichotomy of the West vs. the Islamic world should be considered obsolete. Personal choice, individual assessment of their religion, critically evaluating the difference between local culture and tradition and the religion of Islam could be observed among women in the Moroccan sample as much as in the French sample. The cover story of a Moroccan weekly magazine illustrates this point: “Quel Islam voulons nous?”1 In the article Moroccan economist Driss Benali is quoted as saying : “Dans l’avenir il faudra commencer à accepter le libre arbitre des individus […] Toutes les sociétés ont un fond religieux, mais le développement économique les amène à devenir plus individualistes.” The article cites Malaysia as an “exemple extraordinaire” for a country that is, “profondément religieux mais qui a construit son propre modèle de laïcité. Je pense que, devant l’ouverture économique qui se profile, il nous faudra faire preuve de flexibilité.” Despite the cultural mingling, many Muslims also stress the difference between the West and Islam because of their dualistic worldview. Thinking in terms of “us” versus “them” is still a widespread perspective. Several respondents for example insisted that Moroccan culture and Islamic laws were intrinsically different from and incompatible with French culture and laws. With regards to the law, this difference was based on the belief that Islamic law is divinely inspired and therefore superior to any man-made law. And yet no one in my sample refuted that this divine law had been corrupted in the process of human application. Exceeding the scope of this investigation

1 TELQUEL No 99, 7 novembre 2003

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but worthy of further research would be an exploration of attitudes towards law in general among the two populations. Dualistic thinking is the hallmark of the three Abrahamic religions and resulting worldviews. The cosmology of these faiths is based on a belief in the duality of heaven and hell, good and evil, salvation and damnation, God and Satan, life on earth and in the hereafter, superiority and inferiority. In this, basic views in the Arab/Islamic world and the Western world with its marked Judeo-Christian heritage, are more similar than dissimilar. Thus one could argue that some of the conflict between the Western and the Islamic world is rooted in this likeness as there is limited basis for conflict among thought-systems that have little in common. My findings shed doubt on the continued belief in the perceived divergence between Western European and Islamic worldviews as exemplified in the two samples. They are more in line with Mohammed Arkoun’s assertion that the cultures that have developed along the Mediterranean coastline were shaped up until modern times by the same historical forces. Arkoun challenges the notion that the Christian West and the Islamic East are inherent opposites with few, if any, social and cultural commonalities (Arkoun, 1994). Yet despite the historical links and the presence of millions of Muslims within Europe’s borders, Islam is not treated as a part of the European religious and cultural fabric. Most women in my samples perceived no conflict between their “Western” inspired personal and professional aspirations and their religious identity as Muslims. Their comments on legal changes, personal and professional goals and challenges were rather based on pragmatic assessments. Whatever helped them to advance their goals of greater personal freedom, choice and professional opportunities was welcomed. Changes that restricted their freedoms, such as the headscarf ban, were either rejected or viewed with skepticism, even though respondents said that laws needed to be obeyed regardless of whether one agreed or disagreed with them. Thus, there was no revolutionary zeal evident among my respondents, despite the fact that in their own ways they were contributing to a significant change in their respective societies. Similarity in attitudes transcended national boundaries even though the actual status of women in France and in Morocco is unquestionably very different. The women who participated in this research displayed a notable eagerness to contribute to changes in

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their respective communities and viewed existing societal or familial structures as being in contradiction to their desire for personal choice and professional advancement. Evident in the samples was a strong link between the insistence on individual rights, choice and education. All women in my samples received their formal education in educational institutions modeled after Western schools and universities. With attainment of higher educational qualifications came a desire to break out of conventional gender roles and to seek a place in the public sphere. Women in both samples credited higher education as an important factor in their transformed sense of self. In addition to academic training, another major factor in shaping individuals’ perceptions was the degree of exposure to people from different countries. The effect of international travel was profound regardless of the destination. A comparison of responses revealed that an extended stay in Saudi Arabia, for example, had an effect similar to that of a trip to the United States because it brought to the traveler an awareness of the difference between religion and culture. It also allowed for a re- examination of their understanding of the status of women. Even when international exposure occurred within Morocco, for example by attending a university with a strong exchange program, the result was an appreciation of difference rather than a rejection thereof. Respondents with close international contacts often said Islam was one religion among others but it happened to be theirs. Women in my samples took their cues from a variety of sources and observed with interest how women from different cultural and religious backgrounds approached major life issues. In France young women were surrounded by the values of mainstream French society which often were seen in contrast with those of their families. Those women looked critically at both models and did not simply adopt one while rejecting the other. Again, the attitudes of my respondents did not reflect a dualistic world view, but one in which western values of individualism, choice, rights and freedoms go hand in glove with a life of faith guided by the Qu’ran. Young, educated and professional women arrived at an understanding of the Qu’ran that differed from conventional interpretations because in their reading, the status of women was equal to that of men. Education and professional ambitions were in their view supported by the scriptures. Likewise, the public domain was not understood as being reserved for men. On this point respondents in Morocco and in France agreed

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almost unanimously and regardless of their conception of Islam. Though some with Islamist leanings were hesitant about seeing women as judges, in general both groups strongly disagreed with patriarchic, autocratic interpretations. Interpretation of sacred texts aside, with regards to professional opportunities and challenges, the data analysis revealed that gender was only one factor impacting on women’s perceptions of their personal and professional opportunities. Social class surfaced as a recurrent theme in France yet even more so in Morocco. Women in the samples felt that crossing the social divide posed a larger hurdle than overcoming disparities based on gender. Certainly, in a developing world country such as Morocco, class divisions are more pronounced than in a highly industrialized Western country such as France. In Morocco a large middle class is only now emerging; historically there has been a very small elite upper class while large segments of the population hovered on the edges of poverty. The women in the French sample did not speak as much about social class than about the distinction between majority and minority cultures. In France the majority culture was perceived as discriminating against a minority along ethnic and religious lines whereas in Morocco a social minority limited advancement of the majority of the population. Unemployment in Morocco is officially estimated at 19 per cent2 but in reality is much higher, therefore employment in line with educational qualifications is limited. Unemployment figures for the French banlieues3 may be comparable to those of Morocco, creating a similar environment of uncertainty. A study investigating unemployment in the French banlieues and comparing this with unemployment in Morocco could yield interesting results. Still, women treasured their educational opportunities as a means which offered them an altered sense of self. Barriers imposed by social class or majority culture filled women in both samples with resentment and frustration. This is not necessarily because of some heightened sense of social justice or support for an egalitarian system but because of their personal experience of exclusion. Very few respondents, for example, displayed a particular interest in political ideologies. Being denied access to a social order

2 World Bank Country Statistics, www.theworldbank. Last accessed April, 2005. 3 Unemployment among young people is estimated at 25 % in the socially disadvantaged banlieues according to “Es beginnt in den Banlieues”, Frankurter Allgmeine Zeitung, July 19, 2005, p.5.

