Bushfires Report.Indd

PPERFORMANCEERFORMANCE EXAMINATIONEXAMINATION

Responding to Major Bushfires

Report 7 October 2004

Serving the Public Interest AUDITOR GENERAL for Western Australia

THE SPEAKER THE PRESIDENT LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

PERFORMANCE EXAMINATION – Responding to Major Bushfires

This report has been prepared consequent to an examination conducted under section 80 of the Financial Administration and Audit Act 1985 for submission to Parliament under the provisions of section 95 of the Act.

Performance Examinations are an integral part of the overall Performance Auditing program and seek to provide Parliament with assessments of the effectiveness and efﬁ ciency of public sector programs and activities thereby identifying opportunities for improved performance.

The information provided through this approach will, I am sure, assist Parliament in better evaluating agency performance and enhance Parliamentary decision-making to the beneﬁ t of all Western Australians.

D D R PEARSON AUDITOR GENERAL October 20, 2004

2 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

Contents

Auditor General’s Overview 4

Executive Summary 5 Key ﬁ ndings 5 Key recommendations 6 About this examination 7 Major bushﬁ res in Western Australia 7 Need for better coordination 8 Need for better preparation 9

Introduction 12 The risks associated with major bushﬁ res are increasing 13 Scope and focus of the examination 15

Arrangements Across Organisations Need to be Better Coordinated 16 Findings and recommendations 16 There are inherent risks in many organisations sharing authority for fi ghting major bushfi res 17 A command structure across organisations is needed during major bushfi res 20 The State’s Emergency Management Plan, Westplan Wildfi re, needs improvement 22

Fire Fighting Organisations Need to be Better Prepared 24 Findings and recommendations 24 The Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System needs to be uniformly established 26 Training and development issues need to be addressed 29 Major bushﬁ res have exposed weaknesses in planning 33 Telecommunication problems have hampered effective operations 34 Shortfalls in appliances and equipment are being attended to 35

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 3 Auditor General’s Overview

Bushfi res are a natural part of the Australian landscape and Western Australia experiences thousands of bushfi res every year. The vast majority of these are detected and extinguished by our volunteer and career fi re fi ghters before they have time to escalate into major bushfi res. On occasion, however, particularly under extreme weather conditions, bushfi res can intensify very rapidly, and lives become threatened, property destroyed, and our natural environments devastated. It is critical in these circumstances, that we are well prepared, and capable of combating these bushfi res effectively.

Accordingly, this examination has focused on the improvements needed for managing such bushfi re emergencies. This focus is not intended to detract from the invaluable work done by fi re fi ghting organisations, and volunteer and career fi re fi ghters, in successfully extinguishing the large number of fi res that do not escalate into major bushfi res.

Indeed, I commend all fi re fi ghters for their courage and dedication in what can be very trying and dangerous situations. I especially applaud the work of volunteers, who form the backbone of our fi refi ghting system. Volunteers keep our communities protected from the destruction that uncontrolled bushfi res can infl ict.

It is, also important to ensure that both volunteer and career fi refi ghters have the safest and most effective system possible for combating bushfi res. Many advances have been made in this regard over recent years. These include the formation of the Fire and Emergency Services Authority which has improved the coordination of urban and rural bushfi re services, and the introduction of the Emergency Services Levy, which established greater certainty of funding for supplying volunteer brigades with the appliances and equipment they need.

Fundamentally, however, the organisational arrangements for managing bushﬁ res has not changed since their introduction over 50 years ago. System level changes are necessary to establish a clear authoritative basis and a more cohesive structure for controlling major bushﬁ res.

4 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

Executive Summary

The authority for fi ghting bushfi res is shared across each of the 122 local governments in regional Western Australia, the Fire and Emergency Services Authority (FESA), and the Department of Conservation and Land Management (CALM). Authority is based on land tenure, according to the geographical jurisdiction of each organisation. While fi re fi ghting organisations generally work well together, major bushfi res have exposed weaknesses in these arrangements. Changes are needed to establish a more cohesive fi re fi ghting structure and a sound authoritative basis for managing bushfi re emergencies.

Key findings Western Australia relies heavily on volunteers to fi ght bushfi res with local government volunteer Bush Fire Brigades forming the foundation of the bushfi re fi ghting system.

Particularly at regional levels, there is a high level of goodwill and cooperation across fi re fi ghting organisations which support fi re fi ghting efforts.

The organisational arrangements for ﬁ ghting major bushﬁ res need to be better coordinated:

the authority for fi ghting bushfi res being dispersed across 124 organisations poses inherent risks when multiple bushfi res demand a coordinated response, or when major bushfi res cross organisational boundaries

the absence of a State-wide command structure across volunteer Bush Fire Brigades weakens the capacity for managing major bushﬁ res effectively, particularly when there are multiple bushﬁ res burning simultaneously

the State’s bushfi re Emergency Management Plan (Westplan Wildfi re) lacks supporting legislation and is not part of an actively supported planning framework, which undermines its effective implementation in major bushfi re emergencies.

Fire ﬁ ghting organisations need to be better prepared:

the Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS) has been adopted by the State ﬁ re ﬁ ghting authorities in Western Australia and throughout Australia, however, its adoption at local government level is varied, with some local government brigades fully embracing it, and others not

there are key training and development issues to be addressed:

there are barriers to the take-up of training by volunteers which impacts on volunteer safety during major bushﬁ res

CALM faces challenges in maintaining its current level of trained staff

major bushfi res have exposed local level planning weaknesses which have reduced the effectiveness of fi re fi ghting efforts

problems with telecommunications systems across organisations have hampered effective operations.

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (continued)

Key recommendations Government should:

establish a State-wide command structure across volunteer Bush Fire Brigades for ﬁ ghting major bushﬁ res, to more effectively manage the coordination of personnel and resources

establish emergency management legislation which clarifi es State and local government responsibilities, and which rectifi es the defi ciencies in the State’s bushfi re Emergency Management Plan, Westplan Wildfi re.

FESA should:

in addition to its current initiatives, develop and implement structured programs (with clearly identiﬁ ed objectives, target groups and time lines for achievement) aimed at:

increasing the level of adoption of AIIMS by local governments and volunteer Bush Fire Brigades

improving local government bushﬁ re emergency and response planning.

Fire ﬁ ghting organisations should:

address their key training and development issues

resolve existing telecommunication problems and work with other emergency service organisations to establish compatible telecommunications systems.

6 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

About this examination This examination focused on how well prepared the State is to deal with major bushﬁ res in the south west land division of Western Australia (from Kalbarri to Esperance, which includes 93 local government areas) by reviewing the:

coordination across fi re fi ghting organisations for responding to major bushfi res

planning and other preparations needed to support bushﬁ re ﬁ ghting operations.

Major bushfires in Western Australia In the summer of 2002-03, Western Australia experienced its most severe bushfi re season since the fi res which destroyed Dwellingup in 1961. Overall, while most of these bushfi res were small or medium sized fi res, there were also at least nine major bushfi res. Major bushfi res are those fi res where complex fi re management issues are present requiring a coordinated multi-agency response over several days or weeks.

Over the past two summers, four people have lost their lives, and millions of dollars worth of private property, stock and livestock have been destroyed, as a direct result of major bushﬁ res. Environmental damage was inﬂ icted on thousands of hectares of woodlands and wetlands in the proposed Walpole Wilderness Area and State forest.

The risks associated with major bushfires are increasing Changes in land use have increased the threats posed by major bushﬁ res. Urban sprawl has blurred the previously clear distinction between urban and rural land. Housing estates now extend into bushﬁ re prone areas putting life and property at greater risk.

Urban sprawl has also changed the type of fi res that fi re fi ghters and fi re fi ghting organisations are having to deal with. Many new housing estates fall within the jurisdiction of local governments, where fi res are managed by volunteer bushfi re fi ghters (although support is usually provided from the Fire and Rescue Service within FESA). CALM may also be involved in fi ghting fi res that threaten property and townsites, if they are close to forests, plantations or national parks.

Higher fuel levels have also contributed to an increased level of risk. CALM reports that approximately one third of CALM land in the south west has been accumulating fuel for over 10 years. This level of fuel build-up makes bushﬁ res extremely difﬁ cult to control.

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (continued)

Need for better coordination

There are inherent risks in many organisations sharing authority for fighting major bushfires Under the Bush Fires Act 1954 (the Act), bushfi re fi ghting responsibilities are shared between FESA, CALM and 122 individual local governments. Each of these 124 organisations has the authority to manage bushfi res and command resources within its own jurisdiction.

