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Whiteman Air Force Base, Minuteman HAER No. M0-88 Missile Launch Facility Trainer T-12 (Whiteman Air Force Base, Facility 1100) Northeast of Oscar-01 Missile Alert Facility '~&m.,,..A,,L;r_J'3? r c. e ..~.B as e Johnson County Vicinity of Knob Noster Missouri PHOTOGRAPHS WRITTEN HISTORICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE DATA REDUCED COPIES OF MEASURED DRAWINGS HISTORIC AMERICAN ENGINEERING RECORD Rocky Mountain System Support Office National Park Service P.O. Box 25287 Denver, Colorado 80225-0287 HISTORIC AMERICAN ENGINEERING RECORD Whiteman Air Force Base, Minuteman Missile Launch Facility Trainer T-12 (Whiteman Air Force Base, Facility 1100) HAER No. M0-88 Location: Northeast of Oscar-01 Missile Alert Facility Whiteman Air Force Base Vicinity of Knob Noster Johnson County Missouri Construction Date: 1967 Owner: U;S. Air Force Historic Use: Minuteman Missile Launch Facility Trainer Present Use: Abandoned Significance: Cold War missile development in the United States led to the necessity for a more rapid, yet economic system of retaliation than provided in the earlier Atlas and Titan systems. The Air Force found the solution in the Minuteman series, a solid-fuel missile that could be launched from a remote center having control over a network of silos spread over a wide geographical area. The Launch Facility Trainer (LFT), replicating a silo in the field, provided a full-scale model where some 400 missile maintenance personnel honed their skills in both routine and emergency procedures vital to the readiness of the system. Prepared by: Douglas McChristian Historian, Fort Laramie National Historic Site, Wyoming Date: December 1996 HAER No. M0-88 Page2 Introduction For nearly half a century the United States and the Soviet Union were poised in a deadly contest that risked the very future of the human race. From the end of World War II until the collapse of communism in 1991, the so-called superpowers stood at the brink of nuclear holocaust. Knowing full-well the consequences of such a conflict, the opponents confronted each other in a test of wills, each side combining technological advancements with the economic muscle to implement increasingly complex and effective weapons in the hope of gaining superiority. The era witnessed the creation of nuclear weapons with unparalleled capability for mass destruction. More than an arms rac_e, it was a "cold war" of political and geographical maneuvering, of espionage and the threat of the use of arms. Hanging in this delicate balance was the pervading fear of nuclear Armageddon. Almost from its inception in the wake of the 1917 Russian Revolution, the Soviet communistic system posed a subtle ideological and economic threat to the Western world. Yet it went widely unrecognized among political leaders in the West, and even less so among the general populace. For a time prior to World War II, the newly-created Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) witnessed almost continual internal power struggles during the formative period of societal restructuring. Thus preoccupied at home, the Soviets were in no position to actively extend their doctrine beyond their own borders for nearly two decades. Nevertheless, the essential differences between the philosophies represented in capitalistic and communistic systems polarized Eastern and Western nations, thereby setting the stage for an inevitable collision. While an armed conflict might have resulted in any event, German chancellor Adolph Hitler hastened war from another quarter with his own quest for global supremacy in the late 1930s. Germany's military alliances with Italy and Japan accelerated a collective plan for world conquest with alarming rapidity. An overly-confident Hitler violated his earlier non-aggression treaty with Russia and in so doing created for himself a two-front war. This proved to be a fatal strategic error. By taking on both the free world and the communists simultaneously, and especially by underestimating the strength and resolve of the Soviets, Hitler all but sealed his own fate. The Cold War that developed after 1945 had its origins in the so-called Grand Alliance among Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. With both the Russians and the western allies threatened by a common enemy, the two sides combined resources in a partnership that was as tenuous as it was unnatural. Nevertheless, Hitler's lust for world domination was perceived among many in the West as an evil infmitely greater than that posed by the communists at the time. The Allies were therefore willing to risk entering into what all of the leaders recognized was merely a marriage of convenience for the purpose of prosecuting an exhaustive war against Germany. Sometimes stormy, always mutually mistrustful, the relationship barely survived the duration of the war. Cooling of U.S.