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for which they feel well qualified can lead to anger, resentment and alienation that should not be underestimated. Neither the government of France nor that of Morocco should halt the momentum of these women who are keen and willing to overcome current obstacles. If large numbers of women in the end remain unsuccessful as a result of lack of opportunities, discrimination or old class divisions, both nations stand to waste tremendous human and economic potential. Regardless of substantial hurdles, most women in both samples had already made remarkable achievements. Indeed, those who had secured good professional positions said they saw education as an important factor in overcoming boundaries imposed by social class. Higher education allowed them entry into a work environment in which they interacted with people of similar educational backgrounds, regardless of social class. Nonetheless, professional ambitions and achievements came at a high cost: marriage. The majority of the women in both samples were single, most in their late twenties, some in their thirties. Marriage was seen by the majority of women in both samples as an integral part of life and the fact that they had not yet been successful in finding a husband was a source of great concern, even agony. Most were hopeful that by some miraculous turn of events they would come by a partner who respected their personal and professional choices, supported their careers and would be willing to disregard their age. By any standards, these women had embarked on extraordinary journeys for their lives and were willing to postpone marriage at the risk of possibly never attaining it. Certainly, no society can afford to have a generation of educated, professional young women rejected by the male population. King Mohammed V provoked a national discussion about marriage and gender roles when he married Salma Bennani, a young, professional information technology engineer. Though there was still a considerable age difference between the then 38-year-old King and his 24-year-old bride, the fact that the monarch chose a professional woman and married her in a public ceremony in July 2002, struck a new chord. The King had invited 200 couples from across the nation to get married at the same time, thereby ensuring that this wedding was an affair that resonated with varying local populations and is remembered. By contrast, the marriage of his father,

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King Hassan II, had been kept out of the public eye. In a country where societal change is initiated from the top down, Mohammed V’s marriage carried a message of change. Postponing marriage can be viewed as a courageous, risky, or desperate decision. Courageous because women intentionally prioritize education and career ambitions over fulfillment found in marriage and family life; risky because they might end up not getting married at all or desperate because education is the only avenue that affords women a degree of self-determination and independence unheard of in their mother’s generation. Some might argue that Berber populations in the rural areas have traditionally granted women a measure of independence unknown to urban women, such as working outside the house in the fields or tending to livestock, thereby having an opportunity to meet men and marry someone of their own choosing, owning property or learning a skill such as carpet weaving. Even though these are by current standards limited choices, they still serve as a reminder that women’s freedom and right to choose are not an entirely new, western invention. Women in both samples cited changes in mentality and behavior as more important than legal changes such as the family law reform in Morocco. While respondents in Morocco felt that a change of mentality fell mostly on the shoulders of men, respondents in France saw that men and women both needed to change their mentality transform habits and discard traditions that for generations supported a patriarchic, authoritarian system. Respondents cited archaic mentalities as one of the main obstacles on their path to personal and professional fulfillment. They said that a mentality that supported authoritarian, patriarchic systems was based in pre-Islamic, Arab culture and was not justified by the religion of Islam. Limited professional opportunities, precarious social status as emancipated women, insistence on personal choices in all spheres of their personal and professional lives are traits the women in my samples shared in common. Both were striving to expand the range of their rights and freedoms in the face of tremendous obstacles. In general, disenfranchised groups display similar traits owing to their particular situation of “oppression.” It is upon achieving relative equality that differences between them may come more sharply into focus. Thus, broad similarities between my samples in Morocco

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and in France may disappear as women attain their personal and professional goals and are able to focus on bringing their individual talents to bear on their respective societies. Because this investigation is based on two relatively small samples, the findings should be used as a starting point for research on a larger scale with more representative samples. Research into the attitudes of young, educated, professional and urban men would be useful in determining the extent of gender-based differences. Likewise, it would be useful to expand research over larger geographical areas to include other Western European countries with large Muslim populations such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Great Britain and those from which the largest flow of Muslim immigrants emanate, namely Algeria, Turkey and Pakistan. As this dissertation was written in the wake of yet another string of terrorist attacks perpetuated by self-proclaimed Islamic fundamentalists in the summer of 2005 in various locations, it is all the more important that people who are part of communities that can breed violent elements are provided with increased professional opportunities and receive more public support. France and Morocco stand only to gain by tapping into the vast potential of young, educated, professional women who aspire to offer their contributions to the private and public spheres.

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APPENDIX A. Questionnaire

Informations personnelles

1) age a) 18-22 b) 22-26 c) 26-30 d) 30-35 2) éducation : dernier diplôme 3) profession 4) Etat civil :

a) marié b) divorcé c) célibataire

5) Enfants (combien)

6) Logement :

a) vit seul b) avec des amies c) avec la famille d) avec mari e) autre (spécifiez)

7) Que signifie l’Islam pour vous?

8) Etes-vous musulmane par naissance ou par choix ?

a) naissance b) choix c) les deux d) autre (spécifiez)

9) Est-ce que votre mère porte le voile ?

a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

10) Est-ce que vous portez le voile ?

a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

11) Si oui : Depuis quand ?

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12) Depuis que vous portez le voile, y a-t-il eu des moments où vous ne l’avez pas porté ?

13) Pourquoi ?

14) Si non : Pourquoi ne portez-vous pas le voile ?

15) Quel est votre lieu de naissance ?

16) Est-ce que vous pensez que les femmes devraient êtres nommées à des postes

gouvernementaux de haut rang et/ou qu’elles devraient pouvoir servir comme juges ? a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

17) Qu’avez vous pensé lorsque vous avez appris la réforme de la moudawana au Maroc ?

18) Dans quelle mesure la réforme influence t-elle la vie des femmes au Maroc ?

19) A votre avis, est-ce que cette nouvelle loi est-elle basée sur le Coran ?

a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

20) A votre connaissance, y a-t-il une femme dans votre famille qui a eu une expérience personnelle avec la moudawana ?

a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

21) Est-ce vous pensez que la loi de la famille doit être la même en France qu’au Maroc ? a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

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22) Est-ce que vous le considérez possible de vivre seule ?

a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

23) Est-ce que vous lisez le Coran :

a) quelque fois par semaine b) quelque fois par mois c) quelque fois par an d) jamais

24) Dans quelles circonstances utilisez-vous le français ?

25) Dans quelles circonstances utilisez-vous l’arabe (deraja) ?

26) Dans quelles circonstances utilisez-vous le tamazight (le berbère) ?

27) Si c’était possible, dans quel(s) pays préfériez-vous vous installer ?

28) Est-ce que vous pouvez réciter quelques partis du Coran par cœur ?

a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

29) Est-ce vous pensez que les pouvoirs publics tiennent compte de vos points de vue ou opinions quand ils prennent leurs décisions ?

30) Qu’est-ce que vous pensez de la nouvelle loi qui interdit le voile dans les écoles publiques en France ?

31) A votre avis, quelles seront les conséquences de cette nouvelle loi sur les femmes musulmanes en France ?

32) Est-ce que vous pensez que cette nouvelle loi pourrait avoir des avantages ?

a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

33) Pour quelles raisons ?

34) Est-ce vous pensez que l’état en France doit intervenir dans la domaine de la religion comme par exemple sur la question du voile ?

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a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

35) Pourquoi ?

36) Est-ce que vous pouvez décrire une expérience personnelle où l’Islam a été important pour vous ?

37) Est-ce que votre compréhension de l’Islam a évolué avec le temps ? a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

38) Dans quel sens ?

39) Est-ce que vous considérez le mariage comme une partie essentielle de la vie ? a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

40) Est-ce que vous pouvez imaginer la possibilité de vous marier avec un non- musulman ? a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

41) Quels facteurs influenceraient-ils votre décision concernant le choix de votre époux ?

42) Quels sont les objectifs les plus importants que vous vous fixez dans la vie dans les dix ans à venir ?

43) Est-ce que vous pratiquez le Ramadan ?

a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

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44) Est-ce que vous priez chaque jour ?

a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

45) Est-ce que vous croyez que vos opportunités professionnelles sont suffisantes pour le moment?

a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

46) Quels sont les principaux obstacles empêchant les jeunes femmes de réaliser leurs buts dans le pays où vous résidez?

47) Est-ce que vous avez des amis qui ne sont pas des Musulmanes ?

48) D’après vous, quels sont les principaux conseils du Coran concernant le rôle des femmes ?

49) Est-ce que vous pensez que vous avez autant d’opportunités que tout autres membre de la société dans laquelle vous vivez, homme ou femme ?

a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

50) Décrivez-vous en utilisant une ou plusieurs catégories - cochez une ou plusieurs case(s)

a) progressive b) laïque c) conservatrice d) pratiquante e) aucune de ces catégories f) autre (spécifiez)

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51) Est-ce qu’une interprétation légale de l’Islam vous parait importante ou est-ce que la religion signifie pour vous plutôt un voyage spirituel ?

a) interprétation légale b) voyage spirituel c) les deux d) autre (spécifiez)

En France :

52) Est-ce que vous avez réfléchi sur la possibilité de rentrer de manière permanente au Maroc ? d) oui e) non f) autre (spécifiez)

53) Comptez-vous y rentrer de manière permanente ?

d) oui e) non f) autre (spécifies)

54) Pourquoi ? 55) Combien de fois vous avez visité le Maroc ? 56) Est-ce que vous avez visité d’autres pays ? (lesquels - à nommer) 57) Est-ce que vous avez de la famille au Maroc ? 58) Est-ce que vous parler l’Arabe ?