FESA has operational responsibility for bushfi res inside gazetted fi re districts. These districts include most rural townships, regional centres and the greater portion of the Perth metropolitan area, although outer suburbs such as Butler, Ellenbrook, and Baldivis lie outside the Perth gazetted fi re districts.

Local government volunteer Bush Fire Brigades are responsible for extinguishing bushfi res outside gazetted fi re districts. This represents the majority of land in Western Australia including unallocated Crown land, Crown reserves, pastoral leases and private property. FESA’s role in these areas is to provide support to local governments on technical and operational matters, and training of volunteers, but has no operational responsibility for bushfi res (unless requested by a local government).

CALM is also an important ﬁ re management authority, and the Act gives CALM the discretionary power to take control of bushﬁ res burning on or near CALM controlled land or Crown land.

Western Australia is now the only Australian State which places the legislative and operational responsibility for fi ghting major bushfi res with local governments, although changes have been recommended. Over the past 40 years, a Royal Commission (1961), a parliamentary inquiry (1984) and a ministerial inquiry (1994) all recognised the need for a more coordinated structure during major bushfi res, however the specifi c changes recommended have not been acted on.

A command structure across organisations is needed during major bushfires Under the current arrangements, in the event of a major bushﬁ re:

There is no command structure to ensure that if the ﬁ re develops beyond the expertise of local personnel, a more experienced person will take over control.

There is no single body which has the legislative authority to prioritise how resources are used at a local, regional or State level during multiple bushﬁ res.

The mobilisation of bushfi re fi ghting resources relies heavily on informal cooperation among fi re fi ghting organisations. There is a high level of goodwill which supports this type of mutual aid. However, while assistance is almost always provided, pre-determined formal arrangements promise a more reliable outcome when fi re fi ghting organisations are faced with the pressure of fi ghting major or multiple bushfi res.

8 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

Changes to the legislation in November 2002 include amendments aimed specifi cally at improving the coordination across fi re fi ghting organisations by giving FESA the authority to take over the control of a bushfi re, if requested by a local government. However, since the amendments were passed, FESA has not been requested to take control of any major rural bushfi res outside the Perth urban-rural fringe.

The State’s Bushfire Emergency Management Plan needs improvement Westplan Wildfi re (the Plan) was developed by FESA and CALM to provide a framework for a coordinated multi-organisation response to major bushfi res. The Plan outlines the triggers for activating a regional or State level response to a bushfi re emergency, and the mechanisms for coordinating fi re fi ghting organisations, emergency services, and other support agencies. However, there are defi ciencies in the Plan which undermine its effective implementation in major bushfi re emergencies. In particular, the Plan:

has not been endorsed by individual local governments and they are not a signatory to the Plan

lacks an authoritative basis to make certain the Plan is implemented

assumes lower level support plans (such as local government, district and regional bushﬁ re response plans, local emergency management plans, and telecommunications plans) are in place, but the extent to which this occurs varies widely

relies on the uniform uptake of a common incident management system (‘AIIMS’) across ﬁ re ﬁ ghting organisations, but this is yet to be fully achieved.

Need for better preparation

The Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System needs to be uniformly established The Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS) is used for coordinating and directing personnel and resources during a bushfi re. It has been adopted by CALM and FESA, however the level of adoption among volunteer Bush Fire Brigades needs to be increased signifi cantly. Thirty-seven local governments in the south west land division (approximately 40 per cent) do not have a fi re control offi cer trained in AIIMS. The implications of this is demonstrated by the poor control of people and resources during recent major bushfi res, where reporting arrangements were confused and formal strategies for combating the fi re were not developed.

Inquiries into major bushfi res in other States have stressed the need for the uniform adoption of AIIMS. In particular, the Victorian Coroner found that the failure of organisations to implement AIIMS was a key factor leading to the deaths of fi ve volunteer fi re fi ghters at Linton in 1998.

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (continued)

Training and development issues need to be addressed Many volunteers have built up skills and competencies through the experience of attending bushfi res, and are effective in combating most fi res. However, most bushfi res do not escalate to become major bushfi res, and few volunteers have had suffi cient exposure to major bushfi res to provide them with the level of experience needed. For all fi re fi ghters, experience must be supplemented by training. Among volunteers, there are signifi cant barriers to the take-up of training, which relate to time and fi nancial loss, as well as divergent views about the perceived need for training. Consequently, the level of training, particularly in rural areas, is relatively low. As the principal training provider, FESA has commenced a process of ‘brigade profi ling’ to better match the type of training provided to volunteers to the type of bushfi res they may face. However, FESA has not yet used the profi les to govern the training provided to volunteers. FESA needs to undertake a systematic analysis of volunteer training needs, and to target its training programs toward addressing these needs.

The severe 2002-03 bushfi re season put a signifi cant strain on CALM’s ability to manage the large number of simultaneous bushfi res which occurred. While CALM has since appointed additional crew members, it still faces future challenges in maintaining adequately trained staff. These are due to CALM’s ageing fi re crews and its reliance on other organisations to supplement key fi re management roles. Given CALM’s key bushfi re fi ghting role in the south west, CALM needs to implement targeted action plans to ensure the State’s future bushfi re fi ghting capability in this region is not weakened.

Major bushfires have exposed weaknesses in planning and communications Inconsistencies in local level planning have hampered both fi re fi ghting and emergency management operations. Problems include managing road closures and evacuations, and the availability of maps and local fi re fi ghters to provide vital local knowledge of the area.

The ability to communicate by radio and mobile telephone is critical for effective fi re fi ghting operations, yet problems are common, for example, overloading of radio and mobile networks, not following protocols for radio communications, and radio repeater breakdowns. Across the emergency services there is no compatible telecommunication system. Fire fi ghting organisations, police and ambulance all use different technologies. The State’s bushfi re Emergency Management Plan, Westplan Wildfi re has no supporting telecommunications plan to address these issues.

10 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

Shortfalls in appliances and equipment are being attended to The overall adequacy of volunteer brigade appliances and equipment cannot reliably be determined because, at this stage, there is no systematic method for determining the level of resources needed by brigades according to the level of bushfi re risk they face. FESA has developed such a model, however it will take several years before resources are systematically allocated across all local governments based on this approach. FESA advises that using the current allocation method, based on local government submissions of existing resource levels and projected need, any signifi cant shortfalls in resources are being identifi ed and addressed. FESA will need to continue close monitoring of this.

CALM relies, in part, on private contractors to supply and operate heavy machinery such as bulldozers during a bushfi re. The 2002-03 bushfi re season exposed a shortfall in contracted machinery which adversely affected CALM’s response to some incidents. CALM has addressed this by placing extra heavy machinery operators under contract. However, contractors are often located some distance from forest regions and CALM will need to systematically evaluate the ability of contractors to respond promptly to bushfi re incidents on an ongoing basis.

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 11 Introduction

Australia is one of the most bushfi re-prone countries in the world. The eastern states in particular have experienced devastating and costly bushfi res such as the Ash Wednesday bushfi res in 1983, which killed 75 people, and the 2002-03 bushfi res across New South Wales, Victoria and the ACT where fi ve lives were lost and over 500 homes destroyed.

While Western Australia has tended to avoid this level of bushfi re disaster, it is no less bushfi re prone, and experiences major bushfi res every year.

In the summer of 2002-03, Western Australia experienced its most severe bushfi re season since the fi res which destroyed Dwellingup in 1961. Over 9 000 fi res were managed by volunteer bushfi re brigades throughout the State. CALM attended 620 bushfi res that burnt out over 1.2 million hectares of Crown land and private property in the south west land division. Most of these were small and medium sized bushfi res, although approximately eight per cent exceeded 1 000 hectares (by way of comparison Kings Park in Perth is approximately 400 hectares). The area burnt in the south west forest region represents an eight-fold increase on past years.

Typically, less than one per cent of bushfi res escalate to what may be considered a major bushfi re. Such fi res often extend over several days or weeks. They generate a number of complex fi re management issues which require a high level of incident management across multiple organisations (Figure 1).

Fire Management Response

Requires multi-agency response and extended lex few Major management structure Several days to few weeks

Medium Local resources GEMENTUES comp INCIDENTS May take several days and minimal management Minor structure

Resolved within a few hours MANA many

straight Type of Bushfire forward ISS

Figure 1: The relationship between bushﬁ re severity and the level of management response required

Source: OAG

12 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

In the past two years there have been 14 bushfi res considered by FESA and CALM to be major bushfi res. Four people lost their lives as a direct result of these fi res. Millions of dollars worth of private property, stock, and crops were destroyed. Over 50 000 hectares of woodlands and wetlands in the proposed Walpole Wilderness Area and D’Entrecasteaux National Park and 18 000 hectares of conservation land and State forest at Mount Cooke (south east of Armadale) suffered signifi cant environmental damage. Bushfi res threatened the townsites of Jurien Bay and Cervantes just prior to Christmas 2002. On December 22 and 23, 2002, forty-two lightning strikes in the forests east of Perth severely stretched the resources of both CALM and local government volunteer brigades.