- Soviet Relations The smoldering mistrust between the western powers and the Soviet Union became openly evident shortly after the Allied victory in 1945. Although the Americans had embarked upon a nuclear research program on the eve of the war, they had avoided sharing this information with the Russians, whereas the British were kept fully apprised of U.S. progress in this field. When in July 1945, American scientists HAER No. M0-88 Page3 secretly reported to President Harry S. Truman that they had developed an atomic bomb - one that worked - Truman chose not to inform the Soviets. Hedging his bets for the post-war era, Truman confided, "I'll certainly have a hammer on those boys." 1 Truman's secrecy was based on the premise that a confrontation with the Soviets was only a matter of time, and that sole possession of the bomb would be a trump card in the hands of the British and Americans. Truman and his close advisors reasoned that the Soviets could be controlled by the knowledge that the Americans not only possessed such a weapon, but also had the fortitude to use it. Although it was not revealed at the time, this was key to Truman's decision to use the nuclear device against Japan. Dropping the bomb would at once end the war, saving many American lives - and it would send an unequivocal message to the Russians. Within a month after the successful detonation of a test device, a lone B-29 bomber winged its way over Hiroshima, Japan to drop the first of two atomic bombs. Nagasaki shared a similar fate a few days later. Predictably, the awesome power of the bombs, coupled with a latent Russian declaration of war against Japan, finally convinced the Japanese that further resistance was pointless. The Russians were dumbfounded that their allies possessed such unheard-of power. The Soviets, now extremely vulnerable, considered themselves betrayed by the United States for having withheld such critical information. The lines were clearly drawn for future relations. Following the formal surrender of Japan just weeks later, the wartime alliance quickly dissolved. Fearing for the security of his own nation, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin directed his scientists to, "Provide us with atomic weapons in the shortest possible time ... The balance has been destroyed. Provide the bomb ... it will remove a great danger from us. "2 Chilling as Stalin's announcement may have been, United States military and political advisors scoffed at his ability to actually produce an atomic bomb. Some American scientists joked that, "the Russians could not surreptitiously introduce nuclear bombs into the United States because they had not yet been able to perfect a suitcase. "3 Many American scientists predicted that the Russians were still five to fifteen years away from developing an atomic bomb of their own. There was concern early on in the West that atomic weapons should be controlled lest they fall into the wrong hands, namely those of the Soviet Union. The newly-formed United Nations briefly considered a U.S.-backed plan, known as the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal, calling for a measured transition to international control of nuclear technology and weapons production. While the theory may have been sound enough, the practicality of the plan was questioned by Bernard Baruch, American delegate to the 1 John F. Lauber and Jeffrey A. Hess, Glenn L. Martin Company Titan Test Facilities, Denver, Colorado. (Minneapolis: Hess, Roise, and Co., 1993), p. 10 (hereafter cited as Martin Test Facilities). 2 Karen Lewis, Katherine J. Roxlau, et. al., "Historic Context and Methodology for Assessment." A Systemic Study of Air Combat Command Cold War Material Culture. (Fort Worth: U.S. Air Force: 1995), Vol. I, p. 27 (hereinafter cited as, Systemic Study of ACC Material Culture with volume number). 3 Lauber and Hess, Martin Test Facilitie~ pp. 15-16. HAER No. M0-88 Page4 U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. Baruch feared that the Soviets, who possessed an all-powerful veto on the Security Council, would nullify any attempts to inspect their facilities. Too, Baruch was concerned that the Soviets had far more to gain initially by such an agreement, since the United States would be obligated to share its hard-earned classified research. Influenced by Baruch's convincing arguments against the plan, President Truman finally responded that, "We should not under any circumstances give away our gun until we are sure the rest of the world can't arm against us. "4 Baruch subsequently offered an alternative proposal founded upon the same premise of international control. But, there would be no vetoes, thus ensuring openness by both sides. Predictably, the Russians rejected the plan and pressed forward in their program to develop an atomic bomb of their own. Meantime, the Americans secretly began work on an even more powerful hydrogen bomb that Truman calculated would be in place to negate the Soviet's atom bomb. The stage was thus set for an escalating arms race. Fueling the post-war military situation was the vacuum of a collapsed European economy left temporarily void of international investment.

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