Au Maroc :

59) Est-ce que vous avez réfléchi sur la possibilité de vivre ailleurs ? (où ?)

a) oui b) non c) autre (spécifiez)

60) Pourquoi ? 61) Est-ce que vous avez visité la France ? 62) Combien des fois et pour combien de temps ? 63) Est-ce que vous avez visité d’autres pays ? (lesquels – à nommer) 64) Est que vous avez de la famille en France ?

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APPENDIX B. Discours Royale

S.M. le Roi Mohammed VI, accompagné de S.A.R. le Prince Moulay Rachid et de S.A. le Prince Moulay Ismaïl, a présidé, vendredi en fin d'après-midi au siège du Parlement, l'ouverture de la deuxième année législative de la 7e législature.

Le Souverain a prononcé à cette occasion un important discours, dont voici le texte intégral :

"Louange à Dieu,

Prière et Salut sur le Prophète, Sa Famille et Ses Compagnons,

Mesdames et Messieurs les honorables parlementaires, En ouvrant cette session parlementaire, Nous parachevons le renouvellement des institutions constitutionnelles, concrétisant ainsi notre ferme volonté de mettre le processus démocratique sur la bonne voie en tant qu'option irréversible, quels que soient les défis aux niveaux national et international.

Mais si nous sommes fiers de la réalisation de ce bond qualitatif, est-ce à dire que nous avons déjà atteint l'objectif ultime auquel nous aspirons? Ainsi que Nous l'avons maintes fois rappelé, il n'y a pas de démocratie sans démocrates. La démocratie est un processus long et ardu et non un champ virtuel de guerre de positions. Il s'agit, plutôt, d'une citoyenneté engagée et une pratique incontournable de bonne gestion des affaires publiques, au niveau local en particulier.

La consolidation de la démocratie passe nécessairement par l'ancrage de la culture de la citoyenneté; mission qui, du reste, revient aux partis politiques et aux organisations de la société civile et par l'amélioration palpable pour le citoyen, de son vécu quotidien.

Et, quelle que soit la composition des Conseils élus, Nous ne cesserons, néanmoins, de poser la question essentielle suivante : l'élection est-elle une fin en soi, marquant l'aboutissement ultime du parcours ? Assurément non, car le respect de la volonté populaire exige de se défaire de la mentalité de la démocratie des sièges, au profit d'une adhésion franche aux vertus de la démocratie du développement.

Dans la perspective de tirer tous les enseignements qui s'imposent de l'élection des Conseils représentatifs, et de réunir les conditions requises pour en assurer la rationalisation, Nous nous limiterons aujourd'hui à évoquer le renouvellement de l'élection des Conseils des collectivités locales, qui incarnent la démocratie participative et de proximité, et forment le noyau dur de la Chambre des conseillers.

Nous engageons les collectivités locales à tourner la page de la compétition électorale, somme toute passagère, pour ouvrir les chantiers essentiels de l'action sociale, refusant de baisser les bras devant l'ampleur des difficultés et s'employant, en revanche, à élaborer des plans de développement locaux, en vue de la mise en œuvre concrète des chantiers prioritaires que sont l'habitat salubre, l'investissement porteur, l'emploi productif, l'enseignement utile et la création des conditions d'une vie digne pour tous.

Voilà qui va stimuler les citoyens qui, du reste, doivent être associés, de manière effective et permanente, à la réalisation des projets de développement répondant à leurs préoccupations réelles. Telle est la voie à emprunter pour la réhabilitation de la démocratie locale, laquelle doit être une relation synergique et permanente avec les citoyens, plutôt qu'un exercice de circonstance qui ne dure que le temps d'un scrutin.

Nous tenons à féliciter les nouveaux élus, et Nous nous réjouissons du score élevé réalisé par les jeunes les plus qualifiés. Toutefois, le faible niveau de représentation féminine dans les collectivités locales nous amène à nous interroger : jusqu'à quand allons-nous continuer à recourir à la discrimination juridique positive, pour garantir une large participation de la femme aux institutions ? La question exige, sans aucun doute, un renouveau global, par une transformation profonde des mentalités archaïques et de la conscience collective. Elle requiert de laisser à la femme la faculté de s'insérer dans tous les rouages de la vie de la nation, d'autant plus qu'elle a fait la démonstration de ses mérites, de sa droiture et de son dévouement au

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service de l'intérêt général.

Corrélativement aux Hautes Directives que Nous avons données aux autorités publiques pour apporter leur appui aux collectivités locales, Nous n'avons pas manqué d'insister sur la nécessité pour ces autorités de faire preuve de vigilance, de fermeté et de contrôle continu pour s'assurer de l'exercice optimal par les Conseils élus, des larges prérogatives qui leur sont dévolues par la loi.

Parallèlement à la mise en garde que Nous lançons contre l'irresponsabilité et la mauvaise gestion, même de la part d'un élu ayant obtenu une forte majorité, Nous tenons à rappeler en particulier Nos Hautes Instructions visant la pénalisation d'actes favorisant la prolifération de l'habitat insalubre et l'application ferme, efficace et sans complaisance de la loi à l'encontre de tous les manipulateurs.

Nous considérons que la collectivité locale ne peut s'acquitter pleinement de sa mission qu'en conjuguant ses efforts avec ceux de l'Ecole et de la Famille, trois institutions sur lesquelles se focalise notre ferme volonté de réforme visant l'édification d'une société démocratique, moderniste.

Nous avons suffisamment insisté sur la nécessaire mise en œuvre optimale de la Charte nationale de l'éducation et de la formation. Nous nous contenterons aujourd'hui de prévenir, mais avec force, que cette année constitue un tournant décisif pour la réalisation de cette réforme essentielle. Aussi faut-il se résoudre à prendre, à cet égard, les décisions audacieuses qui s'imposent, faire preuve de tout le courage et de toute la fermeté requise et veiller à la mise en œuvre utile et effective de ces dispositions dans la pratique et le vécu des citoyens.

S'agissant de la famille et de la promotion de la condition de la Femme, j'en ai déjà énoncé la problématique fondamentale dès le lendemain de mon accession à la Charge Suprême d'Amir Al Mouminine, en m'interrogeant dans le discours du 20 Août 1999 : "Comment espérer assurer progrès et prospérité à une société alors que ses femmes, qui en constituent la moitié, voient leurs droits bafoués et pâtissent d'injustice, de violence et de marginalisation, au mépris du droit à la dignité et à l'équité que leur confère notre sainte religion ?" Outre les multiples décisions et initiatives que Nous avons prises et qui étaient autant de signaux forts en faveur de la promotion, dans l'équité, de la condition de la Femme, Nous n'avons pas hésité à intervenir pour épargner à la société les risques de déchirements autour de cette question.

Nous avons constitué, à cet effet, une Commission consultative composée de divers profils et compétences, chargée de Nous soumettre des propositions sur une réforme substantielle de la Moudawana. Depuis, Nous n'avons cessé de lui prodiguer Nos Hautes Directives, jusqu'à ce qu'elle ait soumis à Notre Haute Appréciation les résultats de ses travaux.

A cet égard, Nous tenons à rendre hommage aux efforts déployés par son président et tous ses membres. Si les avis étaient quelquefois éloignés sur certaines questions, nous considérons, cependant, qu'entre ouléma, les divergences sont plutôt porteuses de bénédiction.

En adressant Nos Hautes Directives à cette Commission, et en Nous prononçant sur le projet de Code de la Famille, Nous entendions voir introduire les réformes substantielles suivantes :

1- Adopter une formulation moderne, en lieu et place des concepts qui portent atteinte à la dignité et à l'humanisme de la femme.