The risks associated with major bushfires are increasing Major bushfi res now pose a larger threat than when the existing arrangements for managing bushfi res were established in 1954. Changes in land use and, more recently, increased fuel levels have contributed to life and property now being more at risk from these fi res. Consequently, the complexity of bushfi re management issues has increased.

Land use has signiﬁ cantly increased risk. Urban development has blurred the distinction between urban and rural areas, with housing estates now placing homes and urban infrastructure in close proximity to ﬁ re prone bushland.

Around the fringe areas of Perth, this type of development is planned to increase. From 2002 to 2007 approximately 13 000 new housing lots have the potential for release within the local government areas of Wanneroo and Joondalup, and a further 17 000 new lots in Kwinana, Rockingham and Cockburn.

Urban development has also changed the type of fi res that fi re fi ghters and fi re fi ghting organisations now face. New housing estates that lie in the ‘interface’ zone between urban and rural land areas, often fall outside the Perth metropolitan fi re district boundaries. All fi res outside these boundaries, including house fi res, fall within the jurisdiction of the relevant local government, and volunteer bushfi re fi ghters are responsible for extinguishing them, although support is provided by the Fire and Rescue Service from FESA. Currently, this includes suburbs such as Butler, Yanchep, and Lancelin to the north, Ellenbrook to the north east, Bedfordale and Byford to the south east, and Parmelia and Baldivis to the south.

Similarly, housing estates have been developed around the fringes of Perth and in the south west in close proximity to forest plantations and national parks. Since CALM takes responsibility for bushﬁ re management in these areas, CALM personnel are increasingly faced with managing the risk to life and property, as well as to the environment.

The level of fuel available to burn also has a signifi cant impact on bushfi re risk. While fuel levels are cyclical, currently, approximately one third of the south west forest regions has been accumulating fuel for over 10 years, without being cleared or burnt through prescribed burning programs (Figure 2). Bushfi res burning in fuels this old are likely to be more intense, larger, and very diffi cult to control. Attempts to

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 13 INTRODUCTION (continued)

extinguish these fi res through a direct attack will normally fail. If a direct attack fails, fi re fi ghters have to rely on indirect methods, such as back burning or land clearing to create reduced fuel buffers, and allowing the fi re to burn into the buffer, to contain the spread of the fi re.

100%

80%

I Over 10 years – very difﬁ cult to control 60%

I 6 to 10 years – difﬁ cult to control 40%

20% I 0 to 5 years – able to control

0% Swan South Warren Total West

Figure 2: Fuel ages and degree of difﬁ culty in controlling bushﬁ res in the three south west forest regions (at February, 2004)

Source: CALM

The amount of fuel in the south west forest regions that has been accumulating for more than fi ve years has gradually increased over the past several years. In 1997-98, 55 per cent of these regions had a fuel age of more than fi ve years. However, due to the extended drought impacting on the opportunity to safely undertake prescribed burning, this area increased to 69 per cent in 2002-03, although has since dropped back to 65 per cent. CALM reports that it will take at least two years to meet its target of 60 per cent, which is considered by CALM to be a more manageable level for controlling bushfi res.

Prescribed burning as a method to reduce fuels levels is currently under review by the Environmental Protection Authority and did not form part of this examination.

14 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

Scope and focus of the examination The examination reviewed the effectiveness of preparing for, and responding to bushfi res in the south west land division of Western Australia (from Kalbarri to Esperance, which includes 93 local government areas). This area refl ects the highest level of bushfi re risk, in terms of incorporating high population densities, and high agricultural, forest and environmental values. Specifi cally, we examined the:

coordination across fi re fi ghting organisations for responding to major bushfi res

planning and other preparations needed to support ﬁ re ﬁ ghting efforts.

The examination reviewed the reports of previous inquiries into bushfi re management in Western Australia. We gathered information from the Fire and Emergency Services Authority (FESA), the Department of Conservation and Land Management (CALM), and from offi cials and volunteers from ten local governments, who provided detailed information on specifi c bushfi re management issues in their areas. The examination also draws on the lessons learned from inquiries and reports on recent major bushfi res in other Australian States.

Major bushﬁ res in Western Australia were also reviewed in detail, working from post incident analysis reports produced by FESA and/or CALM. Of the 19 incidents where a report was prepared by these agencies, 12 were selected for review according to the following criteria.

The incident:

was a major bushﬁ re within the south west land division

involved a multi-agency response

occurred since the summer of 2000-01.

While the examination concentrated on major bushfi res the implementation of the recommendations will undoubtedly impact on the management of smaller bushfi res. In most instances this will be benefi cial, however, it is not intended that recommendations should override the existing effective management of smaller bushfi res.

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 15 Arrangements Across Organisations Need to be Better Coordinated

The current legislative framework for fi ghting bushfi res assigns the authority to fi ght bushfi res to each of the 122 local governments in regional Western Australia, FESA and CALM. Each of these organisations has the responsibility to control bushfi res within its own jurisdiction, which are delineated by geographical boundaries. Policy arrangements and memoranda of understanding have been established to manage the coordination of personnel and resources across jurisdictions during major and multiple bushfi res, but currently, these are not supported by legislation.

Findings and recommendations

Findings Western Australia relies heavily on volunteers to fi ght bushfi res with local government volunteer Bush Fire Brigades forming the foundation of the bushfi re fi ghting system.

The authority for fi ghting major bushfi res being dispersed across 124 different organisations poses inherent risks when multiple bushfi res demand a coordinated response, or when major bushfi res cross organisational boundaries.

Over the past 40 years, three separate major inquiries have identifi ed the need for a more cohesive structure for fi ghting major bushfi res, however the organisational arrangements have remained largely unchanged.

Particularly at regional levels, there is a high level of goodwill and cooperation across fi re fi ghting organisations which support fi re fi ghting efforts.

The absence of a State-wide command structure across volunteer Bush Fire Brigades causes problems in the management of major bushﬁ res, particularly when there are multiple bushﬁ res burning simultaneously.

The State’s bushfi re Emergency Management Plan (Westplan Wildfi re) lacks supporting legislation and is not part of an actively supported planning framework, which undermines its effective implementation in major bushfi re emergencies.

Recommendations Government should:

establish a State-wide command structure across volunteer Bush Fire Brigades for ﬁ ghting major bushﬁ res, to more effectively manage the coordination of personnel and resources

16 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

There are inherent risks in many organisations sharing authority for fighting major bushfires Under the Bush Fires Act 1954 (the Act) the prime responsibility for fi ghting bushfi res, outside gazetted fi re districts, lies with local government volunteer Bush Fire Brigades (Figure 3). This includes all fi res burning on private property, unallocated Crown land, and all other Crown land where CALM does not have the authority to take over the control of the fi re.

FESA is responsible for controlling bushfi res inside gazetted fi re districts. Gazetted fi re districts comprise:

most of the Perth metropolitan area (Perth metropolitan ﬁ re district boundaries cut through the City of Wanneroo, City of Swan, Shire of Mundaring, Shire of Kalamunda, City of Gosnells, City of Armadale, City of Cockburn, and City of Rockingham)

regional centres such as Albany, Bunbury and Geraldton

most rural townships (although small towns and rural settlements are not usually gazetted as ﬁ re districts).

Outside these districts, FESA’s prime responsibility is to administer the Act, and to assist local governments by providing advice and support in the prevention and extinguishment of bushfi res. FESA has no operational responsibility or authority for the management of bushfi res outside gazetted fi re districts (unless requested by local government).

The Act authorises individual local governments to appoint fi re control offi cers, including a Chief Bush Fire Control Offi cer (CBFCO), to control bushfi res and direct volunteers in their jurisdictions. These offi cers have wide ranging powers equivalent to that of the Director of Operations of FESA, including the authority to take charge of any Bush Fire Brigade present at a bushfi re, and any other measures he or she considers necessary to control a bushfi re.

CALM also has a key role as a bushfi re management authority, as the Act gives CALM the discretion to take control of bushfi res on or near CALM or Crown land. Typically, CALM will exercise this discretion and take control of bushfi res in forest areas and where there are high environmental considerations. ‘Taking control’ includes the authority to direct any volunteers who may also be assisting at the scene of the fi re.

Western Australia is now the only Australian State which places the legislative and operational responsibility for fi ghting major bushfi res with individual local governments. In all other States there is a single bushfi re service which is responsible for directing volunteers during major bushfi res (although the roles of land managers and conservation agencies vary).

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 17 ARRANGEMENTS ACROSS ORGANISATIONS NEED TO BE BETTER COORDINATED (continued)

For example, up until 1997, New South Wales had a similar structure to Western Australia, with each local government acting as a separate bushfi re emergency service. As a result of the 1994 bushfi re deaths, the NSW Coroner recommended an integrated Rural Fire Service be established. The new structure means that while small incidents are handled locally, there is now a clear command structure, from the Commissioner to a local fi re control offi cer, in the event of a major bushfi re.

Improvements have been made to the fi re fi ghting arrangements in Western Australia over the past few years. In particular, the formation of FESA in 1999, which brought together the Fire and Rescue Service, the Bush Fires Board and the State Emergency Service, was a positive step forward in fi re and emergency management. This provided for a more integrated approach to bushfi re emergency management, with the appointment of a single Executive Director responsible for bushfi re services across urban and rural areas, and established formal mechanisms for working with local governments.

Memoranda of understanding (MoU) and other non-legislative arrangements have also been established. For example, FESA and CALM have established four inter-agency strategy committees: community safety, fi re operations including water bombing, training, and geographic information systems (used for storing and analysing map data). Through a MoU, these agencies have also agreed to develop compatible arrangements for fi re operations in areas such as incident management, staff competencies, communications, equipment, the use of aircraft, and fi re protection planning. Similarly, FESA and local governments have established a number of consultative and advisory forums. In addition, in three of the high risk shires within the south west region, FESA jointly funds local government appointed fi re management offi cers to assist with the shires’ bushfi re management responsibilities.

However, while all these initiatives have progressed the management of bushfi res, they do not change the basis of authority for fi ghting bushfi res, which continues to be based on organisational and geographical boundaries.

The need for change in Western Australia has been recognised in previous reviews Over the past 40 years, three separate inquiries have all reported on the inherent risks of having multiple organisations individually responsible for bushfi re emergencies in Western Australia. While many of the inquiries’ recommendations were implemented, specifi c recommendations aimed at achieving a more cohesive structure across fi re fi ghting organisations have not been implemented.

In 1961, as a result of an extremely severe bushfi re season which also destroyed the township of Dwellingup, the Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Enquire into and Report upon the Bushfi res of December, 1960 and January, February and March 1961, in Western Australia stressed the need for a single point of control during major bushfi res. The report recommended the Minister nominate a person before the beginning of every fi re season, who would take charge of all fi re fi ghting operations in a district, should a major bushfi re occur. A ‘district’ represented two or more local government areas.

18 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

In 1984 the Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly Appointed to Inquire into Bushfi res in Western Australia reported concern that a bushfi re extending across shire boundaries would have similar fragmentation to that which occurred during the Ash Wednesday fi res. It recommended that the status of the Bush Fires Board (the forerunner of the Bush Fire Service now within FESA), should be upgraded from that of an advisory authority, to a formal role in the coordination of major bushfi res.

Ten years later in 1994, the Ministerial Working Group Investigating the Darling Escarpment Fire Hazard recommended that, as the volunteer Bush Fire Brigade system was part of the emergency service of Western Australia, it needed to have a clear chain of command up to State level, and encompassing the whole State.

Minister for Police and Minister for the Emergency Services Environment

Fire and Emergency 122 local governments Department of Services Authority (outside gazetted fire Conservation and Land districts) Management

Advisory role only to local governments outside of Perth fringe areas unless requested to take control

FESA staff member Local government Authorised CALM Act appointed Chief appointed Chief officer – discretion Bushfire control bushfire Control to take control of Officer – in five local Officer – in 117 local bushfires and direct governments (Perth governments volunteers where fires fringe areas only threatening CALM – on request from controlled land or local government) Crown land

Volunteer Bush Fire Brigades CALM fire crews

Figure 3: Organisational responsibilities for fi ghting bushfi res outside metropolitan fi re districts. Source: OAG

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 19 ARRANGEMENTS ACROSS ORGANISATIONS NEED TO BE BETTER COORDINATED (continued)

A command structure across organisations is needed during major bushfires A command structure across organisations is needed to cope with the pressure of fi ghting major bushfi res and to prioritise and coordinate personnel and resources during multiple fi res.

While local CALM staff are initially responsible for controlling a bushfi re within their area, there is also a command structure which means, if needed, a more experienced offi cer can take over the management of a major bushfi re anywhere in the State. Within local governments however, the chain of command and responsibility for a bushfi re stops with each local government’s CBFCO. There is no mechanism to ensure that if a bushfi re develops beyond the expertise of local personnel, control of the bushfi re is handed over to the most experienced person available.

Furthermore, the command structure inherent within a State agency such as CALM, also means resources can be prioritised according to need, in the event of multiple bushfi res. State-wide, however, no single organisation has the authority to mobilise fi re fi ghting appliances and machinery, or direct volunteers, during a bushfi re emergency. Each of the 122 local governments, CALM and FESA command their own resources. No organisation has authority over another organisation to ensure appliances, equipment and personnel are mobilised and prioritised during major multiple bushfi res.

For example, the examination’s analysis of the incident reports (prepared by FESA and/or CALM) on the management of 12 major bushﬁ res identiﬁ ed the following issues:

FESA was not informed that a major bushﬁ re was threatening life and property

despite a recommendation from FESA that it assume control of a major bushﬁ re, this did not eventuate

FESA’s offers of assistance to the CFBCO during a major bushﬁ re were declined

an insuffi cient number of fi re fi ghters and equipment were available to combat a bushfi re

fi re fi ghting organisations from other areas, who could have offered assistance during a major fi re, were not advised that assistance was needed.

Under the Act, the only provision to assume control of a bushfi re, or to direct personnel and resources across jurisdictions, is for the Minister for Police and Emergency Services to declare a bushfi re emergency and appoint a single person to take charge of fi re fi ghting operations (although the provision specifi cally states that local governments, Bush Fire Brigades, and FESA’s Bush Fire Liaison Offi cers come under the control of a person so appointed, and does not state whether this also applies to CALM fi re fi ghters).

FESA advises that the provision has rarely been used. For example, a bushﬁ re emergency declaration was made in 1978, when Cyclone Alby generated between 800 and 900 bushﬁ res across the south west of Western Australia, but only one declaration has been made since then, in 1995. In practice, assuming

20 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

control of a major bushfi re that has exhausted the expertise of local resources, or joining-up resources to fi ght major fi res across jurisdictions, relies on requests and cooperation among organisations.

There is a high level of goodwill among fi re fi ghting organisations which supports this type of mutual aid. In most circumstances, needed assistance is provided from neighbouring local government brigades, and from FESA and CALM. This willingness to assist extends across the State, with volunteers, FESA and CALM personnel sometimes travelling long distances to assist with major bushfi res. Volunteers, in particular, have travelled far outside their local areas to supplement bushfi re fi ghting crews during summer holidays, including the Christmas period. Western Australia relies on this goodwill for the protection of our rural and urban-rural communities.

Nevertheless, greater assurance of an effective response to ﬁ ghting major or multiple bushﬁ res would be provided by having an across jurisdictional command structure in place.

Legislative changes have been made to achieve a command structure but they have had limited impact Recent changes to the legislation seek to improve the management of bushfi res across fi re fi ghting organisations, and in particular the problems caused by the lack of a command structure. However, to date, the changes have had limited impact.

CBFCOs and volunteer brigades are experienced in fi ghting small and medium sized bushfi res. However, because major bushfi res do not occur on a regular basis within a CBFCO’s jurisdiction, FESA is concerned that few CBFCOs have suffi cient experience to manage major fi res safely and effectively.

In November 2002 a number of legislative amendments to the Act were introduced which included two aimed specifi cally at improving the coordination across fi re fi ghting organisations.

Under Section 13(4), any local government can now request FESA to take control of a bushﬁ re.

However, to date, this provision has not been utilised. FESA has not been requested to take control of any major rural bushﬁ res. Furthermore, the Act does not specify the circumstances under which this request should be made, or the triggers for prompting such a request, although FESA has advised it is developing guidelines on this.