- Placer la famille sous la responsabilité conjointe des deux époux. A cet égard, mon aïeul le Prophète Sidna Mohammed, Paix et Salut soient sur Lui a dit :" Les femmes sont égales aux hommes au regard de la loi". Il est, en outre, rapporté qu'Il a dit : "Est digne, l'homme qui les honore et ignoble celui qui les humilie".

2- Faire de la tutelle (wilaya) un droit de la femme majeure, qu'elle exerce selon son choix et ses intérêts, et ce, en vertu d'une lecture d'un verset coranique selon laquelle la femme ne saurait être obligée à contracter un mariage contre son gré : "Ne les empêchez pas de renouer les liens de mariage avec leurs maris si les

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deux époux conviennent de ce qu'ils croient juste". La femme peut, toutefois, mandater de son plein gré à cet effet, son père ou un de ses proches.

3- Assurer l'égalité entre l'homme et la femme pour ce qui concerne l'âge du mariage, fixé uniformément à 18 ans, en accord avec certaines prescriptions du Rite Malékite, et laisser à la discrétion du juge la faculté de réduire cet âge dans les cas justifiés. Assurer également l'égalité entre la fille et le garçon confiés à la garde, en leur laissant la latitude de choisir leur dévolutaire, à l'âge de 15 ans.

4- S'agissant de la polygamie, Nous avons veillé à ce qu'il soit tenu compte des desseins de l'Islam tolérant qui est attaché à la notion de justice, à telle enseigne que le Tout-Puissant a assorti la possibilité de polygamie d'une série de restrictions sévères.

"Si vous craignez d'être injustes, n'en épousez qu'une seule".

Mais Le Très-Haut a écarté l'hypothèse d'une parfaite équité en disant en substance "Vous ne pouvez traiter toutes vos femmes avec égalité, quand bien même vous y tiendriez".

De même avons-Nous gardé à l'esprit cette sagesse remarquable de l'Islam qui autorise l'homme à prendre une seconde épouse, en toute légalité, pour des raisons de force majeure, selon des critères stricts draconiens, et avec, en outre, l'autorisation du juge.

En revanche, dans l'hypothèse d'une interdiction formelle de la polygamie, l'homme serait tenté de recourir à une polygamie de fait, mais illicite. Par conséquent, la polygamie n'est autorisée que selon les cas et dans les conditions légales ci-après :

- Le juge n'autorise la polygamie que s'il s'assure de la capacité du mari à traiter l'autre épouse et ses enfants équitablement et sur un pied d'égalité avec la première, et à leur garantir les mêmes conditions de vie, et que s'il dispose d'un argument objectif exceptionnel pour justifier son recours à la polygamie;

- La femme peut subordonner son mariage à la condition, consignée dans l'acte, que son mari s'engage à s'abstenir de prendre d'autres épouses. Cette conditionalité est, en fait, assimilée à un droit qui lui revient.

A cet égard, Omar Ibn Khattab, que Dieu soit satisfait de lui, a dit : "Les droits ne valent que par les conditions y attachées".

"Le contrat tient lieu de loi pour les parties" ("Pacta Sunt Servanda"). En l'absence d'une telle condition, il lui appartient de convoquer la première épouse et demander son consentement, aviser la deuxième épouse que son conjoint est déjà marié, et recueillir également son assentiment.

En outre, il devrait être loisible à la femme dont le mari vient de prendre une deuxième épouse de réclamer le divorce pour cause de préjudice subi.

5- Concrétisant la Haute Sollicitude Royale dont Nous entourons Nos chers sujets résidant à l'étranger, et afin de lever les contraintes et les difficultés qu'ils subissent à l'occasion de l'établissement d'un acte de mariage, et en simplifiant la procédure, de sorte qu'il soit suffisant de l'établir en présence de deux témoins musulmans, en conformité avec les procédures en vigueur dans le pays d'accueil, et de le faire enregistrer par les services consulaires ou judiciaires marocains, conformément à cette recommandation du Prophète : "Facilitez, ne compliquez point" !

6- Faire du divorce, en tant que dissolution des liens de mariage, un droit exercé et par l'époux et par l'épouse, selon les conditions légales propres à chacune des parties et sous contrôle judiciaire. Il s'agit, en effet, de restreindre le droit de répudiation reconnu à l'homme, en lui attachant des normes et conditions visant à prévenir un usage abusif de ce droit. Le Prophète-Prière et Salut soient sur Lui - dit à cet égard : " Le plus exécrable (des actes) licites, pour Dieu, est le divorce".

Pour ce faire, il convient de renforcer les mécanismes de conciliation et d'intermédiation, en faisant

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intervenir la famille et le juge.

Si le pouvoir de répudiation revient au mari, l'épouse en a également la prérogative, par le biais du droit d'option.

Dans tous les cas de figure, il faudra, avant d'autoriser la répudiation, s'assurer que la femme répudiée bénéficiera de tous les droits qui lui sont reconnus.

Par ailleurs, une nouvelle procédure de répudiation a été adoptée. Elle requiert l'autorisation préalable du tribunal et le règlement des droits dûs à la femme et aux enfants par le mari, avant l'enregistrement du divorce. Elle stipule, en outre, l'irrecevabilité de la répudiation verbale dans des cas exceptionnels.

7- Elargir le droit dont dispose la femme pour demander le divorce judiciaire, pour cause de manquement du mari à l'une des conditions stipulées dans l'acte de mariage, ou pour préjudice subi par l'épouse, tel que le défaut d'entretien, l'abandon du domicile conjugal, la violence ou tout autre sévice, et ce, conformément à la règle jurisprudentielle générale qui prône l'équilibre et le juste milieu dans les relations conjugales. Cette disposition répond également au souci de renforcer l'égalité et l'équité entre les deux conjoints.

De même qu'a été institué le divorce par consentement mutuel, sous le contrôle du juge.

8- Préserver les droits de l'enfant en insérant dans le Code les dispositions pertinentes des conventions internationales ratifiées par le Maroc et en garantissant l'intérêt de l'enfant en matière de garde, laquelle devrait être confiée à la mère, puis au père, puis à la grand-mère maternelle.

En cas d'empêchement, il appartient au juge de décider de l'octroi de la garde au plus apte à l'assumer parmi les proches de l'enfant et en tenant compte du seul intérêt de l'enfant.

Par ailleurs, la garantie d'un logement décent pour l'enfant, objet de la garde, devient, désormais, une obligation distincte de celles dues au titre de la pension alimentaire. La procédure de règlement des questions liées à ladite pension sera accélérée, puisqu'elle devra s'accomplir dans un délai ne dépassant pas un mois.

9- Protéger le droit de l'enfant à la reconnaissance de sa paternité au cas où le mariage ne serait pas formalisé par un acte, pour des raisons de force majeure. Le tribunal s'appuie, à cet effet, sur les éléments de preuve tendant à établir la filiation.

Par ailleurs, une période de cinq ans est prévue pour régler les questions restées en suspens dans ce domaine, et ce pour épargner les souffrances et les privations aux enfants dans une telle situation.

10- Conférer à la petite - fille et au petit -fils du côté de la mère, le droit d'hériter de leur grand-père, dans le legs obligatoire, au même titre que les petits-enfants du côté du fils, et ce, en application du principe de l'effort jurisprudentiel (l'Ijtihad) et dans un souci de justice et d'équité.

11- S'agissant de la question de la gestion des biens acquis par les conjoints pendant le mariage : Tout en retenant la règle de séparation de leurs patrimoines respectifs, les conjoints peuvent, en principe, convenir du mode de gestion des biens acquis en commun, dans un document séparé de l'acte de mariage. En cas de désaccord, il est fait recours au juge qui se base sur les conditions générales de preuve pour évaluer la contribution de chacun des deux époux pour la fructification des biens de la famille.