The circumstances surrounding a change in the control of a major bushfi re was raised in July 2004 by the State Coroner investigating the death of a volunteer fi re fi ghter in 2003. He recommended that a review of the Act be conducted to determine ‘with some precision’ how and when a change in control should take place in the circumstance where:

a relatively small ﬁ re develops into a larger ﬁ re requiring increased resources, particularly when lives and property are threatened, and

there is an increasing need for control by a full-time professional ofﬁ cer and one is available.

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 21 ARRANGEMENTS ACROSS ORGANISATIONS NEED TO BE BETTER COORDINATED (continued)

Under Section 38A, at the request of the local government, FESA can now appoint one of its own staff as the CBFCO. This arrangement only applies where FESA has established a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the local government. Under the MoU, the CBFCO position is funded by both the local government and FESA, and takes on a range of bushfi re prevention and fi re fi ghting duties.

This amendment is a positive step forward in establishing a command structure across organisations. MoUs have been established with fi ve local governments within the high risk fringe areas of the Perth metropolitan area (Mundaring, Swan, Wanneroo, Cockburn, and Gosnells). A further eight local governments, in other areas of high risk, are currently undergoing the review process in conjunction with FESA, to determine whether a MoU should be established. The MOUs also provide a range of benefi ts in bushfi re prevention, and assisting local governments in preparing for bushfi res.

However, as the MoUs rely on mutual agreement between the local government and FESA, are for fi xed term periods, and do not extend to all high bushfi re risk areas, their impact is limited in terms of establishing a regional or State-wide command structure for fi ghting major bushfi res.

The State’s Emergency Management Plan, Westplan Wildfire, needs improvement Developed by FESA and CALM in 1999, Westplan Wildfi re (the Plan) is the State’s Plan for managing bushfi re emergencies. The Plan usefully outlines the mechanisms for activating a regional or State level response to a bushfi re emergency, and coordinating fi re fi ghting organisations, emergency services, and other support agencies. The plan has been reviewed annually and subsequent reviews have better defi ned the triggers for upgrading fi re fi ghting responses to escalating bushfi res.

Nevertheless, there are defi ciencies in the Plan which undermine its effective implementation in major bushfi re emergencies. These defi ciencies include the lack of support for the Plan through either bushfi re management or emergency management legislation, or alternatively, as a component of an integrated and actively supported planning framework:

Unclear local government support

FESA and CALM developed the Plan but the extent to which individual local governments endorse or support the Plan is unclear; no local government is a signatory to the Plan.

22 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

Lacks authority to implement

As Western Australia has no emergency management legislation, there is no authoritative basis established to make certain the Plan is implemented. This has a number of implications operationally, during a bushﬁ re emergency, as well as in planning for bushﬁ res. For example:

The Plan outlines the means for managing a number of major bushﬁ res across a region. This includes the appointment, through a consultative process between FESA, CALM and local governments, of an Operations Area Manager to monitor and coordinate operational priorities and resource needs. However, FESA and local governments do not have the legislative authority to carry out this role. While CALM is able to strategically manage priorities and resources across regions, this is limited to ﬁ res burning on or near CALM controlled land.

The effectiveness of the Plan relies on lower level planning being established, reliable, and up-to-date, however there are wide variations in the extent to which lower level planning is undertaken. Lower level planning includes developing bushfi re response plans and establishing emergency management arrangements. Bushfi re response plans should be formulated at brigade, local government, district and regional levels. Plans should contain operational and logistical information such as contact details of brigade members, machinery operators, FESA and CALM personnel, descriptions and locations of high bushfi re risk areas and residential areas, maps, the protocols for fi re duty rosters and ‘calling out’ of brigades, mobilisation plans across districts, and where to source local supplies. Emergency management arrangements at local levels are the responsibility of the Local Emergency Management Committee, which is chaired by the local government nominee. Emergency management arrangements should include evacuation procedures and the designation of safe areas, broadcasting of public information, and alerting hospitals and medical services.

No supporting telecommunication plans

The Plan cites the importance of good communication between local, district and regional authorities at all times, to enable accurate intelligence and timely application of resources to manage the emergency. However, there is no compatible radio system across emergency service organisations (eg across FESA, St Johns Ambulance and Police) and there are no inter-agency telecommunication plans and procedures which detail how the necessary links between emergency services should be established during a bushﬁ re emergency.

Variable uptake of required incident management system

The Plan states that a uniform incident management system is crucial to effectively managing a bushfi re emergency, yet the uptake of this system across fi re fi ghting organisations varies widely.

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 23 Fire Fighting Organisations Need to be Better Prepared

When confronted with major bushfi res, fi refi ghter safety and effectiveness depends on being adequately prepared. This includes ensuring all personnel are familiar with the same system for managing a bushfi re, that they are well trained, and that there are plans in place for responding to the bushfi re emergency. It also includes ensuring telecommunication plans and systems are reliable, and appropriate fi re fi ghting equipment is available.

Findings and recommendations

Findings The Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS) has been adopted by the State ﬁ re ﬁ ghting authorities in Western Australia and throughout Australia, however, its adoption at local government level is varied, with some local government brigades fully embracing it, and others not.

There are training and development issues which need to be addressed across all ﬁ re ﬁ ghting organisations:

there are barriers to the take-up of training by volunteers which impacts on volunteer safety during major bushﬁ res

CALM faces challenges in maintaining its current level of trained staff

FESA needs to ensure it has sufﬁ cient staff to effectively assume control of major bushﬁ res, if requested.

Major bushfi res have exposed local level planning weaknesses which have reduced the effectiveness of fi re fi ghting efforts.

Problems with telecommunications systems across organisations have hampered effective operations.

The adequacy of volunteer appliances and equipment could not be determined, as the model for determining resource need based on bushﬁ re risk, has not been systematically applied across all local governments.

CALM relies on heavy machinery contractors to support its fi re fi ghting capability and while past shortfalls in availability have been rectifi ed, consistent monitoring is needed to avoid this happening again.

24 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

Recommendations FESA should, in addition to its current initiatives, develop and implement structured programs (with clearly identiﬁ ed objectives, target groups and time lines for achievement) aimed at:

increasing the level of adoption of AIIMS by local governments and volunteer Bush Fire Brigades

improving local government bushﬁ re emergency and response planning.

Fire ﬁ ghting organisations should address their training and development issues.

Fire ﬁ ghting organisations should resolve telecommunication problems and work with other emergency service organisations to establish compatible telecommunication systems.

FESA should continue to identify and remedy any under-resourcing of brigade appliances and equipment while the risk based model for allocating resources is being ﬁ nalised.

CALM should systematically evaluate its heavy machinery capability, and in particular the ability of heavy machinery contractors to provide a timely response to bushﬁ re incidents on an ongoing basis.

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 25 FIRE FIGHTING ORGANISATION NEED TO BE BETTER PREPARED (continued)

The Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System needs to be uniformly established An incident management system is an emergency management structure for directing personnel and managing resources during emergencies. In bushﬁ res, an incident management system is critical for the safe and effective management of the ﬁ re.

The Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS) was developed because of identifi ed weaknesses in previous systems used for controlling bushfi res. It is endorsed and promoted by the Australasian Fire Authorities Council, the peak body representing fi re authorities throughout Australasia (Figure 4).

While FESA and CALM have adopted AIIMS, the level of adoption among volunteer Bush Fire Brigades varies widely. This is refl ected in the varied levels of training in AIIMS undertaken by fi re control offi cers. FESA, as the principal training provider, recommends that, as a minimum, one fi re control offi cer in each local government area should be trained in AIIMS. However, FESA reports that of the 91 local governments where data are available (out of 93 in the south west land division):

37 (41 per cent) do not have any ﬁ re control ofﬁ cers who are trained in AIIMS

32 (35 per cent) have between one and three ﬁ re control ofﬁ cers who are trained in AIIMS

22 (24 per cent) have four or more ﬁ re control ofﬁ cers who are trained in AIIMS – with some local governments having up to 12.

Ideally, all volunteers should be familiar with AIIMS and how it is implemented during major bushfi res. The lack of a uniform system across all fi re fi ghting organisations has caused operational problems whereby fi re fi ghters were placed at greater risk, and the effectiveness of operations was hampered.

Analysis of the 12 selected incident reports identiﬁ ed the following issues:

people did not pass through a checkpoint, which resulted in the Incident Management Team not knowing their whereabouts (an extremely dangerous situation)

no formal strategies or plans were developed for containing the ﬁ re – people made their own decisions about how they should attack the ﬁ re

standard procedures for assigning roles and responsibilities were not adhered to, and people individually determined ﬁ re ﬁ ghting priorities

fi re fi ghters responsible for managing the fi re were not identifi ed

communications from the ﬁ re ground to the Controller were not maintained.

26 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

The critical importance of AIIMS in ensuring an effective bushfi re emergency response has been stressed by recent inquiries into the management of bushfi res in other parts of Australia. The reports of these inquiries note that while less formal systems for fi re fi ghting may suffi ce for smaller incidents, their inherent weaknesses will be exposed under the pressure of major bushfi res.

For example, in the Report of the Investigation and Inquests into a Wildfi re and the Deaths of Five Firefi ghters at Linton on 2 December 1998, the Victorian Coroner noted the operation of two systems during the fi re – AIIMS and the old Group System. He regarded the failure by all fi re fi ghting organisations to adopt a single incident management system, specifi cally AIIMS, as one of the factors leading to the deaths of these fi refi ghters.

The report of the Inquiry into the 2002-03 Victorian Bushfi res, commented on the Victorian Coroner’s 1998 fi ndings, and concluded that, as a matter of urgency, the Country Fire Authority and its volunteer groups must work together to fi nalise the integration of AIIMS into their management of bushfi res.

The Inquiry into the Operational Response to the January 2003 Bushfi res in the ACT noted a lack of clarity over the roles and responsibilities of the people in charge of managing the fi res. Recommendations included greater integration of the AIIMS across the ACT Bushfi re Service, land managers, and the ACT Fire Brigade.

THE AUSTRALIAN INTER-SERVICE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Incident Controller Responsible for overall incident control

Planning Operations Logistics monitoring and predicting developing specifi c ensuring the necessary bushfi re behaviour strategies and tactics in facilities and services monitoring and analysing line with the Action Plan are available – ground the need for resources managing and supervising and air support, supplies, communication, equipment turning broad strategies combat forces on the fi re ground catering, medical assistance, into an Action Plan fi nancial functions

Figure 4: The Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System

Source: The Australasian Fire Authorities Council

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 27 FIRE FIGHTING ORGANISATION NEED TO BE BETTER PREPARED (continued)

IMPLEMENTING AIIMS IN MAJOR BUSHFIRES

A major bushfi re is a high risk phenomenon. It can behave very erratically, and is potentially devastating. The fi rst few hours can be chaotic. The need for a system for managing the fi re is critical. Under the Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS), the Incident Controller is responsible for bringing together a team to take control of the fi re and has overall responsibility for managing the incident.

The initial tasks for the team are threefold:

To gather intelligence on the bushﬁ re itself: its size, how quickly it is spreading, where the ﬁ re perimeter is, and what is, or could be under threat (homes, livestock, communications infrastructure, ecologically sensitive areas) and to communicate this information.

To best apply existing ﬁ re ﬁ ghting resources, and to determine what else is needed.

To quickly obtain the support needed to sustain the ﬁ reﬁ ghting effort.

The Incident Controller prepares objectives for controlling the fi re, and these form the basis for subsequent action plans. The fi re will be divided into sectors, with commanders and crews assigned to each sector. Their job is to implement the strategies and tactics that will ensure the objectives are achieved – clear a section of vegetation to reduce fuel, back burn against a track or road to establish a fi re break, or protect houses from the fi re.

Accurate maps and local knowledge of the area are needed to help determine how the fi re is likely to behave, where houses are located, and where the fi re can be attacked. Effective communication systems are essential to gather intelligence and to give directions. Welfare, transport and other requirements are coordinated to maintain the momentum of the suppression endeavours. Underpinning all activities is the focus on the safety of all fi re fi ghters and the public.

A major bushﬁ re can take days or even weeks to bring under control. Work continues around the clock, 24 hours a day. Teams are rotated on and off shift ensuring fresh and alert people are always available. AIIMS provides the means by which everything that needs to happen can be addressed, and the community protected from the ravages of bushﬁ re.

Source: CALM

28 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

Training and development issues need to be addressed

There are barriers to the take-up of training by volunteers which impacts on volunteer safety during major bushfires FESA training records indicate that, while there are variations across the south west land division, overall, the uptake of training by volunteers needs to be increased.

Many volunteers have built up skills and competencies through the experience of attending bushfi res, and are effective in combating most fi res. However, most bushfi res do not escalate to become major bushfi res. When this does occur, all fi re fi ghters require a high level of skill to maintain their own safety. Few volunteers have had suffi cient exposure to major bushfi res to provide them with this level of experience.

Since 1999 FESA has had the State-wide responsibility for supporting and advising local governments on bushfi re management issues including volunteer brigade training. As part of this responsibility, FESA has developed ‘brigade profi ling’ to better match the type of training provided to volunteers to the type of bushfi res they may face. For example, volunteers fi ghting bushfi res in urban-rural areas need a different type of training to volunteers in farming areas. In total, there are seven different types of brigade profi les developed by FESA. Each profi le has a set of recommended minimum and target training levels.

FESA advises that approximately half of the 93 local governments in the south west land division have indicated their acceptance of the profi ling policy in principle. However, FESA does not maintain training records which relate profi le type to volunteer training. FESA is therefore unable to determine the extent to which volunteers have undertaken the type of training needed according to the profi le.

FESA should undertake a systematic analysis of volunteer training needs and gaps according to their brigade proﬁ le. FESA should then develop and implement a targeted training program to address these gaps, which should also include establishing clear objectives and measuring the achievement of these objectives.

While systematic analysis of training levels according to brigade proﬁ les is not possible, an analysis of individual training records undertaken by FESA, reveals that there is a relatively low level of training among volunteers. Of particular concern is the rural, but nonetheless high risk areas of the south west land division.

Volunteer training is a problem which faces all jurisdictions across Australia, and is a complex issue to resolve. There are signiﬁ cant barriers to take-up of training among volunteers, relating to the time and ﬁ nancial loss that they can experience when undertaking training. There are also divergent views among volunteers about the perceived need to undertake training. For these reasons FESA has been cautious about introducing system-wide changes to volunteer training too quickly.

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 29 FIRE FIGHTING ORGANISATION NEED TO BE BETTER PREPARED (continued)

Notwithstanding these considerations, FESA shares the responsibility, along with local governments and CALM, for not only ensuring that the community’s welfare is safeguarded against bushfi res, but also that the welfare of volunteers is safeguarded when fi ghting bushfi res. For this reason FESA, as the principal training provider and adviser to local governments, needs to progress training issues more urgently and purposefully. In particular, FESA needs to ensure local governments and volunteer brigades are fully informed of the risks of not having trained and experienced CBFCOs in control of bushfi res, and of not having volunteers adequately trained in fi ghting the larger and more dangerous fi res they may face.

CALM has a well developed training regime, but faces future human resource challenges CALM currently has suffi cient trained staff and fi re fi ghting crews to manage the type and number of bushfi res typical of most bushfi re seasons.

Bushfi re fi ghting personnel include both incident management staff and bushfi re crews:

Managing a bushfi re incident, through the AIIMS structure, is performed by fi re management staff, and other CALM staff who ‘double-up’ on their normal positions (eg conservation offi cers, administrative offi cers) when needed.

CALM’s fi re crews combat bushfi res during the fi re season and are also involved in prescribed burning programs at other times of the year.

Forest Products Commission (FPC) staff form an integral part of CALM’s fi re fi ghting capability, comprising 22 per cent of CALM’s total contingent of fi re management staff, in 2003-04. CALM also relies on local government volunteer Bush Fire Brigades who routinely supplement CALM crews and may also perform management roles.

All CALM and FPC fi re personnel have assigned to them a rating which indicates if they are fi t for fi re duties, and what sort of role they are competent to perform. This rating is only assigned if they have undertaken training and had their fi tness level assessed. No CALM or FPC staff are permitted to engage in fi re duties without adequate training. Incident management staff are also assigned a rating to indicate their competency for managing small, medium or major bushfi res.

The number of personnel needed to fi ll roles within the management team of AIIMS has been determined by CALM based on scenario planning: three major incidents occurring simultaneously would require 50 trained personnel for each incident, in order to fully implement AIIMS for one shift. Six air operations offi cers to coordinate water bombing operations across the three incidents would also be needed. A major incident requires two shifts. Therefore, 312 personnel (in addition to fi re crews) are required to fi ll all the functions within AIIMS in the event of this type of bushfi re emergency.

30 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

CALM has developed benchmarks for the minimum number of trained fi re crews required in the south west forest regions. These benchmarks have been derived from a model of bushfi re risk developed for each region. The models are based on the location of fi re-vulnerable forests and conservation areas, bushfi re history, the type and age of fuel, and a range of other risk factors.