Mesdames et Messieurs les honorables parlementaires. Ces réformes dont Nous venons d'énoncer les plus importantes ne doivent pas être perçues comme une victoire d'un camp sur un autre, mais plutôt comme des acquis au bénéfice de tous les Marocains. Nous avons veillé à ce qu'elles cadrent avec les principes et les références ci-après : Je ne peux, en ma qualité d'Amir Al Mouminine, autoriser ce que Dieu a prohibé, ni interdire ce que Le Très-Haut a autorisé. Il est nécessaire de s'inspirer des desseins de l'Islam tolérant qui honore l'Homme et prône la justice, l'égalité et la cohabitation harmonieuse, et de s'appuyer sur l'homogénéité du Rite Malékite, ainsi que sur l'Ijtihad qui fait de l'Islam une religion adaptée à tous les

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lieux et toutes les époques, en vue d'élaborer un Code moderne de la Famille, en parfaite adéquation avec l'esprit de notre religion tolérante.

Le Code ne devrait pas être considéré comme une loi édictée à l'intention exclusive de la femme, mais plutôt comme un dispositif destiné à toute la famille, père, mère et enfants. Il obéit au souci à la fois de lever l'iniquité qui pèse sur les femmes, de protéger les droits des enfants, et de préserver la dignité de l'Homme.

Qui, parmi vous, accepterait que sa famille, sa femme et ses enfants soient jetés à la rue, ou que sa fille ou sa sœur soit maltraitée ? Roi de tous les Marocains, Nous ne légiférons pas en faveur de telle ou telle catégorie, telle ou telle partie. Nous incarnons la volonté collective de la Oumma que Nous considérons comme Notre grande famille.

Soucieux de préserver les droits de Nos fidèles sujets de confession juive, Nous avons tenu à ce que soit réaffirmée, dans le nouveau Code de la Famille, l'application à leur égard des dispositions du statut personnel hébraïque marocain.

Bien que le Code de 1957 ait été établi avant l'institution du Parlement, et amendé, par Dahir, en 1993 au cours d'une période constitutionnelle transitoire, Nous avons jugé nécessaire et judicieux que le Parlement soit saisi, pour la première fois, du projet de Code de la Famille, eu égard aux obligations civiles qu'il comporte, étant entendu que ses dispositions à caractère religieux relèvent du ressort exclusif d'Amir Al Mouminine.

Nous attendons de vous d'être à la hauteur de cette responsabilité historique, tant par le respect de la sacralité des dispositions du projet qui s'inspirent des desseins de notre religion généreuse et tolérante, qu'à l'occasion de l'adoption d'autres dispositions.

Ces dispositions ne doivent pas être perçues comme des textes parfaits ni appréhendeés avec fanatisme. Il s'agit plutôt de les aborder avec réalisme et perspicacité, dès lors qu'elles sont issues d'un effort d'Ijtihad valable pour le Maroc d'aujourd'hui, ouvert au progrès que Nous poursuivons avec sagesse, de manière progressive, mais résolue.

En Notre qualité d'Amir Al Mouminine, Nous jugerons votre travail en la matière, en Nous fondant sur ces prescriptions divines : "Consulte- les sur la question" et "si ta décision est prise, tu peux compter sur l'appui de Dieu".

Soucieux de réunir les conditions d'une mise en œuvre efficiente du Code de la Famille, Nous avons adressé à Notre ministre de la Justice, une Lettre Royale, faisant remarquer que la mise en œuvre de ce texte, quels que soient, par ailleurs, les éléments de réforme qu'il comporte, reste tributaire de la création de juridictions de la Famille qui soient équitables, modernes et efficientes.

En effet, l'application du Code actuel a confirmé que les lacunes et les défaillances qui ont été relevées ne tenaient pas seulement aux dispositions proprement dites du Code, mais plutôt à l'absence de juridictions de la Famille qualifiées sur les plans matériel, humain et de procédure, à même de réunir les conditions de justice et d'équité nécessaires et de garantir la célérité requise dans le traitement des dossiers et l'exécution des jugements.

Nous lui avons également ordonné, outre la mise en place rapide du Fonds d'entraide familiale, de prévoir des locaux convenables pour les juridictions de la Famille, dans les différents tribunaux du Royaume, et de veiller à la formation de cadres qualifiés de différents niveaux, eu égard aux pouvoirs que confère le présent projet à la Justice.

Nous lui avons, en outre, ordonné de soumettre à Notre Majesté des propositions pour la mise en place d'une commission d'experts, chargée d'élaborer un guide pratique comportant les différents actes, dispositions et procédures concernant les juridictions de la Famille, afin d'en faire une référence unifiée pour ces juridictions, tenant lieu de mode d'application du Code de la Famille.

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Il importe également de veiller à réduire les délais prévus dans le code de procédure civile en vigueur, concernant l'exécution des décisions prises sur des questions afférentes au Code de la Famille.

De même qu'il convient de lancer une large campagne médiatique pour sensibiliser toutes les couches de la société quant à l'importance de cette réforme, et ce, avec la participation de jurisconsultes et de différentes sensibilités intellectuelles et politiques.

Quelle que soit l'importance des questions qui vous sont soumises, la cause sacrée de l'intégrité territoriale du Royaume doit rester à la tête des questions nécessitant une mobilisation générale.

Aussi vous exhortons-Nous à user activement de la diplomatie parlementaire pour défendre cette cause avec audace, efficacité et d'une manière offensive à toutes les occasions et devant toutes les instances.

Nous tenons, à cet égard, à rendre hommage à la participation dynamique des représentants des provinces du sud au sein des institutions élues, participation qui confirme leur adhésion à Notre option nationale pour la gestion démocratique de leurs affaires locales dans le cadre de l'unité nationale et de l'intégrité territoriale du Royaume, qui fait l'objet d'une unanimité sans faille de Notre cher peuple sous la conduite de Notre Majesté.

Je suis déterminé à aller de l'avant dans la mise en œuvre de toutes les réformes, avec la participation de toutes les forces vives et, en particulier la jeunesse, pour ancrer chez elle les valeurs de la citoyenneté positive et pour qu'elle contribue à l'édification du Maroc de la démocratie, de la solidarité et du développement.

A cet égard, Nous réaffirmons Notre volonté de consacrer cette année à la consolidation des principaux piliers de ce projet, à savoir la Famille stable, l'Ecole d'avant-garde et la Collectivité locale mobilisée au service de l'intérêt général et du raffermissement des fondements de l'Etat démocratique, fort de ses institutions efficientes. Wa Salamou Alaïkoum Wa Rahmatou Allah Wa Barakatouh".

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APPENDIX C. Projet de Code de la famille : simplification des procédures de mariage des MRE Publié par A. Riadi le Dimanche 02 novembre, 2004.

Le projet de code de la famille, que S.M. le Roi Mohammed VI a présenté devant le parlement, à l'occasion de l'ouverture de la nouvelle année législative, comporte des stipulations intéressant la communauté marocaine résidant à l'étranger, partant de la Haute sollicitude dont S.M. le Roi entoure cette catégorie de citoyens et ce en vue de faciliter notamment la procédure de conclusion des actes de mariage dans les pays d'accueil.

Le texte stipule en effet que dans le souci de simplifier la procédure de mariage des MRE, l'acte de mariage sera désormais établi en présence de deux témoins musulmans en conformité avec les procédures en cours dans les pays d'accueil. L'acte doit par la suite être enregistré par les services consulaires ou judiciaires nationaux.

Il est à rappeler toutefois que ces dispositions ne sont applicables que pour l'aspect administratif de l'établissement de l'acte de mariage dans les pays d'accueil. Les autres conditions qui sous-tendent l'acte de mariage restent en vigueur, à savoir le consentement plein et entier des époux, l'inexistence de l'un des empêchements prévus par la Charia, tels les liens de parenté entre les deux époux et la nécessité de la présence et de l'accord d'un tuteur au cas où l'un des futurs mariés serait mineur.