The 2002-03 bushfi res severely strained both fi re crews and AIIMS teams, when lightning strikes caused multiple, major bushfi res during the same period. Crew numbers were insuffi cient, and while the major AIIMS roles were fi lled in most fi res, many of the minor roles were not able to be fi lled.

A subsequent review of the fi re models by CALM has resulted in additional funding of $3 million for 2003-04 (with further allocations for fi re services approved until 2007-08). This is being used, in part, to appoint extra fi re fi ghting crew members. Similarly, further training of CALM staff means that, except for three minor roles, CALM now has suffi cient trained staff to fi ll the AIIMS roles considered necessary under the three major bushfi re incidents scenario.

However, CALM faces future challenges in maintaining adequately trained staff. These include:

the age demographic of ﬁ re ﬁ ghting crews – in 2002, 51 per cent were aged 45 years and over, and in the Swan coastal region 54 per cent were aged 50 years and over

a general reliance on FPC staff and local government volunteer Bush Fire Brigades to supplement AIIMS roles and ﬁ re crews

the time it takes to train senior level incident controllers – up to 10 years for experienced forest ﬁ re incident controllers

long-term fatigue – some staff and crews attend bushﬁ res season after season, in addition to prescribed burning duties in cooler months.

CALM is aware of these issues and is taking some actions to address them (such as mentoring programs and initiatives aimed at reducing fatigue). However, these problems are challenging and long-term. Given CALM’s key bushfi re fi ghting role in the south west, it needs to implement targeted action plans to ensure the State’s future bushfi re fi ghting capability in this region is not weakened.

FESA needs to ensure it has sufficient staff to effectively assume control of major bushfires FESA has offi cers well trained in incident control and a review of individual training records indicates FESA offi cers are continuously updating their skills and knowledge in bushfi re management. For many FESA offi cers their skills and knowledge are further enhanced through their role as trainers, delivering training programs to volunteers.

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 31 FIRE FIGHTING ORGANISATION NEED TO BE BETTER PREPARED (continued)

Experience in applying these skills and knowledge is afforded by:

acting in an advisory role to local government controlled ﬁ res

State-wide deployments during major bushfi res, which range from the very large bushfi res which occur in the Kimberley region to smaller but very intense bushfi res on the urban rural fringe

providing specialised personnel to assist with the management of major bushﬁ res such as taskforce commanders and aerial reconnaissance ofﬁ cers.

Up until 2002 FESA did not have the authority to take control of a bushfi re, and performed a supporting role only to CBFCOs by advising on strategies and tactics in combating the bushfi re. Amendments to the Act in 2002 expanded this role, by giving FESA the discretionary authority to take over the control of a bushfi re, if requested by a local government.

While taking over the control of a major incident involves providing an Incident Controller, it may also require FESA to provide further staff to supplement the local Incident Management Team. Given the relatively low level of training in AIIMS among Bush Fire Brigades in some areas, providing only an Incident Controller is unlikely to be sufﬁ cient to assume effective control.

FESA estimates it has suffi cient staff, drawn from Bush Fires Services, Fire and Rescue Services and the State Emergency Service to fi ll the critical positions in AIIMS incident management teams for at least fi ve major bushfi res, if requested to do so. However, currently, FESA does not have the systems in place to confi rm that this is the case. This is partly due to the current systems not adequately capturing and updating all recently completed course work and peer reviewed competency assessments.

FESA has recognised this issue, and has recommended an internal review be undertaken to identify whether any competency gaps exist and for remedial action to be taken, if necessary.

FESA needs to complete this review as a matter of urgency to provide positive assurance it has suffi cient offi cers with both the experience and training to take over the control of major bushfi res. In conducting the review FESA should ensure the principal AIIMS roles can be fi lled during multiple major bushfi res, taking into account the existing capacity of Bush Fire Brigades.

32 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

Major bushfires have exposed weaknesses in planning Inconsistencies in local level planning have hampered both ﬁ re ﬁ ghting and emergency management operations.

Planning for bushfi res means ensuring the resources, information, and communication technology used in fi ghting fi res are established, reliable and up-to-date. It also means establishing emergency management procedures for managing evacuations and road closures, and broadcasting information to the public.

Plans are not only essential to support an effective response to a local bushfi re emergency, they also underpin the State level plan for dealing with a bushfi re emergency, Westplan Wildfi re. Therefore, defi ciencies in local plans result in gaps in Westplan Wildfi re, limiting the State’s ability to cope with a large scale bushfi re emergency.

The demands of fi ghting major bushfi res have exposed local level planning weaknesses. The examination’s analysis of the 12 selected incident reports identifi ed the following issues:

a lack of, or a poorly equipped incident control centre from which to manage the incident

a scarcity of local personnel available to provide the Incident Management Team with vital local knowledge of the area, because many of them were physically ﬁ ghting the ﬁ re

problems with broadcasting and disseminating public information, and liaising with media representatives

problems concerning who is responsible for road closures and lack of agreement between Police and ﬁ re ﬁ ghting organisations over the need for road closures

lack of evacuation procedures and the inability to communicate with emergency services personnel

problems with availability of experienced or trained machinery operators

lack of appropriate maps for use in managing a bushﬁ re (eg not available for the relevant area, inadequate scale to read detail, and roads, tracks and important geographical features not shown)

problems with telecommunication systems.

Bushfi re response planning will not prevent problems from emerging during major bushfi res, nonetheless they provide the foundation for a sound fi re fi ghting response. While the type and detail of information will vary according to the level of bushfi re risk, information should be included on:

the areas vulnerable to bushﬁ re threat under the range of weather conditions likely to prevail

fuel levels, vegetation types, ﬁ re breaks and strategic buffers

contact details of relevant personnel, such as heavy machinery operators, local FESA and CALM staff, and brigades in neighbouring local government areas

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 33 FIRE FIGHTING ORGANISATION NEED TO BE BETTER PREPARED (continued)

the type and number of resources required in the initial dispatch to a bushﬁ re

suitable locations for establishing control points.

FESA has identifi ed an inconsistent approach to bushfi re response planning across local governments. In many instances planning is minimal, or the plans do not contain the detail required. FESA recognises there are diffi culties for local governments in formulating plans, including the lack of resource capability to develop and update them regularly. FESA has commenced a number of separate initiatives to assist local governments in preparing for bushfi res. FESA needs to progress these initiatives on a more rigorous basis.

Telecommunication problems have hampered effective operations Telecommunications include radios and mobile telephones, and the infrastructure to support these devices such as radio repeaters. Telecommunications are vital in ﬁ ghting bushﬁ res, yet problems were raised in the majority of the 12 post incident analysis reports reviewed:

overloading of radio and mobile phone networks and ‘blackspots’ in the network coverage

breakdown of the telecommunication system because of power failure to the radio repeater, lack of maintenance to the repeater, and lack of procedures for substituting a standby mobile repeater

inadequate protocols, or not following established protocols for changing radio channels and therefore not receiving some radio communications

confusion over call signs

lack of compatibility in radio equipment mainly between ﬁ re ﬁ ghting organisations on the one hand, and volunteers using their own vehicles.

In a major bushfi re north of Perth recently, a volunteer fi re fi ghter was killed when the appliance he was travelling on, was involved in a vehicle collision. The State Coroner ruled this tragedy an accident. However, he noted that the loss of the radio repeater “…signifi cantly disrupted communications prior to the fatal collision” and recommended the need for a maintenance program for radio repeaters and contingency planning in the event of the main repeater failing.

34 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

Telecommunications across the emergency services Across the emergency services there is no single telecommunication system. Fire fi ghting organisations, Police and the ambulance service all use different technologies and cannot communicate easily with one another. In an emergency, the local, district or regional Police Offi cer-in-Charge is the designated Emergency Coordinator. Yet the inability of Police to contact the Incident Management Team responsible for managing the bushfi re itself was raised in two of the incident reports reviewed. In one case this caused confusion over evacuation procedures and access to safe areas.

The inability of the various emergency service organisations to communicate with each other, due to incompatible systems, was also identiﬁ ed as a critical issue in a recent government survey (“Telecommunications Needs Assessment: The communications needs of regional Western Australians”, July 2003). The report notes:

“The heavy reliance on two-way and CB radio creates a problem of compatibility with the different emergency service providers. Councils indicated the inability to communicate via the two-way or CB radio with ﬁ re, police, hospital or ambulance during an emergency restricted their ability to launch a coordinated response.”

Westplan Wildfi re (the State’s bushfi re Emergency Management Plan) has no supporting telecommunication plans to address these critical issues. In some areas, across emergency service communication issues are being addressed at a local level. However, this is an issue which needs to be addressed at a State level, in order for Western Australia to be adequately prepared for major bushfi res, as well as other types of emergencies.

Shortfalls in appliances and equipment are being attended to

The adequacy of volunteer brigade resources is being addressed The resource capability of local government volunteer brigades is now addressed through the Emergency Services Levy which funds the purchase of appliances and equipment. However, actual levels of under or over-resourcing of volunteer appliances and equipment is not able be determined at this stage because the model for allocating resources, based on bushﬁ re risk, has not yet been systematically applied across local governments.

Appliances and equipment used by volunteer fi re fi ghters are either local government owned or privately owned. In harvesting areas, private landowners are required by the Act to maintain their own fi re fi ghting capability (typically a portable fi re fi ghting unit which can be attached to the tray of a small truck). These types of appliances are used by volunteer fi re fi ghters/landowners to fi ght bushfi res on their own land, and throughout their districts, assisting other landowners. For example, during the Tenterden bushfi re in December 2003, of the approximately 130 fi re fi ghting appliances present at the fi re, approximately 124

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 35 FIRE FIGHTING ORGANISATION NEED TO BE BETTER PREPARED (continued)

were privately owned by volunteer ﬁ re ﬁ ghters. In non-harvesting areas, appliances are generally owned by the local government.

Prior to the Emergency Services Levy (ESL), the purchase of fi re fi ghting appliances was driven by local priorities, and relied in part on fundraising and local government fi nancial support. The introduction of the ESL in 2003 represented a signifi cant milestone in resource allocation. It enables more equitable and transparent funding of brigades and, given that appliance allocation is based on a 10 to 16 year replacement program, provides a level of certainty about future resource levels.

Under the new arrangements appliances and equipment required by volunteer brigades are allocated through FESA. At present, the method used by FESA for determining the allocation is based on existing brigade resource levels and projected need.

However, while FESA has identifi ed shortfalls in appliances and equipment using this method, this approach does not provide suffi cient assurance that resource levels are matched to the level of bushfi re risk. To do this a more systematic ‘resource to risk’ model is required. FESA has developed such a model and is applying it in the current round of resource allocations where:

there is an obvious discrepancy in sensible allocation of resource types and placement, such as an extensive numbers of brigades and resources, or where resources appear to be inadequate to deal with the perceived risk

local governments have made a request

a dispute or appeals assessment has been made.

However, FESA advises it may take several years before the model is applied systematically and appliances and equipment are allocated across all local governments on this basis.

Multiple bushfires exposed a shortfall in CALM heavy machinery CALM relies on both CALM owned appliances, heavy machinery and equipment, and heavy machinery contracted from the private sector to ﬁ ght bushﬁ res.

During the 2002-03 ﬁ re season CALM experienced shortfalls in the availability of heavy machinery such as bulldozers. This adversely impacted on CALM’s response to some ﬁ res during the season. On four occasions in 2002-03 CALM was unable to access heavy machinery in a timely manner.

On one occasion, two fi res burning simultaneously both escalated to more than 200 hectares because machinery was not available. At Mount Cooke a delay of up to 12 hours in accessing three bulldozers was a contributing factor in the fi re escalating into a very intense fi re which burnt out approximately 18 000 hectares. CALM advises that the fi re could have been contained to less than 100 hectares had machinery been immediately available.

36 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA RESPONDING TO MAJOR BUSHFIRES

CALM has now addressed the identiﬁ ed shortfall by placing additional heavy machinery under contract.

However, despite this resolution, the availability of contracted machinery throughout the south west will remain an issue. One reason for this is that more heavy machinery now has to be sourced from non-forest areas, such as farming areas. This means extra time is required before responding to the ﬁ re, as not only does the machine have to be transported some distance to reach the south west forest regions, but then it has to be cleaned prior to being used, in case of dieback contamination. CALM will need to continue to monitor the ability of heavy machinery contractors to provide a timely response to bushﬁ re incidents throughout the season.

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 37 Previous Reports of the Auditor General

2001 Sale of the Gas Corporation’s Businesses (Special Report) February 14, 2001 On-line and Length? – Provision and Use of Learning Technologies in Government Schools May 23, 2001 Implementing and Managing Community Based Sentences May 30, 2001 Public Sector Performance Report, 2001 June 20, 2001 – Administration of Legislation – Financial and Management Control Issues – Follow-up Examination: Listen and Learn Report on Public Universities and TAFE Colleges – 2000 annual reporting cycle June 20, 2001 Lifting the Rating: Stroke Management in Western Australia August 22, 2001 Good Housekeeping: Facilities Management of Government Property and Buildings August 29, 2001 Second Public Sector Performance Report 2001 September 19, 2001 – Management, Compliance and Control Issues – Follow-up Performance Examinations Righting the Wrongs: Complaints Management in the Western Australian Public Sector October 17, 2001 Third Public Sector Performance Report 2001 November 7, 2001 – Appointment and Use of Contract Staff – Management of Mobile Phones in Government – Ombudsman’s Statistics and Complaints Automated Register Project – The Perth Convention Centre Life Matters: Management of Deliberate Self-Harm in Young People November 28, 2001 First Byte: Consortium IT Contracting in the Western Australian Public Sector December 5, 2001 Report on Ministerial Portfolios at November 30, 2001 – Summary of Audit Results – Accounting and Contemporary Issues – Summary Results of Agency Audits December 19, 2001 2002 Level Pegging: Managing Mineral Titles in Western Australia June 19, 2002 Report on Public Universities and TAFE Colleges and of other Ministerial Portfolio Agencies for 2001 August 14, 2002 A Critical Resource: Nursing Shortages and the Use of Agency Nurses August 14, 2002 Public Sector Performance Report 2002 September 25, 2002 – Agency Management of Fringe Beneﬁ ts Tax – Common Use Contracts in Government – Procurement of Medical Equipment – Follow-up Performance Examination A Measure of Protection: Management and Effectiveness of Restraining Orders October 16, 2002 Grounds for Improvement: Government Owned or Controlled Contaminated Sites November 13, 2002 Management of Hospital Special Purpose Accounts November 27, 2002 Second Public Sector Performance Report 2002 December 4, 2002 – Management of Conﬁ dential – Personal Information in Government Electronic Databases – Management of Intellectual Property by the Department of Agriculture – Performance Examination: Family Centres Report on Ministerial Portfolios at November 29, 2002 December 11, 2002

38 AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 2003 Customer Calling: Call Centres and the Delivery of Customer Beneﬁ ts April 2, 2003 Contracting Not-For-Proﬁ t Organisations for Delivery of Health Services April 16, 2003 Supplementary Report on Ministerial Portfolio Agency Audits for 2001-02, primarily the Public Health Sector June 11, 2003 Public Sector Performance Report June 25, 2003 – Management of Marine Safety and Seas Search and Rescue – Regulation of the Taxi Industry and Small Charter Vehicles – Security of the Government Internet Gateway Report on Public Universities and TAFE Colleges for 2002 August 13, 2003 Balancing Act: The Leasing of Government Assets September 17, 2003 Second Public Sector Performance Report 2003 September 24, 2003 – Management of Water Resources in Western Australia – Regulation of Gaming and Wagering in Western Australia – Planning and Monitoring Vocational Education and Training in Western Australia A Roof Over Our Heads: Maintenance of Public Housing October 29, 2003 Turning the Tide: The Business Sustainability of the Rottnest Island Authority November 26, 2003 Report on Ministerial Portfolios at November 25, 2003 December 3, 2003 Patients Waiting: Access to Elective Surgery in Western Australia December 9, 2003 2004 Public Sector Performance Report 2004 – Investigation of Breaches of Industrial Laws – The Regulation of Human Organ and Tissue Removal – Computer Anti-Virus Management – Internal Audit in Government Agencies – Management of Tree Plantations – Follow-up Performance Examination: Surrender Arms? May 5, 2004 Report on Universities and TAFE Colleges and other audits completed since November 25, 2003 June 2, 2004 Administration of Superannuation June 30, 2004 Second Public Sector Performance Report June 30, 2004 – Management of Food Safety in Western Australia by the Department of Health – Records Management in Government – The Administration of Grants – Follow-up Performance Examination: A Tough Assignment Developing the State: The Management of State Agreement Acts June 30, 2004 Third Public Sector Performance Report 2004 September 22, 2004 – Setting Fees – The Extent of Cost Recovery – Management of Western Australian Government Corporate Credit Cards

The above reports can be accessed on the Office of the Auditor General’s website at www.audit.wa.gov.au/

On request these reports may be made available in an alternative format for those with visual impairment.

AUDITOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA 39