Dans le but de permettre aux services consulaires de suivre de près la situation matrimoniale des marocains résidant à l'étranger, il est demandé à toute personne ayant établi un acte de mariage selon les conditions énumérées par le nouveau texte, de déposer, dans un délai de trois mois à compter de la date de conclusion de l'acte, copie de l'acte de mariage aux services consulaires de la circonscription ayant établi l'acte ou directement au ministère des affaires étrangères si la circonscription ne compte pas de services consulaires.

Le ministère des Affaires étrangères se charge alors de transmettre ladite copie à l'officier d'état civil et à la section de la juridiction de la famille du lieu de naissance des deux époux.

Si ces derniers ou l'un d'eux n'est pas né au Maroc, la copie de l'acte de mariage est transmise à la section de la juridiction de la famille et au procureur du Roi près le tribunal de première instance de Rabat.

Le code de la famille comporte par ailleurs de nouvelles dispositions relatives notamment aux divorces prononcés par les tribunaux étrangers, en stipulant que les verdicts rendus par ces juridictions ne sont exécutoires que s'ils émanent d'un tribunal spécialisé et qu'ils ne sont pas en contradiction avec les dispositions du code de la famille.

Le texte régit également les aspects inhérents à la séparation des époux en stipulant que les décisions judiciaires relatives au divorce, prises conformément aux dispositions du nouveau code de la famille, ne sont passibles d'aucun recours dans leur volet juridique.

Les amendements introduits par le nouveau texte à la Moudawana sont donc de nature à lever les nombreux obstacles qui se dressaient devant les ressortissants marocains résidant l'étranger pour l'établissement de leurs actes de mariage dans les pays d'accueil. Les nouvelles dispositions sont en outre conformes aux accords et conventions internationaux ratifiés par le Maroc dans le domaine de la coopération judiciaire et la protection des MRE, tout comme ils sont en parfaite accord avec les enseignements de la religion musulmane dans les rapports avec les tierces parties.

Le respect des accords et conventions auxquels l'on souscrit est en effet fort recommandé par la charia (Coran et Sounna).

Le Très-Haut dit: "Soyez fidèles à l'alliance de Dieu après l'avoir contractée. Ne violez pas les serments, après les avoir solennellement prêtés et avoir pris Dieu comme garant entre vous" (Coran, les abeilles).

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Le Très-Haut dit aussi: "Dieu ne vous interdit pas d'être bons et équitables envers ceux qui ne vous ont pas combattus à cause de votre foi et qui ne vous ont pas expulsés de vos maisons;- Dieu aime ceux qui sont équitables-" (Coran: L'Epreuve).

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APPENDIX D. LOI n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics (1)

NOR : MENX0400001L

L'Assemblée nationale et le Sénat ont adopté,

Le Président de la République promulgue la loi dont la teneur suit :

Article 1

Il est inséré, dans le code de l'éducation, après l'article L. 141-5, un article L. 141-5-1 ainsi rédigé :

« Art. L. 141-5-1. - Dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse est interdit.

Le règlement intérieur rappelle que la mise en oeuvre d'une procédure disciplinaire est précédée d'un dialogue avec l'élève. » Article 2

I. - La présente loi est applicable :

1° Dans les îles Wallis et Futuna ;

2° Dans la collectivité départementale de Mayotte ;

3° En Nouvelle-Calédonie, dans les établissements publics d'enseignement du second degré relevant de la compétence de l'Etat en vertu du III de l'article 21 de la loi organique no 99-209 du 19 mars 1999 relative à la Nouvelle-Calédonie.

II. - Le code de l'éducation est ainsi modifié :

1° Au premier alinéa de l'article L. 161-1, les références : « L. 141-4, L. 141-6 » sont remplacées par les références : « L. 141-4, L. 141-5-1, L. 141-6 » ;

2° A l'article L. 162-1, les références : « L. 141-4 à L. 141-6 » sont remplacées par les références : « L. 141-4, L. 141-5, L. 141-5-1, L. 141-6 » ;

3° A l'article L. 163-1, les références : « L. 141-4 à L. 141-6 » sont remplacées par les références : « L. 141-4, L. 141-5, L. 141-6 » ;

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4° L'article L. 164-1 est ainsi modifié : a) Les références : « L. 141-4 à L. 141-6 » sont remplacées par les références : « L. 141- 4, L. 141-5, L. 141-6 » ; b) Il est complété par un alinéa ainsi rédigé :

« L'article L. 141-5-1 est applicable aux établissements publics d'enseignement du second degré mentionnés au III de l'article 21 de la loi organique no 99-209 du 19 mars 1999 relative à la Nouvelle-Calédonie qui relèvent de la compétence de l'Etat. »

III. - Dans l'article L. 451-1 du même code, il est inséré, après la référence : « L. 132-1, », la référence : « L. 141-5-1, ». Article 3

Les dispositions de la présente loi entrent en vigueur à compter de la rentrée de l'année scolaire qui suit sa publication. Article 4

Les dispositions de la présente loi font l'objet d'une évaluation un an après son entrée en vigueur.

La présente loi sera exécutée comme loi de l'Etat.

Fait à Paris, le 15 mars 2004.

Jacques Chirac

Par le Président de la République :

Le Premier ministre,

Jean-Pierre Raffarin

Le ministre de la jeunesse, de l'éducation nationale et de la recherche,

Luc Ferry

La ministre de l'outre-mer,

Brigitte Girardin

Le ministre délégué

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à l'enseignement scolaire,

Xavier Darcos

(1) Travaux préparatoires : loi no 2004-228.

Assemblée nationale :

Projet de loi no 1378 ;

Rapport de M. Pascal Clément, au nom de la commission des lois, no 1381 ;

Avis de M. Jean-Michel Dubernard, au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles, no 1382 ;

Discussion les 3, 4 et 5 février 2004 et adoption le 10 février 2004.

Sénat :

Projet de loi, adopté par l'Assemblée nationale, no 209 (2003-2004) ;

Rapport de M. Jacques Valade, au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles, no 219 (2003-2004) ;

Discussion et adoption le 3 mars 2004.

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APPENDIX E. Décrets, arrêtés, circulaires Textes généraux Ministère de l'éducation nationale, de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherché

LO n° 118 du 22 mai 2004 page 9033 texte n° 10

Circulaire du 18 mai 2004 relative à la mise en oeuvre de la loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics

NOR: MENG0401138C

Paris, le 18 mai 2004.

Le ministre de l'éducation nationale, de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche à Mesdames et Messieurs les recteurs d'académie, Mesdames et Messieurs les inspecteurs d'académie, directeurs des services départementaux de l'éducation nationale

La loi du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics, marque la volonté très largement partagée de réaffirmer l'importance de ce principe indissociable des valeurs d'égalité et de respect de l'autre. Elle témoigne de la volonté des représentants de la Nation de conforter l'école de la République.

La présente circulaire précise les modalités d'application de la loi du 15 mars 2004. Elle abroge et remplace la circulaire du 12 décembre 1989 relative à la laïcité, au port de signes religieux par les élèves et au caractère obligatoire des enseignements, la circulaire du 26 octobre 1993 sur le respect de la laïcité, et la circulaire du 20 septembre 1994 relative au port de signes ostentatoires dans les établissements scolaires.

I. - Les principes

La loi du 15 mars 2004 est prise en application du principe constitutionnel de laïcité qui est un des fondements de l'école publique. Ce principe, fruit d'une longue histoire, repose sur le respect de la liberté de conscience et sur l'affirmation de valeurs communes qui fondent l'unité nationale par-delà les appartenances particulières.

L'école a pour mission de transmettre les valeurs de la République parmi lesquelles

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l'égale dignité de tous les êtres humains, l'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes et la liberté de chacun y compris dans le choix de son mode de vie. Il appartient à l'école de faire vivre ces valeurs, de développer et de conforter le libre arbitre de chacun, de garantir l'égalité entre les élèves et de promouvoir une fraternité ouverte à tous. En protégeant l'école des revendications communautaires, la loi conforte son rôle en faveur d'un vouloir-vivre-ensemble. Elle doit le faire de manière d'autant plus exigeante qu'y sont accueillis principalement des enfants.

L'Etat est le protecteur de l'exercice individuel et collectif de la liberté de conscience. La neutralité du service public est à cet égard un gage d'égalité et de respect de l'identité de chacun.

En préservant les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, qui ont vocation à accueillir tous les enfants, qu'ils soient croyants ou non croyants et quelles que soient leurs convictions religieuses ou philosophiques, des pressions qui peuvent résulter des manifestations ostensibles des appartenances religieuses, la loi garantit la liberté de conscience de chacun. Elle ne remet pas en cause les textes qui permettent de concilier, conformément aux articles L. 141-2, L. 141-3 et L. 141-4 du code de l'éducation, l'obligation scolaire avec le droit des parents de faire donner, s'ils le souhaitent, une instruction religieuse à leurs enfants.

Parce qu'elle repose sur le respect des personnes et de leurs convictions, la laïcité ne se conçoit pas sans une lutte déterminée contre toutes les formes de discrimination. Les agents du service public de l'éducation nationale doivent faire preuve de la plus grande vigilance et de la plus grande fermeté à l'égard de toutes les formes de racisme ou de sexisme, de toutes les formes de violence faite à un individu en raison de son appartenance réelle ou supposée à un groupe ethnique ou religieux. Tout propos, tout comportement qui réduit l'autre à une appartenance religieuse ou ethnique, à une nationalité (actuelle ou d'origine), à une apparence physique, appelle une réponse. Selon les cas, cette réponse relève de l'action pédagogique, disciplinaire, voire pénale. Elle doit être ferme et résolue dans tous les cas où un élève ou un autre membre de la communauté éducative est victime d'une agression (qu'elle soit physique ou verbale) en raison de son appartenance réelle ou supposée à un groupe donné.

Parce que l'intolérance et les préjugés se nourrissent de l'ignorance, la laïcité suppose également une meilleure connaissance réciproque y compris en matière de religion. A cet égard, les enseignements dispensés peuvent tous contribuer à consolider les assises d'une telle connaissance. De même, les activités de « vivre ensemble » à l'école primaire, l'éducation civique au collège ou l'éducation civique, juridique et sociale au lycée constituent des moments privilégiés pour faire progresser la tolérance et le respect de l'autre. Plus spécifiquement, les faits religieux, notamment quand ils sont des éléments explicites des programmes, comme c'est le cas en français et en histoire, doivent être utilisés au mieux dans les enseignements pour apporter aux élèves les éléments de culture indispensables à la compréhension du monde contemporain.

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II. - Le champ d'application de la loi

Aux termes du premier alinéa de l'article L. 141-5-1 du code de l'éducation, « dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse est interdit ».

2.1. La loi interdit les signes et les tenues

qui manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse

Les signes et tenues qui sont interdits sont ceux dont le port conduit à se faire immédiatement reconnaître par son appartenance religieuse tels que le voile islamique, quel que soit le nom qu'on lui donne, la kippa ou une croix de dimension manifestement excessive. La loi est rédigée de manière à pouvoir s'appliquer à toutes les religions et de manière à répondre à l'apparition de nouveaux signes, voire à d'éventuelles tentatives de contournement de la loi.

La loi ne remet pas en cause le droit des élèves de porter des signes religieux discrets.

Elle n'interdit pas les accessoires et les tenues qui sont portés communément par des élèves en dehors de toute signification religieuse. En revanche, la loi interdit à un élève de se prévaloir du caractère religieux qu'il y attacherait, par exemple, pour refuser de se conformer aux règles applicables à la tenue des élèves dans l'établissement.

2.2. La loi s'applique aux écoles,

aux collèges et aux lycées publics

La loi s'applique à l'ensemble des écoles et des établissements d'enseignement scolaire publics. Dans les lycées, la loi s'applique à l'ensemble des élèves, y compris ceux qui sont inscrits dans des formations post-baccalauréat (classes préparatoires aux grandes écoles, sections de technicien supérieur).

La loi s'applique à l'intérieur des écoles et des établissements et plus généralement à toutes les activités placées sous la responsabilité des établissements ou des enseignants y compris celles qui se déroulent en dehors de l'enceinte de l'établissement (sortie scolaire, cours d'éducation physique et sportive...).

2.3. La loi ne modifie pas les règles applicables

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aux agents du service public et aux parents d'élèves

Les agents contribuant au service public de l'éducation, quels que soient leur fonction et leur statut, sont soumis à un strict devoir de neutralité qui leur interdit le port de tout signe d'appartenance religieuse, même discret. Ils doivent également s'abstenir de toute attitude qui pourrait être interprétée comme une marque d'adhésion ou au contraire comme une critique à l'égard d'une croyance particulière. Ces règles sont connues et doivent être respectées.

La loi ne concerne pas les parents d'élèves. Elle ne s'applique pas non plus aux candidats qui viennent passer les épreuves d'un examen ou d'un concours dans les locaux d'un établissement public d'enseignement et qui ne deviennent pas de ce seul fait des élèves de l'enseignement public. Ceux-ci doivent toutefois se soumettre aux règles d'organisation de l'examen qui visent notamment à garantir le respect de l'ordre et de la sécurité, à permettre la vérification de l'identité des candidats ou à prévenir les risques de fraudes.

2.4. Les obligations qui découlent, pour les élèves, du respect du principe de laïcité ne se résument pas à la question des signes d'appartenance religieuse

La loi du 15 mars 2004 complète sur la question du port des signes d'appartenance religieuse le corpus des règles qui garantissent le respect du principe de laïcité dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics.

Les convictions religieuses des élèves ne leur donnent pas le droit de s'opposer à un enseignement. On ne peut admettre par exemple que certains élèves prétendent, au nom de considérations religieuses ou autres, contester le droit d'un professeur, parce que c'est un homme ou une femme, d'enseigner certaines matières ou le droit d'une personne n'appartenant pas à leur confession de faire une présentation de tel ou tel fait historique ou religieux. Par ailleurs, si certains sujets appellent de la prudence dans la manière de les aborder, il convient d'être ferme sur le principe selon lequel aucune question n'est exclue a priori du questionnement scientifique et pédagogique.

Les convictions religieuses ne sauraient non plus être opposées à l'obligation d'assiduité ni aux modalités d'un examen. Les élèves doivent assister à l'ensemble des cours inscrits à leur emploi du temps sans pouvoir refuser les matières qui leur paraîtraient contraires à leurs convictions. C'est une obligation légale. Les convictions religieuses ne peuvent justifier un absentéisme sélectif par exemple en éducation physique et sportive ou sciences de la vie et de la Terre. Les consignes d'hygiène et de sécurité ne sauraient non plus être aménagées pour ce motif.

Des autorisations d'absence doivent pouvoir être accordées aux élèves pour les grandes fêtes religieuses qui ne coïncident pas avec un jour de congé et dont les dates sont rappelées chaque année par une instruction publiée au Bulletin officiel de l'éducation nationale. En revanche, les demandes d'absence systhématique ou prolongée doivent être

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refusées dès lors qu'elles sont incompatibles avec l'organisation de la scolarité. L'institution scolaire et universitaire, de son côté, doit prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour qu'aucun examen ni aucune épreuve importante ne soient organisés le jour de ces grandes fêtes religieuses.

III. - Le dialogue

Aux termes du second alinéa de l'article L. 141-5-1 du code de l'éducation tel qu'il résulte de la loi du 15 mars 2004, « le règlement intérieur rappelle que la mise en oeuvre d'une procédure disciplinaire est précédée d'un dialogue avec l'élève ».

3.1. La mise en oeuvre de la loi

passe d'abord par le dialogue

Le second alinéa de l'article L. 141-5-1 illustre la volonté du législateur de faire en sorte que la loi soit appliquée dans le souci de convaincre les élèves de l'importance du respect du principe de laïcité. Il souligne que la priorité doit être donnée au dialogue et à la pédagogie.

Ce dialogue n'est pas une négociation et ne saurait bien sûr justifier de dérogation à la loi.

3.2. L'organisation du dialogue

relève de la responsabilité du chef d'établissement

Lorsqu'un élève inscrit dans l'établissement se présente avec un signe ou une tenue susceptible de tomber sous le coup de l'interdiction, il importe d'engager immédiatement le dialogue avec lui.

Le chef d'établissement conduit le dialogue en liaison avec l'équipe de direction et les équipes éducatives en faisant notamment appel aux enseignants qui connaissent l'élève concerné et pourront apporter leur contribution à la résolution du problème. Mais cette priorité n'est en rien exclusive de tout autre choix que le chef d'établissement pourrait au cas par cas juger opportun.

Pendant la phase de dialogue, le chef d'établissement veille, en concertation avec l'équipe éducative, aux conditions dans lesquelles l'élève est scolarisé dans l'établissement.

Dans les écoles primaires, l'organisation du dialogue est soumise en tant que de besoin à

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l'examen de l'équipe éducative prévue à l'article 21 du décret n° 90-788 du 6 septembre 1990.

Le dialogue doit permettre d'expliquer à l'élève et à ses parents que le respect de la loi n'est pas un renoncement à leurs convictions. Il doit également être l'occasion d'une réflexion commune sur l'avenir de l'élève pour le mettre en garde contre les conséquences de son attitude et pour l'aider à construire un projet personnel.

Pendant le dialogue, l'institution doit veiller avec un soin particulier à ne pas heurter les convictions religieuses de l'élève ou de ses parents. Le principe de laïcité s'oppose évidemment à ce que l'Etat ou ses agents prennent parti sur l'interprétation de pratiques ou de commandements religieux.

3.3. En l'absence d'issue favorable au dialogue

Le dialogue devra être poursuivi le temps utile pour garantir que la procédure disciplinaire n'est utilisée que pour sanctionner un refus délibéré de l'élève de se conformer à la loi.

Si le conseil de discipline prononce une décision d'exclusion de l'élève, il appartiendra à l'autorité académique d'examiner avec l'élève et ses parents les conditions dans lesquelles l'élève poursuivra sa scolarité.

IV. - Le règlement intérieur

La loi du 15 mars 2004 s'applique à compter de la rentrée scolaire prochaine.

Même si l'interdiction posée par le premier alinéa de l'article L. 141-5-1 est d'application directe, il est utile de la rappeler dans les règlements intérieurs et de veiller à ce que ceux- ci ne comportent plus de référence à la notion de signes ostentatoires qui s'appuyait sur la jurisprudence du Conseil d'Etat à laquelle la loi nouvelle se substitue.

Les règlements intérieurs doivent rappeler, conformément aux prescriptions du second alinéa de l'article L. 141-5-1, que la mise en oeuvre d'une procédure disciplinaire est précédée d'un dialogue avec l'élève.

Les chefs d'établissement sont invités à soumettre aux conseils d'administration les clauses jointes en annexe.

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* *

Les recteurs diffuseront prochainement aux établissements une liste des personnes qui auront pour mission de répondre aux questions que pourraient se poser les chefs d'établissement et les équipes éducatives. Ces correspondants académiques, sous l'autorité du recteur, seront eux-mêmes en contact étroit avec la direction de l'enseignement scolaire et la direction des affaires juridiques qui sont chargées de leur apporter toute l'aide nécessaire dans la mise en oeuvre de la loi. Les recteurs et les correspondants académiques sont, en tant que de besoin, les points de contact avec les tiers intéressés à la mise en oeuvre de la loi.

Chaque chef d'établissement adressera au recteur de son académie avant la fin de l'année scolaire 2004-2005 un compte rendu faisant le bilan des conditions d'application de la loi dans son établissement et des éventuelles difficultés rencontrées. Une attention particulière doit être apportée à la rédaction de ces comptes rendus, qui fourniront les informations nécessaires au travail d'évaluation prévu par l'article 4 de la loi.

François Fillon

A N N E X E

Modèle d'article à insérer dans le règlement intérieur de l'établissement :

« Conformément aux dispositions de l'article L. 141-5-1 du code de l'éducation, le port de signes ou de tenues par lesquels les élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse est interdit.

Lorsqu'un élève méconnaît l'interdiction posée à l'alinéa précédent, le chef d'établissement organise un dialogue avec cet élève avant

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APPENDIX F. Human Subjects Committee Approval Memorandum.

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Aicha , 18 - 22, single, student Amal , 18 - 22, single, student Aziza, 18 - 22, single, student Chaibia, 22 - 26, single, M.A., communications officer Farida , 22 - 26, single, licence, teacher Fatna, 22 - 26, single, B.A. computer analysist Fouzia ,22 - 26, single, licence, accountant Hanane ,22 - 26, married, M.A., university career center Hasna, 22 - 26, single, BAC, office assistant Halima , 22 - 26, licence, executive assistant Jamila, 26 - 30, single, M.S., university staff Kaotar, 26- 30, licence, married, Human Resource officer Karima, 26 - 30, licence, married, librarian Khalida, 26 - 30, licence, teacher Lamiae, 26 - 30, B.S., mid-level manager international corporation Latifa, 26 - 30, M.A., civil servant Leila, 26 -30 3ième cycle, married, program officer Loubna, 26 - 30, graduate student, married Mina, 26 - 30, M.S., financial officer Nadia, 30 - 35, single, M.A., civil servant Naima, 30 - 35, single, licence, journalist Nezha, 30 - 35, married, 3ième cycle, civil servant Rachida, 30 - 35, single, licence, teacher Rokia, 30 - 35, single, licence, nurse Samira, 30 - 35, single, Ph.D., psychologist Saadia, 30 - 35, single, Ph.D., university professor Touria, 30 - 35, single, Ph.D., researcher Zoubida, 30 - 35, single, M.A., university lecturer Zineb, 30 - 35, single, licence, librarian Zhour, 30 - 35, married, licence, accountant

230

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Aicha, 26 - 30, single, 3ième cycle, civil servant Amina, 30 - 35, single, maîtrise, assit. Director, NGO Fatima,18 - 22, single, student Fatma, 30-35, divorced, maîtrise ,director, social service organization Fouzia, 26 - 30, single, licence, social service program development Imane, 18 - 22, single, student Ilham, 18 -22, single, student Halima, 22 - 26, single, journalist Hassiba, 30 - 35, single, maîtrise, biochemist Hayat, 18 - 22, single, student Kerima, 26 - 30, single, maîtrise, in between jobs Khadija, 22- 26, single, licence, legal assistant Kheira, 26 - 30, divorced, professional degree, nurse Latifa, 22 - 26, divorced, BAC in between professions Lila, 22- 26, single licence, teacher Malika, 22- 26, single, professional degree, asst. manager Maria, 22 - 26, single, professional degree, security officer Mouna, 30 - 35, single, 3ième cycle, lawyer Nacira, 26 - 30, married, maîtrise, accountant Naima, 26 - 30, married, maîtrise, admin. assistant Rabha, 18 - 22, single, student Rhizzlane, 22 - 26, married, BAC, licence, nursery school teacher Saadia, 30 - 35, single, BAC + 3, communications specialist Touria, 30 - 35, divorced, maîtrise, bank employee Zoubida, 22 - 26, single, just attained graduate degree

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255 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Doris Herr-Gray hails from Frankfurt, Germany. She received her baccalaureate from the Ursulinenschule St. Angela with a concentration in modern languages and pursued her undergraduate studies in German literature at Ludwig-Maximilian Universität in Munich. She then pursued training in journalism in Bielefeld. She worked as journalist for the following 20 years, a decade as a foreign correspondent based first in South Africa, then in Kenya for the German Press Agency (dpa). Upon her relocation to the United States, she attained a graduate degree in Journalism (M.S.) at Florida A&M University (1997) and taught Journalism and Mass Communications at Tallahassee Community College. From 1999-2001, she taught as a Visiting Lecturer at Al Akhawayn University in Morocco. She received her doctoral degree from Florida State University in the Department of Modern Languages with a concentration on Francophone Studies. While at FSU, she taught French language courses and also taught in the Women’s Studies Department.

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